NREP Report

8132019 NREP Report

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullnrep-report 19

European Union Institute for Security Studies1

The EUrsquos non-recognition and engagementpolicy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Summary1

The EU is currently building its new European

External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty Atthe same time the European Commission and theEuropean External Action Service are jointly conduct-ing a comprehensive strategic review of the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy (ENP) aspiring among otherthings to strengthen the Unionrsquos role in conict reso-lution in its neighbourhood

The Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia endorsed in December2009 has the potential to combine a variety of politi-cal and economic tools and policy instruments (ENPEastern Partnership European Neighbourhood and

Partnership Instrument Instrument for Stability) intoone approach to conict resolution and condencebuilding If adapted to other conict situations it couldbecome a model for the EUrsquos conict resolution policyin the neighbourhood

EU Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP)towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia aims at openinga political and legal space in which the EU can interactwith the separatist regions without compromising itsadherence to Georgiarsquos territorial integrity

1 My thanks go to the EUSR for the South Caucasus from 2006 to

2011 Peter Semneby and his entire staff for excellent cooperation on this

and other projects For invaluable input and comments on different drafts

of this report I would like to thank Peter Semneby Mark Fawcett and Fredrik

Wesslau

Conditions on the ground have worsened in the pastthree years Georgian policy towards the conict re-gions is torn between isolation and engagement andremains essentially restrictive South Ossetia has

become practically inaccessible for international ac-tors except Russia Windows of opportunity exist in Abkhazia but they are closing fast Therefore time isof the essence for the success of the NREP

Existing instruments and elements of the NREP havea very limited time horizon It remains unclear howengagement will evolve in the future This note there-fore suggests that the EU needs to develop a moresystematic and reinforced NREP that focuses on de-isolation and transformation

De-isolation implies more systematic contacts with civil

society and the population(s) at large For this the EUneeds a smart policy on granting visas to inhabitantsof Abkhazia and South Ossetia Moreover contactswith the de facto authorities should be stepped up to astructured dialogue in order to create an environmentthat enables more civil society exchange (p 6)

The EU needs to nd imaginative ways for using exist-ing instruments if it wants to be able to engage with Abkhazia and South Ossetia More funds should beallocated to support private entrepreneurship andeconomic interaction across conict lines While

the EU will not be able to match Russian economicinvolvement in the two entities it has a lot on offer interms of modernisation strategies ndash and this is beingnoticed particularly in Abkhazia (p 7)

EuropeanUnionInstitute forSecurity Studies

SeminarReports

SEMINAR CO983085HOSTED BY THE EUSR FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

AND THE EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

WITH THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS

Brussels 1-2 December 2010 by Sabine Fischer

8132019 NREP Report


2 European Union Institute for Security Studies

EUISS Seminar Report

More measures in the areas of information educationhealth care and training would help increase interac-tion with civil society build trust in society at largeand contribute to conict transformation In the longrun the EU should consider how to involve the twoentities in the EU approximation process (p 7)

NREP is also about linking the EUrsquos various activitiesstrategically so as to make its involvement visible to thepopulations and to increase its leverage (p 8) Giventhe situation in the two entities NREP should continueto focus on Abkhazia and turn it into a showcase forSouth Ossetia and other breakaway territories in theEastern neighbourhood

The EU has to carefully calibrate its policy in a difcultand tense political environment Its goals and prioritiesdo not fully coincide with those of any of the parties tothe conicts Clarity on Georgiarsquos territorial integrity andon non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian inde-pendence is of the essence Georgian fears of lsquocreep-ing recognitionrsquo need to be taken seriously Howeverthe EU needs to inuence the Georgian mindset inthe direction of shifting the main focus to engagementrather than isolation It has to make it clear to Tbilisi thatpolitical and economic engagement with the two enti-ties are in Georgiarsquos medium and long term interest Atthe same time it has to apply operational impartiality inrelations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to open thedoor for engagement with the two entities (p 9)

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Two years after the Russian-Georgian war in August2008 the conicts involving the separatist territorieshave lsquorefrozenrsquo EU stabilisation efforts particularlythrough the EUMMrsquos monitoring activities are of cru-cial importance to provide stability along the ceaserelines and prevent the resumption of hostilities TheGeneva Talks in which the EU plays a key role arethe only international format in which the parties tothe conicts interact The talks however have beendifcult and limited in scope On the ground Russiais consolidating its control over Abkhazia and SouthOssetia while Georgia is pushing for the isolation ofthe entities

This new status quo appears to be stable but is in factfragile and liable to move the sides further away fromeach other rather than bring them closer together The

EU as the primary peacemaker in Georgia has astrong interest in strengthening and intensifyingthe engagement component of its policy in order toincrease its inuence in the entities and inject a newand constructive dynamic into the conict-resolutionprocesses

In December 2009 the Political and Security Committeeof the Council of the European Union endorsed a policytowards Abkhazia and South Ossetia which is basedon two pillars non-recognition and engagementOne year later the EUISS and the EUSR for the South

Caucasus with the nancial support of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Netherlands organised a semi-nar in Brussels to take stock of the implementation ofthis Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP)and to discuss ideas for its further renement

The EUrsquos non-recognition and engagement policy

The European Unionrsquos policy towards Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia rests on two pillars the non-recogni-tion of their self-proclaimed independence on the one

hand and engagement with the entities on the otherThis twin-pillar policy opens a political and legal spacein which the EU can interact with the separatist regionswithout compromising its adherence to Georgiarsquos ter-ritorial integrity While being rm on principle the EUis pragmatic in practice

The NREP foresees the following elements

n The EUrsquos rm commitment to the principle of Geor -giarsquos territorial integrity and sovereignty provides

the political framework for all measures of EU en-gagement with the two entities

n The EU has an interest in contacts with the defacto authorities from Abkhazia and South Osse-tia These contacts should be developed in orderto promote condence building conict resolutionand humanitarian assistance

n Contacts with the civil societies and populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are essential in orderto overcome the international isolation of the popu-lations of the two entities

n Contacts should unfold through condence-build-ing measures particularly in the spheres of civil so-ciety human rights and economic integration It is

important to avoid the politicisation of condence-building measures by the parties unconditional ac-cess for humanitarian aid needs to be assured

n Contacts with the Tbilisi-backed authorities for Ab-khazia and South Ossetia should be undertakenwhen necessary Support for the IDP populationremains a key priority for the EU

n Contacts with Russian forces in the entities may benecessary given their responsibilities under Inter-national Humanitarian Law and Russiarsquos role in the

resolution of the conicts Contacts with Russiandiplomats should be avoided and should be limitedto the conict resolution framework ie the IncidentPrevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)

With this policy the EU pursues several goals

n It increases the EUrsquos leverage and footprint in thetwo entities Without interaction and engagementthe EU will lack both carrots and sticks with whichto inuence the entities Non-engagement will onlypush the entities further into Russiarsquos embrace

n It can work to support alternative political narrativesand perspectives to counteract the currently veryone-sided discourses in Abkhazia and South Os-setia

n De-isolation and diversication of narratives are aprecondition for the long-term goal of conict reso-lution

The NREP represents one component of the EUrsquoscomprehensive conict resolution strategy in Georgia

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The component complements and reinforces effortsby EUMM the Geneva Talks the IPRMs politicaland economic reform processes in Georgia within theENPEaP framework and Commission projects in therealms of condence building humanitarian and post-conict reconstruction assistance in the two entities

The NREP towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia isbased on the EUrsquos strategic interest in sustainableconict resolution in Georgia and stability in the SouthCaucasus region The South Caucasus is an importantpart of the Unionrsquos Eastern Neighbourhood with whichthe EU has developed close political societal and eco-nomic interdependence It is an important transit routefor energy exports to the EU In the past few years theEU and the South Caucasus countries have workedto deepen their relationships In 2010 negotiations

on Association Agreements in the framework of theEastern Partnership programme have been openedwith all three states

The unresolved conicts however threaten theregionrsquos peaceful and sustainable development Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Transnistriaand Nagorno Karabakh are essentially lsquowhite spotsrsquoon the map of the Eastern Neighbourhood that falloutside the regionrsquos approximation agenda The EUtherefore has a vital interest to engage pro-activelywith these entities

The Georgian policy process

Despite the stabilisation after the August 2008 war thesituation in Georgia remains tense In light of the warthe Government of Georgia (GoG) has elaborated itsown policy towards the two entities which is torn be-tween elements of isolation and of engagement

This policy rests on four legal and political documentsthe Law on Occupied Territories (LoOT adopted in

October 2009) the Strategy on Occupied TerritoriesEngagement through Cooperation published by theGeorgian State Ministry for Reintegration in January2010 (henceforth referred to as the Strategy) theAction Plan for Engagement on the implementa-tion of the Strategy (henceforth AP adopted in July2010) and the Modalities for Conducting Activitiesin the Occupied Territories (henceforth Modalitiesadopted in October 2010)

These documents reect a fundamental dilemma Onthe one hand the GoG has acknowledged that engage-ment with the two entities is an inevitable componentof conict resolution and ultimately the restoration ofGeorgian territorial integrity Particularly the AP con-tains numerous innovative ideas on how to engageOn the other hand the GoG fears that engagement byinternational state and non-state actors could lead tolsquocreeping recognitionrsquo As a consequence the LoOTeven after its revision in reaction to comments fromthe Venice Commission remains very restrictive withregard to activities of international organisations andNGOs in the entities The Strategy too applies a re-strictive approach particularly by its wording (occupiedterritories) and its refusal to interact with the de factoauthorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi

Since August 2008 Georgiarsquos policy has evolved indialectic interaction with the international communityTbilisi has sought and been open to comments andadvice from Western partners and international organ-isations For instance following the rst discussionsamong EU member states on the NREP in June andJuly 2009 informal discussions were held between theEU and the GoG on the EUrsquos NREP which resultedin the Georgian government adopting a more exibleattitude when elaborating its own policy Moreoverthe GoG has accepted the involvement of the VeniceCommission of the Council of Europe on various occa-

sions The body of documents that forms the basis forits policy is therefore partly the outcome of a learningprocess that has slightly softened the Georgian ap-proach Nevertheless it retains many restrictive ele-ments Critics argue that the Georgian Strategy aimsto impress the international community rather thangenuinely engage with Abkhazia and South Ossetia Itremains to be seen in the forthcoming implementationof the AP to what extent this policy will be efcient

The dismissive attitude of the de facto authoritiesand populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia cer-tainly represents a major obstacle to the success of

the Georgian policy of engagement Sukhumi andTskhinvali deny Georgian claims that direct consul-tations were held in the course of the elaboration ofthe Strategy and Action Plan They categorically ruleout engagement on the basis of the AP as long as theStrategy on Occupied Territories remains the politicalframework of the GoGrsquos approach Ofcial Abkhazand South Ossetian rhetoric dismisses the EU as pro-Georgian because of its close relations with Tbilisi andits insistence on Georgian territorial integrity

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The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

In Abkhazia much less attention is paid to the con-ict with Georgia since the August 2008 war andthe subsequent recognition by Russia The Abkhazleadership with tacit support from the Armenian andRussian minorities focuses its attention on the com-pletion of the Abkhaz state-building project Sukhumirelies on massive political and economic support fromthe Russian Federation As a consequence Moscowrsquospolitical and economic inuence has grown exponen-tially in the past two years The forthcoming OlympicWinter Games in Sochi in 2014 will further increasethe speed of Abkhaziarsquos drift into Russia Abkhazianpolitics is mainly about access to resources comingfrom Russia and corruption increases with the amountof money that ows into the entity

On the other hand there is growing wariness ofMoscowrsquos impact and real intentions A certainnumber of actors in the political institutions includingamong the de facto leadership and civil society fearthat this will ultimately have negative repercussions on Abkhaziarsquos lsquosovereigntyrsquo and the Abkhaz nation Thesegroups have an interest in closer interaction with ex-ternal actors other than Russia particularly with theEU Their room for manoeuvre however is shrinkingThe window of opportunity for the EUrsquos NREP towards Abkhazia is therefore closing fast

The political and economic dependence of SouthOssetia on Russia is even higher Unlike AbkhaziaSouth Ossetia lacks any economic basis for an inde-pendent existence The South Ossetian leadershiprefuses constructive exchange with international play-ers other than Moscow Civil society in South Ossetiaremains very weak Under such circumstances thereare very few footholds for NREP in South Ossetia

The NREP substance and measures

The EUrsquos non-recognition and engagement policy to-wards Abkhazia and South Ossetia has manifesteditself primarily through maintaining contacts with theentities and implementing projects But these effortshave been limited in scope

The European Commission was and remains thelargest donor supporting the needs of conict-affectedpersons in South Ossetia and Abkhazia The projectsfunded and conducted by the Commission encompass

humanitarian aid and support for IDPs support forthe populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia andcondence and dialogue projects After the August2008 war the Commissionrsquos space for manoeuvre inSouth Ossetia was reduced to almost zero Projectsin Abkhazia however are ongoing The Commissionfaces problems and obstacles on both sides of the con-ict line The restrictive approach of the GoG on the onehand and the refusal of Abkhaz partners to cooperateunder programmes assigned to Georgia undermine itsactivities For the rst three years after the 2008 warthe implementation of projects was facilitated by a reli-ance on the Instrument for Stability and EIDHR whichare not tied to the consent of a partner governmentIn May 2010 UNDP started a lsquoCommission-fundedCondence Building Early Response Mechanismrsquo(COBERM) for condence-building and dialogue

projects These are essential elements of the NREPHowever the funding will expire in the near futureThe Instrument for Stability is designed for short-termpost-war reconstruction and rehabilitation ndash protractedconict situations are not envisaged in this framework As a consequence funds for the abovementionedprojects will dry up by the end of 2011

Up until February 2011 the EUSR for the SouthCaucasus and his staff travelled to Abkhazia on a reg-ular basis and maintained contacts with the de facto authorities civil society and the population (EUSR

visits every 4 months EUSR Police Liaison Ofcers(PLOs) about 50 visits since early 2008 plus monthlyvisits by the EUSR POLAD from Tbilisi) Unlike EUand Member States diplomats accredited in Tbilisithe EUSRrsquos regional mandate provided him witheasy access to interlocutors in Sukhumi which haspublicly refused entry of Tbilisi-based AmbassadorsTherefore the EUSR and staff helped preserve animportant channel of communication and provideBrussels institutions and Member States with valuablereporting on developments in Abkhazia The PLOs hadcontacts with the de facto law enforcement authoritiesin Abkhazia and closely follow policing issues on the

ground on both sides of the boundary line

Similar contacts were held with South Ossetia beforethe August 2008 war but have since been stoppedbecause of resistance from the de facto authoritiesSince the war engagement with South Ossetia hasbecome much more difcult

The EUSR and the EUISS have been organising a se-ries of small roundtable events on EU-related topics inSukhumi since early 2009 The aim of this series is to

8132019 NREP Report




bring more information about the EU to Abkhazia Withthe mandate of the EUSR in question it is unclear if thiskind of engagement can be continued in the future

The way ahead for NREP

de-isolation and transformation

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are isolated from therest of the world with the exception of the Russianpresence in the entities and easy access to Russia As Georgia moves forward on its EU approximationtrajectory Abkhazia and South Ossetia move furtheraway

The situation is becoming increasingly difcult andurgent given the limited time horizon of the existingelements of the NREP together with the lack of prag-matism demonstrated by Georgia The EU needs todevelop a more systematic and reinforced NREP to-wards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to coun-ter the negative tendency Based on the discussionsduring the seminar we suggest that the NREP shouldfocus primarily on de-isolation and transformationThe immediate objective of the NREP should be tocounter the isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetiafrom the international community This should be ac-

companied by transformation efforts aimed at open-ing up Abkhazia and South Ossetia through slowlyincreasing societal and economic interaction with theEU and Georgia Only transformation addresses theroot causes of the conicts and can set the stage forreconciliation between the societies and ultimatelyconict resolution

The EU has yet to start a systematic policy of de-iso-lation Given the time pressure with respect to boththe situation on the ground and quickly vanishing EUfunds there is a risk that further progress in the di-rection of medium-term transformation and long-term

reconciliation and resolution will not be possible

At this early stage de-isolation should focus on twomain issues

The EU should aim at developing more systematiccontacts with civil society and the population(s) atlarge It is counterproductive to prevent representa-tives of these groups from travelling to the EU sincethis increases antipathy towards the EU limits expo-sure to the EU and prevents contacts between peo-

ples Member States should agree to pursue a smartpolicy on granting visas to inhabitants of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia Such a policy should in essence begenerous and non-restrictive in order to encouragemobility while at the same time extract a political pricefrom the leadership of the entities for travel to the EU

Most residents have Russian passports which havebeen issued arguably in violation of international lawin disregard of clear GoG protests and with the effectof exacerbating the conict It is unlikely that this willchange in the near future It is equally unlikely that Abkhazians and South Ossetians will accept status-neutral travel documents issued in Georgia (for po-litical reasons or for fear of pressure from de factoauthorities) A pragmatic approach therefore seemsnecessary

An intermediate solution to this problem could be visasissued in Russian passports by consular ofcials fromEU Embassies regularly travelling from Tbilisi to theentities A similar practice to enable travel has beenestablished in other status-related conicts Such anapproach would require concessions from both sidesGeorgia would have to acquiesce to Abkhaz and SouthOssetians travelling on Russian passports Abkhazand South Ossetians for their part would need toacquiesce to their visas being issued by ofcials ac-credited in Tbilisi Acceptance of such a mechanism

would require strong backing by Member States Inthe past individual Member States put forward similarideas but lacked strong and united EU support Whileapplying such a temporary pragmatic solution the EUshould encourage the development of status neutraldocuments

Contacts should be maintained with the de facto au-thorities of the entities If the EU intends to advance onthe path of NREP it is necessary to maintain regularcontacts with the de facto authorities in the frameworkof non-recognition They are crucial for the creationof a political environment in which civil society repre-

sentatives can engage with the EU without having tofear pressure from the de facto authorities and hencefor increasing societal and economic interaction at laterstages of the NREP In the framework of the NREP theEU should therefore step up its contacts and aim to initi-ate a structured dialogue with the de facto authoritiesin order to provide for a regular exchange of opinionsand discuss possibilities of further engagement Effortsshould be made to increase the EUrsquos presence and vis-ibility in the entities by more regular visits of EU andMember States representatives travelling from Tbilisi

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It is evident from other status-related issues beyondthe borders of the EU that the extent of contacts withthe de facto authorities of unrecognised states is fun-damentally a political question The legal constraintson contacts in order to avoid legitimisation or recog-nition ow from political considerations in particularvis-agrave-vis the mother state Hence it is up to the EU todetermine politically to what extent it wants to havecontacts with the de facto authorities in Sukhumi andTskhinvali

A less restrictive policy on visas would require a veryhigh degree of pragmatism and greater coordinationon the part of the EU and the GoG One of the mostdifcult tasks of the NREP consists therefore in con-vincing the GoG that this pragmatic approach is inGeorgiarsquos long-term interest Again a strong common

position of EU Member States would be of crucial im-portance

Steps towards a clearer policy on travel and visa reg-ulation and contacts with the societies and de facto authorities of the entities must be anked by continu-ing and increasing efforts in the sphere of condencebuilding It is of the utmost importance in this respectnot to discontinue funding and political instrumentswhich allow for engagement in this complex environ-ment To assure continuity the EU should revisit theapplication rules for the Stability Instrument or nd im-

aginative ways of using funds from the ENPI

De-isolation goes hand in hand with increased eco-nomic and societal interaction Economic engagementshould be initiated at different levels Mechanisms toencourage interaction should be considered The ar-rangement used for Transnistria could serve as aninspiration since 2006 Transnistrian companies whoregister in Moldova can benet from EU trade prefer -ences and export to EU countries

At the micro-level the EU already funds projects thatsupport private entrepreneurs on different sides of the

conict lines For instance the London-based NGOInternational Alert runs a partly EU-funded CaucasusBusiness and Development Network that links pro-ducer and business communities in the three SouthCaucasian republics the three unrecognised entitiesand Turkey Activities of this kind should be expand-ed

Special attention should be given to the active involve-ment of the Georgian population in the Gali district A

regional approach opens more avenues for people inthe entities to take part in projects focusing on pro-duction trade and livelihood More systematic supportfor the private sectors in the entities can also have apolitical dimension An increasing number of economi-cally independent people cooperating across conictlines can help to diversify related discourses withinthe societies With time other areas such as tourismcould be considered for linking the business communi-ties along the coastal strip

On a larger scale the EU should reconsider promotingand supporting the reconstruction of the railway linkbetween Russia Georgia Armenia and Azerbaijanwhich runs through Abkhazia This is an ambitious andcomplex project but it would be a strategically signi-cant one which would also impact beyond the region

of the South Caucasus From a Russian perspectiveit would improve the infrastructure along its Black Seacoast and would be a valuable asset in the prepara-tion of the Sochi Olympics There is strong interest inthe railway in Armenia which needs it as an additionalaxis of communication with Russia The rehabilitationof the railway is also important for Tbilisi in order toincrease cross-boundary interaction Cooperation onthe railway could open the way for the normalisationof Georgian-Russian relations which the EU shouldstrongly encourage It would considerably reduce ten-sions in the regional environment and help to increase

interaction between Georgia and Abkhazia

It is impossible for the EU to match Russiarsquos increas-ing economic involvement and nancial support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia However even thoughthe EUrsquos proposals in this regard may look meagrein terms of quantity it has a lot more on offer (thanRussia) in terms of quality Economic involvement fromthe EU also has a strong political appeal in AbkhaziaThe modernisation discourse broadly discussed inthe Russian media has spilled over into Abkhazia aswell ndash and people in Sukhumi understand that Russiamay not be the most promising partner in this area

The prospect of access to European technologies andknow-how could be a strong incentive for local entre-preneurs Economic cooperation could also providespace for non-political engagement

As for interaction between civil societies and people-to-people contacts there are numerous possibilitiesfor the EU to explore Many of them are in the elds ofinformation education (including exchanges) healthcare and training in various areas

8132019 NREP Report




There are other areas of mutual interest between thecommunities which can be explored by the EU andin which the de facto authorities in Sukhumi have ex-pressed a clear interest These include cooperation inthe elds of combating organised crime and efforts tocombat trafcking in human beings and drugs

The proposal to set up an EU information ofce inSukhumi which was close to realisation when the warbroke out in August 2008 should be revisited The en-visaged status-neutral Liaison Mechanism betweenSukhumi and Tbilisi could possibly facilitate the ofce An information ofce would be an excellent means toincrease the knowledge and understanding of the EUamong the local population It could organise events(similar to the EUISS Abkhazia roundtables) that wouldspark a debate between ofcials experts civil society

representatives from the EU and an Abkhaz audience

The EU should also consider increasing the number ofscholarships for Abkhaz South Ossetian and Georgianstudents Currently three Georgian and three Abkhazstudents study together at the Free University inBrussels Projects like this one should be expandedIn a society as small as Abkhazia 80 or 100 scholar-ships could make a signicant difference More couldbe done in the elds of language and tuition intern-ships cultural exchanges etc Again special attentionshould be paid to the involvement of the Georgian

population in Gali as well as the IDP population in allof Georgia This links back to the immediate task ofde-isolation for scholarship programmes to be suc-cessful however they must be accompanied by ex-ible travel and visa arrangements

While de-isolating and engaging Abkhazia and SouthOssetia the EU should consider how to involve thetwo entities in the EU approximation process Asmentioned earlier it is unacceptable and dangerousthat these territories are excluded from this processDuring the early phases of engagement this may provedifcult because of the state-centred approach of the

European Neighbourhood PolicyEastern Partnership As it stands the approximation between Georgia andthe EU per se is no incentive for Abkhazia and SouthOssetia to open up Flexible involvement of Abkhazand South Ossetian NGOs in the Civil Society Forumof the EaP could be a start Later on and with the con-sent of the GoG a simple action plan ndash an lsquoENP lightrsquocould be developed for the entities Such an approachcould introduce useful incentives for the de facto au-thorities increasing the EUrsquos leverage

Currently the atmosphere in relations between theEU and Georgia on the one hand and Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia on the other is tense and polarised Inthis process it is crucial for the EU to link its projectsand activities strategically and to make its involve-ment visible to the populations in the two entities andGeorgia Indeed the EU is already funding projectsthat benet the population in Abkhazia ndash however fewpeople know about it An EU information centre andother PR measures could further promote the NREPas an opportunity (rather than a threat) for local popula-tions and enhance the EUrsquos attractiveness Moreoverstrategically signicant projects such as the rehabili-tation of the railway would bring the EUrsquos role to theforefront

Conclusion

Clearly Georgian Abkhaz and South Ossetian goalsinterests and perceptions are as far apart as everThe Georgian narrative places the main conict onthe level of Georgian-Russian relations From thisperspective Abkhazia and South Ossetia appear tobe Russian pawns with no independent role to playGeorgian policy therefore prioritises the restoration ofterritorial integrity and international support vis-agrave-visRussia Engagement of international actors includ-

ing the EU with the two entities is met with suspicionfor fear of lsquocreeping recognitionrsquo Abkhazia and SouthOssetia read the conicts as the history of their resist-ance against Georgian nationalism and imperialismBacked by Russia they have as their primary goal thepreservation of their independence and the comple-tion of their state-building projects The EU and otherWestern international actors are perceived as pro-Georgian

Against this tense and contradictory background theEU has to carefully calibrate its policy of non-recogni-tion and engagement Differences in policy priorities

remain between the EU and Georgia ndash even thoughthey concern emphasis rather than substance TheEU supports Georgian territorial integrity but beyondthat stresses long-lasting peace and stability in theregion as its foremost strategic goal The Georgianranking of priorities is the opposite The EU sharesneither the interpretation nor the goals of Sukhumiand Tskhinvali Nevertheless it will have to nd away to interact with them to make engagementpossible

8132019 NREP Report




Clarity on the Unionrsquos commitment to Georgiarsquos ter-ritorial integrity is of the essence Reassuring Georgiathat the NREP is not a slippery slope towards recogni-tion is the only way for the EU to create an enablingenvironment for its policy of engagement On the otherhand however Tbilisi has to accept that the EU needsspace for manoeuvre for this policy and that Georgianattempts to restrict and fully control access of inter-national state and non-state actors to the entities arecounterproductive If the GoGrsquos call for internationalengagement in conict resolution is genuine it needsto be more open and forthcoming with respect to activi-ties of international partners To this end the EU needsto inuence the Georgian approach and mindset inthe direction of shifting the main focus to engagementrather than isolation

Achieving clarity on the Unionrsquos stance with regard toGeorgian territorial integrity is also important in its rela-tions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia However moreis needed to fully implement the NREP The Union has touse its instruments in a much more exible way so as tocreate incentives for people in the entities to overcomethe political and psychological barriers which currentlyprevent more engagement It has to interact with the defacto authorities so as to create an environment whichmakes societal interaction possible Therefore whilebeing rm on the normative principles of its policy the EUto some extent should apply operational impartiality in re-

lations with the entities to make engagement possible

Finally the EU has to take into account Russiarsquos rolein Abkhazia and South Ossetia Moscow is not inter-ested in more engagement of external actors in the

entities At the same time however renewed Russianinterest in cooperation with the EU makes it easier forthe Union to be rm on its engagement policy NREPhas to unfold under the assumption that Russia isand will remain a crucial actor in the conicts The EUshould suggest cooperation where possible

Conditions for engagement with the conict regionsin Georgia have worsened over the past three yearsConsiderable footholds for NREP still exist in AbkhaziaOn the other hand South Ossetia has become practi-cally inaccessible for the EU and other actors While thedoor should be kept open for engagement with SouthOssetia the Union should continue to focus its activi-ties on Abkhazia Turning Abkhazia into a showcaseof NREP could increase incentives for South Ossetiato engage The same goes for Nagorno-Karabakh

where NREP could provide a useful tool for the EU toaddress the most dangerous unresolved conict in itsEastern Neighbourhood

The unresolved conicts in Abkhazia South Ossetiabut also Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria createlsquowhite spotsrsquo which can easily turn into black holesand become sources of instability and insecurity TheEU cannot afford to let this happen (again) As a keyregional player and soft power it is well equipped toaddress the conicts The creation of the EuropeanExternal Action Service and the strategic review of the

European Neighbourhood Policy provide an excellentopportunity to review the EUrsquos toolkit and devise in-struments and strategies Conict resolution shouldbecome one of the most important strategic goals ofthe EU in its Eastern Neighbourhood

8132019 NREP Report




More measures in the areas of information educationhealth care and training would help increase interac-tion with civil society build trust in society at largeand contribute to conict transformation In the longrun the EU should consider how to involve the twoentities in the EU approximation process (p 7)

NREP is also about linking the EUrsquos various activitiesstrategically so as to make its involvement visible to thepopulations and to increase its leverage (p 8) Giventhe situation in the two entities NREP should continueto focus on Abkhazia and turn it into a showcase forSouth Ossetia and other breakaway territories in theEastern neighbourhood

The EU has to carefully calibrate its policy in a difcultand tense political environment Its goals and prioritiesdo not fully coincide with those of any of the parties tothe conicts Clarity on Georgiarsquos territorial integrity andon non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian inde-pendence is of the essence Georgian fears of lsquocreep-ing recognitionrsquo need to be taken seriously Howeverthe EU needs to inuence the Georgian mindset inthe direction of shifting the main focus to engagementrather than isolation It has to make it clear to Tbilisi thatpolitical and economic engagement with the two enti-ties are in Georgiarsquos medium and long term interest Atthe same time it has to apply operational impartiality inrelations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to open thedoor for engagement with the two entities (p 9)

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NREP Report

Documents

Transcript of NREP Report