officials bureaucracy Accountability RTI open · 34 Source: UC Analysis Appropriate Representation...

Copyright © Jay P Desai, 2013. All Rights Reserved Accountability: Angst, Awareness, Action

bills

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Accountability democracy

culture

performance elections

tran

spar

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officials

liability

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tole

ranc

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information

solic

it control

implementation

improve

policy

independence

literacy

invo

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transfers

infr

astr

uctu

re

monitoring

reform Judiciary regulations

hierarchy

responsibility justification

authority laws

bureaucracy

decisions

impa

rtia

lity

acts

civi

c pa

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Institutions vo

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perf

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Exec

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right

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agencies

enforcement

Legislature

open

debate ci

tizen

s Angst Action

Awareness

Constitution governance

parliament

answerability

dism

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audi

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RTI

PIL

Objective

advocacy

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achm

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CSO

foundation


Jay P Desai Founder & CEO

Universal Consulting India Pvt Ltd

Accountability Angst Awareness Action


2

To increase the public understanding of accountability

Objective

Angst Awareness Action


3

&  Angst A Question of Accountability

The Accountability Deficit

&  Awareness Unveiling the Shroud

Three-Dimensional Accountability

&  Action The Six Initiatives

The Five-Fold Path Epilogue

The Origin of Angst

citiz

ens

Angst


5

A Question of Accountability

“A prudent question is one-half of wisdom.”

Francis Bacon, 1561–1626


6

A host of acute and chronic tragedies underline the lack of accountability within the public administration

Institutions

Distribution

Healthcare

Education

l  Public projects and auctions face accusations of financial impropriety

l  Inept public response systems exacerbate natural and industrial disasters

l  Millions of tonnes of food grains rot in warehouses every monsoon due to inefficiencies in the Public Distribution System (PDS)

l  High absenteeism among doctors and support staff, chronic shortage of medicines, primitive facilities, unhygienic conditions and sub-standard care

l  Poor educational infrastructure and absent teachers plague the public education system


7

The Origin of Angst “Set up eyes and ears in your kingdom that pick up weak

signals before your enemies.”

Machiavelli, 1469–1527


Independent India Vedic Age Mauryan and Gupta Empire

Medieval and Post-Medieval India Colonial India

60yrs 200 yrs 1500 yrs 2500 yrs 3500 yrs Years Ago

l  King was the supreme authority, but provisions to depose him in case of misconduct existed

l  People’s opinions were invited on important matters through Public Meetings called Sabha and Samiti

l  Arthashastra emphasised on the system of spies and penalties to check mal-practices in society

l  However, it justified bribery or fraud, if is was conducted for welfare of the State

l  Corruption in civil service increased, as monetary tips to officials in return of a favour became a norm

l  Usage of information gatherers or spies to report corruption cases of officials continued in this era too

l  Formal mechanisms like Auditors and Committees to check public finance were introduced

l  Role of citizens and media in protesting against wrong Government practices increased

l  India moved to democracy, introduced the Constitution and elections

l  Framework of institutions and policies to check accountability introduced

l  CSOs and the media have been playing an important role in exposing corruption

8 Source: UC Analysis, Secondary Research

Socio-Cultural Structure l  Social stratification

into four castes l  Introduction of

Hinduism, belief in God l  Epics like Mahabharata

emphasized on dharma (conduct), where morality/fair play was secondary

l  Caste based rigidity increased with rules and penalties for each strata defined in Manusmriti

l  Foundation of Islam religion was laid

l  Religious tolerance reduced as most Mughal rulers discriminated against practitioners of other religions

l  Differentiation between castes deepened due to:

-  Introduction of caste-based census

-  Reservation of seats for ‘Scheduled Castes’ in the legislatures

l  Caste has degenerated into an inflexible hierarchical system

l  Communal harmony has reduced due to high social diversity

Institutional Structure

Social institutions and accountability practices that originated thousands of years ago, mould our view of accountability today


Citizens Charter

9

Pre-1900 1900 -1925 1925 -1950 1950 -1975 1975 - 2000 2000 - 2009

CAG

USA

UK

India

CAG

CAG

RTI

RTI

RTI

PIL

PIL

LP

EC

EC

EC

DAC

DAC

DAJ

LP CC

CC

WBP

WBP

2009 onwards

DAJ WBP

Source: UC Analysis, Secondary Research

Comptroller & Auditor General

LP Age of democracy: 59 yrs

Age of democracy: 129 yrs

Age of democracy : 200 yrs

CAG

PIL Public Interest Litigation

Right to Information

Disclosure of Assets by Judges/Candidates

RTI

DAC

Election Commission EC

CC

Lokpal LP

WBP Whistleblowers Protection DAJ

Pending

MS

US

MS

US MS

US

Male Suffrage MS

US Universal Suffrage

Although many key accountability mechanisms have already been introduced in India, the lack of proper implementation is a roadblock


10

The Accountability Deficit

“The hardest thing to see is what is in front of your eyes.”

Goethe, 1749–1832


Source: Wignaraja, Kanni. “Mutual Accountability Mechanisms: Accountability, Voice and Responsiveness.”, UNDP Development Group (2006); Bovens, Mark. “Public Accountability.”, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005

11

Public Officials Citizens/ CSOs/ Media

Objects (Duty Bearers) Agents (Rights Holders) Accountability Mechanisms

•  Justification •  Information •  Reward •  Punishment

Accountability is a two way process – it is the responsibility of public officials to justify their conduct to citizens by using accountability mechanisms. It is also the responsibility of citizens to extract answerability and sanction public officials


12

Source: UC Analysis, Bovens, Mark. “Public Accountability.”, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005

Appropriate Representation

Participative Conduct

Legitimate Conduct

Liability Enforcement

Accountability Proactive Reactive

Accountability should be both proactive - ensuring selection of right public officials and participative governance process; and reactive - ensuring transparent and legitimate conduct and enforcing liability for conduct on public officials

l  Electing/ appointing public officials through an objective and transparent process

l  Inviting participation of stakeholders like citizens, CSOs and media, in policy formulation and implementation

l  Monitoring and assessing the performance of public officials, to ensure transparent, fair and honest functioning

l  Applying penalties such as legal proceedings, penalty fees or resignation, against errant public officials


13

Source: UC Analysis; W. Carrington, J Debuse, H. Lee. “The Theory of Governance and Accountability”, The University of Iowa Centre for International Finance and Development, 2008

ACCOUNTABILITY

Social Performance

Economic Performance

Governance Performance

It is imperative to improve governance, to strengthen the economic and social performance of a country


14

Source: UC Analysis, ‘Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009; ‘Corruption Perception Index’, Transparency International, 2010;

Worldwide Governance Indicators (2009)

Corruption Perceptions Index (2010)*

World Bank

Transparency International 87 78 69 154 20 22

India China Brazil Russia USA UK Index Institution

Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices.

112 148 91 26 20 161

178

Total

213

Democracy Index (2010) The Economist Intelligence Unit 40 136 47 17 19 107 167

*India’s 2011 rank is 95

Governance Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight the poor quality of governance in India, on a comparative basis


15

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Doing Business Index 2010’, World Bank; ‘Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009

Doing Business Index (2010)

Global Competitiveness Index (2010-11)

World Bank

World Economic Forum

133

51

89

27

129

58 63

4 5

12 4

120


Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices

Total

139

183

Economic Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight India’s poor comparative ranking on economic indicators


16

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Doing Business Index 2010’, World Bank; ‘Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009

Economic Performance: Poor governance reflects in the poor economic performance of the country

-2

-1

0

1

2

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0

Governance and Economic Performance Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Score 2009 (#)

Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11 (#)

Sample size: 96 countries

India

l  Governance performance is measured using the scores of countries on Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2009

l  Economic performance is measured using scores of countries on Global Competitiveness Index in 2010-11

l  The correlation between Worldwide Governance Indicators and Global Competitiveness Index shows a very high positive correlation co-efficient (r) of 0.86

l  This indicates a very strong relationship between governance performance and economic performance of a country

l  Poor governance in India is reflected in its poor economic performance, in global surveys (see below)

r = 0.86

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7


17

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Human Development Index - 2010’, Human Development Report 2010, UNDP; ‘Global Gender Gap Index 2010’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009

Human Development Index (2010)

United Nations Development Programme

119


Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices

89 73 4 26 65

Global Gender Gap Index (2010) 112 61 85 19 15 45

World Economic Forum

Total

134

169

Social Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight India’s poor comparative ranking on social indicators


18

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Human Development Index - 2010’, Human Development Report 2010, UNDP; ‘Global Gender Gap Index 2010’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009

-2

-1

0

1

2

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Governance and Social Performance Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Score 2009 (#)

r = 0.76

Human Development Index 2010 (#)

Sample size: 98 countries

l  Governance performance is measured using the World Bank’s World-wide Governance Indicators (WGI) score 2009

l  Social performance is measured using UNDP’s Human Development Index score 2010

l  The correlation between Worldwide Governance Indicators and Human Development Index shows a high positive correlation co-efficient (r) of 0.76

l  This indicates a strong relationship between governance performance and social performance of a country

l  Poor governance in India is reflected in its poor social performance, in global surveys (see below)

Social Performance: Poor governance also reflects in the poor social performance of the country

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.76

citiz

ens

Awareness


20

Unveiling The Shroud “… The success of democracy is not merely a matter of having the most perfect institutional structure that we can think of. It depends inescapably on our actual behaviour patterns and

the working of political and social interactions ….”

Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice


Source: UC Analysis 21

Income Per Capita

Social Hierarchy

Democratic Lineage

Adult Literacy

Individualism

Population

Social Diversity

Urbanisation

Number of years since the country attained democracy

Gross Domestic Product per capita, as an indicator of economic development (Income Per Capita = GDP/ Population)

Share of total population residing in urban areas

Share of adult population that is literate (adult literacy defined by UNESCO as individuals over 15 yrs of age, who can read and write simple statements)

Degree of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation in a country

Extent of inequality of power and wealth, as perceived and accepted by less powerful individuals, or groups

Degree to which individuals are integrated/dis-integrated into groups

Size of population of the country

Voter Turnout Percentage of registered voters who casted vote in elections

We examined Socio-Economic factors across 60-100 countries to understand their correlation with governance


World Average: 12.5

USD Thousands

Source: UC Analysis; ‘GDP Per Capita (PPP)’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010; Kaufmann Daniel and Art Kraay, “Growth without governance”, The World Bank, 2002

22

Per Capita Income Correlation

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

r = 0.87

Income Per Capita (PPP) 2009

Sample Size: 99 countries

There is strong correlation between income per capita and governance. World Bank research suggests that governance matters significantly for growth in the per capita income in the long run

Income Per Capita (PPP) 2009

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Score 2009

10 7 3

19

37

46

0

10

20

30

40

50

USA UK Russia Brazil China India

Income Per Capita – Are most countries with lower income levels, like India, destined to have poor quality of governance and accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.87


Scores (#)

World Average: 43

Source: UC Analysis; Hofstede Geert, ‘Individualism Index ’, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind, 2010; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

23

Individualism Correlation

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 20 40 60 80 100

r = 0.69

Individualism (Hofstede’s Individualism Index) score


There is strong correlation between individualism and governance. India’s collectivist culture could be a barrier for India to achieve higher levels of accountability and a better order of governance

39 3820

91 89

48

0

20

40

60

80

100

USA UK India Russia Brazil China

Individualism (Hofstede’s Individualism Index)


Individualism - Is a relatively collectivist society as we find in India, a barrier to achieving higher governance and accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.69


Source: UC Analysis; Hofstede Geert, ‘Power Distance Index’, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind, 2010; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

24

-2

-1

0

1

2

00 20 40 60 80 100 120

r = (0.65)

Social Hierarchy (Hofstede’s Power Distance Index) score

Social Hierarchy Correlation

There is a moderate to strong correlation between social hierarchy and governance. Social hierarchy and the numerous inequalities among the people of India, could be significant obstacles on the pathway to

better governance and greater accountability

Sample Size: 63 countries Social Hierarchy (Hofstede’s Power Distance Index)


World Average: 55

Scores (#)

8069

40 35

7793

0

20

40

60

80

100

Russia China India Brazil USA UK

Social Hierarchy - Does the high degree of social distance, in terms of power & wealth, predispose India to lower governance & accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = (0.65)


58 4560

130162

201

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

210

USA Switzerland UK India Japan Singapore

Years

Source: UC Analysis; 2010; Country Reports, Polity IV project, Center for Systemic Peace; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

25

Democratic Lineage Correlation

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225

r = 0.63

No of years of Democracy (as of 2010)


There is moderate correlation between democratic lineage and governance. Many democracies below the age of 60, have substantially better governance scores than India. Young democracies, therefore,

are equally capable of demonstrating good governance

No of years of Democracy (as of 2010)


Democratic Lineage – Does age of democracy have a strong and significant relationship with governance levels?

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

India

r = 0.63


World Average: 57

(%)

Source: UC Analysis; 2010; ‘Urban Population’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

26

Urbanization Correlation

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

r = 0.55

Urban Population 2009 (% of total population)


There is moderate correlation between urbanization and governance, but rapid urbanization by itself, will not usher in an era of good governance

Urban Population 2009 (% of total population) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Score 2009

7344 30

828690

0

20

40

60

80

100

UK Brazil USA Russia China India

Estimated Urban and Rural population in India

72 70 55

28 30 45

0

20

40

60

80

100

2001-10 E2011-20 E2050

Urban

Rural

(%)

Urbanization – Is this low level of urbanisation in India, a key constraint in achieving high accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.55


(%)

World Average: 89

Source: UC Analysis; Global Rankings – Adult Literacy Rate (Total), UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2008; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

27

There is a weak-moderate correlation between adult literacy levels and governance. High adult literacy, thus, does not necessarily mean better quality of governance. Good governance is certainly not just the

preserve of the well-read

-2

-1

0

1

2

00 20 40 60 80 100

r = 0.50


Adult Literacy Rate (%)

Correlation

300 Mn

300 Mn

Adult Literacy

99 99 94 90

66

99

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

UK USA Russia China Brazil India

Adult Literacy Rate 2008


Adult Literacy - Is the low level of adult literacy in India a key constraint in achieving high levels of governance and accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.50


(%)

World Average: 69.5

Source: UC Analysis; 2010; ‘Unified Database’, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

28

Voter Turnout Correlation

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 20 40 60 80 100

r = 0.33

Average Voter Turnout (%)


There is weak correlation between voter turnout and governance. This suggests that voter turnout, while important, is not sufficient to address the issue of poor governance

69 65 595975

8586

0

20

40

60

80

100

Denmark Germany UK Japan USA India Russia

Average Voter Turnout


Voter Turnout – Does low voter participation act as a roadblock to achieving better governance?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = 0.33


World Average: 0.775

Source: UC Analysis; Okediji, T, ‘Social Diversity Index- The dynamics of ethnic fragmentation: a proposal for an expanded measurement index’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2005; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

29

-2

-1

0

1

2

0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20

r = (0.28)

Social Diversity Index (Score)

Social Diversity Correlation


There is a weak correlation between social diversity levels and governance. This shows that India’s great diversity is not argument enough to justify the poor quality of governance in India

Social Diversity Index

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Score 2009 Scores (#)

0.96 0.88 0.850.66

0.98

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

India USA China UK Brazil

Social Diversity - Does high linguistic, cultural & religious fragmentation in India predispose it to lower governance & accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = (0.28)


World Average: 188

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Population’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010

30

-2

-1

0

1

2

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

r = (0.08)

Population (in millions)

Population Correlation


There is a weak correlation between population levels and governance. There is extremely low probability that countries with large populations are automatically relegated to the basket of

poor governance

Population 2009 (in 000’s)


61

1155

193307

1331

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

China India USA Brazil UK

#

Population - Does high population in India predispose it to lower governance and accountability?

India

Moderate

Weak

Strong

+0.5 < r < + 0.7

r < + 0.5

r > + 0.7

r = (0.08)


Source: UC Analysis, Secondary Research 31

100 83

63 28 1

63 49 1

98 21 1

100 89 1

1

100 91 1

78 70 1

85 71 1

100 100 1

Correlation with Governance (r) Socio-Economic Factors

Per Capita Income

Social Hierarchy

Democratic Lineage

Adult Literacy

Individualism

Population

Social Diversity

Urbanisation

Voter Turnout

Strong 0.87

0.69

(0.65)

0.63

0.55

0.50

(0.08)

(0.28)

0.33

Moderate

Weak

India’s Rank

Unfortunately, India’s position on most of the socio-economic factors is weak, limiting its ability to improve its ranking and demonstrate rapid change


32

Three-Dimensional Accountability

“The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new lands, but in seeing with new eyes.”

Marcel Proust, 1871–1922


Source: UC Analysis, Bovens, Mark. “Public Accountability.”, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; Goetz, Anne Marie and Rob Jenkins. “Hybrid Forms of Accountability.”, Public Management Review 3.3 (2001); Schacter, Mark. “When Accountability Fails- A Framework for Diagnosis and Action.” Institute of Governance, Ottawa Policy Brief, 2001

33

Civil Society Organisations Media

Citizens

Legislature Judiciary Executive

Internal Accountability

Independent government agencies (CAG, CVC, CBI..)

External Accountability

Horizontal Accountability

Institutions of Government

Mechanisms of accountability could be internal - imposed from inside by self-monitoring policies; horizontal - imposed by independent government institutions; and external - imposed from outside by citizens, CSOs, media

l  Internal Accountability: A government body monitoring the performance of its staff internally

l  Horizontal Accountability: A government body scrutinizing the activities of another government department

l  External Accountability: Accountability imposed upon the Government from outside, by citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs) and media


34 Source: UC Analysis



Legitimate Conduct


Accountability

Foundations of Accountability

(1st dimension)

Mechanisms of Accountability

(2nd dimension)

Civil Society Organisations Media

Citizens

Legislature

Judiciary

Executive

Independent government agencies (CAG, CVC, CBI..)

Pub

lic

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Pub

lic

Par

ticip

ati

on

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct

l  Accountability mechanisms that help improve the quality of citizen’s representatives in the Government

l  Accountability mechanisms that help improve the performance of the Government officials

l  Accountability mechanisms that help sanction the Government officials for their performance

Liab

ility

E

nfor

cem

ent

Liab

ility

E

nfor

cem

ent

Pub

lic

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Pub

lic

Par

ticip

atio

n Le

gitim

ate

Con

duct


l  Accountability mechanisms that help improve the quality of citizens’ participation in the Government



Judiciary Internal Accountability External

Accountability Horizontal

Accountability


Pub

lic

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Pub

lic

Par

ticip

ati

on

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct




Liab

ility

E

nfor

cem

ent

Liab

ility

E

nfor

cem

ent

Pub

lic

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Pub

lic

Par

ticip

atio

n Le

gitim

ate

Con

duct





Executive Internal Accountability External

Accountability Horizontal

Accountability


Pub

lic

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Pub

lic

Par

ticip

ati

on

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct




Liab

ility

E

nfor

cem

ent

Foun

datio

ns o

f Acc

ount

abili

ty

Liab

ility

En

forc

emen

t A

ppro

pria

te

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Part

icip

ativ

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ondu

ct

Legi

timat

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ct

Legislature

Internal Accountability External Accountability Horizontal Accountability

Enumerate &

Evaluate

We assessed the strength of the internal, horizontal and external accountability mechanisms, across the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, to examine the ability of the mechanisms to support the four foundations of accountability Institutions of

Government (3rd dimension)


35

Does Not Exist

Participative Policy Formulation

No internal check on implementation of citizen’s participation mechanisms

Internal Evaluation of Performance

Lack of checks on parliamentary proceedings and behaviour of MPs

Expulsion of MPs -  Expelling MPs is rare -  No penalties for poor

participation in Parliament

l  Elections Low participation by citizens in elections and biased voting decisions

Citizen’s Evaluation of Performance

-  Poor access to information about MPs’ performance

-  Indifferent attitude of citizens

Election Commission -  Lack of authority with the

Election Commission in controlling unethical voting practices

-  Lack of co-operation from election officers in the voter registration process Participative Policy

Formulation

No independent check to ensure implementation of citizen’s participation mechanisms

Judicial Review -  Judiciary cannot question the functioning of Legislature -  No independent check to review parliamentary proceedings exists

Police, Judiciary -  Political interference in

appointments and transfers -  Lack of accountability -  Inadequate infrastructure

Citizen’s Feedback and Advocacy

-  Low awareness about feedback mechanisms and advocacy organisations

-  Indifferent attitude of citizens


Legislative Accountability A

ppro

pria

te

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Part

icip

ativ

e C

ondu

ct

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct

Liab

ility

En

forc

emen

t

Foun

datio

ns o

f Acc

ount

abili

ty

Public Interest Litigation Difficulty in using PILs due to lack of understanding of scope and application

Right to Recall -  Inadequate implementation

Not Applicable

Legislature: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of these accountability mechanisms


Objective and Transparent Process -  Lack of objective process of selection of Council of Ministers -  Lack of transparency in transfer of public officials

Participative Policy Implementation

No internal check on implementation of citizen’s participation mechanisms

•  Annual Performance Assessment Reports, Results Framework Document

-  Performance not linked with salaries •  Whistle-blowers Protection

-  Inadequate protection to whistle-blowers

Dismissal, Removal or Reduction in Rank

-  Lengthy process to prosecute corrupt officials

-  Lack of action due to political interference

RTI Act, Citizen’s Charter, Budget Advocacy, Social Audits, PETS, Report Cards & Community Scorecards -  Low awareness about

mechanisms -  Low participation by citizens -  Limited reach of CSOs

Objective and Transparent Process -  No independent check on selection of Council of Ministers -  No independent monitoring of the transfers of civil officials

Participative Policy Implementation

No independent agency to check implementation of citizen’s participation mechanisms

Legislature, Parliamentary Committees, Delivery Monitoring Unit, Planning Commission, CAG, CBI, CVC, Lokayukta/ Lokpal

-  Limited authority to take action -  Lack of independence in

functioning -  Political interference

Advocacy and Government-Citizen Initiatives

Lack of decentralized governance structure to encourage local participation


Executive Accountability A

ppro

pria

te

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Part

icip

ativ

e C

ondu

ct

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct

Liab

ility

En

forc

emen

t

Foun

datio

ns o

f Acc

ount

abili

ty

Police, Judiciary -  Political interference in

appointments and transfers -  Lack of accountability -  Inadequate infrastructure

Public Interest Litigation Difficulty in using PILs due to lack of understanding of scope and application

Public Disclosure of Appointments

No justification for transfers available in public domain

36

Does Not Exist

Executive: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of these accountability mechanisms


37

Does Not Exist

Judicial Collegium -  Lack of neutral and external

members in the Collegium -  Lack of an objective and

defined process for appointment

-  Non-transparent and secretive process to appoint judges

Internal Evaluation of Conduct -  Investigation against judges has

been rarely initiated by Collegium or judges

-  CJI rarely grants permission to conduct investigation

Impeachment -  Impeachment is seldom initiated

by the Collegium -  No other mechanism of

imposing minor penalties or punishing judges

Public Evaluation of Conduct -  Difficult to challenge judges

due to threat of ‘contempt of court’

-  Difficult to access information about court proceedings

Independent Evaluation of Conduct No independent agency exists to investigate complaints against the Judiciary

Parliament & President -  Slow and lengthy process of

impeachment -  Political patronage hampers

impeachment process

Public Interest Litigation -  No independent authority

exists to review PILs against Judiciary

-  Difficulty in using PILs due to lack of understanding of scope and application


Weaknesses in Mechanisms of Accountability - Judiciary A

ppro

pria

te

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Part

icip

ativ

e C

ondu

ct

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct

Liab

ility

En

forc

emen

t

Foun

datio

ns o

f Acc

ount

abili

ty

President & Governor -  Limited authority with President

and Governor to challenge the appointment of judges


Judicial Accountability A

ppro

pria

te

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Part

icip

ativ

e C

ondu

ct

Legi

timat

e C

ondu

ct

Liab

ility

En

forc

emen

t

Foun

datio

ns o

f Acc

ount

abili

ty

Public Monitoring of Appointments

-  No voluntary disclosure of information regarding appointments by Judiciary

-  Citizens cannot file RTI for appointment information

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

Judiciary: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of these accountability mechanisms


Source: UC Analysis 38

The four foundations of accountability have been severely weakened by constraints in the implementation of accountability mechanisms

Lack of transparency in appointment and

transfer

Lack of defined criteria for appointment and

transfer

Citizen’s apathy in selecting appropriate

candidates



Legitimate Conduct


Accountability

Lack of authority devolved to local

agencies

Ad-hoc implementation of participation

mechanisms by public officials

Low involvement of citizens in policy-

making

Lack of authority with investigating agencies

like CBI, CVC, CAG

Subjective and non -transparent

performance assessment of officials

Administrative apathy and non-cooperation of

public officials Low awareness of

accountability mechanisms like RTI,

among citizens Low involvement of

citizens in monitoring Government

Corrupt and lengthy process of prosecution

of officials

Low involvement of citizens in monitoring

Government

Lack of adequate infrastructure with law enforcement agencies

Low awareness of accountability

mechanisms like PIL, among citizens


39

Corrupt and lengthy process of prosecution of officials

Foundations Weaknesses Inadequacies



Legitimate Conduct


Citizen’s apathy in selecting appropriate candidates

Lack of defined criteria for appointment and transfer

Lack of transparency in appointment and transfer

Low involvement of citizens in policy-making

Ad-hoc implementation of participation mechanisms by public officials

Lack of authority devolved to local agencies

Lack of authority with investigating agencies, like CBI, CVC, CAG

Low awareness of accountability mechanisms like RTI, among citizens

Subjective and non-transparent performance assessment of officials

Administrative apathy and non-cooperation of public officials

Lack of adequate infrastructure with law enforcement agencies

Low awareness of accountability mechanisms like PIL, among citizens

1

2

3

4

Inadequate Information

1

Inadequate Impartiality

2

Inadequate Implementation

3

Inadequate Infrastructure

4

Inadequate Independence

5

Inadequate Involvement

6

Low involvement of citizens in monitoring Government

Lack of minor penalties like warnings to check mis-conduct

Source: UC Analysis

These constraints can be further categorized into six inadequacies, that limit the performance of the existing accountability mechanisms

citiz

ens

Action


41

The Six Initiatives I hope that I may always desire more than I can accomplish.

Michelangelo, 1475–1564



Impartiality Implementation Infrastructure Independence Involvement

Information Availability

Information Accessibility

Personnel

Technology

Policy Formulation

Performance Evaluation

Redressal Enforcement

Authority to Agencies

Decentralisation

Information

Independent Agency

Fixed Tenure

Performance-linked Incentives

Institutionalisation

Timelines

Penalties

To strengthen the foundations of accountability, initiatives are needed in six areas: Information, Impartiality, Implementation, Infrastructure, Independence and Involvement

1 2 3 4 5 6

No Progress

Strong Progress

Minimal Progress

Partial Progress

Good Progress


Information Availability

Provide information about the amount allocated to public schemes, the amount utilised and the outcome

Provide information on funds allocated, and the amount utilised by the Ministries

Allow citizens to track their public services (license, ration card etc) applications online

43

Initiative 1 - Information: Enhance transparency in government functioning by improving information availability and accessibility

Information Accessibility

Leverage information and communication technology (internet, mobile phones) to foster transparency

Build awareness about accountability mechanisms

Source: UC Analysis

1.1

1.2

Increase transparency in appointments and transfers

Provide information on the operational expenses incurred by Ministries

None Strong Minimal Partial Good

Progress


Independent Agency

Form an independent agency to overlook appointments and transfers

44

Initiative 2 - Impartiality: Introduce independent check on appointment and transfers, fixed tenure and performance-linked incentives

Fixed Tenure

Introduce fixed tenure for civil service officials to avoid rampant transfers

Source: UC Analysis

2.1

2.2

Performance-linked Incentives

Introduce performance-linked incentives and build an integrated performance management system

2.3


Progress


45

Initiative 3 - Implementation: Strengthen implementation of policies by institutionalising social accountability checks, prescribing timelines and penalising officials for poor performance

Source: UC Analysis

Institutionalisation

Institutionalise social accountability mechanisms as part of governance structure

Timelines

Prescribe timelines for implementation of accountability mechanisms

3.1

3.2

Penalties 3.3

Introduce penalties as a part of accountability mechanisms and public schemes


Progress


Personnel

Provide adequate personnel to accountability agencies

Provide training to improve effectiveness of personnel

46

Initiative 4 - Infrastructure: Provide adequate infrastructure support in the form of personnel and technology

Technology

Leverage information technology and telecommunications to facilitate enforcement of accountability

Source: UC Analysis

4.1

4.2


Progress


Authority to Agencies

Provide adequate authority to monitoring agencies

47

Initiative 5 - Independence: Empower monitoring agencies and decentralize authority, to enable them to function effectively

Delegation of Power

Strengthen local authorities by delegating power

Source: UC Analysis

5.1

5.2


Progress


Policy Formulation

Participate in policy formulation

Track public expenditure

Evaluate quality of public services

48

Initiative 6 - Involvement: Increase participation of citizens in seeking accountability for non-performance

Redressal Enforcement

Complain against poor delivery of public services

Complain against corrupt officials

Source: UC Analysis

6.1

6.3

Performance Evaluation 6.2

Participate in budget formulation


Progress


49

The Five-Fold Path “What would life be if we had no courage to attempt anything?”

Vincent Willem van Gogh, 1853–90


50

Provide Time

Encourage employees to volunteer time for CSOs: •  Infosys employees can opt to work for a year with a CSO at half the

salary •  HSBC and Standard Chartered encourage their staff to officially dedicate

some time and energy for social causes

1

Provide Media Access

Sponsor media campaigns of CSOs:

•  Tata Tea supported the Jaago Re! campaign of a CSO, to build citizen’s awareness on the importance of voting

•  NDTV supported and screened the ‘RTI Awards’ organised by a CSO

2

Provide Intellectual Capacity

Conduct research for CSOs, or share technical expertise in areas like legal or financial analysis:

•  Accenture extends its expertise and skills to local CSOs, at lower fees •  A law firm, Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre, supports

CSOs by providing legal advice, legal research and litigation support

3


51

Provide Technology & Infrastructure

Corporates can provide CSOs with IT infrastructure or physical infrastructure: •  SP Jain Institute provides a CSO with office space and lecture room to

conduct workshops •  The ‘ConnectIT’ workshops run by the NASSCOM Foundation, was

aimed at building IT capacity in NGOs

4

Provide Monetary Support

Corporates can provide grants/sponsorships to CSOs: •  Ford Foundation, set by the Ford Motor Company provides grants to

CSOs working for various causes •  National Foundation of India (www.nfi.org.in) collects funds from

corporates and provides them to CSOs focused on specific issues

5


52

Epilogue “There is a tide in the affairs of men.

Which, taken at the flood, leads to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat,

And we must take the current where it serves, Or lose all our ventures”

William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 1564–1616



1 3 7 6 4 5

1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010

53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 89

9 8 11

15 14

13 16

10 17

12 18 20 19 24 21

22

23

65 80

Phase I Phase II Phase III

25 36 26

29 28

37 30

27 31

33 34

32

35 39 38 42 46 45 40 43

44 41 47

25. New industrial policy

26. FDI allowed in various sectors

27. Banking reforms

33. SEBI set up

28. Rules of FERA liberalised

29. Investment of foreign equity allowed

30. FIIs were permitted

31. Greater freedom to banks

44. Quantitative restrictions on imports removed

45. Competition commission set up

92 98 01 04 07 95

32. Creation of NSE

47. VAT implemented

1. Nationalisation of RBI

2. Planning Commission formed

5. Development Banks

6.  Few industries opened to foreign investment

3. Industrial development strategy

7. Foreign Investment Promotion Board

9. RBI strongly regulated banks

4. India investment centre created

12. Nationalisation of insurance companies

17. Regional rural banks set up

13. Inspector Raj

18. Delicensing of c. 50 sectors

21. Restrictions on imports liberalised

14. FERA implemented

19. Production capacity limits removed

22. Tax rates reduced

15. Restriction imposed on industries

20. Foreign equity permitted

23. Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction

16. Import restrictions

2

8.  Monopolies Restrictive Practices Act

35. Tax reforms

36. Private & foreign banks allowed

38. FDI limits increased

39. Further de-licensing

40. FERA replaced by FEMA

42. Disinvest-ment of sick PSUs

Pre’50 10

Negative impact Positive impact

10. Nationalisation of banks

11. New industrial licensing policy

24.  One committee system for approval

34. Firms allowed to raise capital from abroad

41. IRDA set up

43. Foreign participation in JVs increased

46. De-reservation of items

Significant economic reforms have been introduced since 1991



1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010

53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 89 65 80


23. Panchayati Raj Institution

29. Mandatory disclosure of information by election candidates

33. Centralized Public Grievance Redress & Monitoring System

24. Alternate Dispute Resolution

34. SC Judges declare assets & HC Judges agree to disclose assets

25. Citizen’s Charter

35. Delivery Monitoring Unit

92 98 01 04 07 95

1. Official Secrets Act

11. Central Vigilance Commission

2. Enactment of the Constitution

12. Central Civil Services Conduct Rules

3. Parliamentary Committees

13. 1st Administrative Reforms Commission

4. Comptroller and Auditor General

4 5

20 13 25 28 29 31 9 21 26 10 11

6

3

27

30

2 19 22 24 14 7

12

15 16 17

6. Union Public Service Commission

7. First General elections

8. Programme Evaluation Organisation

9. Law Commission

14. Judges Inquiry Act

15. Maintenance of Internal Security Act

21.  First Lokayukta

16. Censor- ship of media

19. National Police Commission

17. Political parties were banned

26. Judicial Collegium

31. Mandatory social audit as part of NREGS

34

36. UID-Aadhar rollout

18

22. Prevention of Corruption Act

30.  RTI Act implemented at national level

23

35

27. Bhagidari Initiative

1

50 Pre’50

8

5. Election Commission

10. Central Bureau of Investigation

32

10

Negative impact

Positive impact

36

33. National e-Governance plan

18. Controller General of Accounts

20. Public Interest Litigation

33

32. Outcome budgeting

Governance reforms have been few and sparse over the past decades, resulting in poor quality of governance and lower accountability



Has negative impact

Has positive impact

1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010

53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 89 65 80


92 98 01 04 07 95

Key Accountability Policies

1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010

53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 89 65 80


92 98 01 04 07 95 50

50

Pre’50

Pre’50

Burst of economic reforms

Burst of accountability

reforms needed

Key Economic Policies

10

10

A burst of high-intensity governance reforms, similar to the economic reforms during liberalisation are needed to improve accountability & governance


Implementation of accountability mechanisms

Valley of Despair

Per

ceiv

ed A

ccou

ntab

ility

New Equilibrium

Initial Equilibrium

Tipping Point

Low

High

Exposure of misgovernance by

media, citizens, CSOs Improvement in Accountability

?

?

India’s position in 2011

External Accountability

Internal, Horizontal & External Accountability

?

?

?

56

Looking at the current pace of reforms, it is likely that we will see a measurable improvement in accountability medium to long term




Legitimate Conduct


“…You must be the change you want to see in the world…” Mahatma Gandhi

57

Accountability

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