Navon, David /TITLE The Seemingly Appropriate but ... · David. Navon. University of Haifa....

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DOCUMENT RESUME

'ED 212 989 .- CS 006'501

AUTHOR . Navon, David/TITLE The Seemingly Appropriate but Virtually

Inappropriate:,Notes about Cha4cteristics of Jokes.Technical Report No. 223.. --

INSTITUTION Bolt, Beranek arld Ne*man, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.;Illinois Univ., brbana. ,Center for the Study ofi,

.., Reading.SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington; D.C.PUB DATE Nov 81CONTRACT 400-76-0116.NOTE 39p.

EliRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage,DESCRIPTORS Cognitive Processes; *Concept FormatiOn; Conflict

Resolutions *Congrueffce (Psychology); *Rumor; *Verbalti Stimuli -

IDENTIFIERS *Jokes

ABSTRACTA prevalent theory about the coggitiiie aspect of

humor is that most humorous stimuli are characterized by incongruitythat is first perceived and then resolved. However, the combinationof incongruity and resolution is not sufficient for constituting a'joke--resolution should be inadequate as well. In other words,resolution is brought about by the receiver's disregard of anessential piece ofinformation that Ls not explicitly stated but istypically assumed or inferred add that actually makes the initialinformation unambiguous. Thus), the incongruity only appears to beresolved' because the resolutiOn conflicts with valid reasoning madepreviously. The resoltAtion is seemingly appropriate but virtuallyinappropriate..A joke is understood when thsk, listener realizes notonly the incongruity or its possible resolution, but also the . .

predication of the resolution on overlooked knowledge that seemsessential for proper interpretation: In contrast, with the concept ofajoke, which is a category of stimuli, funniness is a continuum, not .

,a categky. Many factors, none of which is either a necessary or asufficient condition in itself, may contribute to the amount offunniness, independently or interactively. (HOD) .

4

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DOCUMENT RESUME

'.ED 212 989 CS 006'501-

cAUTHOR , Navon, David

"TITLE The Seemingly Appropriate but VirtuallyInappropriate:,Notes about Charkteristics of Jokes.Technical Report No". 223.., '. .

INSTITUTION Bolt, Beranek and Ne*man, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.;Illinois Univ., trbana. /Center for the Study ofReading.

SPONS AGENCY National Inst. -of Education (ED), Washingtoni P.C.PTtB DATE Nov 81 ,

CONTRACT 400-76-0116.NOTE 39p.

EURS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage,DESCRIPTORS Cognitive Processes; *Concept yormatiOn; Conflict

Resolutions *Congrueffce (Psychology); *Humor; *VerbalStimuli -

IDENTIFIERS *Jokes

ABSTRACT \

A prevalent theory about the cognitil'ie aspect ofhumor is that most humorous stimuli are characterized by incongruitythat is first perceived and then resolved. However, the combinationof incongruity and resolution is not sufficient for constituting ajoke--resolution should be inadequate as well. In other words,resolution is brought aboUt by the receiver's disregard of anessential piece of.information Oat is not explicitly stated but intypically assumed or inferred add that actually makes the initialinformation unambiguous. Thus\ the incongruity only appears to beresolved'because the'resolutiOn conflicts with valid reasoning madepreviously. The resoliAtion is seemingly appropriate but virtuallyinappropriate..A joke is understood when thk listener realizes notOnly the incongruity or its possible resolution, but also the . . .,1

predication of the resolution on overlooked knowledge that seemsessential for proper interpretation: In contrast with the concept ofajoke, which is a category of stimuli, funniness is a continuum, not .

,a categky. Many factors, none of which is either a necessary or asufficient condition in itself, may contribute to the amount offunniness, independently or interactively. (HOD)

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EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFOI3dATIONCENTER (ERIC)

'ATMs document has been reproduced asreceived horn the person or VanizatiohOnginat.giri

Minor changes have been made to, improvereproduction quality

Points of view or opinions stated m this dotument do not necessarily represent official NIEposaion Or poky

Technical Repor;t No. .223

THE SEEMINGLY APPROPRIATEBUT VIRTUALLY INAPPROPRIATE:

NOTES ABOUT CHARACTERISTLCS OF JOKES

4

University of Illinoisat Urbana-Champaign

51 Gdrty DriveChampaign, Illinois 61820

.

David. Navon

University of Haifa

November 1981

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Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.50,Moillton Street

CambriAge,' Massachusetts 02238

The research reported herein was supported in part by the National Insti-tute of'Edpcation under Contract No. HEW-NIE-C-400-76-0116. It wascompleted while the author was.on leave at theMiliversity of Illinois.

7

_

EDITORtAL BOARD

Paul Jpse and Jim Mosenthal ,Co-Editors

s . .

Harry Blanchard Asghar Iran -Nejad

Nancy Bryant .1,p1 LaZansky

Larry Colker Ann Myers

Avon Crismore Kathy Starr

Roberta Ferrara Cindy. Steinberg

Anne Hay -rVilliam Tice',der.... .

Paul Idilson i,...v

chael Nivens, Editorial Assistant

di

1

Abstract

.The Seemingly Appropriate

'A prevalent thesory about the cognitive aspect of humor is that most,humorous

stimuli are characteriied by incongruity that is first perceived and then

resolved. It is argued here that the combination of incongruity and reso-

lution is not sufficient for constituting a joke, It is' proposed/here Oat

the resolution shduld be inadequate'as well; in other words, that it is.

brought 'bout by the protagonist's.disregard of an essential piece of infor-,

mtion that is not explicitly stated but is typically assumed or inferred

.:and that actually disambiguates.the situation. Thus, the incongruity only

appears to be resolved bequse the res4 u it. on conflicts with valid reasonin

.

made previously. it is seemingly appropriate but virtually inappropriate:

A joke is understood when the listener realizes not only the incongruity

or its possibte resolution, but also the predicationtof the resoluVon on)

,. .

overlooked knowledge that seems' essential for proper interpretkiton. Inv.

. *contrast with the concept of a :joke, which is a category of stimuli, funniness

...

is regarded as a continuum:

0 -

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The Seemingly Appropriate

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'The Seemingly Appropriate but Virtually Inappropriate:4

Notes about Characteristics orJokes

The first problem for the study of humor is what to syudy first, The

-// questi.on "What is funny,?" has fast ated many generations'of philosophers

and psychologists, but it seems to liave.eluded the numerous attempts to

'answer it, probably because judgment of funniness 1 value -laden and very

much influenced by persopal taste and subjective experience. Answering

such a qtJestion appears abou't as`difficult as answering the question "What

,in a piece of music makes it sound pleasant?" A less intangible goal of.

the psVchology of music is to.try, instdad, to define the distinctive

properties of music in general, or of a certain genre of music.

Accordingly, it may be prudent to focus at present on'the relatively/

modest question of "What is a joke?" A joke may not be funny, and yet in-most .cases we would havemo'problem recognizing it as a joke, just as we

! . , .

do .not fail to identify a melody as, such even ,when it is unpleasant,) ,

Thus, Since for that judgment we cannot totally rely on emotions aroused

brsth stimulus, and since often we cannot fall back on clues from the

socia contexi, ,there mist be something in the joke to tell us that is

a joke, some internal characteristics that distinguish the catigory o

jokes from othy categories of verbal stimuli, such as gtories, fa es,

dialogues, etc. Why' members of this category often elicit laughter is a

di/fferent issue. How they are rated as more or less funny is still another

one. . In this paper I elaborate on the defining features of the stimulus

5I

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I`The Seemingly Appropriate

3

category rather than oh the features.that make its nembers vary in funniness,

or on the triggering mechanism of the specific reactions they evoke.

What'do I mean by the term joke?- A formal description is, of course,,

the e8d, not the starting pOint, but first the objects'to be described must,

be isolated.,.One would naturally like to start from a set of stimuli.) I

accepted by most people as jokes, and then find a rule that defines the set

of _jokes. The problem hire is that the word joke is not very well defined

tin natural language, and people may metimek disagree as to whether someY. t

stimuli' are orJare 'not properly callgd "jokes." To face thiS problem, I

start from a. reSCricted sense of eke catevry.ttlat admits just very short

stories that are deliberately constructed to elicit laughter or a smile;

and that would not be better Grassed as nonsense. I believe that given.

'' 'this rough description plus a feW positive and negative examples, people

would be able-to,sort jokeS fromnonhumorous stories very reliably, and

jokes from other kinds of potentially funny stimuli-like nonsense, puns,

etc. quite reliably.

Should we, then, try to look for general propei-tiirshared by all such

jokes? I believenot.,-The nature of such properties.isthat they are

loose and ttgue enough to be identifiable post hoc:not only in jokes but

also in many-other.stimull or-situations as well. Somewhat ironically, a

notable author'Who tried.to'specify such a common denominator has himself

.proclaimed it as ". . .4bf central' importance not only in humour but in

allJdomains orCreative- activity" (Koestler, p. 32). I found it more

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.useful to look for a set of properties that 'characterizes only jokes,

although not necessarily all of them. In other words, rather thap looking

for universal symptoms, one may try to identify valid symptoms, in the

sense that their occurrenc9 in a given utterance suggests to the listener16

- that it is meant as a joke. Some of those-properties may turnout to be

negessary or to characterize other kinds of humor as

Is Humor Explained by Humor Theories?

lies of humor may Be classified in three major classes: superiorityTh

theories, refief theories, and incongruity, theories (for detailed reviews, .

r see BcAton, 1974; Keith-Spiegel, 1972; McGhee, 1979; .Piddington, 1933/1963).

4

Theories of the first two _classes (e.g.., Freu4, 1928; Hobbes, 1651; Leacock,

1938; Spencer 1860) ascribe the reaction of humor to emotional, social, or

motivational factor. They may be quite pertinent to explaining why jokas

are amusing. Howdver; if indeed a joke can be identified, or at-least

analytically described, 3independently of the psychological state it produces,

then structural aspects of jokes or their processing characteristics.must

be consiared. The third class of theories attempts to isolate such properties.'

TheseOF

theories find in jokes elements of incongruity betwee -a-Concept and at

stimulus (". . . incongruity between a concept and the real objects . ."

Schopenhauer, 1819, cited in Piddington, 1933/1963, p. 171)% between two-juxta-,

posed ements (". . . incongruous parts 'or circumstances, considered as united

in one co lex objec-t. .," Beattie, 1776, cited in Piddington, p. or

l

) .

The Seemingly Appropri \ate

5

between,two-possible interpretations of a stimulus (", . . events . .

.

capable of being interpreted in-Iv/6 entirely different meanings . . .;"

Bergson, 1911, O. 96; ".. ..perceiving of a situation or idea L in two

self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference," Koestler,

1964, p. 35). -Many .ofcthese theories go even further to claim that

in9ongruity is ty icallY revealed suddenly through miolatiop of expectations

(e.g., ". . . sudien transformation of strained'expectation into nothing,"

Kant, 1790, cited in Piddington, 1933/1963,p. 163). Since the concept of

incongruity emerging from tho union of these views is quite vag e, it was%suggested that its sense be restricted,to theperception of 'the c nflict

betweeRthe expected and the actual ending of a joke, a conflict that.

typically draws on the existence of an ambiguity in the text cir the'situation

(e.g., Nerhardt, 1976; Rothbaert, 1976; Shultz, 1976; Suls, 1972), However, .

since ambiguity exists in many nonhurborou's.Nsituations and surprise accqmpanes1

many nonhuMorous events, it has been recognized lately that incongruity

and/or surprise in themselves are not sufficient. A -common formulation is

that most humorous stimuli are characierized by incongruity that is first

perceived and 'then re olved (e.g., Shult4, 1976; Suls, 1972). The` resolution

is ". . . a form of problem solving to fina'a-cognitive rule which makes

the punchline follow rom the main part of the joke and reconciles the

inconigruous parts." (Suls, 1972, p, 82),

Incongruity accompanied,by resolution can presumably be. identified

in many stimuli or situations. The proem is 4.1at there Tay be too many

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1

' The Seemingly Appropriate

incongruities. In other words; not all relived incongruities are considered

sei

jokes. For 4.ample, most mystery st8)-tes lead the reader to construdt an

,

elabofate ructure that later collapses in view of some dis,confirmed expec-.

tati'ons and-is superceded by a new structure that atcpmmodates the inforMa-s,

, I

tion better. Yet a mystery story is clearly not a joke..

Also, 'many jokes are baied on an incongruity between expectations setI,

up by one interpretation of'a linguistic ambiguity in' the punchline) , phichV

follows from another interlirexation. This is a case of resolved incongruity

,par excellence. Can this serve as a blueprint for producing jokes? Consider,

for example, the syn6.ctically ambiguous sentence:'1

(1) "I saw the boy with .the binoculars."

Since people most often interpret an ambiguous utterance in one waywithout

ticing'the ambiguity (Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1968), we could generate

both perception and r'esalutrgm of incongruity by confronting the listener

who selected oneihterpreeation with the alternate one, For example, if

the listener interpreted the binoculars as a modifier of "the boy," we

could adafthe reply:

(2) "Was he that Oar away?"

However,thi does not seem to be humorbus; it_would most likely be judged

as a natural:discourse that contains some grammatical ambigUity; it would

not be more humorous if we did not count on the listener's natural biases,

but rather lead him to interpret the'binoculars as a modifier of "the boy"

in the following way:

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7

(3) "What'did you re?"

"I saw,the girl with the do)l.and the boy with the bi-noculars."

,!'Was he that far away?"'

So, the combination of incongruity and resolution is not sufficient for

constituting a joke. Is there another ingredient that should be added to

the recipe?

A Proposed Model for Jokes 4

I propose that the resolution should be inadequate; in other words;

that it disregards an essential piece of information that actually dis-

ambiguates he situation (at least enough to render the resolution implausible).

Cqnsider, for example, the following,joke:

(4) A housewife asked her daughter to go to the butcher to see

if he had pig's feet. The, daughter returned Jater and said, .

ti

' "I couldn't tell, because the bdtcher had his shoes on."

This joke 'draws on the ambigaity of had. It is nowherekmade explicit that

by sayirig "had".the mother meant "had f6r sale" rather than "had, as part."

However, the word. had is only technically-ambiguous. There are enough clues

in the story to convey to most rational and informed listeners which sense1

was really meant. The incongruity created by the daughter's bizarre explaA

tia`hJdr the failure of her' errand is apparently resolved by rigt g the 4.

ialternate interpretation of the mother's request. But ally the incon-

gruyty.just appears to be//esolved, because tt,rJ)resolution" conflicts with

valid e.tasoning made previously. In other' w6rd§, it is seemingly appropriate

but virtually inappropriate. ,

got

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. The Seemingly Appropriate

8A

The structure of a joke an d'its processing are sketched in Figure 1,

in every joke (aii least of the sort being formalized here4'there issome

ambiguous element; a ward, a sentence, a physical environment; 4a social

sittron, another,persoWl behaviol-, etc.; it.is ambiguous in'the broad

sense of being technically open to more than one interpretation, The

structural components of most jokes are-the setting and the punchline.. -

S. ,

T. thatsetting contains disambiguation cues that strongly indicate one inter-...,

r,

.pretatrop of the ambiguou's element for any perspn with-some assumed state

of knowledge. That interRretkion establishes some range of-expectltions>

about the punchline. However, the disambiguation cIres-do rolt_ preclude

alternative interpretations 'explicitly: the latter are 16St made insensible

'of stored gene'rYrknowledge that must be'consulted.for-the dis-.

ambiguating potential the cues to come into effect. Thus, although the

expectations about the punchline are quite firm,they are conditional

on a khowledge assumed to be shared by the listener, teller, and Rro-..

tagontst, The disconfirmation orexpectation% in the punchline tells the...,. _

ttstener that the prot9gonist does not have that knowledge, or does n ot 1

use it in the same way, or just pretends' so.1

Therefore, the latter has '

.

selected an interpretation that would have been ruled out by that imptitit

knowledge, but which is cdmpletely legitimate when that, knowledge is , -tebsent. ,

or ignored, As will be demonstrated later, the requirement that the'

violation of expectations can be blamed on the absence, disuse, or misuse

of knowledge is probably-crucial..

Insert Figure 1 about here.4

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9 4,

Nowwe are in a posy ion to explain our failure to mt!tutettUre a joke -

drawing on the graMmdtilCal ambiguity in .411. It is possible to bias the

listener toNards,one syntactical intel-pietation as was dope in (3)4 but

thisdoes not makethe other one illegitimate. The two interpretations,

r

are hot equally liikely given what we know bout the Waj, people normally.)e '

construct sentenes,lbut,they are; nonetheless, equally'sensible, Thus,

the humorous impact of the punchline,is not .due to, the surprise.value of

the alter interp'reL,ation jt introduces., but rather to its inadequacy.,

l'f,'after'be g exposed to the alternate interpretation, the listener may

say, ,30h, 1 didn''t think of that, but it is clearly a possibility," he or

she would presumably not consider.wl6t he or she had heard as a,joke, let

.

0 alone find it funny. So, the adequacy of a resolution is not related to its

likelihdod, but rather to its compatibiliti, with all the knowledge we bring toor

.

bea'r5n,the setting: ' ,

4s it not more economical, then,` ust to say ,that we joke at the

: *inapprOpriale1_,1 believe not. True, we often find inapprppriate.behayior

funny; but We do not consider it a yoke.. To constitute a joke, the.

inappropriate must be offered as a seemingly approkiate resolution to a

problem or An apparently legitimate interpretation of a situation or an

utterance, The quite uniqUe and fairly general prbpertyof the resolution

in a joke is that while?' being clearly inadequate, it is still perfectly

,

adequate when predicated on interpreting the situation with one eye closed,S

typically the eye with th2 broader perspective. The,,resolution is ',compatible

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TheSeethingly Appropriate

10

rl. withtiost rules of interpretatiOn, yet is pejected bylsome high-level

consideratioit./

./

Consider, fqr example, the following joke:.

(5) How would you fit femur elephanls'in a VW bug?

Two,in the front seat, and two in the back:

In this joke the sgilitron is apparent-ly legitimate except that-itconflicts.

with our knowledge about reasonable Rroportians. The averlooking,of this'.

. t. .

type of knowledge is often ridiculedin humor. A behavior that mechanically, .

,

foelows ru-l-etbat can be

,

made explicit but violates requirements that are

hard to specify, like reasonable proportions, is a common Tot', in nonvecbqli

humor (see Bergson, 1911). Consider, for example, the clown who cracks a. . ,

a-Inut with a sledge-hammer. ,But note that the disregard of knowledge about

relative size per se is not as important as the flagrant elusion of the,

,?a

. . ,

0assignment implied by the riddle:like,struciure-to solve just that problem.

t

A'cartoon Si-rowing somebody who actually tries to fit foUr elephants. in a

.car would,have a completely different flay.it--.-penaive "solution"

suggested in the punchline is an excellent illustraition that "'resolution.., . .

of a joke does appear appropriate in a, sense, and that that innocuous,

appearance is created by ignoring a mast essential piece of informationt

which, nonetheless, is rfot xplicitly`stated.

Joke Comprehension

t In contrast with the-two-stage model for joke comprehension advocated,

e.g., by Buis (1972) , I propose that understanding ajOke involves three

13.4

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-The Seemingly Appropriate

.elempnts. Ajoke is understood when they listener realizes not only the1,

.

incongruity and its possible-resolution, but also that theyesolution

11-

depends on ignoring' knowledge'essential for proper pretatiOn. 'Thus;,

,to understand the joke, the listener has to locatd the source of incongruity..

ATo do this, he or she, ha..4 to backtrack hi's processing of the setting arid,

search for an imglicit assumption that can be relaxed without conflicting

with explicitly stated information, and whose relaxation suffices for

6

accommodating both the setting and the punchli

)

e within' a new coherent'

structure, The process of comprehension may be regarded, thus, as a chain-

.....

of search, relaxation, and coherence testing applied to rules and assumptions

considered as candidates for being the source of incongruity.

A listener will pot understand a joke if he perceives the-incongruity__. _

but fails either to, find or to re-evaluate that part of the first inter-ez.

-t4 pretatio9 which must be interpreted differently' fn order that the situation

can be,restructured. Sometinies he may understand it not os intended by

the teller, because the:search for sources of incongruity self-terminates.

before-the intended source is found. Any resolution that satisfies the,

'conditions that at-e sufficient for categorizing th8 stimulus as .a joke,

K.--4

funny or not so feny, will probably iking theprocess of understanding to

a hblt,

Tipe.of Knowledge Disregarded

'HOW versatile is the class of jokes described by the proposed model?

To convey to the reader some feeling for its breadth, 1 present a few1,

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exempies crudely classified by the type of knowlgdge which is di regarded

to enable resolution. Some of the. jokes below are not very funny.. This

does not matte,", I believe, as long as'thI ey unequivocally qUalify as

4.

beinging,to the cateiory of jokes. It may even be a virtue, because We. .

1.

.

ingredients that serve to make ajoke very-funny may sometimes camouflage

the underlying` structure that makes a joke of the first place.

Inappropriate Enterpretalion of Verbal Communication

There is a growing recognition in psychology, linguistics, and computer

science that language.cannot be unglerstdod without bringing to bear a vast

amount of kraoirledge,about semantics and pragmatics;_applying only lexical_

knowledge and syntax rules simply will not do in many cases (see Chafe,

'1970; Clark & Clark, 1977, 4h, 2, 3; Rumelhart, 1977; .Schank, 1973; Searle,

1969; Verbrugge, 1977; Woods:1975). Many joke6 capitalize on errors of. .

.

interpretation due to such unsophisticated linguistic reasoning,which/-

appears technical.ly appropriate: .

Disregard of semantic environment, Semantic cues derived from oolltext it--.. _

, ,

may affect the selection of one' of the potsible meanings of an homonym, or

of one of the possible parsings of a sentence, or of one of the possible _

resolutions of ambiguity of reference (see Rumelhart, 1977). Many jokes

'draw on a semantically inappropriate reading of an homonymous or polysemous

Word or worq sequence, For example, consider again joke (4), Detpite the,

polysemy of had, its occurtehce in the first sentence is disambiguatedby

the semantic knowledge that-butchers have pig's feet for sale but have

person's 'feet as body darts,

15

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:Seemingly Appropriate

13

Somejokes are based on a grammatical interpretation, that is semen--

tically mpossible. 'For example, conOdtv'the following home-made Ickes,

4 which utilize a well-known grammati 1 ambiguity:

(6) "See these two old ladigs on the bench; they are eaffing

apples.",.1*

4c,

"Are they? ,But most of,the apples I've seen,arse not

that chatty."

-

The second sentence imples that the'spear has interpreted the first

sentence tomean that persons are apples,14hrch is certainly InapprOpriate.

Finally, consider the follow.pfg j

oe;(7) "t saw the Grand Canyon-Tlying to New York,"

"Did At board the plane at IOC ngetes or San Di.ego7

The 'ambiguity of reference with regard- to e e4ent offlying is resolved0

by our knowjedge that canyons cannot fly, if this information is igpored,

the results will be'humorous. 44:

.Literal understanding of metaphors and idioms. A listener can usually

:

easIlrdetirmine whether an utterancR is used literally, metaphorically,-

or idiomatically- (see Ortony, dhallert, Aeynolds,A4An os-08). Thet g

incongruity in some jokes lsesbecause the protagonist interprets an-F

40,

-it

.idiomatic utterance in a literal way, asAn the following examgle borrowed

"fr9m Bergson (1911) :

(8) "Don,!t get involved.in the stock market; it is a risky' game.

One day Yttlic°4911n, the other 'da you lose."

"So, I'll only buy anc,,sell.on ever=Y- ther day."

i 1

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.4 The Seemingly Appropriate

. 14 ..

,fter, fi

4.One might argue that metaphoric language is in.iiself

iriapp(

roAriate

in a way, becaUse it disregards some properties associated,with the literal-

sense. Indeed, some readers of previous versions of this article used

this argument to contend that inappropriately'resorvedincongruities are

not unique te) jokes, since<they characterize metaphors.as well. My view 'is_

that the premise uncreirlyiq this argument is false. Figurative language

')is as:legitimAe ipd normal in speech and writing as literal:language is,

and there are some indications that both are processed in basically thq,

Same way (see Ortony et al., 1978) Hence, kr9wledge of,how to interpret; ..metaphorical statements or idioms is part of the ccign4ti've armamentarium

of intelligent persson, It is the fallU're to use this knowledge thateTY

i

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s inappropriate, sinde it may be diagnostic of some deficiency in linguistic

skills.

Disregard of pragmatic knowledge. A lot of information that is not

seated in a'text is completed on the basiS of nonlinguistic pragmatic

knowledge 'retrieved from memory. ['Ignoring that .knowledge may produce mis-es

judgment of intentions (jokes 9, 10), of expected emotions '(joke 11), of

perceived social, hierarchy (joke 12), etc.,,

(9) A man eating in a restaurant suddenly jumped up and

&Oa

complained to the waiter,-"Look what I found in my soup:

A sock!'" The waiter' repliZd, "Andy what did you expect

to get fbr your two bucks? &silk scar"

17Vy?

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The Seemingly -Appropriate

15

(10) A man fell into the river and started waving his hands_g

and shouting: "Help! I don't know how to swim, Help!

I don't know >trek° swim." Another man passed by and

. .

said to,him: "Listen, buddy, I don't know how to swim,

either, but I,don't make such a big deal out of it."-

(11) "Sir 1.am,sorry to tell you that your

wife ran away with your chauffeur.".

"Never mind, fellow, I know how to drive."

hik-youlth Oscar-Wilde was podr but had a developed

sense of 1f-respect. He was once interviewed by a

nobleman vilio looked foi a tutor for his son. The

nobleman, was inclined .to hire but asked:

As for meals,,tz. Wide, cid you expect to eat with

the family?"

satI';That," saill Wilde calmly, "just depends op the table

manners pf the .memberi of your famtly."

In each--of these examples, the netting ,provides sufficient contextual

information to suggest a7chema that would make a= particular phrase

unequivocal, but the punchline shows that that phrase is, in fact, ambiguous

if t§at contextual knowledgq is distegarded.

Apecialtype of pragmatic knowledge is embodied in rules for inferring

intentions from meaning.' Grice (1975) ported out that knowledge about

Ikonvintions of verbal communicftion provides a lbt of infoi-mation about the

18


16

intended meaning of a message that is not indicated by semantics and syntax.

For example, the question

//4

(l '3) Could you tell me the time?

is not taken literally/because of Some implicit assumption about the speaker's

intent. The discovery thata perso4p.bas not made this assumption (for

example, if he replies, "I suppose 1,c,ould")-re4truetures the question-in a

way that is techhically legitimate b0.-,r

practically inadequate. Hence, such

a reply would sound humorous.

Consider now where-, when-, orCahy-questions. The amount of information

sought is not specified but rather inferred by the liscener.from his model

of the speaker's intent (Norman,'1973). For example, it was pointed out by

Rumelhart (Note 1) that the appropriate amount of specification of location

information is one level below the smallest geographical unit at which both

the

/place

n question a d the conveesarits are located. cooperative..

,.....1

,in A.

listener sho specify xactly 'that amount pf information by Grice's maxim

of quantit The realization that the protagonist of the following joke. . -

fails to u e this rule, a9d thus does not comply w th tricei,s maxim of

quantity, appears humorous;

, -

(14) The) scene: New YO1-k City; Fifth Avenue at 30th St.

A tourist asks a bby who looks localite:

"Where is is the Empire-State Building ?"

The.boy'answers:

"In America,"

O

(

gt

S

4 The Seemingly Appropriate

17

One more illustration Of the humorous effect oft an interpretation

4compatible with one 'technically legitimate sense but incompatible with

inferred ,intended meaning is presented, below:

(15).A journalist asked Winston Churchill about his opimion-

on-the prediction that in the yea,2000 the women will.11,

rule the world.

Churchill answered: "Stilly'

Grice's maxiM)of quantity prqscribes that had the journalist thought

that women ruled the world ate the time, he should have himself inserted'

the word still before the word rule. Churchill's pretended igorancre of

that maxim is unexpected and funny. The fact that it is pretended and

Ithat it subtly conveys Churchill's opinion about women makes it witty as

well.

Iflappropriate.Interpretation of a Situation

Up to'now l have examined jokes thit draw can an unexpected and

inappropriate interpretation of a verbal message. Other jokes describe

verbal or nonverbal behavior or a solution to a problem that disregards

an esential9aSPeCt of the sitdati'on: The setting leads the listener to +'

expect some sort

)

of behaVior or solution on the basis &f a generally

accepted interpretlation of the situation. Those expectations are never-

theless disconfirmed,in the punchltine because the way in which the pro-

tagonist interprets the situation, Old acc;71Thgly, the manner by which -he

responds to.it,are a "near miss" (Winston, 1973); namely, it is.apriropriate

26

f

The 'Seemingly Appropriate

18

in many regards except for one that,is essential, Consider, for example,or

the insensitivity to proportions exhibited by the solution offered to the__-

question posed in joke146 (5).

-

Another implicit but essential bit of knowledge often ig4Ored

by protagonists of jokes is the appropriateness of behayfor um various

4--conditions, as illustrated in the following examples:

(16) A miser fell off Ole roof of his three-story house.

On his way down he passe the kitchen window where his

wife was fixing dinner, and shouted to her:' "Make it

one persqn less!"

(17) The scene: An operating room, in the middle of open -X.

heart surgery. The surgeon asked a nurse for at

scalpel. The nurse put her hand behind her back and

"said, "Guess which hand."

The miser in joke (16) continues to exhibit behavior no longer funtional C'

even from his point of view. Similarly, the behavior of the nurse in

'joke (17) would look just exuberant in other circumstances. We rightfully

infer that 6o0 the miser and'the hurse have misinterpreted the situations:

Discussion

What inappropq ate Does Not- Mean '

One might wonder: whether inappropriate is not just another name for

incprigruous. It is true that the presentry loose manner in which the term

4Wincongruity is used permits this understanding of it as well. However, to

ti

21

rThe Seemingly Appropriate

19,

be of any use a s ntif* term, Vague as it may be, mustnot be ambiguous.,,

I maintain that in the sense in which 1t is typically used, incongruity is

viewed as "a conflict between whet is expected -arid what actually occurs in

the joke" (Shultz, 1976, p. la) that " . . , disappears . . ...when the

pattern is seen to be meaningful or compatible in a previously overlooked

way" (McGhee, 1979, p. 7) 1 in other words, the incongruous parts are seen0

to be reconciled (see the quotation above from Suls 1972) by the. resolution,

'probably because it has not been generally 'realized that the incongruity

in a joke cannot be solely due to the existence of two interpi-etations, one

of which isNless expected, but rather tb the fact that the least expected

......)interpretation is also insensible. Hence,. incongruity disappears only . on

1

the surface, It actuAflly not reconcile 1 , because the resolution is

inappropriate, While incongruity' -is a psychological-state that occurs in,

many situations, the recognition tflet it results from some inappropriate

interpretation is chaiacteristic only of joW.

Rothba }t and R.ien (1977) sugge00t st that ome jokes are characterized by

an incomplete resolution that ". . intr duces a new eminent of incongruity

that leaves the situation impossible. Rothbart and Pien seem to

regard the re ming incongruity-as an extra spice tha is not essentLel .

-. .

.

for the humbrous impact, This is clearly true if the impassibility of the

situation ,W1 taken as a criterion; for. example, most the jokes in this,

paper depict quite possible, albeit not very plausible, situations.r 7

morel, incompleteness per se oftert characterizes attempts to prod jok

.22

fr

her

7 .


20

that do not quite rna'ke it, but:rather reSulx in some kind of nonsene, for

example, f in'joke (9) the waiter had replied, "Yeah?!I had expected it

to be a hat." As stated earlier, within thp class of funny stimuli, the

unique property of jokes is.that the inappropriateness contained in them

is disguised by a seemigly*appropriate surface appearance. That is, their

resolution roust make perfect sense if'one or/ two assumptions are re) xed.

This seems like a good place to warn against conceivable overgeneYal-y S

i zat of the term inappropriateness as used iri.this context-.. Why is it'

IFthat we do not consider,as humorous.any violation of soiriethin we know

about the world?' For ez<ample, simply tenting about an impossible event,

such as an animal that is talking, clearly cannot constitute the punchline

of a joke. The reason is that even xhough-the expectations of the listenerm /derived from his 4r her world knowledge)are disconfirmed, he or she cannot

ascribe it to:misinterpretetiondue to lack of that knowledge on the part'

of anybody else. The tellerMyst be lying or telling abouVL event in an

imaginary World: Either way, the teller is award of the same knowledge as

the listener is, and the protagonists Seem to obey the laws of the hypothetical

world in which they reside.. If they do not, that Canbeia good subject for

joking, as in the following joke:.

(18NA horse bought a ticket for the. theatre. As he entered

the hall, he svddely burst into laughter.

"What i-sso funny, horse?"

"See who's sitting -in the first row: A donkey!"

1

1'4

r


21

The essential role of the of some misinterpretation is

exemplified by the following story, originally suggested as a counter-

example by akperson who read a previous-version of this article.

(19) Jack put a pencil in his pocket, but becau1se it had,

a hole in it, it fell out. He picked his pocket up '

and.took it to his tailor.

:Here, context combined with world knowledge sugge that the referent

of the last it in the first sentence is the pencil. ''We-are surprised

to find out that despite these considerations, it actually refers to

tKe.pocket. Why is (19) ndt considered a joke? The answer is that we are

not introduced to any protagonist who misinterpret a situation or an

utterance. The teller tells us about an unlikely (albeit not impossible)

event, and we are, invited to take it seriously despite two flagrant vtolat.ions

ofrules of cooperative communicatton tAat lead our expectattous astray.

It might be different iif prota onist misinterpreted a proper communication

as if it were phrased 'in violation of those rules,,as in the follbwing example:

(20) "Bill, perhaps you ca help'me. Yeterday. when 1 left your.

office, 1 put pencil in my pocket, but because it Ilad a

hole in it fell out. Did you happen .to find it?"

uSorny,'I have not found any pocket-"

What Essential Means

Another issue is-whether there 're any constraints on the type of

knowledge that is disregarda'to enable the-resolution, and if there are, N

'NO

The Seemin ly:Appropriate

22

what are they/ It was stated'earlier that-that knowledge should be essential.'

What does essential mean? First, it .means that knowledge is generic rather

than episodi.c (see Tulying: 1972), Second, it is seldom of swel) a loW

.that its absence would preclude any interpretationtwhatsoever,(say, knowledge

2.

of a ruie ofgrammar);. otherwise the resolution would be imppssible: Also,

it is often knowledge that helps to resolve ambiguity ati..a lower level;

hence, it cannot be a very low-level knowledge. Third, it is'often-so taken

for granted thit we usually do not even realize that' we use it; it is the

kind of thing a programmer of a cognitive simulation tends to overlook in

his first program, Finally, tt.is the sort ofi&nowledge that the listener,

would be very ashamed not to have. In other words; lacking3t would make-':

htm:silly rather than just uninformed or 14 rudent: We seldom joke at the

ignorance of the fict that Hebrew is a Semitic language, or at a failure

tcrtake into account the possibility that it might be raining shortly. We#

would more readily joke at, say,'the violation of one of Grice's (1975) maxims

of cooperative communication, as in joke 15).

These properties do not constitute a 'formal definition of the meaning,

of essential because they are vague in themselves. owever, I believe that

the presenqp of such properties 'can be diagnosed q ire reliably. Thusi

although the theory proposed here does not dispel vagueness, it,i'estricts

its locus.

Can we'hope ever to specify an objective meaning of* essntia,1? Note,

that not every.1istener is equally s'ensieltO the same points, Some

listeners lack the knowledge that-makes the resolution ridiculous. Their

25

0

F

to

.


23

high-level knowledge is presumably the lower-level,knowledge of other.

listeners. Apt explains why humorousness is subjective. Ajoke should.

be tuned to the sophistication or cultural biases of the'listcner's system

of representation and processing.411,

The Issue of Sufficiency

Do the ct acteristics outlined here constitute a recipethat-.

is

..e-,.

sufficient for producing stimuli intended ds jokes? These characteristics... r.

will certainly fail the most stringent test of suffiqiency, the generation

of funny 'jokes. That-may be difficult got only because of problems of,

retrieval involved in any creative:lt, but also because of a simple but_

often overlook ,pd fact:' Funniness qualifies to a variple\degree the members

of the category of jokes. .Thus, funninegs in, itself is a continuum, not

a category, Many factors, none of which is either a necessarypor a sufficient

4

condition in itelf, may contribute to the amount of funni-ness, independently

or interactively. Those numerous 'determinants of funniness may be. called

intensifying, factors because they-amplify an embryo of funniness ingrained

in whatever belongs to the category of jokes: .Such factors, were proposed

.

by many discussions of humor. Among them one may think of involvement of. ..

,.. . \emotionally arousing cues, relief of tension, proper timing, high familiarity

kk

with and high relevance of the 'reason for misinterpretation on they part of

. the protagonist,,and many others. To construct a theory of how they build

up a comic effect or even justto.compile a moderately exhaustkie list of

them ". . may be a task as delicate as analysing the chemical composition

The Seemihgly Appropriate

24-. r

of a-perfume . :" (K 1964 p. 61). Hence, this paper focUses- '- a

just on the defining features of the stimulUs.Category. Dealing with-theN4;4,

r: distinctive featias that ma e, tts members differ in funniness falls beyond,

C

f

its scope,.

Are we reiNf'e then, to devise an algorfthm that produces only jokes,

' funny..or unfunnY as the case may be ?' The .theory proposed in, this article

suggestS that a short story' can be into a joke in the 6)1 lowing

.

s. j 1'41

'waytA One would have to rempve the ending-of the story, isolate the generic

knowledge that must be.used'by the protagonist to disambiguate parts of .

the text that ate technically open to more than one interpr.ftati4m, disregard

done piece of such information that is essential, and than create an ending .

that tells about an action or rance of the protagonist that is com-.

patible with,thereit 'of the in tion, explicit as.well as implicit".

.Whfle most parts of-this procedure are fairly well defined, the major

stumblinig%lock is clearly the absence of a forthal definition of the attribute- ,

essential. Hence, a generation procedure cannot be constructed without

affixirig to it a clinical judgment of "essentiality.O

' Can agrocedure for producing Jokes -really.work with the aid of this-.

stilt? Copsider the following iljustration dialogue:

(21) The father top his daughter: I:Minnie Mouse put her

- ,..". 4 t

9C

rust in Bugs Bunny's tibat, but there was a crack in% .

.. -,the boat, so An the' middle of the river it sank."

I

The Ddugher,cried:. "Poor Minnie:"

. 27

A

L

oThe Seemingly Appropriate

I

25

The situation, as well as the discourse, are not unrealistic or

unreasonable. Now suppose the last word, Minnie, is removed. People who

C

employ their linguistic apparatus properly and who consult their knowledge

S.

of the world would probably complete t missing word as.it appears in the

original. However, people who act on the assumption that the trust

*means some kind of animate object will probably insert it as:the subject

_Of.the daughter's exclamation. By so doing, they naively produce a 'dialogue.

that is likely to be perceived as a joke by other people 4o know the real -*

meaning of the word trust. This demonstration shows that when a response--..

to an utteraDte takes into account aLerrelevant knowledge save one essential

piece., the dialogue may be perceived as a joke.r -

," HoW illkely is this procedure to produce a joke? Unfortunately, not

very likely. One reason is quite simple. ,This procedure focuses on the

narrated text proper, and furthermore, just on its sema010, Yet'the human

-*mind may pick and utilize many other' cues -as well, For example; it is

common wisdom in psychology that theperception of a given stimulus or

re"the mental state tt, evdkes are aff$cted not only by its own internal

properties but alsoby how the perceiNier.s set to view it. The listener

can often anticipate a joke becase of some explicit 'prepa'ratory cues such

as the introductory question, "Heard this one?" or more subtle ones suchAb

as the expresston on the face 4f the teller, Even _;in the_alAerIce of external

cues,the.listener may be relying on structural or stylistic features of

the text itself. ,For example, a joke is usually self- contained; it seldom

fai

4

8

-4 'The.eemingly Appropriate

-26

makes reference to ch Vacters that. are part of the context in which it is

presented. The pr= entation of events in a joke is rapid,/ikmediate,'and

economical In to ms of words. Jokes, often resort to characteristic openrqs

such as, "A pr est, a' doceor, and a lawyer .travelled together in a train . .

,,Those ues and some others signal the presence of a joke and predispose

the list- er to treat itas a joke, namely, to look for an inappropriate

)

resolu ton of a forthcoming incongruity, They might even'sbmetimes bias

--the isener to judge a'nonjoke as a joke. However, it is clear that they

,

a e neither necessary nor suffient. MorOver,I' propose that they serve

as signals rather than asdefinjng properties. Their absence may sometimes

cause the listener to miss a joke, but their presence in any number or

amount cannot substitute for a lack of the essence of a Joke, which is an

inappropriately resolved incongruity, A listener who hears a story that

misses an Inappropriately resolved incongrui.ty, but that is anticipAted

or introduced as a joke, will probably feel deceived,, This could happen

because psigdal 1,'acilitates the rscoVery of defining features` and even

induces the Processing system to fi d them in otherwise ambiguous stimulus

constituents, yet it cannot replace them.

A more basic problem with this joke procedure is its tacit assumption,

that inappropriace/fnterpretation will be reflected iri behavior that is

.

Incongruous loin expectations. Not every failurdwa understanding brings

about a response that reveals it. For example, one may misinterpret trust

,in (211 to be some kind

"of animate object and still utter completely

29


2)7

.

context-cempatibler.phrases:suc as "Robb bunny!" or "And what happened

then?" etc. Such phrases are,clearly undiagnostic of misunderstandings.

Even bre problematik is the applicafiqp of this procedure to any

haphazardly selectesistory.or dialogue. It is often surprisingly difficultg- 1116

to systematically uncover,hidden assumptions and tacit knowledge that

people employ, during comprkhension. Once we do, we figure that much of

that knokledge does not fall under the,heading essential. But erhaps

the most serious problem is that absence of -knowledge may take many forms,

and most often several of them may lead to the same outcome. In this case'4

the incongruity-created may nor be resolvaSe, because its source may not/

be traceable. For example, if the littite girl in (21) said, "How could

it ever get to the middle of thq. 'river ?" the litener may have a hard time

finding out that she Se,* it because she thought a boat was a sort of an

automobile. Thus, to be considered inappropriate, the= resolution has to

. be found in the first place.. in other words, there must.be a way to Pilfer

from the punchline what knowledge was missed or disregarded. Hence, the

main obstacle,for the generation of jokes seems ironically not tp be any

property which 'uniquely typifies jokes. 'It'is ra r the more general

difficulty to compose,a gtory in which a hidden cause e r liably

recovered from its 'effect, The,,humorous tot?ch is added when that cause is

a' disregard of an essential" piece of, knowledge.

Thus, an algorithm for joke generationis probably far ahead of us,

but perhaps not because we are short of specifying a sufficient formula

The Seemi ngly App rop r i ate

28

for a joke. The formul0. may be quite simple, yet it still takes'a human1..

brain to combine the elements.-.

Q

k.j. 31

,4

ileference Nole


29

1. Rumelhart, D. E. Thd room theory. Unpublished manuscript. University

of California San Diego, La Jolla, 1974.

(

t

4

1

32.


30

Referencps

Bergson, H. Laughter: An essay on the meaning Of the comic. New York:

Macmillan, 1911.'4

Essay on laughter and _ludicrous compositiOn. In J.

Edinburgh: Witltamtreech, 1776.

eattie,

Boston; R. An anatomy of Laughter. London: Collins, 1974.

Chafe, W. L.- Meaning ancl,the structure of language. Chicago: ,University

of Chicago Press, 1970.

Clark, H.-H., & Clar:k, E. V. Psychology and language. New York: Harcourt

Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

Foss, D. J., Bever, T., &' Silver,,M. 'The cOMprehensiorrand verification

of ambiguous sentences.' Perception & PsychoPhysics, 1963, 4, 304-306._,

Freud, S. Humor. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1928, 9, 1-6.

Grip, 'H. P. Logic and conversation: In P. Cole & J. L.4Morgan (Eds.),

Syntax and semantics (Vol.'3): Speech, acts. Hew Yprk: Academicess,

1975.s,

Hobbes, T. Leviathan. London: Crooke, 1651.

Kant, 1. Kritik der Ur- teilskraft. Berlin:, Lagarde, 1790.

Keith-Spiegel, P. Early conceptions of. humor: ,Varieties and issues.

In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), THe psychology of humor;

Theoretical pirspectives and empirical issues. New York:?Academic

Press, 1972.ti

Koestler, A. The'act of creation. New York: Macmillan, 1964.

*4.

The Seemingly Appropriad

31

teacock, S. Humor and humanity: An introduction to the study of humor.

New York: Holt, 1938

McGhee, P. C. Humor,: Its origin and development. San Francisco: Freeman,

1979

Nerhardt, G. Incongruity and funniness: Towards a new descriptive

model. 1n A. J. Chapman CH. C. Foot (Eds.), Humor and 'laughter:

Theory, research, and applications. London: Wiley, 1976

Norman, D. A. Memory, knowledge, and the answering.of questions. In

R. L. Solso(4d.), Contemporar issues in cognitive psychology:

The Loyola Symposium. Washington, D.C.: Winston, 1973.

4- Ortony, A., Schallert, D, L., Reynolds, -R. E., & Antos, S. J. Lnterpreting

metaphors and idioms: Some effects of context on comprehension.

,..:14rnal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1978, 17, 465-'477.

Piddingioil, R. The psychology of laughter: A study in social adaptation.

New York: Gamut Press, 1963. (Originally pyblished, London:

,Figurehead, 1933,1.

Rothbart, M. K. Incongruity, problem solving and laughter. In,A. J.

Chapman & H. C. Foot (EdS.), Humour and laughter: Theory, research

and applications. London: Wiley,'1976.

Rothbart, M. K., & Pien, D: Elephants and marshmallows: A theoretical

synthesis of-incongruity-resolution and arousal theories of humor:

In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.)', It's a funny thing, humour.

. Oxford: *Pergamon Press, .1977

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The Seemingly Appropriate-

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Rumelhaar'D. E. Towards an interactive model of reading. In S. Dornia'

(Ed:), Attention and perYormance VI. London: Academic Press, 1977.

Sclidilk-, R. C. Identification.oeconceptualizationsunderlying natural

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Schopenhauer, A. Die Welt als and Vorstel lung. -Leipzig: Brockhaus,.

1819. tio

Searle, J.R. Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Prdss, 1969.

Shultz, T. R. A cognitive - developmental analysis of humor. In A. J.

Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humour and laughter: Theory, research

and applications. London: Wiley, 1976.

Spencer, H. Physiology of laughter. Macmillan's Magazine, 1860.

Suls, J. M. A two-stage model for the appreciation of jokes and cartoons:

An information-processing analysis.. In J. 11. Goldstein & P; E.

McGhee (Eds.), The psychology of humor. New Ydrk: Academic Press,

1972.

Tulving, E. %Episodic ah semanti.c memory. In E, Tulving & W, Donaldson

(Eds.), Organization of'memory. New York: Academic Press, 1972.

Verbrugge, R. R. Resemblances in language and perception. In R, Shaw

6. J. Bransford (Edr.), Perceiving, acting and knowing. 'Hillsdale,

N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977. Fp. 365-392,

Winston, P. .H. Learning to identify toy. block structures. In R, L. Solso

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Symposium. Washington, Winston, 1973.


33

Woods, W. A. Syntax, semantics, and speech. in p. R. Reddy (Ed.),

Speech recognition. N- gric:, Academic Press, 1975. .

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.34

'Footnotes

ThiS piper has' evolved out of many fruitful talks.) had with "Jim

Levin. I am indebted to stimulating ideas and helpful comments contributed

by him, as well as to comments made by Ofra Nevo, Benny Shanon, and,'

Joseph Shimrori.

.1

in some cases the protagonist may be hidden, and his or her part)

may be acted by, the teller. For example, in joke (5) the teller provides

the answer .that an imaginary protagonist.with no feeling for reasonable- ,

proportions would have given.

,,.

37

44.

tot

4

Figure Caption

The SeemfnglyAppropriate

-35

Figure 1. An outline of the structure of jokes and joke processing.

r

10.

a

ti

O

Y

SETTING PUNC LINE

, disambiguationcuet

ambiguous

element

for for

J.

INTERPRETATIONI

INTERPRETATION

II

4LISTENER'S

LONG-TERM1MEMORY

l'eads 'to

generic

knowledge

LISTENER'S PROCESSING

Inte'rpretation I is selected

Bu;?oke Protagonist:selected.Interpretation. AA, which t.incompatible with the dis-'ambigoation cues and generiqknowledge

HenceProtagonist does notpossess the relevantknowledge

,

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