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“One Man One Vote”: The Tension between SNCC and SCLC in Selma, Alabama

In 1965 the population of Selma, Alabama was 28, 385.1 Of this 57 percent or 13, 969

were African American.2 Despite the African American community encompassing more than

1 “Selma and Dallas County, Alabama: A Statistical Roundup” March 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: VIII: 18, 1047.


Hannah Dirks History 490: Research Seminar

Dr. Anderson-BrickerFall 2017

D i r k s P a g e | 1

half of the population, only .9 percent were registered voters.3 Within the two adjoining counties

of Wilcox and Lowndes, of which the African American community accounted for 70 percent of

the total population, they had never seen a registered African American voter.4 It was this issue

which drew the attention of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC, who

went to work on establishing a voting rights campaign in Selma, Alabama. SNCC’s campaign

was ultimately confronted by the arrival of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, or

SCLC. The presence of SNCC and SCLC in Selma resulted in tensions, due to their conflicting

viewpoints over logistics, organizational structuring, and the importance of empowering a secure

local base.

SNCC, initially didn’t plan on setting up a campaign in Selma, Alabama. As described by

historian Robert Pratt in his work Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the

Struggle for Racial Equality a campaign in Selma had never been considered, because SNCC

had crossed off the possibility of leading a campaign in the entire state of Alabama.5 SNCC

chairman John Lewis declared to SNCC member Bob Zellner that, “. . . it would take a federal

army to force the Black Belt counties to register blacks.”6 Forman too had crossed off the entire

state of Alabama, because after sending two previous groups to the state, they both reported that

the, “. . . whites were too mean, and blacks were too afraid.”7 Selma was further considered to be

at risk when it came to establishing a campaign, because African Americans could not “. . . walk

3 Daniel Luck, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 141.

4 “SNCC Alabama Drive Enters 3rd Year” January 9, 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: XV: 37, 0017.

5 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 31.

6 Bob Zellner, The Wrong Side of Murder Creek (Montgomery, AL: NewSouth Books, 2008), 223. 7 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 31.


in the street, hold mass meetings, or picket peacefully.”8 It was for these reasons that SNCC,

initially didn’t plan on setting up a campaign in Selma, Alabama.

Furthermore SNCC didn’t plan on setting up a campaign in Selma due to the white power

structure. According to historian Wayne Greenhaw within his book Fighting the Devil in Dixie:

How Civil Rights Activists Took on the Ku Klux Klan in Alabama, the whites in Selma had

already formed a white power structure through the formation of the White Citizens Council,

which aimed to keep African Americans from gaining the right to vote throughout the Black

Belt.9 This structure was led by Selma sheriff Jim Clark, who led a group of 300 hundred militia

men.10 According to a September 1963 press release from SNCC these men were “. . . deputized

into a special posse which has the authorization to carry weapons and make arrests.” SNCC

proclaimed that the white power structure in Selma which consisted of Sheriff Clark and his 300

men were “One of the strongest forces operating against us in Selma.”11 SNCC chairman John

Lewis furthered this within his 2012 memoir Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the

Future of American in which he explains that the white resistance was magnified in Selma

because Sheriff Clark and his White Citizens Council were “. . . on constant watch.”12 Due to this

dominate white power structure initially SNCC didn’t plan on setting up a campaign in Selma.

8 “Alabama Officials Arrest Negroes Trying To Get Vote,” September 1963, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: XV: 37, 0052.

9 Wayne Greenhaw, Fighting the Devil in Dixie: How Civil Rights Activists Took on the Ku Klux Klan in Alabama (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011), 161-180.

10“Contraband Militia Intimidate Protestors,” September 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: VIII: 18, 1001.

11 “Selma, Alabama,” 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: VIII: 18, 0987.

12 Lewis John, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY: Hachette Books, 2012), 49.


Starting a campaign in Selma had never been considered, due to the risk of violence.

Selma hadn’t been considered because, “. . . the potential for bloodshed was too great.”13 It is the

risk factor of violence which led to the death of-twenty-eight year old, Jimmy Lee Jackson, who

was killed by state police as he was attempting to aid his mother, who had recently been

clubbed.14 Jackson’s death acted as one of the catalysts behind the marches in Selma, because

according to Ann Reeb, the daughter of the slain Reverend James Reeb, his death was not only

meet with silence but that no one was arrested in connection for his arrest.15 The death of people

like Viola Liuzzo, Reeb, and Jackson left people stunned. People like activist Susan Jans-

Thomas remarked that the death of these people led her to understand, “. . . that while "only the

good die young" it is those who remain who must continue to tell their stories.”16

Forman and LaFayette soon decided that setting up a campaign in Selma was necessary

in order to engage the African American community of Selma. Upon LaFayette’s arrival and the

initial efforts, SNCC discovered that, “. . . the city had an active and interested black

community.”17 According to a Dallas County statistical roundup produced by SNCC in 1965

Selma’s population was made up of 28,385 people 13,969 of which were African American.18

This was furthered by the 1960 census, which showed that the community consisted of 57.7


14 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 158.

15 John Blake, “Chapter 6 Children of the Martyrs.” n Children of the Movement: The Sons and Daughters of Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, George Wallace, Andrew Young, Julian Bond, Stokely Carmichael, Bob Moses, James Chaney, Elaine Brown, and Others Reveal How the Civil Rights Movement Tested and Transformed Their Families. by John Blake (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2004), 225.

16 Susan Jans-Thomas, Reflections of the 1965 Freedom March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama: A Memoir of the United States Civil Rights Movement, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012) 87.

17 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 210.



percent nonwhites to the 42.3 percent whites.19 It was Selma’s large population of African

Americans which swayed SNCC to establish a campaign in Selma.

Furthering this, SNCC declared that they wanted to establish a campaign in Selma,

because while this town consisted of a large African American population it had never seen a

black vote. SNCC’s executive secretary James Forman within his work The Making of Black

Revolutionaries explained that,

“Of the blacks, 84 percent existed on less than three thousand dollars a year and 82 percent of those worked held jobs as maids, janitors, farm and other kinds of laborers, truck drivers, and helpers. Of the blacks over twenty-five years old, 95 percent had less than a high school education, while 62 percent had completed six years or less of school. Among the whites on the other hand, 81 percent had incomes of three thousand dollars a year or more while 73 percent fell into the better paid and more desirable job categories, and only 11 percent had six or less years of school.”20

Despite this huge black population the city of Selma and its entire county of Lowndes, had never

witnessed a registered black voter.21 Within a January 1965 SNCC press release they stated that

“In Dallas County, Negroes are 57% of the county’s population but only .9% of the eligible

Negros are registered voters. Two adjoining counties, Wilcox and Lowndes, with 70% Negro

populations, have no registered Negro voters.”22 Forman later explained that Selma was chosen,

because it presented “. . . a firm beachhead in the heart of the Alabama Black Belt.”23 Ultimately,

SNCC decided that they wanted to establish Selma as the beachhead of their movement in

Alabama, due to its large African American population which had never seen a black vote.

19 Daniel Luck, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 141.

20 James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1972), 317.

21 James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1972), 317.

22 “SNCC Alabama Drive Enters 3rd Year” January 9, 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: XV: 37, 0017.

23 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 211.


Once SNCC had set up a campaign within Selma, they started the voter education effort,

in 1963. Within a flyer for an upcoming march SNCC expressed that the goal of the voter

education effort, was to get the right to vote, assembly, and protest peacefully.24 In February of

1963, SNCC members, Bernard and Colia LaFayette arrived in Selma where they began the

voter registration drive on behalf of SNCC.25 As they began in the spring, they focused their

attention on registering, would-be voters.26 In the fall of 1963, with the help of SNCC member

Worth Long, “. . . SNCC began a series of peaceful demonstrations which culminated in a

“Freedom Day” on October 7, when more than two hundred blacks lined up outside the Dallas

County Courthouse to take the registration test.”27 SNCC held a Freedom Day in Selma, to

encourage people to attempt to register.28 According to a January 15th 1965 press release from

SNCC the goal of Freedom Day was to encourage the African Americans within Dallas County

to come to the courthouse in large numbers, in order to attempt to register.29 SNCC also

encouraged people to vote by organizing, “. . . mass meetings attended by hundreds of Selma’s

black residents with speakers like Jim Forman, Ella Baker, SCLC field secretary and former

SNCC staffer James Bevel, comedian Dick Gregory, and writer James Baldwin.”30 SNCC also

encouraged voter registration through the development of its literacy project which was figure

24 “Core-SNCC New York Marches with Selma” March 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: VIII: 18, 1029.




28 Faith Holsaert, “Part Nine The Constant Struggle The Alabama Movement, 1963-1966,” in Hands on the Freedom Plow: Personal Accounts by Women in SNCC, by Faith Holsaert (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 449.

29 “Selma Freedom Day Set” January 15th 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers. 1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 37, 0019.

30 Faith Holsaert, “Part Nine The Constant Struggle The Alabama Movement, 1963-1966,” in Hands on the Freedom Plow: Personal Accounts by Women in SNCC, by Faith Holsaert (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 449.


headed by SNCC activist Maria Varela who arrived in Selma in 1963.31 Overall, SNCC

successfully launched their voter education effort, in 1963.

On July 2, 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law but

this act failed to address the voting rights, which were being fought for within Selma. While this

law focused at decimating public discrimination, it failed to even address voting rights.32 Richie

Jean Sherrod Jackson within her memoir The House by the Side of the Road: The Selma Civil

Rights Movement explained that while it did result in the voluntarily integration of Selma’s

restaurants by the winter of 1965, it did nothing to support voting rights.33 SNCC activist and

chairman, John Lewis within his 1998 memoir Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the

Movement recalled that when the law passed he, “. . . felt glad, but not joyous. There was no

sense of celebration. We were still in the middle of a war down there, a campaign that was just

beginning.”34 The 1964 Civil Rights Act failed to address voting rights because Johnson “. . .

thought that because of the contention over civil rights in 1964, everyone needed a breather—the

people, to get used to the social changes wrought by the 1964 act”.35 While the activists in Selma

did see this as a priority, they continued to organize and kept trying to register to vote.36

While Johnson’s 1964 Voting Rights Act didn’t address the issues being fought for in

Selma, it did bring about some change. This is the case, because it did, “. . . prompt a revival of

31 Faith Holsaert, “Part Three Movement Learning Posts: The Heart and Soul of the Southwest Georgia Movement, 1961-1963,” in Hands on the Freedom Plow: Personal Accounts by Women in SNCC, by Faith Holsaert (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 157.


33 Richie Jean Sherrod Jackson, The House by the Side of the Road: The Selma Civil Rights Movement (Tuscaloosa, AL: University Alabama Press, 2011), 156.

34 John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 266-267.

35 Stephan Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994), 317.36 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 33.


protest activity.”37 This is the case, because “Blacks felt that even if they could not vote, they

could test the limits of this new civil rights legislation.”38 Lewis in his 1998 memoir recalled that,

“The news from Washington felt as if it were coming from another country, from a very distant

place.”39 But protestors in Selma soon began to test the limits, from July fourth to July sixth.40 On

one of these occasions SNCC chairman John Lewis, “. . . led about fifty blacks to the courthouse

in an attempt to register; once there they were beaten by Clark’s deputies before being

arrested.”41 It wasn’t just the members of SNCC who were revived after the passing of the 1964

act, Martin Luther King and his group SCLC saw the passing of this bill as a way in which to

drive Alabama governor George Wallace out of office.42 It was for this reason that SCLC arrived

in Selma, in December of 1964.43

As you will see the tensions between SNCC and SCLC are clearly present, but despite

this it is hard to discern this from the primary source material. Through examining the Student

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers it is challenging to find any examples more so than

a paragraph were SNCC clearly states its differences with SCLC. Despite this we can still clearly

see that there were many differences between these two organizations. It is for that reason that

the majority of the below research comes from memory based sources as well as a few

supplementary secondary sources. It with these sources that the argument was constructed


38Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 34.




42 Stephen Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994), 317.43 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.:

Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0988.


focusing on the tensions between SNCC and SCLC. While this research is in dialogue with other

historians focused on SNCC and SCLC’s campaigns in Selma, it works to build upon their

scholarship by focusing on the conflicting viewpoints and tensions over ideologies between these

organizations throughout this time period.

In 1964 SCLC decided that they would launch a campaign in Selma, due to the existence

of SNCC’s campaign. SCLC launched their own campaign in Selma in December of 1964,

despite knowing that SNCC had long been, “. . . working on voter registration in and around

rural communities in Selma and Dallas County”.44 Despite knowing about SNCC’s preexisting

work in Selma, SCLC established a campaign of their own, because they believed that, “. . .

SNCC’s commitment to Selma was diminishing”.45 SCLC believed SNCC’s efforts in Selma had

run their course and that SCLC’s presence in Selma would help to rejuvenate the black

community.46 Ultimately, SCLC decided to establish a front in Selma, as a way to launch other

campaigns in the surrounding counties of “. . . Perry, Wilcox, Lowndes, and Hale. It could also

organize demonstrations in Montgomery. With sufficient persistence and agility, it ought not be

too difficult to precipitate a dramatic confrontation, under circumstances of SCLC’s own

choosing, somewhere in Alabama’s Black Belt.”47 SCLC soon make the decision to establish a

campaign in Selma as a way to, “. . . break the injunction.”48 Within a March 1965 document


45 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York, NY: W. Morrow, 1986), 359.





SNCC declared that the main purpose of SCLC was to expand into other counties within the

Alabama Black Belt by setting up individuals within each of these counties.49

Once SCLC had established their campaign in Selma, it didn’t take long for there to be

tensions between SCLC and SNCC. According to Richie Jean Sherrod Jackson whose house

played a crucial role in this movement, she could tell that SCLC’s sudden presence in Selma

upset SNCC, because while, “. . . SNCC had been working for several years with very little

publicity or funds. SCLC came in and overnight the press arrived and money began to come in as

well. Money and a place in the sun can bring egos to a boiling point, and they did.”50 Bernard

LaFayette the founder of the movement in Selma, within his 2015 memoir In Peace and

Freedom My Journey in Selma recalled that “SNCC had done all of the groundwork on the

Voting Rights Campaign and had labored hard for two years to get to this point. Some members

of SNCC felt that SCLC was uprising their campaign.”51 It didn’t take long before debates arose

over sharing the, “. . . spotlight and funding. Discussions about who should be in a photo-op,

who should lead the march, methodology, and future benefits.”52 SNCC chairman John Lewis

recalled that when SCLC came to town, “. . . there were feelings—strong feelings—that toes

were indeed being stepped on here. It was the same old story all over again. We dug in early, did

the groundwork, laid the foundation, then the SCLC came in again with their headline-grabbing,

hit-and-run tactics.”53

49 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0988.


51 Bernard LaFayette, In Peace and Freedom My Journey in Selma (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 127.


53 John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 314.


Tensions between SNCC and SCLC soon erupted over their organizational structuring

and the importance of empowering a secure local base. Historian, Adam Fairclough within his

1987 work To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and

Martin Luther King Jr. summarized this when he wrote,

“SNCC believed in organizing communities “from the bottom up,” and this entailed the slow, painstaking task of founding and nurturing indigenous organizations that were representative, democratic, and built to last. SCLC’s confrontational approach involved the engineering of short-lived crises; it paid little heed to building on local organizations, as its almost complete neglect of its own affiliates attested.” Even if on rare occasions SCLC evoked some form of federal intervention, SNCC workers complained, the results were evanescent and superficial for the great majority of blacks. Black advantage, to be solid and secure, had to proceed from a strong and secure local base. SCLC’s campaigns actually left local black organizations exposed, enervated, divided, and often disillusioned.”54

SNCC felt this way because according to a 1965 statement, they saw themselves as differing

from SCLC because, “. . . SCLC pushes the idea that local people need leaders like Martin

Luther King and Rev. Abernathy, and others, while SNCC says that local people build their own

self-confidence by doing this.”55 SNCC chairman John Lewis believed this, because he thought,

“. . . our differences were primarily philosophical. From the beginning we at SNCC had believed in moving away from the cloistered settings of colleges and universities, away from the town and the gown, and going out on the byways and highways to connect with people, the true masses. Unlike the members of the old-guard civil rights organizations, especially the SCLC, who tended to look down through the telescope at the little people, who met with one another and conducted membership drives and membership meetings and big fund-raisers and rallies but did not step down and suffer the kinds of indignities and injustices that the local people were suffering on a daily basis, we did go out and live and suffer with the everyday people. That was the key to whatever success we were able to achieve.”56

Ultimately, tensions resulted between SNCC and SCLC due to their organizational structuring,

because “. . .SCLC pushes the idea that local people need leaders like Martin Luther King. . . 54 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and

Martin Luther King Jr. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 212-213.55 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.:

Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0988. 56 John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 1998), 186-187.


while SNCC says that local people build their own leaders, out of their own communities.”57

Overall, tensions erupted between SNCC and SCLC over organizational structuring, because

while SNCC favored empowering a secure local base SCLC favored leaders like Martin Luther

King.

Tension continued between SNCC and SCLC over the voter registration test and if there

should be a literacy requirement. Within a 1965 statement, SNCC expressed that one of the

conflicts they had with SCLC was that, “. . . SNCC is demanding a voter registration test with no

literacy requirement. SCLC is not pushing hard for that yet.”58 SNCC argued for the adaptation

of the voter registration test because,

“To register in Alabama, a person had to fill out a four page application that was developed by the White Citizens Council, a coalition of businessmen, government officials, and prominent citizens who collectively imposed economic sanctions against any black persons who attempted to register; they could be fired from their jobs, evicted from their homes, foreclosed upon by banks or other lenders. The council made it easy to discover who these folks were. Since the registrar’s office was open only during business hours on the first and third Monday of each month, they had to ask for time off from work. In small rural town, news travels fast. In addition, the names of all applicants were published in the newspaper.”59

These tests were created to, “. . . further frustrate potential black voters. They might require

citizens to count the number of jelly beans in a jar or the number of bubbles in a jar of soap.”60

These tests were so difficult that when SNCC chairman John Lewis took the Alabama literacy

test to a Harvard professor, he could answer only one of the three questions asked.61 SNCC

member Bernard LaFayette portrayed an example of the proposed literacy test SNNC which 57 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference (New York, NY: W. Morrow, 1986), 396.58 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.:

Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0988. 59 John Lewis, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY:

Hachette Books, 2012), 45.60 John Lewis, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY:

Hachette Books, 2012), 47.61 John Lewis, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY:

Hachette Books, 2012), 47.


involved participants answering questionings about the impeachment process, the three branches

of the government, answering who the attorney general was, the process of being tried for

treason, jury selection, the passing of bills as well as a section in which they read aloud from the

Constitution.62

Another tension between SNCC and SCLC resulted from their conflicting views on what

role people should be playing within the advancement of voting rights. Within a 1965 statement

from Selma, SNCC stated that, “Another difference we have with SLC is that we support the

idea of local people writing their own bill, submitting it to Congress, and lobbying for it; while

SCLC opposes that idea.” 63 According to SNCC chairman John Lewis, SNCC members in

Selma feared that SCLC would not do this because they didn’t, “. . . nurture leaders among the

local community but instead bringing in their own leaders, then leaving after they’d gotten what

they needed out of it.”64 Tensions over the voting rights campaign continued between SNCC and

SCLC, through the way they wanted to continue encouraging African American’s to vote. “A

third difference is that we support the idea of an FDP-a third party in Alabama, while SCLC

would rather see Negroes registered and then channeled into either Democratic or Republican

Parties.”65

With all of these tension, SNCC decided that at the very least they must be accepting of

SCLC’s presence within Selma. Within a 1965 statement SNCC explained that, “SCLC came to

62 Bernard LaFayette, In Peace and Freedom My Journey in Selma (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 157-158.

63 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0988.


65 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982),A: VIII: 18, 0988.


Selma as an organization in December 1964. We are trying to work with them.”66 SNCC

chairman John Lewis recalls that he,

“. . . had many different thoughts about this. On the one hand, I knew exactly how Worth and John felt. They had already felt neglected by our own SNCC leadership because of the emphasis we had put on Mississippi that year. And now they were being pushed aside by the juggernaut of the SCLC. But I also had more respect and understanding of what the SCLC was honestly and earnestly trying to do than most of my SNCC colleagues. I was still a member of the SCLC board, which put me in the peculiar position of having a foot in both camps – something that did not sit well with many of my SNCC colleagues, but something I never apologized for. I had respected Dr. King and all he stood for in the beginning. I respected him now. I would always respect him. Simple.”67

The founder of the movement in Selma, Bernard LaFayette remembers acting as the mediator

between the two organizations, but that the presence of, “. . . Dr. King and SCLC were

tremendous assets to winning mass appeal. When they became involved, publicity increased

dramatically and gave the movement greater visibility, which led to more finical support. SNCC

was simply not strong enough presence to make the same impact.”68 Lewis decided that he must

accept the presence of SCLC because,

“. . . the people of Selma themselves had gone and asked King to come help them. How could we stand in their way, no matter how valid our reasons or objections or concerns might be? We might not like it. We might choose to be minimally involved – which turned out to be the case, at least in the beginning. But we had no choice but to accept the fact that the Selma campaign was now going to officially become an SCLC undertaking.”69

Ultimately, despite their differences SNCC decided that at the very least they must be accepting

of SCLC’s presence.

66 “Selma, Alabama” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982),A: VIII: 18, 0988.





The movement in Selma came to the forefront in January of 1965 due to the presence of

both SNCC and SCLC. In a speech on January second 1965 SCLC leader Martin Luther King

declared to seven hundred people gathered at Brown Chapel, that the goal of SCLC’s

involvement in Selma was to have a,

“. . . determined, organized, mobilized campaign to get the right to vote everywhere in Alabama. . . If they refuse to register us, we will appeal to Governor Wallace. If he doesn’t listen, we will appeal to the legislature. If the legislature doesn’t listen, we will seek to arouse the Federal Government by marching by the thousands to the places of registration. We must be willing to go to jail by the thousands. We are not asking, we are demanding the ballot.”70

John Lewis remembers hundreds from both Selma and the surrounding communities, gathered

together, “. . . under the cooling clouds of moody winter days.”71 By January eighth SCLC leader

Martin Luther King and SNCC chairman John Lewis joined together and had successfully tested,

“. . . seven Selma restaurants without incident, after which King and SNCC’s John’ Lewis led

some four hundred blacks in the campaign’s first march to the courthouse.”72 On January 17th

Lewis, “. . . kicked off the voter registration drive at a mass meeting. Lewis repeated his earlier

appeal for “One Man—One Vote.””73 On the morning of January 18th King then lead a group of

marchers to the county registrar office only to be turned away.74 After he and his marchers were

turned away but not arrested, King proclaimed that they would fill every local jail, until they

were allowed to register to vote.75 Both SNCC and SCLC kept this promise as the protests and

marches continued until March of 1965. 70 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and

Martin Luther King Jr. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 229. 71 John Lewis, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY:

Hachette Books, 2012), 49.72 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 37.73 “Fact Sheet” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.:

Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 0966.74 Richie Jean Sherrod Jackson, The House by the Side of the Road: The Selma Civil Rights Movement

(Tuscaloosa, AL: University Alabama Press, 2011), 156.75 Richie Jean Sherrod Jackson, The House by the Side of the Road: The Selma Civil Rights Movement

(Tuscaloosa, AL: University Alabama Press, 2011), 156.


Tensions between SCLC and SNCC crescendoed in March of 1965, as SNCC debated if

they should participate in a March seventh march led by SCLC. On a meeting held on March

sixth 1965,

“. . . the SNCC executive committee met all night in the basement of a restaurant in Atlanta, debating whether we should participate in the march. It was the decision of the committee that we shouldn't participate in the matter. Some people felt a lot of people would get hurt. Some people started saying the SCLC would have this march and then they would leave town, and the people would be left holding the bag.”76

SNCC’s executive secretary James Forman was “. . . dead set against SNCC’s participation.”77

Others like John Lewis, “. . . took the position that people we had been working with in the heart

of the Black Belt for more than three years wanted to march and we should be there with them.

The decision was made that if I wanted to go, I could go as an individual but not as a

representative of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee."78 Ultimately, after much

discussion the, “. . . majority of SNCC’s executive committee voted to oppose the march but to

allow any SNCC staffers who wanted to participate as individuals to do so. They also agreed to

send King a letter criticizing SCLC’s actions in Selma and asking for a meeting to discuss

improved relations.”79 While the tensions between SCLC and SNCC crescendoed in March of

1965, SNCC ultimately decided that those who wanted to march on March seventh could do so

but not as representatives of SNCC.

The conflict between SNCC and SCLC boiled over when Martin Luther King decided to

not participate in the scheduled march on March seventh, 1965. According to John Lewis, Dr.

76Susan Jans-Thomas, Reflections of the 1965 Freedom March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama: A Memoir of the United States Civil Rights Movement (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012), 75-76.


78 Susan Jans-Thomas, Reflections of the 1965 Freedom March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama: A Memoir of the United States Civil Rights Movement (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012), 75-76.



King, “. . . had decided late the day before to postpone the march until Monday. He’d missed too

many preaching commitments at his church in Atlanta, he explained. He needed to deliver his

sermon that weekend. The march from Selma, he decided, would have to wait a day.”80 Bernard

LaFayette supported this as he remembers that, “. . . Dr. King couldn’t be there on Sunday, the

first day, but it was decided that the march should begin anyway and he would join it later.”81

According to historian Robert Pratt King’s reason for not participating went much deeper as,

“. . . members of the Southern Christian leadership Conference . . . had agreed last night [Saturday March 6] that he should not lead the march because they had learned troopers would block it.” King also said that while he expected that there would be mass arrests, he was not expecting any serious violence. However, the fact that ten doctors and nurses had flown into Selma from New York that Saturday, along with the presence of several ambulances strongly suggests that someone was expecting violence. No doubt, King was aware of these developments. His explanations notwithstanding, it is very likely that King either decided himself—or was persuaded by SCLC staffers—to abstract himself from the march because of the likelihood of violence. Two chroniclers of movement events suggest that King avoided the march because of the personal danger it posed to him.”82

Unlike Dr. King SNCC member Barbra Brandt recalls that they “. . . knew something big was

going to happen.”83 Despite this after calling Dr. King in Atlanta, they were instructed “. . . to

choose one among them—Andy, Hosea or Bevel—to join me [John Lewis] as co-leader of the

march. . . . Andy returned with that news, and the three of them proceed to flip coins to see who

would join me. The odd man would march; the other two would stay. The odd man turned out to

be Hosea, and so that little slice of history was settled—by the flip of a quarter.”84




83 Faith Holsaert, “Part Eight Fighting Another Day: The Mississippi Movement after Atlantic City, 1964-1966,” in Hands on the Freedom Plow: Personal Accounts by Women in SNCC, by Faith Holsaert (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 433.



March seventh, 1965 would come to be known as Bloody Sunday, due to the horror

which awaited the marchers at the other end of Pettus Bridge. Lewis within his 1998 memoir

remembered that there was something peculiar about this march,

“It was more than disciplined. It was sober and subdued, almost like a funeral procession. No one was jostling of pushing to the front, as often happened with these things. I don’t know if there was a feeling that something was going to happen, or if the people simply sensed that this was a special procession, a “leaderless” march. There was no big names up front, no celebrities. This was just plain folks moving through the streets of Selma.”

As the marchers reached the crest of the bridge they encountered, “. . . a combined force of

deputies and state troopers commanded by Sheriff Jim Clark and Major John Cloud.”85 Lewis

recalls stopping dead at

“. . . the other side, stood a sea of blue helmeted, blue-uniformed Alabama state troopers, line after line of them, dozens of battle-ready lawman stretched from one side of U.S. Highway 80 to the other. Behind them were several dozen more armed men—Sheriff Clark’s posse—some on horseback, all wearing khaki clothing, many carrying clubs the size of baseball bats. On one side of the road I could see a crowd of about a hundred whites, laughing and hollering, waving Confederate flags. Beyond them, at a safe distance, stood a small, silent group of black people.”86

The Major of the State Troopers then “. . . made an announcement that they should turn around.

The people refused. They knelt to the ground in prayerful manner.”87 Lewis later recalled in his

2012 memoir that, “. . .when I saw those troopers, I realized my time might have come to an end.

But that was all right with me because I knew deep within my heart that I was living the life I

was meant to lead, and I was willing to follow that calling wherever it took me. If I had to die, I

believed my sacrifice along with the sacrifice of others would mean something.”88

85 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 159.


87 “Selma, March 7, 1965” March 7 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 1027.

88 John Lewis, Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America (New York City, NY: Hachette Books, 2012), 170.


It is the violence that the marchers would encounter as they crossed Pettus Bridge which

would leave March seventh, 1965 with the name Bloody Sunday. According to Bernard

LaFayette as Lewis and Hosea continued their prayer,

“The troopers lined up across the street put on gas masks. They held their billy clubs out horizontally and began pushing through the crowd, knocking marchers over. Tear gas canisters were tossed into the masses, and all hell broke loose. A sound like thunder filled the air as the horses galloped into the crowd, trampling people, whips slashing heads. Hundreds of marchers scattered, unable to breathe, eyes stinging, running toward the water to escape the gas and beatings. Others staggered back toward Brown Chapel with open wounds and blood drenched clothes, chased by troopers on horses thrashing whips and wielding batons. Confused and injured, marchers tried to help each other while fleeing the onslaught of violence. The leaders, Hosea and John, and hundreds of others suffered bloody beatings.”89

LaFayette wasn’t the only one who recalled the violence which laid at the end of Pettus Bridge,

an unknown SNCC staff member within a March seventh 1965, press release recalled that, “. . .

the State Troopers fired tear gas at them and began to beat them. I was hit in the head. People

went back to the church. There are about 2000-3000 in the church. The posse is coming down to

the church. People are on horseback are beating people with whips and ropes. They are shooting

tear gas. I’ve never seen anything like it in my life. They are shooting gas, acid.”90 John Lewis

recalls that

“. . . then they were upon us. The first of the troopers came over me, a large husky man. Without a word, he swung his club against the left side of my head. I didn’t feel any pain, just the thud of the blow, and my legs giving way. I raised an arm—a reflex motion—as I curled up in the “prayer protection” position. And then the same trooper hit me again. And everything started to spin. . . . People are going to die here. I’m going to die here. I really felt that I saw death at that moment, that I looked it right in its face. And it felt strangely soothing. I had a feeling that it would be so easy to just lie down and let it take me away.”91


90 “Selma, March 7, 1965” March 7 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 18, 1027.



John Lewis suffered a fractured skull, as a result of this beating. But he wasn’t the only one

injured, more than ninety men and women were treated, for “. . . injuries ranging from head

gashes, and fractured ribs and wrists and arms and legs to broken jaws and teeth.”92

While the violence of Bloody Sunday was overwhelming it did evoke people to mobilize,

and to join the movement in Selma. SNCC member Bernard LaFayette remembered that, “. . .

Bloody Sunday because of the bloodshed, increased the awareness of the important issue. . . .

The national audience saw the horrors, the national conscience was awakened. . . . Newspapers

recorded in pictures and in words the terror of that experience, garnering the support of the entire

nation and the world.”93 It was Bloody Sunday which led Barbara Krasner a white mother of five

to head to Selma, as she believed that she had to “Go and suffer with them; you have no right to

remain in your safe white world.”94 Bloody Sunday fueled LaFayette as he soon started acting as

a strategist, as he quickly rounded, “. . . up willing participants who were already involved in the

Chicago project, including gang members who had been trained in nonviolence, and made plans

to transport them to Selma. I arranged for many cars and vans to load up with people and head

down to Selma, an entire range from gang members to church members.”95 SNCC member John

Lewis recalls that the response to Bloody Sunday was immediate, “By midnight that evening,

even as I lay asleep in my room over at Good Samaritan, people from as far away as New York

and Minnesota were flying into Alabama and driving to Selma, forming a vigil of their own

outside Brown’s Chapel.”96 By the time Lewis woke up the next morning, “Several carloads, and 92 John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 1998), 343.93 Bernard LaFayette, In Peace and Freedom My Journey in Selma (Lexington, KY: University Press of

Kentucky, 2015), 125-126. 94 “Barbra Krasner Testimonial” March 18 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: XV: 37, 01388.95 Bernard LaFayette, In Peace and Freedom My Journey in Selma (Lexington, KY: University Press of

Kentucky, 2015), 126. 96 John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon &

Schuster, 1998), 345.


truckloads [had arrived] as well, of SNCC field workers from Mississippi had rushed in that day,

along with a chartered plane of staff people from Atlanta—Forman and others. All told, more

than thirty SNCC people had arrived in Selma by that afternoon.”97 While the violence of Bloody

Sunday was horrendous it did evoke people to mobilize, and to join the movement in Selma.

After Bloody Sunday SNCC and SCLC struggled with how to move forward after the

horrific events of the previous day. On March eighth 1965, the day after Bloody Sunday SCLC’s

leader Martin Luther King declared, “We’ve gone too far to turn back now. . . We must let them

know that nothing can stop us—not even death itself. We must be ready for a season of

suffering. The only way we can achieve freedom is to conquer the fear of death.”98 It was two

days later on Tuesday March ninth that marchers yet again crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge in

the hopes of reaching Montgomery. But when Dr. King who was leading this march, “. . .

reached the city limits sign, he dropped down on his knees, and Rev. Abernathy prayed. The

entire crowd knelt in prayer with him. When he finished, he rose; everyone turned around and

walked back across the bridge. . . . Critics later referred to it as “Turnaround Tuesday.””99 King

ultimately decided to turn the march around, due to the restraining order against the march which

had been issued by Judge Johnson. He made this decision, because he had promised federal

officials that he would turn the marchers around as a symbolic gesture in order to, “. . . await

Judge Johnson’s hearing later that week.”100 Shortly thereafter, Johnson ruled in their favor






proclaiming that the march from Selma to Montgomery could continue, as long as the marchers

followed the enforced guidelines.101

Tensions quickly intensified after Turnaround Tuesday as many within SNCC saw this as

the final straw. SNCC member Bernard LaFayette remembers that “Some members of SNCC

criticized SCLC and Dr. King for turning around in the second march.”102 One of the members of

SNCC who criticized SCLC after Turnaround Tuesday was SNCC’s executive secretary Jim

Forman who was livid at the trickery, double dipping, betrayal, and duplicity of Dr. King.103

SNCC chairman John Lewis remembers that this was “the last straw” for SNCC.104 Soon after

this Lewis recalled “There would be no more working with the SCLC. There would be no

waiting for a judge’s injunction. SNCC was finished with waiting, finished with Selma.”105 Only

twenty-four hours later SNCC began to shift its focus and manpower from the streets of Selma to

Montgomery.

Despite SNCC’s withdrawal from Selma the relationship between SNCC and SCLC

changed as a result of the Selma to Montgomery march. While “. . . SNCC officials refused to

endorse the demonstration . . . they did allow SNCC members to participate individually. From

the very beginning, SNCC’s national chairman John Lewis, was committed to the march;

SNCC’s executive secretary, James Forman, would eventually join the march as well.”106 John

101 “Williams vs. Wallace” March 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: VIII: 23, 1050.


103 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 73-74; John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 348-349.





Lewis contrast this as he recalls that this march would involve the “. . . full participation of

SNCC, the SCLC, the NAACP, the Urban League and every civil and human rights organization

in the United States.”107 Despite the presence of SNCC during this march tensions still existed.

This is the case, because some like SNCC member Stokley Carmichael couldn’t understand why

Lewis wanted to participate in this march, so he decided to use this as the opportunity to seek out

the people from Lowndes County promising them SNCC would stay rather than just passing

through.108 Another point of frustration between the two organizations was King’s public

domination when they reached Montgomery. While SNCC chairman John Lewis did have the

chance to speak his remarks where ceded by Dr. King whose speech is remembered as his “. . .

majestic oratory [which] provided a triumphant conclusion to the Selma to Montgomery

march.”109 One can then infer that SNCC would be frustrated by the public domination of King

as he overshadowed the work that SNCC had been doing in Selma in order to empower

indigenous leadership.

One of the consequence of the fallout between SNCC and SCLC over the campaign in

Selma is that it fractured SNCC. SNCC chairman John Lewis recalls, “My feelings and

philosophy about the movement, about our strategies and tactics, my commitment to

nonviolence, my loyalty to Dr. King were all increasingly putting me at odds with many of my

SNCC colleagues. . . . Most of the people in SNCC were sick of me.”110 Among those was SNCC

member Stokley Carmichael who within his autobiography recalls that “All told, it was not our



109 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 97; John Lewis, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 345.



finest hour. John Lewis, our chairman, was clear. He was going to march. Not as chairman of

SNCC? people asked. Well, he said, he was also on the SCLC board. Folks wondered just what

that meant.”111 SNCC executive secretary James Forman furthered explored the fracturing of

SNCC after Selma as he explained that during this time SNCC was facing, “. . . internal

problems, especially those created by individualism and a lack of self-discipline-”112 SNCC

member Barbra Brandt recalled that,

“After the events in Selma, SNCC began to change. Despite all those years of nonviolent self-sacrifice, the oppression and brutality were still going on. The people had not gotten their freedom—they’d just gotten another crack on the head. The black staff in the Atlanta office began to make increasingly bitter comments about “nonviolence” and “love” and “brotherhood.””113

Lewis too believed that after Selma the group started to change and even crumble as he stated,

“It had been Selma that held us together as long as we did. After that, we just came apart.”114

Shortly thereafter, in May of 1966 John Lewis was replaced as the chairman of SNCC in favor of

Stokley Carmichael. This change in leadership signaled a change in direction of SNCC from

nonviolence and integration toward Black Nationalism.115

Another consequence of SNCC and SCLC’s campaign in Selma is the passing of the

1965 Voting Rights Act. On March fifteenth 1965 shortly after Bloody Sunday and Turnaround

Tuesday, President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress to ask them to consider

111Stokley Carmichael and Michael Thelwell, Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (New York City, NY: Scribner, 2003), 455.

112 James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1972), 443-444.

113 Faith Holsaert, “Part Eight Fighting Another Day: The Mississippi Movement after Atlantic City, 1964-1966,” in Hands on the Freedom Plow: Personal Accounts by Women in SNCC, by Faith Holsaert (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 434.


115Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 114.


passing his voting rights bill.116 Within this speech Johnson promised the nation that “we shall

overcome” and “. . . allied himself with the civil rights movement.”117 SNCC’s executive

secretary James Forman “. . . remained skeptical, calling Johnson’s use of the movement‘s

phrase a “tinkling empty symbol” and said that the president had “spoiled a good song.””118 But

on August sixth, 1965 President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law.119 This law “. . .

banned racial discrimination and secured equal voting rights for black citizens.”120 The Voting

Rights Act stated that, “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or

procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the

right of any citizen of the United States to vote in account of race or color.”121 SNCC chairman

John Lewis remembers seeing the passing of this bill as “. . . a culmination, a climax, the end of

a very long road. In the sense it represented a high point in modern America, probably the

nation’s finest hour in terms of civil rights.”122

Central to the discussion about SNCC and SCLC’s role in Selma is the debate over who

played a greater role in the advancement of the Civil Rights Movement, be it federal leadership

and national organizations or the grassroots organizing of individuals who worked to spark mass

116 “The White House Remarks of the President to a Joint Session of Congress” March 15, 1965, Civil Rights During The Johnson Administration. 1963-1969 (Dubuque, IA: Loras College Library Microfilm Collection), Box: Six; 12, 00053.

117 “We Shall Overcome…” August 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: I: 1, 1025; Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 83.


119 “Executive Office of the President” August 1965, Civil Rights During The Johnson Administration. 1963-1969 (Dubuque, IA: Loras College Library Microfilm Collection), Box: Two; 3, 00646; Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 107.

120Bernard LaFayette, In Peace and Freedom My Journey in Selma (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 143.

121 “H.R. 6400” Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), A: XVI: 70, 0922.



protest. Steven Lawson and Charles Payne in their work, Debating the Civil Rights Movement,

1945-1968 explore this argument through their focus on the view from nation and the view from

the trenches. Lawson within his section entitled “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The

View from the Nation” argues that it was the federal government, national leaders, and national

organizations who made the most advancements.123 Lawson makes this argument, because he

didn’t believe that the federal government was taking action based off of the actions of the

grassroots, rather he believed change came as a result of the actions of national organizations and

key national figures.124 Payne on the other hand disagrees with this within his section entitled,

“Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches” in which he argues, that it

was the people within the trenches who played the most influential role in the advancement of

the Civil Rights Movement.125 Payne makes this argument, because he believed that the actions

on the level of the grassroots organizers resulted in more change.126 Ultimately, both Payne and

Lawson strongly argue their positions, but where the tensions between SNCC and SCLC lie

within their argument isn’t as clear.

The tensions between SNCC and SCLC within Selma could be used to explore both

Lawson and Payne’s arguments. These tensions could be used to examine Lawson’s argument of

the view from the nation, due to the passing of President Johnson’s 1965 Voting Rights Act

which came as a result of these two national organizations working in Selma. However, the

tensions between SNCC and SCLC within Selma, fits more in line with Payne’s argument of the

view from the trenches. This is the case, because SNCC was working closely with the people 123 Steven Lawson, “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Nation,” in Debating the

Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968, by Steven Lawson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 3-4. 124 Steven Lawson, “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Nation,” in Debating the

Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968, by Steven Lawson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 3. 125 Steven Lawson, “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches,” in Debating the

Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968, by Charles Payne (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 115-116. 126 Steven Lawson, “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches,” in Debating the

Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968, by Charles Payne (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 116.


within the trenches. SNCC chairman Stokley Carmichael said that his goal from the march from

Selma to Montgomery was to, “. . . seek out all of the people from Lowndes County who came to

the march. I would get them, write down their names, their addresses, record it, and tell them

“Listen, we are going to stay in Lowndes County, we’re not just going to pass through.””127

SNCC’s grassroots campaign in Selma is then more in line with Payne’s argument, because

SNCC was working and encouraging the people within the trenches. SNCC activist and the

founder of the Selma campaign, Bernard LaFayette believed that it was SNCC’s commitment to

the grassroots in Selma, which allowed this campaign to be successful while empowering a

secure local base. He stated this within his 2015 memoir In Peace and Freedom My Journey in

Selma when he recalled,

“My mission was accomplished during the two years of working in Selma. I felt that the part I played in getting things started then fading back and allowing the natural leadership of the community to emerge was not only strategically correct; it was my personal design to push that leadership forward. I was proud that I was able to work effectively within the community to bring about specific changes in the voter registration process. Equally important, I was honored to have worked closely with such an amazing group of individuals who helped the people in the Black Belt of Alabama transform internally. They also realized that they had the power to effect change when they worked together toward a common goal. Although it was just one campaign, I believe that the lessons learned from Selma can generalize to other movements. It was a huge national triumph that began in one small Alabama town.” 128

Ultimately, LaFaette believed that it was SNCC’s involvement on the grassroots level which

allowed them to not only empower a secure and strong local base, but to create national change.

John Lewis within his 1998 memoir Walking With the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement,

furthered this, as he believed that any and all success that SNCC had gained was due to their

involvement on the grassroots level. He believed that it was this which differentiated SNCC from

SCLC the most because, SNCC went “. . . out on the byways and highways to connect with




people, the true masses. . . . we did go out and live and suffer with the everyday people. That

was the key to whatever success we were able to achieve.”129 Overall, it was SNCC’s

involvement and encouragement to the everyday people which allowed them to not only

empower a strong and secure local base but to then create a national change.

In 1965 Selma’s population was 28, 385 of this 57 percent or 13, 969 were African

American, but only .9 percent were registered voters .130 SNCC established a voting rights

campaign in 1963 despite the preexisting violent white power structure, in order to engage the

African American community who had never before seen a black vote. SNCC’s efforts however,

were confronted by the arrival of SCLC who decided they too would launch a campaign in

Selma, due to the existence of SNCC’s campaign. The presence of SNCC and SCLC in Selma

resulted in tensions, due to their conflicting viewpoints over logistics, organizational structuring,

and the importance of empowering a secure local base. The consequences of these tension lived

on long after the campaigns in Selma had ended, because they resulted in the fracturing of

SNCC, and the creation and passing of Johnson’s highly influential 1965 Voting Rights Act. On

Tuesday, August tenth federal examiners opened the Federal Building in Selma to a crowd of

300 African Americans, at the conclusion of the day there was 107 newly registered voters in

Selma.131 By the end of August 1965, 60,000 African American voters had been registered not

only in Alabama but within Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana, far exceeding SNCC’s goal of

one man one vote.132


130 “Selma and Dallas County, Alabama: A Statistical Roundup” March 1965, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers.1959-1972 (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), microfilm, A: VIII: 18, 1047; Daniel Luck, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 141.

131Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 113-114.

132 Robert Pratt, Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 113-114.


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Pratt, Robert A. Selma's Bloody Sunday: Protest, Voting Rights, and the Struggle for

Racial Equality. Witness to History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017.

Stanton, Mary. From Selma to Sorrow: The Life and Death of Viola Liuzzo. Athens: University

of Georgia Press, 1998.

Thornton, J. Mills. Dividing Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights

in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002.

Hannah Dirks

Participation: 85 B (good preparation for seminar and participation when required, quality of work good); 88 B+; C+ 77 = 83% B

Peer Review: 84 B (see proposal rubric for feedback); review of initial project of David Hayes – 92 A- -- honesty with the author about the lack of a persuasive argument due to organization and evidence use; also effort to point out to author places where paragraphs could be broken into multiple claims; Could you offer an alternative organizational structure to the author?; B+ 88 = 88 B+

Project Proposal: 82 B- Initial Project: 77% C+

Midterm Grade: 83 B

Presentation: 93% A

An excellent presentation due to the clear statement of thesis, structure organized clearly by claims, evidence well-identified and drawn from a variety of sources. Good use of script,


professional demeanor and well-delivered, good eye contact. At times your pace went a bit fast, perhaps out of anxiety. Excellent fielding of questions and additional content shows depth of understanding and you demonstrated increased confidence over the course of your question section. YOU SHOULD PRESENT AT THE LEGACY SYMPOSIUM!

Ideas to consider for your final thesis project:

1. Conflicting viewpoints and tension over ideology is central to your thesis – how are you in dialogue with other scholars on your topic? Where do your fit in the Selma historiography?

2. How did SNCC policy change (or not) over the course of the Selma-Montgomery March? That multi-day event was largely absent from your presentation.

3. What role did SNCC play in the series of speeches in Montgomery? King is most associated with that part of the event. Did SNCC cede the field to SCLC?

Final Project: 85 B x 5 = 425

A solid research paper but not a thesis that introduces new knowledge. In it you demonstrate your ability to utilize Toulmin—good claim and evidence structure—and increased the number of primary resources integrated into the argument. Several of your pieces are quite interesting and new to me. But, ultimately, the secondary sources (especially Pratt) drove your argument. The consequences of the march could have been a place for you to tie the historiography together in a new way—for example, you overview the consequences in one paragraph each—this exploration would be very fruitful. For example, how do the arguments of Pratt and Jeffries (Bloody Lowdnes) come together?

I still think you should present at the Legacy symposium – you have a good argument to make orally, especially to a non-scholarly audience.

HIS 490 Final Grade: 848 = 85% B

“One Man One Vote”: The Tension between SNCC and SCLC in ... file · Web viewSelma to Saigon:...

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Transcript of “One Man One Vote”: The Tension between SNCC and SCLC in ... file · Web viewSelma to Saigon:...