National Public Management Research Conference

7th Conference

Washington, DCUSA

Conference Paper

Bureaucratic Corruption in a Globalized World: Explaining the Divergence of National Responses in Japan,

Hong Kong and China*

Wilson WongAssistant Professor

Department of Government and Public AdministrationThe Chinese University of Hong Kong

Shatin, NTHong Kong

Tel: 202-797-2493Fax: 202-797-2485

Email: wwong@cuhk.edu.hk

October 10, 2003

*Please do not quote or cite without the permission of the author

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Bureaucratic Corruption in a Globalized World: Explaining the Divergence of National Responses in Japan, Hong Kong and China

Abstract (188 words)

This paper introduces the analytical framework of global pressure and bureaucratic changedeveloped by Welch and Wong (1998, 2001b) and applies it to explain the divergent responses ofnational bureaucracies under the global pressure of bureaucratic corruption through comparativecase studies of Japan, Hong Kong and China. With the emergence of the global economy and thesame global pressure of bureaucratic corruption, there is a divergence instead of a convergence ofnational responses, with some vast differences in the level of success of eradicating bureaucraticcorruption. Bureaucratic corruption is not an organizational pathology with no cure. It is not theavailability and accessibility of organizational knowledge and technologies on curbingbureaucratic corruption that are leading to the divergence. As bureaucratic corruption is anorganizational problem rooted in the domestic context of the national systems where thebureaucracy is embedded in, the divergent responses to bureaucratic corruption across countriesare manifestations of differences in the domestic context of the bureaucracy. The three countriesin this study have some marked differences in their levels of and responses to bureaucraticcorruption, and importantly, the roles of their bureaucracies in the social, political and economicsystems.

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Bureaucratic Corruption in a Globalized World: Explaining the Divergence of National Responses in Japan, Hong Kong and China

Introduction

This is an exploratory working paper applying the analytical framework of global

pressure and bureaucratic change developed by Welch and Wong (1998, 2001b) to explain the

divergent responses of national bureaucracies under the global pressure of bureaucratic

corruption through comparative case studies of Japan, Hong Kong and China. Public

bureaucracies operate increasingly in a global environment that requires greater communication

and cooperation among nations (Farazmand 1999; Kettl 1997; Cleveland 1993). This

globalization of public administration has highlighted the parochial nature of much of the

literature, much of which was written to apply to one nation or to a small group of similar

countries. When literature that was designed for the West or for Europe is applied to Non-

Western nations, it often does not fit well, exaggerating the tension between theory and practice.

At the same time that globalization underscores the poor fit between theory and practice, global

pressures provide an opportunity to conduct comparative research that is meaningful and useful

for managers in all nations regardless of economic, political and social considerations. Such

work can help bridge the gap between Western and Non-Western perspectives. This article

provides a framework that will facilitate such research.

With the emergence of the global economy, advancement in information and other

technologies linking up the globe as one interactive world, bureaucratic corruption has arisen as a

major and pressing global concern (Quah 2001; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Elliot 1997; DeLeon

1993). According to the framework of Welch and Wong, the ultimate impact of a global

pressure on the administrative system of a nation is determined by both the direct influence of the

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global pressure and the indirect impact as filtered by the domestic context of the nation. The

domestic context consists of the economic, political and social systems of the country.

With the same global pressure of bureaucratic corruption, there is a divergence instead of a

convergence of national responses, with some vast differences in the level of success of

eradicating bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic corruption, however, is not an organizational

pathology with no cure. Far from it, knowledge on preventing and resolving bureaucratic

corruption is widely available and easily accessible to policy-makers. It is not the availability

and accessibility of organizational knowledge and technologies on curbing bureaucratic

corruption that are leading to the divergence. Bureaucratic corruption is an organizational

problem rooted in the domestic context of the national systems where the bureaucracy is

embedded in. The divergent responses to bureaucratic corruption across countries are

manifestations of their differences in the domestic context of the bureaucracy. The three

countries in this study have remarkable differences in their responses to bureaucratic corruption

and the roles of their bureaucracies in the social, political and economic systems.

The article is divided into two major sections. The first section will identify the gaps as

problems for public administration theory and practice and describes broader concepts of the

modern global environment as well as the theoretical importance of organizational environments

for bureaucracies. Having thus outlined the problem and opportunity, it introduces the

framework of global pressure and bureaucratic change of Welch and Wong and discusses how it

can be applied to study the research questions in public administration under the global context.

The second section will apply the framework to the global problem of corruption and illustrate

how differences in the domestic context, particularly the role of the bureaucracy in the economy,

can explain the divergences of responses to the global challenge of corruption among three major

Asian countries / cities: China, Hong Kong, and Japan.

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The Analytical Framework

Bridging a Dual Gap

Disenchantment and even amazement over the parochial nature of American public

administration is well expressed in the literature. American public administration is not

considered to be either informed by international theoretical perspectives or very adaptable to

other national contexts. For example, Hood writes.

“Today (Americans perhaps excepted), public administration scholars live in what is much more of a ‘globalvillage’ conceptually, in that it would be hard to write an acceptable research degree thesis in the subject todaywhich did not draw on an international literature for its conceptual framework. It is hard to see this trend goinginto reverse.” (Hood, 348)

The parochial nature of U.S. public administration theory would not be such a concern in

a world of the 1920s or even the 1960s, but in today’s “global village” failure to incorporate

ideas from other contexts can be detrimental to the long term development of public

administration theory in America and for the applicability of American public administration

theory abroad. Efforts in US comparative public administration (CPA) have attempted through

various means and with a variety of national objectives, to bridge the gap between theory based

on the American perspective and the context of other administrative systems. Two main

methodological trajectories have emerged in the literature.

The first, ascribed mainly to the founders of the field in the USi take the perspective that

bureaucracies are subsystems within the political, economic and social context of a particular

nation. Analysis under this framework takes the form of an “outside-in” process in which

bureaucracies can be evaluated best by a continual focusing in from the social to the economic to

the political context in which it is found. The aim of this approach is to provide a description

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and explanation for “why” bureaucracies are what they are and why they do what they do. This

set of theorists can be grouped into what may be called traditionalists.

The second and more recent position is typified by the work of Guy Peters in which

improvement in scientific integrity is sought through the identification of dependent variablesii

and the systematic collection of empirical evidence. This type of analysis is an “inside-out”

exploration in which phenomena, found universally in the bureaucracies studied, are analyzed to

determine “what” the differences are. The context is then formed around the findings while long

term objective of prescription is sought. This set of theorists can be grouped into what may be

called revisionists.

The revisionists criticize the lack of cumulative knowledge in comparative public

administration as one of the reasons for its downfall in the 1960s and 1970s and see this as a

direct result of lacking scientific methods and approach. The traditionalists criticize the

assumptions and reductionist nature of the newer approach as not providing enough richness of

detail on the one hand and being almost necessarily limited to the comparison of bureaucracies

operating under similar political, economic and social contexts. That is, the traditionalists

criticize the revisionists for focusing almost exclusively on Western bureaucracies.

“Being empirical is not the problem, but being comparative is. The comparisons that are made by [theempiricists] are almost completely limited to the United States and a few European countries - all Westernindustrialized democracies. Some models that [they use] seem to be applicable only to parliamentary orpresidential democracies, and not to the much larger number of contemporary political entities which haveregimes dominated by single parties or by professional bureaucrats....In my view, the best available approachesfor the comparative study of public administration over the whole range of existing national political systemsshould be pursued, even though empirical and quantitative measurements are not always possible. If this meanssome loss of status or prestige in relation to comparative public policy or other fields of inquiry where suchmeasurements are more readily available, so be it.” (Heady, 54-55, 1995)

Unfortunately, neither of these efforts has helped develop theory that is more applicable

or informative for non-Western nations. The traditionalists have provided a lens for adoption of

theory and administrative technology in non-Western nations. However, the model does not go

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far enough to provide testable hypotheses of broader cross-national theoretical generalization.

Moreover, the revisionists have been limited in their scope of analysis to the inclusion of

organizations that align politically, socially and economically. These theoretical models are little

informed by non-Western experiences and, in cyclical fashion, are thus poorly applicable to non-

western theorists and practitioners. Although the work of the revisionists appears to provide

some hope for greater theoretical generalization, such efforts and resulting models are little

informed by the adoption and adaptation processes occurring in non-Western countries.

Even though the impetus for borrowing from American public administration theory

continues, a cursory review of the Asian public administration literatureiii reveals a gap between

what is borrowed and what fits.

“....public administration in China has yet to develop its own theories....A review of recent books andjournal articles indicates that, as far as theory building goes, most Chinese public administration scholars aremerely “importers”. They have borrowed ideas and theories from various schools in the West ... to apply to theChinese contest. If scholars continue to borrow ideas, the development of theories to explain and predictadministrative phenomena in China will be problematic.” (Zhang, p. 14)

One contributor in Caiden’s recent edited book on Administration in Korea concurs: “Thus many Korean scholars have argued that conventional Western theories are not adequate to fully

explain what really transpires in the Korean administrative setting. The gap between scholars of publicadministration and actual practitioners seems partially linked to the fact that academicians largely refer toforeign sources of information and guidance in their professional field, while the actual administrators takecounsel in the local managerial staff and in their own experience. Direct participation in their own Koreanadministrative system may be a way to root theorists more solidly in the realities and complexities of the Koreanpublic bureaucracy.” (Kim and Bell, p. 19)

These references indicate that in addition to the gap in communication across borders that

results in poorly informed U.S. theory, there may also be an expanded gap between theory and

practice in Asia. It is always difficult to find a perfect match between theory and practice.

However, when theoreticians in non-Western nations are mainly informed by American public

administration theory, while practitioners are busily adapting administrative technologies to a

vastly different context, the gap between theory and practice in non-Western nations may be even

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wider than in the U.S. Theorists in non-Western nations have two options. First, they could

adopt the traditionalist perspective of context evaluation. This theoretical perspective seems well

versed for situational exploration for adoption of technologies. Unfortunately, this type of

analysis does not lead to generalization that is useful for policy or management.

Second, other nations may consider middle-range analysis as an appropriate starting point

for development of theoretical models of change and reform that are locally relevant and

predictive for management and policy purposes. Unfortunately, this situation has developed a

gap in theory development in which middle-range theory may be helpful from a regional

perspective but theorists in Asia will be less able to find a common language with theorist in the

West. In addition, neither set of nations will appreciate the global context within which they now

exist.

While this article considers that both approaches to CPA are necessary, the schism among

theorists is creating a gap between public administration research and practice in Western and

non-Western nations. Emphasis on middle-range theory renders many of the Western models

off-target for non-Western practitioners, while emphasis on broader, more inclusive theory

provides limited policy or management relevance for practitioners faced with more immediate

policy and management decisions.

Ironically these gaps are occurring at a time in which the global environment is subjecting

most governments to a similar set of global pressures. Although each governments reacts

differently to these forces based on national context (political, economic, and social systems), it

is suggested that global pressures are a substantive force pushing governmental change. As a

result, the identification of a set of environmental pressures common to all nations and their

subsequent inclusion into a theoretical model for analysis may serve to reduce the theoretical and

application gaps identified above.

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Rise of the Global Environment

The existence of climate of global pressures for change has been described in numerous

of books and essays. For example, Harlan Cleveland notes that a substantively changed world

has been created:

“...the growth of choice and....[The realization that we must develop] a sense of what world governments, regionalgovernments, national governments and local governments are best fit to take responsibility for. The bordersbetween world and regional, world and national and regional and national are of most dynamic and no lessimportant than local borders.” (Cleveland, 1993)

Not only are administrative domains becoming increasingly blurred, so too are lines of control

and power. For example, Cleveland shows that power of national bureaucracies is being shifted

into an international and borderless domain. He notes that power is leaking from the top of

national government into international arrangements, agreements, and agencies. This type of

leakage may result in reduction of national government discretion and control (Cleveland, 1933)

Other students of the global context of public administration include Ali Farazmand who

writes about the shifting terrain of public administration around the world.

“The emerging global public administration is based on a number of structural adjustments or readjustments thathave been taking place around the globe. These readjustments have been in the forms of redefining the scope andboundaries of public and private sectors, of administrative reforms, or civil service reforms, of organizationalreconfiguration and restructuring, and many more.” (Farazmand, p. 81)

Ferrel Heady acknowledges that a set of international variables in addition to political,

economic and social consideration are relevant factors.

“...Cross-national explorations of the relative importance of such factors should be encouraged, and for anunderstanding of any single nation-state bureaucracy all of the pertinent factors should be investigated.” (Heady, p97)

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Finally, although examples of this kind of writing are common in the literature, Keith

Henderson correctly frames the issue of global pressures for change and evolution of

administrative systems as an argument between “indigenization and internationalization: the

former position advocating a basically nationalistic or regional perspective on study and

application in public administration and the latter a world wide study and international

application.” (Henderson, p. 333)

Clearly, therefore, governments and by extension, bureaucracies, are not only increasingly

aware of global pressures for change and reform, they are increasingly making decisions that

incorporate global constraints and opportunities into their own domestic agendas. National

bureaucracies are becoming increasingly porous and increasingly affected by the global

environment. At the very least, the global environment should not be ignored as an influential

force for bureaucratic change and decision-making. This article takes the argument one step

further and offers a structured framework for analysis of how global pressures impact

bureaucracies.

A vast body of American public administration literature considers the environment of

organizations to be a primary contributor to administrative and policy outcomes. For example,

Olsen (1988) offers a four models of governance - based primarily on observation of Western

administrative systems - that seek to explain how decisions can be impacted or directed by the

environment. Two of these models deal specifically with environmental pressures. According to

his Institutional State Model, decisions are made among actors with shared goals or norms while

they are determined and respond to environmental forces. The Supermarket State Model speaks

to a situation in which decisions are made among actors with conflicting interests - also in a

context of response to environmental factors. In addition, Olsen notes that all four models can

exist simultaneously to various extent in any nation.

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Rainey (1991) outlines well the potential ways in which environment forms descriptive

and analytical dimension to organizations. For example, he reviews how Aldrich points to

multiple dimensions of environmental analysis including domain consensus-discensus, stability-

instability, concentration-dispersion, homogeneity-heterogeneity, and turbulence (see Table

One). Each of these dimensions is increasingly applicable to a global environment layered on top

of the national social, economic and political environments.

_________________________

Insert Table One about here

_________________________

In summary, not only is the environment of administrative systems and organizations

clearly an appropriate place to look in public administration theory, but the relevance of the

global context is also increasing. However, discussion about the importance of the global

environment is not helpful without a theoretical framework within which researchers (and

educators) can begin to focus. It is with this purpose in mind that this article now turns to the

global pressures that is increasingly affecting all administrative systems in the world.

Theoretical Framework for Global Pressures

A set of requisite qualities exist for the development of a viable theoretical model from

which hypotheses can be generated. First, the strength of the theoretical perspectives of the

traditionalists and the revisionists must be preserved and incorporated into the design. Second,

the existence of global pressures must be considered to impact bureaucracies through both direct

and indirect pathways. It is of critical importance that the model recognizes that these pressures

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are acted out indirectly through the filters of national political, economic, and social systems. In

addition, however, these pressures are also acting directly on the bureaucracy from the

increasingly dynamic and powerful global system. The third requisite function of the model is to

maintain the bureaucracy as the focus of analysis in which organizational characteristics and

roles are the objectified criteria of comparison. Finally, the model must be adaptable to

comparisons across multiple national contexts such that the theoretical and practitioner gaps are

addressed.

It is with these criteria in mind that the model of global pressures on bureaucracies is

presented in Figure 1. According to this model, the global system, represented by global

pressures, acts directly on bureaucracies. However, it also works indirectly on bureaucracy

through the filters of national political, economic and social systems. Finally, true to the last two

criteria outlined above, the bureaucracy remains the focus of analysis, and the framework is not

limited in its scope of applicability for national comparison.

_________________________

Insert Figure One about here

_________________________

While Figure 1 appears relatively simple, there are in fact a number of complexities that

need to be drawn out. Firstly, global pressures range in significance and impact from minor to

major. Their significance depends upon the nations in question. This article does not attempt to

name the full array of existing global pressures and it will not presume to rank the subset chosen.

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Instead, the pressures described below are offered as examples to demonstrate the validity of the

framework.

Secondly, this model allows researchers to set up hypotheses that control for national

political, economic and social contexts. In addition it may be possible to hypothesize, test and

offer generalizations about how various national systems tend to alter global pressures and

thereby act upon bureaucracies. If, for example, a plus or minus sign is added within each of the

political, economic, or social system boxes in Figure 1 above, it may be possible to define a set

of influences that nations have as mediators between global pressures and the bureaucracy. Such

research activity could begin to discover a reduced set of national models of governmental

change or reform that would be of great benefit to public managers in all nations.

This leads to the final comment. The bureaucracy and its attributes remain the unit of

analysis. Therefore, dependent variables such as the size, scope of services, management

behavior, or decision making autonomy can be subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. In

summary, the model takes advantage of existing global pressures and the two existing theoretical

perspectives for analysis, traditionalist and revisionist, to build a composite model for analysis.

The main unit of analysis is still the bureaucracy, while in the synthesis model any set of nations

can be the focus of the analysis rather than individual nations in the traditionalist sense or a

similar set of nations in the revisionist sense.

Finally, while the strengths of this new approach have been stated above, its weaknesses

should also be acknowledged. Comparative studies of this sort will require significant a priori

work to operationalize variables and to obtain comparable data. In addition, obvious

characteristics such as size and influence of nations in the global system or recipient nations need

to be better incorporated. For example, the size and influence of the United States more often

makes it a contributor to the global system rather than a recipient of global pressures.

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The Global Pressures

The inclusion of global pressures into the model of analysis not only promises to bridge

the gap in comparative public administration, it also serve as an important step of increasing the

explanatory power of public administration theory on the change of bureaucracy. Three major

global pressures are identified in this article: information technology, global institutions, and

efficiency and productivity.iv

Information Technology

The global pressure of information technology broadly captures the on-going impact of

information revolution technologies on public bureaucracies. Governments decide to create or to

adopt (or not) increasingly powerful information storage, retrieval and communications hardware

and software as a means of increasingly the viability and modernity of their bureaucraciesv. It is

widely assumed that information technology allows organizations to work smarter and more

efficiently in an era of heightened citizen demand and awareness. In addition to the more

straight-forward issues of hardware and software, information technology has two other major

impacts on bureaucracies. First, it often provides the capacity for reorganization and

restructuring that alters information flows in terms of speed and direction. This scenario has

implications for power shifts and concerns for information sharing which are time honored areas

of analysis in public administration. Second, implications of the information revolution are not

limited to increases in processing capacity. Greater availability of information and affordable

prices for access mean that information is potentially more available to citizens through, for

example, the Internet. The extent to which nations attempt to exert control over the on-line

information flow may have implications for the structure, role and behavior of the bureaucracy.

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Information technology is considered a global pressure because the process of

technological change is self-sustaining and not directly controlled by any single national

government. In addition, the impact of the information technology is felt around the world and

creates different impacts on and responses from national bureaucracies.vi While newer

information technology is often adopted by individual countries for such reasons as maintenance

of global economic competitiveness and institutional legitimacy, it is undeniable that it also

creates major, and sometimes unexpected, impacts on bureaucracy (Ingraham, 1996; Kettl,

1997). For our purposes, there exists variation in information management philosophies, styles

or techniques among national bureaucracies which can become the subject of rigorous analysis.

Global Institutions

The pressure of global institutions is probably the most visible and tangible of all global

pressures. It is defined as the pressure exerted by a formalized institution with a global

jurisdiction that has authority and power over individual countries in the related policy area. It

represents the fact that there are many policy areas that are no longer controlled within the

national boundary but are rather conducted in an international setting and context. An increasing

set of policy decisions are now being made in global institutions instead of individual country.

Numerous examples of formalized global institutions that exercise power and influence

over individual countries exist. For example, with the advent of the global economy many global

trade agreements or organizations such as the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade),

may even have greater influence on a country’s economy than any of the domestic economic

institutions in each individual country. Examples are not limited to economic policy and the

expansion of free market economies, but are also evident in other policy areas such as

environmental protection and health.vii

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Efficiency / Productivity

The global pressure of public sector efficiency and productivity is perhaps the best

documented pressure in the public administration literature (Ingraham 1996; Kettl 1997; Pollitt

and Bouckaert 2000; OECD 1993, 1995). It can be said that there now exists a worldwide

pressure on public bureaucracy to cut waste and increase output. With an increasingly inter-

linked world of mobile resources (both human and physical capital) and well-informed citizens, a

reluctance of keeping one’s bureaucracy up to a global standard of efficiency and productivity

can mean a permanent outflow of valuable resources from one’s national territory and (or) facing

an uneasy atmosphere of governance created by an “unsatisfied” citizenry.

The flip side of efficiency is the simultaneous pressure on public agencies to develop

ways of increasing effective output and delivery of services. This pressure has been most

obvious through the number and variety of streamlining, downsizing, new management, and

privatization efforts in governments throughout the world. However, the impact of this pressure

is more profound than simply pushing bureaucracies to become more efficient and productive. It

possesses the potential to redefine the role of government in society, create more tension between

administration and democracy, and pose serious questions on the foundation of legitimacy in

public administration.

The Domestic Context

The focus of the new model is bureaucratic change. However, change in this model has

three components: global pressures, domestic context and global pressures acting through

domestic context.viii This section highlights the domestic context by identifying some important

factors that influence the effect of global pressures on bureaucratic change.ix

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Economic Context

Dahl and Lindblom (1953) showed that national economies should be classified

according to the degree of influence of market and hierarchy in the economy instead of the

dichotomous approach which was previously used to classify economies into either market

economy or planned economy. Additionally, national economies can be classified relative to

each other in terms of the role of production, degree of dependency, or level of development in

the world economy, as emphasized by the dependency theory or world systems theory

(O’Donnell, 1973; Wallerstein, 1979). To this end, three types of economic variables can be

used in operationalizing the economic context. Standard economic variables such as GDP and

economic growth rate are used to measure the capacity or size of the nation. Economic structure

variables, such as international trade as a proportion of national income or concentration of

industrial production, are used to characterize the nature of the economic system and its linkage

with the global economy. Finally, the bureaucratic economy can be represented by data on the

government budget. This measure presents an image of the size and role of the government in

the economy.

Bozeman (1987) and Perry and Rainey (1988) agree that economic context is a major

factor that shapes public organizations. Failure to control for the economic context may provide

misleading conclusions on the effect of the global pressures. For example, a country with a

closed and self-sufficient economy may be less subject to changes of the efficiency pressure

induced by the competition for mobile resources in the international market. Therefore, the

absence of reforms in a public bureaucracy does not necessarily indicate an absence of the global

pressures. It may simply reflect a domestic economic context that offsets the effect of the global

pressure.

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Political Context

The political context is no less important than the economic context in filtering the effect

of global pressure. Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) showed that more centralized political

systems (i.e., with fewer veto-players) respond more quickly, through policy adjustment, to

changes in the global economy. Political regime can be identified in traditional terms – such as,

autocratic, oligarchic, representative democratic – or based upon a much more complex

dimensions. Morgan (1996) provided an alternative framework that identified different types of

states – hegemonic (or integral), patrimonial and custodial. As democratization is a major

phenomenon that is spreading over many countries around the globe, the degree of

democratization can also be used as one of the dimensions in describing and measuring the

political context of each country (Huntington, 1991).

Other major variables that describe the political dimensions of nations could be

intergovernmental relations, stability, regional position, and issue position. The political context

can be classified according to the relationships among governments within the regime, especially

between the central and local governments. Stability can refer to the system of leader

replacement, level of civil unrest, or existence of extra border conflict. Regional position is a

variable that describes the regional importance of the locality, such as the leadership position of

the town in the prefecture or the leadership position of the nation in the regional community of

nations. Finally, issue position reflects a desire to incorporate some measure of distance (or

relevance) between the origination of the global pressure and the destination. Locations that are

politically removed from development or initiation of a global pressure are probably less

responsible for its domestic implementation.

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Social Context

There are many different ways to describe the social context of nations. Classification

can be made according to religion, culture, class, stratification, inequalities, social mobility,

ethnicity, family system and other social variables. Within each dimension there are usually

multiple indicators to capture the different facets of the dimension. For example, family size and

numbers of generations within each household is a simple means of understanding some of the

needs of the nation in terms of social infrastructure. Types and levels of social policy may also

be a useful measure for social comparison – those countries with more extensive social policies

may have more developed bureaucracies.

Among all the available measures of social context, culture is a well-known and

influential variable that has strong effects on the developments of a country. In The Protestant

Ethic and Rise of Capitalism, Max Weber (1998) showed the close linkage between culture and

economic development. In the classic work of Almond and Verba (1963), they had identified the

three different kinds of culture (participant, subject and parochial) that were closely related with

the level of political development of a nation. In studying the politics of Asian countries, Pye

(1985) had recognized that it was impossible to have a real understanding the power structure

and sources of authority in a country without using a cultural perspective. There is little doubt

that culture is also exercising significant influences on the role and power of the public

bureaucracy in each nation. For example, the trust in government and authority has led to an

unusual major role of bureaucracy in policy-making in Asian countries such as Singapore and

Japan (Quah, 1999, 2001; Beeson 2001; 2003; Lincoln 2001).

Dimensionalization of the domestic context is an important step toward understanding

how global pressures affect public bureaucracy. In addition to the three major dimensions

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identified, other subdimensions can also be introduced to enhance the richness of analysis. For

example, an additional dimension can be added with regard to the relationship between the civil

service and the political regime (Heady, 1996). Morgan (1996) used the state-society relations,

which differentiation was based on institutionalization of the nation state and public attitudes

toward the state, as a dimension of studying public bureaucracy. Similarly, interfaces among the

three dimensions can be studied to further understand how the domestic context alters the impact

of the global pressures exerted on public bureaucracies. For the sake of parsimony and

usefulness, the model must strike a balance between a limited the number of relevant dimensions

and inclusion of all critically important and measurable dimensions.

Testable Hypotheses and Rationale

The impact of each of these global pressures on four major attributes of bureaucracy:

structure, scope, autonomy, and management, is also examinedx. In Table 4, the impacts of the

global pressures on the four different attributes of bureaucracy are summarized. This analytical

framework serves as the essential and middle stage between the model in Figure 1 and the

development of testable hypotheses below.

Structure refers to the centralization and decentralization dimension of the bureaucracy.

A global pressure may impact on a bureaucracy in either direction - increasing or decreasing the

degree of centralization. Scope describes the breadth of services the bureaucracy is responsible

for. It can also incorporate a measurement of the assignment of social services between the

public and private sectors. Global pressures can be said to either increase or decrease the scope

of the public sector in society. Autonomy deals with the ability or power of the national

bureaucracy to make independent policy decisions. Global pressures can be seen to either reduce

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or enhance bureaucratic autonomy in a policy area. Finally, the attribute management relates to

the orientation guiding the management behavior in a bureaucracy.

_________________________

Insert Table Two about here

_________________________

Due to the importance of accountability in public administration and management

(Dilulio, Garvey, Kettl, 1993; Finer, 1941; Friedrich, 1940; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987;

Rosenbloom, 1992), this criterion has been chosen here to describe the impact of global pressures

on the management attribute of the bureaucracy. Moreover, instead of being a single dimension

concept, accountability is multidimensional where different global pressures can impact on

different dimensions of bureaucratic accountability. Information technology can pressure a

bureaucracy to shift its accountability focus along a continuum of discretion and control, while

the pressure of global institutions may force public managers to balance accountability between

local and global needs. The pressure of efficiency and productivity touches on a classic question

in public administration. Namely, does more efficiency and productivity shift the accountability

focus from process to outcome in which a trade-off between democracy and efficiency may have

to be made (Kaufman, 1977; Waldo, 1948)?

Drawing on the analytical framework, we now use three of the combinations between the

global pressures and attributes of the bureaucracy to formulate specific hypotheses and to build

theoretical rationales that can allow our model and framework to be tested empirically. These

chosen combinations are highlighted in bold print Table One.

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A major emphasis in terms of research is the setting up of an empirically testable

theoretical model for understanding how global pressures affect bureaucracies. We have tried to

build a theoretical framework that can explain and predict; and which is subject to empirical

testing for modification and falsification (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Such an approach allows

greater generalization and accumulation of knowledge - some of the problems that have troubled

the field of public administration in general and comparative public administration in specific for

a long period of time (Bozeman, 1989; Dahl, 1947; Denhardt, 1990; Rosenbloom, 1992;

McCurdy, 1986). Moreover, empirically-supported theory forms the foundation in the

development of prescriptive knowledge in public administration (Bozeman, 1993).

It is also important to emphasize that the global environment provides a natural and

useful opportunity for developing a more comprehensive theory of public administration. On the

one hand, the direct-and-indirect-effect approach allows us to isolate other confounding factors

and to shed insights on the pure effect of each global pressures on bureaucracies. On the other

hand, the appreciation of the mediating effect of national context allows us to discover a reduced

set of national models of governmental change or reform. In short, by taking advantage of the

global environment, the theoretical framework in this article can enrich our knowledge on

bureaucracies in general and any specific national bureaucracy.

Divergence under the Global Problem of Corruption

The theoretical richness of the framework of analysis based on the model is actually much

greater than the few theories that we choose to illustrate and describe here. In addition, once

empirical observations are collected, the circle of research is completed and we can verify and

modify the model and theory according the empirical results to improve its explanatory and

predictive power. Moreover, by using empirical evidences as the evaluation criteria, it allows the

merit of our theory to be judged with other competing theories and models.

22

Applying the framework to the global problem of corruption, this paper would like to find

out how differences in the domestic context, particularly the role of the bureaucracy in the

involvement of the state in the economy, to explain the divergence of bureaucratic corruption.

Since there can be a variation of different definitions of corruption as defined by the laws in

different countries, this paper adopt the public-office-centered definition of corruption as defined

by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Quah 2001). It refers corruption as “the

misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit – through bribery, extortion,

influence, peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement”.

With the arrival of the global economy, corruption opportunities had also been globalized

(Asian Development Bank 2001; Klitgaard 1988; Elliot 1997; Root 1996). Nevertheless, there is

a divergence in the level of corruption activities across the countries despite the exposure to the

same kind and similar level of global pressure. Divergence is also observed in terms of

administrative systems among countries in adopting administrative reforms (Hon 2003; Pollitt

2001a, 2001b). Table Three has shown the level of corruptions among China, Hong Kong, Japan

and other selected countries. The data is provided by Transparency International (TI), an non-

governmental organization aims at curbing corruption, which is based in Berlin of Germany. As

the actual level of corruption cannot be directly observed (not all corruption cases are caught and

prosecuted), TI relies on surveys of businessmen and other participants who have direct

knowledge of the countries surveyed to ask their perceptions of the level of corruption activities

in the countries as a proxy for measuring the actual level of corruption activities. Their

perceptions are used to compute the corruption perception index (CPI).

_________________________

23

Insert Table Three about here

_________________________

Table Three shows the CPI in two different years, 1998 and 2002, to give a change of the

change of corruption activities across the countries over time. Eight-five countries are included

in the 1998 CPI survey. In 2002, the number of countries included in the CPI survey is expanded

to 102. In reading the table, first of all, it can be found that there is a wide variation of

divergence among the level of corruption in different countries. In a scale of ten, where a score

of ten represents “cleanest” country and a score of 0 to represent the most “corrupted” countries,

in 1998, the cleanest country, which is Denmark, receives a perfect CPI score of 10. On the other

hand, Vietnam, which is ranked 74 in the 1998 survey only receives a CPI score of 2.5.

The three different countries that we are interested in – China, Japan and Hong Kong, are

relatively stable in their own CPI scores over time. For example, China receives the same CPI

score of 3.5 in 1998 and 2002. Its ranking is only changed slightly from 52 to 59. For Hong

Kong, its CPI score increased from 7.8 in 1998 to 8.2 in 2002, with its ranking changed from No.

16 in 1998 to 14 in 2002.

However, there is a significant differences among the three countries in the variations of

corruption level. Among the three countries, Hong Kong is the “cleanest” country (area). As

stated above, it is ranked at 14 out of 102 countries in 2002. For Japan, it is the “medium-level”

corruption countries among the three countries. It is ranked 20 in 2002. However, it should be

noted that, according to the CPI score, the level of corruption in Japan is increasing over time,

from a CPI score of 5.8 in 1998 to a CPI score of 7.1 in 2002, representing an increase of 22% in

its score. Chain is the most corrupted countries among the three, with a ranking of 59 in 2002.

24

What are the explanations for the divergence of corruption activities? When both

corruption opportunities and anti-corruption measures are globalized, as suggested by our

framework of global pressure and bureaucratic change, it should be the domestic context that is

serving as the major driving force for the divergence of corruption activities. Quah (2001) has

identified three major patterns of corruption control. They are: anti-corruption laws with no

independent agency (Pattern One); anti-corruption laws with many agencies (Pattern Two); and

anti-corruption laws with an independent agencies (Pattern Three). In his study, Quah has argued

that Pattern Three is the most sufficient mode of corruption control. This pattern is adopted by

both Hong Kong and Singapore, which are two of the cleanest countries in Asia, as ranked by the

CPI surveys.

_________________________

Insert Table Four about here

_________________________

If the anti-corruption measures are available and its effectiveness are well demonstrated,

why there are still a wide divergence in corruption levels among the countries. Why the more

corrupted countries do not simply follow the clean countries to adopt the anti-corruption

measures? In another study, Quah (1999) has attempted to answer this question. Table Four

shows the matrix of anticorruption strategies devised by Quah. In the matrix, four different

scenarios are described by using the two dimensions: anticorruption measures (adequate vs.

inadequate) and commitment of political leadership (strong vs. weak). Effective strategy will

only occur when there is a combination of strong commitment of political leadership and

adequate anticorruption measures. To the very extreme, a scenario of “hopeless strategy” will

25

come up when there are both inadequate anticorruption measures and weak commitment of

political leadership. Whenever there is either an inadequate anticorruption measures or a weak

commitment of political leadership, an effective strategy will result.

Nevertheless, with the global pressure of information technology which facilitates the

diffusion of policy solutions and ideas across countries, it can be expected that the scenarios due

to inadequate anticorruption measures will be eliminated (i.e., ineffective strategy 2 and hopeless

strategy). In other words, the case that anticorruption measures are inadequate owing to the lack

of anticorruption expertise and knowledge will eventually disappear. Consequently, according to

the Quah’s analysis and following our logic of thinking in analyzing the effect of globalization in

terms of policy diffusion, weak commitment of political leadership will remain to be the last and

ultimate variable left for the explanation of the divergence of bureaucratic corruption among the

countries.

_________________________

Insert Table Five about here

_________________________

However, under the lens of our comparative framework of global pressure and

bureaucratic change, attributing all the divergence to the lack of commitment of political leaders

can be an over-simplification of both the problem and its cause. According to the logic of our

framework, the decision of adoption of anticorruption measures and the choice of declining to

adopt them is a reflection of the domestic context, particularly the role and characteristics of the

bureaucracy. In order to go beyond the simple explanation, we have constructed a Table (Table

26

Five) to introduce the perspective of applying the domestic context as an explanation for the

divergence of corruption among the countries in a global context.

It does not seem that regime type or the political context of the three countries is a major

variable that explain for the divergence. Japan is the most democratic countries among the three

and by being an authoritarian country, China is on the other extreme. If democratization is a key

variable, Japan should be the less corrupted country. As it turns out, it is Hong Kong, which is

only a partial democracy, that is the least corrupted country. Similarly, it does not seem that

economic context is a strong explanatory variable. For instance, both Japan and Hong Kong are

experiencing a very slow growth or even major decline in its economy but they has shown some

significant differences in the level of corruption.

This article would like to suggest here that it is the role of the bureaucracy in the

economy that explains the divergence. More than a simple explanation of a lack of political

commitment or the personal decisions of the leaders or bureaucrats, it is the economic setting

under which the bureaucracy is embedded in the economy that take away the incentive of the

bureaucrats in introducing widely known anticorruption reforms. The states in all three countries

play a very strong and active role in economic development. Both Japan and Hong Kong has

adopted what is widely known as the “developmental state model” for its development (Haggard

2000; Evens 1995; Johnson 1982). That is, the bureaucracy in these two countries has played a

very active and intervening role in leading the economic development – particularly in the

process of industrialization (Flynn 1999; McLeod and Garnaut 1998).

Despite both of the states are developmental in nature, two very different modes of

developmental states are adopted in Japan and Hong Kong. The developmental state of Japan is

more active in providing directions and guidance to the economy. The bureaucracy in Japan

actually sets an industrial policy and gives clear directives on how to devote and allocate

27

resources to different sectors and industries in society (Lincoln 2001). Many senior bureaucrats,

after their retirement, would join the business sector (Beeson 2003). This further enforces the

interconnected and interlocked of the bureaucracy with the business interests (Pempel 1999).

In the case of Hong Kong, no industrial policy is set. There is a clear separation of

interests and boundary behind the business sector and the bureaucracy. When the state does

interfere in the economy, it usually participate in the non-profit sectors to develop policy areas

such as housing, welfare, education that have a high economic return but relatively loose direct

connection with the business leaders and sectors. The distinctive identify of the bureaucrats in

Hong Kong will make them more willing to adopt anticorruption measures to shield themselves

off from corruption opportunities (Chan 2001; Lo 1993). On the other hand, in the case of Japan,

when the line of bureaucrats and the business sector is more blurred and the difference between

public and private interests become more ambiguous, the bureaucrats, who are also powerful

policy makers, will be less willing to adopt anticorruption measures to constrain its own power.

Finally, the most extreme case of state intervention and state-driven economy comes up

in China. Although China is undergoing rapid economic reform, the growth and expansion of its

market economy does not come with the shrinking and retreat of the bureaucracy (Oi 1999). It is

because a major economic reform strategy devised by Deng Xiaping, the former Chinese leader

who started off the economic reform, is to “buy off” or “corrupt” the local bureaucrats (Gore

1998; Gong 1997; Kwong 1997). The economic model in China is often termed as “bureaucratic

entrepreneurism” as many of the new businesses set up under the economic reform are actually

businesses set up by the bureaucrats themselves or joint venture with their direct participation

(Duckett 1998). This “buying off” strategy is politically ingenious in pushing forward the

economic reform. As when the bureaucrats know that it is themselves who would get rich under

the economic reform, they would do little to resist the adoption of market economy (Shirk 1993,

28

1994). However, a direct consequence of this strategy of economic reform has made the interests

of the bureaucrats and the businesses essentially inseparable. As a result, the bureaucrats in

China, who are powerful political leaders, are the least interested group among the bureaucrats in

the three countries, to adopt anticorruption measures. Anticorruption, limiting their power of the

bureaucracy in influencing the business sector, will be a direct hit on their own interests as the

interests of the business sector and the interests of the bureaucracy become the same.

Conclusion

This article has identified two important gaps in public administration theory and practice

with regard to Western and non-Western nations. First, there is a gap between the two

theoretical approaches of comparative public administration. This gap has also resulted in an

exaggerated secondary gap between public administration theory that is borrowed by non-

Western administrative systems and the applicability of that theory. Simultaneous with the

development of these gaps, there has been a visible rise in the common constraints and

opportunities faced by all nations. These forces have been identified in the article as global

pressures for bureaucratic change. These pressures - information technology, global institutions,

and efficiency/productivity - are considered to be common themes intrusive enough into the

national political, administrative, economic and social environments that they can be objects of

analysis in the analytical framework.

29

In applying the framework, this paper attempts to explain the divergent responses of national

bureaucracies under the global pressure of bureaucratic corruption through comparative case

studies of Japan, Hong Kong and China. With the emergence of the global economy and the

same global pressure of bureaucratic corruption, there is a divergence instead of a convergence of

national responses, with some vast differences in the level of success of eradicating bureaucratic

corruption. Bureaucratic corruption is not an organizational pathology with no cure. It is not the

availability and accessibility of organizational knowledge and technologies on curbing

bureaucratic corruption or the simple explanation of the lack of political leadership and

commitment that are leading to the divergence.

The three countries in this study have some marked differences in their levels of and responses to

bureaucratic corruption, and importantly, the roles of their bureaucracies in the social, political

and economic systems. It is argued that it is the degree of integration of the interests of the

bureaucrats and the interests of the business sector that explain such a divergence. Therefore, the

adoption of anticorruption measures and the decline of its adoption is actually a reflection of the

characteristics of the bureaucratic system of the country. The resulting analysis allows

development of testable hypotheses and provides channels for feedback for enhancement of

theory in understanding the problem of corruption under a global context and the unique nature

of the bureaucracies among different countries.

30

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Table One. Descriptive and Analytical Dimensions of Organizational Environments(Taken from Rainey), Aldrich, 1979.

Characteristic DescriptionCapacity The extent to which the environment affords a rich or lean

supply of necessary resources.Homogeneity-heterogeneity

The degree to which important components of the environmentare similar or dissimilar.

Stability-instability The degree and rapidity of change in the important componentsor processes in the environment.

Concentration-dispersion

The degree to which important components of the environmentare separated or close together, geographically or in terms ofcommunication or logistics.

Domain Consensus-discensus

The degree to which the organization’s domain (it’s operatinglocations, major functions and activities, and clients andcustomers served) is generally accepted or disputed andcontested.

Turbulence The degree to which changes in one part or aspect of theenvironment in turn create changes in another; the tendency ofchanges to reverberate and spread.

36

FIGURE 1. MODEL OF GLOBAL PRESSURES ON BUREAUCRACIES

37

GLOBAL PRESSURES BUREAUCRACY

POLITICAL SYSTEM

ECONOMIC SYSTEM

SOCIAL SYSTEMFEEDBACK

NATIONAL CONTEXT

TABLE 2. EFFECTS OF GLOBAL PRESSURES ON BUREAUCRACIES

PRESSURE /ATTRIBUTE

STRUCTURE SCOPE AUTONOMY MANAGEMENT

INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY

CENTRALIZATION /DECENTRALIZATION

INCREASE /DECREASE

REDUCE /ENHANCE

ACCOUNTABILITY:

DISCRETION / CONTROL

GLOBALINSTITUTIONS

CENTRALIZATION /DECENTRALIZATION

INCREASE /DECREASE

REDUCE /ENHANCE

ACCOUNTABILITY:

LOCAL / GLOBAL

EFFICIENCY/PRODUCTIVITY

CENTRALIZATION /DECENTRALIZATION

INCREASE /DECREASE

REDUCE /ENHANCE

ACCOUNTABILITY:

PROCESS / OUTCOME

38

Table Three: Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International on China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Selected Countries 1998 2002 Index Rank Index Rank

Denmark 10 1 9.5 2Finland 9.6 2 9.7 1Sweden 9.5 3 9.3 5New Zealand 9.4 8 9.5 2Canada 9.2 6 9 7Singapore 9.1 7 9.3 13Switzerland 8.9 10 8.5 12Australia 8.7 11 8.6 11United Kingdom 8.7 11 8.7 11Germany 7.9 15 7.3 18Hong Kong 7.8 16 8.2 14United States 7.5 17 7.7 16France 6.7 21 6.3 25Spain 6.1 23 7.1 20Japan 5.8 25 7.1 20Malaysia 5.3 29 4.9 33Taiwan 5.3 29 5.6 29South Africa 5.2 32 4.5 40Italy 4.7 38 5.2 31South Korea 4.2 43 4.5 40Brazil 4 46 4 45China 3.5 52 3.5 59Mexico 3.3 55 3.6 58Philippines 3.3 55 2.6 77Argentina 3 61 2.8 70Vietnam 2.5 74 2.4 85

Number of Countries Surveyed: 85 (1998); 102 (2002)Scores range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Source: Transparency International

39

Table Four: A Matrix of Anti-Corruption Strategies

Anticorruption MeasuresCommitmentof Political Leadership

Source: Quah 1999

Adequate InadequateStrong Effective Strategy Ineffective Strategy 2Weak Ineffective Strategy 1 “Hopeless” Strategy

40

Table Five: Comparison of the Domestic Context of China, Hong Kong and Japan

China Japan Hong KongRegime Type Authoritarian Democratic Partial DemocraticEconomic Context Semi-reformed

market economy Fast economic

growth

Mature marketeconomy

Slow economicgrowth

Mature marketeconomy

Slow economicgrowth

Role ofBureaucracy Policy-MakingRole

BureaucraticDomination

Strong BureaucraticInfluence

Strong BureaucraticInfluence

Formation of theBureaucracy

Political loyalty,limited degree pfmerit

Merit based Merit based

State Autonomy(level of politicalintrusion)

WeakLack of institutionaldevelopment

High Powerful and

independentbureaucracy

Extendedinfluence to thebusiness sector

High but Weakening(due to political andcivil servicereforms)powerful andindependentbureaucracy

Economic Role State-driveneconomicdevelopment (strongstate influence)

State-driveneconomicdevelopment (highstate influence)

State-driveneconomicdevelopment(medium stateinfluence)

Bureaucratic Rolein EconomicDevelopment

Bureaucraticentrepreneurism(direct participationof bureaucrats ineconomicdevelopment)

Development State(state formulateindustrial policiesand direct flow ofresources todifferent industries)

Development State(no industrial policy,state involvement insupporting and non-profit sectors)

BureaucraticIntegration withEconomic Interests

Almost inseparable Interconnected andinterlocked

Clearly separable

41

Table Five: Comparison of the Domestic Context of China, Hong Kong and Japan(Continued)

China Japan Hong KongBureaucraticIncentives forCorruptionControl

Low Medium High

Nature ofBureaucraticCorruption

Systemic:threatening to slowdown the pace ofgrowth and negativeimpact on the equityin society

Systemic: adverselyaffecting theeconomictransformation andrestructuring

Non-Systemic

Pattern ofCorruptionControl

Anti-corruptionlaws with manyagencies

Anti-corruptionlaws with manyagencies

Anti-corruption lawswith an independentagency

Level ofBureaucraticCorruption

High Medium Low

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i Most obviously Ferrel Heady and Fred Riggs.ii The four dependent variables are People, Organizations, Behavior and Power. Policy is another such variable.iii Again, Asia is only used as one example of a set of non-Western nations.iv In interpreting the global pressures, it is important to understand that these three are not the only global pressures -numerous others exist. Rather, these pressures are highlighted because they are some of the most obvious examples ofglobal pressures that are influencing national bureaucracies. It is not the purpose of this article to compile a full listing of allpossible global pressures, but rather to demonstrate the theoretical richness of the new model in generating theory oranalyzing change in public bureaucracies.v The category of information technology is not confined to one channel of communication or type of technology, but ratherrepresents the broader effort to enhance and improve information flows and work processes with electronic informationprocessing equipment.vi For example, in western countries like the United States, information technology is observed to create a leakage inauthority from government (Cleveland). Meanwhile, Asian countries such as China and Singapore are investigating ways ofusing information technology to tighten the state control over society (New York Times, Feb. 5, 1996).vii Examples in health policy include the World Health Organization’s (WHO) procedures for controlling communicablediseases. For environmental protection, one example is the 1987 Montreal Protocol for the protection of stratospheric ozoneby reducing emissions of chlorflurocarbons.viii The term domestic context is chosen to provide flexible interpretation of location. It is not limited to administrativejurisdiction but can be based on geographical, cultural or some other useful boundary distinction. In the case ofadministrative jurisdiction, domestic can refer to national, regional, local or some other administrative delineation. Thisflexibility will enable the model to be extended to the analysis of regional administrative systems.ix It is recognized that identification of comparable and commensurate measures is often difficult (McGregor and Salano,1996) and that correlations among some of the following measures may be high.x The four attributes are similar to the attributes of people, power, behavior, and organization that are examined by Peters(1988). Other attributes of bureaucracy can also be studied as dependent variables using the model of global pressures.