Ordering Power - Dan Slater

8/13/2019 Ordering Power - Dan Slater

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Ordering Power:

Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia1

Dan [email protected]

Chapter 1

To Extract and to Organize

I. The Problems, the Puzzles, and the Arguments

ne!!ecti"e States and #naccountable $egi%es

n !ra%ing a go"ern%ent which is to be ad%inistered by %en o"er %en, the great di!!iculty liesin this: you %ust !irst enable the go"ern%ent to control the go"erned& and in the ne't place

oblige it to control itsel!()

*a%es +adison,Federalist No. 51

he post-colonial world is riddled with go"ern%ents that re!lect what %ust ha"e been +adisons

worst political night%are: hey are neither enabled to control society, nor obliged to control

the%sel"es( +ore than hal! a century a!ter the !loodgates o! global decoloni.ation started

swinging wide open, e!!ecti"e and accountable public authority re%ains a rare co%%odity

throughout Asia, A!rica, /atin A%erica, and the +iddle 0ast(

Post-colonial states ha"e enoyed considerable success at securing their borders, than2s to

international nor%s supporting their territorial integrity(3But they !re4uently !ail to assert any

recogni.ably national interest 5 not only at the geographic %argins o! the territory they

ostensibly rule, but also in the !ace o! particularistic pressures !ro% societal elites in their own

capital cities( +ost notably, precious !ew states in the de"eloping world ha"e e'hibited the

capacity to %obili.e signi!icant re"enue through direct inco%e or corporate ta'es on econo%ic

elites, who hold the lions share o! wealth in de"eloping societies(6

ncapable o! !undingthe%sel"es, such states ha"e pro"en incapable o! per!or%ing "irtually e"ery "irtuous tas2 that

%odern states are e'pected to !ul!ill(

1his is still ust a penulti%ate dra!t o! %y dissertations opening chapter( Please do not cite or circulate( Other dra!t

chapters are a"ailable upon re4uest(37erbst 3888(6/ieber%an 3886(

1
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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De%ocrati.ation has %ade greater headway than state-building in the post-colonial world,

especially since the end o! the Cold 9ar( et the third wa"e);o! de%ocrati.ation has been !ar

%ore une"en in its i%pact than the %etaphor i%plies( 9hile indeed rese%bling that %ighty

%etaphor in so%e regions or ha"e de%ocratic transitions ser"ed as any panacea !or the "ast array o!

political and econo%ic woes that plague %ost o! the post-colonial world, such as ende%ic

corruption, steep ine4uality, crushing po"erty, recurrent "iolence, and shoddy public

in!rastructure( But by pro"iding electoral chec2s on arbitrary state power and by subecting

political leaders to %ore critical %edia e'posure, de%ocrati.ation has at least %odestly increased

so%e states public accountability, pressuring the% to i%pro"e their per!or%ance and curtail

their %ost wanton, predatory abuses(

Stateness and de%ocracy ha"e thus pro"en elusi"e in the post-colonial world, but not

entirely unattainable( Why have some states proven so much more capable, particularly at

mobilizing tax revenue, than others? And hy have some authoritarian regimes proven so much

more durable than others?Since the durability o! authoritarian regi%es has been con"incingly

traced to the robustness and consolidation o! ruling political parties,?the regi%e 4uestion

in"ol"es an inter"ening party 4uestion: Why have some authoritarian regimes constructed more

poer!ul and cohesive ruling parties than others?

his dissertation co%%ences with the assertion that these three political pu..les 5 the state

pu..le, the regi%e pu..le, and the party pu..le 5 can be use!ully portrayed as three distinct

%ani!estations o! a %ore !unda%ental pu..le: Why are elites more e!!ectively organized in some

political systems than in others?States cannot e!!ecti"ely assert and broadcast central authority,

ruling parties cannot reliably channel support to authoritarian regi%es, and such regi%es are

highly "ulnerable to collapse a%id pressures !or de%ocrati.ation, unless the o!!icials who

co%%and these institutions can generate elite collective action( By o!!ering an e'planation !or

why le"els o! elite collecti"e action "ary so dra%atically across countries, hope to gain

;7untington 1@@1(?he classic proponent o! this "iew is 7untington


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signi!icant and si%ultaneous analytic le"erage on the social and coalitional !oundations o!

parties, states, and regi%es in the post-colonial world(

+y o"erarching argu%ent is this: Di"ergence in elite coalitions and political institutions

has been pri%arily produced by di"ergent patterns o! contentious politics5 i(e( labor stri2es,

ethnic riots, rural rebellions, student protests, and separatist insurgencies( n contrast to %ost

scholarship on state-building, argue that internalcon!licts can %a2e the state)Eas surely as

international war!are 5 but only when they ta2e especially threatening and challenging !or%s(

Since these types o! contentious politics help build states by helping to !oster elite collecti"e

action, they !acilitate the !or%ation o! broad-based parties and the durability o! authoritarian

regi%es as well( elaborate and assess this causal !ra%ewor2 through a co%parati"e-historical

analysis o! se"en countries in a region that e'hibits tre%endous "ariation in party strength, state

capacity, and authoritarian durability: Southeast Asia(

ro% actions to nstitutions

0lite collecti"e action is as elusi"e as it is ele%ental( On the one hand, the cohesion o! the

political elite is the crucial ele%ent in the search !or political stability()But strong elite

coalitions are e'tre%ely di!!icult to construct and consolidate on a national scale( n %ost places

and under %ost circu%stances, elite politics is ri!e with !actionalis% and parochialis%( 0lites are

neither congenitally attracted to large-scale organi.ations, as Da"id ru%an once i%plied, nor

naturally inclined toward indi"idual rather than collecti"e action, as +ancur Olson !a%ously

countered(@$ather than ru%ans habitual oiners or Olsons ato%istic loners, elites are %ost

typically cli4uish( 9hene"er institutions arise to organi.e elite collecti"e action on a national

scale, there is a political pu..le to be e'plained(

7ow is elite !actionalis% o"erco%e, and elite collecti"e action gainedF Or, to state this

4uestion in ter%s o! the speci!ic institutions under the analytic %icroscope here: 7ow can state

his rather !ashionable concept has e%erged !ro% a collecti"e e!!ort by leading theorists o! social %o"e%ents and

re"olutions to situate their respecti"e areas o! study within a co%%on analytic !ra%ewor2( One o! these lu%inariesdescribes contentious politics as broader than social %o"e%ents but narrower than all o! politics,) and pri%arily

de!ines it as public, collecti"e, episodic interactions a%ong %a2ers o! clai%s whenG(at least so%e o! theinteraction adopts noninstitutional !or%s)


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o!!icials be induced to wor2 together to e'tract signi!icant direct ta'es !ro% econo%ic elites, and

to channel those re"enues to a central treasury, rather than cutting sel!-ser"ing side-deals with

!actional allies in the pri"ate sectorF 7ow can those econo%ic elites be con"inced that resistance

to such direct ta'ation is either !utile or sel!-de!eatingF a'ation clearly represents a %assi"e

collecti"e action proble% 5 not only !ro% the perspecti"e o! indi"idual ta'payers with ob"ious

incenti"es to !ree-ride, but !or go"ern%ent o!!icials who %ust construct


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Contentious Politics and 0lite Collecti"e Action in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia presents a perple'ing political patchwor2( $egion-wide processes o! wresting

national so"ereignty !ro% 9estern and *apanese control in the years and decades !ollowing 1@;?

produced what He"in 7ewison has described as a remarkable range of political forms.10The

postwar period has seen the regionincubate e'tre%ely strong states


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9hat accounts !or this stri2ing institutional di"ersity within a single world regionF +y central

argu%ent is that a !ourth, relati"ely unrecogni.ed causal !actor 5 contentious politics 5 can shape

elite collecti"e action and subse4uent institutional pro!iles at least as pro!oundly as the e'istence

o! e'ternal threats, the abundance o! econo%ic bene!its, and the a"ailability o! shared nationalist

sy%bols( Iariation in the type and timing o! contentious politics e'plains national "ariation in

elite collecti"e action, and hence in the robustness o! state, party, and regi%e institutions( 0"en

when geopolitical conditions ha"e been per%issi"e, patronage resources ha"e been scarce, and

nationalist .eal has been lac2ing, political leaders ha"e generated i%pressi"e le"els o! elite

collecti"e action when !acingphysically threatening and administratively challengingtypes o!

%ass %obili.ation(

o be sure, not all se"ere bouts o! internal con!lict produce signi!icant and sustained elite

collecti"e action( n a political world go"erned by agency as well as structure, it is always

possible that elites will utterly !ail to respond to organi.ed challenges, thus unwittingly ushering

in their own political e'tinction( o assu%e that threats auto%atically produce e!!ecti"e

responses would be to engage in crude and discredited %odes o! !unctionalist reasoning( et this

does not %ean that threats are irrele"ant& it only suggests that they are notsu!!icient conditions

!or the outco%es o! interest, a standard that precious !ew independent "ariables can %eet( he

causal logic presented here does suggest, howe"er, that se"ere threats to elites property,

pri"ileges, and persons are a necessary condition!or the intrinsic challenge o! elite collecti"e

action to be o"erco%e( i"en their propensity !or parochialis%, elites will not dee%phasi.e their

narrow !actional interests on behal! o! broader class or national interests e'cept under e'tre%e

duress( But how do we 2now e'tre%e duress) when we see it, without succu%bing to the sort o!

post hoc reasoning that de!ines the se"erity o! the threat by the seriousness o! the responseF

sub%it that so%e !or%s o! contentious politics are syste%atically %ore threatening and

proble%atic than others( 9hile identi!ying the di!!erence independently o! the responses that

such con!licts elicit is certainly tric2y, it is not i%possible( here are two 2ey !actors( irst, do

state and societal elites percei"e contentious politics to be endemicor episodicF Second, do they

percei"e such upswings in %ass %obili.ation to be manageablewith e'isting institutional

arrange%ents, or unmanageablegi"en e'isting le"els o! state !rag%entation and political

opennessF he source o! such perceptions is di!!icult to !or%ali.e, and depends to so%e degree


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on the historical speci!ics o! the case in 4uestion( But in the Southeast Asian conte't 5 and,

%ore tentati"ely suggest, elsewhere 5 there see%s to be a discernible causal pattern at wor2(

Both the type and ti%ing o! con!lict are "ital( n ter%s o! ti%ing, the 2ey consideration is

whether contentious politics erupts be!ore or a!terthe inauguration o! bureaucratic-authoritarian

regi%es(1;n ter%s o! the type o! con!lict, outbrea2s o! contention will be percei"ed as %ost

physically threatening and ad%inistrati"ely challenging when class con!licta!!lictsurban areas

and e'acerbatescommunal tensions( 9here this type o! con!lict erupted be!ore the introduction

o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, new elite coalitions arose in acti"e support o! both increased

state centrali.ation and open-ended authoritarianis%, as the i%perati"e o! re-stabili.ing the social

and political order ca%e to outweigh the percei"ed long-ter% ris2s o! gi"ing !ree rein to a

potentially predatory state(1?Such high le"els o! elite collecti"e action ser"ed as the social

!oundation !or highly cohesi"e ruling parties, states with considerable !iscal power, and

authoritarian regi%es o! particularly long duration in +alaysia, Singapore, and to so%e degree

ndonesia(

By contrast, where class con!lict be!ore bureaucratic-authoritarianis% was %uted in

intensity, e'clusi"ely rural, or too2 place against the bac2drop o! less politici.ed ethno-religious

di"isions 5 as in the Philippines, South Iietna%, and hailand 5 elite groups percei"ed the

danger to their property, pri"ileges, and persons to be relati"ely episodic and %anageable( hey

thus pro"ided %ore tepid and te%porary support !or authoritarian rulers proects o! state-

building and regi%e %aintenance( li%sy coalitions produced !li%sy institutions: +ilitary-

1;he ter% is ODonnells


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bac2ed leaders enoyed precious little success at building robust ruling parties, ta'ing upper

groups inco%es, and securing their regi%es long-ter% sur"i"al in the !ace o! cross-class anti-

regi%e %obili.ation( n all three cases, contentious class politics loo2ed dra%atically %ore

threatening a!terthe birth o! bureaucratic-authoritarian regi%es than be!orehand(

n short, authoritarian regi%es in +alaysia and Singapore 5 and to a lesser e'tent ndonesia

5 enoyed %ore success at ordering power) than their counterparts in hailand, the Philippines,

and South Iietna%( Power was ordered) both in the sense o! being extracted!ro% society,

especially through ta' re"enue& and in the sense o! being organizedinto political institutions,

especially centrali.ed states and ruling parties( 0lite collecti"e action produced stronger party,

state, and regi%e institutions in the !irst set o! cases, while elite !actionalis% ha%strung these

sa%e institutions in the second set(

he Deducti"e /ogic o! Ordering Power: Con!licts, Coalitions, and nstitutions

0'plaining the "ariation in political order between these two sets o! cases is the pri%ary tas2 !or

this dissertation( o be both deeply con"incing and broadly applicable, howe"er, any such

e'planation should be e'pressed in ter%s o! deducti"e, theoretical reasoning that transcends

regional speci!icities(

his dissertation indeed atte%pts to e'plain institutional outco%es "ia a deducti"e

!ra%ewor2 that can be applied to other world regions( ollowing Da"id 9aldner, sub%it that

political institutionsre!lect the strength o! social coalitions, which the%sel"es represent legacies

o! historical con!licts


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necessarily recei"es econo%ic bene!its as an i%petus to do so( 9hen see2ing to deter%ine what

2ind o! coalition e'ists in an authoritarian setting, we should as2 not what the go"ern%ent does

!or its coalition& we should as2 what the coalition does !or its go"ern%ent(

7ow well authoritarian leaders !are at capturing the strategic resources that di!!erent social

groups possess depends on the types o! contentious politics that presage the ad"ent o!

bureaucratic-authoritarian rule( 9here such con!licts are widely percei"ed as both ende%ic and

un%anageable, as de!ined abo"e, authoritarian regi%es enoy an e'cellent opportunity to cra!t

what call aprotection pact: a pro-authoritarian coalition lin2ing upper groups on the basis o!

shared perceptions o! threat


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Power!ul post-colonial protection pacts ha"e arisen only rarely& but when they ha"e, as in

+alaysia and Singapore, they ha"e per%itted states and regi%es to e'tract considerable

co%pliance and resources !ro% their elite partners( +ore precisely, economic elitesha"e paid

higher ta'es and supplied %ore generous political !inancing to authoritarian leaders and their

political "ehicles("iddle classesha"e re!rained !ro% oining popular sectors in anti-regi%e

%obili.ation, helped pro"ide intellectual usti!ication !or non-de%ocratic rule, !or%ed the social

bac2bone o! authoritarian political parties, and e"en directly assisted go"ern%ent !orces in

crushing political dissent( )ommunal elitesha"e granted authoritarian regi%es a critical

i%pri%atur o! legiti%acy, %obili.ed !ollowers to help suppress regi%e opponents, and allowed

state institutions to insinuate the%sel"es into tithing and other internal processes( hreatened

state o!!icialsha"e pro"en %ore loyal to ruling party or %ilitary institutions, %ore ready to

i%pose coerci"e %easures on regi%e opponents, and %ore li2ely to i%ple%ent highly e'tracti"e

ta' policies in a coherent and e!!ecti"e %anner(

he ideal-typical protection pact is one in which all !our o! these upper groups reliably play

these roles, pro"iding their strategic resources to incu%bents and withholding the% !ro% the

opposition( Such coalitions endow states and the regi%es that run the% with a near %onopoly on

$I%&RE : Elite ollectie Action in Southeast Asia

on)licts oalitions Institutions

ontentious

Politics2

Protection

Pact

Part!

Strength

Authoritarian

#urabilit!

State

Po'er

* Between 1945 and the inauguration of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule

+urma 1345 Indonesia 13445 6ala!sia 13435 Phili""ines 1375

Singa"ore 13485 South 9ietnam 13885 Thailand 1380

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what A%itai 0t.ioni describes as the three sub-types o! power:


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as robust as those o! the ordered) cases, nor as %oribund as parties, states, and regi%es in the

disordered) e'a%ples(

9hat do these inter%ediate cases tell us about the e'planatory "alue o! the deducti"e

!ra%ewor2 ust introducedF Con!ronting these challenging cases !orces two i%portant

re!ine%ents to the causal %odel( irst, Bur%a !orces %ore e'pansi"e thin2ing about the varieties

o! contentious politicsthat %ight shape elite coalitions and political institutions( Class con!lict

%ay ha"e been the %ost ubi4uitous !or% o! contentious politics in Cold 9ar Southeast Asia, but

it was not the only type( And the ndonesian case !orces a %ore disciplined analysis o! the

mechanisms o! reproductionthat sustain coalitional and institutional legacies o"er the li!e o! an

authoritarian regi%e(1@

o understand coalitional contours and institutional outco%es in Bur%a, !irst o! all, it is

necessary to loo2 beyond class con!lict, and consider the causal i%plications o! another type o!

contentious politics that has ra"aged so %uch o! the post-colonial world: regional rebellions, or

"iolent struggles o"er the establish%ent o! central authority) %ar2ed by pro"inces rebelling

against control by the capital()38here is co%pelling reason to suspect that %ass %o"e%ents

ai%ing to escapethe state will tend to build "ery di!!erent elite coalitions than %obili.ation

geared toward capturingthe state( 9hereas class-based con!licts can spur a wide range o! elites

to percei"e a shared interest in organi.ing !or co%%on class protection, regional rebellions

present little i! any direct physical threat to econo%ic elites, %iddle classes, and co%%unal

elites, who are %ostly huddled in capital cities( ! such peripheral "iolence spar2s increased

collecti"e action a%ong any elite group, it is %ost li2ely to be %ilitary leaders, who shoulder the

actual responsibility o! 4uelling regional dissent(

thus hypothesi.e that regional rebellions will syste%atically tend to e'hibit a uni!ying

e!!ect on the national %ilitary, but not upon the other elite groups who can potentially constitute

a !ull-blown protection pact( he %ost li2ely institutional result is a highly uni!ied but

%ilitari.ed state with wea2 lin2s to societal elites and 5 gi"en %ilitary o!!icers chronic

disinterest in the details o! ci"il go"ernance 5 wea2 ad%inistrati"e capacity to boot( et the

relati"e cohesion o! %ilitary elites will still contribute to the possibility o! a durable authoritarian

1@or the best analysis o! %echanis%s o! reproduction in historical-institutional analysis, see helen


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regi%e, so long as the states coerci"e apparatus re%ains willing to use "iolence to co%pensate

!or the regi%es lac2 o! social support(

Bur%a pro"ides the consu%%ate e'a%ple o! such causal dyna%ics in the Southeast Asian

conte't( $egionalis% raged !ro% independence in 1@; until the establish%ent o! open-ended

%ilitary rule in 1@3, and ci"ilian authorities chronic incapacity to deal with such ar%ed

%o"e%ents pro"ided a pri%ary rationale !or the %ilitarys political inter"ention( As in +alaysia

and Singapore, un%anageable contentious politics in Bur%a on the e"e o! bureaucratic-

authoritarian rule helped produce a tight, cohesi"e elite coalition( he boundaries o! this

coalition ha"e been no broader than the boundaries o! the %ilitary apparatus itsel!, howe"er, as

upper groups in urban areas ha"e ne"er had reason to percei"e the %ilitary as a necessary

protector !ro% any organi.ed societal ri"als( 9ith no potential social !oundation !or either a

strong central state or a broad-based ruling party, Bur%as %ilitary leaders ha"e e!!ecti"ely

bun2ered the%sel"es in, sustaining their illegiti%ate regi%e with the %ain weapon at their

disposal 5 organi.ed "iolence( he elite collecti"e action necessary !or authoritarian durability is

not e'pressed through the sort o! e!!ecti"e state and party institutions that order power) in

+alaysia and Singapore& but what sustains Bur%ese %ilitary rule is elite collecti"e action

nonetheless(

he Bur%ese e'ception is thus broadly consistent with the basic causal !ra%ewor2

introduced here, so long as one recogni.es the di!!ering coalitional logics that arise !ro%

di!!ering types o! contentious politics( he distinction between contentious class politics and

contentious regional politics is also critical in co%prehending inter%ediate patterns o! political

de"elop%ent in ndonesia( Care!ul analysis o! the ndonesian case shows that the country

con!ronted a combinationo! class and regional con!licts a!ter 9orld 9ar that 2nows no

parallel in Southeast Asia 5 or perhaps anywhere( One cannot understand the dra%atic

%ilitari.ation o! state politics that co%%enced in the late 1@?8s without recogni.ing the uni!ying

e!!ect that regional rebellions had on the ndonesian ar%y( et these rebellions ne"er pac2ed the

separatist punch o! Bur%as border wars, and had been e!!ecti"ely curbed be!ore bureaucratic-

authoritarianis% was installed in the %id-1@8s( t was instead the dra%atic rise o! contentious

classpolitics in the early-%id 1@8s, "ia the %obili.ation o! a power!ul, grassroots co%%unist

party, that spurred a re%ar2able increase in elite collecti"e action upon the birth o! the Suharto

regi%e(

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political institutions, which is precisely why path-dependent causal e'planations are considered

so power!ul and re%ain so popular in political science and sociology(

et political structures canbrea2 down or wither o"er ti%e, as the ndonesian case so elo4uently

testi!ies( 9hy %ight a protection pact elapse or erode, depri"ing an authoritarian regi%e o! the

coerci"e, re%unerati"e, and sy%bolic power that help it sur"i"eF 7ere is where the attitudinal

%echanis% o! reproduction co%es into play( his entails elite perceptions o! earlier historical

episodes o! contentious politics, and e"ol"ing "iews o! the probability that such %ass unrest

could ree%erge i! authoritarian controls were li!ted( Such indi"idual


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di!!icult path !ro% such attitudinal shi!ts to the coalitional and institutional shi!ts necessary to

physically o"erthrow an authoritarian regi%e 5 but it is an i%portant start(31

Authoritarian rulers ac2nowledge the i%portance o! attitudes as well as institutions in

sustaining their rule when they tru%pet the "iew, ad nauseum, that their regi%es pro"ide the only

protection elites enoy !ro% utter chaos( heir goal is to con"ince social !orces that they ha"e

%ore to !ear !ro% each other than !ro% the state, thus nipping potential cross-class de%ocratic

coalitions in the bud( Iirtually all authoritarian regi%es try to %a2e this case( But they are not all

e4ually con"incing( 9hen bureaucratic-authoritarian rule isprecededby types o! contentious

politics that are widely percei"ed as un%anageable and ende%ic, anti-de%ocratic attitudes will

be relati"ely easy to sustain o"er the long ter%( n short, so%e authoritarian regi%es enoy !ar

better historical raw %aterial with which to construct threat perceptions than others(

he o"erall causal logic is %ost succinctly e'pressed by the te%plate pro"ided in igure ;(

Contentious politics is the independent "ariable( States and ruling parties are dependent "ariables

arising !ro% contentious politics, as well as inter"ening "ariables that in!luence authoritarian

durability in turn( he causal relationship between contentious politics and authoritarian

durability is thus both direct


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organizingthese elites into coherent state and party institutions: a dual political e!!ort re!er to

as ordering power() o assess %y argu%ent that these coalitions in!luenced long-ter% regi%e

durability, will then e'a%ine the role played by all !our elite groups during %o%ents o!

%a'i%u% regi%e "ulnerability, pri%arily in the 1@8s and 1@@8s( e'pect to !ind consistent

patterns o! de!ection and resistance in the cases o! de%ocratic transition, and the relati"e absence

o! such de!ection and resistance in cases o! authoritarian retrench%ent(

n the tradition o! path-dependent causal analysis, %y study presents an argu%ent regarding

not only hythese institutions di"erged, but henthe seeds o! this di"ergence were initially

planted( argue that national "ariations in patterns o! contentious politics beteen World War ''

and the birth o! bureaucratic+authoritarian rulepro"ide the best e'planation !or national

"ariations in !iscal power, ruling party strength, and authoritarian durability throughout

Southeast Asia( n the parlance o! co%parati"e-historical analysis, a% suggesting that this ti%e-

period represents the critical uncture) during which the subse4uent causal patterns o! interest

were initially produced(

et whene"er we social scientists del"e into history, our analyses %ust ine"itably rec2on

with the sort o! %essiness) that historians accept as an integral part o! their cra!t( ry as we

%ight to co%%ence our analysis in the period o! interest, and not a %o%ent be!ore, we 4uic2ly

!ind that e"ents and conditions preceding the critical uncture) co%e to see% critical in their

own right( Path-dependent studies ostensibly subsu%e such bac2ground conte't into the category

o! antecedent conditions,) which Da"id Collier and $uth Berins Collier de!ine as a Lbase line

against which the critical uncture and the legacy are assessed()33 o produce a true base line,)

howe"er, scholars would need to select cases with identical %easures on all antecedent

conditions( Since such control is di!!icult to gain in co%parati"e analysis, scholars need tools to

discern whether antecedent cross-case "ariation should be properly "iewed as


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exhibit a direct causal influence on the independentvariable, they should be included in the

analysis, as what I call critical antecedents. Their impact is too important to ignore, but not

determinative enough to be the main story. If antecedent conditions have a direct influence on

the dependentvariables, they should not be considered antecedent at all. They should be

considered the true independent variables, and the historical period in which they emerged

should be considered the true critical juncture. In such an instance, the initial argument

positing a later critical juncture should be considered seriously impugned, if not altogether

falsified.36

As I argue at greater length below, Southeast Asias contemporary divergence in political

institutions cannot be directly traced to prewar factors. Yet the social cleavages that helped

define the impact of postwar mass mobilization were indeed shaped before the Japanese

invasion, thus indirectly (but critically) influencing the outcomes of interest. Specifically, this

studys seven cases already exhibited three distinct cleavage structures before World War II: (1)

territorially integrated plural societies in Malaysia and Singapore; (2) relatively homogenous

national societies in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam; and (3) territorially

fragmented plural societies in Burma and Indonesia.

It is no coincidence that these prewar cleavage structures correspond exactly to the seven

cases three broad postwar political pathways. They serve as critical antecedents that would

help determine whether postwar mass mobilization would (1) exacerbate communal tensions, but

not give rise to territorially based regional rebellions, as in Malaysia and Singapore; (2) mobilize

stronger class grievances than communal or regionalist tensions, as in the Philippines, Thailand,

and South Vietnam; or (3) confront new states with stronger initial pressures to escape the state

altogether than to seize it outright, as in Burma and Indonesia.

+y purpose in introducing such critical antecedents) is not to tell history !or historys

sa2e, but to lay the essential e%pirical groundwor2 !or %y co%parati"e causal argu%ent( o

unra"el these causal relationships, %o"e beyond structured, !ocused co%parison) across cases,

and e%ploy longitudinal, "ariable-based process-tracing) within all se"en countries(3;Beyond

36his approach is indirectly endorsed by Collier and Collier, who warn scholars positing that a particular critical

uncture produced a particular legacy %ust also consider the ri"al hypothesis that i%portant attributes o! the legacy

%ay in !act in"ol"e considerable continuity andor direct causal lin-s ith the preexisting system that are not

mediated by the critical uncture)


19/47

e'panding %y total nu%ber o! e%pirical obser"ations, this %ethod helps %e deter%ine whether


20/47


21/47

he ulti%ate test o! any research design is whether it allows a scholar to control !or alternati"e

e'planations( his is the only way to instill con!idence in a s2eptical readership that the

hypotheses o!!ered truly e'plain the outco%es o! interest( A "ariety o! alternati"e e'planations

e'ist !or all three institutional outco%es o! interest here( +y case-selection allows %e to control

!or these as !ollows(63

State a"acit!

As ust discussed, the se"en cases under consideration here are generally 4uite si%ilar on a range

o! possible e'planations !or !iscal power: i(e( capitalist de"elop%ent %odels, pro-9estern Cold

9ar alliances, positi"e growth rates, and centrali.ed rather than pro"incially based ta'

collection( 0"en where these cases are not si%ilar, ri"al e'planations cannot pro"ide a better

e'planation than %y own e%phasis on the causal centrality o! contentious politics(

Antecedent 'nstitutions( Perhaps the %ost de"astating potential criti4ue o! %y hypotheses is

that Southeast Asias intra-regional di"ergence in state power occurred be!ore rather than a!ter

9orld 9ar , when all o! the region e'cept hailand was still under colonial rule( 9hile ta'

data !or Southeast Asia during the pre-1@;? period are spotty and inconsistent, it does not appear

that British +alaya or Singapore had any appreciable edge on their neighbors be!ore the

*apanese occupation( +alaya in particular was go"erned under a highly !rag%ented syste%,

partly !ederated and partly un!ederated, which would see% to ha"e represented a serious obstacle

to postwar centrali.ation( n !act, $ichard Stubbs, the pre-e%inent e'pert on post-colonial

+alaysian state-building, has e'plicitly co%pared the !rag%entation o! political authority in

+alaya be!ore 1@; to the splintering o! power in the Philippines in the sa%e period( 66!

anything, the !act that hailand and the Philippines were already unitary rather than !ederal

syste%s be!ore 9orld 9ar should ha"e gi"en each a head start on British +alaya in the post-

war period(6;

63o be clear at the outset, this e'ercise does not !alsi!y these alternati"e e'planations& it %erely highlights their

insu!!iciency, at least in the Southeast Asian conte't( Since %a2e a probabilistic argu%ent regarding the causalsigni!icance o! protection pacts, it would be dirty pool !or %e to hold these other hypotheses to a deter%inistic

standard that do not %eet %ysel!( or an e'cellent discussion o! deter%inistic and probabilistic strategies o! causalassess%ent in s%all-n studies, see +ahoney 3888(66he go"ern%ental structure at the start o! the 0%ergency was relati"ely wea2( he "arious +alay states

do%inated by regional elites, co%parable in so%e respects to the caci/ueso! the Philippines, had only been brought

into a !ederal structure through the ederation o! +alaya Agree%ent in 1@;)


22/47

+ore i%portant e"idence o! the co%parability a%ong these cases antecedent institutions

deri"es !ro% the mixo! ta'es deployed be!ore the *apanese occupation( All depended

o"erwhel%ingly on custo%s and consu%ption ta'es !or their ta' re"enues, rather than direct

inco%e or corporate ta'es( n !act, %ost tellingly o! all, British +alaya and Singapore were the

only e'a%ples a%ong these casesnotto ha"e had direct inco%e and corporate ta'es in place

when *apan con4uered the region in 1@;3( his strongly suggests that whate"er !actors e'plain

+alaysia and Singapores 4ualitati"e di"ergence !ro% their neighbors in ter%s o! !iscal power,

they appear to ha"e been operati"e in the i%%ediate postwar period(

ndeed, according to #nited >ations data o! the ti%e, direct ta' collections in British

+alaya rose !ro% so%ewhere between 1-3 o! total ta' re"enue in 1@;E to le"els ranging !ro%

around 1?-38 throughout the 1@?8s( Singapores direct ta' collections si%ilarly leaped !ro%

under ? in 1@;E to a range o! appro'i%ately 68-;8 in the subse4uent decade(6?And this

re%ar2able u%p in !iscal power occurred during the ti%e o! the co%%unist-inspired +alayan

0%ergency, when "iolence was %ore intensi"e and protracted than in any other colonial

territory in the decoloni.ation era()6

his does not %ean, howe"er, that antecedent conditions can si%ply be ignored( 9hile they

do not o!!er any better e'planation !or the "ariation see2 to capture than %y own independent

"ariable, they pro"ide essential bac2ground !or understanding that independent variable itsel!:

elite perceptions o! the %anageability o! contentious class politics a!ter 9orld 9ar ( n the

chapters that !ollow, ai% to show that historical !actors uni4ue to each case %ay a!!ect the

outco%es o! interest, but only indirectly, through the %echanis% o! the causal process speci!y(

0eadership and Agency( Be!ore considering how %y e'planation !or state power stac2s up

against the range o! structural e'planations in the literature, it is !irst necessary to address a non-

structural e'planation: "i.(, the potential causal in!luence o! leadership in o"erco%ing structural

obstacles to state !or%ation( 7istory boo2s are replete with reat +an) theories e'ploring the

role o! power!ul, a%bitious, and charis%atic personalities li2e Peter the reat, >apoleon

Bonaparte, +usta!a He%al, and Por!irio Dia. in crushing internal ri"als and centrali.ing state

power( n Southeast Asia itsel!, historiography o!ten turns to hagiography when considering

!igures such as Singapores /ee Huan ew, +alaysias +ahathir +oha%ad, and hailands

state in the sa%e way that Stubbs argues the 0%ergency period in +alaya ations, "arious years(69hite 1@@: @E(

33


23/47

%oderni.ing %onarchs, +ong2ut and Chulalong2orn( By contrast, the !ailure o! erdinand

+arcos to build a stronger Philippine state is co%%only attributed to the greed and sultanistic)

tendencies o! his conugal dictatorship) with his notorious wi!e, %elda(

a% not so %uch o! a structural deter%inist as to assu%e that such personalities %a2e no

di!!erence whatsoe"er( $uler agency is al%ost entirely ignored in this analysis, not because wise

leadership is unnecessary, but because it is grossly insu!!icient to account !or "ariation in state

per!or%ance( ndeed, in no instance ha"e !ound a highly capable leader o"erco%ing the sort o!

structural constraints that highlight here( +ost notably, the Philippines highly charis%atic and

widely ad%ired de!ense secretary and president, $a%on +agsaysay, was stonewalled in his

e!!ort to re%a2e the Philippine state in the 1@?8s( +eanwhile, +alaysias %ain bouts o! state-

building long preceded the ascent o! the countrys %ost !orce!ul leader, +ahathir +oha%ad( /ee

Huan ew played his hand well, but he was also dealt so%e "ery good cards, in the !or% o!

strong elite support !or a %ore authoritarian and statist dispensation a!ter race riots roc2ed the

island in 1@;( n su%, inco%petent leadership %ight always %a2e state-building i%possible& but

history is too littered with e'a%ples o! highly co%petent and co%%itted leaders !ailing to

achie"e their obecti"es to belie"e that charis%a and chut.pah are all it ta2es(

0evel o! evelopment( ! the di"ergence in state capacity between +alaysia, Singapore, and

their neighbors cannot be attributed to the 4uality o! national leadership, or to antecedent

institutions, %ight the e'planation lie in these countries greater le"el o! econo%ic de"elop%entF

o be sure, +alaysia and Singapore are the richest countries in Southeast Asia, sa"e Brunei,

which gi"es the% an edge in collecting inco%e and corporate ta'es( But endogeneity co%plicates

this argu%ent, since high public sa"ings represent a co%%on cause as well as a potential e!!ect

o! econo%ic growth(6E

Another di!!iculty with this e'planation is that it rests on what uiller%o ODonnell calls a

co%parison o! national %eans) rather than a cross-center strategy o! co%parison()6n other

words, all o! the countries being analy.ed here contain signi!icant urban concentrations o! wealth

that could potentially be ta'ed by state authorities( he !act that Philippine and ndonesian

peasants are poorer than +alaysian peasants has little or no in!luence on the stri2ing "ariation in

these countries !iscal power, since +alaysian peasants are not the indi"iduals paying the bul2 o!

inco%e ta'es( n !act, i! any country in Southeast Asia was too i%po"erished to sustain any

6EHriec2haus 3883(6ODonnell 1@E6: 3?-3(

36


24/47

increase in do%estic ta'ation during the period under analysis, it was ndonesia in the wa2e o!

Su2arnos !all !ro% power in 1@( et Suhartos >ew Order regi%e see%s to ha"e dra%atically

stepped up do%estic collection o! re"enues in these %ost unpro%ising circu%stances6@5

suggesting that any other country under consideration here possessed su!!icient national wealth,

i! not the institutional capacity or political will, to ha"e done li2ewise(

2xternal &hreat( As discuss at length in the ne't chapter, it would not be theoretically

surprising i! +alaysia and Singapore de"eloped increased !iscal power in response to e'ternal

threat rather than do%estic con!lict( his e'planation see%s highly plausible in post-1@?

Singapore, suggesting that the city-states re%ar2able state capacity since gaining independence

is causally o"erdeter%ined( 7owe"er, e'ternal threat cannot e'plain why colonial authorities in

Singapore were so success!ul at collecting inco%e ta'es and i%ple%enting !orced sa"ings

sche%es


25/47

the argu%ent presented here that Singapore built its power!ul state under conditions o! resource

scarcity and !ew opportunities to garner e'ternal rents( Once again, Singapores post-1@?

e'perience is o"erdeter%ined(

et the !iscal history o! post-colonial Southeast Asia suggests that highly contentious class

politics can e"en lead states with access to a%ple e'ternal re"enues to step up direct ta'ation(

his is not what e'pected to !ind when began this study, howe"er( i"en the pronounced

e%phasis on e'ternal re"enues in the rentier state) literature, assu%ed such re"enues would

act as a %aor suppressor "ariable, reducing the i%pact o! contentious class politics on ta'

collections( 9ith the potential, partial e'ception o! ndonesia a!ter its oil boo%, howe"er, did

not !ind e"idence !or any noticeable suppression e!!ect(

Co%%odity-rich +alaysia is the best e'a%ple( 0"en during the Horean 9ar co%%odity

boo% o! the early 1@?8s, British +alayas direct ta' collections s2yroc2eted(;6ndonesias burst

o! increased ta'ation between 1@ and the oil boo% o! the %id-1@E8s is si%ilarly noteworthy,

gi"en ndonesias access to considerable !oreign aid during this period( Although %any

obser"ers thin2 ta' institutions !altered in ndonesia a!ter the %id-1@E8s due to a rentier state)

logic, others consider the country the clearest e'ception to the rentier rule in this regard(

Proble%atic data %a2e it di!!icult to resol"e this contro"ersy de!initi"ely( But e"en i! ta'

institutions did e'perience a drop in e'tracti"e per!or%ance !ro% the %id-1@E8s on, suggest

that had as %uch i! not %ore to do with the declining se"erity o! do%estic threats !ro% below 5

and a subse4uently shrin2ing authoritarian coalition 5 than the oil boo% itsel!(

0"en in the Philippines, ta'ation increased noticeably, i! te%porarily, in the wa2e o!

erdinand +arcos declaration o! %artial law a%id an upswing in le!tist %obili.ation( his spi2e

in the Philippine states !iscal power surprisingly occurred in an era when e'ternal re"enues were

especially abundant, gi"en the co%bined e!!ect o! a %assi"e ti%ber boo% and ballooning

A%erican pay%ents !or the lease o! %ilitary bases( n su%, the in!luence o! e'ternal re"enues on

direct ta'ation does not appear signi!icant enough to warrant its inclusion as either an

independent or suppressor "ariable in this dissertations causal !ra%ewor2(

(ritish )olonialism( inally, is it possible that +alaysia and Singapore de"eloped greater

!iscal power than their neighbors because they were coloni.ed by Britain, while their neighbors

were notF his argu%ent is i%%ediately called into 4uestion, i! not seriously i%pugned, by the

;6Stubbs 1@@E(

3?


26/47

negati"e e'a%ple o! the other !or%er British colony in Southeast Asia: Bur%a( >or can British

colonial legacies e'plain the spi2es in direct ta' collections witnessed during ti%es o!

intensi!ying internal con!lict in ndonesia, the Philippines, and South Iietna%(

+ore i%portantly, a 4uic2 glance outside the Southeast Asian conte't suggests that British

colonial legacies are by no %eans associated with state strength in other areas o! the de"eloping

world( Although a large cross-sectional analysis would be necessary to assess this issue

de!initi"ely, the dread!ul per!or%ance o! states in countries ranging !ro% Pa2istan and

Bangladesh to >igeria and Sierra /eone does not pro"ide %uch con!idence that the British

0%pire had a +idas touch where state-building was concerned( ndeed, Bur%as bro2en-bac2ed

state);;appears %ore si%ilar to central authorities in %ost !or%er British colonies than the highly

capable state apparatuses in +alaysia and Singapore( Colonial legacies thus appear in no way to

predestine any particular pattern o! post-colonial state power(;?

A %ore nuanced argu%ent %ight hold that +alaysia and Singapore bene!ited !ro% the

durationo! colonialis% rather than(ritishcolonialis%( And indeed, these were the only two

colonies under analysis here to gain independence through a %anaged, gradual transition rather

than through anti-colonial war or an i%%ediate post-war hando"er o! so"ereignty(; would not

suggest that this !actor is irrele"ant( et it raises the 4uestion hythe British %anaged the

transition so care!ully, and %ade e!!orts to install state capacity in ways 4uite unli2e other cases

o! %anaged transition, such as all o! British A!rica( On this point, would sub%it that Britains

distincti"e i%perial approach to +alaysia and Singapore was not idiosyncratic, but rather was

deeply in!luenced by precisely the independent "ariable speci!ied here: highly intense urban

class con!lict with e'plosi"e co%%unal i%plications(;E

American 'ntervention( #(S( inter"ention ob"iously had a pro!ound e!!ect on Southeast

Asia throughout the Cold 9ar period, with the Iietna% 9ar ser"ing as only the %ost dra%atic

and de"astating e'a%ple( +ight it there!ore be the case that A%erican inter"ention shaped state-

building outco%es %ore pro!oundly than "ariation in the type and ti%ing o! contentious politicsF

;;H( *ac2son 1@?: 38(;?he one possible e'ception to this rule is long-ter% *apanese occupation, which Hohli


27/47

o assess the "alidity o! this alternati"e hypothesis, it is !irst necessary to speci!y in

which direction A%erican inter"ention is presu%ed to ha"e had its causal e!!ect( here see% to

be two basic possibilities( On the one hand, #(S( aid and assistance %ight ha"e i%pro"ed

Southeast Asian states ad%inistrati"e capacity to go"ern their populations and, %ore

speci!ically, to collect direct ta'es in si.able a%ounts( 9e %ight call this the enhance%ent

hypothesis() On the other hand, A%erican assistance %ight ha"e da%pened Southeast Asian

states need to collect re"enue internally by pro"iding the% with a reliable alternati"e re"enue

strea%( 9e %ight call this the suppression hypothesis()

At !irst blush, the historical record pro"ides !ar %ore support !or the suppression

hypothesis( he three states where the #nited States pro"ided the %ost signi!icant econo%ic and

%ilitary assistance 5 the Philippines, South Iietna%, and hailand 5 all wound up as cases o!

relati"e !iscal incapacity( By contrast, #(S( inter"ention in +alaysia and Singapore was close to

non-e'istent during the Cold 9ar, and these are Southeast Asias two %ost i%pressi"e ta' states(

i"en this broad correlation between A%erican inter"ention and state wea2ness at ta' collection,

the enhance%ent hypothesis recei"es little initial e%pirical support( But what about the

suppression hypothesisF

here are se"eral reasons why belie"e the suppression hypothesis !ails to outper!or%

%y own hypothesis centering on contentious politics( irst, the case o! Bur%a clearly de!ies the

general correlati"e pattern 5 A%erican assistance was nil, and state !iscal capacity re%ained

%oribund( A second, bigger wea2ness o! the suppression hypothesis is that it !ails to e'plain why

Americaninter"ention see%s to ha"e debilitated states in the Philippines, South Iietna%, and

hailand, while(ritishinter"ention e"idently !orti!ied the state in +alaysia and Singapore( his

suggests that it is not si%ply the presence or absence o! !oreign inter"ention, but the character o!

!oreign in"ol"e%ent, that see%s to help shape state-building outco%es(

+y argu%ent is not there!ore that !oreign inter"ention was irrele"ant( $ather, it is that the

character o! !oreign inter"ention itsel! was pro!oundly shaped by the types o! contentious politics

that 9estern powers con!ronted on the ground in Southeast Asia( 9here contentious politics was

widely percei"ed as ende%ic and un%anageable under e'isting political arrange%ents, !oreign

inter"ention broadly ai%ed to strengthen central states, e"en at the e'pense o! power!ul societal

elites( 9here contentious politics was %ore generally percei"ed as episodic and %anageable,

3E


28/47

!oreign inter"ention did not in"ol"e sustained e!!orts to increase state e'traction, and thus wound

up e'hibiting %ore o! a suppression e!!ect than an enhance%ent e!!ect(

Critically, this pattern holds !or both A%erican and British inter"ention( o see how, we

%ust go beyond the analysis o! no%inal "ariation across cases


29/47

has collapsed in relati"ely low-inco%e ndonesia and the Philippines but not in relati"ely high-

inco%e +alaysia and Singapore, we clearly %ust loo2 to other potential causal "ariables(

2conomic )risis( he !lip side o! the argu%ent that econo%ic success in authoritarian

regi%es leads to de%ocrati.ation is that se"ere econo%ic crises can ha"e a si%ilar, albeit %ore

sudden e!!ect( Singapores dual i%%unity to both econo%ic downturns and political unrest

pro"ides e%pirical support !or this hypothesis, as does the !act that both ndonesia and the

Philippines saw authoritarian rule collapse a%id horrible econo%ic ti%es( et hailands

de%ocratic transitions in 1@E6 and 1@@3 did not occur against the bac2drop o! econo%ic

troubles,;@and authoritarian regi%es in Bur%a and +alaysia sur"i"ed the i%pact o! se"ere

econo%ic crashes in 1@ and 1@@, respecti"ely( +y argu%ent here is not that econo%ic crisis

does not %atter: $ather, argue that protection pacts can help sustain authoritarian rule during

hard ti%es, when non-de%ocratic regi%es capacity to pro"ide econo%ic growth co%es into

serious 4uestion( 9hene"er pro"ision !ails, protection beco%es essential(

urther%ore, since the robustness o! protection pacts helps e'plain state !iscal power, it

also helps e'plain why so%e countries are %ore i%%une to se"ere !iscal crises 5 or %ore

nationally resilient when they occur 5 than others( +ost notably, +alaysias authoritarian regi%e

enoyed access to copious state sa"ings, accu%ulated o"er decades, when the !inancial crisis o!

1@@E-1@@ roc2ed Asian %ar2ets( he regi%es capacity to a"oid the !ate o! ndonesias Suharto

regi%e ne't door was thus inti%ately connected to "ariation in the capacity o! the two countries

state institutions(

ominant 3eligion( 9hich religion is considered broadly inco%patible with de%ocratic

"alues shi!ts on a regular basis( irst it was Catholicis%, then Con!ucianis%, now sla%( o

wea2en any argu%ent that religion is doing the theoretical wor2, rather than protection pacts, the

e'a%ple o! ndonesia as the worlds largest +usli% country and one o! the worlds newest

de%ocracies is a power!ul one( /oo2ing at "ariation within a single case, the !act that pro-

de%ocracy acti"ists in +alaysia during the regi%e crisis o! 1@@ were o"erwhel%ingly +usli%

lends !urther credence to the argu%ent that religion alone cannot e'plain the "ariation in

4uestion( Ad%ittedly, Con!ucianis% and de%ocracy do not %i' anywhere in Southeast Asia& but

the e'a%ples o! sturdy de%ocracy in *apan, Horea, and aiwan, as well as the "igor o! recent

;@7aggard and Hau!%an


30/47

pro-de%ocratic %o"e%ents in 7ong Hong, suggest that Con!ucianis% and de%ocracy can indeed

go hand in hand(

(ritish )olonialism( +yron 9einers !a%ous attribution o! post-colonial de%ocracy to

Britains ostensibly liberal heritage !ares e"en worse than econo%ic de"elop%ent as an

e'planation !or regi%e outco%es in Southeast Asia(?8he three durable authoritarian regi%es

under consideration here 5 +alaysia, Singapore, and Bur%a 5 were all once British colonies( he

cases o! de%ocratic transition 5 ndonesia, the Philippines, and hailand 5 were all not( /egacies

o! British rule thus !ail to pro"ide a con"incing e'planation !or authoritarian durability as well as

!iscal power(

Antecedent 'nstitutions( 0"en i! British colonialis% did not plant the seeds !or post-colonial

de%ocracy, %ight other prewar institutions ha"e done soF he %ost plausible such clai% would

be that the Philippines de%ocratic procli"ities ha"e prewar rather than postwar origins, as

A%erican colonialists introduced elections 4uite early in the twentieth century( et the only

other Southeast Asian country to ha"e e'perienced recurrent prewar elections was Bur%a,

suggesting that such se%i-de%ocratic colonial institutions are by no %eans su!!icient to e'plain

post-colonial de%ocrati.ation( And since newly de%ocratic ndonesia has no such colonial

electoral legacy, prewar electoral institutions do not see% to be a necessary condition !or

authoritarian brea2down either(?1

0abor+3epressive 0andlords( Classic studies o! de%ocrati.ation in 0urope and /atin

A%erica broadly concur on which social !orce has historically posed the %ost stubborn social

obstacle to popular so"ereignty: large landlords who depend on cheap or bonded rural labor(?3

et none o! Southeast Asias %ost i%pressi"e cases o! authoritarian durability


31/47

argues that regi%e durability 5 both authoritarian and de%ocratic 5 rests upon the e!!ecti"e

incorporation o! rural %iddle classes into the ruling coalition( his can ta2e a "ariety o! !or%s&

but the 2ey consideration is whether the state %anages to deli"er side-pay%ents to supporters in

the countryside, hence buying their long-ter% political loyalty(

9aldners thesis !its Southeast Asian e"idence relati"ely well( Authoritarian regi%es in

+alaysia and ndonesia clearly channeled %ore state spending into rural areas than their

counterparts in hailand and the Philippines, and they ha"e indeed pro"en %ore durable( et this

capacity to co-opt the countryside with generouspolicies rested upon strong state and party

institutions, which are precisely the central !ocus here(?6urther%ore, while rural incorporation

%ight help e'plain a regi%es long-ter% structural stability, it tells us little about the causal

%echanis%s through which such regi%es actually brea2 down 5 as 9aldner hi%sel!

ac2nowledges( Since authoritarianis% in Southeast Asia has uni"ersally been !elled by %ass

urban%obili.ation rather than any steep decline in rural support, we see% to gain greater

analytic purchase on de%ocrati.ation in the region by studying coalitional politics in cities than

in the countryside(

Authoritarian 'nstitutions( he %ost con"incing alternati"e line o! argu%ent holds that

%ilitary regi%es are %ore "ulnerable to de%ocratic transition than single-party regi%es(?;his

hypothesis !ares 4uite well in the Southeast Asian conte't, where all three cases o! de%ocratic

transition occurred in %ilitary-bac2ed regi%es: ndonesia, the Philippines, and hailand(

+eanwhile, party-bac2ed regi%es in +alaysia and Singapore


32/47

%ight ha"e done his regi%e %ore har% than good by constructing a ruling party, because his

regi%e lac2ed the necessary social and coalitional !oundations to order power) o"er ti%e(

On the whole, %y e'planation is 4uite consistent with the general clai% that single-party

regi%es syste%atically outlast both %ilitary and personali.ed regi%es( et by o!!ering an

e'planation !or why these %ilitary regi%es e'perienced the 2ind o! durability that is %ore

co%%only associated with single-party regi%es, hope to show that authoritarian sur"i"al is not

only about institutions per se, but coalitions and legacies o! contentious politics as well(

+ore i%portantly, i! a% correct that new authoritarian regi%es are syste%atically %ore

li2ely to construct robust parties i! they rise to power in the !ace o! %aor threats !ro% below,

this will help us understand where single-party regi%es co%e !ro% in the !irst place( Perhaps

hailand and the Philippines re%ained %ilitary regi%es, ne"er elaborating party institutions to

enhance social control, precisely because these regi%es needed no such institutions to bridle

un%anageable contentious class politics( And with no threat !ro% below to te%per elite

!actionalis%, constructing parties would ha"e been %ore li2ely to e'acerbate these regi%es

coalitional wea2nesses than sol"e the%( By the sa%e to2en, it see%s reasonable to suggest that

+alaysia and Singapores ruling parties ca%e to de"elop their e'tensi"e organi.ational tentacles

precisely to pre"ent a recurrence o! the se"ere social and political instability o! the 1@;8s, 1@?8s,

and 1@8s( i"en societal elites shared concerns with renewed %ass "iolence in those settings,

they %ade easy pic2ings !or authoritarian rulers trying to co-opt all potential elite ri"als into

national party apparatuses(

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Part! Strength

7ow does this e'planation !or ruling party strength in authoritarian settings 5 as ust elaborated 5

co%pare with e'isting argu%ents in the theoretical literatureF #n!ortunately, we 2now %uch less

about party !or%ation than state !or%ation& and while theorists ha"e long recogni.ed the role o!

ruling parties in sustaining authoritarian rule, scholars are only beginning to thin2 rigorously

about why so %any authoritarian regi%es !ail to de"elop robust ruling parties at all( ndeed, the

two %ain e'planations !or party strength in post-colonial settings apply to de%ocratic as well as

authoritarian conte'ts 5 suggesting the potential need !or %ore theori.ing o! how authoritarian

party !or%ation %ight syste%atically di!!er !ro% such dyna%ics in de%ocratic settings(

3evolutionary #truggle( >o scholar has thought %ore deeply about the role o! political

parties in ordering hird 9orld politics than Sa%uel 7untington& and no scholar has pro"ided a

%ore concise hypothesis !or why such parties "ary so greatly in their robustness( Put si%ply, the

harder a party is !orced to struggle to sei.e power, the stronger the party will be a!ter doing so(

One party syste%s which e%erge out o! re"olutions,) 7untington concludes, are %ore stable

than those produced by nationalist %o"e%ents, and those produced by prolonged nationalist

%o"e%ents are %ore stable than those produced by %o"e%ents whose struggle was brie! and

easy()??Chinas Co%%unist Party and ndias Congress Party ser"e as consu%%ate e'a%ples on

opposite sides o! the regi%e-type di"ide(

his hypothesis wor2s rather well in apprehending %ost o! Southeast Asias cases o! wea2

ruling parties, but less well in e'plaining its stronger ones( hailand, the Philippines, and South

Iietna% all e'hibited wea2 ruling parties during bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, and none o!

these countries were led by anti-colonial elites, let alone re"olutionary elites, during this era( But

neither did +alaysia and Singapore ha"e re"olutionary or e"en !iercely anti-colonial !igures

!ronting their "anguard parties during the decoloni.ation process, when +alaysias #+>O and

Singapores PAP arose and beca%e institutionali.ed( $ather, the strongest anti-British "oices in

+alaysia and Singapore beca%e tarred by association with co%%unist insurgents, and were

crushed be!ore independence was secured(

i"en their borderline nationalist credentials, #+>O and the PAP gained and retained

broad support, argue, pri%arily by de!ending ethnicinterests rather than nationalinterests 5

ethnic +alay interests in #+>Os case, and ethnic Chinese interests in the case o! the PAP(

??7untington 1@: ;3?(

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hese co%%unal interests were not %erely challenged at the elite le"el, but threatened by

disturbing patterns o! %ass %obili.ation by ethnic others( By contrast, nationalist parties leading

i%%easurably %ore contentious anti-colonial struggles in Bur%a and ndonesia !ailed to

institutionali.e the%sel"es su!!iciently to sur"i"e into those countries bureaucratic-authoritarian

periods( 9e %ust there!ore loo2 beyond re"olutionary nationalis% !or sources o! post-colonial

ruling party strength in Southeast Asia(

2lectoral 3ules( Party strength is o!ten directly related to the o!!icial rules go"erning

electoral co%petition( 0"en though electoral authoritarian) regi%es such as +alaysia and

Singapore !all short o! the procedural %ini%u% de!inition o! de%ocracies, they do hold periodic

elections that broadly accord to codi!ied, o!!icial guidelines( Can speci!ic institutional

arrange%ents e'plain why these countries ha"e consolidated such stronger ruling parties than

other countries in the region during their periods o! open-ended authoritarian ruleF

Once again, +alaysia de!ies theoretical e'pectations %ost pro!oundly( 0lectoral rules there

ha"e always been !ar %ore candidate-centered than party-centered: "oters choose indi"idual

candidates rather than party labels, and candidates ser"e bounded geographic constituencies

rather than being chosen !ro% a ran2ing on a national party list( hese are the sa%e basic rules

that go"erned elections in hailand and the Philippines during the eras in 4uestion, when parties

had precious little independent political i%portance, and electoral politics re"ol"ed around local

bosses and their personal !ie!do%s( hat Singapore a"oided such a !ate despite candidate-

centered electoral rules %ay si%ply be due to its purely urban geography 5 wiping out parochial

!ie!do%s was there!ore easier to acco%plish( But the success o! the parties in +alaysias ruling

coalition in establishing e!!ecti"e hierarchical control o"er their %e%bers, gi"en electoral rules

!a"oring stronger direct ties !ro% parlia%entarians to "oters than to party leaders, is a serious

theoretical pu..le(

rganized pposition( n a "aluable update and re!ine%ent o! 7untingtons hypothesis that

the se"erity o! struggle shapes party strength, Bena%in S%ith argues that new authoritarian

regi%es will not construct power!ul ruling parties unless they con!ront highly organi.ed

opposition %o"e%ents(?he har%onies o! this argu%ent with %y own regarding the i%pact o!

contentious class politics on party !or%ation should be sel!-e"ident( S%ith and agree that party-

?B( S%ith 3886, 3883( 7e adds that this e!!ect is strengthened whene"er new regi%es lac2 access to !le'ible

!inances) such as aid and oil re"enues( his %ight help e'plain Singapores power!ul ruling party& but +alaysia and

ndonesia each enoyed relati"ely easy access to e'ternal re"enues during their pea2 periods o! party-building, by

%ost %easures(

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building is a ris2y and costly political e'ercise, in which new leaders %ust allow elite !igures

outside their own inner circle to assu%e positions o! political authority( et when opposition

!orces are already well organi.ed, a new regi%e %ight be !orced to out-organi.e its opponents to

consolidate political control(

#nli2e S%ith, howe"er, draw a sharp analytic contrast between %ass opposition and elite

opposition( 9hereas S%ith argues that the presence o! either a %ass-based or an elite-based

opposition group is li2ely to press authoritarian leaders to construct a broad and e!!ecti"e ruling

party, sub%it that only %ass opposition should ha"e this e!!ect( 9hen elite opposition to a new

regi%e is strong, argue that the social and coalitional !oundations !or a strong ruling party are

lac2ing( o build a ruling party under such conditions is to !oster elite collecti"e action in a

conte't where elite support cannot be assured 5 in other words, to play with !ire( By contrast,

when %ass opposition to a new regi%e is strong, elites will be %ore supporti"e o! the destruction

o! de%ocratic institutions, and thus %ore li2ely to ser"e as reliable coalition partners(

his plays out in our slightly di!!erent readings o! the ndonesian and Philippine cases( or

S%ith, Suhartos ndonesia e'hibited strong opposition and a strong ruling party, whereas

+arcos Philippines displayed a wea2 opposition and hence a wea2 ruling party( So long as

opposition !orces are coded as strong or wea2 along a single di%ension, S%iths classi!ications

%a2e sense( et when one distinguishes between %ass and elite opposition, would sub%it that

+arcos actually !aced %ore intense elite opposition than Suharto, while Suharto !aced %ore

intense %ass opposition than +arcos( t was not %erely the o"erall wea2ness o! political

opposition that led +arcos to eschew a %aor party-building e!!ort, as S%ith argues, but the

relati"estrengtho! elite opposition(

he "irtues o! distinguishing between %ass and elite opposition beco%e e"ident when

considering the contrasting party outco%es in ndonesia and +alaysia( 0lite opposition to the

i%position o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in ndonesia %ight ha"e been wea2er than in the

Philippines, but it was %uch stronger than in +alaysia( here was thus too %uch residue o! elite

opposition in ndonesia !or Suharto to pri"ilege new party institutions o"er old %ilitary

institutions, which initially pro"ided a %ore reliable basis !or political support( +alaysian leaders

built a %uch stronger coalition o! ruling parties because ende%ic !ears o! %ass co%%unal

"iolence had uni!ied elite groups behind a strategy o! curtailing de%ocratic co%petition( Only

when we draw a clear distinction between %ass and elite opposition can we see why ndonesia is

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%ore o! an inter%ediate than a purely strong) case, and e'plain the wide range o! "ariation in

party politics !ro% the Philippines to +alaysia(

ecisive Factional %ictory( n another %aor recent contribution to our understanding o!

party origins, *ason Brownlee has argued that strong parties arise !ro% the decisi"e "ictory o!

one elite !action o"er all others during the initial !or%ation o! an authoritarian regi%e(?E0gypt

and +alaysia are his positi"e cases( By contrast, where authoritarian onset witnesses the

co%pro%ise and incorporation o! co%peting elite !actions 5 as in ran and the Philippines 5

parties will be less cohesi"e and %ore prone to splits o"er ti%e(

Brownlees argu%ent echoes %y own e%phasis on the obstacles that !actionalis% presents

to party strength, as well as the i%portance o! party origins in in!luencing subse4uent

institutional robustness( try to %o"e beyond the elite le"el, howe"er, by speci!ying the broader

social conditions 5 speci!ically, challenging and threatening !or%s o! %ass %obili.ation 5 that

%ight lead elites to o"erco%e !actional !rictions in the !irst place( urther%ore, would sub%it

that success!ul party-building in cases such as +alaysia e'e%pli!ies not so %uch the decisi"e

"ictory o! %ono-!actionalis% o"er %ulti-!actionalis%, as Brownlee portrays it( $ather, we see

the decisi"e de!eat o!!actionalism rit large, as the broad interests o! the party-as-institution

co%e to supersede the narrower interests o! particular !actions( actionalis% is not transcended

because particular party-builders are notably sel!less or "isionary, but because ende%ic pressures

!ro% below present power!ul incenti"es to set aside parochial !actional interests in !a"or o!

broader class interests(?

Elite ollectie Action

0'isting theory thus does not see% to pro"ide %ore con"incing e'planations !or "ariation in

party, state, and regi%e institutions in Southeast Asia than %y own argu%ent e%phasi.ing

contentious politics( But what about alternati"e hypotheses !or elite collecti"e action, which

depict as the social !oundation o! all three o! these distinct political institutionsF As noted in the

opening o! this chapter, there are three broad perspecti"es on how elite collecti"e action can be

generated 5 but all three !ace li%itations in e'plaining coalitional di"ergence in Southeast Asia(

2xternal &hreat( ha"e already shown in %y discussion o! state-building that e'ternal

threats and international wars ha"e had li%ited e!!ect on Southeast Asias political institutions(

?EBrownlee 388?(?or a parallel argu%ent in /atin A%erica, especially Chile, see rieden


37/47

#nli2e 0urope and /atin A%erica, but 4uite si%ilar to sub-Saharan A!rica, Southeast Asia was

characteri.ed by international consensus on borders and boundaries during 2ey processes o! state

!or%ation(?@he regions e'perience thus does not show that international wars do not !oster

elite collecti"e action in any general sense& it only shows that e'ternal con!lict cannot e'plain the

dra%atic "ariation in elite collecti"e action within Southeast Asia itsel!(

As will argue in greater detail in the ne't chapter, see contentious politics as %ore o! a

!unctional e/uivalent!or e'ternal threat than a ri"al hypothesis( 9ar has indeed helped %a2e the

state in %any conte'ts, precisely by !ostering elite collecti"e action a%ong state o!!icials, and by

pressuring societal elites to collecti"ely co%ply with state de%ands( 9hat Southeast Asia shows

is that contentious politics can trigger a si%ilar political process, but only when it ta2es certain

!or%s( n su%, argue that eithere'ternal threat or internal con!lict is a necessary condition !or

elite collecti"e action, and hence !or i%pressi"e state capacity, party cohesion, and authoritarian

durability as well(

Nationalist #entiment( One o! the causal %echanis%s through which e'ternal threat is

presu%ed to !oster elite collecti"e action is "ia the strengthening o! nationalis%( 0'ternal

con!licts are clearly %ore liable than internal con!licts to !oster nationalist attach%ents& hence,

%ost theorists o! war and the nation-state ha"e concluded that while e'ternal wars bring national

elites together, internal con!licts tear a countrys elites apart( +y argu%ent that purely do%estic

!or%s o! contentious politics can !oster elite collecti"e action thus stands as a direct challenge to

this broad consensus(

9idespread s2epticis% that internal stri!e can pa"e the way !or greater elite collecti"e

action arises !or a si%ple reason: +ost internal con!licts are elitecon!licts( t is rare that %ass

%obili.ation can be generated without so%e sort o! elite sponsorship( Contentious %ass politics

thus typically ser"es as notice that elites are not getting along, and are using %ass allies to ta2e

their battles to the streets(8

et this is not uni"ersally the case( As Southeast Asias e'perience shows, %ass politics

can also e%erge when elite control is disrupted by %aor political e"ents( Speci!ically, *apans

rout o! 9estern colonial powers during its in"asion o! Southeast Asia crushed the regions

colonial states, upsetting e'isting arrange%ents o! social control( 9hile *apan ruled the region

with incredible brutality, occupation !orces were hardly obsessed with ad%inistrati"e e!!iciency(

?@7erbst 3888(8See 9aldner


38/47

urther%ore, displaced colonial powers poured aid and %ateriel to anti-*apanese rebel groups

throughout the occupation 5 creating the %onster o! %ass politics that they had 2ept %ostly

under loc2 and 2ey during the prewar period( 9hen *apanese rule suddenly collapsed in August

1@;?, returning colonialists were !orced to con!ront entirely new patterns o! %ass %obili.ation

that they could not co%pletely control(

et these %ass %o"e%ents that arose during the *apanese occupation "aried in critical

ways( So%e had the capacity to penetrate the urban sphere, while others were relegated to the

countryside( So%e had re"olutionary intent, while others were %ore re!or%ist, and thus easier to

%anage( inally, so%e o! these %ass %o"e%ents e'acerbated ethnic and religious tensions in the

process o! %obili.ing new %ass organi.ations, while others only presented a threat in class, not

co%%unal ter%s( 0lite collecti"e action was strongest in response where contentious politics had

an urban i%pact, e'pressed re"olutionary ideology, and worsened inter-co%%unal tensions(

his has surprising and highly counter-intuiti"e i%plications !or the relationship between

nationalis% and the state( n countries where prewar nation-building had been %ost e!!ecti"e,

such as hailand and the Philippines, le!tist unrest posed little i! any threat to o"erturn the

political order in ter%s o! ethnicity and religion( 0lites thus re%ained highly !actionali.ed, and

saw little i%perati"e to act collecti"ely, despite their shared sense o! nationalis%( #tates

remained ea- here nations ere relatively strong( Only where prewar nation-building had

!ailed to create any strong sense o! national identity, as in +alaysia and Singapore, did

co%%unist insurgents literally put the !ear o! od into state and societal elites( Paying higher

ta'es to a central authority that could 4uell such !orces was a s%all price to pay indeed( Strong

states and i%pressi"e le"els o! elite collecti"e action thus e%erged out o! wea2 nations 5

precisely the opposite o! recei"ed wisdo%(

2conomic (ene!its( n his classic treatise, +ancur Olson suggested that selecti"e bene!its)

were essential !or inducing collecti"e action( #nless %e%bership


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One %aor concern ha"e with this argu%ent is that it is too pro'i%ate to the institutional

outco%es o! interest to be substanti"ely enlightening( t is certainly true that regi%es are %ore

unstable, ceteris paribus, when they !ail to pro"ide patronage to elite coalition partners( But why

do so%e regi%es !ail to %obili.e the re"enue necessary to 2eep patronage !lowing, or !ail to

organi.e supporters into institutions that %a2e the deli"ery o! patronage %ore predictable and

syste%aticF Ade4uately answering such 4uestions re4uires attention to long-ter% processes o!

state-building and party consolidation, not ust short-ter% patterns o! econo%ic crisis, elite

de!ection, and regi%e brea2down(

n other words, we %ust consider how political leaders succeed or !ail at ordering power)

in the !irst place( And on this point, would argue that patronage is a relati"ely ine!!ecti"e tool

with which to cra!t a reliable elite coalition( As argue at %ore length in the ne't chapter,

patronage has two %ain drawbac2s "is--"is protection:


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%aority population, lac2 a labor-repressi"e landlord class, depend on %ilitary rather than party

institutions, and e'hibit a British colonial heritage( hose regi%es can build highly e!!ecti"e and

cohesi"e rulingparties, e"en when they did not !ace a protracted and contentious process o!

decoloni.ation, and electoral rules !acilitate personali.ed, parochial politic2ing rather than party

discipline( n broader ter%s, political leaders can generate i%pressi"e elite collective actionin

the absence o! e'ternal security threats, copious patronage !unds, and reser"oirs o! nationalist

senti%ent( $ather, argue that the elite collecti"e action that is essential !or state capacity, party

strength, and authoritarian durability can best be accounted !or by the robustness o! protection

pacts, which are the%sel"es a !unction o! historical legacies o! contentious politics(

III. The #issertation )rom =ere

he !ollowing chapters see2 to establish the "alidity o! these argu%ents in se"en Southeast Asian

countries( et due to space and ti%e constraints, do not pay all se"en country-cases e4ual

attention( nstead, sort these se"en countries into three sets, based on their o"erall signi!icance

!or the dissertations theoretical !ra%ewor2( he two pri%ary cases) are +alaysia and the

Philippines, the co%parison o! which constitutes the lions share o! the e%pirical chapters 5 three

chapters apiece( he re%aining !i"e cases are di"ided into three congruent cases)


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by paying closer attention to co%%unal elites, and the e%otional appeals they use to %obili.e

!ollowers against authoritarian incu%bents(

Part e'a%ines the historical e"olution o! wea2 states, wea2 parties, and brittle

authoritarian regi%es through the e%pirical lens o! the Philippines( Chapter 6 traces the postwar

wea2ness o! the Philippine state to the %anageable character o! contentious politics between

1@;?-1@??, rather than the prewar A%erican colonial legacies that ha"e captured %ost scholars

attention( Chapter ; e'plores the upswing in urban unrest that preceded erdinand +arcos

i%position o! open-ended authoritarian rule in 1@E3, and argues that +arcos apparent

co%plicity in %uch o! the "iolence pre"ented hi% !ro% le"eraging the instability into broad elite

support( Chapter ? shows that +arcos !aced considerable elite opposition !ro% the onset o!

%artial law, denying hi% the necessary coalitional !oundations upon which to build stronger state

and party institutions to buttress his dictatorship( 9ith only tepid and unorgani.ed support !ro%

his !ellow elites, +arcos pro"ed unable either to 4uell cross-class de%ocratic %obili.ation, or to

%aintain the cohesion o! his regi%es coerci"e apparatus during the political crisis o! 1@(

Part shi!ts attention to +alaysia: a case o! ordered power) that stands in star2 contrast

to the disordered power) witnessed in the Philippines( Chapter shows that contentious class

politics !ro% 1@;?-1@?E was considerably %ore urban in i%pact, re"olutionary in intent, and

co%%unalist in e!!ect than conte%poraneous patterns o! contention in the Philippines( his ga"e

British and +alayan elites a power!ul incenti"e to o"erco%e !actional di"isions and wor2

collecti"ely toward the establish%ent o! %uch stronger state and party institutions( Class and

co%%unal tensions re%ained e'plosi"e throughout the era o! parlia%entary de%ocracy in the

1@8s, cul%inating in the Huala /u%pur riots o! +ay 1@@( Chapter E e'a%ines the close

coupling o! electoral co%petition and ethnic con!lict between 1@?E-1@@, which con"inced %ost

+alaysian elites that a %ore authoritarian syste% was necessary to %aintain social and political

order( Besides !ostering such anti-de%ocratic attitudes, un%anageable urban unrest be!ore the

onset o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in 1@@ ga"e the political leadership considerable

le"erage to build stronger state and party institutionsin the early 1@E8s( Chapter shows how

these institutions ha"e consistently e'tracted econo%ic resources and organi.ed political support

!or the ruling regi%e, pro"iding it with a preponderance o! power that helped it snu!! out

de%ocratic %obili.ation with ease in 1@@-1@@@(

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Part I concludes the dissertation with an assess%ent o! %y argu%ents broader

applications and i%plications( Chapter @ pro"ides a cursory o"er"iew o! the political pathways

tra"eled by this dissertations three congruent cases) ew Order) in the %id-late 1@8s thus ca%e to oppose it by the %id-late 1@@8s,

bringing the regi%e crashing down a%id %assi"e urban protests in 1@@(

Chapter 18 concludes the dissertation by considering the studys i%plications !or %a2ing

public authority both e!!ecti"e and accountable 5 in other words, !or resol"ing +adisons classic

dile%%a( Although the cases considered here broadly suggest that state-building and

;3


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de%ocrati.ation are di!!icult goals to reconcile, particular bits o! e"idence !ro% speci!ic

Southeast Asian cases pro"ide %ore grounds !or opti%is%( Speci!ically, show that relati"ely

co%petiti"e national elections ha"e at ti%es spurred state-building e!!orts in ndonesia, +alaysia,

and the Philippines( hese causal dyna%ics were triggered when go"ern%ents percei"ed that the

sta2es in such elections were especially high, in large %easure because radical %ass %obili.ation

pro"ided the% with an urgent need !or a strong electoral %andate( 9hile not unco"ering any

correlation between state-building and de%ocracy per se, these e'a%ples re"eal potential causal

%echanis%s through which robust political co%petition %ight !oster state e!!ecti"eness in the

post-colonial world(

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ew or2: ree Press o! lencoe(

rieden, *e!!ry( 1@@1(ebt, evelopment, and emocracy( Princeton: Princeton #ni"ersity

Press(

eddes, Barbara( 1@@@( 9hat Do 9e Hnow About De%ocrati.ation A!ter wenty earsF)

Annual 3evie o! $olitical #cience3, pp( 11?-1;;(

eddes, Barbara( 1@@8( 7ow the Cases ou Choose A!!ect the Answers ou et: Selection

Bias in Co%parati"e Politics()$olitical Analysis3, pp( 161-1?8(

eorge, Ale'ander /( and i%othy *( +cHeown( 1@?( Case Studies and heories o!

Organi.ational Decision +a2ing() n $obert ( Coula% and $ichard A( S%ith, eds(,

Advances in 'n!ormation $rocessing in rganizations, %ol. :, 3esearch on $ublic

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>ew or2: Ca%bridge #ni"ersity Press(

7aggard, Stephan and $obert Hau!%ann( 1@@?( &he $olitical 2conomy o! emocratic

&ransitions( Princeton: Princeton #ni"ersity Press(

7erbst, *e!!rey( 3888( #tates and $oer in A!rica6 )omparative 0essons in Authority and

)ontrol( Princeton: Princeton #ni"ersity Press(

7ewison, He"in( 1@@@( Political Space in Southeast Asia: LAsian-Style and Other

De%ocracies()emocratization, pp( 33;-3;?(

7untington, Sa%uel P( 1@@1( &he &hird Wave6 emocratization in the 0ate &entieth

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#ni"ersity Press(

7utchcro!t, Paul D( 3888( Colonial +asters, >ational Politicos, and Pro"incial /ords:

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*ac2son, Harl D( 1@?( Post-Colonial $ebellion and Counter-nsurgency in Southeast Asia()

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;E

Ordering Power - Dan Slater

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