Nuclear Posture 2009-2010

8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010

1/48Progressive ideas for a strong, just, and free america www.americanProgres

Orienting the 2009Nuclear Posture Review

A RoadmapAndrew Grotto Cene f Ameican Pgess

Joe Cirincione Plugsaes Fund

November 2008


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Orienting the 2009Nuclear Posture ReviewA Roadmap

Andrew Grotto Cene f Ameican Pgess

Joe Cirincione Plugsaes Fund

November 2008


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Cnens 1 Executive summary3 An emerging bipartisan consensus or

a new nuclear posture

3 ChArt: Glbal nuclea sckpiles, 19552008

4 21st century nuclear threats4 Nuclea eism and gue saes

5 te nuclea black make

6 Nuclea enegy and nuclea eapns plifeain

8 The imperative o U.S. leadership8 russias key le

10 ChArt: te NPtS gand bagain

11 Needed: a new U.S. nuclear weapons posture12 Structuring the 2009 NPR

16 Sequencing the 2009 NPR16 Duing e ansiin

16 te fis 100 days

17 te fis yea

18 A progressive nuclear posture: key policy issues18 Deeence and dcine

18 ChArt: U.S. nuclea fces by e numbes (acive sckpile)

19 Fce sucue and e nuclea eapns cmplex

19 ChArt: Key nuclea eapns-elaed faciliies

20 Nnplifeain and ams cnl

21 ChArt: U.S. nuclea fces and e nuclea iad

21 Appendix I: Revised Nuclear Posture Review

(1070 FY 2008 National Deense Authorization Act)

23 Appendix II: Past as prelude: the politics and process

o nuclear posture reviews

28 Appendix III: A brie history o strategic arms control,

19692008

32 Selected reerences

35 Endnotes

36 About the authors


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exuv summay | www.amanpgss

Execuive summay

ere is an emerging biparisan consensus ha Americas curren nuclear weapons posure

imposes an unnecessary burden on .. eors o preven nuclear errorism and curail

he spread o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology o addiional naion-saes.

holds ha he nied aes mus reain a nuclear arsenal as a sraegic deerren, bu

should embrace he vision laid ou by senior saesmen eorge hulz, enry Kissinger,

illiam erry, and am unn o a world ree o nuclear weapons in order o srenghen

Americas abiliy o exercise global leadership in counering 21s cenury nuclear hreas.

e bama adminisraion should use he congressionally mandaed 20092010 uclear

osure eview, or , o realign nuclear policy, orces, and posure wih hese hreas.

is sudy makes he case or why a successul should be among he bama adminis-

raions op prioriies and provides a roadmap on how o srucure and manage he review

so ha i achieves key policy objecives. is no a sudy on nuclear weapons docrine.

e 20092010 will be he hird ormal review o .. nuclear sraegy conduced

since he end o he old ar. e preceding reviews were conduced early in each o he

linon and Bush adminisraions rs erms. e linon adminisraions review essen-

ially raied he old ar saus quo, despie an urgen need o recalibrae in ligh o he

ovie nions collapse and he need o work wih oscow o preven he urher spread

o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology. e aional ecuriy ouncil was largelydisengaged rom he process, as he hie ouse was jus emerging rom a series o biter

dispues wih he armed orces over such issues as omalia and gays in he miliary. e

adminisraion was also batling boh he miliary and an increasingly hosile ongress

over deense spending prioriies. e Deparmen o Deense underwen a leadership

change in he middle o he review, and oher issues, such as dealing wih orh Koreas

nuclear program and he muliple prolieraion concerns presened by he collapse o he

ovie nion, compeed or senior appoinees nie ime and resources.

he second ormal ook place in 2001 under vasly dieren poliical and

policy circumsances. was driven by presidenial prerogaives, which guaraneed

ha senior oicials would inves ime and energy in he process. he reviewyielded he adminisraions preerred policy oucomes, bu i also u ndermined

Americas n onprolieraion credenials.


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2 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap

e goals o he 20092010 should be o recalibrae Americas nuclear deerren

in ligh o exising and emerging hreas, srenghen Americas hand in negoiaions on

improvemens o he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime, and send a clear signal o he

world ha he nied aes is charing a new, mulilaeral course. uccess in achieving hese

goals hinges on developmen o a coheren, realisic sraegy or conducing he review ha

ensures senior appoinees devoe susained atenion even as hey conron oher naional

securiy challenges. e sraegy should be organized according o hese principles:

Do no poliicize nuclear weapons docrine.

onduc he review as a sraegy-driven exercise guided by a vision or nuclear weapons

policy elaboraed by he presiden.

onsul and engage he Join hies o a.

onsul and engage ongress.

Appoin experienced proessionals o carry ou he vision.

nsure ha he review is ineragency.

onsul and engage key allies and parners.

Develop a communicaions plan.

is sudy idenies he key nuclear policy issues ha demand senior-level atenion,

which we ideniy as alling ino hree caegories: Deerrence and Docrine, orce

rucure and he uclear eapons omplex, and onprolieraion and Arms onrol.

also provides a noional imeline or sequencing he review.

ese recommendaions and ndings are based on a review and comparison o how he

srucure o he linon and Bush adminisraion s, conduced in 19931994 and

2001, shaped he nal review produc in each case. e sudy was also inormed by nearly

wo dozen inerviews and inormal discussions wih expers, congressional sa, and

ormer senior ocials wih experience in nuclear policy rom boh sides o he poliicalspecrum. e auhors ake sole responsibiliy or he conen o his repor.


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An mgng bpasan nsnsus f a nw nula psu | www.amanpgss

An emeging bipaisan cnsensusf a ne nuclea psue

ere is an emerging biparisan consensus ha Americas curren nuclear weapons

posurehe policies governing he role, mission, and size o he .. nuclear weapons

arsenalimposes an unnecessary burden on .. eors o preven nuclear errorism and

curail he spread o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology o addiional naion-saes.

is consensus, which includes more han wo-hirds o living ormer naional securiy

advisors and secrearies o sae or deense, acknowledges he ongoing role o .. nuclear

weapons as a sraegic deerren or he nied aes and is allies. Bu he consensus also

embraces he vision o a world ree o nuclear weapons ariculaed by ormer ecrearies

o ae eorge hulz and enry Kissinger, ormer ecreary o Deense illiam erry,

and ormer enaor am unn (D-A) in a pair oWall Street Journal op-eds.1

e emerging consensus ress on wo proposiions. irs, i holds ha he curren posure

is based on oudaed old ar assumpions abou nuclear argeing ha emphasize he

need o deer large-scale, preempive nuclear srikes by ussia, our ormer old ar

adversary. old ar hosiliies ended more han 15 years ago wih he collapse o he

ovie nion and he arsaw ac. Alhough he nied aes and ussia have serious

dierences over a range o inernaional securiy issues and reain large nuclear arsenals,

he wo naions no longer consider each oher as irreconcilable ideological adversaries.

hina has an esimaed wo dozen ballisic missiles capable o delivering a nuclear payloado he coninenal nied aes and is slowly modernizing is nuclear orces. aiwan

remains a poenial ashpoin in ..-hina relaions, bu as long as all paries respec

he principles laid ou in he hree ..-hina Join ommuniqus and he one hina

policy, armed conic is a remoe possibiliy and nuclear conic even more so. Alhough

he nied aes will reain a nuclear arsenal or as long as oher counries possess hem,

hese developmens have brough he world a sep closer o achieving residen onald

eagans dream ha one day nuclear weapons will be banished rom he ace o he earh.

Rest o the World

Russia

United States

Global nuclear stockp

19552008

10

200

3,057

351

6,129

31,982

723

19,055

27,826

1,085

39,197

24,237

1,200

27,000

12,144

1955

1975

1995

2 0

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

1965

1985

Source: NRDC (2006); Norris (2007); Norris

(2008a); (2008b); (2008c); (2008d); (2007).


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21s cenuy nuclea eas

e second proposiion underlying he biparisan consensus is ha many counries

consider .. compliance wih is nuclear disarmamen obligaions under Aricle

o he on-rolieraion reay, or , a precondiion beore supporing addiional

.. nonprolieraion iniiaives ha are vial o counering 21s cenury nuclear hreas.

ese hreas are characerized by he diusion o nuclear maerials, know-how, and

echnologymuch o i wih a civilian dimensiono sae and non-sae acors enabled

by globalizaion and economic developmen. n he words o secrearies hulz, Kissinger,

erry, and en. unn, ihou he vision o moving oward zero [nuclear weapons], we

will no nd he essenial cooperaion required o sop our downward spiral.2

e nied aes canno couner hese hreas alone. e success o American non-

prolieraion sraegy is now ied in signican par o he willingness and capaciy o

oher counries o make cosly invesmens o ime, money, and sovereigny in a hos o

domesic and inernaional insiuions designed o regulae he ranser o sensiive mae-

rials and echnology, build condence in global supplies o nuclear uel so ha domesic

enrichmen projecs are unnecessary, penalize violaions o nonprolieraion norms, and

deer uure ransgressions. e nied aes could acquire much greaer leverage o

persuade oher counries o ake [hese seps] by addressing concerns abou Aricle

compliance, according o a nonprolieraion policy ask orce chaired by ex-ecreary oae adeleine Albrigh and ormer ecreary erry.3

Nuclea eism and gue saes

ere is no single greaer hrea o he .. homeland han erroris use o a nuclear device

agains an American ciy. Alhough he chances o his happening are small, he conse-

quences o a nuclear atack would be devasaing, likely killing hundreds o housands o

people, causing rillions o dollars in lasing damage, and orever changing our way o lie.

oenially vulnerable sockpiles o weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium, or

wha a erroris would need o build a crude nuclear deviceexis a civilian research acil-iies in dozens o counries around he world. By securing or eliminaing hese sockpiles,

he nied aes could pracically guaranee agains an ac o nuclear errorism. Ye he

pace o eors o address his key naional securiy vulnerabiliy by securing sockpiles and,

preerably, phasing ou he civilian use o alogeher lags behind he severiy o he


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21s nuy nula has | www.amanpgss

hrea. As o 2007, an esimaed our ou o ve research reacors lacked adequae securiy

o proec agains sophisicaed hieves, while only around one-hird o -ueled

research reacors have had all heir monioring removed.4

ogue sae acquisiion o nuclear weapons presens a dieren, more complex challenge.

raises he chances o nuclear war hrough miscalculaion or acciden while providing an

incenive or oher counries o seek heir own nuclear deerren, poenially leading oregional arms races. ran coninues o press orward wih is nuclear program in violaion

o successive .. ecuriy ouncil resoluions demanding a suspension. orh Korea has

agreed in principle o eliminae is nuclear program as o his wriing, bu i is by no means

cerain wheher ongoing negoiaions will produce ha oucome. her saes, such as

yria, may also have secre programs underway. Alhough concerns abou .. compli-

ance wih Aricle are unlikely o exer a direc inuence on rogue saes nuclear

ambiions, such concerns may inuence he willingness o oher counries o join an

inernaional eor o conain hose ambiions using sancions, diplomaic pressures, and

oher means. inally, over he long run, an insisence by he worlds sronges convenional

miliary power, he nied aes, ha i canno mee is securiy needs wihou nuclear

weapons can only make nuclear weapons more atracive or weaker powers.

te nuclea black make

e lieline or hese illici eors is a nuclear black marke comprised o skilled manuac-

urers, engineers and scieniss, middle-men, and ransporaion and logisics channels.

is serviced by hree broad ypes o prolieraors ha vary in heir willingness and abiliy

o comba prolieraion: willul prolieraors, such as he inamous A.. Khan, aher

o akisans cenriuge enrichmen program; willully blind prolieraors ha should

reasonably know heir skills and wares will be used o advance a bomb program bu ail operorm due diligence; and ignoran prolieraors ha genuinely do no undersand he

prolieraion consequences o heir acions. fen, he acor in quesion is a privae-secor

eniy operaing in a counry wih uneven or largely non-exisen governmenal oversigh

over ows o poenially sensiive maerials and echnology. ach o hese prolieraors

presens a unique challenge, bu hey all have his in common: ey reec undamenal

weaknesses in domesic and inernaional governance o global commerce.

n he indusrialized es, here have been major improvemens in expor conrols and

relaed measures o clamp down on illici nuclear rade during he pas 15 years. ese

advances were spurred in large par by shocking revelaions in he afermah o he 1991

ul ar concerning he size and scale o addam usseins nuclear procuremens duringhe 1980s. raq during his period, along wih ndia, akisan, and ohers, exploied weak-

nesses in he expor conrol regimes o he advanced indusrial democracies, paricularly

in selec uropean counries whose indusries possessed high echnologies. e exposure

o A.. Khans nework in 2003 moivaed anoher round o improvemens in many coun-


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ries. xpor conrols remain a work in progress, despie decades o experience regulaing

nuclear expors. onsan vigilance is demanded o say ahead o he prolieraion curve.

oreover, he orces o economic developmen, indusrializaion, and globalizaion are

esablishing new ceners o high echnology in he developing world ha can serve as

alernaive suppliers or sensiive, precision echnologies. A.. Khan, or example, se up

a cenriuge componen manuacuring aciliy in alaysia, a counry wih litle priorexperience policing illici ransers o prolieraion-sensiive echnologies. is develop-

men presens a grave and growing new challenge o he nonprolieraion regime, or many

o hese counrieswhich are concenraed in he on-Aligned ovemen, or A, an

inernaional bloc o mosly developing counrieslack he domesic capabiliy o ade-

quaely regulae sensiive echnology ows and/or he poliical will o beter regulae he

ow o echnology expors, which are ofen seen as essenial o economic developmen or

counries ha have made expor-led growh he cornersone o heir naional economic

policy. A nied aions nsiue or Disarmamen esearch sudy repors, or example,

ha many developing counries regard expor conrols wih suspicion, viewing hem as

barriers o economic developmen a bes, and a wors as par o a deliberae sraegy o

echnology denial on he par o he developed world.5

.. ecuriy ouncil esoluion 1540 highlighs he diculies associaed wih moiva-

ing counries o spend scarce resources on nonprolieraion eors. is, in essence, an

ununded mandae requiring ha counries adop and enorce appropriae eecive laws

prevening non-sae acors rom prolieraing D. aes mus criminalize prolieraion,

adop and enorce expor and border conrols, and insiue eecive physical proecion

measures. or many counries, paricularly developing ones, his is a very all order requir-

ing poenially signican invesmens in a range o specialized regulaory capaciy

invesmens hey migh preer o spend on educaion, inrasrucure, or public healh. Bu

-1540 does no dene wha appropriae eecive means, leaving he inerprea-ion o individual counries discreion. As a resul o hese acors, implemenaion among

developing counries, according o he D sudy, is weak.

Nuclea enegy and nuclea eapns plifeain

uure prolierans need no pursue he clandesineand hence unambiguously ille-

galroue ha ibya, raq, ran, orh Korea, and possibly yria have aken. nsead, a

governmen could announce a grandiose nuclear energy developmen program ha

includes a domesic nuclear uel-making capabiliy, osensibly o guaranee a supply o

nuclear uel or is anicipaed reacor ee. e does no expressly prohibi saesrom pursuing his echnology, provided i is or avowedly peaceul purposes and he hos

governmen subjecs i o AA inspecionseven hough i can produce uel or bombs

as well as reacors. ran, or example, had disclosed he exisence o is nuclear uel-

making program rom he beginning insead o hiding i in violaion o is AA saeguards


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21s nuy nula has | www.amanpgss

agreemen, he prevailing view among mos inernaional legal expers is ha he program

would be permissible under he . AA inspecions can veriy ha a declared aciliy

is peaceul in naure, bu hey canno preven a counry rom kicking inspecors ou and

using he aciliy o produce uel or bombs. Alernaively, a sae can diver he experience

and knowledge gained rom operaing a declared peaceul aciliy o a secre, undeclared

aciliy dedicaed o making bombs. a is why rans nuclear uel-making programs pose

such a grave prolieraion risk.

ese scenarios are ar rom hypoheical. ran already jusies is enrichmen program

on energy securiy grounds, and many developing counries are relucan o srongly con-

demn rans program or ear ha urher resricions on nuclear uel-making could jeop-

ardize heir energy securiy should hey develop nuclear reacors or producing elecriciy.

her counries may well ollow he more above-board roue available o hem under he

and pursue a weapons program under he guise o a civilian energy program.

is risk could grow precipiously in he coming decades i demand grows or nuclear

energy as an alernaive o burning ossil uels or elecriciy producion. A presen, more

han 90 percen o exising nuclear reacor capaciy is concenraed in developed and

ransiion economies. os o he ne growh in worldwide capaciy, however, is projeced

o occur in developing counries, paricularly in hose associaed wih he on-Aligned

ovemen. n jus he pas wo years, or example, many such counriesincluding sev-

eral .. parners in he iddle ashave announced ambiious nuclear energy develop-

men plans, ciing concern over global warming and rapid demand growh or energy.

nly a ew non-aligned counries, such as Brazil and ouh Arica, currenly possess

domesic enrichmen echnology or have plans o pursue i; he risk ha several or more

may decide o do so in he uure, however, is signican. op nonprolieraion priori-

ies or he bama adminisraion will include reducing he incenive or indigenousuel making by promoing credible, economically atracive alernaives o domesic uel

producion, improving ransparency o civilian nuclear energy programs by srenghen-

ing he nernaional Aomic nergy Agencys abiliy o conduc nuclear inspecions, and

srenghening expor and border conrol regimes o curb he ow o illici nuclear com-

merce. e challenge or nonprolieraion diplomacy is ha counries are under no general

legal obligaion o accep or suppor hese measures. ome counries recognize he direc

benes hey would derive rom acceping hese obligaions and already suppor hem.

her counries, however, do no and mus be lobbied or cajoled ino supporing hem.


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te impeaive f U.S. leadesip

.. leadership is essenial o mobilizing inernaional acion o reduce hese risks. As ormer

ecrearies hulz, erry, and Kissinger and en. unn wroe in heir 2007 Wall Street Journal

op-ed, i is required o ake he world o he nex sageo a solid consensus or reversing

reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vial conribuion o prevening heir prolieraion

ino poenially dangerous hands, and ulimaely ending hem as a hrea o he world.

Bu many developing counries have rejeced .. leadership. A recen D sudy

repors, or example, a widespread belie in ouh-as Asia and elsewhere ha an exag-

geraed non-sae D hrea is being used by he nuclear weapons saes o disrac

atenion rom heir ailure o comply wih heir disarmamen commimens.6 ese

counries accuse he nied aes o ailing o uphold is commimen o nuclear disar-

mamen as required by he , ciing he Bush adminisraions repudiaion o a polii-

cal undersanding reached a he 2000 eview onerence on a series o 13 specic

measures or acions ha would serve as benchmarks or evaluaing progress as well as

he oucome o he 2001 ha, as explained in Appendix , is widely inerpreed

as expanding he role o nuclear weapons in .. deense sraegy. e 13 benchmarks

include enry ino orce o he omprehensive es Ban reay and a issile aerial

u- reay wih vericaion provisions, susaining he Ani-Ballisic issile reay,

and oher arms conrol measures. ncreasingly, developing counries are he main argeso nonprolieraion diplomacy, ye hey have indicaed hey will no enerain he pos-

sibiliy o assuming new nonprolieraion obligaions unless he exising nuclear powers

ake urher seps o reduce heir arsenals. is issue will dominae he spring 2010

eview onerence, which many expers regard as a make-or-break momen or he

nonprolieraion regime. e success o he conerenceand he abiliy o he nied

aes o advocae or necessary improvemens o he nonprolieraion regimewill urn

in par on he nuclear weapons policies o he nied aes.

russias key le

ussian suppor is indispensable o any durable eor o consrain prolieraion. is

already a major miliary and diplomaic power and a leading energy supplier due o is

large reserves o oil and naural gas. also has an advanced nuclear energy indusry. ese

asses endow ussia wih remendous inuence over prolieran saes such as ranand


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th mpav f U.S. ladshp | www.amanpgss

he prospecs or more durable improvemens o he nonprolieraion regime, such as

iniiaives o consrain he spread o nuclear uel-making aciliies.

By he same oken, he nied aes canno revialize inernaional eors o reduce

nuclear weapon dangers wih ussia, hina, and oher counries wihou a clear sense

o how nuclear weapons ino broader .. deense sraegy. n December 2009, he

cornersone arms conrol agreemen beween he nied aes and ussia, he Areay, will expire. is agreemen species he essenial procedures and mechanisms

or veriying muual compliance wih agreemens ha reduce and eliminae nuclear

arsenals, including he oscow reay (also known as ) signed in 2002.

her key iems on he arms conrol and nonprolieraion agendas include he disposiion

o he omprehensive es Ban reay, ongoing negoiaions over a issile aerial u-

reay, convincing developing counries o renounce naional uranium enrichmen

in avor o mulilaeral alernaives, and srenghening he AAs auhoriy and abiliy o

conduc nuclear inspecions. Achievemen o hese objecives is likely o hinge in par on

he saus o .. nuclear weapons policy.

norunaely, he ..-ussia relaionship, which had achieved unprecedened coop-

eraion on nuclear nonprolieraion maters in he 1990s, is broken. e Bush admin-

israions wihdrawal rom he Ani-Ballisic issile reay in 2001 se he sage or

an increasingly acrimonious and a imes hosile relaionship beween he wo ormer

miliary adversaries. ussias leadership, paricularly ormer residen and curren

rime iniser ladimir uin, deserves he lions share o he blame or he downurn.

oscow has clamped down on reedoms a home and exploied is newound clou in

global energy markes o bully neighbors. n addiion, is miliary conic wih eorgia

in Augus 2008 has raised grave quesions abou ussias sraegic direcion. Bu Bush

adminisraion policies ranging rom he 2003 invasion o raq o is curren eorso esablish a missile deense beachhead in asern urope have ed he impression in

ussia ha he nied aes is no an enlighened superpower, bu an expansionis one

ha seeks power and inuence a ussias expense. ..-ussian relaions have reached a

nadir no seen since he old ar ended nearly 20 years ago.


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Regarded as the cornerstone o the nuclear nonprolieration regime, the

NPT divides the world into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon

states. The treaty considers China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and

the United States nuclear-weapon states. Every other country in the worldis considered a de jure non-nuclear weapon state, even i they de acto

possess nuclear weapons. Thus, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are

considered non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Those our countries

are also the only countries that arent party to the treaty.

Nuclear-weapon states:

Wont prolierate to non-nuclear weapon states (Art I)

Facilitate the use o peaceul nuclear technology (Art IV)

Negotiate in good aith toward nuclear disarmament (Art VI)

Non-nuclear weapon states party:

Foreswear nuclear weapons (Art II)

Accept IAEA saeguards over peaceul nuclear activities (Art III)

The NPTS grand bargain

United States

United Kingdom

France

Russia

China North Korea

India

Israel

Pakistan

Nuclear-weapons states

De facto nuclear states


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Ndd: a nw U.S. nula wapns psu | www.amanpgss.

Needed: a ne U.S. nucleaeapns psue

e bama adminisraion mus break his logjamboh wih he developing world

and wih ussiain order o eecively comba he nuclear hreas o he 21s cenury.

A renewed commimen on he par o he nied aes o reducing is nuclear arsenal,

along wih a reinvigoraed sraegic dialogue wih ussia, would bolser Americas nonpro-

lieraion bona des and enable i o reassume is radiional leadership role in eors o

srenghen he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime.

Accordingly, he bama adminisraion should use he congressionally mandaed

20092010 nuclear posure review [see Appendix ] o realign nuclear policy, orces, and

posure wih 21s cenury nuclear hreas. e goals o he review should be o recalibrae

he nuclear deerren in ligh o exising and emerging hreas, srenghen Americas hand

in negoiaions over improvemens o he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime, and

send a clear signal o he world ha he nied aes is charing a new course.


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Sucuing e 2009 NPr

uccess in achieving hese goals hinges on developmen o a coheren, realisic sra-

egy or conducing he review ha ensures senior appoinees rom he deparmens o

deense, sae, and energy, along wih he aional ecuriy ouncil, devoe susained

atenion even as hey conron oher naional securiy challenges. e 2009 will

occur in a vasly more complex policy environmen han eiher o he preceding wo

reviews, which occurred a he sar o each o he linon and Bush adminisraions rs

erms. e bama adminisraion will inheri a saggering array o major oreign policy

challenges ha will compee or he atenion o senior appoinees, including wars in raq

and Aghanisan, errorism, orh Koreas nuclear weapons program, rans nuclear ambi-

ions and growing regional clou, a broken ..-ussia relaionship, energy insecuriy,

climae change, and a nonprolieraion regime in urgen need o repair. will also likely

have o make a number o dicul choices abou deense spending prioriies.

olicy choices in one area may consrain or enable policy opions in oher areas. or

example, some analyss have proposed eliminaing he Kings Bay aval ubmarine

Base in eorgia, which serves as he Alanic seapor or Americas B ee. rom an

operaional sandpoin, his would eecively eliminae he abiliy o he nied aes o

conduc nuclear parols in he Alanic, which has implicaions or .. alliance relaions

in A and broader .. policy oward ussia as well. Adminisraion policy owardnuclear esingincluding he Bwill aec he abiliy o he nied aes o

achieve diplomaic objecives a he 2010 eview onerence. And a deermina-

ion o press orward wih missile deense insallaions in asern urope will aec he

prospecs or bilaeral arms conrol wih ussia. Abandoning hese insallaions, however,

could have alliance repercussions. ese are jus a ew illusraions o why i is essenial o

have a coheren sraegy or carrying ou he .

aionalism in ussia is a an apex, as is disrus o ashingon. ese dynamics reinorce

he need or he bama adminisraion o seek a sraegic dialogue wih ussia, bu hey

also raise quesions abou wheher ussias leadership is ready o engage he nied aes

in a serious way, paricularly wih respec o sraegic issues such as nuclear weapons, mis-sile deense, and A expansion. e bama adminisraion mus seek his dialogue,

bu have realisic expecaions abou wha i is capable o producing in he near erm.


19/48

Suung h 2009 NPr | www.amanpgss.

inally, he emerging biparisan consensus on nuclear policy does no ye exend o such

key quesions as he appropriae nuclear weapons manuacuring complex o suppor he

arsenal, he role and uure o ballisic missile deense sysems, and he miliary use o

space. n addiion, some conservaive legislaors and pundis urher o he righ on he

poliical specrum remain commited o a old ar posure and have indicaed srong

suppor or a nuclear weapons complex capable o supporing a much larger arsenal han

may be warraned by a realisic hrea assessmen. e bama adminisraion shouldexpec hese conservaives o challenge a progressive nuclear posure and seek o racure

he emerging biparisan consensus.

n order o maximize he s eeciveness and ensure is subsequen implemenaion,

i should be srucured according o he ollowing lis o core principles. ese principles

are derived rom a series o wide-ranging inerviews wih expers and ormer senior

ocials wih experience in nuclear policy rom boh sides o he poliical specrum, and

a review and comparison o how he srucure o he linon and Bush adminisraion

s shaped he nal review produc in each case (see Appendix , as as relude: e

oliics and rocess o uclear osure eviews).

Conduct the NPR as a strategy-driven exercise guided by a vision for nuclear

weapons policy elaborated by the president in a Presidential Decision Directive or

other appropriate means.A review process conduced wihou a sense or he ulimae

desinaion is unlikely o produce any meaningul changes in he posure. is vision

is essenial or dening he parameers o ineragency debae (whas setled and whas

up or grabs), ocusing he review process, and arming he presidens appoinees wih

poliical auhoriy or driving he presidens agenda orward. e presiden himsel

should deermine he goal o he review, which could be as general as insrucions o his

senior appoinees ha hey achieve deep cus in nuclear orces consisen wih susain-

ing deerrence and revialize inernaional arms conrol. is senior appoinees shouldhen lead he review, as opposed o delegaing he review o mid-level appoinees and

career civil servans. is is essenial in order o ideniy, weigh, and deniively setle

radeos across radiionally sovepiped policy areas.

Consult and engage the Joint Chiefs. eir advice and suppor is essenial o conduc-

ing a posure review and eecively communicaing he resuls o he American people

and ongress. e J are in all likelihood prepared o accep poenially signican

changes in .. nuclear weapons policy, bu heir suppor should no be aken or graned.

is essenial ha hey be acively consuled and brough ino he review process.

Consult and engage with Congress. e bama adminisraion could coun on hesuppor o a progressive ongress, provided key members o ongress are consuled

a he onse o he review and given an inerim repor. onservaive legislaors may

atemp o challenge he bama adminisraions nuclear weapons policies, bu hey


20/48


can be rebued i here is consisen, close communicaion beween he hie ouse

and he ongress, accompanied by a concered eor o reach ou o moderae con-

servaive legislaors.

Do not politicize nuclear weapons doctrine. e presiden mus speak o he American

people abou he sraegic hreas o he naion, paricularly nuclear errorism and he

risk o nuclear weapons use. is adminisraions nuclear policy, however, may be anatracive arge or conservaives in ongress and elsewhere, paricularly i hey sense

ha he presiden is personally commited o he issue. ere is litle value in elevaing

he poliical prole o nuclear weapons docrine beyond he broad parameers o he

biparisan consensus in avor o urher reducing he size and sraegic prole o nuclear

weapons in .. sraegy. is consensus is embodied in he join wriings o senior

saesmen hulz, Kissinger, erry, and unn. inally, he adminisraion should be par-

icularly careul no o make public commimens in advance o he review on specic

numbers or he weapons sockpile.

Appoint experienced professionals to carry out the vision. A successul mus

engage a diverse specrum o nuclear weapons policy consiuencies, some o which

may resis an eor o sreamline .. nuclear orces. e process will go much more

smoohly i he presiden aps experienced proessionals who undersand he inner

workings o he nuclear weapons bureaucracy, have producive working relaionships

wih he uniormed miliary and wih each oher, and enjoy he respec o civilian and

uniormed career proessionals alike. ese individuals mus also be able o coun on

he presidens ull suppor. e adminisraion can gain addiional insighs and suppor

or is policies rom independen exper groups, including he congressionally mandaed

ommission on he raegic osure o he nied aes and he ommission on he

revenion o eapons o ass Desrucion rolieraion and errorism.

Ensure that the review is interagency. All relevan agencies should have a sea a he

able, hough i is imporan o recognize ha he personal relaionships among he

senior appoinees and heir commimen o he process will exer a ar greaer impac on

he process han ormal lines o consulaion and communicaion.

Consult and engage key allies and partners. Americas allies are weary o oreign policy

surprises and increasingly jitery abou Americas securiy commimen o hem. e

unease could grow among allies in he iddle as in ligh o rans nuclear ambi-

ions and as he nied aes begins o redeploy rom raq, in asern urope due o

ussias armed conic wih eorgia, and in as A sia because o orh Koreas nuclear

program. is unease could corrode Americas relaionships and inuence, and leadsome counries o seek a nuclear weapons capabiliy. is essenial ha he con-

sider he eec ha changes in he size and sraegic prole o .. nuclear orces may

have on Americas alliances.


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Suung h 2009 NPr | www.amanpgss.

Develop a communications plan. is will ensure ha he nied aes reaps he

maximum possible inernaional diplomaic bene rom is new posure a he 2010

eview onerence, where A counries are likely o link heir suppor or

new nonprolieraion obligaions o progress on nuclear disarmamen by he nied

aes and oher nuclear powers. e nied aes should seek o be as ransparen as

possibleconsisen wih susaining deerrenceabou he reviews resuls in order o

couner mispercepions and concreely illusrae how he nied aes is ullling isnuclear disarmamen commimens under Aricle . n addiion, conservaives

mus no be allowed o rame he debae over he resuls o he . eir criique is

likely o employ hese ve rheorical sraegies and argumens: atemp o inaccuraely

rame he sakes o he as a choice beween heir vision o nuclear weapons policy

and unilaeral nuclear disarmamen; ridicule he noion ha nuclear reducions by he

nied aes would have any impac on counries like ran and orh Korea when he

main diplomaic objecive is o inuence non-aligned counries willingness o suppor

Americas nonprolieraion agenda; alsely sugges ha oher counries are modernizing

heir sraegic arsenals while America is no; selecively inerpre echnical daa on war-

head reliabiliy o jusiy large nuclear weapons producion aciliies; and oer unduly

opimisic projecions abou he cos o hese new aciliies.


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Sequencing e 2009 NPr

e sequencing and pace o he review will depend largely on he degree o which he

presiden and his senior appoinees make i a prioriy, along wih he broader poliical and

policy climae in 2009. ill, i is useul o lay ou a noional imeline in order o provide an

iniial ramework or organizing he process.

Duing e ansiin

Signal presidential commitment to a progressive nuclear posture. e presiden-elec

and/or his senior appoinees should inorm he J during ransiion briengs ha

he presiden-elec wans o ake bold seps in he direcion o a world ree o nuclear

weapons while preserving Americas nuclear deerren. e ransiion eam should begin

o ouline he main parameers o a new residenial Decision Direcive on nuclear

weapons policy.

te fis 100 days

Hold a meeting of the principals of the National Security Council, along with the

commander of STRATCOM, to formally launch the review.e goals o he meeing

are o demonsrae presidenial commimen o nuclear policy, ideniy which aspecs

o nuclear policy are setled and which are up or grabs, and esablish a preceden or a

robus ineragency process. e presiden should reques ha he resuls o he review

be given o him in he orm o a memo o opions ha all paricipans in he review

regard as legiimae, even i hey preer one over anoher. e advanage o his approach

is ha i doesn require he presiden o explicily overrule he viewpoin o any paricu-

lar consiuency when he chooses his preerred opion.

Develop a process ensuring sustained senior-level commitment to implementing the

presidents vision. e success o he review will hinge in signican par on he parici-paion o senior-level poliical appoinees capable o mobilizing heir respecive bureau-

cracies behind he presidens vision, resolving ineragency dispues, and engaging

he J. is may require a careul examinaion o wheher he ce o he Assisan

ecreary o Deense or pecial peraions/ow-nensiy onic & nerdependen


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apabiliies, or /&, which currenly has responsibiliy or nuclear weapons

policy a DD, has he resources o eecively lead he review, given is oher policy

responsibiliies. ne opion is o creae a separae ce o raegic apabiliies

headed by is own assisan secreary. A second and perhaps preerred opion, in ligh o

he challenges associaed wih a signican reorganizaion o DD, would be o appoin

a srong assisan o he secreary o deense or nuclear, chemical and biological deense

programs, or AD(B), and make i a direc repor o he secreary o deense. isposiion already exiss on paper and requires enae conrmaion.

Host a meeting with congressional leaders on the presidents vision. ongressional

inviees should include he enae ajoriy eader, he peaker o he ouse, and he

hair and anking embers o he ouse and enae oreign relaions and armed

orces commitees and relevan subcommitees.

Launch outreach process to key U.S. allies and parners. e nied aes should

launch consulaions wih A allies, in connecion wih As eor o draf is

new raegic oncep, on he role o nuclear weapons in he alliance and he disposi-

ion o he esimaed 350 acical nuclear weapons orward-deployed by he nied

aes in urope. e nied aes should also iniiae discussions on nuclear policy

wih he governmens o Ausralia, Japan, and he epublic o Korea. should also

explore avenues o deepen a dialogue over sraegic orces wih hina. inally, he

nied aes should seek a sraegic dialogue wih ussia on he role o nuclear weap-

ons and he uure o arms conrol in ligh o he December 2009 expiraion o A .

te fis yea

Present Congress with an interim briefing.

e goal o he brieng is o give ongressan opporuniy o weigh in on he process and o launch a process o resolve any dis-

agreemens well in advance o he ebruary 2010 due dae.

Provide the president with the options memo on nuclear weapons policy. e

resuls should be delivered o he presiden by he secrearies o deense, energy, and

sae, along wih he chairman o he J.

Launch a bipartisan process to address and resolve issues relevant to Senate ratifica-

tion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. e main issues are vericaion o he

reay and he reays implicaions or sockpile reliabiliy.

Develop a communications plan on nuclear policy. is should be considered a core

par o he review, no an aferhough. n addiion o raming he new posure o build

domesic poliical suppor, he communicaions plan should also eaure a vigorous sra-

egy or maximizing .. diplomaic gains a he spring 2010 eview onerence.


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A pgessive nuclea psue:key plicy issues

e demands made on he presiden and his senior appoinees are grea even in peace-

ime. Bu he bama adminisraion will inheri wo wars and a hos o oher pressing

naional securiy problems ha will compee or senior policymakers limied pool o

ime and atenion. is hereore essenial o ideniy in advance he key nuclear policy

issues ha are likely o demand senior-level decisions and guidance. ese issues all ino

hree caegories: Deerrence and Docrine; orce rucure and he uclear eapons

omplex; and onprolieraion and Arms onrol.

Deeence and dcine

The mission(s) and role(s) for nuclear weapons. hould he employmen o nuclear

weapons be limied o deerring and i necessary responding o nuclear atacks? r are

here oher legiimae missions or nuclear weapons, e.g. o preemp or realiae agains

he use o chemical or biological weapons atacks? ould he nied aes ever use

nuclear weapons rs? ha role, i any, exiss or acical nuclear weapons? Does uncer-

ainy over he sraegic direcion o hina or ussia maerially aec hese quesions?

Nuclear weapons targeting plans.

hould he nied aes coninue o rely on preseargeing plans agains ussia, hina, and oher possible adversaries, or abandon hem

in avor o exible argeing procedures ha ailor a response o unique coningencies

as hey emerge?

Deployment practices, including alert rates. hould he nied aes reain rapid

launch opions or nuclear weapons, such as launch on warning or launch under

atack? ha are he operaional implicaions?

Declaratory policy. hould he nied aes publicly renounce and/or rearm (as he

case may be) is policies regarding securiy assurances?

The role, if any, of nuclear weapons in sustaining key security alliances. ow impor-

an is Americas nuclear umbrella o he A alliance and .. relaions wih Japan?

hould A remain a nuclear alliance? ha abou exending he umbrella o ohers,

e.g. allies in he iddle as?

U.S. nuclear orces by the

numbers (active stockpile)

Warheads

Delivery vehicles/platorms

2,000

Sea Land Air Non-

strategic

1,500

1,000

500

0

ource: Norris and Kristensen (2008d).


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The relationship between nuclear forces, conventional long-range strike, and bal-

listic missile defense systems.

Fce sucue and e nuclea eapns cmplex

The sum total of the arsenal, including deployed and reserve nuclear weapons.

hould he oal be a poliical decision dicaed ex ante by he presiden (e.g., presiden

issues insrucions a he onse capping he oal arsenal a 1,000 warheads)?

Key nuclear weapons-related acilities

Bangor Naval Submarine Base, WATrident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles.

Houses an estimated 2,364 warheads.

Barksdale AFB, LA B-52H bombers. Houses 940 warheads.

Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MOManuactures and procures non-nuclear components or nuclear

weapons. Employs ~2,900 personnel.

Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, GATrident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles.

Houses an estimated 1,364 warheads.

Kirtland AFB, NMHome o the Air Force Materiel Commands Nuclear Weapons Center

(NWC). Houses an estimated 1,914 warheads.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,

Livermore, CA

Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and reurbishment.

Employs ~5,100 personnel.

Los Alamos National Laboratory,

Los Alamos, NM

Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and reurbishment.


Malmstrom AFB, MT Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 535 warheads.

Minot AFB, ND

B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMS, and nuclear-capable

advanced cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles.Houses an estimated 1,250 warheads.

Nellis AFB, NV Houses an estimated 902 warheads.

Nevada Test Site, Las Vegas, NVSupports stockpile stewardship and sustains U.S. readiness to resume

underground nuclear testing. Employs ~2,200 personnel.

Ofutt AFB, NE Home to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TXRange o warhead surety and saety services, along with pit storage

and warhead assembly and disassembly. Employs ~3,200 personnel.

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,

NM; Livermore, CA; Kauai, HI; Tonopah, NV

Responsible or non-nuclear components and systems engineering.


Savannah River Site, Aiken, SCProduces and manages tritium or use in nuclear weapons. Employs

~1,700 personnel.

Warren AFB, CO, NE, WY Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 170 warheads.

Whiteman AFB, MO B-2 bombers. Houses an estimated 136 warheads.

Y-12 National Security Complex,

Oak Ridge, TN

Fabricates warhead parts and components rom special nuclear

materials. Employs ~4,000.


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The configuration of the triad, including whether all three legs are required. hould

he nied aes eliminae one or more o he legs? ha are he sraegic, budge-

ary, and poliical implicaions o eliminaing, or example, he bomber ee and/or he

inerconinenal ballisic missile orce?

The appropriate nuclear weapons surety and manufacturing base to guarantee the

safety and reliability of the arsenal. ow can he nied aes susain is nuclearweapons design experise? Does he nied aes need o design and build new war-

heads? Does i need new nuclear weapons producion aciliies, e.g. o produce pluo-

nium pis? ha are he sraegic, budgeary, and poliical implicaions?

Nuclear testing, including disposition of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. an

he ockpile ewardship rogram guaranee he saey and reliabiliy o he arsenal,

paricularly in he even o deep reducions ha would reduce he number o weapons

held in reserve or inacive saus?

Nnplifeain and ams cnl

The role of arms control. hould he nied aes negoiae legally binding accords

wih ussia on nuclear reducions or pursue hem unilaerally? negoiaed, o wha

exen should issues such as missile deense and A expansion be par o he discus-

sions? pursued unilaerally, wha i ussia does no reciprocae? here does hina

in? And where do allied (rance and rea Briain) arsenals in?

The relationship between Americas nuclear posture and its ability to advocate on

behalf of nuclear nonproliferation.ha can he nied aes do o address concerns

expressed by many counries ha i is no living up o is nuclear disarmamen obliga-ions under Aricle o he onprolieraion reay?


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The United States currently has an estimated 10,000 nuclear warheads in

its total stockpile o which approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads are in the

active stockpile: 4,075 operational weapons and another 1,260 warheads

kept in reserve. The operational stockpile consists o around 3,575 stra-tegic nuclear orces and 500 nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear orces. The

remainder o the weapons is in storage awaiting dismantlement.

Strategic nuclear forces. A nuclear warhead is generally considered

strategic i it is delivered using a long-range strategic delivery platorm

as part o a deterrence mission. These platorms include:

IntercontInental BallIstIc MIssIles, or IcBMs. America has an

estimated 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, but plans reductions to 450.

The ICBMs are located at three U. S. Air Force bases in ve states:

Minot AFB (ND), Malmstrom AFB (MT), and Warren AFB (which over-

laps corners o CO, NE, and WY). These ICBMs carry an estimated

764 nuclear warheads, most o which are 20 times more powerul

than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

BallIstIc MIssIle suBMarInes, or

ssBns. The United States has 14 SSBNs,

two o which are currently in overhaul. These are based out o Bangor

Naval Submarine Base (WA) or Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base (GA). The

SSBN eet can carry 288 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles. Each missile, in

turn, can carry six nuclear warheads or a total o 1,728 operationallydeployed strategic warheads on the SSBN eetnearly 40 percent o the

operationally deployed arsenal. The explosive power o these warheads

ranges rom eight times to 30 times more powerul than the Hirosh

device, depending on the warhead model. More than 60 percent o

patrols now occur in the Pacic, compared to just 15 percent in the

The targets or these patrols are likely China, North Korea, and Russ

long-range heavy BoMBers. Two bombers, the B-2 Spir

B-52 Stratoortress, are dual-hatted or nuclear a

conventional missions. America

B-2s and 56 B-52s on operatio

status, and another our B-2s and 38 B-52Hs are used or training, t

and backup missions. The B-52s are stationed at Barksdale AFB (LA

Minot AFB (ND), and the B-2s at Whiteman AFB (MO). The bombers

carry several diferent types o nuclear weapons, including some w

so-called dial-a-yield capability that enables the user to choose r

range o explosive yields. The explosive power o the air-delivered

tegic arsenal ranges rom less than the explosive yield o the Hiros

bomb to 80 times as powerul. More than 1,000 strategic warhead

operationally deployed to the bomber orce.

Non-strategic tactical nuclear forces. These are nuclear we

intended or tactical use on a military battleeld. There are no bind

international legal constraints on them. America has an estimated

non-strategic weapons, o which 500 are considered operational

ready or deployment. The remaining 790 are considered inactive

timated 350 warheads rom the active stockpile are orward deplothe territory o several NATO allies. The non-strategic arsenal consi

sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and air-launched gravity b

U.S. nuclear orces and the nuclear triad

Source: Norris & Kristensen (2008d).


28/48


Appendix I

revised Nuclea Psue revie (1070 FY 2008 Nainal DefenseAuizain Ac)

(a) EQUIEMEN FO COMPEHENSIVE EVIEW.n order o clariy .. nuclear deer-

rence policy and sraegy or he near erm, he secreary o deense shall conduc a

comprehensive review o he nuclear posure o he nied aes or he nex 5 o

10 years. e secreary shall conduc he review in consulaion wih he secreary o

energy and he secreary o sae.

(b) ELEMENS OF EVIEW. e nuclear posure review shall include he ollowing elemens:

(1) e role o nuclear orces in .. miliary sraegy, planning, and programming.

(2) e policy requiremens and objecives or he nied aes o mainain a sae,

reliable, and credible nuclear deerrence posure.

(3) e relaionship among .. nuclear deerrence policy, argeing sraegy, and arms

conrol objecives.

(4) e role ha missile deense capabiliies and convenional srike orces play in

deermining he role and size o nuclear orces.

(5) e levels and composiion o he nuclear delivery sysems ha will be required

or implemening he nied aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any

plans or replacing or modiying exising sysems.(6) e nuclear weapons complex ha will be required or implemening he nied

aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any plans o modernize or modiy

he complex.

(7) e acive and inacive nuclear weapons sockpile ha will be required or imple-

mening he nied aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any plans or

replacing or modiying warheads.

(c) EPO O CONGESS.e secreary o deense shall submi o ongress, in unclas-

sied and classied orms as necessary, a repor on he resuls o he nuclear posure

review conduced under his secion. e repor shall be submited concurrenly wih

he quadrennial deense review required o be submited under secion 118 o ile 10,

nied aes ode, in 2009.(d) SENSE OF CONGESS. is he sense o ongress ha he nuclear posure review con-

duced under his secion should be used as a basis or esablishing uure .. arms

conrol objecives and negoiaing posiions.


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Appndx ii | www.amanpgss.

Appendix II

Pas as pelude: e pliics and pcess f nuclea psue evies

e bama adminisraions nuclear posure review will be he hird ormal review o

.. nuclear sraegy conduced since he end o he old ar. e preceding reviews

conduced early in each o he linon and Bush adminisraions rs ermsoccurred

under dieren policy and poliical conexs ha maerially aeced he conduc o he

review and is impac on .. policy. omparing he wo provides crucial lessons on how

o srucure he 2009 o achieve a desired resul.

te 19931994 NPr

e rs occurred in 19931994, during he rs erm o he linon adminisraion.

As a candidae in 1992, linon had made change a cenerpiece o his campaign. is rs

secreary o deense, es Aspin, brough ha heme o he enagon, where he launched a

major deense policy review o craf a .. deense policy or he pos-old ar era. e

so-called Botom-p eview was compleed in epember 1993 and se he sage or he

adminisraions , which was launched shorly hereafer.

e original goal o he was o ocus on he role o nuclear deerrence in .. secu-

riy sraegy in he new pos-old ar environmen. e main nuclear hrea was consid-

ered by linon appoinees o be he accidenal or unauhorized launch o a weapon by

ussia or he acquisiion o nuclear weapons by a rogue sae such as raq or orh Korea,

and no an inenional nuclear srike by he legiimae ussian leadership. e nuclear

posure needed o complemen Americas broader eors o address hese hreas. e

risk o accidenal or unauhorized launch could be reduced i boh sides were o aban-

don nuclear war plans driven by he old ar need o deer a surprise atackwhich

demanded large numbers o weapons on hair-rigger alerin avor o a smaller, surviv-

able orce. e nied aes also sough o promoe he nuclear nonprolieraion norms

capured in he 1968 on-rolieraion reay, paricularly in advance o he spring1995 eview and xension onerence ha would decide wheher o indeniely

exend ha reay or allow is expiraion laer ha year. e prospecs or indenie exen-

sion o he could be maximized i he nied aes was seen as reducing he role o

nuclear weapons in is own deense sraegy.


30/48


n he end, however, he review generaed a posure ha more or less raied he old ar

sraegy o deploying housands o nuclear weapons on hair-rigger aler. e sory or

why he review urned ou his way is complex, bu several hemes sand ou. Alhough

he old ar was over, here were some uncerainies over wheher and when ussia,

which remained a ormidable sraegic weapons power wih ens o housands o nuclear

weapons, would evolve ino a ull-edged democracy. easonable people could disagree

on his undamenal dimension o he overall hrea assessmen, bu opponens o changeused his residual uncerainy, and in some cases exaggeraed i, o suppor a hawkish posi-

ion on ussia. ere was no susained ineragency eor o resolve his divergence, which

inherenly avored he saus quo policy o planning nuclear requiremens and operaions

primarily on he basis o he poenial hrea posed by oscow.

imilarly, here was a major gap beween he uniormed miliary and he mid-level DD

poliical appoinees ha managed he on wha role nuclear weapons played in ..

deense policy. R was commited o susaining and even expanding he saus

quo role o nuclear weapons. e poliical appoinees, by conras, judged ha precision

convenional weaponry had already begun o replace nuclear weapons in acual war gh-

ing, and ha his rend would only accelerae. e remaining mission or nuclear weapons

was deerrence by he hrea o overwhelming realiaionand ha mission, in heir v iew,

could be ullled solely by ballisic missile submarines.

e suggesion ha he oher wo legs o he nuclear riadinerconinenal ballisic mis-

siles and heavy bomberswere obsolee and could be on he chopping block promped a

vigorous campaign on he par o R o preemp he ormal process wih

is own inernal policy review and vigorous advocacy on he ill. e uniormed miliary

and he civilian nuclear weapons bureaucracy closed ranks around Rs per-

specive, and proceedings were leaked o seleced members o ongress, who hen

waged parisan atacks agains he adminisraion.

ere was no concered eor by senior poliical appoinees o broker or setle hese dis-

pues over undamenal issues o .. grand sraegy. e hie ouse was jus emerging

rom a series o biter dispues wih he armed orces over such issues as omalia and gays

in he miliary, and was batling boh he miliary and an increasingly hosile ongress

over deense spending prioriies. e was largely disengaged rom he process, and

DD underwen a leadership change in he middle o he review and was preoccupied

wih oher issues, such as dealing wih orh Koreas nuclear program and he muliple

prolieraion concerns presened by he collapse o he ovie nion. n he end, he 1994

essenially raied he conclusions o Rs own inernal policy review:

keep he riad, pursue no urher reducions beyond hose agreed o in A , andsick wih curren operaional docrine.


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te 2001 NPr

e second ormal ook place in 2001 under vasly dieren poliical and policy

circumsances, and was srucured in such a way as o produce he adminisraions

desired oucome. n a ay 2000 presidenial campaign speech, candidae eorge .

Bush linked reducions in .. nuclear orces o he aggressive pursui o naional mis-

sile deense, wih he later being a core ideological objecive or conservaives. ponaking oce, residen Bush old his senior advisors ha he waned he o resul in

signican nuclear reducions. is insrucion was likely moivaed by a desire o recas

..-ussian relaions in he pos-old ar era, a key objecive o ondoleezza ice, his

naional securiy advisor, and ephen adley, ices depuy. ome senior ocials in his

adminisraion also viewed he process as an opporuniy o consolidae suppor or

wihdrawing rom he AB reay, which was preordained, and pursuing naional mis-

sile deense. ese acors helped ensure ha he would be ideological and driven

by wo presidenial prerogaives, which guaraneed ha senior ocials would inves

ime and energy in he process. Bu i also produced a posure ha undermined

Americas nonprolieraion credenials.

e main parameers o he review were deermined by a relaively small group o senior

ocials rom he aional ecuriy ouncil and Deparmen o Deense. e was

conduced primarily during he iniial nine monhs o he new adminisraion, a period

o relaive calm wih ew major inernaional crises. ndeed, he main oreign policy batle

he adminisraion was gearing up or was over he AB reay and missile deense.

e adminisraion atemped o ake a page rom onald eagans raegic Deense

niiaive, or D, playbook and link nuclear reducions o missile deense. By developing

and deploying such a sysem, he nied aes could render rogue nuclear arsenals, in

eagans words, impoen and obsolee and hereby ree up he nied aes o make

cus in is own arsenal. e Bush adminisraion also had he luxury o a less hosileongress and, a leas in 20012002, enjoyed a repuaion or compeency in deense

policy due o he considerable experience o Bushs cabine and senior advisors.

n maters o nuclear docrine, he appoinees had a head sar in he review process: mos

o hem were involved in a ask orce sudy on nuclear weapons policy convened in 2000 by

he aional nsiue or ublic olicy, a conservaive hink ank. According o some par-

icipans, his sudy served as a reresher on he relevance o nuclear weapons policy o ..

naional securiy and helped ge senior appoinees on he same page rom day one.

verall, he Bush did no cu ha hard agains he grain o esablished nuclear

orhodoxy wihin he enagon or generae any clear budgeary losers in he bureaucracyor ongress. is lef he Bush adminisraions criics wih ew consiuencies o link up

wih and limied channels o wage a campaign agains he resuls. (ndeed, he mos


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poen early criic o he adminisraions nuclear weapons policy urned ou o be he

epublican chairman o a ouse Appropriaions subcommitee, David obson (),

who challenged elemens o he adminisraions nuclear weapons budge proposal and

no he review s core conclusionsper se.)

e setled on 1,7002,200 operaionally deployed warheads, which marked a reduc-

ion o around wo-hirds in he operaionally deployed orce. a gure was codied ina ay 2002 agreemen wih ussia called he raegic ensive educions reay, or

. (ome senior ocials, such as hen-Depuy aional ecuriy Advisor adley,

reporedly suppored even deeper reducions, perhaps by several hundred, bu were

deerred by he prospec o a batle wih hen-ecreary o Deense Donald umseld).

enior paricipans in he 2001 genuinely believed hey reduced he role o nuclear

weapons in .. naional securiy sraegy. n his oreword o he repor submi-

ed o ongress, or example, ecreary umseld announced ha he .. will be less

dependen han i has been in he pas on nuclear orces o provide is oensive deerren

capabiliy. Bu many counries, ranging rom ussia o members o he A, judged

he precise opposie when porions o he were leaked o he press in early 2002.

e called or greaer exibiliy in he planning, developmen, and use o nuclear

weapons, including he developmen and possible use o acical nuclear weapons agains

rogue saes such as ran and orh Korea. also singled ou hina and ussia as pos-

sible arges or nuclear operaions. inally, he divided .. sraegic capabiliies

ino hree rheorical caegories described as he new riad: nuclear and convenional

oenses, deenses such as missile deense, and a responsive nuclear weapons manuac-

uring and surey inrasrucure. e inended goals o his ormulaion were o signal

a reducion in he salience o nuclear weapons o .. sraegic policy and o boos he

prole o missile deense.

Aside rom he emphasis on missile deense, hese developmens did no mark a sig-

nican change in nuclear weapons docrine rom he linon adminisraions posure.

e nied aes already considered he lised counries as possible arges or nuclear

operaions, or example, even i i hadn said so publicly. Bu he Bush adminisraions

aggressive unilaeralismparicularly is wihdrawal rom he AB reay and is new

docrine o prevenive warcreaed an inerpreaive conex or he s clumsily blun

language ha led hina, ussia, and many A counries o inerpre he posure in

he wors possible ligh. e new riad ormulaion, or example, was widely criicized

as blurring he disincion beween convenional and nuclear orces. And he adminis-

raions ill-advised proposals or developing new acical nuclear weapons such as he

so-called bunker buser, which senior paricipans viewed as enhancing deerrence(as opposed o supplemening convenional miliary operaions), dramaically reinorced

his inerpreaion.


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n he end, he 2001 did grea damage o Americas nonprolieraion credenials.

e deense deparmen, which had responsibiliy or he public relaions componen o

he , had negleced o inves any ime or energy ino how he resuls migh be

received by he adminisraions many criics. hen he criicisms began o moun, he

adminisraion made no concered eor o couner hem. is neglec is a reecion in

par o he adminisraions unilaeralismmany senior ocials simply didn care how

oreign audiences would reac. Bu he deense deparmen was also disraced by he warin Aghanisan and early planning or he 2003 invasion o raq. aricipans in he 2001

believe ha a more eecive communicaions plan migh have bluned some o he

criicism, alhough he hosiliy ha he Bush adminisraions broader unilaeralism was

generaing around he world would have made his inherenly dicul.


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Appendix III

A bief isy f saegic ams cnl, 19692008

te Nixn/Fd yeas (19691977)

raegic Arms imiaion alks, or A (19691972). is process led o he rs rea-

ies and agreemens beween he nied aes and he ovie nion ha would impose

consrains on sraegic weapons. e AB reay was one produc o his process. e

oher main produc was he nerim Agreemen, in which he nied aes and ussia

agreed o sop building new B silos, exercise resrain in expanding he size o exising

ones, and cap he number o submarine-launched ballisic missi les and Bs. a agree-

men expired in 1977.

Ani-Ballisic issile reay, or AB (1972). e AB reay banned deploymen o a

missile deense sysem inended o guard he enire naion agains ballisic missiles, and

prohibied a range o research and developmen aciviy ha could lead o such a sysem.

e nied aes wihdrew rom he reay on June 13, 2002.

reshold es Ban reay, or TB (1974). oncluded by he ixon adminisraion, his

early atemp a arms conrol prohibied nuclear ess ha exceeded 150 k (10 imes hesize o he iroshima bomb) and esablished a number o ransparency and vericaion

measures. imiing he permissible yield or nuclear esing would consrain developmen

o new, more powerul weapons ha could be used in a nuclear rs srike. Boh paries

announced in 1976 heir inenion o observe he reays yield limi pending raicaion.

oncerns over vericaion held up raicaion, however, unil 1987 when he wo sides

agreed on addiional vericaion measures. e reay nally enered ino orce in 1990.

e reay duraion is rolling ve-year erms, which are auomaically renewed unless

eiher pary noies he oher o is inen o erminae.

te Cae yeas (19771981)

A (19721979). e A process began monhs afer he A process

ended. produced a reay in 1979 ha would limi boh sides o a oal o 2,400 delivery

vehicles, where each B silo, submarine missile-launch ube, or bomber was consid-


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Appndx iii | www.amanpgss.

ered a single delivery vehicle. hen he ovie nion invaded Aghanisan laer ha year,

however, residen Jimmy arer asked he enae o pu advice and consen or he reay

on hold. Boh counries iniially pledged o abide by is erms pending raicaion, bu in

ay 1986 residen eagan renounced his pledge, saying he nied aes mus base

decisions regarding is sraegic orce srucure on he naure and magniude o he hrea

posed by ovie sraegic orces and no on sandards conained in he A srucure.

Alhough he reay was never raied, ongress laer ha year enaced a nonbindingmeasure indicaing he sense o he ongress ha i is in he naional securiy ineress o

he nied aes o coninue volunary compliance wih he cenral numerical sub-limis

o he A reay as long as he ovie nion complies wih such sub-limis.

te reagan/Bus yeas (19811993)

nermediae-ange uclear orces reay, or (1987). n his reay, he nied aes

and ussia agreed or he rs ime o eliminae an enire caegory o nuclear weapon:

ground-launched ballisic missiles and cruise missiles wih ranges beween 5005,500

kilomeers. e reay also eaured provisions mandaing on-sie inspecions o veriy

compliance and esablished a pecial ericaion ommission o aciliae reay imple-

menaion. e reay enered ino orce in June 1988. reay membership expanded in

1991 o include Belarus, Kazakhsan, and kraine, which along wih ussia had inheried

nuclear weapons when he ovie nion dissolved. e provisions or on-sie inspecions

expired on ay 31, 2001, so vericaion is now conduced using surveillance saellies.

e reay is oherwise o unlimied duraion.

raegic Arms educion reay, or A (1991). nder A, he nied aes

and ussia agreed o reduce heir deployed sraegic arsenals o 1,600 delivery vehicles

and 6,000 warheads. e reay eaures elaborae couning rules or deermining heselimis. e paries agreed o desroy excess delivery vehicles and accep inrusive inspec-

ions o veriy compliance. ey also se a deadline o December 5, 2001 o comply wih

he reay. All paries me ha deadline.

e collapse o he ovie nion in December 1991 delayed he reays enry ino orce

because i produced our saes wih nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhsan, ussia, and

kraine. n ay 1992, he paries signed he isbon roocol, in which all our counries

(along wih he nied aes) agreed o sign A . Belarus, Kazakhsan, and kraine

pledged o join he as non-nuclear weapon saes. A enered ino orce in

December 1994.

e reay will expire on December 5, 2009 unless he paries agree o a ve-year exension.

An exension or oher ime periods would consiue an amendmen o he reay and

hereore require re-raicaion by boh paries.


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e residenial uclear niiaives, or s (19911992). e is he rs and only

concree eor by he nied aes and ussia o joinly reduce heir acical nuclear

weapons arsenals. n epember 27, 1991, residen eorge .. Bush announced

ha he nied aes would unilaerally end overseas deploymen o ground-launched

shor-range nuclear weapons and desroy all weapons in his caegory. e also pledged o

end deploymens o acical nuclear weapons on several naval plaorms during normal

circumsances, i.e. unless hosiliies broke ou.

Bush made hese pledges in order o signal o he ovie nion ha he nied aes

would no exploi ovie weakness as he ovie sae disinegraed and o promp ovie

presiden ikhail orbachev o ake reciprocal acion. Bush worried ha he command

and conrol o he ovie nions acical nuclear orces, which i deployed in large num-

bers hroughou he arsaw ac, could be compromised. orbachev reciprocaed wih

pledges o eliminae and/or consolidae several caegories o acical nuclear weapons.

e s resuled in he eliminaion o housands o nuclear weapons, including 3,000

American weapons. simaes o he curren size o he ussian acical arsenal vary widely,

bu he range is likely o be 3,000 o 6,000, down rom beween 12,000 o 21,700 in 1991.

Bu here are no mechanisms in place o veriy compliance wih he pledge, and periodic

eors o negoiae ransparency measures, such as accouning exchanges on invenories,

have ye o succeed. ussia has condiioned urher negoiaions on he wihdrawal o he

remaining .. acical nuclear orces rom urope, where hey are deployed per A

policy. A decision o remove hem would require he consen o all 26 A counries.

te Clinn yeas (19932001)

A (1993) and A . e core obligaion in A is o urher reducedeployed sraegic nuclear warheads o beween 3,000 and 3,500. Anoher imporan ea-

ure o he reay is ha i would have banned muliple warheads on Bs. e nied

aes raied he reay in January 1996 and ussia in ay 2000, bu ussia reused

o exchange insrumens o raicaion unless he nied aes ongress approved a

1997 proocol ha would exend he A s implemenaion deadline and a series

o concurrenly negoiaed agreemens ha claried and srenghened he AB reay.

ongress never approved hese measures so A has no enered ino orce.

A was inended o serve as a ollow-on agreemen o A . envisioned

urher reducions and new ransparency measures, bu i was eecively superseded by

he 2002 agreemen.


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Appndx iii | www.amanpgss.

te Bus yeas (20012009)

raegic ensive educions reay, or (2002). igned by ussia and he nied

aes in ay 2002, i commis he paries o limiing heir respecive arsenals o opera-

ionally deployed sraegic warheads o 1,700 o 2,000 by December 31, 2012, on which

dae expires.

suers rom several shorcomings. e reay incorporaes he vericaion

measures o he raegic Arms educion reay, bu ha agreemen is se o expire in

December 2009, and here is no replacemen or i ye. does no speciy a imeable

or benchmarks o guide he implemenaion o he reay, which makes i dicul o objec-

ively assess reay implemenaion. n addiion, does no esablish any ceilings or

he number o sraegic warheads kep in reserve or require ha excess sraegic warheads

be dismanled or desroyed, so when he reay expires in 2012, eiher pary could launch

a rapid nuclear build-up using sockpiled weapons and delivery vehicles.


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Endnes

1 George P. Shultz et. al., A World Free o Nuclear Weapons. The Wall

Street Journal, January 4, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB116787515251566636.html ; George P. Shultz et. al., Toward a Nuclear-Free

World,The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.

com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries .

2 Shultz et. al., Toward a Nuclear-Free World.

3 National Security Advisory Group, Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing

Nuclear Terrorism (2007).

4 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007 (Cambridge: Harvard University/Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), available at www.nti.org/securingthebomb.

5 Tanya Ogilvie-White, Facilitating Implementation o Resolution 1540 in South-

East Asia and the South Pacic. In Lawrence Scheinman, ed., ImplementingResolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (New York: United

Nations Institute or Disarmament Research, 2008).

6 Ibid.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://www.nti.org/securingthebombhttp://www.nti.org/securingthebombhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html


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Abu e aus

ANDrEw J. Grotto

Andrew J. roto is a enior aional ecuriy Analys a he ener or American

rogress, where he specializes in .. nuclear weapons sraegy, nuclear nonprolieraion

policy, and nuclear energy.

is work has appeared in a variey o scholarly and popular publicaions, and he is a

requen gues lecurer on nuclear nonprolieraion a he oreign ervice nsiue, he

.. ae Deparmens pos-graduae school. e is also a regular gues commenaor on

nonprolieraion and .. naional securiy sraegy or major inernaional and naional

media oules, including BB, , B, Al Jazeera, ox, ky hannel, aional

ublic adio, and Air America. n addiion o his wriings on deense policy, roto has

also published scholarly works on inernaional rade and inellecual propery.

roto received his J.D. rom he niversiy o aliornia a Berkeley, where he served as

an edior o heBerkeley Journal o International Law. e received his masers degree rom

arvard niversiys John . Kennedy chool o overnmen and his bachelors degree

rom he niversiy o Kenucky, where he was a aines ellow.


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Abu h auhs | www.amanpgss.

Abu e aus

JoSEPh CIrINCIoNE

Joseph irincione joined loughshares und as presiden in arch 2008. e is auhor

oBomb Scare: Te History and Future o Nuclear Weapons and served previously as senior

vice presiden or naional securiy and inernaional policy a he ener or American

rogress and as direcor or nonprolieraion a he arnegie ndowmen or nernaionaleace or eigh years. e worked or nine years in he .. ouse o epresenaives as a

proessional sa member o he ommitee on Armed ervices and he ommitee on

overnmen peraions, and served as sa direcor o he biparisan iliary eorm

aucus. e eaches a he eorgeown niversiy raduae chool o oreign ervice and

is a member o he ouncil on oreign elaio

Nuclear Posture 2009-2010

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