O Guarda e a Fórmula · 5 According to Alexy, adopts the perspective of the participant who, in a...

Rev.DireitoPráx.,RiodeJaneiro,V.10,N.4,2019p.2428-2456.CarlosEduardoPalettaeJoãoVitorDeFreitasMoreiraDOI:10.1590/2179-8966/2019/35974|ISSN:2179-8966

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OGuardaeaFórmulaTheGuardAndTheFormula

CarlosEduardoPalettaGuedes11 Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, Brasil. E-mail:[email protected]:https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8553-560X.

JoãoVitorDeFreitasMoreira22 Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brasil. E-mail:[email protected]:https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8508-7699.Artigorecebidoem11/07/2018eaceitoem8/03/2019.

ThisworkislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense


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Resumo

O presente artigo discute os limites da teoria jurídica, especialmente a defesa da

FórmulaRadbruchfeitaporRobertAlexyesuasimplicaçõessobreoconceitodeDireito.

Assim sendo, considerar-se-á comoanteparoAntígona,uma tragédiade Sófocles, que

tem sido amplamente utilizada em textos jurídicos e pode trazer uma perspectiva

diferente na construção da crítica. Primeiramente, a tragédia é analisada em seu

contexto, enredo e personagens. Subsequente, o papel do Guarda - um personagem

secundário-édiscutidoconsiderando-seaFórmulaRadbruch“injustiçaextremanãoé

direito”.Comodemonstraçãodacrítica,dadoshistóricosevidenciarãoque,emtiranias,

nenhuma exclusiva ferramenta teórica é utilizada, mas, sim, diferentes perspectivas

jurídicasmotivaramaresistênciaaolongodahistória.Finalmente,aocriticaradefesade

AlexydaFórmula,aposiçãodifícilderesistiràleiinjustaéconsiderada,apresentando-se

então uma abordagem acerca do ensino em direitos humanos como perspectiva

alternativaaosparâmetrosformaisdavisãodeAlexy.

Palavras-chave: Fórmula de Radbruch; Antigona; Robert Alexy; Resistência; Educação

emdireitoshumanos.

Abstract

Thispaperdiscussesthe limitsof legaltheory,especiallyRobertAlexy’sdefenceofthe

RadbruchFormulaanditsimplicationsontheconceptofLaw.Antigone,thetragedyby

Sophocles,hasbeenwidelyused in legal textsandcanbringadifferentperspective in

theconstructionofthefollowingcritique.Firstthetragedyisanalysedinitscontext,plot

and characters. Later the role of the Guard – a secondary character – is discussed

considering the Radbruch Formula which states that extreme injustice is not law.

Historicaldatawill demonstrate that, inactual tyrannies,nounique theoretical tool is

usedbutdifferentlegalperspectivesservedresistancethroughouthistory.Finally,while

criticizingAlexy’sdefenceoftheFormula,thedifficultpositionofresistingunjustlawis

consideredwhile it is presented an approach regarding human rights education as an

alternativetotheformalityofAlexy`saccount.

Keywords: Radbruch’s Formula; Antigone; Robert Alexy; Resistance; Human rights

education.


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1.Introduction

Haemon:[…]Whothinksthathealoneiswise,thatheIsbestinspeechorcounsel,suchaman

Broughttotheproofisfoundbutemptiness(Antigone,707)1

Greektragedieshaveprovedtobeageless.Wearefamiliarwithnamesandcharacters

that are as immortal as the old Greek gods have been in history. Writers and

philosophers have been analysing these plays for centuries: John Milton, Samuel

Johnson,VirginiaWolf,Hegel,Freudamongothers(HALL,1994).Sophocleandramahas

that same enduring popularity and Antigone, especially, has been used in legal and

moral studies fora long time2. Its richness inconflictandoppositionhasprovedtobe

paradigmaticforlegalstudies,especiallylegalphilosophy.

Thatiswhybesidesfocussingonlegaltheoryandresearch,thispaperwillmake

use of literature (Antigone), especially the Law and Literature strategy in which,

according to Richard Weisberg: “literature provides unique insights into the

underpinnings of law and that stories and poems stand as sources of law, richer and

certainly more accessible than others in legal philosophy” (WEISBERG, 1992) 3.

Considering this approach, we aim to discuss one of the central logical Formulas in

Alexy’swork:theRadbruchFormula,opposingittotheconflictofperspectivesnarrated

bySophoclesinAntigoneandfactualepisodesoflegalrhetoricundertyrannies.

Themajorpoint inAlexy’spractical reasoning is the intimate relationbetween

thebasesofhistheory.Tobemoreprecise,thethesisstatesthatthereisaconceptually

necessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmorality,andconsequentlythereisanormative

argumentthatpointsinthesamedirection,thatisanormativelynecessaryconnection

(ALEXY,2000). Inorder toprove the conceptuallynecessaryaswell as thenormatively

necessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmorality,Alexyestablishesthreearguments:(I)

1 All the epigraphs of the present work are based on the edition of the tragedy made by HALL, Edith.Antigone,OedipustheKingandElectra.:Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998,178p.2ForasuccinctlistofmaterialsrelatedtoAntigone,seeMarthaC.Nussbaum,Afragilidadedabondade[Thefragilityofgoodness](2009),at383,note3.3RichardWeisberg,inPoethicsandotherstrategiesofLaw&Literature(1992),alsopointsthat“literatureprovidesalivelyandaccessiblemediumforlearningaboutlawinanethicalway”,at5.


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The claim to correctness, (II) the argument of injustice, and (III) the argument of

principles.4

The purpose of our use of the Law and Literature strategy is to criticize the

Radbruch Formula applied in the argument of injustice, which is linked to the

correctness claim. Thus, the paper provides critical overview of, essentially, Alexy's

argumentaboutthenormativelynecessaryconnection,whichbringsuptheargumentof

injustice. However, because the argument of correctness takes on a major role, the

argument of the conceptually necessary connectionwill be questioned. Thus, a direct

critique of the normatively necessary connection will be made, and therefore the

elements of Sophoclean tragedywill be consistent in the critique of the conceptually

necessaryconnection.

Speakinginliterarywords,theGuard,asecondarycharacterintheplay,holdsa

limitedauthorityguidinghisactionsaccordingtothepolis’lawenactedbyCreon,butat

the same time the Guardwas the onewho had felt the Antigone claim and had the

chancetodisobeyCreon’sorder,takingintoaccountthepossiblecontradictionhehad

felt when the paradigmatic conflict took place. This view in the play is important

becauseitworksasabalancetopromoteaweighingofalexyanconceptsandmeasures

their validity. Once considered the Guard’s view combined with the other relevant

characters’,theyassumeaparticipant’sroleinAlexy’sviewpoint5,thatis:beingableto

takenormativeactions.

AlthoughAntigonewastheaccusedone,hercourageandstrengthcanbeused

asaparadigmof resistance duringextreme times,which is anexample for thosewho

wanttoopposeunjustlawunderevilregimes–andajudge,thecentralexampleinthe

participant’sview,whocarriessuchcharacteristics,canbecalled,forthepurposeofthis

paper,JudgeAntigone.Ontheotherhand,theJudgewhofollowstheruleswillbecalled

JudgeGuard.With thatperspective, thedifficultyof resisting injusticewhenholdinga

publicposition isthefocusofthispaper:tryingtoshowhowtheFormulacouldsound

4Eachofthemaredevelopedindifferentworks,butallareconnectedinonefamouspapercalled“ZurKritikdes Rechtspositivismus”, originally published in Rechtspositivismus undWertbuzeug des Rechts. VorträgederTagungderdeutschenSektionderinternationalenVereinigungf.RechtsundSozialphilosophie(IVR) inder Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Göttingen, 12-14. Oktuber 1988, Ralf Dreier (Org.). Stuttgart: FranzSteiner,1990,p9-26.5AccordingtoAlexy,adoptstheperspectiveoftheparticipantwho,inalegalsystem,presentsargumentsaboutwhat this legal system commands, prohibits and allows, aswell as on their attributions of power.ALEXY,Robert(1990),p12-20.


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goodinsomeways,butattheenditsimplydoesnotmodifyanythingoranytragedyin

legalsystems.

Inconclusion,wetrytoframetheonlywayinwhichthepossibilityofresistance

unfoldsitselfandthatisbasedonhumanrightseducation.FollowingMarthaNussbaum,

theideaofresistancecanonlybetriggeredofthroughoutanapproachofhumanrights

content thatdoesnotallow itself tobe summarized in anabstract theory that canbe

easilycastasidebyinterestandwillofpower.Therefore,humanrightseducationmust

become that powerful narrative in order to function as a source of democratic legal

norms and avoid the objectification of different concepts of justice just to fit into a

logicalformula.

2.TheTragedy

Antigone:[…]CreonhasordainedHonourforone,dishonourfortheother

(Antigona,21)

Greektragedyappearsintheendofthe5thcenturyb.C.,andbeforeonehundredyears

had passed, they disappeared. According to Vernant and Naquet (2011), the tragic

oppositionsreflectedthesentimentofthattime–butnotonlythat.Aftertheworkof

LouisGernet,theauthorssaythattherealthemeofthetragedywasthespecificsocial

thought of the city, especially the legal discourse still in process of elaboration and

debate.ThetragedieshadacloseconnectionwithcasesbroughttoGreektribunals.The

tragic poets used the new legal vocabulary as means to play deliberately with its

uncertainties, fluctuations, lackofprecision. Itwasthepassingfromareligiousculture

toalegalone.

Greeksdidnothavetheideaofanabsolutelaw,organizedinacoherentsystem

suchasthemodern legalsystems.Localauthoritiesversussacredpowers,worldorder

versus Zeus’ justice are some of the problems they faced in law. Besides that,moral

problemswereshowninlegaldisputes,puttinginevidencehumanresponsibilityandits


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meaning6.It’salsoimportanttounderstandthetragedyinstitutionalstatusatthattime:

itwasnotonlyaformofartbutasocialinstitutionthatthecityplacedsidebysidewith

itspoliticalandjudicialbodies(VERNANT;NAQUET,2011).Tragedieswereperformedby

exclusivelymaleactorsandproducedatsacred festivals inhonourofDionysus,godof

wine,dancingandillusion.Everyyeartherewasthetragedycompetitioninwhichthree

tragedians competed against each other with the aim of persuading a jury

(democratically selected) to award the first prize which brought prestige and fame

(HALL,1994).

Antigone is the most political of Sophocles tragedies. Creon assumes power

after Oedipus’ two sons (Polyneices and Eteocles) kill each other. The first law that

CreonpassesisthatPolyneices,thetraitorwhoattackedthecity,istoberefusedburial.

Antigone disrespects this decree and buries her brother’s corpse, defending that she

wouldnotcontradicttheunwrittenlawprotectingtherightsofthedead.Creon’sdecree

andAntigone’sreactionstartthecatastrophiceventsthatwillcausetheterribledeaths

ofAntigone,Creon’swife(Eurydice)andson,Haemon.

FollowingBrandão(1992),inthetragedySophoclesopposestheancientlawtoa

sortofnewconceptionthatfinditsbasisintheSophistsinfluence.Theplayisnotonly

about the accepteddike7,but the new legal frame consisting in theathemistia’s law,

that could be seen as adikia, that is injustice and illegality. According to Nussbaum,

Antigone is a play about practical reason, ending with the assertion that practical

wisdom (tò phoneîn) is the most important element of the good living (eudaimonía)

(NUSSBAUM,2009,p.44).Eachoftheprotagonistshasavisionoftheworldthatcanbe

simplisticbutatthesametimeitisavisionthatcannotbeallocatedinsidesofrightness

orwrongness.ThatiswhatallowsustosaythattheGreektragediesarenotthemselves

tragedieson‘jurisprudence’,butcertainlyontheconstructionofmoralitythatconsiders

theethicalandlegalcontingency.

NussbaumaccuratelyassertsthatCreon,despitebeingPolynieces’s(thetraitor)

uncle,cannottreathim likeonebecausehebetrayedthecity.Hisnephewwasnotan

ordinaryenemy(whosecorpsewouldbereturnedtorelativesforanhonourableburial)

6VernantandNaquet(2011)affirmsthatnotragedyisalegaldebatebut,byusinglawasasubjectmatter,they used its elements of confrontation as a means for expressing the opposition of values, having thehumanbeingasthecentraltheme.7IntheGreekmythology,Dikewasthegoddessofjusticeandthespiritofmoralorderandfairjudgementbasedonimmemorialcustom(BRANDÃO,1992).


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butwasatraitorwhowouldnotdeservesuchconsideration(NUSSBAUM,2009).Having

to choose between family ties or the city, Creon’s edict demonstrates how easily,

withoutanytraceofdoubt,hechosethecityoverPolynieces.

Thisedict:(…)(…)IhaveproclaimedtoThebesthatnoneShallgivehimfuneralhonoursorlamenthim,Butleavehimthereunburied,tobedevouredBydogsandbirds,mangledmosthideously.Suchismywill;nevershallIallowThevillaintowinmorehonourthantheupright;(Antigone,194)

Inthetragedy,ontheotherhand,AntigoneisCreon’sextremeopposite.While

Creon is closed in himself, denying any chance of tragic conflicts (as any conflict that

might appear shall be solved in favour of the city), Antigone also denies any

heterogeneity. But, in her case, she chooses family instead of the city. All her life is

structuredaroundasimplesetof rulesandvaluesthatprioritizesherchoices.Creon’s

values are circumscribed to the city’s civic life; Antigone’s are limited to the dead

(VERNANT; NAQUET, 2011).8 Both are narrow minded, unilateral, closed to the

perception of another set of values. They want to eliminate the conflict, trying to

suppresscontradictionsanddoubts.

Contingencies, however, are part of life, as they will understand. Despite

Haemon and Teiresias warnings (in favour of flexibility, against rigidness), Creon will

learntheresultsofhis insensitivedeeds.NussbaumremembersthatCreon’s intention

had a civilizing character but turned out to be grotesquely uncivilized (NUSSBAUM,

2011,p.70).Justiceisadisputeindeedandthetensionsthatgiverisetothesedisputes

are, at the same time, part of the values themselves. Antigone, in the passage 450,

expresses this dispute by saying that neither dike had decreed the rule nor Zeus,

showingtheconflictbetweenancientlawandCreon`slaw,andputtinginevidencethe

values that guided her actions. It’s clear by now that the decree by Creon did not

obligate Antigone and her agency was in a way in which considered unjust acting

accordingtothepolis rule,causingherunbearablesuffering.Even ifCreonrulewas in

8Antigone’scoldnesstowardshersisterandfiancé,whoarealive,isnotedbyNussbaum(2011).ShedoesnotexchangeonewordwithHaemonduringthewholeplay.


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coherencewiththepolis law,Antigonetooktherisktoconfrontthatsameunjust law,

knowingthatheractionwouldcertainlygeneratepunishmentfromCreon.

Creon:Andsoyoudaredtodisobeythelaw?Antigone:ItwasnotZeuswhopublishedthisdecree,NorhavethePowerswhoruleamongthedeadImposedsuchlawsasthisuponmankind;NorcouldIthinkthatadecreeofyours–Aman–couldoverridethelawsofHeavenUnwrittenandunchanging.NotoftodayOryesterdayistheirauthority;Theyareeternal;nomansawtheirbirth.WasItostandbeforethegod`stribunalFordisobeyingthem,becauseIfearedAman?IknewthatIshouldhavetodie,

evenwithoutyouredict;[…]Butwhenmymother`ssonlaydead,hadINeglectedhimandlefthimthereunburied,thatwouldhavecausedmegrief(Antigone,450-460)

Although Nussbaum recognizes that both – Antigone and Creon – are

dangerously narrow-minded and afraid of contingencies, she criticizes Hegel for not

recognizingthatAntigone’schoice issuperiortoCreon’s.9Bearingthis inmind,wewill

discuss if Antigone could have been saved by the Radbruch Formula considered in

Alexys’approachandhowharditisforanofficialtoresistanorderfromanauthority.

3.TheGuard,theFormula...Andwhocouldresist?

Guard:It’sbadtojudgeatrandom,andjudge

wrong!Creon:Youjudgemyjudgmentasyouwill–

butbringThemanwhodidit,oryoushallproclaimWhatpunishmentisearnedbycrooked

dealings.(Antigone,323)

TheGuard isaminorcharacter inAntigone.Placedinthebeginningofthetragedy,he

had the unpleasant and dangerous task of telling Creon of the crime committed by

9Thissuperiorityisclearthroughoutthetragedy:theplot,itsendingandinthelinesofTeiresias,Haemonand,ofcourse,Creonhimselfafterknowingwhathappenedtohissonandwife(NUSSBAUM,2011).


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Antigone.HeisobviouslyterrifiedtobringthebadnewstoCreon,thesovereignofthe

citywhoproclaimedthatdeathwasthepricefordisobeyinghisedict.Theauthorityof

the sovereign must prevail, and the Guard’s words show his fragile position while

headingtoCreon’spalace:hetellsthat,morethanonce,stoppedandturnedaroundin

hispath,thinking“whydoyougotocertainpunishment?”(HALLS,1994,p.10).Hesays:

“Iamtheunluckymanwhodrewtheprize(…)andthereforeIamcomeunwillingand,

for certain, most unwelcome: nobody loves the bringer of bad news” (HALLS, 1994,

p.10).

Creon’sresponseisviolent,asoneshouldexpect.Hesays:

[…]Myoath:unlessyoufind,andbringbeforeme,Theveryauthorofthisburial-riteMeredeathshallnotsuffice;youshallbehangedAlive,untilyouhavedisclosedthecrime,[…](Antigone,306)

Because of this threat, the relieved Guard will eventually bring Antigone to

Creon, being then cleared of the grave earlier accusations. As any official, the Guard

mustfolloworders.Atthesametimehehasadoublerole:ofauthorityandservantto

superiorpower.Inthecaseofthetragedy,theGuard,besidesCreonandAntigone,had

thechance,althoughwithseveredifficultiesaswewillsee,todecidewhichwaytogoor

which position to assume: Antigone’s or Creon’s. But in order to grasp this point,we

shall first analyse a theory that preconizes that an authority, when facing extreme

injustice,mustnotapplytheunjustrulebecauseitisnotlaw:theRadbruchFormula10.

In “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law,” a short article published in

1946,GustavRadbruchwrote:

Theconflictbetweenjusticeandlegalcertaintymayberesolvedinthatthepositive law, established by enactment and by power, takes precedenceeven when its content is unjust and improper, unless the contradictionbetweenpositive lawandjusticereachessuchan intolerable levelthatthestatute, as “incorrect law” [unrichtiges Recht], must yield to justice. It isimpossible todrawa sharper linebetweencasesof statutorynon-lawandlaw that is still valid despite unjust content. One boundary line, however,canbedrawnwithutmostprecision:Wherethereisnotevenanattempttoachievejustice,whereequality,thecoreofjustice,isdeliberatelydisavowedintheenactmentofpositivelaw,thenthelawisnotmerely“incorrectlaw,”

10ThesocalledRadbruch’sFormulaispresentedinits“final”termsbyRobertAlexy,asweshallseeduringthetext.Forexample,see:ALEXY,Robert.AdefenceofRadbruch’sFormula.InRecraftingtheRuleofLaw:thelimitsoflegalorder,1999.


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it lacks entirely the very nature of law. For law, including positive law,cannot be otherwise defined than as an order and legislationwhose verymeaningistoservejustice(RADBRUCHapudHALDEMANN,2005,p.166)11.

RobertAlexy(1996,p.16)12explainsthattheFormulaiscomposedbytwoparts:

theintolerabilityFormulaandthedisavowalFormula.Haldeman,followingAlexy,states

that “while the intolerabilityFormula isattuned to the levelof injusticeand therefore

hasanobjectivecharacter,thedisavowalFormulareferstothepurposeorintentionof

thelegislator”(HALDEMAN,2005,p.166).Positivelawlosesitslegalvalidityif,andonly

if, it reaches a level of extreme injustice.Only in situations of the extremedoes legal

certainty must give way to arguments based on justice as a ground for judicial

“resistance”. Inordinarytimes,however,moralityshouldnotdeterminethevalidityof

law.

Alexy has defended the Radbruch Formula in the general context of a post-

positivisttheoryoflaw:

What iscorrectly takentobe the lawdependsnotonlyonsocial factsbutalso onmoral correctness. In thisway,what the lawought to be finds itsway into what the law is. This serves to explain the Radbruch Formula,whichsaysnotthat“Extremeinjusticeshouldnotbe law”but,rather,that“Extreme injustice is not law.” Perhaps what has been said will suffice,however, to indicatewhatnon-positivistsmeanwhentheyclaimthattheirmore complex explication is closer to the nature of law than the simplerexplicationofferedbythepositivists(ALEXY,2008,p.297).

OnceweadmitthattheFormulaisapplicable,wemustnowturntotheGuard

whocouldhavesavedAntigone.Asaparticipant in thesystemof thepolis, theGuard

hadtheimportanceofabalanceinthecontextofapplyingornotthedecree,especially

becausethesubjectmatterinquestionwassomethingcontradictorytotheancientlaw,

11Theoriginal:„DerKonfliktzwischenderGerechtigkeitundderRechtssicherheitdürftedahinzulösensein,daß [dass]daspositive, durch SatzungundMacht gesicherteRecht auchdanndenVorranghat,wennesinhaltlichungerechtundunzweckmäßigist,esseidenn,daß[dass]derWiderspruchdespostivenGesetzeszurGerechtigkeiteinsounerträglichesMaßerreicht,daßdasGesetzalsunrichtigesRechtsderGerechtigkeitzu weichen hat. Es ist unmöglich, eine Sscharfere Linie zu ziehen zwischen den Fallen des desetzlichenUnrechtsunddenTrotzunrichtigen InhaltsdennochgeltendenGesetzen.Es istunmöglich,eineSchärfereLinie zu ziehenzwischendenFällendesgesetzlichenUnrechtsunddenTrotzunrichtigen Inhaltsdennochgeltenden Gesetzen; eine andere Grenzziehunh aber kannmit allter Schärfe vorgenommenwerdem:woGerechtigkeitnichteinmalerstrebtwird,wodieGleichheit,diedenKernderGerechtigkeitausmacht,beider Setzung positiven Rechts bewußt verleugnet wurde, das ist das Gesetz nich etwa nur "unrichtigesRechts"vielmehrentbehrtesüberhauptderRechtsnatur.DennmankannRecht,auchpositivesRecht,garnicht anders definieren denn als eine Ordunung und Satzung, die ihrem Sinn nach bestimmt ist, derGerechtigkeit zu dienen“. In RADBRUCH, Gustav. Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht.SüddeutscheJuristen-Zeitung,v.1,n.5,p.105-108aug1946.12 Given the specificity of the article cited in relation to this essay wewill refer preferably to it. ALEXY,Robert.AdefenceofRadbruch’sFormula.InRecraftingtheRuleofLaw:thelimitsoflegalorder,1999.


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and as shown by Antigone, unjust in an ethical sense, causing suffering and pain for

those linkedbyblood ties. If the argumentof injustice couldbeused in such isolated

norms(ALEXY,1990),andifitisnormativelybindingbecausethisFormulaisaresultofa

balancingbetweenthevaluesofjusticeandlegalsecurity(SOUZA,2011),theGuardhad

theopportunityasparticipantnot to followtherulebecausetherewasnotaclaimto

correctnessunderstoodasaclaimforjustice.

It is important tosay thatCreoncouldnotusetheFormulahimselfsincehe is

theauthor(theauthority)thatimposesthedecree–howcouldheeverassessfroman

externalpointofviewtheextremeinjusticeifhewastheonewhogavethecommand,

believingthathisedictrespectedthegods’law?Therefore,heconsideredhiscommand

an act of justice –, and also he is an already positioned participant.Who could have

disrespectedtheedict,lettingAntigoneescapewithoutbeingcaught(thereforeresisting

orrefusingtoaccepttheunfairlaw)13?

The burden of the Formula is on the person who has to choose between

following the rule or not. The Guard14 is the only character in the play that had the

chance to saveAntigone,becausehewasable toevaluate ifCreon’sdecreewouldbe

unjustasanextremeunjustrule.Takingallcharactersasparticipants,theGuardcould

use Alexy’s practical reasoning and balance to assess if the unjust law should be

followedornot, inwhichcase itwouldbecharacterizedasunjustandcouldnotrisea

claimtocorrectness,deprivingthenormofitsnormativesense,andthusnotobligating

anyonetoacceptitoruseitinadecisum.

IfwereadcarefullytheGuard’swords,wewillfindapatternoffear/doubt(ifhe

could, hewould have avoidedmeeting Creon) and eagerness to please the king after

arresting Antigone. Some authors contend that Creon did not consult the citizens of

Thebes beforemaking his announcement forbidding the burial. If we assume that he

composedthisprohibitiononthebattlefield,asJudithFletcherdoes,therewouldbeno

opportunity for deliberation (he does announce it a second time to the assembly of

ThebanEldersbutwithoutanydebateorconsultation).“Creonattemptstocreate law

unilaterally,ignoringboththevoiceofthedemosandthelawsofthegods”(FLETCHER, 13If the decree actually qualifies as unfair law is a point open to discussion. But taking into account thecomplexityasawhole,onlyunfairlawcouldcauseinanormativesensetragedy,expressinghereourpointofviewaboutwhatissomethingvaluabletobecalledjusticeorunjust.Laterinthisworkthisviewwillbeclarified.14Tobeprecise,theguards(plural)hadthatchance.ButsinceonlyoneGuardappears inthetragedy,wewillassumethatheistheonewhocouldhavechosentoletAntigonefree.


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2008,p.79).Inthatrespect,fromanexternalpointofview(Alexyanobserver),wecould

beledtotheassumptionthattheedictislawevenifunjust.Asanobserveritistotally

understandablethattheGuardfollowedtherulesandexecutedtheorderonthebasis

ofeitheranacceptanceofthedecreeasjustoranabsenceofresistanceforfearofthe

hostileconsequences15.

Antigonechosetodefythedecreeofatyrantandburyherbrother.Sheactedas

anindividualwhoresistsanunjustlaw.16HerewefindaconnectionwithHansKelsen’s

positivist view concerning the individual’s possibility of resisting to unjust law; as

Haldemann emphasizes, Kelsen’s content-neutral concept of legal validity does not

implyamoraldutytocomplywithanyandalllegalnorms:“sincemoralvaluesareonly

relative, the moral decision to obey or disobey the law is left to each citizen”

(HALDEMANN,2005,p.169).Forajudge,however,thisstatementisnotapplicable.For

Kelsen, according to Haldemann, the proper objective role of judges and officials

consists,afterall,inthestrictapplicationofthelaw,understoodasaneffectivesystem

ofcoerciverules(herewefindamajordifferencebetweenKelsenandRadbruch,asfor

Radbruchthejudgecanchoosetonotconsiderlawanormthatisextremeunjust).

ButitistheGuardwhocouldhavesavedAntigone–if,andonlyif,accordingto

Alexy’slesson,hehadthisnon-positivisticapproach,i.e.,theRadbruchFormulainmind

andifheagreedthatitwasworthriskinghislifetoresistanextremeunjustlaw.But,as

Klemperer(1992)hasshown,it’snotaneasytasktohavethatkindofattitude–apoint

whichisevenacknowledgedbyAlexy’spositioninhisdefenceoftheFormulawhenhe

saysthat,forajudgeinanunjuststate,itmakeslittlesubstantivedifferencewhetherhe

reliesonHart’sview(basedonmoralgrounds)orRadbruch’s(basedonlegalgrounds):

other factors,apart fromthestruggleover theconceptof law,arealso relevanthere,

suchas,thepersonalcostsandpreparednesstotakesucharesistantattitude.

15Foranexplanationoftheinternalandexternalpointsofview,seeHART,H.L.OconceitodeDireito(2005)atpage100/101.Foranapplicationof theseperspectivestotheRadbruchFormula,seeALEXY,Robert.AdefenceofRadbruch’sFormula. InRecraftingtheRuleofLaw:the limitsof legalorder,1999.Foracriticalapproachof thisdistinction inAlexy, see JosephRAZ, Joseph.TheArgumentFromJustice,orHowNot toReplytoLegalPositivism(2007).Availableat:<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=999873>.VisitedinApril6th,2016.16LarryBennettandWilliamBlakeTyrrell,apudFletcher,saythat"AntigoneactscorrectlybecauseshedoesnotdefyCreon,leaderofAthens,butCreon,thetotalitarianrulerofimpiousThebes"(FLETCHER,2008,p.79).Inotherwords,saysFletcher,blindobediencetothecommandsofarulingpowerwasnotanobligationifthosecommandswerenotsensible.


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The Formula presupposes two conditions in Radbruch’s approach: extreme

times(tyranny,dictatorshipand,asaconsequence,theriskofsufferinginstitutionalized

violence) andwill to resist (even if it is one’s duty to apply the law – this, of course,

being the rarer of the two). It is far easier to find examples of theRadbruch Formula

application after the evil regime was deposed. We agree with Brian H. Bix when he

argues that in practice, the Formula is most likely to be applied when some form of

transition fromanevil regimetoa justonehashappened.Therefore,a judge isasked

not to apply the law of the previous regime: post-war Germany (after the Nazi era);

unifiedGerman(afterEastGermanpast)etc.AsBixoutlines,heisunawareofanycourt

usingtheFormulatorefuseenforcementofotherwisevalidlegalnormsenactedunder

thatregime17–duringtyrannicaltimes,asweshallsee,moreefficientandsafertoolsare

available.

This becomes even clearer when we read Klemperer analysis of the German

resistance under the Nazi regime. Comparing the resistance in Norway, France and

Holland,heconcludesthatinGermanytheresistancemovementshadnoclearmandate

as opposed to those countries where the struggle was against occupation and

oppressionfromaforeignpower.InGermany,hesays,“therewasterror,ofcourse,but

alsosomethingevenmorebedevillingthanterror,namely,theNaziregime'ssemblance

of legality, respectability,andcleanliness” (KLEMPERER,1992,p.104).Klemperer finds

that sociological approach to resistance forgets about its existential dimension, “the

autonomousdecisionoftheindividualactinginsolitudeandfollowingthecommandsof

hisorherownconscience”(KLEMPERER,1992,p.108),againstanenormouspressureto

followtherulesoftheoppressor.Attheriskofbeingaccusedtobetrayhisorhernation,

theindividualwhochoosestoresistdoesnotwanttobetrayhisorherconscience.Ifthis

17SeeBIX,BrianH.Radbruch’sFormulaandconceptualanalysis.AmericanJournalofJurisprudence,v.56,pp. 45-57, 2011. Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017942>. Visited atJuly 15th, 2015. In this paper, Bix finds that the Radbruch Formula should be seen “as prescriptions forjudicialdecision-makingratherthanasdescriptive,conceptualoranalyticalclaimsaboutthenatureoflaw”.In his other paper the same position is defended: the Formula is important to help judges but doubtfulwhenusedasatheoryaboutthenatureoflaw.SeeBIX,BrianH.RobertAlexy,Radbruch’sFormula,andtheNature of Legal Theory. Rechtstheorie, v. 37, pp. 139-149, 2006. Available at:<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892789>. Visited at July 15th 2015. See also FINNIS,John. Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s “Ideal Dimension”.American Journalof Jurisprudence,v.59,2014.Availableat:<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428733>.VisitedatApril10th 2016:“In short, theRadbruchFormuladoesnot stateaconceptualnecessity (…). It isnotatruth about law, a truth of the philosophy of law (legal theory), even if inmany cases its adoption andapplicationasaruleofthumb–an‘expedientconcept’,asAlexysays–worksreasonablywellinresolvingquestionsarisinginlegalpracticefromsuchinjustice”.


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individual is in fact acting in total solitude or is relying on some previous collective

values, is a matter we shall discuss later (WALZER, 1967, p.31)18. Anyway, the

consequencesofsuchanactare,inmostcases,aburdentobecarriedalone.

Although Alexy (1999) affirms that he does not have any illusions about the

chancesofaresistanceagainstanunjustregime,whichcaneasilydestroylegalpractice

consensus by intimidation, changes in personnel and rewards for conformity, he then

defends his view saying there are two effects that serve as evidence in favour of the

Formulaandhisanti-positivistdoctrine:theeffectonpracticeandtheriskeffect.

About the first effect (on practice), according to Alexy (1999), there is a

differencebetweenrelyingonthelegalpracticeoronthejudge’sindividualconscience.

Basedon legal practice consensus, therewouldbea capacity toprovide resistance to

theactsofanunjuststatebyargumentswhichareboth juridicalandmoral.However,

there is no empirical evidence in favour of this view. As demonstrated above,

Klemperer’s scepticism on sociological analysis of movements of resistance can be

applied mutatis mutandis to the legal theoretical discussions about the realities of

tyrannical regimes. It ishard,althoughnot impossible, tobelieve thata judgeundera

dictatorialregimewouldnotimposeperfectvalidrulesonthegroundsofalegalpractice

consensusbasedonnon-positivist limitsfortheconceptof law. Ifthisbrave judgecan

do that, it is amatter of aweak regime or a strong and resistant individual: a Judge

Antigone.Eitherway,it’sapersonalandcourageousact(although,asdemonstratedin

partVofthepresentpaper,precededbycollectivevalues);andinspiteofAlexy’sown

doubts(hethinksthatthis isa limitedeffect),onecanacknowledgethat it isbetterto

rely on both legal andmoral arguments than solely onmoral ones so as to deny the

applicationofavalidruleunderanevilregime.Inthisrespect,Alexy’s(1999)argument

isbetterthanHart’s,atleastunderaconsequential-pragmatistanalysis.

Finally,thereistheriskeffect,explainedbyAlexyintheseterms:

Take for example a judgewho confronts the questionwhether he shouldimpose a terroristic prison sentence which falls within the scope of thelegislated injustice. […] He is as little concerned about the fate of theaccused as he is greatly concerned by his own. On the basis of historicalexperience, he cannot exclude the possibility that the unjust state will

18According toWALZER,Michael. Theobligation todisobey. Ethics, v. 77, n. 3 (Apr., 1967), pp. 163-175.Available at: < http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379683> . Visited at visited April 10th 2016: “The heroicencounter between sovereign individual and sovereign state, if it ever took place, would be terrifyinglyunequal. If disobediencedependedupon a conscience really private, itmight always be justified and yetneveroccur”.That’swhyWalzerdefendsthatthereismutualityindisobedience.


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collapseandhewonders aboutwhatwould thenhappen tohim. Supposethathemustacceptthatananti-positivisticconceptoflawwillprevailorbegenerally accepted, according to which the norm on which he based thisterroristicjudgmentisnotlaw.Itfollowsthatheundertakesarelativelyhighriskofnotbeingabletojustifyhimselflaterandthusbeingprosecuted.Therisk isdiminished ifhecanbesure thathis conductwillbe judged later inaccordancewithapositivisticconceptoflaw(ALEXY,1999,p.31).

Alexy clearly links an anti-positivist concept of law to the disincentive to act

accordingtoanextremelyunjust law,even if the judgeseesnoreasontorefrainfrom

participating in injustice. It seems here that Alexy is, in other words, saying that an

indifferent judge (not saint nor hero, as he describes) would prefer to avoid future

condemnationbypreferringtoriskhislifeandbecondemnedatthepresenttimebythe

evilregime.Thatisnotanobviousandintuitiveconclusion.Ifoneistotalkaboutrisks,it

ismuch riskier toconfrontanevil regime (which is,well,evil!)nowthanexpect tobe

condemned by a future post-evil (and probably non-evil) regime that lives only in

conjectures unless the tyranny is recognisably in its final breath. If the options for a

JudgeGuard(notforaJudgeAntigone,whodoesn’tcalculate)are:I)presentandalmost

certainpain;orII)futurelessprobablepain,anattitudeofutilitarianavoidanceofself-

sacrificehelpstodecideinfavourofavoidingtheeminentandactualriskindetrimentof

a future unknown risk. As a result, we have to ask the following question: How

Radbruch’sFormulawouldbeusefulinanypracticalcaseofaparticipantsurroundedby

thecharacteristicsinaccount?

4.JudgeAntigoneandJudgeGuard

Creon:Haveyounoshame,nottoconformwithothers?(Antigone,510)

AlexytriestousetheRadbruchFormulaasacomponentofhisconceptoflawbut,ashis

double-effectlessonshows,attheendofthedayitisamatterofpersonalchoicebefore

a dilemma, even though personal choices are never totally apart from values whose

origins come from community [as Walzer (1967) argues]. The argument of extreme

injustice is a normative argument, thereby it refers to a substantive thesis that could

only be affectedwith substantive arguments (ALEXY, 1998). Until nowwe only have

demonstrated that the Formula itself is notmuchuseful in practical casesof extreme


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times,which isacontradiction,because if there isanormativelynecessaryconnection

betweenlawandmorality,theGuardshouldhadguidedhisagencyinaccordancewith

what the very fundamental core of that connection prescribes, and that is: extreme

unjustlawisnotlaw.Thus,thegeneralpracticalobligationisnottofollow,becausethe

decree is not in accordance with the claim to correctness raised by morality,

represented in the play by Antigone’s choice. If that claim does not turn into legal

terms, thismeans that Creon’s decree is unjust, because, as Alexy says, the claim to

correctness is also a claim to justice (ALEXY, 1998).But theparadox relieson the fact

thatiftheGuardinAntigoneisourJudgeGuard,hisdecisionoffollowingCreon’sdecree

alsoraisesaclaimtocorrectness–oranobjectiveclaimtocorrectness,asAlexysays:

“Ontheotherhand,thereisanobjectiveclaimtocorrectnessifeverybodywhodecides,

judges, or discusses the matter in a legal systemmust necessarily raise this claim”19

(ALEXY,1998,p.206).Well,thequestionhereishowwecansolvetheconflictbetween

claimstocorrectness?

Moreover, every legal system contains coercive precepts which by no means

define,butcomposessuchasystem,evenifitisdevelopedinaminimum.Thepointis

thatduringtheprocessofdefininghowtoactinaccordancetoAlexy'slogicalstandards,

it isnotpossibletofindaformulathatdealswithdecisionsthatdetermineinconcrete

casesthecoercionasaconstitutivepartofit.Asapieceofevidenceofthisfallibility,the

doubtsdemonstratedby theGuardmayeven say that hehadmade constructionson

the fact that Creon's decree was unjust, but such constructions were not sufficiently

bindingtooverthrowtheelementofcoercion. It looks like justasCreonandAntigone

wereblindlyseekingcertainty,Alexy’sargumentofinjusticedoesthesame.

As a result, another pointmay bemade. The Formula presupposes a certain

objective concept of justice in order to be valid, which is not possible in our view,

because in order to say that a norm is unjust as a conclusion of logical terms, it is

necessaryamajorpremise thatdefineswhat justice is.Onecannot find this inAlexy’s

norinRadbruch’sthoughts,especiallybecausewhensocialmattersareposedinlogical

terms,theformallogicisnotpossible,sinceitrequiresadiscursivelogic.Alexyknows–

andthisiswhyheputssomucheffortonit–that,inhisterms,toprovetheconnection

19An interstation interpretationof that ispresentedbySTRECK,LenioLuiz.PorqueadiscricionariedadeéumgraveproblemaparaDworkinenãooéparaAlexy?.RevistaDireitoePráxis, v. 4,n. 2, pp.343-367,2013.


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between law and morality, the normativity of some ethical standards constructed in

principled languagemust fulfil the formal requirementof the logical conclusion in the

argumentofinjustice.However,thisobjectification(thatjustifiestheapplicationofthe

Formula) ends up removing from the legal cases the possibility of having different

meanings.Inotherwords,themoralprincipleswhichtakepartinlegalsystemsbecome

imperativesthatmovethecontingency,thesoulofone’shistory20.Noonecouldresist

thismoraldailylifewithoutcausinghimselfharm.

Thesamecontradictionwithinthecorrectnessthesiscouldbefoundintheother

argument that connects morality and law, namely the conceptually necessary

connection. In this argument the theory of principles plays a major role, especially

becauseof the I) the incorporation thesis (ALEXY,1997) thatsaysthateachdeveloped

legalsystem(ordevelopedintheminimum)containsprinciples,andII)themoralthesis

(ALEXY, 1997), which states that each developed legal system (or developed in the

minimum) comprises principles that belong to a commonmorality. It follows that the

applicationof thoseprinciples in specific cases raisesa III) claim tocorrectness,and if

some of that principles are moral ones, the claim raised is also a moral claim to

correctness (ALEXY,1997).Withthat inmind, themoral rule thatAntigonechoosesto

follow was also part of the legal system of Thebes, (which was developed in a

minimum). That moral rule was connected somehow to the old Greek Gods, and as

Brandão(1992)says,theStatewasboundedbytherulesofGreekGodsthatrepresenta

sortofmoralprincipleintheThebeslegalsystem.

Antigonechoosestofollowthatmoralprinciple,whenconfrontedwithCreon’s

decree.Inthispassage,shesummarizesheragonizingconflict:

[…]thatnoonemayBeleftinignorance;nordoesheholditOflittlemoment:hewhodisobeysInanydetailshallbeputtodeath

20Inthisposition,theproblemoffindinganobjectiveconceptofjusticeissomethingindiscussioninmoralphilosophy.What is considered tobe just is always changing, even in thenormative sense. For example,Nancy Fraser, alongside with Charles Taylor, has shown that in the past few decades the claim of anormativeconceptofjusticecouldnotonlybeplacedintermsoftheRawlsianequality,butalsointermsofrecognition.Ononeside,thereisavisionattachedtothekantianmoraltraditionwithitsconstructionofapersonasanendinitselfrequiringrespect.Ontheotherside,onefindstheideaofrecognitionlinkedtothecriticaltheorytradition,moredevelopedwiththeapplicationofamethodologyofimmanentcritique.Inanysense,thislastpointseemsmoreappropriate,becauseitdoesnotstandardizetheideaofjustice.SeetheworkofAxelHonnethpublishedinHONNETH,Axel.Thefabricofjustice:limitsofproceduralism.Civitas,v.9,pp 345-368, 2009. And also Axel Honneth’s theory of justice published in the book HONNETH, Axel.Freedom’sRight:TheSocialFoundationsofDemocraticLife.NeyYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2014.


2445

BypublicstoninginthestreetsofThebes.SoitisnowforyoutoshowifyouAreworthy,orunworthy,ofyourbirth,(Antigone,32).

Thispassagedemonstratesmoreproperlytheconflictinquestion,buthereone

cannot enter into the practical reasoning proposed by Alexy when principles get in

conflict21. The balancing is compromised by the elements that surround the narrow-

mindedAntigone,becausesheisethicallyboundedtoactaccordingtoancientcostume.

Mutatismutandiswhenapersonis inapositionlikeAntigone’s–alreadyconvincedof

thefinaldecisionbecauseofinnerethicalbeliefs–nogeneraltheoryofdiscoursewillbe

able to functionasanaprioriprocedure, since thedecisionhadbeen takenall along.

Evenifsomeonefacesanunjustsituation,itwillnotbepossibletojustifyinprocedural-

rationaltermsthedecisionalreadytakenbecausesuchkindofethicaland,mostofthe

times,emotionalperspectivedoesnotfollowtherigidrulesofbalancing.

Therefore,ifacertaindecisionraisesaclaimtocorrectness,itshouldalsoraisea

claimtojustification.Thisrationaljustification,however,isnotpossibleinthecaseofa

JudgeAntigonebecauseheorshemakesadecisionbasedoncertainmoralimperatives.

Sometimes the claim to correctness, and the claim to justification, arenotpossible in

thelogicalproceduralperspectiveoftheargumentsbecauseitdoesnotencompassthe

hypothetical imperative thatsurroundsoneowndecision. Inotherwords, theclaimto

correctnessdoesnotexpressethicalvaluesthatguidethenormativityofanethicallife22.

Inthatreasoning,GarcíaAmado(2012)23hasshownthatthecomplexityofthe

problem is not faced simply by establishing logical formulas, presenting this

21It’snecessarytomentionthefamousdistinctionmadebyAlexybetweenprinciplesandrules,boththemnorms that compose a developed (or developed in a minimum) legal system: “The necessity thesis hasfound itsmost elaborated form in principles theory. The basis of principles theory is the norm-theoreticdistinction between rules and principles.2 Rules are norms that require something definitively. They aredefinitive commands. Their form of application is subsumption. If a rule is valid and if its conditions ofapplicationarefulfilled,itisdefinitivelyrequiredthatexactlywhatitdemandsbedone.Ifthisisdone,therule is complied with; if this is not done, the rule is not complied with. By contrast, principles areoptimization requirements. As such, they demand that something be realized ‘to the greatest extentpossible given the legal and factual possibilities’.3 Rules aside, the legal possibilities are determinedessentiallybyopposingprinciples.Forthisreason,principles,eachtakenalone,alwayscompriseamerelyprima facie requirement. The determination of the appropriate degree of satisfaction of one principlerelativetotherequirementsofotherprinciplesisbroughtaboutbybalancing.Thus,balancingisthespecificformofapplicationofprinciples.”(ALEXY,2014,p.52)22Forthosewhoareaware,theusageexpressionisatitleofapaperbyAxelHonneth.SeeHONNETH,Axel.Thenormativityofethicallife.PhilosophyandSocialCriticism,v.40(8),pp817–826,2014.23GarcíaAmado(2012),amongmany importantpoints,demonstrateshowAlexy’sclaimtocorrectness isuseless.ItisnotourpurposeheretoconfrontthisspecificaspectofAlexy’stheorybutwecanhaveaclueofAmado’spointifwerememberthatCreon’sedicthadaclaimtocorrectnesssincehebelievedthatthegods


2446

psychological ingredientseparatinglegalfrommoralclaims:ifajudgestatesthatN(or

the result of the application of a rule) is legally correct, he makes a legal claim of

correctness.IfsimultaneouslythejudgeaffirmsthatN(ortheresultoftheapplicationof

a rule) is morally incorrect, he makes a moral claim. In the first case, his point of

referenceisthelegalsystem.Inthesecond,inordertojustifyhisclaim,hewillhaveto

argue considering a moral system. According to García Amado, there is not any

performativeor logical contradictionhere,butonlyapersonaldilemma,whichcanbe

resolvedgivingpreferencetooneofthesetwosystems:legalityormorality.

Antigone relied solely on the moral system, the normative ancient rule. The

Guard after the confession of his confusion acted in accordancewith Creon’s decree,

decidingtofollowthelegalsystem.IftheFormulacouldhelp,itcoulddosobygivinga

pragmatist tool for the judge,bygivingonemore lineofargumentagainstevilnorms.

Butonecannotexpectthisdoctrinetoactuallybeaconceptuallimitoflawthatisuseful

even during extreme times. History shows that even when valid and just rules are

appliedagainstatyrannicalregime,judgesareingreatdanger,letalonetoignorearule

thatfavourstheregimeundertheargumentthatitisnotlaw24.

Sofar,onecanraisethecounter-argumentthatthepointspresentedaboveare

notasubstantivecriticismofAlexy’s theory.Consequently,weshallmove forward.As

aforementioned,Alexy’sdouble-effecttheorydoesnotstandagainsthistoricalevidence,

becausedifferentconceptionsaboutlawwereusefulindifferentcontexts.MarkJ.Osiel,

in fact,hasshowedthat“contingentpolitical circumstances […]determinewhich legal

theory fosters most resistance” (OSIEL, 1995, 481). After researching Brazilian and

ArgentinianJudiciaryduringtheirrespectivedictatorships,heconcludedthat

Wherejudgeshavebeenlargelysympathetictotheauthoritarianregime,asin Argentina, they have sought to express their criticism of its mostoppressivepolicies in thesame jurisprudential formas theadoptedby theregime’s rulers. Given this desire to couch judicial criticism in a friendlyform, positivism offers the most congenial idiom for resistance whereauthoritarian rulers seek legitimacy for themselves and their policies

wereonhisside.Alexywouldreplythatthere isasecondaspectthatoughttoberespected–theactualjusticeofthesystem–whichwaslackinginThebesatthetimeofCreon.Butthatcandefinitelyshowhowthefirstpremise–theclaimtocorrectness–canbecastasidewithoutlosinganytheoreticalrigour.24 InBraziliandictatorship,which lastedfrom1964until1985, for instance, InstitutionalActn.1 (thefirstruleafterthemilitarycoup)suspendedthepublicemployees’rightstostabilityintheirfunction(righttonotbedismissed),whichenabledthenewregimetoimposeretirementsordismissmagistrates.Later,in1969,threeSupremeCourt justices–EvandroLinseSilva,HermesLimaandVictorNunesLeal–wereforcedtoretire because of their democratic positions. For a recent report on the subject, see<http://www.cnv.gov.br/images/documentos/Capitulo17/Capitulo%2017.pdf.>.


2447

through the appearance of continuity with the preceding constitutionalregime(OSIEL,1995,p.542-543).

InBrazil,however,where“theBrazilian Juntadidnot seek justification for the

initialseizureofpowerbyinvokingaconstitutionalprovisionallowingthedeclarationof

astateofemergency”,butinsteadtheirpoliticalaspirationswererevolutionary,[which

had influenceon the “revolutionary legality” (OSIEL, 1995,p. 527)], since judgeswere

largelyunsympathetic to the regime,natural lawprovided themostcongenial formof

resistance. But instead of using natural law formoral reasons, according toOsiel, the

judges’ aim was to address a larger public beyond the ruling circles of the regime.

Whenever the Judiciary, says Osiel, wishes to communicate a sense of the regime’s

fundamental illegitimacy,natural lawargumentsarebest suited (OSIEL, 1995,p. 543).

Contradicting Alexy’s opinion with empirical research, Osiel reaches an important

conclusion:oneshallbescepticalaboutgeneralizationsinthisdiscussionaseachofthe

grand jurisprudential traditions is so plastic “that a skilled rhetorician can always find

whatheneeds,foranypurposes,withinit”(OSIEL,1995,p.548).

Other examples are available. Richard Weisberg research on France under

German occupation found the other side of resistance: acceptance. Weisberg argues

that theFrench legalcommunitywentbeyondthedemandsof theGermanoccupiers,

causing the death of tens of thousands of Jews. According to him, “the prevalent

‘postmodernist’hermeneuticsdirectly risksproducingmodesofpractice that replicate

Vichy’s text-avoidance, relativism,andethicaldebasement” (WEISBERG,2001,p.145).

Weisberg argues that if the legal community had relied on the foundational

egalitarianismoftraditionalFrenchconstitutionallaw,massivemurderwouldhavebeen

avoided.Herewefindagaintheevidenceofanotherkindofproblem:eveninacountry

whereconstitutionalbackgroundexistedtosupporttherhetoricofresistance,thelegal

community preferred an antitextual approach which liberated the legal professional

from ethical norms. Weisberg’s arguments, however, are different from Osiel’s, for

Weisbergisinfactworriedthatpostmodernisttheories(alaStanleyFish,forinstance)

and their lackof restrainingprinciplesmight beused in the future tobypassor avoid

egalitarian traditions25. He ismore preoccupiedwith the non-resistant discourse than

25ItisinterestingtocompareWeisberg’sfindingswithRaz’sstatementthat“Legalpositivistsaremorelikelythannatural lawyersorothernon-legalpositivists toaffirmthat sometimescourtshave (moral)duties todisobeyunjustlaws”(WEISBERG,2001,p.22).


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with the other side of the coin. But his findings can add up toOsiel’s conclusion: if a

French judge under Vichy law had decided to rely on constitutional positivism to

antagonize the racist decrees of that time, he would have had at least a theoretical

justificationthatisfarsaferandstrongerthanothernon-positivistoptions(includingthe

Formula).

Finally, tomake things evenmore complicated, there is the so called “Belgian

case”, which demonstrates that even what is not law can be law when collective

resistance is requiredabove formalities andauthoritativeprocedures.Bothduring the

First and the Second World Wars the Legislative branch in Belgium could not act in

accordance with the Constitution, because this European country, a Parliamentary

Monarchy,wasalmostentirelyoccupiedbytheGermans.AccordingtoPerelman(1979),

inhisaccountofthecaseduringtheFirstWorldWar,theKingandthearmywereinthe

Havre,andastheLegislativecouldnotfunction,theKingenactedstatuteswithoutany

parliamentaryapproval(indiscordancewitharticles25,26and130oftheConstitution).

Nevertheless,afterthesewars,theHofvanCassatiel/Courdecassation(SupremeCourt

ofBelgium) considered thoseacts, enactedwithout following constitutionalobligatory

rites, to be fully valid under the justificatory theory of “constitutional forcemajeure”

(BONDT; BOCKEN, 2001), even though the Constitution did not provide any such

principle.PerelmanusedthisasevidenceagainstKelsen’spositivismanditcanbeused

now as evidence against Alexy. From our perspective, this case proves thatwhen it’s

timetoantagonize (orwould itbeAntigonize?)evil regimesandunjust laws,different

theoriesservingdiverselegalrhetoriccanbeused,sometimesantitextualist,sometimes

positivistones,withoutfallingintothetruncatedsystemofperformativecontradiction.

Itisundeniablethatthereisdangerinthisflexibleuseoflegaldiscourse,i.e.,the

dangerof legitimatizingtyrannythroughmanipulationofrhetoricaimingatweakening

the institutional frameworkbut it isalsoundeniable that law isalwaysunder thisvery

threat26;thatsameflexibility,however,canmeanthesalvationoflivesorthebeginning

26ItisrelevanttorememberwhatwasmentionedaboveaboutRadbruch’sposition:hisFormulaisnotatoolfor times of institutional normality. Disobedience in democratic regimes is a much more difficult andcontentioustopic,onethatisnotbeingdiscussedhere.Ourmainfocusisresistanceagainsttyranny.Somerecentexamplesshowthatevenbehindademocraticfaçade(elections,forinstance)liesanundemocraticstate.For instance,on11December2009 inVenezuela, judgeMaríaLourdesAfiuniwas incarceratedandheldunderhousearrestforthreeyearsaftergrantingbailtoapoliticalprisoneraccordingtoprovisionsoftheVenezuelanpenalcode.AnInternationalBarAssociationReportfoundthat“JudgeAfiuniwasarbitrarilyarrestedwithoutawarrantandwithoutreasonsforherarrestfollowingherdecisiontoreleaseaso-called‘politicalprisoner’inaccordancewiththeVenezuelanPenalCodeandaUnitedNationsWorkingGroupon


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of a counter-discourse that will eventually depose the regime. As the songwriter

LeonardCohenpoeticized:“there isacrack,acrack ineverything, that’showthe light

getsin”(COEHN,1992)27.Onecanonlyhopethatlawcanbethecrackthatletslightget

indarkplaces.

5.ResistanceandHumanRightsEducation

Ismene:What?Wouldyouburyhim,againstthelaw?

(Antigone,44)

In his 1967 paper “The obligation to disobey”, Michael Walzer affirms that morally,

religiously or politically motivated disobedience is almost always a collective act and

findsitsjustificationinthevaluesofthecommunityandthemutualengagementsofits

members28.PuttingtogetherWalzer’sview,therealitiesoftyranniesandthepluralityof

legalconceptsusedtoavoidunjustlaw,onecannotescapesomesortofpragmatism.As

statedabove,pragmatismisasdangerousasanyunprincipledtheory: it isaknifethat

cuts in both ends. It can articulate legal discourse that legitimates dictatorships (as in

Brazil, where themilitary coup was called “revolution” or Vichy and its technicalities

about race)or findways tocounter-attack thatsameregime.Howcanweassure that

ArbitraryDetentiondecision. Immediatelyafterherarrest, the latepresidentHugoChávezFríasappearedonnationaltelevisioncallingforherimprisonmentfor30yearsandsaidthathercaseshouldbeanexampleto other judges”. The IBA delegation found that the case had created an atmosphere of fear amongstjudges,knownas the ‘Afiunieffect’,andheard frequently that ‘noonewants tobethenextAfiuni’.Tthecomplete report is available at <http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=c11d6207-b021-4622-9fa9-a5be94ccdd97>.Foraposition(primafacie)againstjudges’resistanceunderdemocraticregime,seeCarlosSantiagoNino,ÉticayDerechosHumanos(1989),pp.404-411.Inadifferentcontext(protestingratherthanauthorityresistance),wefindacritiqueofthedepoliticizingofprotestactivityunderdemocraticregime:seeEL-ENANY,Nadine.FergusonandthePoliticsofPolicingRadicalProtest.LawandCritique,v.26,n.1,pp.3-6,2015.Foraneo-hegelianapproachtopoliticalresistancemotivatedbylackofrecognition,seeHONNETH, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition – the moral grammar of social conflicts. 1995. These lastapproachestoresistancearenotpartofthisarticle.27 Transgression under an obedient façade is also common in art. See NEUFELD, Jonathan A. AestheticDisobedience.TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,v.73,pp.115–125,doi:10.1111/jaac.12157.2015,“Schoenberg and Stravinsky, in distancing theirmusic from ‘revolution,’ were at pains to argue just this(Schoenberg replacing “revolution” with the non-political and less radical ‘evolution,’ for example)”(NEUFELD,2015,p.116).28He also says that “… commitments to principles are simultaneously commitments to other men, fromwhomorwithwhomtheprincipleshavebeenlearnedandbywhomtheyareenforced”(WALZER,1967,p.164).


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thisuncertaintywillbeontherightsidewhenthetimecomes(rightsidemeaningthe

non-despoticside)29?

Imagineajudgewhoisloyaltohiscountry’sinstitutionalframeworkandtothe

human rights legal corpus he has learned to respect. Now imagine that these two

loyalties are in opposition. The choice between these two set of obligations is what

matters. Resistance can only be stimulated through an educational approach whose

humanrightscontentisnotanabstracttheorythatcanbeeasilycastasidebyinterest

andwill topower.Humanrightswillonlyserve itspurpose if it ispartofadaytoday

education of the legal student and practitioner. Loyalty to human rights shall be

developedonceitsimportanceisprovenbythedemonstrationofviolations–bethem

fromthe rightor leftof thepolitical spectrum– that shockandcause reaction.That’s

whyatheorylikeNussbaum’scultivationofhumanityissorelevant.

AccordingtoNussbaum(2003), threecapacitiesareessential tothecultivation

ofhumanitybystudents:I)thecapacityforcriticalexamination,II)theabilitytoconsider

the reality of distant lives (recognize other humanbeings besides their local groupor

region)andIII)thenarrativeimagination.

Thefirstone isespecially important inmattersofresistance: itmeansthatthe

persondoesnothavetoacceptabeliefasauthoritativejustbecauseithasbeenhanded

down by tradition of habit. Only the arguments that survive reason’s demand for

consistency and justification should be accepted (that is what Socrates called “the

examinedlife”).Thesecondoneremembersusthatweoftenneglecttheneedsofthose

who live far from us or look different from us. A culture of recognition should be

developed as a way of seeing those who are or become invisible (for distance or

difference). And finally, the narrative imagination means that intelligent citizenship

demandstheabilitytothinkwhatitmightbeliketobeintheshoesofapersondifferent

from oneself, to see the world from the point of view of the other. Nussbaum

emphasizeshowcatastrophicwouldbetoberuledbycompetentpeoplewhohavelost

29SeeRORTY,Richard. ThebanalityofPragmatismand thePoetryof Justice.PhilosophyandSocialHope.PenguinGroup: Virginia,2000,p.99.Hedebatedoverthissameissuewhilediscussingparadigmshifts injudicialinterpretations:“IcanshareDworkin’sandEly’sconcernsoverthe‘unprincipled’characterofsuchdecisions – their concern at the possibility that equally romantic and visionary, yet morally appalling,decisions may be made by pragmatist judges whose dreams are Eliotic or Heideggerian rather thanEmersonianorKeatsian.Butasapragmatist, Idonotbelievethatlegaltheoryoffersusadefenceagainstsuchjudges[…]”.Pragmatism,forhim,meantfreedomfromtheory-guiltandscientificanxiety.Hesaidthat“[…] the testofpowerandpertinenceofagivensocial science ishow itworkswhenyou try toapply it”(RORTY,2000,p.96).


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theability to thinkcritically, toexamine themselves,and to respect thehumanityand

diversity of others (NUSSBAUM, 2003, p. 300). The combination of these threes

capacities canbedone inhuman rights educationby knowingand critically discussing

the stories of those affected by evil laws and decisions, including literary pieces (like

Antigone).

Hencehumanrightseducationmustbecomethatpowerfulnarrative30insucha

waythatoneholdsitssetofobligationsabovethedespoticstatethatisnotasourceof

democratic legalnormsanddoesnot requires theobjectificationofdifferentconcepts

ofjusticejusttofitintotheRadbruch’sFormula.31FollowingWalzer’slesson,obligation

beginswithmembershipbut realobligationscomeonlywhenmembership isqualified

aswilful. Human rights shall becomepartof aneducational discourse that generates

that very kind ofmembership. A radical change in theway law is taught has become

urgentifwewantahumanrightsculturethatgoesbeyondlawschoolclasses:ithasto

permeate families, neighbourhoods, economical processes and state/person

relationships (GALLARDO, 2013). If raised inside such a culture, one could expect to

createwilfulmembership in citizens that confront atrocities and,more important and

priortothat,recognizethem32.

Thepriority,therefore,shallnotbeplacedondifferentlegaltheories,aswecan

perceive, but on something that comes even before that choice: a human rights

30SeeWEST,Robin.Jurisprudenceasnarrative:anaestheticanalysisofmodernlegaltheory.1985.Availableat <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738492>. Visited in April 10th, 2016: “Modern legal theorists persistentlyemploy narrative plots as strategic points in their arguments, relating romantic sagas about mythicalcommanders and communities and saturating their writings with realistic anecdotes from lawyers’s andjudges’subjectiveexperiencesoflaw”.31RazandBulyginhavebothcriticizedthispoint.See,forexample:BULYGIN,Eugenio.Alexy`sthesisoftheNecessaryConnectionbetween LawandMorality.Ratio Iures, pp133-1337, 2000.and RAZ, Joseph. TheArgumentfromJustice,orHownottoReplytoLegalPositivism.OxfordlegalStudiesResearchPaper,n.15,2007.32 JohnFinnis realizedwithaccuracy that theRadbruchFormula isnot clearabout the recognitionof thethreshold between severe and non-severe injustice: “Whatever one may think of that argument, therefinementorcomplexificationsuggeststhatthemainAlexy-Radbruchall-or-nothing,valid-or-invalidthesisrestsonanunsoundassumption:thatthemorallysignificantconsequencesofsignificantinjustice(severeornot) in law’smakingorcontentare tobearticulatedas if,atsomepoint (i.e. in relationtosomerulesofsufficientlysevereinjustice),(A)theycouldallbeappropriatelyidentifiedbyreferencetothestandardlegaltechniqueofdrawingabrightlinebetweenthevalidandtheinvalid;and(B)thisbrightlineistobesoughtasatruthaboutlaw”.SeeFINNIS,John.LawasFactandasReasonforAction:AResponsetoRobertAlexyon Law’s “Ideal Dimension”. American Journal of Jurisprudence, v.59, 2014. Available at:<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428733>.VisitedatApril10th,2016.


2452

discourse that encourages a particular subject to take actions that have a universal

projection33.

AsWalzerelucidates

All this is not to suggest that there is anything unreal about individualresponsibility. But this is always responsibility to someone else and it isalways learnedwithsomeoneelse.An individualwhosemoralexperiencesnever reached beyond “monologue” would know nothing at all aboutresponsibilityandwouldhavenone(WALZER,1967,p.174).

Thisisthekindof loyaltyormembershipthatcanonlybeachievedthroughan

educationthat iscritical,empathicand imaginative. It is the learningthatmatters, the

processofeducationofthedecisionmakersindemocraticworldthatwillelucidatethe

waystofollowinthepracticalcase,notsomelogicalformulathatpretendtorationalize

theprocessoftakingdecisions.

An important point in the process of legal education is the necessity to teach

aboutthefallibilityofoneownsactioninthepublicsphere.ThatwasneitherinCreon,

nor inAntigoneperspective in thepolis.Shebelieved shecouldnot fail in leavingher

brotherwithout the burial, aswell as Creonwas certain that he could not fail as the

sovereign. At that point Zenon Bukowski gives a relevant insight in his analyses of

Antigone:

Oneof themost important thingshere is thesearch forcertainty.Wecanseehow indoing thisbothCreonandAntigone lay claim to the law.Theybothtrytoprotectthemselvesinthearmourofthelawbutindoingsotheylose the humanness that they are supposed to preserve. (BANKOWSKI,2001,p.32)

It is thecapacityofnotobjectifyingtheconcretepersonsbehindthecasethat

shouldbeinquestion,caringaboutthehumanisticsideofthestoriesandnotlettingthis

basic characteristics lose themselves in the process. One should avoid falling into the

proceduralism of every-day-life, instead giving attention to the constitutive values of

eachperson–valuesthatmayevenchangethewaythedecisionismade.Thisisthereal

waytoproceedinhardcases,whichdoesnotmeanthatjudgesanddecisionmakersare

notboundedbyprinciples(andalsothatsomeofthoseprinciplesaremoralones).The

33Itisnotreasonabletoexpectajudgeshouldnothavehisideologicalchoicesandtheoreticalpreferencesrelatedtotheconceptoflaw(positivistornon-positivistetc).Butthissetofpreferencesmayverywellbeadaptedtothecircumstancesinordertointelligentlyovercomethepersecutions,obstaclesandlimitationsofthedictatorialregime.


2453

idealperspectiveshouldbeonethatcombinesthelegalframeworkwiththerealstories

behindeachcase.

The only way to reach that sort of equilibrium is by using human rights

education – or, in Nussbaum terms, cultivate our humanity. We cannot solve social

conflicts with formulas, otherwise we would be stuck into some form of dangerous

dystopiaasinsomeoftheBlackMirror(BROOKER,2001)episodes.

6.Conclusion

Antigone:Hehasnorighttokeepmefrommyown!(Antigone,48)

TheGuardneversavedAntigone–hewastooafraidofCreon,tooafraidoflosinghislife

or was just too comfortable following the rules. His motivations are not the most

important point here. What is relevant is the fact that his position and actions

demonstratehowhard it is toapplyRadbruch’s Formulaunderanevil regime–other

legaltheoriesservedbetterindifferentsituations.Asitturnsout,theFormulafunctions

onlyintheaftermathofanunjustregimeor,toputinotherwords,onecanonlybean

alexyan-radbruchian post-positivist ex post facto. In fact, this alexyan-radbruchian

contributionisfairlyimportant,aswellaspertinent.However,whattheFormulacannot

doistodefythevalidityofunjustlawduringtheprocess:otherresistance“weapons”of

legal argumentationhavebeenmoreuseful and lessdangerous.Authorities (including

judges),liketheGuard,whochoosetofollowtherules–forfear,prudenceorcomfort–

will still be sentencing cases, applying those extreme unjust rules, even if their

consciencetellsthemnottodoso.Whatonecanexpectistoprovidealegaleducation

that teaches future legal professionals how to avoid unjust lawwith competence and

humanity.

Resisting infavourofthedefenceless isanactofpersonalcourage indeedand

we cannot expect everyone to develop such an individualistic characteristic: we just

don’tknow,unlessthesituationpresentsbeforeus,ifweareGuardsorAntigones.But

asNussbaumshows,sometimeswecanthink inanotherway,whichcanincorporatea

simpler solution than the complex “rational” argument we find in the Formula. The

attention must be focused in legal education and different approaches in teaching

instead of spending ink and paper to formulate cunning arguments and logical


2454

structures that promise to encompass a certain way to do “the right thing”.We can

educate law students in a way that they should recognize boundaries and feel their

belongingtosomethingmoreencompassingthanuncriticalobedience.

IftheFormulastatesthatjudgesshouldnotapplyextremeunjustnorms,since

theylacktheverynatureoflaw,thiscouldbeapplicableonlytologicalcasesattachable

intotheidealdemocraticstate,whenlegalreasoningisexercisedinanenvironmentof

freedom and equality, and the contingency of the real democratic world is not

considered.Radbruch(andAlexy)mayhavefoundaFormulathatmightbecorrectbut,

asfarasAntigone’sexperienceisconcerned,mightbesometimesjusttoolate.

Referênciasbibliográficas

ALEXY,Robert.LegalCertaintyandCorrectness.RatioJuris,v.28,n.4,p.441-451,2015.ALEXY,Robert.ConstitutionalRightsandProportionality.Revus,v.22,p.51-65,2014.ALEXY,Robert.OnBalancingandSubsumption:AstructuralComparision.RatioJuiris,v.16,n.4,p.433-449,2003.ALEXY, Robert. The Argument from in justice: A reply to legal positivism. Oxford:Clarendon,2002.ALEXY, Robert. On the thesis of Necessary Connection between Law and Morality:Bulygin’sCritique.RatioJuris,v.13,p.138-147,2000.ALEXY, Robert. A defence of Radbruch’s Formula. In DYZENHAUS, David (Org.).RecraftingtheRuleofLaw:thelimitsoflegalorder.WestSussexHartPub.1999ALEXY,Robert.Lawandcorrectness.CurrentLegalProblems,v.68,p.206,1998.ALEXY,Robert.Elconceptoylavalidezdelderecho.Barcelona:EditoraGedisa,1997.AMADO, Juan Antonio García. Sobre a ideia de pretensão de correção do direito emRobertAlexy.RevistaBrasileiradeEstudosPolíticos.v.104,2012.BANKOWSKI, Zenon. Living Lawfully: love in Law and Law in love. Edinburgh: Spring,2001.BLACKMirror (TV series). Produced by Barney Reisz .Executed by Zeppotron (2001 –2014).ReinoUnido:Channel4,2001.


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BOCKEN,Hubert ,BONDT,Walterde. Introduction toBelgianLaw.Brussels: Bruylant,2001.BRANDÃO,JunitodeSouza.Mitologiagrega.5.ed.Petrópolis:Vozes,1992.V.II.COHEN,Leonard.Anthem.In:COHEN,Leonard.TheFuture.Canada:ColumbiaRecords,1992.CD.FLETCHER,Judith.CitingthelawinSophocles'sAntigone.MosaicWinnipeg,v.41,sep.2008.GALLARDO, Helio. Teoria Crítica: Matrizes e possibilidades de Direitos Humanos. SãoPaulo:FundaçãoEditoraUnesp,2013.KLEMPERER,Klemensvon."WhatIstheLawThatLiesbehindTheseWords?"Antigone'sQuestionand theGermanResistanceagainstHitler. The JournalofModernHistory, v.64,1992.NUSSBAUM,Martha C. The Cultivation of Humanity:A Classical defence of reform inliberaleducation.Cambridge:HavardUniversityPress,2003.OSIEL,MarkJ.DialoguewithDictators:JudicialResistanceinArgentinaandBrazil.Law&SocialInquiry,v..20(2),1995.RADBRUCH, Gustav. Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht. SüddeutscheJuristen-Zeitung,v.1,n.5,p.105-108aug1946.SOUZA, Felipe O. de. Entre o não-positivismo e o positivismo jurídico: notas sobre oconceitodedireitoemRobertAlexy.DireitosFundamentaise Justiça,n.14, Jan./Mar,2011.HALDEMANN, Frank. Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law. Ratiojuris,v.18,n.2,p.162-178,2005.HALL,Edith. Antigone,OedipustheKingandElectra.:Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998,178p.VERNANT, Jean-Pierre, VIDAL-NAQUET, Pierre. Mito e tragédia na Grécia Antiga.Perspectiva,2011.WEISBERG, Richard. Fish takes the bait: Holocaust denial and postmodernist theory.CriticalQuarterly,v.43,n.4,2001


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WEISBERG, Richard. Poethics and other strategies of Law & Literature. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1992.

SobreosautoresCarlosEduardoPalettaGuedesMestreemDireitopelaUniversidadeFederaldeJuizdeFora.ProfessordoInstitutoViannaJunior,JuizdeFora-MG.E-mail:[email protected]ãoVitorDeFreitasMoreiraMestrando em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, MG. E-mail:[email protected]íramigualmenteparaaredaçãodoartigo.

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