Network Paper 23 - 1997 - The Coordination of Humanitarian ...
28
paper NETWORK 23 R ELIEF AND R EHABILITATION N ETWORK December 1997 RRN by Koenraad Van Brabant The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka Abstract This case study concerns humanitarian field coordination efforts during Eelam War 3 in Sri Lanka, between 1994 and 1996. The war and the coordination efforts continue. Most documented experiences of the coordination of humanitarian action relate to situations in which government was weakened, collapsed or not in control of significant parts of its territory. Sri Lanka provides an example of a government that has asserted its sovereignty and that simultaneously pursues political, military and humanitarian objectives. The government’s continued responsibility for the protection of and provision for its citizens is briefly examined in the light of its role in conflict. An overview of the challenges for humanitarian action and capacity to respond leads to a discussion of the restriction of ‘humanitarian space’ by the army. Throughout the period in question, humanitarian agencies not only needed to coordinate for programme effectiveness, but also to advocate for humanitarian space and access. Following a review of the coordination mechanisms in place at the outbreak of war, the different initiatives used to strengthen it during the war are examined. Special attention is paid to the review of the NGO Consortium on Relief and Rehabilitation and the Interagency Emergency Group. For organisational, but also for political reasons, both functioned simultaneously and in parallel. The absence of professional knowledge regarding coordination, and the occasional shortage of technical and methodological expertise, added to the usual resistance to coordination, made it a difficult exercise. Contextual constraints, such as the outbreak of the war coinciding with an effort to rethink coordination, and the complex and sensitive politics around humanitarian assistance also played their role. The most important obstacle to effective coordination remained however, the absence of an effective institutional link to coordinate the humanitarian efforts of both the government and those of specialised agencies.
Transcript of Network Paper 23 - 1997 - The Coordination of Humanitarian ...
paperN
ETW
OR
K
23
RE L I E F A N D RE H A B I L I T AT I O N N E T W O R KDecember 1997
RRN
by Koenraad Van Brabant
The Coordination ofHumanitarianAction: the case ofSri Lanka
Abstract
This case study concerns humanitarian fieldcoordination efforts during Eelam War 3 in Sri Lanka,between 1994 and 1996. The war and the coordinationefforts continue.
Most documented experiences of the coordination ofhumanitarian action relate to situations in whichgovernment was weakened, collapsed or not in controlof significant parts of its territory. Sri Lanka providesan example of a government that has asserted itssovereignty and that simultaneously pursues political,military and humanitarian objectives. Thegovernment’s continued responsibility for theprotection of and provision for its citizens is brieflyexamined in the light of its role in conflict. An overviewof the challenges for humanitarian action and capacityto respond leads to a discussion of the restriction of‘humanitarian space’ by the army. Throughout theperiod in question, humanitarian agencies not onlyneeded to coordinate for programme effectiveness, butalso to advocate for humanitarian space and access.
Following a review of the coordination mechanismsin place at the outbreak of war, the different initiativesused to strengthen it during the war are examined.Special attention is paid to the review of the NGOConsortium on Relief and Rehabilitation and theInteragency Emergency Group. For organisational, butalso for political reasons, both functionedsimultaneously and in parallel.
The absence of professional knowledge regardingcoordination, and the occasional shortage of technicaland methodological expertise, added to the usualresistance to coordination, made it a difficult exercise.Contextual constraints, such as the outbreak of the warcoinciding with an effort to rethink coordination, andthe complex and sensitive politics around humanitarianassistance also played their role. The most importantobstacle to effective coordination remained however,the absence of an effective institutional link tocoordinate the humanitarian efforts of both thegovernment and those of specialised agencies.
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
2
Please send comments on this paper to:
Relief and Rehabilitation NetworkOverseas Development InstitutePortland HouseStag PlaceLondon SW1E 5DPUnited KingdomTel: +44 (0) 171 393 1674/47/40Fax: +44 (0) 171 393 1699Email: [email protected] site: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/
A copy of your comments will be sent to the author.
Comments received may be used in future Newsletters.
Notes on the Author
Koenraad Van Brabant is a Research Fellowworking with the RRN and based at theOverseas Development Institute, London.
Special thanks to Oxfam (UK/I) which provided the opportunity to write up a first reflection, and toLaura Gibbons and John Borton for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
Acknowledgements
This paper is dedicated to all the peoplein Sri Lanka who, in ways great and small,
work for tolerance and peace.
ISBN: 0-85003-367-5
Price per copy: £5.00 (excluding postage and packing)
© Overseas Development Institute, London, 1997.
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged.Requests for the commercial reproduction of Network material should be directed to the ODI as copyrightholders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of the use of any of this material intraining, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation.
3
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
3
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
ContentsChronology of Major Events 4
1. The Coordination of Humanitarian Action 5
What is field coordination? 5
NGO and UN coordination 5
Coordination by governments 6
2. Humanitarian Action in Sri-Lanka 7
Protection and provision - the responsibility of the government 7
Challenges for coordinated international humanitarian action 9
The capacity for humanitarian response 10
Humanitarian space 11
3. Mechanisms for Coordination 13
Mechanisms for coordination at the outbreak of the war 13
Strengthening coordination during the war 14
Effective coordination? 18
4. Structural and Contextual Constraints on Coordination 21
Structural constraints 21
Contextual constraints 22
Maps 24
Endnotes 26
Acronymns 26
References 27
Theme and structure of the paper
This case study concerns field coordination efforts during the outbreak of Eelam War 3 in SriLanka between 1994�1996. In addition to considering some of the general obstacles to effectivecoordination, its specific interest lies in the description of the difficulties of coordinating thehumanitarian effort within the context of a strong government waging a war. Together with thewar, the coordination efforts continue to date.
A useful place to begin is by considering what coordination consists of, and then examiningvarious NGO, UN and governmental experiences of coordination. The paper then presentsthe Government of Sri Lanka�s claim to authority in light of its past and current role in theconflicts that have torn this island. An overview of the challenges for humanitarian action andresponse capabilities leads directly to the issue of just how much humanitarian space wasallowed for agencies to operate in. Next, coordination mechanisms in place at the outbreakof war are reviewed, followed by the different initiatives to strengthen it during wartime. Thisraises the question of their effectiveness and of structural and contextual constraints tocoordination. 1
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
4
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka
1971 First JVP led youth insurgency in the south
1975 Emergence of Tamil militant groups
1976 Tamil United Liberation Front demands separate state
1983 Island-wide bloody riots against Tamils, start �Eelam War 1�
1987 Indian intervention, Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord
First national rehabilitation and reconstruction plan
Indian-Peace Keeping Force fights with LTTE until 1990
Second JVP-led youth insurgency in the south until 1990
1990 Start Eelam War 2; expulsion of Muslims from the north
August 1994 People�s Alliance wins elections and begin peace moves
Preparatory study on national rehabilitation and reconstruction
January 1995 Presidential Task Force for the north established
April 1995 LTTE break off talks and starts Eelam War 3
Army abandons territory in the east
Pilot resettlement scheme for IDPs in the east suspended
Start Review Committee of NGO Consortium
July 1995 Government moves the theatre of war from the east to Jaffna peninsula
October 1995 Army offensive that leads to capture of Jaffna in December
Population flees Jaffna city
UN proposes Multilateral Emergency Task Force/Forum
Start Interagency Emergency Group
November 1995 GoSL reaffirms its sovereignty and capacity to the UN
Appointment Focal Point for relief to the north
Media campaign against NGOs
January 1996 Second draft proposal regarding Consortium on Humanitarian Aid
April 1996 Army captures Jaffna peninsula
Resettlement and Reconstruction Authority for the North created
Appointment Focal Point for relief to cleared areas in the north
June 1996 Evacuation of population and aid agencies from Kilinochchi in Vanni
NGO Consortium formally disbanded
Autumn 1996 Army occupies Kilinochchi
New NGO Consortium on Humanitarian Aid inaugurated
Chronology of Events
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
5
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
1The Coordination ofHumanitarian Action
What is field coordination?
Humanitarian action needs to becoordinated to achieve any overallprogramme effectiveness.
Operational coordination is required to achieve thebest resource allocation in terms of needs andpriorities, but resource allocation must also becoordinated in terms of coverage: duplication mustbe avoided but it is also important to avoidomissions in sectors of work or in target groupsthat require help. Secondly, coordination is requiredwhen dealing with the standards and protocols ofimplementation.
But joint, and therefore coordinated action in asituation of active conflict may also be required tonegotiate humanitarian space. Humanitarian spacerefers in the first instance to the basic rights ofvictims of conflict — at a bare minimum theserights include protection and material assistance.Humanitarian space also refers to the right of accessfor impartial agencies to provide humanitarianassistance. Humanitarian space is not alwaysguaranteed: belligerent parties may restrict it, or itcan be limited by threats to security. Where partiesto a conflict restrict this space, joint action may berequired to assert humanitarian concerns andprinciples in the face of more dominant political ormilitary concerns. Coordinated advocacy forhumanitarian principles and negotiation for spaceinvolves humanitarian agencies in ‘political’questions.
Coordination is a notoriously difficult aspect ofhumanitarian action. There is a saying that everyonewants coordination but no one wants to becoordinated. The obligation to coordinate with otherhumanitarian actors is not normally an explicitagency policy and it is also unclear whichmechanisms work best and why, and in whatcontext. However, there is a growing pool ofexperience available for comparative review (forexample, Bennett 1994b; Borton 1996; Donini1996; Lanzer 1996; Whitman & Pocock 1996) towhich this case study would like to add.
NGO and UN coordination
NGO coordinationNGOs have been criticised for their competitivenessand poor coordination (Bennett 1994a: 2). NGOshave shown that they can cooperate and take a leadin contexts where governments and the UN cannotor do not want to. The Joint Church Action duringthe Biafra war, the Emergency Relief Desk duringthe Ethiopian civil war and the Oxfam–NGOconsortium for an internationally isolatedCambodia, are examples of a large-scale operation,combined with international advocacy. The natureof NGO coordination tends to change when a formalauthority emerges, sometimes government,sometimes the UN, in the absence of an effectivegovernment. NGOs need a collective voice toparticipate in national policy debates and nationalaid planning to ensure recognition of their role incivil society and raise issues of specific concern tothem.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
6
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
kaUN coordinationThe over-arching coordinating framework for theUN’s overall involvement in a given countrytypically rests with the UNDP, whose headrepresents the UN to the national government. Inhumanitarian crises, the UN continues to search fora satisfactory institutional framework forcoordination. There have been experiments with alead agency model, for example using UNICEF insouth Sudan, UNHCR during wars in the formerYugoslavia and with situation-specific operationssuch as the UN Border Relief Operation (1982–1991) for Cambodian refugees in Thailand, or theUN Office for Emergency Operations (1984–1987)for the famine response in Ethiopia. The creationin 1988 of a UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian and Economic AssistanceProgrammes to Afghanistan (UNOCA) with aspecially appointed coordinator for the overall UNefforts country-wide was therefore an innovativeapproach. In 1993 however UNDP in Afghanistantook back the responsibility for rehabilitation andeconomic and development assistance, leavingUNOCA with a reduced mandate of relief only(Donini et al. 1996).
Dissatisfaction with perceived weaknesses in theUN’s capacity to mobilise a coordinated emergencyresponse during the Gulf war (Minear et al. 1992)led in 1991 to the creation of a standing UNdepartment for coordination: the Department forHumanitarian Affairs (DHA). It could be arguedthat in many ways the DHA was set up to fail(Dedring 1996). In some cases, such as Liberia andMozambique, there has been tension between theDHA and the Special Representatives of theSecretary-General, whose main mission is to seekpolitical solutions to a conflict, and notably UNDPand UNHCR over operational coordination.Following the establishment of the DHA, in a majorcrisis the UN can appoint a humanitariancoordinator at country level. In principle answerableto the DHA, this role has often been filled by theUNDP’s resident representative. His or her need toexpress concern for an adequate humanitarianresponse does not always fit easily with thediplomatic representation of the UN to a nationalgovernment, as the events in Sudan (Karim et al.1996: 270–73) and Sri Lanka show.
Coordination by government
We see NGOs and the UN take a lead role in thecoordination of humanitarian action where agovernment is weak or collapsed, or where it is seen
as unwilling to take full responsibility for theprotection and provision of all its citizens becauseit is itself party to a civil war. In principle however,national governments are responsibile for thecoordination of humanitarian action.
The challenge for government becomes harder asthe number of international agencies increases, andif it has no plan for humanitarian aid or no formalcoordinating body. Often specialised ministries oradministrations are created for refugee affairs, reliefand rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance ingeneral. Helpful as this is, it brings with it additionalinternal coordination problems at the interface ofsuch specialised administration and the normal lineministries.
Governmental coordination becomes sensitive andcontentious where government is strong andinvokes national security concerns. This can be overthe presence of refugees in a context of regionaltension, or where the government itself is a partyto a conflict. In such cases a Ministry of the Interior,as in Guatemala, or a Ministry of Defence, as inThailand and Sri Lanka, becomes the de facto ‘leadagency’; coordination can then seem more likecontrol. The question of effective operationalcoordination becomes linked to that of humanitarianspace, with agencies demanding more than thegovernment is willing to allow. For internationalhumanitarian agencies, this argument quicklybecomes one of sovereignty. In such negotiationor argument over humanitarian space, the UNusually finds itself in a different position from thatof NGOs. The UN has a recognised humanitarianmandate but is an institution made up of memberstates; while NGOs have a self-appointed mandatethat may be morally recognised but have nointernational legal status. This combination givesthem a strong position in the argument overhumanitarian space but also leaves them morevulnerable to an angry reaction from thegovernment.
A special feature of Sri Lanka is that a belligerentgovernment provides a degree of humanitarianassistance also in opposition controlled areas. Thegovernment’s claim to authority in matters relatedto humanitarian assistance is derived from theassertion that it continues to protect and providefor all citizens in its national territory. The followingsection examines this assertion in the light of thegovernment’s role in the conflict and its control overhumanitarian space.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
7
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
Protection and provision - theresponsibility and authority of thegovernment
Ethnic conflict or a crisis of governance?
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka stems froma conflict over group rights that originatesin the British colonial period (1815–1948).
Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and religiously diversecountry of 18 million people of which thepredominantly Buddhist Sinhalese constitute a clearmajority (circa 74 per cent). The largest minorityare the Tamils who themselves divided betweenthe ‘Ceylon Tamils’ (12.5 per cent) and the ‘IndianTamils’ (now 5.5 per cent). The names are ratherinappropriate given that all Tamils, like theSinhalese, originate from the Indian subcontinent.There is also a Muslim minority (7.5 per cent). Foralmost a century the colonial administration hadfollowed a policy of balanced — or ethnically equal— rather than proportional representation. Thepolitical aspirations of the Sinhalese majoritybecame possible when universal suffrage wasintroduced in 1931.
Immediately after independence in 1948 the newgovernment enacted legislation depriving themajority of the then much larger number of ‘IndianTamils’ of their citizenship and voting rights, partlyfor ethnic reasons, partly to break the power of anorganised working class. Several hundred thousandwould subsequently repatriate to India.
Humanitarian Action inSri Lanka
In 1956 however, Sinhalese nationalism became anelectoral rallying cry, leading to the first riots. Tamilpoliticians wavered between a cross-cutting élitistalliance and straightforwardly ethnic politics, butperceived political discriminations and subsequentriots as strengthening Tamil nationalism and theirdemand for an autonomous or even independent‘Tamil Eelam’. Bloody riots in 1983 fueled thearmed Tamil militancy, now openly supported byIndia, and led to Eelam War 1. They also fosteredinternational sympathy with the Tamil cause. In1987 India intervened to stop the Sri Lankan armyfrom taking Jaffna, the political and cultural centreof the Ceylon Tamils. The subsequent Indo–SriLankan peace accord brought in an Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF). This itself got quicklyentangled in a war with the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE), an effective guerrillaorganisation that promptly bit the hand that had fedit. The LTTE violently established its supremacyover other Tamil militant groups, the remnants ofwhich would later cooperate with the governmentforces to defeat the LTTE. A morally defeated IPKFwithdrew in early 1990. Peace negotiations betweenthe government and the LTTE fell apart when theLTTE started Eelam War 2 in mid-1990, in whichit lost ground in the east but took control of mostof the north, where only a ring of fortified armybases remained. Eelam War 2 drew the Muslimsinto the conflict. In the east, they were set upon bythe LTTE and trained as home guards. This resultedin reciprocal massacres of Tamil and Muslimvillagers. In November 1990 all Muslims wereexpelled from the LTTE-controlled north.
2
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
8
Meanwhile, between 1987 and 1990, while theIPKF was fighting the LTTE, the government hadbloodily suppressed a second armed youthinsurgency in south and central Sri Lanka, the firsthaving occurred in 1971. Although this insurgencywas essentially rooted in frustrated employmentaspirations, unresolved tensions between traditionaland modern identity in Sri Lanka, and a perceivederosion of democracy and state accountability(Government of Sri Lanka 1990), the JanathaVimukthi Peramuna (JVP) that led the uprising, alsoused anti-Tamil and anti-Indian rhetoric to mobilisethe Sinhalese youth. Although the JVP used terroristtactics, the government was internationallycondemned for violating human rights.
Sri Lanka is riven by multiple interrelated conflicts:between Tamils and Sinhalese, between Tamils andMuslims, within the Tamil body politic and withinthe Sinhalese body politic. And yet Sri Lanka pridesitself on having continued democratic elections.The ‘all or nothing’ rivalry between its two mainpolitical parties, an intense political patronage thatdivides all to the last village community, combinedwith aloof and élitist attitudes of those ingovernment have however, raised questions aboutthe plurality of Sri Lanka’s democracy. Even thoughsuch view is not widely held by prominent opinion-makers in Sri Lanka, it could be argued that violencein Sri Lanka is less an ethnic than a governanceissue, and that all groups have experiencedgovernment repression.
Territorial presenceAn unusual feature of this conflict is that theGovernment of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has constantlymaintained a skeleton administration in the so-called ‘uncleared’ or LTTE-controlled areas. Thisincludes a functioning district-level presence ofline ministry staff and a Government Agent (GA)as the most senior authority in the district. For theGoSL this signals continued control over itsterritory and an acceptance of its obligationstowards the war-affected populations. Indeed, theGoSL continues to pay its civil servants, givespensions and welfare allowances to the poor, andsends food to those in the north that war hasinternally displaced. This distinguishes it from otherwar-time situations in Angola, Mozambique,Liberia, south Sudan or Afghanistan, where thegovernment effectively lost control over significantparts of its territory and could or would not, assumeresponsibility for all its citizens.
A war to make peaceNational elections in mid-1994 toppled the UNPgovernment that had held power for 17 years, andhad been responsible for significant state repressionagainst Tamils and Sinhalese alike. It was widelyfelt that the People’s Alliance (PA) had been electedfor its promise to make peace. Indeed, PA quicklyinitiated a triple strategy for peace: talks with LTTE,the preparation of a political package that wouldoffer substantial autonomy to the predominantlyTamil-inhabited areas and a major nationalrehabilitation and reconstruction programme(ERRP 2), studied and costed by a World Bank-sponsored team of consultants. But the peace talksrapidly broke down after which both GoSL andLTTE refused international mediation. In April1995 the LTTE started Eelam War 3. The GoSLthen claimed the moral high ground declaring thatit had been forced to wage war and was fightingnot the Tamils but LTTE as the only obstacle to apolitical settlement of the conflict. Unfortunatelythere was also significant opposition within theSinhalese body politic to an agreement that wouldgive the Tamils substantial autonomy. Today, themost difficult issue remains the future of the easterndistricts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara, aquestion that directly affects the substantial Muslimpopulation there. As a result of past politicalmanipulation, there is now a rough demographicbalance between Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalesein the east. The east offers much-needed irrigatedland for Sinhalese settlers from the south and hasthe excellent deep-water port of Trincomalee. Apolitical settlement over the east will be moredifficult and contentious, than over the Tamil-dominated north.
The international attitudeThe facts that the PA government took concretesteps to make peace, and that the LTTE initiatedEelam War 3, have led to a major shift in the attitudeof the international community. The LTTE nowstands condemned with general support moving tothe GoSL. There remains a questions over whetherthe government is really prepared to makesubstantive concessions to placate genuine Tamilgrievances without losing the support of theSinhalese nationalists. Meanwhile the intensity ofEelam War 3 has created much humanitarian needamong the Tamil population in the north and east.They do not necessarily perceive the GoSL to befighting the LTTE and not the Tamils. They doknow that humanitarian assistance from the GoSLis insufficient and they see international attentionas a way to protect themselves from GoSL abuse.
9
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
9
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri LankaChallenges for coordinatedhumanitarian action
Displacement, drought, repatriation andresettlementDuring the peace talks (September 1994–April1995) GoSL and UNHCR had re-started therepatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from India. TheGoSL had also initiated a voluntary resettlementprogramme for internally displaced people (IDP),with stated entitlements and guidelines, and a pilotscheme in the east. Eelam War 3 interrupted bothprogrammes.
The army offensive in the autumn of 1995 led toJaffna being returned to GoSL control, but notbefore virtually all the inhabitants had fled the city,joining the tens of thousands of IDPs from earlierphases of the war. Some 150,000 went to the easternpart of the Jaffna peninsula, only to be returnedhome when that too came under GoSL control inthe spring of 1996. Another 250,000 crossed theJaffna lagoon into the Vanni. The Vanni is the mixedjungle and agricultural region between the lagoonand Vavuniya town. The bulk initially settledaround Kilinochchi, the major urban centre in theVanni, but would become displaced again, togetherwith Vanni residents, by subsequent fighting there.
In the east LTTE regained control of much of thehinterland and resettled villagers found themselvesback in an ‘uncleared’ area. There is no clearfrontline as in the north, and civilians in manyplaces have to cross the ‘lines’ on a daily basis.Many have more limited access to food and basicservices than in the north, and the Tamils are lesslikely to get financial support from relatives abroadthan their counterparts from urban Jaffna. In theeast, both LTTE and notably the police are lessdisciplined, and there is a gruesome history ofmassacres and disappearances. The army oftendisregards the official policy on voluntaryresettlement and has prevented resettled villagersfrom fleeing again to safer urban areas. Sinhalesevillagers also tend to get more generous relief andresettlement assistance from the authorities thanTamils and Muslims. The north and east constitutethe ‘dry zone’ in Sri Lanka and the whole situationwas aggravated by a country-wide severe droughtin 1995-1996. The category of IDPs becamecomplemented with one of residents who were‘drought-affected’.
Needs assessment and the adequacy of theresponseThe first practical challenge in organising acoherent emergency response is to determineroughly how many people are involved. The GoSLofficially put the figure of the newly displaced at100,000 while the estimate of Government Agent(GA) in Jaffna and the agencies was 400,000. Inpractice the GoSL used a figure of over 300,000 tocalculate food rations and the problem of thenumber of affected people would not arise untillater.¹
Food security remained a major concern becauseof the restrictions on its trade and production,caused primarily by an economic embargo on thenorth but aggravated by drought. The war anddisplacement from Jaffna made health a majorconcern. The Jaffna Teaching Hospital which hadbeen the major referral centre for health no longerfunctioned. There was a great need for surgicalcapacity, curative care and public health. Althoughthe majority of displaced were taken in by localresidents or found refuge in ‘welfare centres’, oftenschools, temples and public buildings, there wereimmediate shelter needs. In the medium term,people would have to be relocated from the welfarecentres and from overcrowded residences.Although the drought reduced the risk ofcommunicable diseases and the incidence ofmalaria, as well as extra pressure for shelter againstthe rains, it did increase concerns over foodproduction and access to sufficient quantities of safedrinking-water.
In these key areas, the needs and the impact of thehumanitarian response had to be monitored overtime. As no agency covered all districts and sectors,interagency collaboration in assessment,monitoring and evaluation was required.
ProtectionProtection is an explicit aspect of the mandate ofsome operational organisations, notably the ICRCand UNHCR. Others feel they have a ‘witnessing’role. The situation in Sri Lanka raised manyprotection issues. In the past both warring partieshad massacred civilians, and fierce arguments havearisen between agencies and the GoSL over reportsof new such instances. Civilians being used — byeither side — as shields behind which to travel,hide or carry out attacks is an unacceptable tactic.Medical facilities came under fire from both thearmy and LTTE, who each justified such action withthe argument that enemy casualties were being
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
10
treated in them. Both sides historically have torturedand abused prisoners and carried out extrajudicialkillings. LTTE uses child soldiers in contraventionof the Convention of the Rights of the Child, whichis at the core of the mandates of the Save theChildren Fund alliance and UNICEF.
Agencies had to decide what position to takeregarding human rights abuse, and how to respondto them.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction
During the peace talks in late 1994, a group ofWorld Bank sponsored consultants prepared a draftplan for the large-scale rehabilitation andreconstruction of the war-affected zones. Unlike theUN, NGOs, although portrayed in the plan asimportant implementing partners, were notconsulted in the process. They did manage to obtaintwo meetings with consultants but were notthemselves yet ready to think on such a grand scaleand consider the change of role from reliefproviders to participants in reconstruction. InJanuary 1995 the GoSL set up its own, exclusivelygovernmental, Northern Task Force which wassuspended when Eelam War 3 broke out. In April1996, when the army had taken the whole Jaffnapeninsula, and over 200,000 Tamils again cameunder GoSL control, the Task Force was revived.The GoSL then presented to the internationalcommunity a multi-million dollar funding proposalfor immediate relief and rehabilitation in Jaffna.The request was shared and discussed within theUN, and by the representatives of major donorgovernments. But NGOs also had to define theirposition and consider what possible role they couldor would or ought to play.
The capacity for humanitarian response
Government capacity
The GoSL itself had significant potential capacityto provide humanitarian assistance. There was aweakened but still functioning administration inplace in most of the conflict-affected areas, as wellas an effective system of registration. There werepolicies and guidelines for the poor and for peopleaffected by war or natural disaster. There was aMinistry of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation withyears of experience. The terrain in Sri Lanka,compared to other countries, is easy and thelogistical infrastructure good. Where problemsoccur, these mostly stem from a top-down approachto planning, a slow disbursement of funds and
bureaucratic attitudes that inhibit consultation. Withthe number of IDPs fluctuating between half andone million, the treasury is severely burdened, butSri Lanka can generally count on significant foreignaid, directly for development projects andhumanitarian assistance, and indirectly throughmacro-economic support.
International agency capacity
For the UN, UNHCR in practical operational termshas been the lead agency, mostly working withNGO partners, and to a lesser degree with localgovernment authorities. UNHCR’s presence in SriLanka is linked to the need to repatriate tens ofthousands of refugees, mostly from southern India.The agency considered IDPs as ‘of concern to theUNHCR’, and also provided relief to areas thathad absorbed repatriated refugees. The role ofUNICEF was to work in conflict areas with andthrough the GoSL. It had no field presence in thenorth. The position of UNDP on the other handwas an awkward one — being both central andmarginal to the UN’s efforts in the conflict zone.As in other countries, UNDP would be likely toplay a lead role in a rehabilitation andreconstruction programme, but not in theemergency phase. Still the brief of the UNDPresident representative included humanitarianactivities. To do this UNDP has funded an in-country post of ‘Adviser on Humanitarian Affairs’since 1993. The ICRC was invited in by the GoSLduring the youth insurgency in the south, and playsa very important role in both protection and reliefassistance in the north and east. There areapproximately eight major international NGOs(INGO) operational in the north and east, severalof which were working in Sri Lanka before theescalation of the ethnic conflict, and many of whichalso have programmes in the south. A fewinternationally affiliated church organisationschannel humanitarian assistance to conflict-affectedpeople from all ethnic groups.
At the time of the exodus of the Jaffna population,the GoSL made it clear it did not want a larger UNpresence. With an explicit reference to Rwanda, italso refused new INGOs arriving to work in thenorth.
National non-governmental capacity
In war-time Sri Lanka there were also manyBuddhist and some Hindu and Muslim charitableorganisations, and a rich array of community-basedorganisations (CBO) that provided relief and
11
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
11
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lankawelfare assistance. Some of these, with increasedforeign funding from INGOs, the UN or evenbilaterally through the Ministry of Reconstructionand Rehabilitation, have grown into intermediaryNGOs. Most of these cover small geographicalareas and have varied but generally limitedexpertise and capacity. Some, not all, tend to beethnically oriented.
It is quite possible that the Tamil ReliefOrganisation (TRO) has the largest operationalcapacity in the north. It denies affiliation to LTTEand claims to be an independent NGO. Others seeit as the relief and rehabilitation wing of LTTE.Whatever its status, there is little doubt that LTTE,as with other national organisations in the territoryit controls, has a major say in the policies,programmes and resources of TRO.
Host population
As in other countries, significant but hidden reliefis being provided to the many IDPs by resident hostpopulations. The majority of IDPs — Sinhalese,Tamil or Muslim — are not in camps, but have beenaccommodated and supported by family, friends orsympathetic local people. Host populations havein turn been affected by the drought and movingbattlelines.
Notwithstanding this significant overall capacitythat, if well coordinated, could have been appliedeffectively, the condition of civilians in the Vanniand in the east gradually deteriorated. A majorreason for this has been the tight control andrestriction of humanitarian space.
Humanitarian space
The economic and the military embargo
From the time when LTTE gained control of mostof the north in the early 1990s, an economicembargo was declared. Some items, with obvioussecurity implications, were banned. These include,for example, binoculars, barbed wire, smallbatteries (used for detonators), petrol or diesel fueland urea-based fertiliser (urea can be used to makeexplosives). Other items such as paraffin andcement (used to build bunkers) were allowed onlyin controlled quantities. In the summer of 1995 therestrictions on urea-based fertiliser were extendedto other ‘straight’ fertilisers, even though it is notactually feasible to make explosives with them.
Although an official list of banned and restricteditems would be ‘gazetted’, the Ministry of Defence
would, without warning, add restrictions on otheritems such as bicycles and their spare parts, tinnedfood and boxes of matche, all of which couldpresumably be used by LTTE guerrillas.Periodically, cash carried by agencies to pay salariesand make local purchases would also be limited.Humanitarian agencies could carry restricted itemsafter obtaining a permit which requiredendorsement by the MoD, but even then, the localmilitary command at Vavuniya and Trincomaleecould impose their own more arbitrary restrictionson every possible relief item; towels, clothes,buckets, hurricane lanterns, plastic sheeting, mostmedical drugs and even soap and Oral RehydrationSalt. Although not officially restricted, there wouldalways be bureaucratic or logistical problems asto why such items could not be allowed entry or atleast only in minimal quantities (Van Brabant 1996).No less problematic was the fact that drought-reliefmeasures were initiated all over the country exceptin the north, where no permit was ever granted forspare parts to repair the many damaged pumps anddrilling rigs.
There was an arbitrary measure that white plasticsheeting could be distributed to the IDPs on theJaffna peninsula but not in the Vanni, although thebulkier and harder to distribute cadjan (woven palmleaves used to construct simple huts) was allowed.
In the east the embargo was more unofficial withoutbeing less arbitrary. As the army withdrew itsoutlying camps, many villages found themselvesagain in ‘uncleared’ territory. Those who hadresettled were entitled to food rations, availablefrom the government controlled centres, but foundthat they could only take small quantities at a time,forcing people to travel back and forth continuously.
Controlling humanitarian assistance to the northwas easy in practical terms. There were only twopossible routes of entry where the lines had to becrossed. There was the landroute to the Vanni, withcheck-points in place at Vavuniya, and a sea routeto the Jaffna peninsula, with checks at the port ofTrincomalee. Agencies would not use militaryplanes or Navy ships to go to Jaffna, nor the privatevessels chartered by the GoSL. The ICRC operatedits own ship between Trincomalee and thepeninsula, thereby offering ‘neutral’ transport.
Perceived impartiality
The international humanitarian agencies madeseveral joint representations to the GoSL to pointout the unmet needs of the population in the north,
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
12
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
kaand to argue particular measures for health, water,shelter and food security. Arguing humanitarianconcerns, and easier access for assistance, wasalways a politically sensitive affair. The GoSL andthe military remained concerned that the aim ofLTTE was to politically exploit the humanitarianargument. There were also quite some doubts aboutthe impartiality of the international agencies,ranging from the belief that they were politicallynaïve and unaware of how LTTE manipulated theirpresence and assistanceto the suspicion that, out ofsolidarity with the Tamil ‘underdog’, some staffmight consciously support LTTE. NGOsparticularly were the object of suspicion, somethingthat has to be seen in the light of years ofinternational condemnation of the (previous) GoSLover human rights, election violence and staterepression.
The perception was fueled by the fact that thehumanitarian agencies had to argue more over thesituation in LTTE-controlled areas than the one inGoSL-controlled areas — many saw their material
assistance role as complementary to GoSL capacityas they had a stronger presence and programme inLTTE-controlled areas, madking them more likelyto witness, and speak out about, large-scale civiliandeath caused by the government forces, than aboutthe massacres of civilians carried out by LTTE.They also had no access problems in government-controlled areas. Although there were occasionalsignals from LTTE command that it might exercisea greater control over their work, as it did over localNGOs, this did not occur, so the agencies did notexperience much restriction of the humanitarianspace from LTTE. It was structurally difficult toappear impartial and balanced because of thesituation on the ground.
It was obvious that control over the Tamil civiliansin the north was an important aspect of the politicaland military strategies of both parties to the conflict.The humanitarian agencies had to balanceconsiderations of need against the risk of playinginto these strategies.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
13
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
Mechanisms forCoordination
Mechanisms for coordination at theoutbreak of the war
The Government
The Ministry of Rehabilitation andReconstruction appeared the naturallocus for coordination. Within it was
located the office of the Commissioner General forEssential Services (CGES) who would organise theGoSL assistance to the LTTE-controlled north,notably food rations, paraffin and medicine.However because most agencies were directlyoperational or worked through line ministries andlocal NGOs, the humanitarian and rehabilitationactivities of the GoSL, the UN (except UNICEF)and the NGOs would operate parallel, without asingle attempt to work according to an agreedoverall plan.
The UN
The UNDP hosted an ‘NGO-Donor Forum’ everymonth to bring together representatives from thedonors, the UN, the Red Cross, INGOs and theGoSL to discuss development issues and to provideupdates on the humanitarian situation. Between1990 and 1994 it had been the forum where NGOshad articulated their concerns over what wasperceived as an intimidating style of the PresidentialCommission of Inquiry in Respect of Non-Governmental Organisations (Van Brabant 1995).In 1994 the idea of setting up an NGO projectdatabase within UNDP, as the core of a potential
Information Unit, managed by the UN or by aninteragency committee including the GoSL wasfloated, but the project never got off the ground.
For its part, UNHCR developed close programmingrelationships with a number of NGOs, asintermediaries or final implementers of its variousrounds of quick-impact projects that had started inlate 1993 to assist communities to which repatriatedrefugees had returned. Programming and reviewmeetingw were organised with its partners.
The NGO Consortium
The NGO Consortium on Relief and Rehabilitationconstituted the largest forum, originating in 1985with informal meetings between NGOs. On theescalation of war in 1987 these meetings becameformalised as the NGO Consortium.Representatives from GoSL, the UN, and the RedCross were routinely invited to the monthlymeetings, the agenda included district updates,information exchange of activities planned or inprogress, and any issues arising. A ‘coordinator’post existed between 1987–1993 which was thenreplaced by a half-time post of ‘secretary’ and anAdvisory Committee of seven member NGOs.
A review of the first decade of the consortiumrevealed a profound discrepancy between its statedobjectives and the minimalist practice ofcoordination that the members allowed. Theobjectives included: assessments of relief andrehabilitation needs; sharing of technical resources
3
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
14
and expertise; strengthening of local organisationsand collective liaison with government agencies.In practice the consortium did little more than holdunimaginative monthly meetings. District updateswould vary in quality and sometimes listed thereporting agency’s activities rather than focus onunmet needs. Sectoral coordination, for example,in health or agriculture, would depend entirely onthe initiative of an interested member agency.Thematic exchange, such as on savings and creditschemes, occured in networks outside theconsortium with no link or feedback to it. Theagency directory gave a general profile but withoutdetails of budgets, staffing or projects.
There was no database of who was working where.The consortium failed to stimulate critical debatearound policy and programme issues. Neither wasit used as the forum for even critical challengessuch as the question of NGO legislation or a large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction plan for thewar-affected areas.
This ineffectiveness, and the resulting discontentwith its performance, had been the members’ ownchoice. Reviews in 1989 and again 1991 hadhighlighted its structural weaknesses, but each timethe members, presumably fearing the loss ofindependence, had refused to give it the formality,the clout and capacity to become more effective. Ittherefore remained a loose association in whichnobody was required to give up any autonomy. TheAdvisory Committee was not an effectivemechanism of governance and did not produce alonger term vision or sense of direction. A half-time secretary was just enough capacity to preparea meeting and send papers around. Locating thesecretary in the office of a member agency, usingthe letterhead of a member agency and rotating themeeting place among members, not only kept thecost low but also the profile. It thus could not actas an identifiable and effective focal point for otheragencies, for government and for visitors.
Strengthening coordination
A UN initiative
When in the summer of 1995 the war intensifiedon the Jaffna peninsula, international agenciesreviewed their emergency preparedness. In October1995 the UN initiated its internal Emergency TaskForce meetings, chaired by UNDP. These includedagencies such as WFP, FAO and WHO who thenhad no programmes or presence in the war-affectedzone. The agenda and outcomes of the meetings
were not shared however, at least not with NGOs.
That same month, following a field visit of anexperienced UNHCR emergency officer, the UNorganised a one and a half day seminar that it washoped would result in a multilateral task force forthe management of the humanitarian situation.Presided over by both the Commissioner Generalof Essential Services and the acting UNDPrepresentative, it brought together seniorrepresentatives from government, other UNagencies, the Red Cross, NGOs and donors. Whenit became clear that the GoSL was reluctant to inviteoutsiders into the decision-making process, the ideaof a task force was modified to an information-sharing ‘forum’. But this also was unacceptable tothe GoSL.
Friction had already been growing in relationsbetween the GoSL and the UN. UNDP had to sendback two medical doctors, UN Volunteers, whenthe MoD refused permission for the radios seenby the agency as a precondition for their work inthe north. The GoSL had also formally complainedwhen the director of UNESCO in Paris, on the basisof an MSF-France press release, condemned thedeath of schoolchildren in an air raid on the Jaffnapeninsula.
A public clash with the UN occured shortly afterthe seminar. When it became clear that thepopulation was fleeing Jaffna city, the UNSecretary-General publicly expressed his concernfor a potential humanitarian crisis, and the needfor a relief operation on an appropriate scale. Thiscaused a sharp reply from the Minister of ForeignAffairs. The government reaffirmed its commitmentand capacity to provide humanitarian assistance,but also made it clear that it did not want a largerUN presence, let alone direct UN intervention. Iteffectively defined the conflict as an internal affair,leaving GoSL to maintain the lead in managing thecrisis.
The Government
One immediate result of this clash with the UN wasthe appointment of a civil servant as a ‘Focal Point’,to serve as interlocutor on matters pertaining torelief for the LTTE-controlled north. Hopes wereraised that this would herald a much-neededimprovement in communication and interactionbetween GoSL and the international humanitarianagencies in particular. Although over the followingmonths, agencies met individually and collectivelywith the ‘Focal Point’, it eventually transpired that
15
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
15
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lankathe role carried with it no effective authority. It wassimply to try and ‘facilitate’ solutions to the manypractical problems that the agencies experienced,with no return flow of information on the GoSL’splans and activities, let alone any joint planning.
In April 1996, when the whole Jaffna peninsula hadcome under army control, the GoSL revived theResettlement and Reconstruction Authority for theNorth (RRAN), the successor of an interministerialPresidential Task Force North that had first beencreated in January 1995, at the time of peace talksand when a national reconstruction programme wasbeing prepared. As with its predecessor, it was notclear who participated in RRAN, what its preciserole and procedures were and on the basis of whatinformation it made decisions. Remarkably theinternational agencies were informed that theauthority of the Ministry of Reconstruction andRehabilitation over the north was withdrawn, andrestricted to the war-affected areas of the centreand east. Confusingly, a second Focal Point wasnow appointed, to serve as the interlocutor for theareas of the north newly brought under governmentcontrol. Once again, what real authority this postentailed was unclear, and the appointment did notopen a channel for effective dialogue andcommunication, let alone coordination, betweeninternational agencies and the GoSL.
The absence of effective communication andcoordination with central government, was incontrast to the situation on the ground, at least inthe northern districts where GAs and line ministrystaff faced the problems generated by sudden andlarge-scale displacement compounded by drought.Close cooperation ensued between the humanitarianagencies within the framework of district reliefcommittees. In December 1995 it appeared that theGA in Vavuniya, in whose district lay the ‘crossline’land route into the Vanni, would become that area’scoordinator.
Combining this role as logistical hub with one ofinformation centre proved difficult in practice.Notwithstanding support from the internationalagencies, the lack of skill and discipline in the flowof information between the many players inColombo, and the GA and agency offices in theVanni, led to often incomplete, confused orunverified information, making coordinationimpossible.
That there was no effective coordination withgovernment was due to the fact that military andpolitical objectives were allowed to override
humanitarian concerns, though not to the point ofcreating a mass emergency, which would havegenerated more international pressure. The MoDassumed overriding authority over any matterspertaining to the war zone. Staff of the MoD andthe Joint Operational Command did not attendinteragency meetings or meetings with the FocalPoints and were, like the office of the Secretary ofDefense, barely contactable. There were thus nopossibilities for information exchange andconfidence-building.
The NGO Consortium on Relief andRehabilitationDuring the first 18 months of war, for external andinternal reasons, the NGO Consortium did not offeran effective mechanism for coordination. A majorexternal reason was the climate of intimidation andsuspicion that quickly arose. Noone remainedunaffected by the renewed outbreak of war andinevitably the unease between most Sinhalese andTamils, heightened including amongst thoseinvolved in relief work. A vicious press campaignin November 1995 alleged that humanitarianagencies were intentionally or unintentionallysupporting LTTE. At one point a crowd mobilisedby local radio against an NGO meeting, turnedaggressive. Church-affiliated organisationsproviding relief were intimidated when two priestswere arrested and accused of smuggling banneditems to the north. The smear campaign effectivelyintimidated agencies who then became secretive.The fact that some statements made at a consortiummeeting were leaked to and distorted in the press,raised great concerns over their confidentiality. Inany case, Government officials stopped attendingconsortium meetings.
Internally, the consortium had not built up atradition of proactive coordination. This would notmaterialise overnight, so a review process was setin motion which coincided with the first year and ahalf of the war.
Objectives To enhance the quality, effectiveness,professionalism and transparency of the work ofits members became the aim of the new consortium.It formulated three objectives:
• to render services of interest to its members;
• to provide a forum for different stakeholders inthe humanitarian response to meet andencourage its members to develop a commonposition and take collective initiatives;
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
16
• to promote and facilitate joint strategicinitiatives, proactive coordination, collectivelearning and skill development.
Clearly the most demanding, but also the mostimportant objective, was the last.
Importantly the geographical scope of theconsortium was confirmed as island-wide.Previously its members had been focused on thenorth, making it vulnerable to accusations ofpartiality and revealing an inadequate analysis ofthe different conflicts in Sri Lanka.
Another new proposal was for the consortium toprovide a forum to explore the roles, opportunitiesand constraints of those agencies working in butalso on the conflict. Previous discussions tendedto be dominated by the technical and logisticalaspects of relief. Little focused attention had beendevoted to local capacities, livelihoods of thepsycho-social or gender dimensions of conflict.There appeared little awareness of local-levelintercommunal dialogue and reconciliation efforts,or of the availability of documentation by SriLankan analysts on the causes and the politics ofthe conflict. Better knowledge of these two issueswould have helped agencies position themselvesmore effectively to argue their role and place in theface of public doubts and criticisms.
The Review Process of the NGO Consortium
A review took place in a consultative and accountable manner and took a strategic planningapproach. The effectiveness of the consortium had been questioned by members in early1995. The Advisory Committee then organised some exploratory reflections that highlightedthe major issues and sensitivities. On 7 May a Review Committee was created, whose terms ofreference were approved by consortium members. The members, four Sri Lankans and threeforeigners, were selected on the basis of commitment and experience. They analysed thesituation in Sri Lanka and in the NGO sector and the relationships of NGOs with other players.Then a vision for Sri Lanka and for the NGO sector was articulated. This was followed by astatement of aims, objectives and potential activities, and was accompanied by recommendedpriorities. Questions of capacity and funding were framed by stated objectives. Finally, astructure of governance was proposed, with an elected Steering Committee that would offerfirmer guidance while maintaining transparency and accountability.²
The first draft proposal was ready in September 1995, with a second following in January1996 (Review Committee 1996). The war slowed the process considerably and questions offunding and membership could only be returned to in mid-1996. By July 1996 the ReviewCommittee had substantially taken over the role of the Advisory Committee. After a workplanfor the creation of a new consortium had been detailed, and an Interim Committee created ofindividuals from agencies with demonstrated interest, the old consortium was disbanded. Thenew Consortium on Humanitarian Aid effectively started work in the autumn of 1996.
Membership The review raised important questionsabout membership. The previous policy of open andinclusive membership had yielded little effectiveaction. Therefore a clearer type of membershiporganisation was proposed, with Articles ofAssociation, formal membership applications to bescreened, stated rights and obligations for membersand the possibility of revoking membership fromindividuals who showed no active commitment. Asmaller membership would have to be balancedagainst greater quality and effectiveness.Interestingly, some church-affiliated organisationswere uneasy about becoming full members of aformal NGO consortium. New, more controllingNGO legislation remained a threat, and they feltthey might better maintain a separate identity: ‘weare with you but not of you’. The question was alsoraised whether pure human rights organisationscould be full members? Both the GoSL and LTTEhave been very sensitive over statements anddenunciations by human rights organisations. Thehuman rights organisations in Sri Lanka, however,do not form a cohesive group with an agreed codeof conduct. This makes operational agencies witha field presence wary about backlash against them,particularly if the information about violationswould appear to have come from them. Althoughit was felt that relationships of trust and cooperationhad to be developed with human rights
17
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
17
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lankaorganisations, it was decided that only operationalagencies should become members of theconsortium.
Capacity To be effective the consortium needed asmall secretariat. To fund it, and avoid anycontinuation of a largely passive membership, theprinciple of a membership contribution had to behonoured. It was proposed to raise the tokenmembership fee. Reference criteria for a new feecould be the level of the annual salary of anunskilled worker in an NGO office, or 1 per cent ofan agency’s annual budget, which seemed areasonable price for information and coordinationbenefits. For those with the willingness but not theability to pay, contributions in kind could beconsidered.
NGO coordination at district level
In several districts of the north and east, NGOs hadtheir own regular gatherings. Apart from the fieldoffice representatives of larger international ornational agencies, they were mostly made up oflocal CBOs or intermediary NGOs. Their meetingstended to be rather formalistic, and limited mostlyto information exchange, not unlike that of the NGOConsortium in Colombo prior to the review. TheJaffna grouping had been most comprehensive inits agenda, but the occasional high-handedness ofthe TRO had caused bad feeling. In Trincomalee,some reflection had started on the role andfunctioning of a coordinating body. At least until1996 the communication between district-NGOconsortia and the NGO Consortium in Colombodepended entirely on the field staff of largerorganisations. This in the medium term seemed aninadequate mechanism. The reflections andagreements in the capital did not always find theirway to the field, while not all concerns raised atfield level — especially in places other than Jaffnaand the Vanni — were followed up in Colombo.Ideally a direct communication and collaborativeeffort could be developed between coordinatingbodies in the capital and in the district. This wouldrequire preliminary investment in a similarcollective reflection at district level, and probablysome support for institution building, asinternational agencies had provided for district-level NGO coordinating bodies in the south.However, this could not be done in the middle ofan emergency.
Some rather effective collaboration in the field didoccur though, certainly in the north. The districtrelief committees chaired by the GA provided a
framework for continued assessment andprogramme planning, UNHCR and the ICRC thenparticipated in these. The GoSL’s restriction on thenumber of international agencies also helped, aswell as, ironically, the restrictions on access andrelief goods. The exchange and pooling of materialand technical resources is more spontaneous whensuch goods are scarce.
The Interagency Emergency Group
With the intensification of the war in the autumnof 1995, eight larger operational NGOs began tohave their own regular meetings. This coalitionderived spontaneously from the commonexperience of bureaucratic obstacles, and from therealisation, after the clash between the GoSL andthe UN, that as international agencies they had asomewhat different ‘political’ position than SriLankan agencies. Sri Lankan agencies had also beenreluctant to join in collective advocacy andrepresentations to the GoSL, or to sign evencarefully worded press releases. The NGOConsortium was not at the time an effective forum.Very quickly UNHCR, the ICRC and the othermajor relief providers joined in. Later UNICEF andWFP occasionally attended meetings. UNHCR andthe ICRC because of their specific internationallegal status at times followed a different protocolin raising issues with the GoSL, so writtencommunications from the group would only besigned by the NGOs. Even so, the forum ensured acommon understanding and continued commonobjectives.
In the spring of 1996 questions arose over theparticipation of donor representatives. It was feltthat humanitarian concerns should remain clearlydistinguished from a broader foreign policy agendaof donors and the GoSL, so preference was givento the Interagency Group making specialrepresentations to the donor community. There werealso questions raised about the participation ofadvisers on humanitarian affairs of which therewere two: one working for the CanadianInternational Development Agency, and oneworking for the UN. While the adviser working forthe donor agency adopted very much an observer’srole and kept most interventions to advice, the UNadviser was sometimes made to act as spokespersonby the head of UNDP.
Given that UNDP had no operational activities inthe conflict-affected areas, and that the GoSL hadshown clear irritation over too firm an advocacyabout humanitarian concerns by UNDP, several
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
18
The purposes of the InteragencyEmergency Group
The objectives of the Interagency EmergencyGroup were to monitor the condition of thedisplaced and the host population and tocommunicate a comprehensive andanalytical picture of the situation to the GoSLand the diplomatic community; to providea forum to initiate coherent lobbying andadvocacy initiatives; and to discuss themeaning and nature of the humanitarianmandate in order to collectively maintainan impartial position in a highly politicisedsituation.
operational agencies felt that the head’s agenda,priorities and approach had become excessivelycautious. These structural tensions betweendiplomatic representation of the UN and acting ashumanitarian coordinator, caused significant uneasefor all concerned.
Effective coordination?
The coordination of humanitarian action
The major challenges for operational coordinationwere in the areas of needs and capacity assessment,resource allocation, standardisation of proceduresand guidelines and coordinated planning andimplementation. Throughout the war, the mostserious attempt at coordination was undertaken bythe Interagency Emergency Group.
Assessment Although the GAs regularly producedsituation reports by district, these were not normallyaccessible to international agencies. Some of theircontents was shared at district-level meetings, butby and large the picture built up in the InteragencyGroup was derived from the reporting of themember agencies. Importantly one or two NGOsalso conducted semi-structured interviews withIDPs and host families, to gain insight about theirperceived needs.
The Interagency Group fairly quickly appointed anInformation Officer. The original idea was that thepostholder would monitor political and militarydevelopments, population movements, foodsecurity, public health and logistics and identify keyissues and trends. Such an overview could then beused for joint operational or advocacy initiatives.In retrospect the attempt to process the various datawith a computerised database did not seem to havebeen appropriate. To facilitate input, information
was sought from member agencies in a standardformat, for which special forms were designed.Agency field staff however saw these as an extraburden and were unwilling to fill them in. Moreimportantly, the database approach focusedattention on easily quantifiable activities. Thusmuch effort was spent tracking the supply ofemergency household items, whereas the greatestvulnerabilities lay in the areas of food security,water and health. There were various sources ofinformation on these sectors, some quantified andothers not, that were not properly collated.
Food security was a politically sensitive issue,especially after the GoSL took offence over hastyand unsubstantiated reports of food shortages andinternational press statements that food was beingused as a ‘weapon of war’. As the GoSL had takenformal responsibility for rations, the humanitarianagencies accordingly avoided involvement in foodtransfers.
Although initial nutritional surveys did not showsigns of significant malnutrition, grave concernpersisted over food security. For practical andpolitical reasons independent monitoring of theration supply line was impossible. Informationabout local food production and market prices wasavailable but, without an adequate food securitymodel, no use was made of this data. WFP and FAO,concerned about the impact of the drought, werenot allowed access to the north. It was eventually ahousehold food security survey by ICRC thatrevealed that mothers and the elderly werebecoming malnourished due to sacrificing their ownfood to give their children, and that food insecuritywas greater in parts of the east than in the north.
In the sector of water and sanitation, only oneagency involved developed a dossier, monitoringwater levels in wells, keeping an inventory offacilities and activities and arguing the need for afirmer intervention. As similar information was notcollated by the other agencies involved, a detailedpicture was only available for one area of operation.
The district health committees, in which localMinistry of Health and agency staff participated,allowed the monitoring of health needs and theresponse capacity of the health services in the north.However, no effective information exchange orcoordination occured centrally in Colombo.Logically, the Ministry of Health should have beenthe appropriate authority, but throughout the firstyear of war, it failed to call any of the quarterlymeetings that it had initiated in the spring of 1994.Moreover, the de facto decisions over health
19
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
19
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lankasupplies were taken by a Medical Committee inthe MoD. This was closed and inaccessible tohumanitarian agencies, and the rationale for itsdecisions was never reported.
On the whole an adequate interagency monitoringand information system proved difficult and slowto develop. Through the verbal reports at the weeklymeetings, however, a reasonable and fairlycomprehensive picture could be maintained, albeitnot always substantiated with hard data. Thiscontributed to the overall situation reports of theUN Adviser on Humanitarian Affairs. In thispolitically very charged context, a UN report stillcarried more clout than one produced by NGOs,whom the GoSL continued to keep at arms length.
The biggest omission was the assessment ofcapacity. Fortunately, the TRO and the skeletongovernment administration in the north showedremarkable organisational talent, while the IDPsand host population in general had more assets thanwas at first feared. After two years of war anddisplacement, those original assets had been largelydepleted.
Resource allocation In geographical terms, theagencies, followed the moving populationconcentrations, both pushed by the war in the north.The most glaring strategic weakness of the wholecoordination effort, however, was the neglect of theeast. Politically crucial, militarily more fuzzy andinsecure, and logistically more demanding, therewere pockets of much greater need, and moreinfringement and violation of people’s rights, thanin the north.
As far as sectoral allocation is concerned, theimbalances in the type of material assistanceprovided cannot be blamed on the agencies, butresult from the restrictive policies of GoSL andMoD. Most agencies were unwilling to get involvedin food ration provision, which GoSL had officiallytaken on as its responsibility. They were keen onstimulating local food production, but found theirefforts hampered by restrictions on fertiliser, seedand cement for the repair of irrigation canals.Support in the sectors of health, water and shelterwas inadequate due to the restrictions imposed. Asa result more effort went into the supply ofemergency household items than would normallyhave been the case. A major demand of the IDPswas for income opportunities, for which there waslimited expertise available among the agencies.Some local initiatives were funded to provide much-needed psycho-social counselling.
In light of the operational limitations experienced,and of the significant local capacity, hindsightshows that more attention could have been paid tocapacity building, especially for CBOs,intermediary NGOs and associations of IDPs,however difficult in a context of continuingdisplacement.
Standardisation of guidelines and procedures Inthe absence of effective task force work, littlesystematic attention was paid to standardisation.UNHCR and its implementing partners streamlinedprocedures for the submission of proposals forquick-impact projects. Agencies distributinghousehold items agreed on a package andprocedures. But different agencies continued to usedifferent methodologies in nutritional surveys, ordifferent policies for the applications to revolvingloan funds that had been set up prior to the latestescalation of war.
Joint planning and implementation Few involvedin relief and rehabilitation expected the entire Jaffnapopulation to flee. A quick response to such a large-scale crisis was seen as a higher priority than aplanned response. Although there was some rapidconsultation on who was planning to do what,agencies made their own decisions on what suppliesto purchase. Some engaged in advance ‘flagplanting’, and then could not deliver.
Proactive interagency planning mostly revolvedaround providing shelter. In line with MoDstipulations some agencies had imported whiteplastic sheeting that could not be used forcamouflage. The agencies were very aware of GoSLconcern that too much assistance would consolidatethe displacement of the Jaffna population, whoGoSL were anxious to see return. Coordination didtake place around methodologies of targeting anddistribution that would leave IDPs themselves withmaximum choice where they would reside. Theseplans were disturbed by arbitrary restrictions onthe transport of plastic sheeting to the Vanni.Detailed joint operational planning in the face ofunpredictable restrictions on importing ortransporting relief items ceased being useful orrealistic. Because of constraints and shortages, therewas much pragmatic exchange and pooling ofresources once these had been taken across the lines.
As far as the 1996 GoSL request for the funding ofrelief and rehabilitation in Jaffna is concerned, thiswas shared with the UN and donors but not withNGOs, who were also excluded from the informaldiscussions that the donors and UN held aboutthem.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
20
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
kaThe coordination of humanitariandiplomacyThe Interagency Group as a whole, or at least theNGO part of it, made a number of collectiveapproaches to GoSL, LTTE and donorrepresentatives. Initially these tended to focus onaccess for the humanitarian agencies (with GoSL)and on their independence (with LTTE), butincreasingly the emphasis turned to the needs ofthe civilians. Several memorandums or short reportswere produced on topics like: the unmet needs inhealth, the impact of fertiliser on agriculturalproduction and the impact of drought anddisplacement on access to safe drinking-water.
The NGOs were individually and collectivelyunprepared to argue for humanitarian principles andhumanitarian space. There was no clear concept ofwhat was considered basic rights of civilians in awar situation. They did not master internationalhumanitarian and human rights conventions, andwere generally unaware of which ones the GoSLhad signed. They even failed to take the GoSL’sexisting policies of entitlement for the poor, thedrought-affected or IDPs and GoSL guidelines onresettlement as reference. They were unaware, untilmuch later, of the Red Cross and NGO Code ofConduct in disasters, on which they might havebased an argument for their own role andhumanitarian principles.
Nevertheless, the Interagency Group did provide aforum for collective reflection on the ways in whichhumanitarian efforts could be co-opted by partiesto the conflict, and then entangled with politicaland military strategies. This contributed to a moreinsightful and careful collective positioning, andprevented a situation in which agencies could beplayed off against each other.
A painful test in this regard occurred in December1995, when it was accidentally discovered that aBritish medical relief agency planned to carry outan ‘assessment’ at Elephant Pass, a military campat the Jaffna lagoon, then still fully inside LTTE-controlled territory and only accessible by militaryplane. The agency was new to Sri Lanka and onlyhad a small project in the government-controlledeast. It had informed the other agencies about itshope to start a medical programme in the Vanni,but not about the Elephant Pass. It did notparticipate in the NGO Consortium meetings. Theplanned assessment raised grave concerns, not inthe least among the agency’s staff. Not only hadLTTE shot down some military planes, but it wasalso felt that the agency, through such closeassociation with the military, might expose itselfto LTTE retaliation if it intended to start work inthe Vanni. It was also known that only one civilianresided at Elephant Pass, which rather compromisedthe ‘humanitarian’ character of the assessment.Finally, the existing agencies at the time feltreluctant to move too hastily into areas in the norththat had returned to government control, as theseheld few civilians and were under tight militaryadministration.
The overwhelming need remained in LTTE-controlled areas, access to which was severelyrestricted. One agency moving on its own into thearmy-controlled area might open the door topressure on the others to follow suit and to shifttheir attention away from the civilians in LTTE-controlled areas. It was hard to see in the plannedassessment more than a publicity and fundraisingexercise. In the end, the assessment did not takeplace but whether that was due to the pressureexercised by the other agencies remains uncertain.The episode underlined again the aggressivecompetitiveness of some NGOs.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
21
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
Structural Constraints
Resistance to coordination
The history of the NGO Consortiumhighlights some of the usual agencyobjections to coordination. Agencies claim
they have different mandates. Different agenciesmay indeed focus on different target groups, forexample, refugees, prisoners, children or thedisabled, or on a specific sector such as health, foodor logistics. But it is obvious that neither populationcategories nor sectoral assistance can be looked atin isolation from each other. The work of differentspecialised agencies is inherently complementarywhich supports the case for coordination. Moreover,all share a similar underlying humanitarianmandate: to save lives and to reduce suffering, andwhere possible to protect and restore livelihoodsand local capacity. Another objection is thatagencies have different operating principles. Thatappears the case for the ICRC which therefore mayadopt a separate approach (Doppler 1996). Otheragencies, that may want to combine materialassistance with protection and/or with conflictmediation roles, have generally not thought throughthe implications for operational conduct. What isneeded here are divisions of labour and learningfrom each other, again an argument for and notagainst collaboration.
It should be admitted that the real reason whyagencies find it so difficult to coordinate is that theywant to maintain their independence and individual
Structural and ContextualConstraints on Coordination
profile. Collaboration and coordination have a cost,but so does competition, and when done effectivelyit can render the combined efforts of agenciesconsiderably more cost-effective — although thismay not show in their individual accounts.Coordination in practice may fail due to substantivereasons, but most often it breaks down because ofpoor leadership. But resisting it a priori, on thegrounds of agency independence, negates the bestinterests of the target groups (and of the taxpayer)which, in turn, contravenes the agency’s proclaimedhumanitarian ethos and principles.
Seeking to collaborate and coordinate is notgenerally an explicit agency policy. It should bemade so and written into the job description of everycountry-level representative. In many casesappropriate decision-making should be delegated,but the decision whether to try and collaborate andcoordinate should not be left to the discretion ofcountry representatives, as is current practice, oftenat the mercy of personal likes and dislikes.
Knowing about coordination
Knowing how to foster coordination is not aprofessional skill that is commonly required of aidworkers, nor is the experience and model ofcoordination part of organisational memory andprofessional training. Rather, making coordinationhappen is entirely dependent on the motivation andskills of individuals. These skills include diplomacy,consultation, trust, chairing effective meetings,maintaining a sense of direction with a continuously
4
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
22
relevant agenda and developing and articulating ashared vision. Specific training in coordination isstrongly recommended.
Technical and methodological knowledge
Effective sectoral and thematic collaboration andcoordination requires at least some participants tohave an adequate technical and methodologicalknowledge regarding perhaps revolving loan funds,gender analysis, participatory appraisal methods,nutritional surveys, logistics planning or foodsecurity models. Coordinated approaches aredifficult to formulate where there is insufficienttechnical expertise. Where such knowledge isavailable, task forces become not only a forum forstandardisation and coordination but also areceptacle for collective learning.
Situational coalitions and formalassociations
The Interagency Group, like the NGO Consortiumat its inception in 1987, was an informal coalitionof agencies that started meeting on a self-selectedbasis and in response to a specific situation. Therewas no formal distinction between members andobservers. Individuals who were included by theparticipants in their meetings depended partly onthe structural position of an agency in the politicsof the conflict, and partly on more subjectiveperceptions of trustworthiness, common interestand commitment. It had no formal structure andpractical problems of funding and human resourceswere simply addressed as they arose.
Coalitions depend on a continuing sense of sharedimmediate interest. They therefore may, and indeedshould, break up as members identify more usefulcontextual alliances elsewhere. Another problemis that maintaining coalitions is a very time-consuming activity. Trust, interest and commitmenthave to be reaffirmed at each and every meetingand with every change of agency head. All thiscan quickly become another full-time task inaddition to someone’s workload at a particularagency. Lack of time and leadership, and sometimesof technical expertise, meant that the InteragencyGroup did not develop other effective task forcesbeyond the one on logistics.
Formal associations have a longer term perspectiveand assume a more institutionalised commitment.When equipped with capacity of their own, thestress on individuals is less. Peer group dynamicsplay a smaller role than in coalitions, and the head
does not have to remain essentially a facilitator butcan act more authoritatively when needed. Lesssituationally dependent, it can bring a broader scopeto the agenda for its meetings. Within theirframework formal associations can accommodatecoalitions in issue-specific task forces. As thehistory of the NGO Consortium also demonstrates,formal associations can also suffer from poorleadership. They do not collapse as quickly ascoalitions but their meetings become sterile, theagenda irrelevant and the discussions boring.
Both coalitions and formal associations need toaddress the problem of size and quality ofmembership. The more inclusive they are, thegreater the risk that they end up with the lowestcommon denominator, wasting time listening to theviews of otherwise uninterested members or withimportant decisions blocked by a majority ofconservative voters more concerned with their owninterests than those of the people their agency isthere to serve.
Contextual Constraints
Timing
Had Eelam War 3 not broken out, or had it done somuch later, then the new vision for collaborationand coordination articulated by the ReviewCommittee of the NGO Consortium would alreadyhave taken root more vigorously and possibly beeninvolved in less stressful and controversialrehabilitation programmes. The lesson here is thatthe substance and format of coordination are betteridentified before an emergency and not in the centreof it.
Politics
A remarkable feature of this case is the creation ofa restricted Interagency Group parallel to an NGOConsortium and practising many of the principlesthat the Review Committee of the NGO Consortiumwould recommend. On the one hand this was relatedto the pragmatic need of the large operationalagencies to focus collectively on their own concernsand priorities. But the consolidation into a smallergroup of international organisations also reflectedthe tremendously politically charged atmospherearound humanitarian assistance which had put aparticular spotlight on the internationalhumanitarian agencies and had silenced many SriLankan organisations. In the light of the changedpolitical situation with peace proposals and a newphase of war, every agency — national and
23
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
23
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lankainternational — had to review its analysis of thesituation and its role and position in relation to it.The operational constraints imposed by GoSL andMoD meant that operational coordination occuredmostly at district level and that the InteragencyGroup remained focused on the questions ofimpartiality and humanitarian space. Opening itselfto new members was certainly conceivable but notwithout first a mature dialogue about how anynewcomer saw its role and position in the overallpolitics of the conflict.
No coordination without authority
The single most important impediment to effectivehumanitarian coordination was the fact that theGoSL, and more particularly the military, retained
the final authority, but did not participate in theagency efforts, keeping the agencies outside theirown intra-governmental coordination mechanisms.This effectively separated the provision ofhumanitarian assistance by the GoSL from that ofother players. The latter then could assess, agreeand plan among themselves, but in the face ofunarticulated policies or arbitrary decisions, theycould never be sure of being able to implement theirpolicies.
The shape that coordination efforts take, and theirfocus and effectiveness are not, as this case studyshows, only influenced by the motivations and skillsof the agencies and their representatives, but alsoby the political environment in which humanitarianaction takes place.
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
24
0 kms 50 100 150
0 miles 25 50 75 100
main roadsmain railways
main airports
Gulf of Mannar
INDIAN OCEAN
Kankesanturai
Jaffna Elephant Pass
Kilinochi
Talimannar
Mannar
Mankulam
Mullaittivu
NORTHERN
Vavuniya
Trincomalee
Welikanda Valaichchenai
Batticaloa
Amparai
Maha-Oya
EASTERN
BibileBadulla
NuwaraEliya
COLOMBO
Galle
Matara
Hambantota
Ratnapura
Ambalangoda
WESTERN
SOUTHERN
UVA
CENTRAL
NawalapitiyaKatunayake
Negombo
Chilaw
NORTHWESTERN
Kurunegala
Dambulla
Habarane PolonnaruwaPuttalam
RambewaAnuradhapura
NORTH CENTRALMihintale
provinceboundaries
Pottuvil
Beruwala
Maps of Sri Lanka
25
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
25
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
Gulf of Mannar
Mihintale
Kankesanturai
JaffnaElephant Pass
Mullaittivu
NORTHERN
Talimannar
Mannar
RambewaAnuradhapura
NORTH
Vavuniya
Mankulam
Kilinochi
Displacement
FRONTLINE
Trincomalee
Map showing the front line and principal displacement effects of the conflicts in Sri Lanka.
THE
CO
ORD
INA
TIO
N O
F H
UM
AN
ITA
RIA
N A
CTI
ON
: th
e ca
se o
f Sri
Lan
ka○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
26
Endnotes1. Whereas sometimes figures are exaggerated to attract more international assistance, here it appearsthey were reduced to prevent greater international involvement that could have been exploited by LTTEor otherwise interfered with the war effort of the GoSL. The question of numbers of newly displaced wasnot of central operational importance at first. Although the total supply of relief goods remained small,the fact that many new IDPs had assets and were supported by the resident population, meant that thosein welfare centres were targeted. They constituted at most 15 per cent and could easily be identified.Over time, however, the resident population saw its capacity to support IDPs decline, or become itselfaffected by drought and displacement. The situation of IDPs from earlier phases of war, who had beenreceiving support from humanitarian agencies, deteriorated as attention and resources shifted to themore recent IDPs. The categories of people in need, and the scale of the problem, did not thereforeremain constant.
2. Inspiration was drawn from the experience of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief(Pakistan) with whom one of the Review Committee members had been involved. This in turn, like theCooperation Committee for Cambodia, had been partially inspired, again through experiences ofindividuals, by the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand, founded in1975.
AcronymnsCBO Community based organisation
CGES Commissioner General for Essential Services
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs
ERRP Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation Programme
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally displaced person
INGO International non-governmental organisation
IPKF Indian Peace-Keeping Force
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
GA Government Agent
GoSL Government of Sri Lanka
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MoD Ministry of Defence
NGO Non-governmental organisation
PA People’s Alliance
RRAN Resettlement and Reconstruction Authority for the North
TRO Tamil Relief/Rehabilitation Organisation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNP United National Party
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
27
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
27
THE C
OO
RDIN
ATIO
N O
F HU
MA
NITA
RIAN
AC
TION
: the case of Sri Lanka
ReferencesBennet, J. (1994a) NGO Coordination at Field Level. A handbook. INTRAC, Oxford.
Bennet, J. (1994b) Meeting Needs. NGO Coordination in Practice. Earthscan, London.
Borton, J. (1996) An Account of Coordination Mechanisms for Humanitarian Assistance during theInternational Response to the 1994 Crisis in Rwanda. Sophia University, Institute of Comparative Culture,Tokyo.
Dedring, J. (1996) Humanitarian Coordination. In J. Whitman and D. Pocock, D. (eds.) After Rwanda.The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Macmillan, London: 35–50.
Donini, A. (1996) The Policies of Mercy. UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda.Brown University, T. Watson Inst. for International Studies, Providence.
Donini, A., E. Dudley and R. Ockwell (1996) Afghanistan. Coordination in a Failed State. DHA, LessonsLearned Unit, New York.
Doppler, B. (1996) The ICRC in Complex Emergencies. An Outsider or Part of a Team? In J. Whitmanand D. Pocock (eds.) After Rwanda. The Cooordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance.Macmillan, London:124–35.
Government of Sri Lanka (1990) Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth. Colombo
Karim, A. et al. (1996) Operation Lifeline Sudan. A Review. Birmingham, Univ. of Birmingham
Lanzer, T. (1996) The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola. A Model for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Assistance? Queen Elizabeth House, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford.
Minear, L. et al. (1992) United Nations Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to theGulf Crisis 1990–1992. Brown University, T. Watson Inst. for International Studies, Providence.
Review Committee (1996) Deliberations and Recommendations of the Review Committee of the SriLanka NGO Consortium. Mimeo, Colombo.
Van Brabant, K. (1995) NGO Legislation. The Sri Lanka Case. Refugee Participation Network Newsletter19:12–15.
Van Brabant, K. (1996) Banned, Restricted or Sensitive. Working with the Military in Sri Lanka. Reliefand Rehabilitation Network Newsletter 5:4–6.
Whitman, J. and D. Pocock (eds.) (1996) After Rwanda. The Coordination of United Nations HumanitarianAssistance. Macmillan, London.
RRNBackground
The Relief and Rehabilitation Network was conceived in 1993 and launched in 1994 as a mechanism forprofessional information exchange in the expanding field of humanitarian aid. The need for such a mechanismwas identified in the course of research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the changingrole of NGOs in relief and rehabilitation operations, and was developed in consultation with other Networksoperated within ODI. Since April 1994, the RRN has produced publications in three different formats, inFrench and English: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and Newsletters. The RRN is now in its secondthree-year phase (1996-1999), supported by four new donors – DANIDA, ECHO, the Department of ForeignAffairs, Ireland and the Department for International Development, UK. Over the three year phase, the RRNwill seek to expand its reach and relevance amongst humanitarian agency personnel and to further promotegood practice.
Objective
To improve aid policy and practice as it is applied in complex political emergencies.
Purpose
To contribute to individual and institutional learning by encouraging the exchange and dissemination ofinformation relevant to the professional development of those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.
Activities
To commission, publish and disseminate analysis and reflection on issues of good practice in policy andprogramming in humanitarian operations, primarily in the form of written publications, in both French andEnglish.
Target audience
Individuals and organisations actively engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance at national andinternational, field-based and head office level in the ‘North’ and ‘South’.
The Relief and Rehabilitation Network is supported by:
Ministry of Foreign AffairsDANIDA ECHO
Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Department for InternationalDevelopment
