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Council Special Report No. 42

January 2009

Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit

Preparing for

Sudden Changein North Korea


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Preparing or Sudden Change

in North Korea


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Council Special Report No. 42January 2009

Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit

Preparing or Sudden Changein North Korea


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The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think

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Cover Photo: Undated picture rom Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on November 6, 2008, shows

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il inspecting a drill ground o a subunit o Korean Peoples Army Unit 534 at

an undisclosed location. KCNA said Kim inspected two army units in the company o several generals and

released two pictures. It did not say when or where the visits were made (KCNA/AFP/Getty Images).

This report is printed on paper that is certied by SmartWood to the standards o the Forest Stewardship

Council, which promotes environmentally responsible, socially benecial, and economically viable man-agement o the worlds orests.


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Foreword vii Acknowledgments ix

Map xi Acronyms xiii

Council Special Report 1Introduction 3Scenarios or Change in North Korea 10Challenges and Dilemmas 16Recommendations or U.S. Policy 29

Endnotes 39About the Authors 43 Advisory Committee 45CPA Advisory Committee 46CPA Mission Statement 47

Contents


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vii

North Korea poses dicult challenges or U.S. oreign policy. It pos-sesses nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, and despite some

progress, it is by no means clear that the ongoing Six-Party Talks willbe able to reveal the ull extent o the countrys nuclear activities, muchless persuade Pyongyang to give them up. The United States maintainstens o thousands o orces on the Korean peninsula in support o itscommitments to the Republic o Korea (South Korea), a country withwhich the North is still technically at war. And the peninsula sits in astrategically vital region, where the United States, China, Russia, Japan,and South Korea all have important interests at stake.

All o this puts a premium on close attention to and knowledge odevelopments in North Korea. Unortunately, Kim Jong-Ils governmentis perhaps the worlds most dicult to read or even see. This CouncilSpecial Report, commissioned by the Councils Center or PreventiveAction and authored by Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, ocuses on howto manage one o the central unknowns: the prospect o a change inNorth Koreas leadership. The report examines three scenarios: man-aged succession, in which the top post transitions smoothly; contested

succession, in which government ocials or actions ght or powerater Kims demise; and ailed succession, in which a new governmentcannot cement its legitimacy, possibly leading to North Koreas col-lapse. The authors consider the challenges that these scenarios wouldposeranging rom securing Pyongyangs nuclear arsenal to provid-ing humanitarian assistanceand analyze the interests o the UnitedStates and others. They then provide recommendations or U.S. policy.In particular, they urge Washington to bolster its contingency planningand capabilities in cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others, and

to build a dialogue with China that could address each sides concerns.With Kim Jong-Ils health uncertain and with a new U.S. president

in oce, this report could not be more timely. And with all the issues

Foreword


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viii

at stake on the Korean peninsula, the subject could not be more impor-tant. Preparing or Sudden Change in North Korea is a thoughtul workthat provides valuable insights or managing a scenario sure to arise inthe coming months or years.

Richard N. HaassPresidentCouncil on Foreign RelationsJanuary 2009

Foreword


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ix

Many people made this report possible. We are grateul to CFR Presi-dent Richard N. Haass and Director o Studies Gary Samore or

supporting the project rom its inception and or providing helpulcomments on drats.

The members o the Advisory Committee and, in particular, PaulHeer, Thomas L. McNaugher, John S. Park, and Alan D. Rombergwere also extremely generous with their time and expertise. Katy Oh,Colonel John S. Clark, and Robert S. Litwak also provided valuableeedback. Along the way we urther beneted rom discussions withgovernment ocials who have requested that they not be identied.

We thank them.Finally, we are grateul to Patricia Dor and Lia Norton in Publica-

tions or their terric editing and to Lisa Shields, Anya Schmemann,and Sara Weeks in Communications and Marketing or their skill inpromoting and distributing the report. We also appreciate the contribu-tion o Assistant Director o Studies Melanie Gervacio Lin or guidingthe CSR through the Studies department and o Research AssociatesJamie Ekern and Elise Vaughan or their support throughout.

This publication was made possible by a grant rom the CarnegieCorporation o New York. The statements made and views expressedherein are solely our own.

Paul B. StaresJoel S. WitJanuary 2009

Acknowledgments


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xi

Map o Korean Peninsula

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl.


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xiv

USFK U.S. Forces Korea

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health OrganizationWMD weapons o mass destruction

Acronyms


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Council Special Report


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3

Introduction

For most o the 1990s, North Korea was under what can only be calleda prolonged deathwatch, so common and condent were predictions

o its demise. Despite suering acute economic stress rom the loss oits principal economic patronthe Soviet Unionin 1991, the suddendeath o its ounding atherKim Il-Sungin 1994, and then soonater a devastating amine that may have claimed as many as a millionlives, North Korea managed to survive. By decades end, North Koreasextraordinary resilience, combined with its deant and at times bellig-erent attitude to the rest o the world, had convinced most experts thatthis was not a country about to pass either quickly or quietly into the

history books. Since then, the conventional wisdom among most i notall North Korea watchers is that it will muddle through indenitely eveni its long-term uture remains doubtul.

There are certainly good reasons to be skeptical about the possibil-ity o undamental political change in North Korea, certainly througha people-power type social movement that have toppled dictator-ships elsewhere. The countrys cult-like political system, its relativegeographical and political isolation, the absence o any real civil society,

and repressive state control all clearly reduce the impetus and oppor-tunities or change rom below. To the extent that speculation aboutthe survival o the North Korean regime has continued to surace peri-odically, it has typically involved uncertainties about the succession oKim Jong-Il, the countrys paramount leader since his athers death in1994. With no clearly designated successor, the possibility o a leader-ship crisis should he be incapacitated or die suddenly has been regularlymentioned as a potential source o instability and even regime change.However, Kim Jong-Ils apparent vigor in public appearances and pri-

vate meetings with oreign dignitaries, his young age (early sixties) rela-tive to his athers when he died (eighty-two), and the possibility thatany o his three sons could be groomed to replace him were all reasons


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4 Preparing or Sudden Change in North Korea

to believe that a succession crisis would not happen any time sooni at all.

These condent assumptions about North Korea have recently beenjolted by reports that Kim Jong-Il suered a debilitating stroke in earlyAugust 2008 ater he ailed to appear at an event celebrating the sixti-eth anniversary o the ounding o the state. Despite ocial protesta-tions o his good health, Kim Jong-Il disappeared rom sight or severalmonths with many rumors circulating about his physical and mentalimpairment. However, with no outward signs that a leadership transi-tion is under way, the prevailing expectation is that he is recuperatingand the situation will eventually return to the status quo ante.

It is possible, however, that Kim Jong-Ils condition may actually bemuch worse than press reports suggest and that his capacity to governi it hasnt already been seriously compromisedmay be short lived.There has long been speculation that he is a diabetic and thereore proneto kidney ailure, heart complications, and at a higher risk o stroke.Indeed, preparations or his succession may already have begun (orbeen accelerated) but discreetly, to prepare the rest o the country orthe transition. The designated leader or leaders may even have assumed

considerable governing powers with both Kims blessing and the sup-port o other senior members o the regime. Given how little we knowabout the inner workings o North Korea, this is entirely plausible. Itrue, continuity o the regime, albeit under new leadership, will havebeen maintained with most likely minimal impact on the rest o NorthKorea and its outward posture.

However, other scenarios that bring about more undamental changeto North Korea should not be summarily dismissed. It is possible, or

example, that succession planning would not proceed smoothlyi atallleaving a vacuum at the top or a weak transitional arrangementshould Kim suer a atal relapse. This might tempt certain individualsor actions to seize power, resulting in a potentially disruptive and evenviolent leadership struggle. What outcome might ensue and what courseNorth Korea might take as a consequence is impossible to predict, buta prolonged and potentially violent contest or supremacy in Pyong-yangNorth Koreas capitalwould undoubtedly place immensestress on the rest o the country, given how much the state is controlled

rom the center. Resilient though it has proven to be, North Korea isstill a undamentally weak state. Its economy has never recovered romthe contraction o the 1990s and the population remains chronically


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5Introduction

short o ood and other basic necessities. Indeed, beore news broke oKims illness, the UNs World Food Program (WFP) had warned thatthe country was acing widespread ood shortages and even amine.

Under these circumstances, the uncertainty and stress imposed bya lengthy and perhaps ultimately inconclusive leadership struggle onthe overall system o governance might prove too much. As numer-ous cases rom around the world attest, totalitarian statesdespiteoutward signs o strengthare remarkably brittle when stressed byinternal orces. North Korea is an exceptional state or all the reasonsoutlined, but at a certain point the pressures could become too intenseor the country to stay intact. In this case, earlier predictions o collapse

and the end o North Korea as an independent sovereign state mightnally come to pass.

These various scenarios would present the United States and theneighboring states with challenges and dilemmas that, depending onhow events were to unold, could grow in size and complexity. Importantand vital interests are at stake or all concerned. North Korea is hardlya normal country located in a strategic backwater o the world. As anuclear weapons state and exporter o ballistic missile systems, it has

long been a serious prolieration concern to Washington. With one othe worlds largest armies in possession o huge numbers o long-rangeartillery and missiles, it can also wreak havoc on Americas most impor-tant Asian alliesSouth Korea and Japanboth o which are home tolarge numbers o American citizens and host to major U.S. garrisonscommitted to their deense. Moreover, North Korea abuts two greatpowersChina and Russiathat have important interests at stake inthe uture o the peninsula. That they would become actively engaged in

any uture crisis involving North Korea is virtually guaranteed.Although all the interested powers share a basic interest in maintain-ing peace and stability in northeast Asia, a major crisis rom withinNorth Korea could lead to signicant tensions andas in the pasteven confict between them. A contested or prolonged leadership strug-gle in Pyongyang would inevitably raise questions in Washington aboutwhether the United States should try to sway the outcome. Some willalmost certainly argue that only by promoting regime change will thethreat now posed by North Korea as a global prolierator, as a regional

menace to Americas allies, and as a massive human rights violator,nally disappear. Such views could gain some currency in Seoul andeven Tokyo, though it seems unlikely. Beijing, however, would certainly


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look on any attempt to promote a pro-American regime in Pyongyangas intererence in the internal aairs o a sovereign state and a challengeto Chinas national interests.

This and other potential sources o riction could intensiy shouldthe situation in North Korea deteriorate. The impact o a severe powerstruggle in Pyongyang on the availability o ood and other basic ser-vices could cause tens and possibly hundreds o thousands o reugees tofee North Korea. The pressure on neighboring countries to intervenewith humanitarian assistance and use their military to stem the fow oreugees would likely grow in these circumstances. Suspicions that thesituation could be exploited by others or political advantage would add

to the pressure to act sooner rather than later in a crisis. China wouldbe the most likely destination or reugees because o its relatively openand porous border; its Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has reportedlydeveloped contingency plans to intervene in North Korea or possiblehumanitarian, peacekeeping, and environmental control missions.Besides increasing the risk o dangerous military interactions and unin-tended escalation in sensitive borders areas, Chinas actions would likelycause considerable consternation in South Korea about its ultimate

intentions toward the peninsula. China no doubt harbors similar earsabout potential South Korean and American intervention in the North.

Should the situation unravel urther and North Korea begin to col-lapse entirely, another set o issues would come to the ore and likelyplace still more strain on allied cooperation and regional stability. ForSouth Korea, the disintegration o the North Korean state would pres-ent both the opportunity to reuniy the Korean people and the challengeo coping with the atermath o change. Having seen the enormous

social and economic costs that reunication imposed on Germany,Seoul might balk at rapid absorption and choose instead a slower, incre-mental pathassuming it had the choice. Although Washingtons incli-nation will be to deer to Seouls wishes, it may still preer not to delayor risk the opportunity or Korean reunication that it has long seenas desirable or the stability o northeast Asia. The possibility, there-ore, o discord arising between Washington and Seoul over the paceand character o reunication is not inconceivable. In any case, Wash-ingtons acute concern about the security and saety o North Koreas

nuclear weapons and other weapons o mass destruction might orce itto take unilateral action. Such action could put it at odds with Seoul, not


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addressed various sources o instability in North Korea and turn it intoa more detailed and concrete operational plan (OPLAN), the initiativewas rebued out o ear that it would antagonize Pyongyang and limitSeouls sovereign prerogatives in a crisis.

Tokyo also developed plans in the 1990s to prepare or the possibilitythat North Korea might suddenly collapse, but Japans pacist constitu-tion has limited the scope o joint planning and coordination with theUnited States. More important, historical animosities and continuingpolitical rictions with South Korea over a variety o issues have eec-tively prevented any real allied dialogue among the United States, theRepublic o Korea (ROK), and Japan, much less contingency planning

or instability in North Korea.Over the same period, China has remained reluctant to engage in any

sustained dialogue about the possibility o political instability with othercontingencies in the North or ear o alienating its relationship with itserstwhile Cold War ally. High-level political consultations and military-to-military discussions have taken place between the United States andChina in recent years, but they have let little room or anything morethan supercial exchanges on the topic. Even the Six-Party diplomatic

process involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the twoKoreas aimed at denuclearizing the peninsula has provided little oppor-tunity to build consensus among the principal players. Its deliberationsbeyond the issues o nuclear disarmament have been general and theinvolvement o North Korea limits the scope or discussion.

Given these concerns, the purpose o this Council Special Reportis to encourage greater attention and heightened preparedness by theUnited States to meet the potential challenges o sudden and destabiliz-

ing change in North Korea. The report is organized into three parts.The rst examines in greater detail a range o plausible scenarios thatmight be precipitated with the succession o Kim Jong-Il. The intent isnot to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate how events might unold insignicant and challenging ways. The second part analyzes the potentialimplications o these scenarios or the United States and other princi-pal actors. The third and nal section proposes some guiding principlesas well as a set o practical policy recommendations to help the UnitedStates prepare or the possibility o sudden and destabilizing change

in North Korea. These measures have been conceived and designed inways that recognize the obvious international sensitivities about dis-cussing the uture o North Korea, especially given that it remains a


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9Introduction

critical partner in various endeavors, not least the denuclearization othe peninsula. In the best o circumstances, governments rarely want todiscuss their national contingency plans or divulge how they intend toreact in a given situation. Although this puts real constraints on the levelo cooperation in advance o a major crisis in North Korea, the risks aretoo great and the stakes too high to rely on last-minute improvisationor a peaceul and stable outcome.


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Scenarios or Change in North Korea

North Korea could change suddenly in any number o ways. Given thevarious structural impediments that reduce i not eliminate the pros-

pects or change rom below, the most plausible scenarios still entailsome kind o a leadership transition or, put dierently, change romabove. Thus, or the purposes o this study, three succession scenariosare considered without any judgment about their relative likelihood.

The rst is a successully managed succession process that preservesthe current regime under new leadership. The second is a contestedsuccession that ultimately produces regime change in Pyongyang. Thethird scenario is a ailed succession process that produces no clear and

eective national leader, atally weakening North Korea as a unction-ing state and leading to its eventual demise. Dierent variations othese scenarios can, o course, be postulated. For example, the succes-sion might be contested but the current regime prevail. Or the currentregime might be successully replaced but the system it created crumble.Other events, whether deriving rom internal or external events (orexample, a large-scale humanitarian disaster, a severe economic shock,or major military crisis) could also all play a role in either triggering or

accelerating the dierent scenarios. Nevertheless, the three chosen sce-narios capture the most important possible outcomes.

Managed Succe SSion

There are no outward indications that Kim Jong-Il has designateda successor, certainly not in the way that his ather groomed him orleadership over some twenty years, placing him in progressively more

senior positions o responsibility while sending clear signals o hischoice to the rest o the regime and the general public to buttress hislegitimacy. Although Kims current illness may have accelerated such


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11Scenarios or Change in North Korea

preparations, the transitional arrangement or eventual successor is byno means obvious.

Given the earlier precedent o ather-to-son succession, a continu-ation o the Kim dynasty would be the most likely outcome save thateach o Kim Jong-Ils three sons are widely considered decient orcompromised in some way. The oldestKim Jong-Namis widelyviewed as lacking in stature in part because he was born out o wed-lock but, particularly, because he was disgraced ater being arrested orusing a alse passport at Tokyo airport in 2001 while on a visit to nearbyDisneyland. Subsequent reports indicated that he was being activelyrehabilitated with senior government appointments and visits abroad

with his ather but later sightings o him living a privileged existence inMacau have suggested otherwise, however. The other two sonsKimJong-Chul and Kim Jong-Unhave also rom time to time been men-tioned as possible successors. A brie bout o propaganda extolling thevirtues o their common mother led several observers to conclude thatthis was the preerred line o succession. Both, however, are consideredtoo young and inexperienced. There have also been unsubstantiatedrumors about their health and physical attributes.

For these reasons, a caretaker arrangement involving one or moreo the ollowing has been seen by some to be more likely: Chang Song-Taek, Kim Jong-Ils brother-in-law; Kim Ok, Kim Jong-Ils currentwie/partner; and Kim Yong-Nam, the president o the Presidium.Although Kim Ok is believed to wield infuence as Kim Jong-Ils per-sonal secretary, her authority is considered largely ephemeral becauseit is derived solely rom her relationship to Kim Jong-Il. Chang Song-Taek, by comparison, has developed his own power base as director

o the administrative department within the Korean Workers Party(KWP), where he has major responsibilities overseeing the domesticintelligence, police, and judiciary agencies. Chang also has close amilyconnections to the police and army, including a brother who is corpscommander o the Pyongyang Military District.

A variation on this managed succession scenario is the emergenceo a more ormal collective leadership to include senior members othe National Deense Commission (NDC), who essentially run thecountry. The NDC is seen as a likely basis or a collective leadership or

several reasons. First, the NDC became the supreme governing bodyo North Korea when Kim Jong-Il decided, ater his athers death, touse his chairmanship o it to wield power rather than assume the more


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ormal title and duties o state president. Second, all ten members othe NDC (seven generals and three civilians) owe their positions to KimJong-Il, though some had had personal ties with his ather. Third, themainly military composition o the NDC is seen as helping ensure thesupport o the armed orces. Some have also speculated that one o thesons could play a gurehead or regent role to lend legitimacy to the newcollective leadership.

Under this scenario, the transer o power would be more or lessseamless. The regime that has ruled North Korea since 1948 wouldessentially perpetuate itsel. Given Kims extensive patronage systemhe has personally promoted 1,131 o the 1,400 generals in the ocers

corps and provided the ruling elite with many perquisites, such asprivileged access to housing, education, ood, liquor, and personaltransportationthe incentives or members o the existing regime tonot rock the boat are high. It is also seems likely that the new leader-ship would continue on the policy course set by Kim Jong-Il, but thiscannot be assumed. The new leader or leadership may believe that achange in courseperhaps one more open and cooperative with theoutside worldis not just desirable but necessary i North Korea is to

survive. A process akin to what occurred in Vietnam, which openedsubstantially and undertook market-based reorms while maintainingobeisance to Ho Chi Minh and his system o political control, could bethe preerred course.

conteSted SucceSSion

Though inormation is sparse, the existence o personal rivalries anddierent actions within the North Korean regime has long been thesource o speculation. I true, the succession o Kim Jong-Il couldbecome a messy, contested process with certain individuals or ac-tions vying or power. Some might consider themselves the right-ul heir and the designated successorassuming there is onetobe illegitimate in some way. Alternatively, the source o a leadershipstruggle could be simply a contest or absolute power regardless oanything ideological. It could also emerge somewhat later because o

undamental policy dierences, perhaps o the kind alluded to, ratherthan out o anything personal.


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How a power struggle would play out and who the eventual winneror winners might be is obviously impossible to predict, but a prolonged,divisive, and potentially even violent succession struggle is not out othe question. Much would hinge on the leadership skills o the individu-als involved, their personal networks, and their organizational capaci-ties, to say nothing o their sources o undingoreign and domestic,including access to the Kim amilys bank accountsthat would enablethem to buy support and valuable resources in any power struggle.Not surprisingly, the backing o the armed orces and also probablythe State Security Department (SSD)North Koreas intelligenceagencyis considered pivotal to the outcome o a possible power strug-

gle. Indeed, the Armywith or without the SSDmay even be theprime instigator. Unconrmed reports o past assassination attemptsand military purges not to mention the apparent precautions Kim takesto ensure his personal security when traveling around the country allsuggest that a military-led coup is quite plausible. Whether one wouldultimately succeed and how peaceully it would be carried out dependson the amount o support its leaders might enjoy among the rest o thearmed orces. Distinct actions based on regional aliations, univer-

sity education, and military academy graduating class are believed toexist in the armed orces, which could cause the armed orces to splinterand coalesce around those competing or power in Pyongyang.

Under this scenario, a new regime would eventually emerge, but notone that would draw its legitimacy rom the Kim dynasty. The possibil-ity o a clean break or a new policy course would clearly exist. As undera managed succession scenario, either could involve a more positiveattitude toward internal political reorm and external engagement. The

precedent and model would thereore be more like China than Vietnam.Conversely, it could also lead in the opposite directiontoward tighter,more repressive state controls and even less international cooperation.

Failed SucceSS ion

For whatever reason, the successor arrangements might ultimately ailto produce a governing regime that enjoyed broad based support and

legitimacy. There might be a sel-declared government in Pyongyang,but its writ might not extend much beyond the city limits. A situation


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akin to the 1989 breakdown o political authority in much o easternEurope could take place. But, unlike eastern Europe, the loss o direc-tion and control rom Pyongyang could produce more undamentaland widespread collapse with serious humanitarian consequences.

Despite the proclaimed system ojuche, or sel-reliance, NorthKoreas economy is extremely weak and continues to depend heavily onoreign assistance, particularly or vital energy supplies. Similarly, theagricultural sector is chronically incapable o providing enough ood toeed the people. The relatively limited amounts o arable land are vulner-able to extreme weather conditions, such as fooding, and a recurringshortage o ertilizer also reduces yields. These problems combined

with widespread postharvest wastage (or illicit diversion), a decrepittransportation system, and a rickety public distribution system (PDS)mean that access to adequate ood is a constant challenge to many NorthKoreans. Indeed, as recently as September 2008, the UN World FoodProgram (WFP) warned that the ood situation in many parts o NorthKorea had become dire. Severe rains during the peak o the growingseason in August 2007 reportedly damaged up to 25 percent o stand-ing crops o maize and rice and led to a poor all harvest and overall

shortall in ood stocks.

Other actorsa reduction o ood assistancerom South Korea and China, rising worldwide commodity prices, anda shortage o uel to distribute ood internallyhave compounded analready serious situation. A UN-sponsored survey reported that closeto 75 percent o the respondents had sharply reduced their daily oodintake and more than hal were eating two rather than the usual threemeals a day. Although the WFP has since organized a concerted cam-paign o ood assistance, including a major contribution o 500,000

tons rom the United States, North Korea remains acutely vulnerableto uture crises o this kind. I a succession crisis were to compromisethe delivery and distribution o ood and other assistance, the situationcould become critical in North Korea.

Should Pyongyangs authority begin to break down irredeemablyand North Korea as a unctioning state enter a terminal phase, its rapidabsorption by South Korea is widely viewed as the inevitable next step.Seoul, however, in conjunction with any residual authority remainingin the North, might choose to manage this in stages or at least to slow

down the pace o absorption through an interim conederated politicalarrangement as a precursor to ull union. In the immediate atermath


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o the all o the Berlin Wall and beore German reunication appearedinevitable, just such an arrangement was pushed by East German lead-ers in a desperate eort to retain some degree o independence rom theWest. Although the likely costs o rapid absorption would be a actorin Seouls calculus, so too would be the attitude and behavior o otherinterested players.


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16

These three scenarios would present decision-makers in Washington andthe capitals o northeast Asia with challenges and dilemmas o varying

complexity and severity that derive rom the potential spillover eects ochange in North Korea as well as the potential spill-in pressures to inter-vene in various ways. In general, unolding events would likely be hardto discern given the limited sources o inormation within North Korea.Decision-makers would, as a consequence, have to grapple with ambigu-ous and conficting reports that may lag signicantly behind events onthe ground. As in any crisis, competing pressures and impulses woulddoubtlessly arise: whether to respond or wait and see, whether to shape

and even accelerate events or to let them take their natural course, andwhether to act unilaterally or in concert with others.

A managed succession scenario would be the least challengingbecause it would be only a minimal departure rom the current situation.Other than possibly causing a temporary hiatus in decision-making inPyongyang as the reins o power were transerred, the spillover eectswould likely be minimal. Regardless o who assumes power, however,the United States and its allies are likely to view the transition period as

a time not only to seek reassurances about prior North Korean commit-ments but also to probe the regime in Pyongyang about its intentions.It is conceivable that dierent assessments emerge about whether thenew leadership represents continuity or change that in turn become thesource o riction over which policies to rescind or renew. Somethingsimilar occurred ater Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union,the United States and several o its European allies disagreeing overwhether he was a real reormer and sincere about his desire to improverelations with the West.

Meanwhile, China would likely be trying to establish a workingrelationship with the new leadership to maintain its infuence in NorthKorea. This could put it at odds with the other interested powers,

Challenges and Dilemmas


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17Challenges and Dilemmas

especially South Korea, who view Chinas designs toward the peninsulawith some suspicion. As in the past, Pyongyang would likely exploit thissituation to its advantage by playing one power against another.

In contrast, a contested succession would present more dicult chal-lenges and dilemmas, though much would depend on how turbulentand prolonged such a struggle became. The possibility that Washingtonwould avor one side over another, perhaps because it was seen as morereormist or predisposed toward external cooperation, is quite conceiv-able. This would immediately raise the question o how to lend supportwithout possibly compromising its internal prospects, not to mention itsvery survival. Again, undamental disagreements could develop among

the allies over how to respond, with some wishing to be more assertivethan others. The dilemmas could grow more acute i one o the competingactions either openly or discreetly called or assistance, say rom SouthKorea. Seoul would doubtlessly nd it dicult to resist such an appeal.But what i another action were to simultaneously appeal to Beijing orsupport? Beijing too might nd such a request hard to ignore, especiallyi it believed that the cost o inaction would lead to the erosion o its infu-ence in the North. Relations between Seoul and Beijing could become

seriously strained with Washington potentially caught in the middle.A dierent but no less challenging spillover eect is the possibility o

border incidents involving the North Korean military. With the likeli-hood that the North Korean military would be put on heightened alertduring any succession scenario at the same time as neighboring nationsare trying to learn more about what is happening inside North Koreaand the intentions o the North Korean military, the risk o dangerousincidents and interactions occurring would inevitably increase. A long

history o such incidents should validate the seriousness o this con-cern. A power struggle in Pyongyang involving competing actionswith conceivably dierent sources o support in the North Korean mili-tary could also result in border incidents staged to build domestic politi-cal support. Those incidents would most likely occur in the DMZ or inthe West Sea, where the North and South have clashed beore over areaso disputed sovereignty. Last is the possibility that a contested leader-ship crisis could lead to the wholesale deection o North Korean mili-tary units, whether out o deeat, despair, or desperation. Because the

military have access to transportation and uel, this possibility cannotbe dismissed lightly. In either case, the potential or a crisis to escalatebecause o misunderstanding or miscalculation is considerable.


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The most commonly eared spillover eect o a violent or pro-longed succession struggle that causes a catastrophic breakdownin the ood distribution system and public order is a large exodus oreugees. China would be the most logical destination given the ormi-dable obstacle that the heavily mined and guarded demilitarized zone(DMZ) poses to reaching South Korea. Beijing would have the optiono accepting and taking care o these reugees, possibly drawing onmany o the same internal resources that allowed China to cope withits own natural disasters, such as the recent earthquake in Sichuan.But, given its past attitudes toward North Korean reugees, as well asears o the negative political and economic consequences o accept-

ing increasing numbers onto its territory, Beijing might opt or seizinga narrow strip o land inside the North to prevent any infux. Judgingby the negative South Korean reaction to recent reports that China isprepared to do just this, a reaction that derived rom long-standing anddeep-seated suspicions about Chinas designs or the peninsula, rela-tions could become seriously strained, thereby complicating manage-ment o the crisis.

Should a humanitarian crisis inside North Korea intensiy in the

wake o a Pyongyang power struggle, the pressure within neighboringcountriesparticularly South Koreato intervene and provide assis-tance would almost certainly grow. Since the UN World Summit o2005, member states have armed a collective responsibility to protectinnocent civilians in the ace o repressive or deliberately negligent gov-ernment behavior. Many are sure to invoke this obligation in a severecrisis. As past cases illustrate, however, humanitarian interventionpresents a host o sensitive political and operational challenges. In the

case o North Korea, they would likely be magnied, given the inher-ent suspicions o the regime toward the outside world, as well as amongneighboring countries, about their dierent national agendas or theuture o North Korea.

Whatever the humanitarian imperatives, a possible breakdown ointernal controls over North Koreas stockpile o weapons o massdestruction (WMDs) would likely provide even stronger pressures tointervene. There is little or no inormation on what those controls aretoday, but the stockpiles are almost certainly the responsibility o the

North Korean military. I the cohesion o the military were to begin toray, preventing leakage o WMDs, materials, and technologies beyondthe Norths borders would become an urgent priority. Although neigh-boring states share a common interest in preventing such a leakage,


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serious dierences could still arise over the necessity and execution oany military operation designed to secure WMDs.

In the event that North Korea were to collapse and its uture as anindependent state begin to look doubtul, the principal parties wouldincreasingly ocus on a dierent, though related, set o challengeshaving to do with the ormation and nal status o a unied Korea. Forthe United States, ostering reunication in line with broader nationalsecurity objectivesbringing greater stability to the region, advanc-ing economic integration and rules-based trade, and promoting sel-determination and human rightswould be o the utmost importance.Those objectives, combined with strong support or what would likely

be a leading South Korean role in dealing with Pyongyangs collapseand the knowledge that Washington should play an important rolein balancing other regional powers, would inorm American policy.Aside rom seeking to work cooperatively with China and other con-cerned countries on the broad range o challenges posed by instability,the United States can be expected to play a more direct role in helpingensure the establishment o security and stability in the North. Never-theless, that role would almost certainly not include providing signi-

cant ground troops that might remain in the North, but rather logisticaland other support. American orces can be expected, however, toplay a direct role in removing the threat posed by the Norths WMDprogramslocating and seizing weapons, materials, and technologybeore any leakage occurs beyond its borders.

For Seoul, North Koreas collapse would present both majoropportunities and enormous burdens. Although the long sought-atergoal o reunication would beckon, Seoul would also ace, accord-

ing to one CIA assessment, the prospect o massive movements opeople as well as uncontrollable demands or economic aid and thelegal, administrative problems o absorbing a large and economicallybackward North. Added to those challenges would be the poten-tially enormous diculties o establishing security and stability inthe North in the wake o the regimes collapse. These problems, alongwith the persistence o regional animosities in the South, have ledsome experts to question whether Seoul could survive the vortex onational unication. As a result, as indicated, South Korea might opt

to establish a separate or conederated entity in the North to managethe pace o reunication.

Conronted with a uniying Korea, China would do everything toshape its ormation in ways that protected and urthered its interests on


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the peninsula. Foremost would be a desire to prevent the United Statesrom establishing military bases in the North or stationing troops, ionly temporarily, near its border. Another major objective would be toensure the security and sae disposal o Norths nuclear weapons andother WMDs. Heading o a reugee crisis that could severely disruptits economy, result in heavy nancial costs, and radically increase thenumber o ethnic Koreans on its territory who might eventually demandgreater autonomy rom the central government would also be an impor-tant priority. Finally, Chinese actions would be designed not only withthe nations long-term political and security interests in mind, but alsowith important economic objectives, such as signicantly expanding

cross-border trade and investment, particularly major inrastructuredevelopment projects.

Whatever trepidations Japan might have about a reunied Koreawould be tempered by a desire to maintain good relations with Seouland the realization that Tokyo does not have much infuence to manipu-late the political outcome. Any eort to put a brake on unication orto hinder Seouls aspirations would also likely invite greater Chineseinvolvement. Still, Tokyo would have to conduct a delicate balancing

act, providing resources to assist Seoul while allaying Chinese andSouth Korean ears that it wished to reassert Japanese infuence on thepeninsula. The potential payo would be economic, in the orm o opentrading relations, growth and stability, and increased access to naturalresources in the North.

Moscows objective would be to continue eorts to reverse the mar-ginalization o its infuence in northeast Asia, as well as to promote itseconomic interests. Russia would seek to limit the expansion o other

powers infuence, which might come at its own expense in supporting aleading role or South Korea in the North. Like other neighboring coun-tries, Russia would attempt to play a role in the economic developmento North Korean territory, i or no other reason than that North Koreaadjoins the Russian Far East. The economic benets or Moscow wouldinclude access to warm water ports, potential development rom trans-Siberian resource extraction, a Korean peninsula rail system linkingnortheast Asia, and the rising demand or Russian energy resources.Whether Moscows eorts to expand its infuence would be welcomed

by Washington would depend on the overall state o U.S.-Russia rela-tions. For the most part, the two countries have worked well togetheron peninsula issues, notably in the Beijing Six-Party Talks. Whether the


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chill in relations ollowing Russias invasion o Georgia has a lastingnegative eect remains to be seen.

Although much will hinge on the circumstances that have broughtNorth Korea to the brink o extinction, the core issues to emerge canbe anticipated with reasonable condence. The most salient concernswould be maintaining security and stability in the North, locating andsecuring Pyongyangs weapons o mass destruction, dealing withpotentially serious humanitarian problems such as large-scale reu-gee fows or starvation, managing the political and legal issues relat-ing to the ormation o a transitional government, and addressing theeconomic challenges posed by the demise o the North and its possible

integration with the South.

Se c uri t y a n d Sta bi l i t y

Establishing security and stability is generally viewed as essentialbeore political, humanitarian, and economic issues can be addressed.This would be no small task given that as many as ve million o North

Koreas citizens are under arms and have or six decades been devoted toan authoritarian regime. Many could be starving and desperate. Ensur-ing public order in such circumstances would almost certainly requirethe commitment o signicant military orces and other resources romthe Republic o Korea, the United States, and perhaps other countriesin the region as well.

How large a orce would be required to bring security and stabil-ity to North Korea would depend on the level o acquiescence to or-

eign intervention. Based on previous experiences elsewhere, the ruleo thumb or the number o troops required or successul stabilityoperations in a permissive environment is somewhere between veand ten per thousand people. Because North Korea has a populationo approximately twenty-three million, a successul operation couldrequire between 115,000 to 230,000 military personal. In addition, tenso thousands o police might also be needed to support these orces inmore basic tasks. Those requirements would place a signicant strainon South Korea, particularly in view o the current plan to reduce its

army by some 30 percent over the next decade. Although Americanorces would not likely become directly involved in daily security opera-tions, they could provide vital assistance in the orm o transportation


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services, command, control, communications and intelligence inra-structure, the distribution o humanitarian supplies, and the repatria-tion o reugees.

I ormer elements o the North Korean military, its security andintelligence orces, or its large special operations orce were to resistthe presence o oreign orces, the size o the needed stabilization orcewould escalate dramatically. Indeed, experience has shown that specialoperations orces are the most likely candidates to mount such resis-tance. Given the large number o such units in the North, the challengecould be considerable. In an insurgency, according to one Deense Sci-ence Board study, as many as twenty occupying troops are needed or

every thousand persons, implying a orce o 460,000 troops, more thanthree times the number o American troops in Iraq. Coping with sucha contingency would likely be impossible or the South Korean andAmerican orces to manage alone.

Establishing an eective disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration (DDR) program takes on added importance in view o the dan-gers posed by active resistance. Much has been learned through similarexperiences in eastern Europe, Aghanistan, and Iraq. A number o

important questions will have to be addressed, including which unitsi any should be maintained or an interim period to assist with publicsecurity or disbanded immediately, whether to retain their existing lead-ership and weaponry or selectively replace them, and how to nd gain-ul employment or those not retained. Signicant military and civilianmanpower will also be necessary to run an eective DDR program.

WeaponS oF MaSS deStruction

Locating, saeguarding, and disposing o materials and stockpiles othe Norths estimated six to eight nuclear weapons, our thousand tonso chemical weapons, and any biological weapons, as well as its ballis-tic missile program, would be a high priority, especially or the UnitedStates. Neighboring countries would want to ensure not only that thoseweapons do not pose a threat to national security, but also that any uni-ed Korean state is WMD-ree. In addition, a new unied Korea would

have to be a party to relevant international agreementsthe Nonpro-lieration Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and theBiological Weapons Conventionprohibiting signatories rom pos-sessing such weapons.


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One lesson rom the recent dicult experience in Iraq is that locat-ing and seizing WMDs requires special teams o thousands o securityorces and technical personnel equipped with advanced detection tech-nologies. Two primary tasks exist. First, known acilities would need tobe secured. In the nuclear area, a prime objective would be the Yong-byon installation and its plutonium production acilities. Second, andmuch more dicult in view o the Norths our decades o experience inhiding its military installations, would be locating and securing other,less well-known WMD acilities. For example, North Korean ocialshave told their American counterparts that their nuclear weapons areassembled and stored at acilities other than Yongbyon. Washington

might have lists o suspected locations, but that inormation is likely tobe inaccurate or incomplete. The same is probably true or nonnuclearWMD programs and installations.

Carrying out this mission could prove tricky or a number o rea-sons. First, the eort to nd and secure North Koreas WMD wouldhave to begin even beore the large-scale intervention o outside powersto avert the danger o outright thet. In Iraq, ater central control brokedown, and beore intervening orces could reach them, a number o

potential sites were stripped by insiders or the local population. A simi-lar situation might arise in North Korea. Second, given the paucity oreliable inormation about North Koreas nuclear inrastructure andstockpile, conducting an on-the-ground program to erret inormationrom key personnel as promptly as possible would be essential. Ratherthan repeating the mistakes made in Iraqtreating scientists and tech-nicians as i they were criminalsincentives would need to be providedto secure their cooperation. Third, because neighboring countries

particularly Chinaalso have a vested interest in locating and securingNorth Koreas WMDs, any competing eorts that they mount couldcause serious complications. Multilateral cooperation, though perhapspolitically dicult to secure, would clearly be advantageous to pursue.

HuMani tarian aSSiStance

South Korean planners have projected collapse scenarios in which up

to one million reugees might fee the North with more than ve hun-dred thousand entering China, up to three hundred thousand to SouthKorea, and the rest to Russia and Japan. China would likely choose tostaunch the fow within North Korea and South Korea might end up


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having to do the same. Although Seoul has made plans to provide careand housing using abandoned schools and other installations in theSouth Korean countryside and intends to harness the help o nongov-ernmental and private organizations, the diculty it has experiencedin handling the ew thousand reugees who have already let the Northraises doubts about its ability to manage an infux o hundreds o thou-sands. Containing the problem within North Korea, however, wouldrequire humanitarian assistance to keep the population rom leavingtheir homes, which would in turn present its own set o challenges.

Depending on the circumstances, such operations might have to beconducted in the ace o sti resistance by ormer elements o the North

Korean military. I dierent actions inside the North appeal to dier-ent constituencies (that is, China or South Korea) or support, thereis also a danger that, in lieu o multilateral cooperation, humanitarianoperations may become politicized and considered a tool or achievingnational infuence. It is even possible to imagine competing humanitar-ian operations as the thin edge o the wedge o competition or infu-ence in the North. Another complex challenge acing whoever takes onhumanitarian assistance will be to ashion a ood distribution system

that is ecient, dependable, and helps the neediest people in ways thatdo not reinorce the old leadership structures or negatively aect theNorths ability to transition to a more open system. For example, theexisting state-controlled distribution network was an instrument o theNorth Korean state created to help ulll its priorities. Yet it is unclearwhether that system should be reconstituted, assuming it can be.

polit ical and legal cH allengeS

Establishing a new, legitimate governing authority in the North wouldlikely pose similar challenges. Although South Korea would seek thelead in this processviewing its primacy as its legitimate right andresponsibilityit would still require the support and at times activeinvolvement o the other interested powers to succeed. At the outset,the principal challenge would be to develop a legal justication orintervention that can, in turn, serve as the basis or subsequent eorts

to create a new political system in the North. Seoul could invokeArticle 3 o South Koreas constitution, which lays claim to the entireKorean peninsula and adjacent islands, to argue that intervention is


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not subject to international law; the United States and its allies, how-ever, might seek early UN approval, perhaps under Chapter VII o theUN Charter, and lay the groundwork or securing the support o otherstates, especially China. As a legitimate occupying power, South Koreawould also take on obligations under the Hague Convention to restoreand maintain public order and saety that would in turn strengthen itslegal claim or the ultimate absorption o North Korea i and when thatwere deemed desirable.

Assuming that it were to receive such consent, South Korea wouldsoon ater have to grapple with the question o whether ormer govern-ment ocials would be allowed to play any role in a transitional govern-

ment and the criteria that would be used to retain some and not others.Care would need to be taken to give the population a sense o condencethat it would not suer by participating in the creation o the new politi-cal order. Those steps might include establishing ties with communityleaders and demonstrating a clear competence in delivering basic ser-vices and any necessary relie supplies. One approach would be to set upprovincial councils responsible or delivering public services and orga-nizing elections or local ocials and representatives to any national

bodies. On the national level, South Korean government ministries couldextend operations to the North to develop and implement policies.

Beyond establishing institutions, putting in place a air, transparent,and democratic process or the North Korean people to identiy andeventually select their own leadership would pose an even more di-cult long-term challenge. Creating a sense o ownership would requireestablishing democratic procedures and the beginnings o a pluralisticculture that has never existed in the North. Useul steps would include

identiying various civic and social structures to serve as the backboneor a process or choosing representatives, determining whether thepool o people with leadership ability to run or oce is adequate, anddeciding whether to allow ormer ocials to participate in the process.

Finally, because international approval o Seoul as an occupyingpower would not give it the right to establish a transitional administra-tion, the South would have to ask or a Security Council resolution toeectively override the Hague Conventions and the Fourth GenevaConvention. At the appropriate timeprobably toward the end o any

transitionthe South might also want to adopt the same legal strategythe Federal Republic o Germany used and claim that a unied Koreanever ceased to exist.


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econoMy

A collapse o the North Korean economy would require devising policiesthat address three important issues. The rst, under the broad headingo macroeconomic stabilization and management, includes six compo-nents: setting up workable new monetary and nancial mechanisms,including deciding on the uture o the North Korean won; addressingthe consequences o recent economic reorms in North Korea, particu-larly infationary conditions with no signicant supply response leadingto increases in production; deciding whether to promote rapid or grad-ual economic reorms and how to balance mobilization o resources

with constraints on absorptive capacity and eciency o investment;dealing with questions o priority and sequencing economic reormsrom the perspective o sustaining macroeconomic stability; surveyingexisting capabilities and asset conditions early on to help establish amacroeconomic strategy designed to address these issues; and buildinghuman and institutional capacity to ormulate and implement macro-economic policies and programsincluding North Koreans retainedto help with transormation and South Korean experts most likely to

be called on to play a direct roleappropriate or economic conditionsin the North.

The second economic issue is the transition rom planned to marketeconomic mechanisms. This task requires genuine price liberalization,establishing a careully managed oreign exchange regime, developingnew policies and institutional capacities in public nance and expen-diture, banking, and both a legal system and ownership rights overproductive assets (especially land). Dealing with the state enterprise

system may require liquidating unviable rms, improving manage-ment, privatizing, and creating a level playing eld with the emergingprivate sector. Institutional change would be much aster and simpler ideveloped with ormer North Korean authorities in a ramework thatmight lead to eventual reunication. In any case, a short-term drop ineconomic output should be expected beore the economy can be stabi-lized and put on a growth path.

The third challenge is reconstruction and development. A publicinvestment program and recurrent expenditure plan would be needed

to remove critical inrastructure bottlenecks, restore economic growthand attracting oreign investment, and provide or basic social services.


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Initially this eort would be donor nanced and synchronized with aworkable macroeconomic and nancing strategy but, in the mediumterm, would be based on raising domestic savings rates and coordinatedwith measures to increase tax revenues and develop banking systems.

The nal challenge involves redeploying military assets and person-nel to economically productive uses. The process o demobilizationmight be long and drawn out, and thus require the use o positive incen-tives. The most important task would be to absorb military manpowerinto the labor pool o an increasingly market-oriented economy per-haps or use in inrastructure rehabilitation projects. Transormingmilitary actories into economically viable enterprises or liquidating

them would be another priority.Rehabilititating and transorming the Norths economy would inev-

itably require working out the roles and contributions o national andlocal authorities, neighboring countries, and the international com-munity. Japan would likely be a major provider o nancial assistance,including debt orgiveness, export credits, and ocial developmentassistance (ODA) unneled through bilateral and multilateral channels.Although Chinas level o economic engagement would be critical in

determining the distribution o labor among oreign powers, it couldvary depending on the demise scenario and whether a pattern o multi-lateral cooperation were established. International nancial institutionswould play a central role in mobilizing and supervising the ecient useo resources, in supporting transormation and reconstruction and inacilitating integration with South Korea. The American role may belimited to providing assistance or humanitarian programs, advice andtraining or economic reorm, health service improvements, agricul-

tural development and unneling support or inrastructure projectsthrough international nancial institutions. Although UN agenciesmay initially ocus on humanitarian assistance, they might shit later onto helping with economic reorms and reconstruction. Koreans over-seas could increase remittances and provide much needed expertise inhelping to gain access to business partners and markets abroad.

As the prospect o a united Korea becomes more real, the issues oresolving the suspended state o the Korean Warwhich was never or-mally concluded with a peace treatyand dismantling the various UN

armistice structures remain. The ormal territorial boundaries o Koreawould also have to be settled, which, as indicated earlier, might not be


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uncontroversial. Koreas continuing commitment to various armscontrol agreements, its uture alliance obligations, and the status andcomposition o oreign orces on its soil, as well as its national deenseintentionsnot least its uture plans concerning the size, structure,and deployment o its armed orceswould all be o great concern tothe interested powers.


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29

Recommendations or U.S. Policy

Although the situation in Pyongyang ollowing Kim Jong-Ils recentillness could soon return to the status quo ante, continuing uncertain-

ties about his health and succession arrangements warrant height-ened attention and preparation or the possibility o sudden change inNorth Korea. The stakes are simply too high and the risks too great orU.S. policymakers to assume that this will not happen any time soonor that very little can useully be done in advance given all the inherentimpediments to contingency planning. Beore discussing the specicinitiatives that should be pursued to prepare or sudden change, it isuseul to lay out some basic principles to guide U.S. preparation or,

and management o the major policy challenges that could arise as aconsequence.

First, the United States should continue to promote behavioralchange within the current regime rather than actively seek to overthrowit unless extreme circumstances dictate otherwise. Aside rom the di-culties involved in eecting regime change, any attempt would compro-mise current denuclearization eorts and much-needed humanitarianassistance, to say nothing o alienating important allies and partners.

Currently the best vehicle or pursuing this is the Six-Party Talks, whichi successul will also do much to limit some o the more worrisome dan-gers should the situation in North Korea become unstable or whateverreason. At the same time, however, the United States should not supporteorts to prop up the current regime beyond the point at which it hasclearly ceased to govern eectively. Being ready then to adapt quicklyand push the process o change in the desired direction, as the UnitedStates did so eectively during German reunication, is critical.

Second, unless overriding national interests compel unilateral

action, the United States should deer to South Korean wishes andleadership in the management o change in North Korea. Nothing


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would alienate Seoul more than high-handed U.S. action. This is notto suggest that the United States should shrink rom making its con-cerns known or rom trying to steer South Korea in directions it con-siders desirablequite the contrary. Being a loyal and supportiveally requires that it be candid and, i necessary, critical at times. Suchsupport simply needs to be oered in ways that do not undermine thetrust and condence that is the oundation o an eective alliance. Inthis respect, the United States should continue to state both privatelyand publicly its desire to support the creation o a united Korea that isdemocratic, prosperous, nonnuclear, and at peace with its neighbors,and that has the sovereign right to choose its security arrangements,

including its alliance partners.Third, the likely challenges associated with sudden change in North

Korea are too big and complex to be addressed by the United Statesand South Korea alone. Cooperation between the principal powersprovides the best chance o coping with these daunting problems ando ensuring a stable, peaceul, new regional order. Failure to accom-modate national interests, on the other hand, could have prooundlynegative consequences or the evolution o Korea, the stability o

northeast Asia, and U.S. relations with major allies and other coun-tries in the region.

Policies should thereore be crated that are either inclusive or atleast reassuring to the other interested parties. Again, the precedento German reunication is instructive. Although Koreas geopoliticalcontext is quite dierent than that o Germany at the time o reunica-tion, many o the core issuescertainly the security-related onesthatwould likely come to the ore in the event o Korean reunication are

actually quite similar. Only through an intensive and deliberate diplo-matic eort driven largely by Washington to reassure the security con-cerns o the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the two Germanyswere these issues resolved.

With these guiding principles in mind, the United States, in concertwith its allies in the region, should pursue certain recommendations toimprove their ability to respond to the potential challenges o suddenchange in North Korea. These can be organized into three mutuallyreinorcing sets o initiatives: enhancing U.S. readiness, promoting

allied coordination and preparedness, and ostering regional transpar-ency and capacity-building.


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31Recommendations or U.S. Policy

enHance u.S. r eadineSS

The United States should upgrade its ability to discern and compre-hend domestic political, economic, and other developments in NorthKorea. Although the U.S. intelligence community devotes substantialassets to monitoring North Korea, the ability to identiy and under-stand potential domestic sources o instability in light o Kim Jong-Ilsillness should be expanded to take advantage o a variety o new sourceso inormation. For example, closer collaboration with members o theEuropean Union, who now have diplomatic representation with NorthKorea, would be desirable. That collaboration, which would ocus on

exchanging inormation and analysis, could also prove useul in build-ing and rening dierent predictive models or the North. Additionalinormation gathered in the uture could either be incorporated intothose models or used help rene them urther.

Establishing broader contacts with Pyongyang during ongoingdenuclearization negotiations will likely also prove helpul. I theyprove successul, North Koreas nuclear program will become increas-ingly transparent as a result o Pyongyangs own declarations and on-

the-ground activities designed to veriy overall compliance. In thiscontext, including Nunn-Lugar like programs, particularly in the areao redirecting the Norths nuclear workorce to peaceul pursuits, couldprove especially valuable. That in turn might make it easier to con-duct operations in the event o collapse, because a scarcity o accurateintelligence would likely be a major problem. Also, i denuclearizationprogresses, the challenges that North Koreas nuclear stockpile poseswill diminish. In the best-case scenario, its weapons and materials will

already have been disposed o beore instability occurs. But even on-the-ground progress toward achieving that goalperhaps urther dis-abling nuclear acilities and gradually reducing Pyongyangs weaponsstockpilewould help lessen the burden on any operation designedto seize and secure the Norths nuclear program. Other disarmamenttalks with the Northsuch as ocusing on eliminating its missiles andother WMD programswould have similar benets.

Another potentially useul avenue would be to reestablish the work-ing relationship between the U.S. and North Korean militaries to

recover the remains o American soldiers missing or killed in actionduring the Korean War. That cooperation was discontinued by the Bush


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administration. Restoring those contacts as well as broadening themto cover other topics o mutual concern, aside rom possibly helpingto improve relations between the two countries, might provide greaterinsight into the North Korean military, especially its leadership, whichcould prove useul in helping to analyze unolding events in the North.

In addition to improving its ability to understand developments inNorth Korea, the United States should review, update, and broaden itsnational contingency plans to ensure a comprehensive and coordinatedpolitical, security, economic, and humanitarian response in the evento destabilizing change. These eorts should go beyond amendingthe current U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK Ministry o National

Deence (MND) Joint Contingency Planning Operation to include acomprehensive interagency assessment o how the United States wouldrespond to the potential political, military, economic, and humanitarianchallenges discussed so ar. The review should thereore be coordinatedby the National Security Council and involve other relevant U.S. gov-ernment agencies, such as the Department o State, the Department oTreasury, and the Agency or International Development (USAID).Whether conducted separately or as part o this eort, the NSC should

also review its overall policy and strategy toward the Korean peninsula,including the possibility o political reunication.

proMote allied coordination

and preparedneSS

The United States should work closely with South Korea and Japan

to improve allied coordination and preparedness or contingencies inNorth Korea. For the same reason that U.S. national contingency plan-ning must be broad based, so too must consultations and preparationswith the allies. Thus the current joint military planning between theUnited States and South Korea needs to be augmented with a coordi-nated political, diplomatic, economic, and legal strategy to tackle thecore issues likely to arise. Both sides are likely to have a great deal to gainrom such consultations and planning. Because South Korean agenciesare probably much urther along in thinking about how to deal with

instability in the North, they could assist U.S. agencies in ormulatingU.S. contingency plans. For its part, the South Korean governmentwould benet greatly rom the vast recent experienceboth positive


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and negativethat U.S. civilian agencies have gained in dealing withsimilar political, economic, and humanitarian problems in other partso the world, particularly over the past ve years in Aghanistan and Iraq.These planning eorts might also benet rom regular tabletop exer-cises or simulations o generic contingencies and possible responses.Such exercises are already common in joint military planning. The U.S.,Japanese, and South Korean militaries conducted several exercises othis kind in the late 1990s and presumably are continuing similar peri-odic military coordination eorts. Such exercises need to be broadenedto enhance joint planning and coordination in a more comprehensiveway to include the nonmilitary aspects o such contingencies.

Washington and Seoul should also begin to develop a commonvision or a potential reunied Korea. Developing such a commonvision is likely to be politically sensitive, but certain issues are air gameor consultation. These include discussing the uture role o the U.S.-ROK alliance and the presence o U.S. orces on the peninsula as wellas a unied Koreas commitment to the global nonprolieration regimenotably membership in the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The United States should actively encourage Japans participationin trilateral talks on the challenges that instability and change in NorthKorea pose. Japan, as noted, has important and legitimate interestsin the uture o the peninsula and the United States and South Koreawould need its logistic support and economic assistance should NorthKorea collapse. Quiet consultations are not just appropriate, then, butalso necessary. Those consultations might initially ocus on comparingassessments o the internal situation in the North and then broaden to

include planning or contingencies o most concern to Japan, such asthe possibility o large-scale reugee movements or the danger that ina chaotic North Korea missiles or even WMDs might be used againstneighboring countries. One option might be to include discussion osuch contingencies in the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group(TCOG), which to date has primarily ocused on nuclear negotiationswith North Korea. Given the sensitive topic, less visible diplomatic orother channels would also be a possibility.

Practical measures can also be taken to improve allied capacity to

respond to the potential challenges particularly in the provision ohumanitarian assistance and disaster relie. All three countries cur-rently work together in the Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team


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(MPAT) overseen by the UN Oce or the Coordination o Humani-tarian Aairs (OCHA), which brings together the militaries o morethan thirty countries to plan or and respond to natural disasters.This multilateral eort, which proved useul in the global response tothe December 2004 tsunami in the Pacic, could be augmented withmore intensive interallied consultations, planning, and training. Crisisresponse consultations could ocus on understanding internal civilianand military processes or dealing with disasters, discussing poten-tial trilateral responses, and thinking about how these eorts mightbe integrated into broader multilateral rameworks. They might alsoinclude an examination o how capabilities and activities conducted

under the rubric o the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliancescommand and control arrangements, intelligence assets, joint exer-cises, and even some procurement planscould contribute to trilateralcrisis response eorts.

FoSter r egional tr anSpar ency

and capacit y buildi ng

To reduce the risk o misunderstanding and riction in a crisis involv-ing North Korea, the United States should pursue a quiet dialogue withthe Peoples Republic o China to discuss issues o mutual concern.Chinese interest in engaging in discussions about North Korea and,more generally, the stability o northeast Asia has clearly increased asa result o the Six-Party Talks, but obvious political sensitivities havehindered the scope o these exchanges. Chinese reticence to engage in

a more ocussed dialogue about North Korea may have lessened, how-ever, as a result o uncertainties about Kim Jong-Ils health. At the veryleast, the possibility o such a dialogue should be explored, perhaps inthe rst instance through inormal discussions among nongovernmen-tal experts rom both countries that might also include several ocialobservers. I productive, such discussions could be elevated to moreormal albeit still discreet talks, perhaps directed initially at the eco-nomic and humanitarian situation in North Korea and then graduatingto more sensitive political and security issues.

The aim o such talks would be not only to raise potential concernsand discuss possible responses but also to minimize misunderstand-ings that might arise and seriously exacerbate a crisis. This might


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include a mutual pledge to consult and share inormation as well as tocreate better channels o communication, including special military-to-military links. Commitments designed to reassure each other ostrategic intentions in the event o instability or collapse would also bedesirable. For example, the United States might pledge to not estab-lish military bases north o the 38th Parallel. Chinese participantsmight eschew any intention to shit the current territorial boundarieso Korea. How the two countries might conceivably act together toprevent various WMD-related contingencies including nuclear leak-age might also be explored.

Whether at some point these discussions could be expanded to

include other countries such as South Korea and Japan is unclear.A great deal will probably depend on the state o the overall bilateralrelationshipsparticularly between China and Japanand o contin-ued cooperation in dealing with Korean peninsular issues. But there isno reason why such dialogues should not be held bilaterally betweenChina and the three allied countries, particularly i South Korea, Japan,and the United States have coordinated their overall views to send thesame policy signals to Beijing.

To complement the initiatives to enhance allied coordination andcapacity or disaster relie and humanitarian assistance, similar eortsshould also be directed to improve the readiness o other regionalactors. Until recently, Chinas PLA has been hesitant to play an activerole in both planning and executing disaster relie operations outsideits territory. But the benets to doing so are obvious and real, rompositive public relations to helping improve Chinas military medicalsystem. And Beijings willingness to be more active may increase as its

military modernizes and its capabilities grow. It has evidently showedsome interest in participating in activities conducted by MPAT, butthat participation has been opposed by certain elements inside the U.S.government. Washington should support a more active Chinese rolebecause such a role would present opportunities or the United Statesto build cooperation and trust through personnel exchanges, joint mis-sions, and other activities. Moreover, establishing such cooperationwould likely benet closer collaboration in the event o instability inNorth Korea.

Discreet discussions should also be held with the UN agencies,European counterparts, and nongovernmental organizations withactive development assistance programs in North Korea to determine


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their preparedness to respond to new contingencies. One recent studythat could serve as the basis or such an examination is the internationalhumanitarian response to the 2004 explosion at Ryongchon train sta-tion in North Korea, which let thousands homeless in addition to themany injured or dead, disrupted the countys electricity supply system,and damaged its water systems. UN agencies and European organiza-tions that played a leading role included OCHA, the UN ChildrensFund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), WFP, theUN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the European Com-missions Humanitarian Aid Oce (ECHO), Concern Worldwide,German Agroaction, and Premiere Urgence. Although the overall

response was eective, it illustrated some o the logistical and technicalchallenges that would be repeated on a much larger scale in the event oa broader ailure o the regime. Quiet consultations might also ocuson the possibility o using indigenous North Korean groups to helpcope with system ailure. For example, because o training providedby the International Federation o Red Cross and Red Crescent Socie-ties (ICRC), the DPRK Red Cross has become a much more eectiveorganization, which, i still unctioning, could play an important role

working with outside relie groups.Other potentially useul skills and capacities could be ostered

among regional actors, including opportunities to conduct bilateraland multilateral training exercises or generic postconfict stabilizationand reconstruction operations. Since 2003, the United States and Mon-golia have conducted an interoperability exercise called Khaan Quest,designed to prepare Mongolian soldiers or their participation in coali-tion operations in Iraq and Aghanistan. Much o the work ocuses on

UN tactics and multilateral operating procedures. In the uture, simi-lar training exercises could be expanded to involve other countries innortheast Asia. The United States has certainly much recent and rel-evant experience to impart.

Finally, the United States and its allies should promote the estab-lishment o a standing institutional mechanism or regional securitycooperation in northeast Asia that, among other benets, might proveespecially useul in coordinating and legitimating responses in the evento instability and collapse in North Korea. The current Six-Party Talks

have already begun to address the possibility o creating a more per-manent regional security dialogue. Whether that eort succeeds willdepend on overall progress toward denuclearization. But even i theSix-Party Talks ail to achieve their primary goal, the habit o regular


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consultation that has developed since they began is a strong endorse-ment or institutionalizing this mechanism among the ve parties(excluding North Korea). Neither should the ocus o such a mechanismbe conned necessarily to the discussion o security issues. Economicand environmental concerns, to the name the obvious, would also ben-et rom greater dialogue and collective action.

Although regional, and in some cases domestic, political realitieslimit the ability o both the United States and the countries o East Asiato plan openly or sudden and potentially destabilizing change in NorthKorea, implementing these recommendations should improve theirability to cope with the likely challenges. As this study has stressed, the

potential implications o these challenges are too important to be letto hasty improvisation, whatever the temptation may be to put o untiltomorrow what doesnt have to be addressed today. Improving contin-gency planning, sharing the results o this planning, improving consul-tation on the uture o the Korean peninsula, and taking concrete stepsto build up generic, potentially useul capabilitiesthough certainlynot sucient in and o themselves to cope with these challengeswillestablish a much rmer oundation or the uture.


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. North Korea is ocially called the Democratic Peoples Republic o Korea (DPRK).Its more common name, however, will be used throughout this report.

. Blaine Harden, N. Korea Releases New Photos o Kim, Washington Post, November

4, 2008.. See Kim Jong-Ils Lie Expectancy, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/

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