Nation Building in Yugoslavia Model

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Competing Identities in Interwar Yugoslavia:

Identity Formation in a Newly Established State

Connie Robinson

Copyright © 2003 by Connie Robinson and TCDS


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Introduction:

Created in the aftermath of World War I, the first Yugoslav state joined together several national

groups who had survived many centuries of foreign control and domination, who shared similar

political, strategic and economic interests along with the need for collective security against the

great powers, and who shared similar language and ethnic backgrounds. However, each national

group brought unique and separate historical and cultural traditions and memories that had

developed in differing socioeconomic conditions and political structures.1 From its formation in

1918 to its collapse during World War II, the first Yugoslav state tried to build a working

government that was considered legitimate by its constituent groups while protecting its

territorial sovereignty from strong external aggressors. The politics of the interwar period

reveals the struggles, aspirations, and goals of the constituent national groups as they try to

develop a working government that would provide collective security, political and economic

arrangements yet enable them to maintain a unique identity with distinctive cultural and

historical traditions.

What is striking in reading the historical accounts of pre-World War I era and the period between

World War I and World War II is the importance given to the creation and articulation of an

inclusive national identity that would be separate from the national identities already used yet

would be capable of unifying diverse groups with different histories and cultures. A Yugoslav

national identity was seen as a way to bring these diverse groups together by emphasizing the

ethnic and linguistic similarities between the groups and downplaying potentially divisive

differences.2 However, in many ways, the Yugoslav national identity was a truly invented

identity and thus had to compete with other, more resonant national identities that had framed

cultural, social and political life for many generations. The Croatian and Serbian national

1 Ivo J. Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,” Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo

J. Lederer, University of Washington Press: 1969, pg. 397. Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War , Yale

(2001). John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country , 2nd edition, Cambridge University

Press (2000). Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Cornell University Press(1984).2 Dimitrije Djordjevic, “The Idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century,” The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-

1918, edited by Dimitrije Djordjevic, Clio Press: Oxford England (1980).


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identities were supported by their own versions of nationalism that articulated political goals,

interests and agendas that supported specific power relations.

Framework for Analyzing National Identity:

In this paper, I would like to propose a framework for analyzing nationalism and national

identity that uses discourse/textual analysis while situating political discourse within its historical

and structural context. By placing political discourse within its particular historical and

structural context, it is possible to illuminate the contestation over national identity within the

public sphere and its effects on the state and politics. In my research, I am focusing on the

process in which the Yugoslav national identity was conceptualized and then competed with the

Croatian and Serbian national identities during the period between World War I and World War

II.3 My specific interest is how these differing conceptions of national identity and their

corresponding nationalist ideologies framed political discourse by providing legitimacy to certain

goals and interests while denying that legitimacy to others and impacted the state formation

process because of their influence on the various groups’ and parties’ definition of good

government. This convergence of identity and culture, expressed in national identity, as it

intersects with the state formation process reveals the strength and resonance of nationalism

because it utilizes social, religious and cultural traditions that are important for many people far

removed from everyday politics and melds the interests of ordinary people with those involved in

politics. This convergence defines what is acceptable within politics and legitimates (or not) the

activities, agendas and aspirations of the politicians and other actors involved in making the state

as well as the outcomes of the political and institutionalization process in the actual structures of

governance. Nationalism can then be seen as a discursive framework that should be analyzed

within the realm of “normal” politics rather than from the periphery.4 As a political ideology, its

saliency comes not from its use by extremist supporters to condone violence but because it used

to address issues that are central to any political system: most importantly, it seeks to define the

3 At this time, I will only use Croatian and Serbian national identities and nationalisms as counterpoints to Yugoslav

national identity and nationalism in order to keep the project manageable. While Macedonia, Slovenia and

Montenegro are important parts of this story, much of the literature and scholarship focuses on Serbia and Croatiaand their battle for supremacy within the Yugoslav state. Future research hopefully will allow me to broaden this

picture.4 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, University of Minnesota Press (1997).


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territorial, legal, and political boundaries of the state, the mutual responsibilities and obligations

of the state and individual, and the parameters of citizenship.

What makes the case of Yugoslavia particularly interesting for such analysis is while

Yugoslavism or Illyrianism, as it was conceived in Croatia during the early 1800’s, was a

recognizable political discourse during the nineteenth century, Yugoslavism did not have real

political saliency until after the formation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918. So, the Yugoslav

state was created before there was a Yugoslav nation but in a territory where two nations,

Croatian and Serbian, were in search of a state. This allows the scholar to interrogate the

theories of nationalism by utilizing a relatively short and compact historical record and

contrasting the different political and socioeconomic conditions and historical legacies between

the national groups.

In order to understand the dynamic situation in interwar Yugoslavia, I have two goals for my

research. First, I will attempt to analyze nationalism as a discursive framework in which certain

cultural or social markers are politicized in order to develop recognizable boundaries between

groups, which could be used to conceptualize a national identity capable of supporting a newly

established state. Second, in order to understand the saliency of nationalism, I will attempt to

situate the Yugoslav, Serbian, and Croatian national identities within their specific historical

contexts, specifically looking at the ways in which the social and political structures inherited

from the past influenced national identity and was in turn influenced by that identity.

At this initial stage of my research, I will analyze the writings and activities of the intellectual

and political elite during the interwar period in Yugoslavia as they conceptualized and promoted

particular national identities and nationalist political ideologies, specifically analyzing how they

relied on specific cultural markers to demarcate the various national identities. The materials

produced by the intellectual and political elite take on significance because they were pivotal

players in the political scene and actively sought to infuse their ideals, conceptions and agendas

into the formation and institutionalization of the first Yugoslav state. In their writings, they

conceptualized and legitimated the various identities and provided the justification that made


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I have decided to focus on the intellectual and political elite in interwar Yugoslavia for several

reasons. First, in contrast to other settings where the middle class played pivotal roles, the

intellectual and political elite appear to the primary political actors during the time period

immediately prior to the formation of the first Yugoslav state and during the interwar period.

They were immediately recognizable as distinct from the peasantry, for example, through their

education and ability to travel which provided exposure to Western European political thought

and trends. Also, they either already occupied powerful political or military positions either

within the Serbian monarchy or through their activities against the two empires or had gained

prestige within cultural, social and religious circles. From what I have read so far, there appears

to be virtually no distinction between the intellectual elite and political elite because those who

would be considered the intellectual elite often became political actors through their own

activities or because the state enlisted them into one of its ministries. The only distinction would

appear within the political elite, between those holding office and actively lobbying for political

change, and those with high position in the military, or the military elite.6

Second, the classic literature on nationalism has emphasized the role of the intelligentsia as the

primary “inventors” of the nation and nationalism.7 However, I would like to adopt a slightly

different approach, utilizing a model first articulated by Miroslav Hroch. In Social

Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, Hroch develops a typology of national movements

within Europe in which each national movement can be seen as going through three phases:

Phase A (the period of scholarly interest), Phase B (the period of patriotic agitation) and Phase C

(the rise of the mass national movement). Hroch considers Phase B to be the most important

because it is during this phase that certain political actors recognize the political saliency of the

“national” history, traditions, and cultures previously articulated during Phase A and seek to

develop a political agenda aimed at emancipation, independence, or some other political activity

6 Dubravka Stojanovic, “Party Elites in Serbia 1903-1914;” Mile Bjelajac, “Military Elites – Continuity and

Discontinuities: The Case of Yugoslavia, 1918-1980;” Ljubinka Trgovcevic, “Serbian Intellectuals in Foreign

Universities in the 19th Century;” Published by Association for Social History, www.udi.org.yu. One of my goals

in this project is to do an in-depth sociological analysis of who these intellectuals were.7 See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914,” in The Invention ofTradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, Cambridge University Press (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm,

Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press (1990).


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directed in favor of the “preservation” of the nation.8 Phase B is the period that most scholars of

nationalism and national movements emphasize. However, most scholars appear to miss the

contestation that occurs during Phase B as the intelligentsia choose certain national traditions to

emphasize, and others to ignore, and as certain political goals are articulated while minimizing

others.

At this juncture, I believe that the literature on civil society and the public sphere is the most

important for highlighting the contestation that occurs within Phase B, especially when the goals

of most nationalist agendas are state-oriented in some form. The model most apt for illuminating

this contestation is that provided by Eiko Ikegami’s multiple publics theory. Each group of

elites, intelligentsia, and other political actors can be viewed as a social network which creates a

public through its internal ties and through links to other groups. Within this public space,

cultural production and identity construction takes place. Further, continual communication and

associations create a “public” that confer legitimacy and assist in maintaining power. As each

network competes within the political sphere, they are contesting each other’s claims to

legitimacy, political aspirations, and institutional and structural goals that either preserve their

group’s hegemony or protect it from other groups.9 The outcome of the contestation – the

national identity - will ultimately dependent upon the relative ability and strength of a particular

group to articulate a particular vision of a national identity and defend that vision against other

groups with their own visions.

Theoretical Implications:

The conceptualization of an identity relies on signifiers, rules, and guidelines which allow

individuals and groups to assess the situation, think, interact, and act accordingly. At the first

instance, the assessment will be based upon the individual’s prior experiences and knowledge.

As distance increases, the individual will increasingly rely on definitions passed down and given

by others. The primary source of information will be the individual’s family and close social

8 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social

Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations, Columbia University Press (2000), first

published by Cambridge University Press (1985), pgs. 22-30. See also, Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement

to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe,” Becoming National , edited by Geoff Eley

and Ronald Grigor Suny, Oxford University Press (1996), pgs. 60-77.


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circle but then secondary sources such as the church and school will be used eventually moving

up the social scale to national and racial groups. In times of confusion and change, when the

individual and those closest to him or her are unable to provide meaning, secondary sources will

be sought out as they look for a reasonable definition of the situation.10

Identity attempts to answer the question “Who am I,” and at the same time, the question “who I

am not.” The conceptualization of the “other” is a crucial element in the development of an

identity. On a basic level, the individual is able to see and thus define the “other” through face

to face contact and interaction with other individuals. As similarities and, but arguably more

importantly, differences are observed between individuals and groups of individuals, meanings

will be constructed and ascribed to those similarities and differences. Group identities are able to

categorize similarities and differences for the individual and provide a point of reference for

attribution of meaning. National identity provides a meaningful and cohesive framework around

which individuals can gather; nationalism provides a definition of who does not belong within

that same group and politicizes the differences. Arguably, one of the most important functions of

the concepts of nation and nationalism is to define the boundaries of the community and/or

public sphere and then influence and determine the parameters of citizenship and even the

boundaries of the state.

Nationalism, however defined by scholars and utilized by nationalists, ultimately relies on border

creation and maintenance, supported by shared histories, cultural forms, and other criteria such

as language or religion. Daniele Conversi argues that “[n]ationalism is both a process of border

maintenance and creation. Hence, it is a process of definition.”11

Borders provide a framework

for national identity; by drawing a line between who belongs and who does not belong serves to

both create and maintain group identity and solidarity. However, the borders are often fluid and

9 Eiko Ikegami, “A Sociological Theory of Publics: Identity and Culture as Emergent Properties in Networks,”

Social Research, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2000).10 Anthony Smith argues that there are three typical conditions or situations that lead the emergence of ethnic myths

and consequently, a strong sense of national identity: 1) prolonged periods of warfare; 2) perceived or actual threat

of secularization of a culture or a clash of cultures that reveals its potential weaknesses; and 3) commercialization

that threatens to break down a community’s isolation or change its existing economic structure. Anthony Smith,

National Identity, University of Nevada Press (1991), pg. 84.11 Daniele Conversi, “Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and

Creation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pg. 77.


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subject to change, changing also the identities that are based on the borders. In times of turmoil

and confusion, greater emphasis is placed on cultural and ethnic markers which make up the

boundaries between groups.

Cultural artifacts and other cultural phenomena such as language are utilized to provide easily

recognizable markers which distinguish groups from one another, recognizable by both the

insider and outsider. For example, a national language, through its expression, incorporates

shared meanings and symbols which make up collective memories and traditions. Effective and

efficient communication requires both the speaker and audience to use and understand a common

language and ascribe the same meanings to words. Language is often used to demarcate those

who belong in the in-group and those who do not. Two people who speak the same language not

only share a semantic understanding but also share common histories, traditions, and memories

which can be invoked through the spoken word.

However, in nationalism, as with “race” and “ethnicity”, it is not the cultural content – the shared

meanings, histories and traditions - within certain social boundaries that is significant but the

meaning attributed to the cultural signifiers and the boundaries they represent. As David

McCrone notes, “[i]t is not a question of wording, but of the power-laden symbolism which lies

behind the categories.”12

Not all cultural markers are significant, only those markers that are deemed salient through social

and political processes and through struggle and conflict and that make up the boundaries

between groups. In this sense, religion, language, statutes, flags take on certain meaning not

because of intrinsic qualities within themselves but through what they represent to both the

communities within and without the boundaries. Cultural markers are used to define boundaries

between groups. The content of the cultural markers remains important sociologically because it

reveals how the group sees themselves and how they perceive others – its self image. However,

“[i]f we are trying to define ethnic or national identity, then what matters is what the boundaries

are, especially people’s self-descriptions of themselves vis-à-vis others.”13

12 David McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism, Routledge (1998), pg. 25.13 McCrone, pg. 29.


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The process of boundary creation and maintenance moves beyond the cultural and social identity

formation process and enters the political realm when group members attempt to institutionalize

and legalize the boundaries in order to gain political opportunities; protect their social, economic

and political interests; and preserve their privileged position against outsiders. Citizenship is one

example which reveals the political embodiment of boundaries because the rules of citizenship

determines who is eligible for state benefits and who is not. Rogers Brubaker conceptualizes the

state as a “membership organization” where certain individuals are allowed memberships and

others are not. Entrance to and participation in the membership organization is granted through

citizenship laws. However, while conceived in a formal and legal sense, citizenship is “an

increasingly salient social and cultural fact. As a powerful instrument of social closure,

citizenship occupies a central place in the administrative structure and political culture of the

modern nation-state and state system”14

As Brubaker’s term suggests, “social closure” is provided by boundaries which can identify

insiders and separate them from outsiders. By using informal classification systems transferred

up from the society below, the state establishes and institutionalizes criteria for membership

through its citizenship laws. Rogers Smith argues that “[c]itizenship laws also literally constitute

– they create with legal words – a collective civic identity. They proclaim the existence of a

political ‘people’, in ways that often become integral to individuals’ senses of personal identity

as well.”15

The delineation of the nation and the distinctions between groups can best be understood as

boundary markers that are used to reinforce group solidarity but also to create a categorization

scheme that can legitimate and/or reinforce power relations through institutionalization of those

boundaries through the political and legal spheres. In this sense, nationalism gains resonance

because it draws upon on historical memories and cultural and social traditions to provide

legitimacy to its political goals while utilizing the boundary markers provided through social

categorization based on nationalism to determine who the beneficiaries of its political activities

are. Nationalism articulates a relationship between identity, culture and state and uses that

14 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press (1992), pg. 23.15 Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, Yale University Press ( ), pg. 31.


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relationship to confer legitimacy upon the state, provide a framework for political institutions

and structures, and even define the boundaries of “normal politics” such as who is eligible for

citizenship, what is appropriate political discourse and who has the right to make claims against

the state. The study of nationalism can not be limited to either how it influences national

independent movement (good nationalism) or extremist genocidal acts of violence (bad

nationalism) but should be analyzed within the realm of “normal politics” because it defines and

articulates the boundaries of state and citizenship, the responsibilities of the state to its citizens,

and confers legitimacy upon the state.

Further, by approaching nationalism from the perspective of civil society or the public sphere

within which there are multiple publics, the scholar can grapple with the contestation and

competition that exists between groups as they seek to influence or fight against the state,

whether it be an empire, totalitarian regime, or democratic state. Rather than seeing nationalism

solely as the results of the activities of the intelligentsia or the state (state-sponsored nationalism

designed to support a state after it has already been established), this approach would allow us to

view national identity as the outcome of contestation in which the form it takes is not necessarily

the same form its nationalist promoters sought. The success or failure of a particular national

identity is ultimately dependent on the relative strength or weakness of its promoters within a

specific historical, political, and social context. However, because its boundaries or even

content may be different from originally intended by its promoters, the resulting national identity

must be viewed as a compromise and can remain a volatile focus point for politics until new

historical memories, cultural traditions, or political structures are available to provide an point of

unity between the diverse groups. This is particularly relevant for Yugoslavia. The

conceptualization of the Yugoslav national identity was the result of fierce contestation between

different groups within a specific security and political contest when the first Yugoslav state was

established. Yet, while the idea of the Yugoslav nation was put into motion with the first

Yugoslav state, it did not change into a recognizable, salient national identity until World War II,

which was experienced in much the same way by all South Slavs regardless of national

membership.

Nation Building in Yugoslavia Model

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