NARENDRAMODIAPOLITICALBIOGRAPHY

AndyMarino

HarperCollinsPublishersIndia

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CONTENTS

IntroductionPrologue

PART1:Beginnings1.TheEarlyYears

2.OntheRoad

3PoliticalAwakening

PART2:TheAscent4.LearningtheRopes

5.TheYatratoPower

6.RisingtoResponsibility

PART3:TheReturn7.TheRiots

8.FightingforGujarat

9.DevelopmentandGovernance

PART4:TheFuture10.AndNow,PrimeMinister?

NotesandReferencesIndexAcknowledgementsPhotographicInsert

AbouttheAuthorCopyright

T

INTRODUCTION

HISISTHESTORYofanextraordinarylife.Asalwaysthere isacontext:NarendraModiistheprimeministerialcandidateof

theBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)inwhatislikelytobeahistoricgeneralelection.The2014LokSabhapollwillsetthecourseforIndianpoliticsandpolicywellinto

thenextdecade. It couldbe themostdramatic and important election sinceMarch1977, when Indira Gandhi was defeated after revoking the Emergency. TheEmergencyendedbeforemostIndiansalivetodaywereborn.Todayover60percentofIndiansareunderthirty-fiveyearsofage.ThiselectionwillbelongtoyoungIndiaandthatiswhy,despiterisingdisenchantmentwithpoliticsandpoliticians,votersareenergizedbytheprospectofchange.

WhenIbeganworkingonthisbook, thecompellingnatureof thesubject struckme:NarendraModi is both a complex and simpleman, but within a multilayeredpersona.Hecanbedecisive, firm,unyielding.Andyethehasacalmabouthimthatenableshimtosurmountcriseswithdispassionatemeticulousness,evendetachment.

Itravelledwithhimonhiscampaignrallies,interviewedhimoverseveralweeksandobservedhimcloselyashewentabouthiswork.

Thoughgregariousinprivate,Modihasn’tgrantedinterviewsoften.Wherehehas,theyhavebeenshortandpointed.Ourconversations,however,wereopen-endedandwentbackandforthoverhislifeandwork.Itispossiblythefirsttimehehasgrantedsuchaccesstoanyjournalistorauthor,Indianorforeign.

In the voluminous recorded conversationswe had, he revealed for the first timedetailsabouthisearlylifeandthemostcontroversialperiodinhispoliticalcareer:thecommunalriotsinGujaratin2002.

Modi spoke with candour, without notes. Nothing, in terms of questions, wastaboo.WespokeinEnglishinwhichheisincreasinglyfluent.Theobviousmisgivingsreaders may have though are: one, how well can a British author decode thecomplexities of India?And two,would this book end up as an attempt to airbrushModi’sfaultsandplayuphisstrengths?

Toanswerthefirstquestion:sometimesanoutsider’sperspectivecanshedclarity

oneventsthatthosetooclosetothem,outofpassionorprejudice,mightmiss.Havingworked in India, I am familiar with Indian politics without being swayed by aparticularideologyorpointofview.

As for the second misgiving: my account of Modi’s life is based on extensiveresearch over almost a year and interviews with a range of people, in politics andoutsideit,forModiandagainstModi,andthishasenabledmetoassesshisworkandlifewithcoldobjectivity.

No biography carries credibility if it is mere hagiography. Having written twobiographies,publishedby leadingpublishers inBritainand theUnitedStates, itwasimportant forme toget the toneandbalanceof thisbookabsolutely right.For thisreason too, footnotes and references have been meticulously catalogued for eachchapterattheendofthisvolume.

Andyetobjectivitydoesnotmeanflying inthefaceof incontrovertibleevidence.Modi has been the subject of the longest, most intense – and probably the mostvituperative–campaignofvilificationsincethe2002communalriotsinGujarat.

In recent months, after he was anointed the BJP’s prime ministerial candidateModi’sdevelopmentrecordinGujarattoohascomeunderclosescrutiny.Allegationsthat he is authoritarian, runs a surveillance-based state, is prone to making factualerrorsinhiscampaignspeechesandhasnoalternativevisionforIndiahavebeenmadebybothhispoliticalopponentsandthemedia.

Ihavecarefullyexaminedeveryoneofthese–andseveralmore–togetatthefactsandseparatethemfromthefiction.

Modideservesanarrativethatisbalanced,objectiveandfair–butalsounsparinglycriticalofhisfoibles.Ihopethisbookmeetsthathighstandard.

W

PROLOGUE

EDROVETOTHEhelipadalongclosed-offroads.Infrontwentthejammer,withitsdomedelectronicsboltedtotheroof.TheeightsilverSUVs,followingtwoor

three abreast, were packed with soldiers and black-clad commandos of NarendraModi’sZ-Plussecuritydetail,thehighestleveltheIndiangovernmentoffersitsVIPs.1

They were there with good reason. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),tireless in its efforts towage a proxywar on India, had stepped up its attacks sinceModi beganhis nationwide election campaign.The ISI trains terror cells and sendsinfiltrators into India,usuallyvia JammuandKashmir (J&K). It smugglesarmsandexplosivesovertheborderintoGujarat.Theporous,poorlypolicedNepalborderwithBiharisanotherconduit.

NarendraModi,asGujarat’schiefminister,hasbeentargetnumberoneoftheISI-financed terror network known as the IndianMujahideen.2 At rallies across India,Modihasdrawncrowds in lakhsandthedangerofasuicidebomber iseverpresent.During his twelve years as chief minister, he has been firm in his resistance toincursionsandterrorplots.Pakistan’scivilianleadershiphasrecentlysaidit‘canwork’with Modi as prime minister but the threat to his life from a proxy terror attackremainspalpable.

Asourconvoyspedalong,soldiersandpolicewereplacedevery100metresontheroadside with their backs towards us, looking for suspicious movements in theundergrowthanddownthewideavenues.Onarrivalat thehelipadthecommandosleapedfromthecarsandsprintedtowardsthechopperwhilesoldiersinkhakifannedout,machinegunsattheready,toprovideawiderringofcover.Itwasonlywhenwewere in the air that the vulnerabilitywouldbe replacedby the relative safety of theskies. Then there would be onlyModi, a couple of senior assistants andme in thepassenger compartment, with the pilot and co-pilot up front. No commandos onboard.

Anaromaofunburnedfuelfromthehelicopter’sexhaustsleakedintothecabinastherotorsspunfaster.IleantacrosstomakemyselfheardtoModi.Thepitchoftherotorshadchangedtoatighter,moreaggressivenoteandwerosesmoothlyintotheair

whilerotatingtofacewest.Asmilebrokeacrosshisface:‘You’llloveit,’hesaid,abovetheenginenoise,speakingabouttherallyhewouldshortlyaddressandourinteractionwiththecrowd. ‘Itwillbethebest.’Thechopper’snosedippedandthecraftsurgedforward.

There had been rain overnight. A mist hung below the cloud cover, restrictingvisibilitytoaround10kilometresatourheightof1,500feet.Asweracedovertownsand villages, vegetationwas everywhere in shades of dark chrome and cobalt green.The rectangular grid of streets and buildings arose straight and cube-cut fromentanglingfoliage,flatgreyconcreteroofsglisteninggrimyandrain-streaked,asiftheywererelicsofanancientcivilization.

Modisatquietlypeeringoverhisspectaclesasweflewalong,abigmaninasmallcabin.Hemulledoverafewhandwrittennotes,factsandfigures,forthespeechhewasgoingtodeliver.Afterthatheskimmedthroughsomearticlesculledforhimfromtheprevious day’s newspapers.Outside, the sky brightened slightly aswe headed south,thevillagesbelownowshowingpitched,red-tiledroofs.Moretemplesflashedupatusinthebrighteningmorninglight.

The fields were still green but the topsoil shallower, the vegetation lighter andsparser as the ground became rockier and showedmore outcrops and escarpments,headingtowardsthewidelittoraloftheArabianSea.

Modi’s critics allege that Gujarat’s transformation is nothing but a grand illusion,smoke and mirrors, and that in truth the state is in a terrible mess, a cauldron ofpoverty and religious bigotry just as it was before Modi took over. Alongside theendlesscontroversiesaboutModi’spersonality,hisdisputedsuccessinGujaratisoneofthedominatingthemesofthe2014generalelection.

ForanybodywritingthestoryofNarendraModi’spoliticalcareer,thechronologyis compelling. His tenure as chief minister of Gujarat more than encompasses theCongressparty’slatest,almostdecade-longruleofIndia.ThetantalizingpossibilityisthattheybothmightnowendifModibecomesprimeministerinMay2014.

ModiwasappointedbyhisnationalpartyaschiefministerofGujaratinOctober2001.(Hewasnotatfirstelected.)Astonishingly,itwashisfirst-everpoliticaltenure.Tillthenhehadonlyheldadministrativepartypositions.Hewasaback-roomworker

andstrategistfortheBJP,risingtobecomeitsgeneralsecretary,buthehadneverstoodforpublicoffice.

Onlyafewmonthsintohisnewjob,Gujaratwasplungedintobloodycommunalriots.ThestatesufferedmurderousclashesbetweenHindusandMuslimsinFebruaryandMarch2002.Eversince,Modihaswidelybeenheldresponsible.Hismostvirulentopponentsclaimheplannedandorchestratedtheriots,whichresultedinthedeathsof790Muslims and 254Hindus,with 223 peoplemissing.TheUnited States deniedhimavisain2005onthatbasisanddespitethisdiplomaticaffronttoIndia,owingtoModi’spositionasanelectedstatechiefminister,theCongress-ledUPAgovernmentraisedonlytheverymildestofformalobjections.

TheGujaratriotsof2002setinstonetheimageofModi.Untilveryrecentlythatview,largelyunchallenged,hadnotchangedsignificantly.Inthemeantime,Modiwasre-electedasGujarat’schiefministerthrice.TheBJP’smajorityinGujaratwasalmostas largeas ithadbeenwhenhewasfirstelectedin late2002.IntheDecember2012assembly election, it is believed that over a quarter of the state’sMuslims voted forhim.Buttheangstremains.

Asourchoppercameintoland,crowdssurgedforwardbelowusandalineofsecuritymenspreadtheirarmsinanattempttoholdthemback.Whenthecabindooropened,the air outsidehad turnedquitepink and Iwasbriefly startledby it until cracklingnoises everywhere revealed clouds of gunpowder smoke from firecrackers, almostinvisible in the daylight. The cordite smell reminded one of the real danger ofgunpowderintheHindiheartlandofUttarPradeshandBihar.

Again there were the commandos and soldiers, a separate detachment sent onaheadtomeetus,andagainweloadedourselvesintoaconvoyofcarsandSUVs.Nowwepassed along decorated, celebratory streets full of balloons and bunting, lined, itseemed,withnearlyhalfthepopulationofthetown.

Attherally,filledwithheavingcrowds,Modispokewithoutnotesandwithoutateleprompter.Inoticedthatnowordwasstumbledoverorswallowed,andhowfirstone arm and then the other would be slowly raised to emphasize a point beforereturning to rest. It gave an impression of both relaxation and strength. At all hiscampaign rallies,Modiuseshisbody language to add force tohisoratory.His voicerises and falls several pitches as he tears into the Congress and other parties. Thecadenceandtonalityisquiteunique–rarelyseeninIndiaorindeedevenintheWest

wherepoliticianscanotherwiseberobusttothepointofevangelical.

DuringthefirstfourdecadesofIndependence,IndiafollowedtheeconomicconsensusofthetimethatexistedalmosteverywhereoutsidetheUSandHongKong:amildornot-so-mildsocialismofbig,state-directedeconomicplanningled, inIndia’scase,byanupper-casteelite.TheNehru-Gandhifamilycementeditsprerogativesduringthistimeandemergedasapoliticaldynasty.

EvenwhenthehegemonyoftheCongressbegantobechallengedin1977bytheJanataParty (and later the JanataDal) after IndiraGandhi’s periodof dictatorship,the left-wing ideology that confined India to its low annual growth rate remained.Always the avowed concern was for the poor, and government policies seemeddesignedtoensurethattherewouldalwaysbeplentyofpoorpeopletobepatronized–chieflywithsacksofriceorgrain–atelectiontime.

Modi has positioned himself as a living rebuttal to that narrative. Would thecountryfollowhim?

Onthestage,awell-wishermanagestoplacearedturbanonModi’shead.Itperchesthere, slightly too small forhim,ashebeginshis speech.Theaudience is largerhereandmore restive than the day before. Its chants and applause are louder – almostexplosive. Modi is in a combative frame of mind as well, attacking the UPA-2government and linking the prime minister’s characteristic silence with thegovernment’smanyfailures–corruption,inflation,security.HeaccusestheCongressleadershipofbeing‘mute’andfailingtospeakupforIndia.

It was a nice conflation, typical of Modi’s penchant for a sort of wordplay,conceptual yet not intellectual, that could be immediately understood by all hislisteners.Itwasanaspectofhispopularappeal,thiscommontouchwithwords,anditsubtlycommunicatedanessentialpointabouthisbackgroundaswell:Modiwasoneofthem,aworking-classmantheycouldidentifywith,notoneoftheoldstatusquopoliticalclass,theDelhielite.Hebreathedchange.

Asthecrowdchantshisname,Modi’svoicerises:

‘At the timeof independence,people aspired for self-rule andgoodgovernance.More than60yearshavepassedbutpeoplearestillasking–whydon’twehavegoodgovernanceinthecountry?’3

In his speeches, Modi consistently focuses on the electoral argument around thisessential issue: the reform and strengthening of political institutions, and therelationshipbetweencitizenandstate.WhatisatstakeforIndiainthesixteenthLokSabhapoll, he says, is a basic choice between reform and empowerment on the onehand,andretrenchmentandentitlementontheother.Doyouwantthegovernmentdoingthingsforyou(badly),orthegovernmenthelpingyoutodothingsforyourself?

More sharply, underlying his question and aimed at the heart of the Congressparty,wastheultimatechallenge:dynastyordevelopment?

Backinthechopper,attheendoftherally,Modiagainsettledoversomepapers,thistimeaprintoutofemailssenttohim.Itisinterestingthatwhileheisacalmandself-containedmaninprivate,heclearlyappreciatesandsometimesperhapsevenneedstohearsomepleasantmessages,whichhisstaffselectfromvoluminouscorrespondence.Hetoldmethathehassufferedtwelveyearsofpublic‘Modi-bashing’sincethetimeoftheriots,andthathisdecisionearlyonwasto‘letthemediadoitswork:therewillbenoconfrontation.Ineverwastemytimeinconfrontation.’Modirarelyrepliestohistormentors,insteadpractisingwhathecalls‘detachment’.

Saurabh Patel, Gujarat’s minister for energy and employment, a successfulbusinessmanbeforehewasapolitician,joinedusinthechopperonthereturnjourneyandModipassedtheemailprintouttohim.Hereaditandhandeditbackwithalittlegesture–oneofthoseeloquent,energy-conservinghandmovements–thatsaid,‘Yousee?’

Modi passed the paper to me. A Ukrainian lady had written to him. She wasrecentlymarriedtoanIndianandnowthatshewasgettingtoknowthecountryshecongratulated Modi on what he had achieved in Gujarat. But her main pointconcernedthe2014election.Backin2005,shesaid,theyhadachancetochangethesysteminUkraine–itwasthetimeofthe‘OrangeRevolution’–buttheyblewit.IfyouhavethechancetochangeIndia,shewrote,don’tfailus,becausethereisnobodyelsewhocandoit.

Modi is constantly referred to as divisive. Many increasingly compare him toMargaret Thatcher, whom the British Left called fascist. This animosity iscompounded by social factors. Modi is an outsider, an OBC who has spent hispolitical life learning how the system works but who remains apart from it. Modioperateswithruthlessefficiencybyappealingdirectlytothepeopleovertheheadsof

otherpoliticians.Butheisanoutsiderwhocouldsoonbeontheinside.If in 2014 Narendra Modi occupies the prime minister’s residence at 7 Race

Course Road, it will be the end of a long and unexpected journey for the poor,backward-classboyfromasmallGujarattowncalledVadnagar.

PART1Beginnings

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1

THEEARLYYEARS

ARENDRAMODIWASBORNon17September1950inthesmalltownofVadnagarin Gujarat, about 110 km directly north of the chief minister’s bungalow in

Gandhinagar where he now resides. The bungalow is not a great distance from hisbirthplace,butinanothersenseitisaverylongwayindeed.

India’sfirstgeneralelectiontookplaceshortlyafterModi’sbirth.PanditJawaharlalNehru’sIndianNationalCongresswonanoverwhelmingmajority–364outofwhatwerethen489seats–intheLokSabha.Atlast,aftertheupheavalsofIndependenceand Partition, the elected Union government began to function according to theIndianConstitution,enactedon26January1950.AsNehrustoodtospeakasprimeministerofthenewgovernmentin1952,littleNarendra,tothedelightofhisparents,wasforminghisfirstwords.

Vadnagarin1950wasaquiet,semi-ruralbackwater,somewhatbrokendownandwithoutelectricity.Itscitizenshadnoaspirationsbeyondtheirownparents’positioninlife.Indiawasnotacountryofsocialadventureoropportunity,andlifeforthevastmajoritywasaroutine,self-containedexistence.ItcouldbesaidthatlikeIndiaitself,Vadnagarhadagreatfuturebehindit:statelyruinstothenorthofthetownhintedatanancientcentre,andgaveevidenceofwhatamassiveandimpressiveregionalcapitalithadbeeninapastmillennium.1

Modi,whenaskedabouthischildhood,describeshowthetownwasoncehometo10,000 Buddhist monks. It is true that the richness of its archaeology supports anintriguing and influential history, but that epochwas very long ago. By 1950, afterwavesof invasionandcolonizationdownthecenturies, theIndianpeople, includingthose in Narendra’s home town, had adjusted their expectations downward. They

were,though,beginningtoimagineafutureatlastintheirownhands.Itmightholdonlyadistantpromiseof somethingbetter–whatever thatmightmean–but therewasatleastthatsliverofhope.

The railway was already there in Vadnagar, of course, and Narendra’s father,Damodardas, earnedhis living froma tea stall set upon theplatformof the town’sstation.The small stallor shopremains there today just as itwas, showing its age: asmallshedofblue-greytinorsteel,patchedandpadlocked,matchinginantiquitythearchitectureoftheplatformitself,underwhoseeavesitstands.

Damodardas was descended from a family named Ranchoddas that moved toVadnagar to open a grocery store late in the nineteenth century.Hewas thirty-fiveyears old in 1950 andmarried toHiraben, a local girl.WhenNarendra arrived hejoined two elder brothers: Som,whowas six years old, andAmrit, just four.Therewouldcomeasister,Vasanti,twoyearsafterNarendrawasborn,andthentwomorebrothers,Prahladin1955,andPankajin1958.

TheModi family was very poor bymodern standards, although theywould nothave felt particularly deprived at that time or within their community. The teabusiness lifted them above the precarious existence of the day labourer orsharecropper.

All eight – parents, brothers and sister – lived in a three-room house of brickaugmentedbymud.Itwassinglestorey:small,notabsolutelytiny,about40feetby12feet,withthebedroomandthesittingroomatthefront,facingtheunmadelane,thedimkitcheninthemiddle,andastorageroomforfuelattheback.Waterhadtobefetchedfromawellandstoredinclayvessels.Theflooringwasmud-coveredbamboo.Therewerenowindowscutintothewalls,andwhenthecow-dungcookingfirewaslittheairturnedthickandsmoky.2

Exceptforthekerosenelamp,thedwelling’sonlyotherillumination,thescenewasindistinguishablefromoneseveralcenturiesearlier.Lateron,Damodardasmadesomeimprovements,addinganupstairs roomandacoupleofwindows.Butbothbathingandlaundryweredoneinthelakenearby.

TheModi familywereof theGhanchi3 caste, traditionallyproducersofvegetableoil–a ‘ghanch’was a localoilpressof great antiquity. Itwas a caste that cut acrossreligiouslinesandtherearealsomanyMuslimGhanchisinGujarat.AnOBC(OtherBackward Caste) is sometimes confused with being low caste. The Modis, as

Ghanchis,wereofthegeneralranksofworkers,andwhatmaybecalledlowermiddleclass–poor,butwithverymanycastesofIndiansbelowthem.

How significant this social ranking and disadvantage would have felt to youngNarendrainasmall,ruraltownisunclear.Thelikelihoodisthatashewasgrowingup,hewashardlyawareofit.Itcertainlyleftnomarkonhimintermsofsocialfeelings–eitherofresentmentorinferiority–andherarelyreferstohisoriginstomakeapointinpoliticaldebate,eventhoughitwouldlikelyhelphimtodoso.4

TheModis,althoughtheylivedinaclose-knitneighbourhood,wereonthesideofit that was closest to Vadnagar’s Muslim community. Mixing with Muslims wasnormal and themajorityofNarendra’s childhood friendswereMuslims.Oneofhisbest friendswas JasoodKhan Pathan.He observedMuslim holy festivals as well asHindu ones.He felt nothing unusual in this, and neither did anybody else, not hisfamilynortheparentsofhisplaymates.Narendrawasgivenanickname– ‘ND’,hispaternalinitialsfrom‘NarendraDamodardas’.

Anecdotes of Narendra’s attitude in school abound. He worked diligently in theclassroom. Teachers and students recall an early gift for rhetoric in the school’sdebating society. There is the much-quoted incident when Narendra stubbornlyrefused to let a classmonitormarkhishomework– insisting that the teacher alonewas qualified to do so. Yet early appearances can be deceptive: many stellar schooldebaters turn into bank clerks or store managers, and academically outstandingstudentssometimesgrowuptobecomeofficemanagersandmid-levelbureaucrats.

Tales from childhood can provide ready-made outlines that slot neatly into thejigsawportraitofa leader.Sometimesthestoriestakeonthehueof legend:it iswellchronicled,forexample,thatNarendralikedtoswiminnearbySharmishthaLake,andthat in this lake lurked crocodiles.An early story relating toNarendra and the lakerecountsthattherewasanancientshrine–inlaterversionsabeautifultemple–onarockyoutcropnottoofarfromtheshore.5

Oncertainholyoccasions the small flag atop this shrinewouldbechanged.Onesuch day, after heavy rain had agitated the crocodiles, the flag did need changing.Despite being advised against it, Narendra and two friends,Mahendra and Bachu,swamtotheoutcropandbackagain. In laterretellings theoutcropwouldbecomeadistant islandandNarendrawould swimalone.Meanwhile,peopleon the shorelinebeatconvenientdrumstoscareoffthereptiles(ormorelikelydrawthemawayfrom

where the boys swam). Narendra returned safely, having changed the flag, and thecrowd, by now grandly swollen, cheered loudly: all present agreed that such actionsbefittedafutureleader,orwordstothateffect.

Today,atsixty-three,Modishrugsatthesestoriesofoverhalfacenturyago.Eyestwinkling,hesimplysaysthathischildhoodwasnormal.

Talkingtoformerschoolmatesandteachers,thepredominanttraitinyoungNarendraappearstohavebeenquietstubbornness.Whenhefelt justifiedinacertainbelieforcourse of action, he could, like all children, be both obstinate andmischievous.Yetbeyondeverything,andtothereliefand joyofhismotherandfather,Narendrawasunremarkablynormal:happy,energeticandaveragelypopular.

Butevenasanormalchild,certaincharacteristicsstoodout.ChiefamongthesewasNarendra’sphysicality.Hewasawiryandathleticboy.Thismaybeimportantbecausephysical confidence from an early age can shape self-perception. There are fewrecollections though, despite many childhood friends, which attest to Narendra’ssociabilityorthathewasparticularlyinterestedinteamsports.

TodayModisayshelikescricketbutonlyasaspectator;andcricketanywayisthethoughtful individual’s team sport. Swimming appealed to him as a child, but bynature it is a solitary pursuit.A flavour of solitariness persists in the anecdotes thatModi tellsmeabouthimself. In thesehe is alwayspresent,butoftenon theedgeofgroupingsandproceedings,bidinghis timebeforemakingadecisivecontributiontothestoryordrama.

Religionpermeates every pore of India: it is everywhere and it is unremarkable; theculture is saturated in it.Myth and ritual – or theirmemorials – are blended intoalmostevery social actionandmeaning.Religion in India is everyday life.What thiscouldmean is that certain tendencies youngNarendradisplayedwere interpretedasculturallyratherthanreligiouslyinspired.

Forinstance,whenstillquiteyoung,astrainofasceticismemergedinNarendra.Itwaswidely noticed among family and friends. First he gave up eating salt.Then hegaveupeatingchilliesandevenoil.Thesavoursoflifewereforsaken,buttowhatend?Narendrastillenjoyedjaggery,hesayswithasmiletoday,butasaboyhadgivenitup.6

Renunciationorasceticismmayindicatepietybutcanalsobeasignofambition,often

socialambitiontobeginwith–theequivalentofacquiringgentilityasaprecursortootherformsofadvancements.

It is possible that Narendra embarked on his path of asceticism for sound andsecularreasons:hefeltinwardlythathewasslightlydifferentfromotherpeople,andduring our long conversations that facet often emerged. It was therefore natural toexploreandunderstandthisfeelingofbeingdifferentbysubtractingfromhislifewhatothers commonly took for granted. In thatway hewould ‘normalize’ his feeling ofseparatenessanddiscoversomethingabouthimself.Forexample,hemighthavebeenreassuredthathehadwillpowerandwasnotgreedy.Theactisself-revealing;theself-denialhelpsyoutocomprehendyourindividuality.Inotherwordsitbuildscharacter.

Ashesits inhis largeoffice,aterracetohis left,sofastohisright,asenseofcalmpervadeshimwhenhe talksofhis childhoodandearlyyears.Andyethe isquick tochuckleatoldmemories.Athishomeheisevenmorerelaxed,andsayssimply:‘Therearetimeswhen,beforeIbecamechiefminister,Ididnoteatamealinthesamehouseformonthsandyears.’

Narendra was a ferocious reader, although his stubbornness led to him refusing topersistwithSanskrit.7Modi’s earlydevotion toSwamiVivekananda iswell-attested,but it was an intellectual admiration of an ‘ecumenical’ figure who made overHinduism for modern purposes, revealing its kinship to other faiths through his‘enlightenedliberalism’.8

YoungNarendra’sapparentreligiositymaybetheresultofattemptstocategorizeatypeofbehaviour(andakindofpersonality)which,atthetime,andamonghissocialclass and environment, was relatively unusual. In Indiamisfits and seekers typicallyfind their way to gurus and ashrams; the more extreme become sadhus or monks.Religiontraditionallysoaksupdisruptivespiritualenergy.ButNarendrasimplywenthisownway,andthiswasacourseofactiondifficulttointerpretoutsideofareligiousframeof reference. Itmayhavebeenanunusual traitbut thenModiwasalreadyanunusualyoungman.

Thathewasoftenkeentocooperateandhelpout,tobeinvolved,isclearandallusive.Afterschool,Narendrawouldracetohisfather’steastallasifworkingtherewastheexcitementhehadbeenlookingforwardtoalldaylongandnothingintheworldwas

morefulfillingthanservingteatorailwaypassengers:‘Iwasinthetraincompartment,thesmallboywhousedtoservetea,andtakethemoney.’

Childrenwere expected tohelpout in the familybusiness,however small itwas,andtheyacceptedtheduty.ButyoungNarendrawantedmorethanmostothers:tobeinvolved in a larger, more grown-up world beyond the classroom. Was childhoodimportant to him, or was he slightly bored by it and indifferent to play, wantinginstead to know and domore thanwas expected of a child?When asked about it,Modi isnon-committal. ‘Byand large, everyone likes their childhoodand Iwas alsolikethat,’hesays.

Didhisstrength–ofbothbodyandmind–makeNarendrafeelolderthanhewas?And did this idea of the self, held back a little by childhood, instil an interest inhistory,politics,asenseoftheworld–andsoalsopatriotism,arespectforthepastandby implication his elders whom he wished to join? In conjunction with histhoughtfulnessandwidereading,suchanevolvingidentitymayeasilyawakenafeelingof duty and belonging in thewidest sense.ThusNarendrawas only eight years oldwhenhebegantoattendthelocalshakhaoftheRashtriyaSwayamsewakSangh(RSS).Itwasadecisionthatlaiddownthedirectionfortherestofhislife.

WhatdiditmeanforNarendratobeborninGujarat insteadofelsewhereinIndia?Whatsortofcardshadhebeendealtbyfate?Indiaisvastandvaried.Howmighthehavegrownupand flourishedhadhebeenaBiharior aBengali, for example?HowmuchdidGujarat,itsculture,traditionandsensibility,mouldModi?

Thestatecomprisesone-thirdofthetotalcoastlineofthecountry–aftertracingthe inlets, foldsandbaysof its littoral.Thestate leanstothepoliticalRightbecauseGujaratis,thankstotheirlongcoastline,havesincetimeimmemorialbeentradersandbusinessmen.

AcrosstheArabianSealietheemirates,caliphatesandkingdomswhichhavebeencommercial partners and competitors long before Muslims arrived in India asconquerors and settlers.A two-way traffic in goods alsomeant a two-way traffic intradersandworkers.ArabsandMuslims,mostlySunnis,havelongsettledinGujarat.Themaritimenatureoftradeinspiredandbredanadventurous,explorative,business-mindedGujaratiethosofmanyfaithswhichputdowncommercialrootsallovertheworld. Today the British corner shop is a Gujarati institution; and in the UnitedStatesmotelshavebecomealmostgenericforGujaratis.

Astestimonytoitsmercantileheritage,GujarathassomethingofanArabicflavourtoitaestheticallyinitscoloursanddesignsandcostumes,especiallyinSaurashtraandthe south. Looking further back, and at the lineaments of some of the tribals’decorationsandfeatures,thereisevenahintofAfrica.AndthefirstIndianstotradewithandsettlein,especially,EastAfricawereGujaratis.Thishasrequiredanadaptivecultural nous. Gujaratis, unlike those from landlocked states, are outward-looking.Andtheyarereceptivetoo:Parsis,forexample,fledtoday’sIrannearly1,400yearsagotofindasafehaveninGujarat.

Notonly trade andcontactswith foreignersbut commerce among its towns andvillageshasaffectedthestate’spolitics.MorethanelsewhereinIndia,whathappenedinthetownsofGujaratwasalwaysquicklyfeltinitsvillages,andviceversa,preciselybecauseoverthecenturiesavigorousbusinessculturehadbredanunusualdegreeofcommunicationbetweentownandcountryside.9

This was expressed in an abundance of roads and therefore an abundance ofmobility and engagement. This interconnectedness and market-friendliness gaveGujaratacultureofindividualityandentrepreneurship–butalsoafeelingofsharedidentity. Over time it proved both a blessing and a curse. It convulsed the statewhenever communal conflict occurred, and then afterwards swiftly repaired thedamagetogetbacktothebusinessoflife.

BengalstandsoutinsharpcontrasttoGujarat.Bengalmaybeemblematicallyandtemperamentally to the Left.10 It has a different kind of individuality – one thatfavours political principle over profit that is somehow rooted in geography andhistory.Kolkata(thenCalcutta)wastheimperialcapitaloftheBritishRajuntil1911.A colonial officiousness of bureaucratic rigour might have seeped into the Bengalitemperandemerged,bereftandangryatthelossofitsauthority-by-association,atjustaboutthetimethattheRussianswerediscoveringtheirrevolutionaryfervour.

V.S.Naipaulsaidin1964that‘Calcuttawasdead,’andthatthebreakwiththeRajhaddone it: ‘HeretheIndianrenaissancehadbegun; somanyof thegreatnamesofIndian reform are Bengali. But it was here, too, that the encounter had ended inmutualrecoil.Thecross-fertilisationhadnotoccurred,andIndianenergyhadturnedsour.’11This,Naipaul implied, ledtoaturningawayfrom–andarejectionof–thefuture,aretreatintoagloriouspast,intoahomelandofmemoryandidentity.

Kolkata is inmanyways reminiscentofParis– another cityof theLeft,with itscombative energy and romantic self-absorption – Howrah Bridge its Eiffel Tower,riparianHooghlyitsdenseMarais.ItishometoIndia’sintellectualsandtheorists,itspoetsandhigh-artfilm-makers,asParis’sleftbankoftheSeinebilletsFrance’sartistic

revolutionaries. Like Paris, Kolkata is haughty and proud and inward-looking; andafteritsownfashion,stylish.And,liketheFrench,too,self-sabotaging.

WhatifNarendraModihadbeenborninKolkata?Withhisfeelingofdifference,hissolitarinessandhis interest inreading,perhapshewouldnothavefelthimselfsodifferent to the spirit of the city. He might therefore have fitted in better. MightNarendraearlyonhavetransfusedthecinemaofSatyajitRayintohisbloodstreamandbecome a radical film-maker, or a photographer like Sunil Janah (Modi is also awanderer,andhedoeslikecameras)?Isitimprobable,givenhisruggedindividuality,thathewouldhavesoughttheorthodoxiesoftheCommunistPartyofIndia?Couldhe have fallen forTagore instead ofVivekananda and evennowbe a disciple livingsimplyatShantiniketan?OrwouldhemorelikelyhaveresembledMamataBanerjee,emerging–giventheopportunitiesavailabletohiminBengaliculture–asapopulistpoliticianandahammerofthepoor,ratherthanatechnocratandmodernizerwhoseGujaratiupbringingallowedhimtobelieveimplicitlyincommerceandfreemarkets?

Would Modi now be challenging for the prime ministership had he not beensuffusedbythesameenvironmentthatcreatedMahatmaGandhi,SardarVallabhbhaiPateland–yes–MuhammadAli Jinnah?It isunlikelyhisappeal,had itdevelopedelsewhere,wouldhavecrossedsomanystateborders.Everybodyisshapedandlimitedbytheirenvironment.

Thereisadangerinover-interpretingtheseimponderables.Butforamanwhocouldsoongovern thedestiniesofover abillionpeople, it is important tounderstand thepsychological influences of his cultural environment: they carry clues to futureconduct.

T

2

ONTHEROAD

HERUSSIANAUTHORANTONChekhovsaidthatall storiesmust ‘turn’.Narendra’searlyliferevealsabright,vigorousandsociableboy.Hewaspoorbutseriousinhis

duties,chantingeverydayinthetempleofGiripurMahadev.Narendrawaskeentobehelpfulbuthecouldalsotakeoffenceandbroodsullenly.

Therewasanenergy,anemotionalchurning inhim,buthismoodswerenotthekeynotes of contradiction: they are found whenever an unusual personality isemerging. A complex character has different parts, andmoodiness can be a sign oftrying to reconcile them. Times were hard. There was no electricity. What Modiremembersisthatasachildhealwayshadideasabouthowtodothings–chores,tasks,games, lessons – differently, more efficiently, and that from his earliest years thisprovokedcommentandsometimesopposition.

‘EvenwhenIwasinschool,’Modisays,eyesgazingatthefardistanceashesearchesformemoriesofhischildhood,‘Iusedtoquestionmyteachers.Notabouttheteachingbutsometimesaboutthemethodologyoftheteaching.Isometimessaid,“Sir,whydoyoudoitlikethat?Youcoulddoitso.Itiseasy–youcoulddoit.Whydon’tyoudothis?”And sometimesmy teacherwould say: “Youare anurchin.Youare annoyingme,yousmallkid.”’

Modihasrarelyspokenabouthisearlylifebutinourconversationsheopeneduptorevealaboywhoconstantlysearchedforanswersoutsideconventionalframeworks.

Byhisownaccount,Modididnotratehimselfanoutstandingscholar.Rather,hefollowed his own interests, and would not be diverted from them. ‘That was mytemperament.Eveninthefamilysystem,sometimeswhenmymotherwasdoingherworkIwouldsay,“Why,Ma,areyoudoingitlikethat?Canyounotdoitlikethis?”

AndIwantedtohelpher,Iwantedtodoitdifferently.Evenhowtowashclothes–Iwasalwaysusingnewtechniques.Peopleusedtowatchme.InmychildhoodIusedtowashmy clothes andmy familymembers’ clothes in the public lake. They used tocometoseehowIwasdoingthis.’

Narendra’smothernevermistookherson’skeeninterestinchoresasasignoflovefordomesticity.On the contrary, theperceptiveHiraben saw the inventiveness andintellectualhunger,andbecameafraidthat‘onedayNarendrawouldrunaway,leavingbehindthishome,townandsansar[world]’.Shecouldseewhatothersdidnot,thathe‘seemed tobedisinterested in family life’.1Paradoxically, itwas theattempt todrawNarendra back towards the family and settled domestic life that finally led to hispermanentdeparture.

Narendra’senthusiasmforchangingandimprovingthings,hisneedtoaligntheworldto the way he saw things, gives additional weight to the idea that childhood wassomewhatconstrictingforhim.HeclearlywantedmorethanVadnagarcouldoffer.

Moditodaynodsinagreementatthisconclusion.‘Innovation,newideas,thatwasbasicallymytemperament.’Hesmiles.Arestlessnesspervadedhim.

The attraction to theRSSwas, at the age of eight, obviously not political in thesenseofhewingtoaparticularideologicalposition.NarendracametotheRSSbywayofcontact,attheageofsix,withaCongressmannamedRasikbhaiDave,whoseofficewasclosetohisfather’steastallattherailwaystation.ItwasatimeofagitationforaseparateGujaratstate,thenpartoftheBombayState.GujaratwouldearnstatehoodinMay1960,afewmonthsbeforeNarendra’stenthbirthday.

He collected pro-Gujarat lapel badges from Dave and then acted as his ‘agent’,distributing them to his school friends. Politicsmay look distant and hazy to a six-year-old boy – this was 1956 – but helping to create your own state would besomethinghecouldgrasp.‘Igotasenseofparticipation,’recallsModi.‘Buttherewasnodeeppoliticalunderstanding.’2

It was in the evenings, after he finished helping his father at the tea stall, thatNarendra, a couple of years later, began to attend the local youth meetings of theRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh.ThatpartoftheRSSthatcatersforaneight-year-oldisbestdescribedasasortofBoyScoutsgroup.Yetitispartofalargerorganizationthat

is right-wing, nationalistic and ideological. The name literally means ‘NationalVolunteerOrganization’.

TheRSSwasbannedin1948intheaftermathofMahatmaGandhi’sassassinationby one of its former members, Nathuram Godse, yet it was also commended foraverting a coup againstNehru.Acquitted by the SupremeCourt of involvement inGandhi’smurder, thebanon theRSSwas revokedby thegovernment in return forformalizing itselfwithaconstitution.SardarVallabhbhaiPatel, thenhomeminister,advisedtheRSStostayoutofpoliticsandremainasocioculturalorganization.

By the timeNarendra began to attend its local shakhamost evenings, where hewould have been one of the youngest participants, the RSS was acquiring quietrespectability as a disciplined force. It was the kind of environment, of ideas anddebateatRSSmeetings,ratherthantherotelearningofschool,thatstimulatedhim.Therehe could learnmore aboutworldlymatters, andperhaps congregatewith theadultswhofascinatedhim.

ItwasthenthathefirstmetthemanwhowouldbecomehisguideandmentorintheRSS,LaxmanraoInamdar,or‘VakilSaheb’ashewasknownbecauseofhislawyer’squalification.InamdarinductedyoungNarendraasa‘balswayamsevak’,ajuniorcadet,andbegantoteachhimwhatitmeanttobeavolunteer,3initiatingNarendrainwhathewould later describe as the ‘silent revolution ofmakingmen’ in an organizationbuiltaround‘renunciation,dedicationandhardwork’.4

TogetherwithSwamiVivekananda,his idol fromearliestchildhood,VakilSahebwouldprovetheenduring influenceonNarendra’spoliticaloutlookandhis ideasofhuman potential: ‘He used to teach us always to try to discover the other person’svirtues and qualities, and trywork on them,’ saysModi today. ‘Don’t focus on thedeficiencies.Eachandeverypersonhassomanydeficiencies,butyouhavetofocusonhis(positive)qualities.’

Worldly matters were soon to intrude on Narendra’s innocence and the routinerounds hemade between school, tea shop and shakha.One of the great shocks forpost-Independence India, andpossibly still its greatesthumiliation,was theChineseaggressionof1962.TheSino-Indianwar tookplace,not coincidentally, at the sametime as the CubanMissile Crisis, when India (supporting the Soviet Union in itsstand-offwiththeUnitedStates)wasdistracted.Chinese logisticalaswellastacticalsuperioritysweptasideIndiandefenceforces,despitetherehavingbeenindicationsof

troubleontheborderforthelongesttime.Communist troops poured into several areas administered by the North-East

FrontierAgency(NEFA).IntheBattleofNamkaChuathighaltitudenearBomdilainArunachalPradesh,5 the7th Indian InfantryBrigadeof thehighlydecorated4thDivision– the ‘RedEagles’whohad served in somany theatres inWorldWar II–found itself surrounded and ‘cut to pieces’.6 Unthinkably, its commander wascapturedandtortured.Thebrigadewassubsequentlydisbandedinofficialdisgracetosavethegovernmentblushes,althoughithadfoughtbravelyalmostto‘thelastbulletandthelastman’.7

The administration of Assam, flabby, corrupt and spavined with bureaucracy,collapsedandran.Delhi,andIndiaasawhole,seemedtobepsychologicallyparalysedby the attack, and its humiliationwas completewhenChina unilaterally declared aceasefireafterdemarcatingalineofactualcontrolandshowingIndiainnouncertaintermswhowasthedominantregionalAsianpower.V.S.Naipaul’sbrutalconclusionabout India’s propensity to surrender to invaders – ‘Any conquerorwill do’ –was,ironically, uttered in the silence surrounding the fallen Indian soldiers, with theirantiqueriflesandinadequatesummeruniforms,abandonedbyNehru’sgovernmentaticyNamkaChu.

AftertheinitialshockofdefeatworeofftheIndianpublicgrewfuriousandfiercelypatriotic.Thisbellicosityundoubtedly filtereddown toNarendra, then twelve yearsold,duringhisnightlyRSSmeetings.

NehruwasroundlyblamedforhispacifistforeignpolicyandthedeludedCongressattitude of ‘brotherhood’ towards the aggressive and double-dealing Chinesecommunists. The invasion proved to be a wake-up call for both government andmilitary.Narendra’sownresponsetothecrisiswastoinformhisfatherhewishedtoattendoneoftheSainikschools.Theseformedanewnetworkofmilitary-styleyouthacademieswhichhadbeenestablishedtheyearbeforebythe(now-disgraced)ministerofdefence,KrishnaMenon.8

Agedthirteen,Narendrawasabout to leaveVadnagarPrimarySchoolNo.1 for thelocal high school, and at such a juncture the idea of applying instead to a juniorofficers’academywasnotentirelyoutlandish.ItwasexactlythesortofideathatwouldhavebeeninspiredinNarendrabyattendanceatRSSshakhaevenings.Buthisfather,Damodardas, forbade themove.TheSainik schoolwasquiteadistanceaway, in the

JamnagardistrictontheGulfofKutch,whichmeantNarendramovingawaytoboardthere.Thecost–therewasnotasparerupeeintheModihousehold–orperhapstheawarenessofthesocialdivide,alsogaveDamodardaspause.9

If so itwas ironic,becausethefounding ideaoftheSainikschoolswastoaddresstheproblemofclassintheIndianarmy’soverwhelminglyupper-casteofficercadreandgivepoorboysachancetomaketheirway into it.ButDamodardaswouldnaturallyhave been worried about young Narendra’s treatment there, or indeed afterwards.Perhapshesimplydisapprovedofmilitary life,ortheinfluenceofapresenceoutsidethefamilyexercisingitselfonhisson.

His father’s refusal, forwhatever reason,perceivedbyNarendra as anattempt tokeephiminVadnagar,meantonlythattheboyinchedalittlefurtherawayfromthevisionofafutureinVadnagar.Clearlyhehadalreadythoughtaboutitandsensedthatmuchlayandbeckonedbeyondtheconfinesofhissmalltown.

TheremaywellhavebeenarewardingcareerawaitingNarendrainthearmy.AfteritshumiliationbytheChineseinthenorth-eastthereweresignsthatchangewasafootinthe Indianmilitary.Very quickly, over the next two years, amassive reorganizationand expansion began. Training, planning and logistics were all given the highestpriority for improvement.Thisproved timely, because the easyChinese victoryhadtheeffectofemboldeningPakistan,itscloseally.

InashortbutfuriouswarthatbeganinAugust1965,Indiaswiftlyandsuccessfullyretaliated against Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir. India regained some of itshonourwhile Pakistan lost ground and failed in its plan to capture the state. Thatconflictmarked the beginning of the political gyrations and economic collapse thatturnedPakistanintothecountryitistoday.

Beforethe1965waritsgrowthoutstrippedIndia’sbysomemeasure.Afterwards,achastenedbut increasinglyfanatical leadershipattemptedtoshoreupmilitarypowerattheexpenseofcivilsociety.BythetimeofthenextIndia–Pakistanwarin1971,itwasspendingasuicidal55percentofgovernmentrevenuesonitsmilitary,upfromanalready burdensome 10 per cent in 1966. Today Pakistan still spends adisproportionate amount, including debt servicing, on defence, while educationreceivesonly2percentofGDP.10

The teenagedNarendra watched the 1965 conflict unfold after the pre-emptivebombingandstrafingattacksonIndianAirForcebases.Hewasstirred.Hepersonally

witnessedaspectsof theconflict at closequartersbecauseVadnagarwasona supplyline to the battle front,meaning soldiers would arrive at the stationmoving up tocombat or, sometimeswounded, returning from it.He served them complimentarycupsoftea.

‘NarendrawaschargedupandvolubleonhowallPakistanisshouldbedecimated,’recalledaresidentofVadnagarwhoknewhimbackthen.11Narendrawouldalsodailybereminded,asthebandagedheroessippedhischaiatthestallhestillhelpedoutat,thathehadbeenforbiddenbyhisparentstoseekanactiveroleinIndia’sdefence–afrustrationwhichatthetimemusthavefeltextremelypointed.Theyhadotherplansfor their son, and one particular part of these plans was the spur for Narendra’sdeparturefromthefamilyhome,nevertolivethereagain.

ThetraditionofchildhoodbetrothalamongGujaratiGhanchisstillexists,butinthe1950sand1960swasmoredeeplyingrainedthantoday.Narendraatthreeyearsofagehadbeen‘engaged’byhisparentstoagirlfromanearbytown.Hewasnotmadeawareofituntilmanyyearslater.Thegirl’sname,courtesyatabloid,wasrevealedina2009‘scoop’tobeJashodaben.Therewouldhavebeenaritualorsymbolicformalizationoftheagreementbetweenthetwofamilieswhenthechildrenwereonthecuspoftheirteenageyears–anengagement,butnotthesamethingasaweddingbetweenabrideandagroomoflegallymarriageableage.

This was exactly whenNarendra was told the Sainikmilitary school was out ofboundstohim.Someyears laterwouldcomeameeting,withmany familymemberspresent,duringwhichhecouldhavetheopportunitytoobservehisbetrothedbutnotnecessarily speak to her. The final stage, signalled by Jashodaben turning eighteen,wouldbethecommencementofaninitialperiodofcohabitation.Whateveractuallyhappened,thechronologyofeventssuggeststhatassoonasNarendrafullyunderstoodthesituationhedecided,literally,tomakehismove.

He abruptly left Vadnagar and his family home when he was seventeen andJashodabenonlyfifteenyearsold.Asoneobserverputit:‘Itwasachildmarriage,andneitherwasitconsummatednorwastherecohabitation.Modirefusedandwentawayas he was never interested in marrying. A case of null and void.’ The tradition ofleavinghome at an early age to seek spiritual knowledge is part of bothHindu andBuddhistfaiths–astheexamplesofLordRamandtheBuddhaattest.

Jashodaben was not eighteen years old but only fifteen when Narendra left

Vadnagar. The first meeting between the couple took place well before thecohabitation stage could arrive. After the introductory meeting – the first timeNarendrahadeverseenhis‘bride’–hequicklydecideditwouldalsobethelast.Bythetime Jashodaben turned eighteen, Narendra had been gone for years and was inAhmedabad,working full-time for theRSS.His rejectionof thebetrothalwasnotapersonal judgementagainsther; itwaswhatsometimeshappenswhenparentstrytofindsuitablepartnersfortheirrecalcitrantchildren.

AsapoliticianModiconstantlylookstohiscountry’scultureandtraditions,believingthat India can draw strength from them and modernize itself without leaving itsidentity behind. But he is also enfranchised under the constitution of a democraticrepublic. As such, he observes a sharp distinction between individual rights andcoercionfromwhateverquarter.

He felt that way when he was seventeen, perhaps not as lucidly as later, yet hisemotionalsuffragewasalreadyrobust.Narendrarefusedtodosomethinghedidnotwantto,nomatterwhattheculturalorfamilypressure.Itwas,hebelievedthenandcontinues to believe now, his constitutional and human right towithdraw from anarrangementmadewithouthisconsent–andhedulyexercisedthatright.Jashodaben,likewise,wasnotcompelledunderIndianlawtoremaincontractedtoNarendra,andcouldhaveaskedherparentstofindanothersuitor,orfoundoneherself.12

Modi’s ‘marriage’,whichheneverspeaksabout,hasbeenusedbythemediainanattempt to discredit him both as a politician and a man. Jashodaben, who never‘remarried’andisnowretiredafteralongcareerasaschoolteacher,ispresentedastheunhappy, lonely,but still lovingand faithfulwifewhoseonlyhope is thatonenightModiwillcomehomefordinner.Thesectionofthemediathatpaintsthistear-jerkingpicture is the samemedia that rails against the injustice and backwardness of childmarriage–exceptwhereModiisconcerned.

ThetensionoffallingoutwithhisparentsoverthechildhoodbetrothalcoincidedwithNarendra’s graduation fromB.N.High School inVadnagar and attendance atthe local college,which he soon abandoned.13He hadnot especially enjoyed schoolexceptforitsextracurricularaspectsofdebatinganddramatics.Inquisitivebutrestless,Narendramayhavebeenequallyunimpressedbytheprospectofseveralmoreyearsofconventional education and formal study. He would later acquire, thoughcorrespondence,amaster’sdegreeinpoliticalsciencefromGujaratUniversity.

Somesortofemotionalpressurewasmeanwhilebuildingwithinhim,andthisledtoasuddendecisiontoleavehome.HisfamilywasnaturallyshockedatNarendraquittinghiseducationandsettingoffwithnoclearobjectiveexcept,ashetoldthem,toseetheHimalayas. They raised objections, yet they were met with an ultimatum: he wasleavingnomatterwhat,butatthesametimehedemandedtheirblessing.Therewasno other visible source of conflict except for Narendra’s headstrong attitude, notunusualinaseventeen-year-old,andevidentinhimsinceearlychildhood.

His own enduring affection for his parents was implicit in his request for theirblessings,butitwasstillanemotionaltacticandhegotwhathewanted.DamodardasandHiraben‘decidedthatifhewantedtogo,hemustbeallowed.Hismothercookedkansar (a sweetdish traditionally cookedonauspiciousoccasions); tilakwasappliedonNarendra’sforeheadwhichsignifiestheopeningofthethirdorspiritualeye.’14

The incident is notable because it displays, just as did his refusal of marriage, acharacteristic that Modi the politician would later come to embody. This was hisreverencefortraditionbutalsohis selectiverejectionof it.Herespectedanddesiredcultural authority, such as his parents’ ritualized blessing, before he disobeyed theirwishesandsetoffonhisownpath.

This sortof tension is implicit in thekindofpoliticsNarendrawouldeventuallycasthimself into–withtheRSSand later theBJP–which idealizedHinducultureandwishedtopreserveit,againsttheatheisticsocialismoftheCongresspartyandtheLeft.Wouldtherebeawayofmakingthattensioncreativeandfruitful,offindingapaththroughpoliticsthatcouldbothdrawonIndia’straditionalcultureandmakeuseof it for innovationandprogress?Orwouldmodernityandtraditionprove tobe somuchatoddsthatoneofthemwouldhavetobesacrificed?

Narendra’sinitialtwo-yearodysseyawayfromhomemarkedthebeginningofwhatwas tobecomeamore than thirty-yearperiodofnomadicwandering,by the endofwhichModicouldclaimthattherewasliterallynowhereinIndiahehadnotsetfooton.Someofthisnomadism,namelytheadventureembarkedonbytheseventeen-year-oldin1967,wascharacterizedbyconstant,restlessmovement.EvenwhenModiwasbased somewhere specific, he was forever in motion between different states, orbetweentownsandvillages.Heneverhadasettledhabitation,andseldomatetwiceinsuccessioninanyoneplace.Helooksbackathisdaysasawanderingasceticwithsomefondness.

Therewasnocomfort inmy life. Ihada smallbag andmywhole lifewas in thatbag. Iwasnotkeeping

anythingelsewithme.For30yearsIwaslikethisandeverydayIwaseatingwithdifferentfamilies.Ihavenevertakenonetypeoffood;Ihavenevertakenthefoodofmychoice.ThismorningIwillgotothisfamilyandIwill say, ‘Yes, Iwillcome,pleasegivemesomefood.’Seconddayanotherresidence, thirdday, thirdresidence.EverymonthIamtakingmyfoodinadifferenthome.

Thememories are still fresh andModi tellsme that the life he led all these years iswhatmadehimwhohe is.Modi says thathealwaysacceptedwhatevermealwasonofferfromwhoeverhewasvisitingonaparticularevening.Thiswashowhedevelopeda habit of indifference to food: all was equally welcome and tasty as far as he wasconcerned,solongasitwasvegetarian.

ExactlywhatNarendradidbetweentheagesofseventeenandnineteen,wherehewentandwhy,remainsobscure.Scrapsofinformationfromhiswalkabout,however,canhelp assemble a rough itinerary and give a theme to hismeanderings. Sitting athometoday,hesmilesandwavesawayquestionsaboutthoseyearsofwandering.Butsomehints emerge.More than anything else, itwas a pilgrimage in the footsteps ofSwamiVivekananda.By the timehe lefthome,Narendrahaddevouredmostof theSwami’s literary works, lent to him by a Vadnagar local, Dr Vasantbhai Parikh.15

Vivekanandahadmadeadeepand,itwouldturnout,apermanentimpressionontheyoungman.

Narendrasetoutfromhome,carryingverylittle.Heownedfewclothesanyway,andwhatmoneyhehadputawayfromwhathehadearned–notonlyfromhisfather’steastallbutalsofromluggingcontainersofcookingoil forafewpaiseatimefora localbusinessman–wouldbebarelyenoughtosustainhimfortwoweeks,nevermindtwoyears.Butitisgoodtobepoorwhenyoungbecauseitoffersthepricelessopportunityto learn not to be dependent onmoney. This would prove to be one of the mostvaluable lessons Narendra learned during his period of uncertainty. It would paydividendslateron,hardeningorinoculatingModiagainsttemptationspresentedbyacareerinthechaoticworldofIndianpolitics.

YoungNarendrainitiallymadehiswaytoWestBengalandtotheBelurMath,onthewestbankof theHooghlyrivernearCalcutta(as it thenwas), sometime in theearlysummerof1968.TheMathistheprincipaltemple-monasteryandheadquartersof Vivekananda’s Ramakrishna Mission, established at the end of the nineteenthcentury,althoughthepresentbuildingwasbuiltonlyin1935.AtthetimeNarendravisited, Swami Madhabanandaji Maharaj was its president.16 Unfortunately forNarendra, he discovered the Math was strictly a postgraduate institution and the

Swamitoldhimifhewantedtostudythere,hewouldfirsthavetocompletehiscollegeeducation.

After a short stay of about a week at theMath, and an exploratory sojourn inCalcutta and its hinterland, Narendra headed north.Whether he paid his way byworking orwas dependent on alms is lost in themist of time, but at one point hefoundhimself,travellingviaSiliguri,asfarnorth-eastasGuwahatiorevenfurther,anddeepina ‘remotejungle’.There,milesfromcivilization,hestumbledacrossahermitormendicantwithwhomhestruckupafriendship.Themanwas‘verythin,itseemedthat he had transparent skin’.17 There was little sense of urgency in Narendra’sjourneying,andhespentaboutamonthhelpingintheascetic’sgardenplot,spendingtimediscussing‘spiritualmatters’,beforehedecidedtomoveon.

Eventually,Narendraarrivedat theothermonasterySwamiVivekanandahadsetup,thepleasantbungalowoftheAdvaitaAshramnearAlmora,inthefoothillsoftheHimalayas. It makes sense that he would have made his way north after Calcuttabefore heading west again on a fresh path, picking his way across Bihar andUttarPradesh intowhat is nowUttarakhand, because he had already crossed India once,fromthewest,afterleavingGujarat.

Narendra’sadventurewasanexploration.Butwasheseriouslyseekingtobecomeamonkatthispoint,orwashesimplyalittlelostandunsureofwhatdirectionhislifeshould take? At Almora he could at least absorb some more of Vivekananda’sinfluence, although the answer he received from the monks was the same as inCalcutta:graduatefromcollegeandthentryagain.

Eventually,afteratleastanotheryearofwandering,NarendrareturnedtoGujaratandthefinallocationassociatedwithSwamiVivekananda,theRamakrishnaMissioninRajkot.18HisroutetheretookhimviaDelhiandthensouththroughRajasthan.Hewished to see new places and not retrace his steps.He skirted theHimalayas as farnorth-west asHimachal Pradesh, then aUnionTerritory, a placeModi still adoresand whose electoral charge he would get over twenty years later as BJP generalsecretary.Notquitenineteen,NarendrawasstillonhisowndiscoveryofIndia.Manyideasformedinthoseimpressionableyears.Theyhavestayedwithhim,headmits.Buthepreferstodaytotalkofthefuture,ofhisvisionforIndia,governance,developmentandeconomicreforms.

At the RajkotMission, as if playing his role in a mystic parable, Narendra wasturnedawayfromthemonkishlifeforathirdtime.SwamiAtmasthanandajiMaharaj,whoarrivedin1966andincidentallystillremainsthere,wastheonewhofinallytoldNarendra that he should forget about becoming a Ramakrishnamonk, that hewas

fundamentallyunsuitedtoit.Thisiscertain,becauseModihimselfadmitteditwhenhereturnedtotheBelurMathinKolkata in2013andmettheSwamithere.InfactModithankedhimforhiswiseguidanceofmanyyearsbefore.19

Themonkswereastutein1969,andidentifiedinyoungNarendrawhathecouldnotyetsee inhimself:thatwhicheverquesthewason, itwasnotonethatwouldbebestansweredinthelifeofanasceticmonk.SwamiAtmasthanandajitoldhimthathisdestiny lay elsewhere, and elsewhere he should seek it. From that point onwardsNarendrachangedcourse.ThemakingofModiwasabouttobegin.

It had been an invigorating and comfortless, lonely and gregarious two years forNarendra– emotionally exposed, andwelcoming of the sorts of hardship one seeksoutinyouthandavoidswhenolder.Butitwastwoyearswellspentbecauseitdecidedhimonhiscourseatadeeppsychologicallevel.Hehadrewiredhisbrainandgainedanunderstandingofhimselfthatremovedanydoubtsabouthisfuture.

Narendra’s devotion to Vivekananda was sincere. It was a good fit with his ownpersonality. Swerving away from amonkish existence by nomeans implied that heshould leave the Swami’s teachings behind. The Swami himself was a jolly, worldlyman, comfortable in American high society, besides being a spiritual philosopher.Modimaintainsthatthecoreofhisowncharacterwasalways‘innovation,newideas’,andinawaythatisanechoofwhatVivekanandahadbroughttoIndiancultureandalsototheWest.

The late nineteenth century was a period in which, having been released fromorthodoxy and empty ritual, religion was finding new ways in which it could beappliedtosociety. ‘Nogoodwillcomeofsittingidleandhavingprincelydishes,andsaying “Ramakrishna, O Lord!” unless you can do some good to the poor,’ saidVivekananda.Itwasactionthatcounted.

One day in late 1969 or early 1970, unannounced andwithoutwarning,NarendrareappearedatthethresholdofhisfamilyhomeinVadnagar.Hehadbeenabsentandsilent for two years – a period of torment for hismother, who pined for him andworriedincessantly.Shesaysshenearlylosthermind.Nowhersonlookedphysicallychanged: hard, lean,weather-beaten, bearded.He had returned as aman.Narendrastoodself-containedandcalminthedoorway,incounterpointtothehystericalshouts

fromhissister,whichbroughtHirabenhurryingfromthegloomyinnerkitchentothefrontroomopeningontothelane.Shebrokedownand,almostinarticulate,askedthesortofquestionaparentwhoseteenagesonhadstayedouttoolatewouldask:‘Wherehaveyoubeen?’

‘The Himalayas,’ replied Narendra laconically. That was where he said he wasgoingwhenhe left in 1967, and technically hewas not lying.Narendra resisted hismother’simpulsetoconjureahomecomingfeastandinsistedonaplainlunchofrotiand vegetables.Then, like any other teenager, hewent out.His fatherDamodardaswasnothome;hewasoutworking.ButitwasnothisfatherwhomNarendrahadgoneto seek.He headed directly to the RSS shakha to try and contact Vakil Saheb, hisoriginalmentor,andthemanwhonowwouldtakehimunderthewingagain,butasamannotaboy.

Assoonashehaddisappearedintotown,HirabendidwhatanymotherwoulddoandbeganriflingthroughthesmallbagofNarendra’sbelongings.Itcontainedalmostnothing: a change of clothes, a pair of shorts and a shawl (for the cold mountainnights).Therewasalso–shehadnocluewherehegotit–aphotographofherthatNarendracarriedwithhimallthetimehewasaway.20

Narendra stayedovernightwithhis family, then setoff again thenextday.Aftertwoyearsawayherestedwiththemforbarelytwenty-fourhours.Shouldanythingbemadeofthis?HewasnottoreturnagaintoVadnagarforovertwentyyears,andeventodayhemaintainsverylittlecontactwithhisbrothers.Oneofthemtookajobinalathe-turningfactoryanddisappearedfromview;onenowworks inthe informationdepartmentoftheGujaratgovernment,whichmeansModiishisboss;buttheyrarelymeet,andneverprofessionally.Anotheristheleaderofalocalmerchants’associationinAhmedabad,onewhichhascrossedswordswithModi’sadministrationinthepast.

Hiraben,ninety-four,now liveswithherdaughter, and it isonlyhismother thatModiseemsdiligentlytoattend,showingtruedevotion.Asfortherestofthefamily,whilerelationsaremostlycordialandmemoriesmostlybenign,thereislittleevidenceofcloseness.WhenModijokeswiththemediathathecanbetrustednottobecorruptbecausehehasnofamilydynastytopromote,heistellingthetruth.

Amotherwillnaturallydefendher sonagainstan impressionof familialdiscord:‘Forhimdeshprem[loveofthenation]ismoreimportantthananythingelseinlife,’sheclaimedin2002,whenareporterquizzedheronwhyGujarat’snewchiefministerdidnotsupportherfinancially. ‘Once,hefoundaone-rupeecoinontheroad.Itoldhimtospenditonhimself.Butinsteadhegavethatcointoapoorman’sdaughterinour village,whoneededmoney to buybooks andpencils.’ She remembered a single

coin from fortyyears ago in the search for something intimate to confide aboutherson. And to underline Narendra’s good character she added a non sequitur: ‘Nomatterwhatthetemperatureis,healwaystakesbathincoldwater.’21

Much has been made of Modi’s emotional coldness. Having spent more timeinterviewinghimthanalmostanyothercontemporaryjournalistorauthor,IcansaywithsomecertaintythatModiisclinicalbutnotcold.Hehasacalmabouthimthatisatoddswiththefiercepersonaheexhibitsatpublicrallies.‘Actually,ofcourse,peopleusedtosaythatIwasaloner,’headmits,usingthepasttense.Butwhenaskedwhetherthere is a close friendhe could callon ifhehadapersonalproblem,Modi’s reply iscuriously,almostmechanically,unemotional. ‘Inmylifethatsituationhasnotcome.ButwhenIwasworkingwiththeRSS,therewasonegentlemanwhowasmymentor–LaxmanraoInamdar.WheneverIwasfacinganyproblematthattime,Iusedtotalktohim.NowIhaveanautopilotsysteminmythinkingprocess.’

Thereisasenseofenormousenergy,pentup,butinprivatealsostoicism.Itisthisstoicismthathasenabledhimto survive theblowsthathavecomehisway,virtuallynon-stop,since2002.

The ‘mission’ on which Narendra embarked without delay after his wanderingceasedwastoconsumehim.WhateverinnerrestlessnesshadsenthimacrossIndiainsearchofVivekanandaandahomeintheRamakrishnaMissionnowcompelledhimtofindanotherabode.ReturningtoVadnagarandhisfamilyhadprovedonlythathecouldnevergohomeagain.Narendra, atnearly twenty,wasnowadifferentperson,onehisfamilybarelyrecognized,andinanimportantsensehewaslosttothem.

Chronology is the first element of deduction, and careful consideration suggeststhe abandoned betrothal, within the tightly knit and traditional Ganchi society inmid-twentiethcenturyVadnagar,was likely thebreakingpoint.Exactlyhowhealthyrelations between father and sonwere even before that, however, is uncertain.Wasthere some lingering resentment onNarendra’s part over the decision to deny himentrance to the Sainik school? Did that disappointment compound with thedisagreementoverJashodaben?MoreimportantlywasNarendra’sincreasingfocusonthe RSS, and his developing friendship with Vakil Saheb, an additional source offriction?

Significantlyorevenemblematically,ModistillremembershowverydisappointedhisparentswerewhenhemissedDiwalicelebrationsoneyear.Itwastheverydaythat

VakilSahebwasinductingNarendraintotheRSSandrepeatingthevowswithhim.22

Damodardasmighthavefelthisson’schoiceonlyasasmallbetrayalordisobedience,butasNarendraspent increasingamountsoftimeattheRSSshakhabeforehetookoffonhis two-year sojourn, a senseof rejectiononhis father’spart couldhavebeenreinforcedtothepointwheretherelationshipwasseverelystrained.

Inevitably fathers see their sons growing up and slipping away, escaping theirinfluence,andsometimesafiercelovecausesthemtoresentit.Whenitalsohappensthatareplacementfatherfigureisinvolved,especiallyonesolocallyglamorousasVakilSaheb, the hurt can be significant and the paternal feelings of redundancy andemotionallosspowerful.Yetthefulfilmentoftheson’snewdirectioncanoftenleadtogreatthings.Thetragedy,however, liesonly in long-termalienation,especiallywhendeathintervenes.

Narendra’schildhood,andhisextendedimmersioninthediverselandscapeofthecountrywhenhe lefthome, formedan importantpartof theadultModi’svisionofIndia,hisideaofthevastnessofthecountryandthevastnessofitshistory,intertwinedand enabling its future. By 1970, after more than two long and tortuous yearswrestlingwithandthensettlingtheissueinhismind,hetookthedecisiontodedicatehisspiritualintereststoapracticalcause.

Yet, in away thatwould informhispoliticalphilosophy in the future,he alwaysdippedintotheseaofIndia’straditionandwisdombeforesettinganynewcourse.‘Tomoveforward,toovercomehurdlesitisimportanttotakeastepback’istodayapartof his mantra of governance. It was at that time, when Narendra the seeker wasrepeatedlybeingturnedawayatmonasterydoors,thathedevelopedthisinclinationtolookintwodirectionsatonce.

Hesteppedoff thepathof themysticandasceticand insteadbeganhiscareerofpolitical service. Narendra bade farewell to his family once again and travelled toAhmedabadtoliveandworkwithanunclewhohadabusinessinthecity.There,hebeganamuchdeeperinvolvementwiththeRSS.

N

3

POLITICALAWAKENING

ARENDRAARRIVEDINAHMEDABADasapennilessandjoblessnineteen-year-oldjustasGandhinagarwasabouttotakethetitleofGujarat’scapitalawayfromit.He

wascertainonlyaboutwhathewantedtodo:workintheRSSandcommithimselftosomesortofpoliticalservice.

ItisnotablethatNarendra’sarrivalalsocoincidedwiththeaftermathandrecoveryfrom the terrible 1969 communal riots in the city under Congress administration.The riots led to the deaths of anywhere between600 and2,000people.1The slow-burningfusehadinitiallybeenlit,incongruously,bydamagedonetoal-AksamosqueindistantJerusalem.MuslimsblamedIsraelisandviceversa,althoughitlaterbecameknownthatanAustraliantourist,aChristianfundamentalist,hadsetthefire.

TherehadalreadybeenunrestinGujarat’sMuslimpopulationowingtothis,andtensionsremainedhighinAhmedabad,partlybecauseofanincidentearlierintheyearwhenaHindupolicemanhad insulted theKoran.AMuslimcrowdsurrounded thepolice station and he had been forced to issue an apology over a loud hailer.2 TheproximatecauseoftheriotswasaflashpointattheJagannathTempleinAhmedabadduringaMuslimcelebrationon18September,abettedbyanegligentmediathatfailedtopublishhastyMuslimapologiesforsomeinitial,andtrivial,skirmishes.

An important point is that the Reddy Commission’s report into the unrestexoneratedboththeRSSandtheBharatiyaJanaSangh(BJS–forerunneroftheBJP)of involvement,andevencommendedtheRSSfor its laterreliefeffortsonbehalfof50,000displacedpeopleofallcommunities.3

Indiainthe1970swasabouttoenteratumultuousperiodofupheavalandchange.ItbeganwiththewaragainstPakistanoverBangladesh,andwasfollowedbycivilunrestand a descent into political dictatorship and repression under Indira Gandhi’sEmergency.Thecountrywouldbeimprisonedbytheverypartythatfreeditfromtheyokeof theBritish.By the time thedecadeended, theCongresswas inpoweragainafter having been briefly rejected by the electorate, its thirty-year stranglehold onIndian governmentbroken afterMorarjiDesai’s JanataPartywon the1977 generalelections.BythenNarendrahadundergoneanothertransformation,thistimeintoaseasonedpoliticaloperator,albeitfrom,asheputsit,‘behindthecurtain’.

In1970hisuncle,Babubhai,heldthefranchiseforarudimentarycanteennexttotheStateTransportOffice andgaveNarendraa job there sohecouldearnhiskeepwhilehelodgedwithhim.Muchmoreservingofteaensuedoverthenextyearorso,butitwasameanstoanend.Narendrahadre-establishedcontactwithVakilSahebatthenearbyRSSheadquarters,HedgewarBhavan.GraduallyNarendramadehimselfmoreandmoreusefultotheeverydayrunningoftheplacewhereheincreasinglyspenthissparetime.HealsoimpressedhisteachersomuchthatVakilSaheb,whohadbeenattheheartoftheGujaratRSSfortwodecadesandwasthefatherofitsdevelopment,begantoseeaprotégéintheyoungmanfromVadnagar.

This process took place over a period of about eighteen months, at the end ofwhichNarendrawas rewardedwithanofficialpositionof ‘pracharak’ in theRSS. Itwas the lowest rungon the ladderbuthewas in.Before that, though, therewas theBangladeshwarwithPakistan,duringwhichanincidentoccurredthatmaywellhavecontributedtoVakilSaheb’sdecisionto‘adopt’Narendra.

The Pakistani generals’ hubristic and misguided offensive, named ‘OperationChengizKhan’,beganwithsurpriseattackson3December1971.Thirteendayslater–oneoftheshortestwarsonrecord–theaggressorhadnotonlybeendefeated,buthadalso lostEastPakistan, soontobecomethe independentcountryofBangladesh.India’s victory was not all celebrations, however. Pakistan had launched a horrificcampaignofpogromsthepreviousMarch,amountingtogenocide.ItwasdesignedtodefeattheBangladeshiindependencemovementandwipeouttheHinduprofessionalandintellectualclassesoftheindependentcountry,leavingitwithnowaytofunctioneffectively. Itwas a scorched earthpolicy: therewereoverhalf amillionmurdersofdoctors, teachers, journalists and politicians, at least 200,000 rapes and eventuallynearly ten million refugees, many of whom ended up in Indian refugee camps orsleepingonthestreetsofCalcutta.4

ItisacluetowhereNarendra’spoliticalthoughtswereatthetimethathemanaged

to get himself thrown into jail during the traumatic period leadingup to the short,sharpwar.TheproblemwastheIndiangovernmentwasjumpy.Therewasinprospecta soon-to-be-declared external Emergency, the second in its history sinceIndependence.ThefirstwasdeclaredwhenChinaattackedin1962,encompassedthe1965warwithPakistan,andwascalledoffin1968.WhenPakistanlaunchedits1971aggression, the secondwartimeEmergencywas immediately instituted,and itwas inthefebrileatmosphereoftheperiodthatNarendraranafoulofthelaw.

TheRSSwasholdingsit-downdemonstrations in sympathywiththeBangladeshsolidaritymovementandpractising ‘satyagraha’,MahatmaGandhi’smethodofnon-violentprotest.5Narendra at this timewasonly informally tied to theRSSbut saysthathe travelledup toDelhi to takepart in one suchprotest.6 In a country on thebrinkofwar,where the security of Indiawas ‘threatenedby external aggression’, todemonstrateagainstthegovernmentwastantamounttosedition.

TheprotestersweredemandingtherightforRSSworkerstojointhearmy,whichwasyetforbidden.‘ButinsteadofsendingustothewarfrontthegovernmentarrestedusandsentustoTiharjail,’recalledModi.7HisimprisonmentwasbriefandNarendrawas soon released, indicating that the episode was simply the authorities sweepingclean the streets. It was in early 1972, just after the war ended, that Vakil SahebsteppedinandtookNarendraformallyintotheRSSfold.

His new home was quite basic, but it was the grandest residenceNarendra hadlivedin,andheshareditwithanotherdozenyoungRSSrecruits.Thusbeganthelongapprenticeship that would lay the deep foundations of Modi’s organizationalexpertise.Hebeganattheverybottom.

‘My daily routine was as follows,’ saidModi: ‘Waking up at 5.00 a.m., fetchingmilk,wakingeverybodyup,participatinginmorningprayers,makingteaandservingeveryone. It was followed by cleaning utensils, going to the shakha, returning andmaking snacks for everyone. Then I served breakfast from 8.30 to 9.00 a.m., afterwhichIhadtocleanuptheentirebuilding,consistingofeighttoninerooms.Isweptandmopped thewholeplace, andwashedbothVakilSaheb’s andmyclothes…Forlunch, I used to go to some swayamsevak’s house by rotation. After returning toHedgewarBhavanIagaingottoworkandmadeteaforeveryone.Thiswasmyroutineforatleastayear,andthiswasthetimewhenImetmanypeople.’8

VakilSahebwasacannyman.NotonlydidheensurethatNarendraunderstoodthefinegrainoftheRSSfromaworm’s-eyeview,buthealsoorderedhimtoresumehisneglectededucation,andsenthimofftostudyhistoryandeventheextraSanskritthatNarendra had refused to learn at school. In the raremomentsNarendra could

spare from his washing and cooking duties, he actually managed to complete anextramuralcoursefromDelhiUniversity,andgainedadegreeinpoliticalscience.9

Hehad failed to gain entrance to aRamakrishnamonastery, but in its routines,demands and disciplines, life as a humble novitiate in the RSS rivalled that austereexistence.Laterhewouldchafeattherestrictions,butforthemomenthewashappytobeontheinsideandpossessedanenterprisingattitude:

Herecalls:‘IfIwasthepersonthatcleansthecar,Imadesuretocleanthecarverynicely,sothatevenmybossthought:“Thatisagoodboy,teachhimtodrive,hewillbeusefulforourdriving.”ThenIbecomeadriver.Sobasically,whicheverassignmentisgiventome,atthatpointoftime,Iamtotallyinvolvedinit.Ineverthinkaboutmypast,Ineverthinkaboutmyfuture.’

Little by little his duties and responsibilities increased. ‘Then, slowly, I startedlooking at the mail that came in and then writing the replies. My work kept onincreasingslowly.’10

In the fifthLokSabha electionsheld inMarch1971, IndiraGandhi campaigned asleader of the split Congress(R) – ‘R’ standing for ‘Requisition’. It was originally abreakaway group from the more conservative ‘Old’ Congress – Congress (O), ‘O’standing for ‘Organization’ – under K. Kamaraj, which was soon eclipsed andeventuallyabsorbedintotheJanataParty.

Shewonalandslidevictorywith352outof518seats.Inthestateassemblyelectionin Gujarat the next year the party replicated its performance, but the post-wareuphoriaoverBangladeshquicklydissipated.‘Garibihatao’hadbeenIndira’spopulistsloganinthegeneralelection,butthegrandpromisesshemadetothepoorweresoonunravelling. In the era of central government planning and the ‘licence raj’, whichtreatedbusinessmenwithsuspicion,rationaleconomicchoicesandfreemarketswereendangered species. The monsoon failed in 1972 and this, alongside Indira’sadherencetotheSovietcentrallyplannedeconomicmodel,ledinthesummerof1973toanagriculturalcrisis.Foodpriceswererisingquicklyasscarcityhithard,provokinginGujaratthefirstoftwouprisingsthatwouldprecipitatetheinternalEmergencyof1975.

A student-led, statewide bandh in January 1974 turned into a two-day riot inAhmedabad, forcing the resignation of ChiefMinister Chimanbhai Patel the nextmonth. Thus commenced what became known as the Nav Nirman Andolan, or

‘reconstructionmovement’,whichhopedtoturftheCongressoutofGujarat.Months of protests and agitation against government corruption and high-

handednessfollowed,leadingto8,000arrestsandmorethan100deaths,mostlyatthehands of the police. Nav Nirman was a genuinely popular movement and at thebeginninghad little todowith theRSS: itwas supportedbyhousewives,academics,doctors,lawyersandworkers.

Everybody spontaneously spilled on to the streets.Throughout 1974 the call forfreshassemblyelectionsgrewlouder,andincreasingnumbersofmembersofthestatelegislativeassembly(MLAs)begantoresigninsympathy.

Meanwhile,totheeastinBihar,asecondagitationbegan.ItwasledbyJayaprakashNarayan (JP). He emerged as the hope of protesting students and called for a‘Sampoorna Kraanti’, or (peaceful) ‘Total Revolution’. After what occurred inGujarat, Indira Gandhi now began to grow seriously worried. Before long, themovementforradicalchange–arisingoutofangeragainstprivilegeandcorruptionaswell as disastrous socialist policies – was beginning to break state borders andthreatening to become a national phenomenon. The government reacted violentlyagainst citizenswhowere complaining about its failed economic policies.When JPvisitedBengalhewasattackedbyaCongress crowd inCalcuttawhodancedon theroofofhiscar.11

Athirdelementthatbroughtabout theEmergency,andpossibly thecrucialone,wasmeanwhilepercolatingthroughthejudicialsystem.TheloserinIndiraGandhi’sRaeBareli constituency in the 1971Lok Sabha elections, RajNarain, had lodged aformal complaint againsther, alleging electoral irregularities. IndirahadusedoneofhercivilservantsfromDelhitorunhercampaign,whichwasstrictlyforbidden.On12June 1975, a new state assembly election in Gujarat voted out the Congress andinstalled a coalition of Opposition parties. That day, the Allahabad High Courtdeclared Indira’s 1971 election to Parliament null and void and banned her fromholdinganypublicofficeforsixyears.

After protesting the decision for a few days, IndiraGandhi declared an internalEmergency on the night of 25 June 1975. Massive, nationwide detentions ofthousands of her political opponents, and even of dissenters within the Congressparty, took place overnight. These arrests were carried out under the alibi of‘Presidential ordinances’, which later became law under dictatorial fiat, along withamendments to theConstitution– including declaring India a socialist and secularstate – a provision the founding fathers, led by Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar, hadconsideredunnecessaryin1950.

LalKrishnaAdvaniandAtalBihariVajpayeewereprominentatthattimeintheBJS, the political arm of the RSS.On 26 June they were in Bangalore attending ameeting, andwere promptly arrested and transported to the city’s central jail. Likeverymanyotherfreshinternees,theycouldhardlybelievewhatwashappening.Indiawasademocracyafterall,withaConstitutionthatguaranteedcivilrightsandfreedomof speech and representation.How could it possibly be abrogated at thewhimof asingle person merely because she decided that the state was threatened by ‘hostile’elements, namely its ownpeople?A coup, like the conceit in Indira’s implicit royalclaimofl’état,c’estmoi,wasatfirstincredible.Bythetimeitsankin,thosewhowerepreviouslyinapositiontocounterherpoliticallywereinprisonorhiding.

Censorshipofthepresscameintooperationonthenightof25June.PowersupplytoDelhinewspaperpresseswasturnedoff.Butbecauseacoupleofnewspaperofficeswere not on Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, the road where most of the newspaperbuildings stood, they avoided the black-out and managed to go to press the nextmorning.12Liketheothernewspapers,theytooweresoonsubjecttodirectcensorship,andwereallowedmainlytoprintarticlesfeaturingfilmstarappearancesandspeechesby Sanjay Gandhi. Almost all foreign journalists were banned – though not theRussians.Indiahadbeenswiftlyturnedintoquasi-policestate.Worstofall,manyinDelhi’schatteringclasseswereattemptingtojustifyit,ifonlytosavetheirownskins.13

Inhisbook,India:aPortrait,PatrickFrenchwritesthat‘ItlookedasifIndiamightbemovingtowardsanewformofgovernment–dictatorship.’14

By now the RSS inGujarat had interlocked with theNavNirmanmovement andestablished a large network of pracharaks, supporters and activists who were stilloperatingintopgearowingtotherecentstateelection.Gujarat’snewJanataMorchagovernment, headedbyBabubhaiPatel,meant that, alongwithTamilNadu, itwasoneofonlytwobigstatesinIndiawheretheEmergencydiktatofIndiraGandhihadany slight chance of being resisted. As such, Gujarat became a magnet for Indiandemocrats fleeingtosafety fromotherpartsof thecountry,andbegantoresembleawartimeResistancestrongholdinVichyFrance.OneofthefirstactsoftheRSSunderthe Emergency was to establish a coordinating committee of this resistance, theGujaratLokSangharshSamiti(GLSS).

It had been over three years since Modi had moved into Hedgewar Bhavan,learningbyheart every systemof theorganization from thevery smallest cog to the

heaviest lever. Surprisingly quickly, he became the man to go to when somethingneeded doing. Modi chaperoned and assisted visitors, oversaw correspondence andeventuallyorganizedoffices,transportationandmeetingsoftheparty.15Thereseemednotaskhedidnotknowhowtohandle,noformalityorprocesswithintheRSShewasunfamiliarwithorfoundtoomundanetotakecareof.SomecalledModiaworkaholicbuthewassteadilymakinghimselfindispensable.

How well he had accomplished this became clear when the GLSS was initiallyconvened in early July under the chairmanship of Vakil Saheb, who promptlyappointedModi its general secretary.16 This appointmentwas to prove the turningpoint, the crucible of both Modi’s career and character. It was because of hisclandestineactivitiesduringtheEmergencythathisriseintheRSSbeganinearnest.Modi, barely twenty-five years old, was chosen by Vakil Saheb because by now heunderstood how everythingworked, knew everybody,was good at handling people,and was trusted. There is often talk of Modi’s egotism, roughness and arrogancealienating people; but evidence suggests, even if thiswas so, countervailing qualitiescountedforalottoo,orModiwouldneverhavebeengivensomuchresponsibilitysoearly.

InthedaysimmediatelyaftertheenactmentoftheEmergency,IndirawasalertedtohowmuchofathorninherfootGujaratcouldbe,thanksmainlytotheactivismoftheRSS.The organizationwas again banned as it had been in 1948.TheCongressevenattemptedtodiscredit itbyclaimingweaponswerefoundintheRSSoffices inAhmedabad.17 Most of its official representatives were speedily rounded up by thepolice and put into prison. Modi, at this point still a junior worker at HedgewarBhavan in the eyes of the authorities, was left relatively free to operate, althoughbecauseofhisnewsecretrolehewasinaperilousposition.

‘AtthattimeIwasactivewiththisagitation,’hesays. ‘Iwas inveryclosecontactwithyouth leaders, student leaders. Iwasbehind the curtainbut Iwasvery close tothem.’ Straight after the GLSS convened and set out a plan of action, KeshavraoDeshmukh,theRSSfigurewithwhomModiwassupposedtocoordinate,wasspottedbythepoliceandarrested.HerealizedthatanotherRSSleader,NathalalZagda,wasalsoinimminentdangerandsoleapedonascooterandrodetopickhimup,ferryinghimtoasafehouse–oneofmanysecretplacesofrefugeModiwouldsoonorganize.

At last his talent for administration was put to the test. ‘It was a threat todemocracy,’ saysModi. ‘I was underground and the police were in search ofme toarrestme.ButIwantedtomeetmypeople,Iwantedtoconvincethemthatwehadtosavedemocracy.’

He set about compiling lists of contacts who could be trusted to carry outclandestine tasks, and then used their knowledge of another wider circle ofsympathizers and democrats to arrange accommodation for activists who neededplacestohide.Healsobeganraisingmoneytopaylivingexpensesofpoliticalrefugeesand activists, and arranged for disbursement of funds.Modi calculated, in his briskmanner, that ‘forevery full-timeundergroundworker,oneneeded the supportof atleast10familieswhohadnofearoftheconsequences’.18Luckily,therewereplentyofGujaratiswillingtovolunteer.Veryquickly,the‘enemiesofthestate’,whomIndira’ssecurityforcesweresearchingforonthestreetsofAhmedabadandelsewhere,meltedawayintosafehouses.

Just as there exist from his childhood apocryphal stories of Narendra’s actionsdesignedtoshowhischaracterinaflatteringlight,sothereisanothercropofstoriesfrom the timeof theEmergency.Although these toomightbe less than completelytrue,evenhisbitterestcriticsadmitthatModididmuchgoodworkatthistime,alotofitatgravepersonalrisk.Twoexamplesofsuchapocrypha:ChhayankMehtatellsofhow,afterDeshmukh’sarrest, itwasdiscoveredthatthepapershewascarryingwerestillwithhim.Thesecontainedplans for the futureactionsof theGLSS,and itwasessentialsomehowtoretrievethem.TothisendModiplannedadistractionwiththehelpofafemaleswayamsevakfromManinagar.TheywenttothepolicestationwhereDeshmukhwasbeingheld.Whilesheposedasarelativeandcontrivedameetingwiththeprisoner,Modisomehowtookthedocumentsfromunderthenosesofthepolice.19

AsimilarstoryhasChandikadas‘Nanaji’Deshmukharrestedwhilecarryingabookofaddressesofsympathizersandpossiblysafehouses.Modithenhadtoremoveeveryone of them from the undergroundnetwork and begin the difficult task of findingalternatives.20

Another apocryphal tale hasModi ‘breaking into jail’ in Bhavnagar tomeet thejournalistVishnuPandya andShankersinhVaghela (who today, ironically, leads theCongress opposition to Modi in Gujarat and is a sworn enemy). For this recklessexcursionhedisguisedhimselfandagainmadeuseofafemaleactivist,‘aladywhowasa regular visitor to the jail’, to allay suspicion.21 The prison outing has never beenconfirmedbyeitherModiorVaghela.22

Thereareotherstorieswhicharecertainlytrue–forinstance,themannerinwhichModimanagedtosendwordofconditionsundertheEmergencytotheoutsideworld

bypublishingsamizdatmaterialthathesmuggledaboardDelhi-boundtrainsintimefor a meeting of foreign Commonwealth leaders taking place there. Booklets withtitles such as ‘Indian Press Gagged’, ‘Facts versus Indira’s Lies’ and ‘WhenDisobediencetoLawIsaDuty’weredistributedtopoliticiansfromforeigncountriesbylocalRSSmembers,andthetruthoftheEmergencystartedtomakeitswaytotheinternationalmedia.He coordinated theundergroundprintpropaganda andwas incharge of sendingmaterial abroad to Indianswho could spread theword about therepression and resistance in India. Such samizdat played a crucial part in eventuallyforcingIndiratoholdnewelections.23

Modi was also responsible for transportation and travel to Gujarat of thoseopponents of Indira still at liberty. In this role hemet with the socialist and tradeunion leader George Fernandes, whose brother had recently been imprisoned andtorturedbytheregime.24Moditoo,inthecourseofhisduties,wascompelledtotravel,often with pamphlets that could have got him arrested. To minimize the risk hebecame amaster ofdisguise, something that camenaturally toonewho alwayspaidattentiontohisappearance.

On one outing he would appear as a saffron-robed sanyasi, on another as aturbaned Sikh.One time hewas sitting in a railway carriage, hiding behind a thickblackbeard,whenhisoldschoolteachersatdownnexttothegrown-up‘urchin’.Thedisguise worked perfectly, but some years afterwards the teacher attested that asNarendradisembarked,heintroducedhimselfandofferedaheartysalutation.25

While theEmergencyallowedhimtoprovehismettle,more important toModiwas the change it wrought in him and how it broadened and clarified his politicalbeliefs. ‘DuringthisperiodIhadthechancetoworkwithsomanyotherparties,’hetold me. ‘I was lucky to work with Gandhians. I was lucky to work with socialistleaders. Iwas lucky toworkwith Islamicorganizations, theCommunistParty,withliberalorganizations–somanypeople.Thatperiodwasagoodperiodtomouldme.BecauseofthatandthedemocraticvaluesthatIfound,itbecameapartofmyDNA.Yes,thatwasoneofthebestexperiencesthatIhad.Ibecameaware;IunderstoodtheConstitution, Iunderstood the rights,becausebefore that Iwas living inadifferentworld.TheEmergencybecameauniversityforme.’

Sympathizers of Indira Gandhi like to explain that she imposed the draconianEmergencyandimprisonedheropponentsorsenthersontopullpoorpeopleoffthestreetsandforciblysterilizethemnotbecauseshewasdictatorialatheart.Instead,theyclaim she genuinely cared for the country and this was her uniqueway of showingaffection.ItismorelikelythatinendingtheEmergencyIndirawasthinkingofherself,

not India. She was aware of her growing international reputation as a tyrant, thedaughterofagreatdemocraticleaderwhoselegacyshehaddamaged.AsthejournalistTavleenSinghpointsout,thepressuretoendtheEmergencycamesimplyfromIndiraGandhi finding it unbearable that ‘the Western media had taken to calling her adictator’.26

There was also of course the shrewd calculation that with her opponentsimprisoned, demoralized, disorganized and exhausted, they would be ineffective incampaigningandshecouldwinthenewgeneralelections.Itwastothecreditofthevotersthattheyprovedherwrong.ThedelayedsixthLokSabhapoll,heldinMarch1977, two months after being announced, saw an informal alliance headed by theJanataPartywin345seatstotheCongress’s189.

For the first time in the history of independent India, the Congress had beendefeated. Morarji Desai was elected prime minister and A.B. Vajpayee appointedexternalaffairsminister.But thealliance,comprising ideologicalopposites,collapsedinlessthanthreeyears.

One of the most remarkable things about the Emergency is how India appearsalmosttohaveforgottenithappened.Alargeproportionof itspopulationwasbornafter1977andthedarkperiodofdictatorshipmustseemasdistanttoitasthedaysoftheRaj.

To demonstrate how shortmemories could be even back then, in January 1980Indiare-electedIndiraGandhiwithamajority.

ThereweretwoimportantconsequencesthatarosefromtheEmergency.ThefirstwasthattheRSSbrokeoutofitsconstrictedspaceasafringeandeccentricmovementandemergedwithcredit,itsreputationenhancedasadefenderofdemocracy.27ThankstoIndira’s period of dictatorship, many ordinary people who would never havecountenancedtheRSSoranyofitsSanghParivarassociatesdiscoveredthatmostofitsworkers were hard-working patriots, not at all the violent fanatics and Gandhi-murderers propaganda had caricaturized them as. For the first time in independentIndia’s socialist-dominatedhistory, an alternative right-of-centre ideological outlookgainedatleastatoeholdinmainstreampoliticaldebate.

The second, less fortunateconsequenceof theEmergencywasa formofpoliticalStockholm Syndrome, which is the psychological state whereby a hostage comes tosympathize with and even justify his captor. This was seen especially in themedia,

which–withhonourable exceptions– genuflected in front of Indira’s regime.Oneseniorjournalist,whowaspresentasayoungreporterthroughoutandknewmanyoftheguilty,reachedthisconclusion:‘India’spoliticalculturechangedforeverduringtheEmergency.Itwasonaccountoftheabsolutepowerthattheprimeministerwasseentowieldthatanatmosphereofservilityandsycophancycametosurroundherandherfamily.’28

TheEmergencyhadtheeffectofinstallingapseudo-royaldynastyatthecentreofIndian politics and society. Its almost feudal power, abetted by the massivelycentralized bureaucracy, was set to spread across the country in regional politicaldynasties.Theparadoxicalphenomenonofliberalsandprogressivesallyingtheirowninterestswithaprivilegedelitewasabouttobegin.

Nearly thirty years old in early 1980, NarendraModi’s political journey wouldbeginonly sevenyears laterwhenheofficially joined theBJP.But theBJP itselfdidnot yet exist. It would be formed towards the end of 1980, the first year of IndiraGandhi’slasttermasprimeminister.

PART2TheAscent

M

4

LEARNINGTHEROPES

ODI’S LIFE WAS ABOUT to change and expand.Hewas in amuchmore visibleposition after theEmergency.Having impressedhis colleagueswithunstinting

labour during the underground resistance, he would now be rewarded for it. Oneconsequenceofhis role incoordinatingbetween theGLSSand figures fromoutsidethe state had been that Modi was introduced to people involved in politics on anational level.They took awaywith them favourable impressions of the young anddiligentGujaratipracharak.

Many people important in the RSS and its associated organizations had beentraumatized by their imprisonment, through physical mistreatment or solitaryconfinement.AreturntonormalityinGujarat–asortof‘democraticreconstruction’– took time and care, andModiworked hard to restore regular functioning in theSangh Parivar. At some time in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of ‘sambhaagpracharak’, a regional organizer. It was a significant responsibility for someone soyoung(hewastwenty-eight)butanacknowledgementthathewasalreadyregardedasacapableandtrustedadministrator.

ModiwasgiventheRSSbrief in thevibhaags (administrativeareas)ofSuratandVadodara, ‘whilehisfieldextendedfromCentralandSouthGujarat’sKhedadistricttoValsad’sUmergaon’.1Thejobentailed,onceagain,near-constanttravel,somethinghewasusedtoandrelished.Thenout-of-stateconnections interruptedhisduties inearly1979whenhewassummonedtoDelhibyDattopantThangadi,aseniormemberof theRSSwithwhomhehad already established a friendship in the underground.Modi was commissioned to research and write the official RSS account of theEmergencyperiod.2HehadalreadywrittenonebookonthesubjectaboutGujaratin

which he avoided mention of his own exploits. The new book involved yet moretravel,exceptthis timenationwide, speakingtoallmannerofpeople involved intheanti-Emergencyunderground,includingthosefromotherpartiesandmovements.3

Italsomeantneglectinghisposition inGujarat foraperiodoftime,andperhapsrisking the advances he had recentlymade in the state RSS hierarchy. But this wasdoubtless balanced out by his first excursion into the national, Delhi-levelorganization,evenasaback-roomplayer– ‘behindthecurtain’,ashealwaysputs it,half-jocularly,inprivateconversations.Modisawtheopportunityforwhatitwasand,accustomedtotravellinglight,jumpedonaDelhi-boundtrainwithonlyasuitcaseandthepromiseofaroomatafriend’splacewhereherestedonlayoversfromhistripstoallcornersofIndia.BackinDelhiafterafact-findingresearchjourney,Modicollatedinterviewsanddocumentspreparatorytocomposingthetextofthebook.4

What he also had was a ringside seat fromwhich to wince at the self-defeatingquarrelsandinfightingthatwouldteartheJanataPartyalliancetopieces.Thismadeadeep and abiding impression on him, and introduced a vital word to his politicallexicon: discipline. Modi understood from what he saw of ideological quibbling,egotism and other unedifying displays of political selfishness that disciplinewas theonlywaytoachieveanything.

AsMorarjiDesai’sadministrationsquanderedahistoricopportunitytochangethecourseofIndianhistory,Modiwasprivatelyformulatingapracticalethicofpoliticalservicehewouldapplytohisowncareer.Animportantelementofitwasthestresson‘practical’ at the expense of ‘ideological’. As an aspiring administrator more than apolitician,hegainedanessentialinsight:thatitwasmoreimportanttounderstandasituationfromallanglesthantoargueovernarrowpointsoftheoryandmisshalfoftheoverallpicture.

Vajpayee,asleaderoftheJanaSanghsince1967,hadworkedhardtoholdtheJanataPartytogether,buttheinevitablecollapse,whenitcame,wasdevastating.TheJanatawononlyasingleLokSabhaseatinGujaratinthe1980generalelection.Indiadidnotatthistimehaveanypartiesspeakingupforthefreemarket.TheSwatantraPartyhadfallenawayin1974.IndiaseemedonlytohavesocialistdogmasinheritedbyfreedomfightersviaCambridgeUniversityandtheLondonSchoolofEconomics(LSE),whichwasfoundedbyFabiansocialists.

Nehru’s subsequent leadership of India after Independence in effect had

bequeathed an all-encompassing socialist outlook that was by now the nationalideology.EventodaytheRepresentationofthePeopleActrequiresallIndianpoliticalparties to pledge allegiance not only to theConstitution but also to socialism.Theclause, added to the Constitution by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, wasamended and strengthened by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 and passed without anyobjectionsfromtheOpposition.Itmeansineffectthat ifyouareanIndian,youarelegallyboundtobeasocialistortovoteforone.5

What India’s putative ‘right-of-centre’ had – instead of free-market-orientedeconomic liberalism as in America’s Republicans or Britain’s Tories – was anationalistic, traditionalistic, Hindu movement under the parentage of the SanghParivar. Itwasnotonly sociallyconservativebutalsoeconomicallyconservative– inthatitofferednopracticalorfree-marketalternativestoNehruviansocialism.

NobodyintheJanataParty,forexample,hadthoughtofgettingridofthelicence-permit-quotasystem;itwassimplytakenforgrantedthatitwasthewaythingsweredone.Ifanything,Desai’sgovernmenthadbeenevenmoredamaginglyfaithfultothecentralist command-and-control systemthan IndiraGandhi’s.Analternativewayofseeingrealitywouldtakeanotherdecadetodevelop,andwouldironicallybereleasedintothebodypoliticbytheCongress.

The fragmentation of the Janata Party meant that the energy of the politicalopposition,havingfailed inoffice,requirednewchannels inwhichtoflow,andnewvocabulariestoarticulatetheirambitionsforthecountry.Soitisnocoincidencethatthe 1980 general election ‘marked the point from which religious identity beganhavingagreaterimpactonIndianpolitics’.6

The reason it did so was partly because of the ‘pressure cooker’ effect of theCongress occupying almost the entire politico-economic space. As a result,Opposition energies went off in different, more cultural directions to find theiridentityandgainvotertraction.Itseemedtheonlyavenueavailable.Butitwasalsoindirect response to the strategicmachinationsof theCongress as it set aboutmakingitselfimmunetopoliticalchallenge.

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) since 1951 had functioned as the semi-officialpolitical arm of the RSS. After the collapse ofMorarji Desai’s administration, andhaving tried and failed to hold the alliance in place, the BJS was in an etiolatedcondition.Itwasstuckinadeadend.IthadgivenupontheJanataPartyanddecidedtoreinventitself,partlyatthebehestofVajpayee,whobecamethepresidentofanewformation,theBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)orIndianPeople’sParty,createdin1980.

TheBJShadbeen a nationalist party for those seeking a nation, and in away it

succeededonlytoowellinitsaims,asM.J.Akbardescribed: ‘Itbeganasthepartyofrefugees from Pakistan. The robust economic and social resettlement of thedispossessed,evidentbythe ’70s,paradoxically, liberatedthemfromthepartywhichhelpedthem.Afterthehigh-dramablipoftheEmergencyandJanataPartyphase,theBJPreinventeditselfasachampionofapsychologicalratherthananeconomicneed.’7

But a psychological need is as real as any other, and this psychological needwaspreciselytheterritorytheBJPwouldoccupy–thatofarecedingHinduidentity,cutadriftbythedominationofthepoliticalcentrestagebytheCongress,withitsfrayedGandhian ideals of the holiness of poverty; and hidden behind the back of thatsupposedhumblepiety,laytheironfist.

The BJP, it was clear early on in 1980, would need to fill the patriotic vacuumcreatedbythenihilismofpost-Independencesocialism;onewitha‘continental’sense,thesenseofbelongingtoapeoplespecificallyofIndia’.8ThenewBJP’srelationtotheRSS–whichsignificantlyatthispointopeneditsdoorstonon-Hindus9–wouldbethesameasthatoftheBJS:itwouldbethepoliticalarmoftheparentorganization,althoughtheywouldbe twodifferententities, andonecould fraternizeamongbothuntiloneformallyjoinedthenewparty.Itarticulatedfivemainaims:nationalismandnational unity, democratic development, Gandhian socialism (there was it appearssimply no imaginable alternative to socialism), principled politics and genuinesecularism–stillofcourseamuch-disputedterm.10

The BJP would prove a sturdy and significant presence in Indian politics, andwithintwodecadesitwouldbegoverningthecountry.Yetitsbirthin1980wasverymuchanideaawaitingfulfilment.

India in 1980, as in 1970, was about to enter a decade of turmoil and upheaval,markedbyriots,militaryactionat theGoldenTemple inAmritsar, IndiraGandhi’sassassination, an anti-Sikh pogrom – and then the optimism over young RajivGandhi’s premiership that itself turned to ashes in consequence of, among otherthings,theBoforsscandal.

DictatorshiphadbeentriedandfoundwantingbytheCongress.Clearly,anotherway to secure its uninterrupted governance of the country was required, and thisinvolvedmarketing itself (with special offers) to various sections of the populationthatwouldreliablyvoteforit.Votebankswereabouttobeborn,andthelaboratoryfortestingthemwouldbeGujaratwhere,inthesummerof1979,NarendraModihad

returned.MadhavSinghSolankibecame thenewCongress chiefministeron7 June1980,

endingnearlyfourmonthsofPresident’sRule.Hearrivedwithamassivemajorityof149 seats out of 182 and a plan thatwould setGujarat aflame and lead to years ofincreasinglydestructiveriotsthatsetcasteagainstcasteandMuslimagainstHindu.11

Itwould, though, secure adecadeofCongress rule in the stateby consolidating thevotes of various minorities in the party’s favour, splitting the BJP’s Hinduconstituencybydividingitalongcasteandclass.Itwasamasterworkofdarkpoliticalcalculation,andonefromwhichModilearnedanotherimportantlesson.

Solanki, along with otherCongress leaders inGujarat such as SanatMehta andJinabhaiDarji,hadthebrainwavethatpoliticalsuccess,nottomentionthemoralhighground, couldbeclaimedby identifying theelectorate in termsof their social statusratherthan–ashadbeenthecase–politicalloyalty.ThiscouldbringinvotesiftheCongress pursued a strategy of identifying the very poorest andmost marginalizedgroups(whichcomprised56percentofthepopulationinGujarat)andofferingthemincentives. In otherwords, paying, in one form or another, the supporters of otherpartiestovotefortheCongressinstead.12

The vessel of this electoral inducement would come to be known as ‘KHAM’,whichtooktheinitialsofthetargetcommunities:Kshatriyas,a ‘warrior’castewhichfeltitshistoricalglorieswereinsufficientlysupportedbyitsstatusinmodernsociety;Harijans, theunderclassDalitswhoremained largelyunorganizedandthinly spread,andthereforeignoredbypoliticalparties;Adivasis,exploitedforestdwellersandtribalcommunities often abused and used as bonded labour; and of courseMuslims, themostvisible,vociferousminority,towhomthemostenticingpromiseswouldbemadetobindthemtotheCongress.

InoneofthemanyironicreversalsofIndianpolitics,theCongressinGujarathadstolen theclothesof the JanataParty, for ithadbeenPrimeMinisterMorarjiDesaiwhohadfirstproposedformalrightsforOtherBackwardClasses(OBCs)throughtheMandalCommissionwhichV.P. Singhput into action adecade later.The aimhadbeen to improve the lives of those groups in society seen to be lagging behindeconomicallyandsocially.TheunderprivilegedOBCsweretobeallottedaportionofpublicsectorjobsandplacesineducationalinstitutions.Theproposalrecommendedariot-provoking27percentreservation.Thereportwashastilyputontheshelfin1980byIndiraGandhiandforgottenaboutuntilPrimeMinisterV.P.Singhresurrectedtherecommendationsin1989–90,withpredictableresults.

As far back as in 1972, in Congress-ruled Gujarat, the Baxi Backward Classes

Commission had been set up ‘to identify socially and educationally backwardcommunities that would qualify for preferential treatment’ – reservations in otherwords.13ItreportedtotheCongressadministrationin1976,addingeighty-sixgroupsofOBCs to the list of scheduled tribes and castes that already enjoyed 31 per centreservationsinGujarat’spublicsectorandinuniversities.14ItsfindingswereadoptedbytheJanataMorchagovernmentin1978,aftertheendoftheEmergency.

Anothercommissionforimprovingthelotofsixty-threeminoritiesandbackwardclasses–whohadbeenexcludedintheearlierBaxireport–wasformedon20April1982 under retired high court judge C.V. Rane. It reported on 31 October 1983.FourteenmonthslaterSolankidecidedtoimplementitsrecommendationofanextra18 per cent reservations, bringing the total quota to 49 per cent. Thiswas enactedimmediatelyprior to theMarch1985Gujarat assembly elections, cynically timed toboost the KHAM vote. Solanki reversed the Rane Commission’s stress on thedefinitionofOBCsbyincomeandinsistedinsteadoncaste,ignoringitscut-offlimitofanincomeofRs10,000,probablytoluretherelativelyprosperousKshatriyas.Theresultagainwasstatewiderioting.15

Thissortofmadnesshadgonenowhereatthenationallevel,ofcourse,andIndiraGandhihadshelvedtheMandalCommissionreportpreciselybecausesherecognizeditsabsurditiesanddangers.Forexample,theminoritiesandcastesidentifiedwerenotuniformly unrewarded, and many people within various groups were doing welleconomically.16 There also existed, quite naturally, vast regional variations in theirfortunes. In Gujarat in 1985, however, Solanki saw that there was political andelectoralprofittobehadinimplementinghisownversionoftheRaneCommissionrecommendations.

Intheensuingriots,17whichbeganinFebruary1985duringtheassemblyelectioncampaign,theangerofthemobswasunderlinedbytheshockthatreservationswerecumulative,sothatifquotaswerenotfilledinoneyear,they‘rolledover’tothenext,adding to the reservations all theway to apossible 100per cent. ‘The thought thattheycouldbeeffectivelybarredfromallseatsof learningwasenoughforupper-castepeople to go berserk, wrote one author.’18 The army was called in, and the primeministerandtheUnionhomeministerhad tovisitAhmedabadto tryandcalmthesituation.Nevertheless, twenty-three houses were burnt to ashes in theDabgarwadneighbourhoodand180peoplediedwhile6,000weremadehomeless.19

ButOBCswerebecomingpersuadedthattheCongresswasontheirside,andtheeffectwassocialpolarization.Astherewasamajorityoflower-castevoters,thissuitedtheCongressperfectly: ‘This strategywasaconscioustop-downeffort torealignthe

socialbasisofthepartysysteminGujarat,’saysoneleadertoday.ItwasevidencetooofhowcommunaltensionsinGujaratweresponsoredandnursed,because‘casteconflictcangetmorphedintocommunalviolencethroughcalculatedpoliticalstrategy’.20Butitalsoslowlybroughtnewpeople–middle-classPatels,BrahminsandBaniyas–whoopposedthereservations,tosupporttheBJP,andwouldprovethefirstsmallstimulusforthenewparty.21

During the fraughtearly1980s,Modi travelledaroundGujaratasanRSSsambhaagpracharak, nurturing the organization in his designated areas. Just as he had had aringside seat for the death throes ofMorarji Desai’s Janata government, so also hewitnessed first-hand the chaos engendered in his state by the Congress strategy ofdivideandexploit.

The KHAM programme would later evolve into what became known,paradoxically,assecularismpractisedbypoliticalpartiesbothattheCentreandinthestates.Theyhadincommonthepiousfictionofhelpingminoritiesandthepoor.Thiswas supposedly in the interest of making society fairer, when in fact politicalfavouritismwasaimedatcertainsectionsof thepopulationforelectoralgain. Inthe1980s,itwasOBCsandAdivasiswhowereofferedpoliticalbenefitsinGujarat;later,on a national scale, it would be overwhelmingly and controversially the Muslimminority,startingwithRajivGandhiunilaterallyoverturningaSupremeCourtrulinginasimpledivorcecase.

WhatModi learnt from the riots over reservations and the proto-‘secularism’ ofSolanki’s Congress administration was a respect for the Constitution and itsdefinition of secularism. Narrowly defined, secularism was ‘understood to meanneutralityoftheStatetowardsallreligions[and]bereftofpositiveapproachtowardsallreligions.Theessenceofsecularismisnon-discriminationofpeoplebytheStateonthebasisofreligiousdifferences’.22Thepracticalimplementationofsecularismhadtoapply beyond faith, because everybody knew religion existed in social space, and itsdifficulties most often were reduced to conflict between castes or betweencommunities–HinduandSikhorHinduandMuslim.

Initswidersensegenuinesecularismmeanttreatingallcitizensequallyunderthelaw. The same laws had to apply equally to everyone for this to work. The riotsinstigated by reservations demonstrated the danger of resiling from that principle.Such abrogations of constitutional principle introduced inequality of treatment to

different communities.That these communities could often be defined by religiousbeliefwassecondary.Underthecountry’sconstitutionaldefinitions,onewasfirstanIndian,andonlyafterthataHinduoraSikhoraMuslimoranythingelse.

Modi had plenty of opportunity, criss-crossing Gujarat on his motorcycle, toobserve the damage caused by such an abridgement. The underclasses were rightlyresentful of the way in which social advantages were always claimed by the uppercastes; the upper castes in turn were protective of their wealth and position, andscepticalthatanygoodwouldcomeofspecialtreatmentforthosebelowthem.Yetifallweretreatedthesameway,howcouldanythingeverchangeandprogressbemade?Itwasallverywellbeingequalunderthelawintermsofrights,butthenwhatcouldendthesevereinequalityandsocialinjusticeofIndia?

Modiponderedthiscomplexproblemandbegantoformulatehisconclusionsandremediesfor it fromaroundthistime.WhenhebecamechiefministerofGujarat inOctober 2001,Modi would immediately begin to put them into practice. That hecoulddosospeedily,andonaverywidefront,wasbecausebythenhecouldarticulateapoliticalphilosophyhehassincemadehiswatchword:development.

ItwasfromhishabitualwidereadingandobservationsasasambhaagpracharakthatModistartedtounderstandhownothingwouldeverchangewhilethe‘Hindurateofgrowth’ of the economy persisted under Nehruvian-style state socialism.23 SinceIndependencesuchgrowthhadaveragedbarely3percentp.a.,notenoughtomakeasignificantdentinpoverty,givenIndia’sgrowingpopulation.

Under the licence-quota-permit raj the outlookof Indianpolitical partieswouldneverchange.Inequalityandpovertywouldpersistiftherewasnotenoughwealthtogoaround;allthatcouldbedonewastotakesomeone’ssliceofthepieandgiveittosomebodyelse.Whynot,thoughtModi,bakeabiggerpie?Thesolutionobviouslywastoproducemorewealth,whichwouldbenefiteverycitizen.Butthatwouldentailanalternative economic model: a free-market economy and, on the part of thegovernment, investment in social and economic infrastructure to grant the poor achancetoprosperaswell.

ThatthissortofthinkingputhimatoddswiththeCongresswasobvious.Butitalso placed him in opposition to his own colleagues in theRSSwhose outlookwasequallyconventional.Itwasanorganization, inModi’sview,thatprovided ‘basicallyhumanresourcemanagementonanationalscale.Ifyouhaveitonanationalscaleyou

havehumanresourcemanagementquality.’Itspotentialtocreatechangewasthereforeconsiderable,andModihadmanynew

ideas. But still his career would prove to be full of friction over the years as heattemptedtopersuadehiscolleagues in theRSS,and later in theBJP, toacceptandadoptthem.‘Notasingleproposal,notasingleinitiative,wasappreciated,’Modisaysof his experience at this time. ‘Always there was resistance, always there werequestions.ButifIamconvinced,Iwillprovetheresults.Thenresultswillmakethemconvinced.’

Hespeakssoftly,aswesitoneeveninginhisoffice.Thevoicerisesincadenceasherecalls the days when hewould argue and cajole his seniors in the RSS to think aseconomic reformers rather than asmere ideologues. It would be a precursor to hisgrowingriftinGujaratwiththeVishwaHinduParishad(VHP)anditsleaderPravinTogadia.Development,notdeity,wouldbecomeModi’sleitmotif.

‘It is a very democratic system in the RSS,’ says Modi. ‘They debate for hourstogether, it’s an open debate. The perception is absolutely wrong that they aredictatorial.Theyareveryopentodiscussion.’

YetModi’sexperienceintheparivar,becauseofhisalternativeviews,hisownwayoflookingatandapproachingproblems,wasthatofanoutsider.‘Ialwaysusedtositonthelastbench,Ineverusedtositintheforefront,’hesays.‘AndIusedtolistentowhatwasgoingonbutInevertookpartinthedebate–thatwasmynature.MostofthetimeIfoundthattheycouldnotunderstandme.Thatwasmyfirstfeeling.ThenItriedtodebateit,buttheydidnotdebateme.’

Intheendhefeltthathehadtotaketheriskofalienatinghiscolleaguesinordertochange their way of thinking. ‘I’ll give you one small, very good example,’ he says,warming to the theme. ‘In1985or1986wehadadrought in the state, a very, veryhuge drought, and even fodderwas not available for cattle.TheRSS decided to dosome social activity, particularly for cattle and poor people. The idea was to seekmoney internationallyand, in theopen-endeddemocratic systemofdebate, thiswasdiscussedforseveralhours.Andsuddenlythefinaldecisionwastobetaken.Iraisedmyhand.Thepersonwhowasinthechair,hewasangrywithme.Hesaid:“Sincethelast four hours we are discussing and you kept quiet; and now, when we areconcluding,youareraisingyourhand.Whatdoyouwanttosay,nowthatthereisnomoretime?”’

Modirecallstheincidentwithrelish:

Isaid,‘Ifyoudon’twanttolistentome,IwillobeytheRSSdiscipline.ButIhaveasuggestion.’Theyknew

meverywell.Theysaid,‘OK,whatdoyouwanttosay?’SoIstarted:‘Whydowedoreliefworklikethis?Whydoweappealtoforeignnations?Whatistheneedofit?Weareanation,wehavehumanpower.Ourwholereliefworkmustbeonthebasisofourhumanenergy,ournation,ourmanpower.Andforthatwecouldhaveadifferenttypeofstrategy.’

AndIgaveastrategy:wehavethesemanybranches,thisnumberofreliefworkers.Iwasspeakingonmyown,givingthefigures.Ifwecancollectonesweetcalledsukri–andthereisnutritionalvalueinsukri–wecancollect sukri fromeachandevery family for sixmonths.For transportationwecangethelp fromtherailways.Weshouldnot storewater forcattle,butwecanmovecattle fromdrought-proneareas togreenareas.Andthegovernmentisprovidingrailwaytrainsfreeofcharge.

Thentheythoughtforawhile,andtheysaid, ‘OK,nowwewillhavealunchbreak,thenwewillthinkaboutModi’s suggestions.’Whenwecamebackagain,mysuggestionswereaccepted.InthebeginningwewerethinkingofcollectingRs1croretodoreliefwork.Becauseofthisscheme,wedidserviceofmorethanRs30crore.

Itisaninterestinganecdote:Moditellsitnotasself-praisebuttodemonstrateseveralelements.First,thatconventionalthinkingwasendemicinIndiaatthistime,bothinthe RSS and the Congress: everybody’s thoughts flowed along the same well-wornchannels or grooves. Second, that there was no feeling or confidence that Indiapossessed the resources – or resourcefulness – to solve her difficulties alone or tosucceed on her own. Third, that there was a new way forward that required anoptimisticreassessmentandreorganizationoftheirownresources(theywerethinkingof‘collecting’forreliefinsteadof,asModiproposed,‘givingservice’bysweatingtheirassets).Fourth,thatafreshwayoflookingatproblemswasrequiredtoenablethis,asortoflateralthinking:itwas,forexample,possibletobringcowstothefodderratherthanfoddertothecows,butithadnotbeenthoughtofbecausetherailwaysostensiblyhadnothingtodowithdrought.

The anecdote also encapsulates neatlywhereModi’s reputation for egocentricityandarrogancecomesfrom,eventhough it isa simpleandhoneststory, technocraticratherthanheroicandinasensebereftofego.Itisnotbecauseheisactingarrogantly,onesuspects,thatthisconsensusonModi’sarrogancehasarisen.Rather,beyondtheRSSandonthenationalstage,itisbecauseheisexpected,asapoliticalparvenu,nottospeak in such a confidentmanner. Perhapsmuch of the internal opposition comesfromModi’simplicitdenialoftherelevanceofclassandcaste.Tohissocial‘superiors’,heremainsaworking-classarrivistewithideasabovehisstation.

FortheCongress,ofcourse,heisanexistentialelectoralthreat.Anditspottedthethreatearly.ThatpartlyexplainstheunprecedentedandrelentlesspoliticalonslaughtModihasfacedsincehisthreeconsecutiveelectionvictoriesinGujarat.

I

5

THEYATRATOPOWER

Religiousorculturalpurityisafundamentalfantasy.–V.S.Naipaul

NDIRAGANDHIWASASSASSINATEDbyherSikhbodyguardson31October1984.Herson Rajiv took over as prime minister as the country’s worst pogrom in modern

historygotunderwayinDelhi.ItwasledbyvengefulCongressmenstillunpunishedtoday.InGujaratintermittentriotsoverreservationshadalreadybeeninprogressforsometime;eventhepolicethemselveshadstartedtoriot,burningdowntheofficesofanewspapercriticaloftheirconductandcorruption.Lawandorderseemedtohavecompletely broken down in the state. The army was more or less permanentlypatrolling the streets of Ahmedabad. For the first time Gujarat’s industries andfactorieswereclosinginresponsetotheunendingviolence.1

Modi, meanwhile, went on quietly with his organizational work for the RSS,remainingstudiouslyuninvolvedinelectoralpolitics.TheBJPhadslowlybeenmakingsmallgainsatthestatelevel,andinthemunicipalelectionsthepreviousMayhadwoncontrol ofRajkot and Junagadh. Subsequently ithad taken all in a series of fiveby-electionstotheLokSabha.2

But after Indira Gandhi’s death sympathy for the Congress across India wasoverwhelming. In the December 1984 general election Rajiv Gandhi received thelargest majority in independent India’s history. The Congress won 414 Lok Sabhaseats; theBJPonly two. It seemed at the time therewas littlehope for theparty tobreakoutandacquireanationalpresence.

RajivdecidedthatSolanki,despiteconsolidatingtheCongressvoteinGujarat,wasadisastrouschiefminister.Theriotshadagainflaredup,withrenewedintensity.Rajiv

sacked him in July 1985 in spite of the record victory in theMarch state election,wheretheBJPwononlyelevenseats.SolankihadledGujaratforfiveyearsandturnedit into a war zone: ‘Looking back to those years of Congress rule in Gujarat, onewondersatthesheerinefficiencyandrecklessnessoftherulers.Casteismwasrunningriot,Hindusocietystooddivided,andcorruptionruledtheroost.’3

Yet amidst the smoke and death there was an ‘intended’ consequence: the newchiefminister,AmarsinhChowdhary,wasanAdivasi,soatleastSolankilimpedawaysafe in theknowledge thathisKHAMstrategyhadproducedonepositive result forthe backward castes. The very samemonth saw the death ofModi’smentor, VakilSaheb.Itwasabodyblowtohimbutsoonanewstageofhiscareerwouldbegin.

After Amarsinh Chowdhary commenced his term as chief minister there was aperiodofpeaceonthestreetsofGujarat,suggestingthatSolankipersonallyhadbeenaprovocationformany.ButtheunderlyingproblemscreatedbyKHAMhadnotgoneaway. Between 1986 and 1988 there were nearly 100 bomb explosions in Gujarat,signalling that rioting was settling in and becoming intractable, with antagonismsbetweenMuslimsandHindusincreasinglyresultinginconflict.

Gujarat society was dividing and ghettoizing itself in the wake of the KHAMrevolution: ‘Religiousdivisionswereunderlinedbyhighwalls thatcameupbetweenchawls inhabited by different communities. Earlier, people couldwind through thestreetsand jumpover roofs ineachother’s areas;nowbrickandconcretewallswithiron gates barred access.’Thiswas happening in 1986, halfway through a decade ofCongress rule inGujarat, and ‘by 1990 itwaswidespread.The boundaries betweenHindu andMuslim areaswere referred to as “border” andMuslimneighbourhoodswerecalled“Pakistan”.’4

Withinthestategovernmentitselfthereweredifficultiesaswell.TheCongresswasinternallydividedandChowdhary, embattled,wasnotevenon speaking termswithseveralcolleaguesloyaltoSolanki.

TheBJPwasreelingafterthemassiveCongressvictoryinthe1984LokSabhapollwhichconfirmedRajivGandhiasprimeminister.Thenear-wipeoutoftheBJPintheGujaratassemblyelectionsayearlaterfurtheraddedtoitsdisorientation,eventhoughit took some comfort in an almost 19 per cent share of the vote. The Congress,however,remainedunassailableatover53percentvoteshare.

TheturnaroundbeganwiththeAhmedabadmunicipalelectionsinFebruary1987.Modi, now thirty-six, had been given responsibility for organizing the campaign.Ameticulous calculation was made about how many party workers were needed tocanvas how many voters, and what percentage of success was likely from so much

energyexpendedperward.Suchmethodicalplanninghelpedthepartywintwo-thirdsoftheseatsintheAhmedabadmunicipality,acompletereversaloffortune.5

NowitwastheturnoftheCongresspartyinGujarattobeworried.Itknewitwasbeginning to reap locally the harvest of divisive policies that had led to ethnic andreligioussegregationinAhmedabad.AnditalsoknewthattheBJPwasthebeneficiaryofHindu disaffection with theCongress’s policy of favouringminorities. Religiouspolarizationwasrife.Theordinarycitizenfeltundersiege.Themafiadon(andlaterterrorist) Abdul Latif even won an election for the Ahmedabad MunicipalCorporationfromhisprisoncell.TheBJPwouldcapitalizeontheoutrage.6

Eventsnowseemedtofollowoneanotherinquicksuccession,leadingtoatumultinIndianpolitics.NarendraModiwas,sotospeak,themanintherightplaceattherighttime to witness and benefit from this. The RSS had often deputed some of itspracharakstoworkwiththeJanaSangh.Thathadceasedatthetimeofthedissolutionof the party in 1980, when the BJP was born. In 1986 though, Advani succeededVajpayeeaspartypresident.Theyearafter,asModiwasbeingfetedasthemastermindof the BJP’s success in the Ahmedabad municipal elections, the RSS decided onceagain to place theirmen in the political armof themovement as liaisons, this timewithintheBJPatvariouslevels.

Modi was an obvious candidate for the role with his organizational success stillfresh in everyone’smind.Besides,heknewAdvani fromduring theEmergency, andAdvani specifically asked for him.7 In what was a clear sideways career jump and amajorpromotion,Modi, at thirty-seven,hadmade the transition from ideologue topolitician–thoughhisremitwasasyetorganizational.HewasappointedorganizingsecretaryoftheGujaratunitoftheBJPin1987.8

Meanwhile, as prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi was proving that apart from theillusion provided by early euphoria over his youthful charisma, he possessed scantpoliticalnous.GreathopesforarenewalandmodernizationofIndiahadbeenvestedinhim.Hetalkedofcomputersbutlittlehadactuallychangedinthethreeyearssincehis election in 1984. And what action there had been was not encouraging. Onedecision thatwas toawaken theHindunationalistmovementand transform it intoelectoralpowerinIndiaadecadelaterwasRajiv’svacillationandthencapitulationtoMuslimfundamentalistpressureintheinfamousShahBanocase.9

Shah Bano was an elderly and destitute Muslim woman from Indore, Madhya

Pradesh, divorced by her lawyer husband. The husband subsequently objected topayingalimonyofafewhundredrupeesamonthashewasobligedtounderSection125oftheCriminalProcedureCode.Hefiledasuit,takenupbyIslamicclerics,thataccusedtheIndianstateof‘interferinginthepersonallives’ofMuslims.ThecasewenttotheSupremeCourtandwasdismissed.ShahBanowasanIndianwomanandhadaright to alimony.The clerics raised anuproar and remindedRajiv of the votes theybroughttotheCongress.

TavleenSinghwas theonly journalistwith thewit to seekoutShahBanoat thetime, and when she found her (‘a bird-like woman with a heavily lined face andbeautifulgreeneyes’),thedivorcee’swretchedplightthrewintofurtherreliefboththecynical nature of the agitation against her and Rajiv’s pusillanimity. ‘She seemedconfusedbythefussshehadcreated,’recalledTavleen.Sheadded:

(ShahBano)toldmethatallshehadaskedforwasanincreaseofRs100intheRs180monthlymaintenanceherhusbandpaidher,andcouldnotunderstandwhythiswas toomuchtoask for.Shesaidherhusbandmadethousandsamonthasalawyerandcouldwellaffordtogivehermoremoney.10

Rajiv,however,decidedtopassalaw–theMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsonDivorce) Act, 1986 – overturning the judgment of the Supreme Court and thusdenyingMuslimwomentheirrightsasIndiancitizens.WiththatonedecisionRajivforever changed the nature of the debate over the constitutional definition ofsecularism. It would in the fullness of time light the fuse for an explosion ofcommunalism on a national scale. It was now officially one law for Muslims andanother for everybody else.Thebacklashwouldbe among the factors that costhimandtheCongressthe1989LokSabhaelection.

TheShahBanocasehadagalvanizingeffectontheBJP,whichdubbedRajivGandhi’sdecision to overturn the Supreme Court verdict as appeasement of the minoritycommunity.Itconstituteddiscriminationagainstnon-Muslimmenbecausetheywerestill liable for maintenance under the law, although Muslim women surely had agreaterrighttobeoutraged.11

So far the BJP had received two major fillips courtesy the Congress’s divisivetactics: first locallywithKHAM and the reservations policy, and second nationallywithShahBano.Rajiv’snextmisjudgementwasevenmoredamagingtoIndia’ssocialfabric, and also far more directly helpful to the Opposition. In a doomed andmaladroit attempt to be even-handed, he allowed the doors of the BabriMasjid in

AyodhyatobeunlockedforHindustoofferpujatoRam,butinrealityhehadopenedthegatesofareligiousfirestorm.

TheBabriMasjidwasbuiltin1527byBabur,thefirstMughalemperorofIndia,inwhat is now Uttar Pradesh. One of the seven holy cities of India, Ayodhya wasbelieved to have been founded ninemillennia ago byManu, lawgiver ofHinduism,and was later associated with Lord Ram’s birthplace. It was previously known asRamkotor‘Ram’sFort’.Untilthemid-nineteenthcenturybothMuslimsandHindusworshippedthere.AftertheMutinyin1857,agitationseventuallyledtoHindusbeingforbidden to enter the inner enclosure. Nearly a century of increasingly tensecommunal confrontations atAyodhya culminated inoneof thedomesof theBabriMasjidbeingdamagedduringriotsin1934.ItwasrebuiltbytheBritish.

After Partition, nationalists placed Ram idols within the mosque. Nehru, whofearedthatthestatueswouldset‘adangerousexample’,askedforthemtoberemoved.But there was an upcoming by-election in Ayodhya, and the Congress needed theHindu vote.The idols stayedwhere theywere.12After that, the structure remainedlocked up except for one day each yearwhen aHindu priestwas allowed inside toperformaceremonialpuja.Then,aftertheShahBanomisstep,RajivGandhidecreedthatHindusshouldbeonceagaingrantedaccess.

A steady and relatively calm situation at Ayodhya was upset. The aggressivelynationalistVishwaHinduParishad (VHP),whichhadbeen campaigning tounlockthedoorsofthemosque,gainedincreasingpopularityforitssectarianphilosophy.Assoon as the doors were unlocked, Hindu radicals saw their chance and began todemand that the mosque be replaced with a new temple in honour of Ram. TheVHP’s divisive and somewhat eccentric Ram Janmabhoomi campaign, started in1984,mighthavegonenowhereinIndia’sessentiallytolerantmulti-faithsociety.Butthanks to Rajiv’s actions it was suddenly blessed with the power of retort to theCongress’sdefinitionofsecularismandgrewintoanangry,nationwidemovementasthespearpointofHindutva.

CommunaltensioninGujaratandacrossIndiahadbeenbuildingupforsomeyearsbythetimeModiformallyenteredtheBJP.Hewasfarfromthebattleground,though,asAdvanihadwantedhimforgrass-rootsworkinthestate–thepatient,nurturing,people-centred job of slowly building the BJP’s presence.Within a very short timeafterhis arrival at theBJP, evidence appearedofModi’s independenceofmind and

inexhaustiblesupplyofideas.Arathyatraisliterallyachariotfestivalthatinvolvestransportingreligiousdeities

onachariot–themostimportantbeingtheoneassociatedwithLordJagannatha.Theyatra-as-political-theatre is an integral part of campaigning andparty propaganda inIndia. It is awayof contacting lakhsofpeople, especially in rural areas and villages,whomightotherwisebequiteoutofcontactwiththemaincurrentsofpoliticalandsocialargument.

The procession of brightly coloured, decorated tractors and trucks containingfamous politicians, film stars and loud crews of enthusiastic party workers, theopportunity for speeches tobeheard, complaints tobe attended and answers given,perhapsevenpromisesmade,aresuddenlyentertainmentandhopejoinedasone.Theprospectof change,ofhavingone’svoiceheardby importantpeople,presents a rarechance.Invillageswithendlessback-breakingroutine, itplantsaseedofsupportfortheparty,tobeharvestedlater.

Almost the first thingsModi began towork on and planwas his first yatra, theNyay Yatra, or ‘Journey for Justice’. It was launched only a few months after heformallyjoinedtheBJP.Theideawasthatitshouldvisitasmanyvillagesaspossibleacross the state. In the end it went to nearly every corner of Gujarat, raisingconsciousnessofthenewpathHindutvawasbeginningtotake.Theyatrawasdeemedasuccess,anditraisedModi’sstockintheBJP.

UnderAdvani,theBJP’soldGandhiansocialismhadbeenjettisoned–ithadbeenmerelyanattempttocopytheCongressanddidnothelptodifferentiatetheBJP.Theparty was now attempting to forge its own identity as a nationalist presence, analternativetotheunimaginativeandbackward-lookingideologyofpost-IndependencedynasticIndia.

In1987,theBJPadoptedtheprogrammeof ‘IntegralHumanism’,thebrainchildof PanditDeendayalUpadhyaya, which he first developed publicly in 1965.Whenone learns of what is involved in this theory, the similarities to whatModi speaksabout so consistently, especially in private, begin tomake sense.Upadhyayawanteddecentralizedgovernmentwithaself-relianteconomyorganizedfromthegroundupinstead of from the top down, shorn of the central control and planning that wasstrangling India. The people and the villages should be the centre and they shouldthenbeusedasbuildingblocksforintegrateddemocraticgovernance:‘Whenthestateacquires all powers, bothpolitical and economic, the result is a decline ofDharma,’Upadhyayasaid.13

AswithModi’sdevelopmentmantra,Upadhyaya’sclarioncallwas‘modernization

not westernization’, and he thought modern technology should be adapted to suitIndianrequirementsratherthanimportedas foreign ideastobeclumsilygraftedon.Forexample,asV.S.Naipaulnoted,Indiausedtobuildcool,shadyhousesdesignedtocope elegantly with tropical heat. Now it threw up stuffy concrete boxes, with airconditionersboltedonthatspewednoxiousvapoursintotheenvironment.Therehadtobeabetterway,bothforhousesandtheeconomy.

Importantly, Upadhyaya’s sense of inclusive and unbending secularism could beexpressed innationalistic rather thansectarianterms: ‘Wearepledgedto the servicenot of any particular community or section but of the entire nation. Everycountrymanisbloodofourbloodandfleshofourflesh.Weshallnotresttillweareable to give to every one of them a sense of pride that they are children ofBharatmata.’14

This intersected perfectly with Modi’s devotion to Vivekananda; it was thepolitical–economiccorrelativeofthespiritualthinkinghehadbeendoing.CriticssaythatIntegralHumanismwas‘adoctrinethatgavetheveneerofthemiddlepathtothehard-lineRSSposition’15 andthatmightseemareasonableopinionbearing inmindtheconflictsoftheAyodhyayears.Butoneshouldbecarefultoseparate–sinceheisthesubjecthere–howModioftendivergesfromthemainstream.

In the end the problemwith theBJP’s adoption of IntegralHumanismwas notwith its inclusivism, but with its partial adoption of Upadhyaya’s economic ideas.Modi, while chief minister in Gujarat, has been the only one to wholeheartedlyimplement them, although the infrastructural initiatives of the Vajpayeeadministration are still remembered with fondness by Indians as they watch thenationalhighwaynetworktheBJPbuiltduring1998–2004slowlycrumbleforwantofsufficientfurtherinvestment.

Modi’s nextmajor project for theBJPwas to organize, in 1989, the Lok ShaktiRathYatra.Itsetoffon31JanuaryfromthetempleofShaktiatAmbaji.Theyatra’stitlemeant‘powerofthepeople’andittravelledthroughanestimated10,000villagesin ‘amobilizationagainstthe liquormafia intheoldcityofAhmedabad,’16althoughitspurposewasalsotoraisetheprofileofthepartyandfundsforit.

ItwasthefirstyatratomakeanimpressiononthetribalpeopleofeasternGujarat.Theywould laterbecomean importantpillarof theBJP inthestate. Itwasperhapsaround now, alert to the mythical power of the presiding goddess at Ambaji, thatModi began to ponder the usefulness of the idea of Shakti in his own politicalphilosophy.

Itwas also in1989 thatModi’s father,Damodardas, passed away. Ithadbeen yearssinceModihadseenhim,andatlasthereturnedtoVadnagartobidfarewell.Thevisitwasbrief,lastingonlyafewhours.V.S.Naipaul,speakingofIndiantradition–ofhowits tradition was capable of undermining all Indian efforts to advance – said:‘Obedience: it is all that India requires ofmen, and it iswhatmenwillingly give.’17

Modi,firstbyrefusingtomarryhischildhoodbetrothed,andsecondbyrejectingthefuturelaidoutforhiminVadnagarbyhiscasteandclass,insteadleavingtopursuehisowndestiny,hadsethimselfasidefromthecommunityhebelongedto.Byrefusingtobeobedienthehadturnedhimselfintoanoutsider.Thetagof‘outsider’wouldattachitselftohimthroughouthispoliticalcareer.Hewasof,forandbythepartybutinawaybeyonditaswell.

By 1990, a new future opening to him in theBJP,Modi had at least closed thecircle forhimself.Hewas anewmanwith anewdharma, and fromherehis futurewouldquickenanddevelop,althoughwithmanyturnsandevenreversals,butnodeadends.

OnesignthatinhisownmindModi,nowforty,feltdistinctandwhollyseparatefromhisoriginswasthewayhedecidednottorefertohisbackgroundinhispoliticalcareer.‘IdecidedinmypubliclifethatIwillnever,never,neverusethiscastesysteminpolitics,’hetoldme.Herepeated‘never’thriceandemphatically.

During the several weeks I spent interviewing him, Modi was always calm,phlegmatic, almost monk-like. When he showed emotion, it was on matters ofchanging systems, innovating methodologies and introducing new technology. Hisanimationovernotusingcaste–ever–isthereforetelling.

‘Iwant harmony, Iwant unanimity,’ he says. It implies that his background hascauseddisharmonyinhisownlife,orinhismind,andthatisatleastonereasonthathe will not refer to it, even though doing somight win him votes of sympathy orsolidarity.18Therewasalso,ofcourse,hisexperienceoftheKHAMyearsinGujarat.

The next yatraModi was involved with is seared into the nation’smemory, and itwouldleadtoaturningpointintheBJP’s,andIndia’shistory.19

Itwason25September1990,inthefinalweeksofV.P.Singh’sadministrationandtwomonthsbeforetheninthLokSabhaelection,whentheSomnath–AyodhyaYatraset off from Somnath Temple in Gujarat. The temple was a symbol for many

nationalist Hindus of the resilience and endurance of India itself, having beendemolishedandrebuiltmanytimesoverthepreviousmillennium.ItwasrebuiltmostrecentlybySardarPatelin1950.Theideaoftheyatrawastofinishatthepointofthecurrentpolitico-nationalistflashpoint,theBabriMasjidatAyodhya.

Once more, Modi with his careful and deliberate thoroughness organized theGujarat legof theyatra through600villages, and followed itas farasBombay(as itthenwas).Hetravellednofurther.Hisworkwasinhishomestateandhewasabusyman,althoughhemayalsohavebeenthwartedinfurtherparticipationbyrivalsintheparty.Itisusefultowonderwhethertheatmosphereonboardtheprocession,ledbyahard-lineL.K.Advaniworkingtomakeanameforhimselfasanational leader,gaveModislightpause.

Nomatterhowsymbolicthejourneywas,theintentionoftheVHPtobuildanewtempledevotedtoRamonthesiteoftheexistingmosquewasindeadlyearnest.ItputthemovementonacommunalcollisioncoursewithIndia’sMuslimsregardlessofthejustice of the VHP’s demands. Ayodhya, even without the archaeological data tosupportitsclaim(recentlyestablishedbutnotsettledbackthen),hadbeenimportanttoHindusformanycenturies.

HistoricallyitmeantlittletoMuslimsexceptthatitwasamosque,althoughthankstotheVHP,theBabriMasjidhadnowbecomeapointofprincipleforthemtoo.InNew Delhi inMarch 1987 the largest organizedMuslim rally since Independencetookplace,whenover300,000peopledemonstratedtodemandthemosquebeonceagainclosedtoHindus.

AsAdvani’sRathYatra raucously enteredBihar itwasbrought to ahaltbyLaluPrasadYadav.Asalways,mindfulofhisMuslimvoteblock,LaluhadAdvaniarrestedatDumka.Advaniwassubsequentlyconfinedataguesthouseofthestate irrigationdepartment on the Mayurakshi river near the Massanjore Dam, and was greatlyhumiliatedbytheincident.20

Theyatrabrieflygroundtoahalt,buton30October,whentheprocessionfinallyarrived at Ayodhya, young men of the Sangh Parivar, wielding bows and arrows,stormed the mosque and planted a flag. This was accompanied by violence in thesurrounding crowds and fiftypeopledied frompolicebullets.21Riots erupted acrossthe country. InGujarat,where theVHP called its supporters onto the streets for abandh,communalriotingleft200dead.

Asthedecadedrewtoaclose,GujaratwasbeginningtoreaptheharvestthatKHAMhadplanted–theriseofanaggressiveandassertiveHindutvamovement.Meanwhile,theCongresshadbeenrejectedbytheGujaratelectorateafterabriefreturnbySolankiin 1989. In the 1990 state elections a JanataDal–BJP coalition underChimanbhaiPateltookover.Thephoenixwasbeginningtorise.

Modi’sperformanceasapartyorganizerwasagainrewardedwhenin1990hewasnamedasoneoftheseventeenmembersoftheBJP’sNationalElectionCommittee,amovethatformallyrecognizedhissuccessinGujarat.Thispromotionwasvitalinthatit tookModi’s realmof operations beyond the borders ofGujarat for the first timesincehehadjoinedtheBJPin1987.

HisfinalyatrawasayearaftertheSomnath–Ayodhyaexcursion,andforthefirsttime Modi played a principal role, staying on board for the entire length of thejourney. This was the forty-seven–day Ekta Yatra with newBJP national presidentMurli Manohar Joshi, which began in December 1991 at the southern tip of thecountry, atKanyakumari inTamilNadu, and finishedwithModiandhis associatesrunningupthenationalflaginSrinagar,Kashmir,inthenewyear.

‘WhathappenedisthattheseparatistsusedtoburntheIndianflag,’herecalls.‘Wewere not allowed to hoist the flag in Srinagar.And they challenged thatwhosoeverwantedtohoisttheflaginSrinagar,wewillkillhim.Wetookonthechallenge:yes,wewillcomethereandwewillhoisttheflag.’

Famously,thiswasthetriponwhichModirefusedtoputonthebodyarmourhewasadvisedtowear–asuccessfulpieceoftheatrethatraisedawarenessoftheneedtostandagainstterrorism.22Andyethehadlesstofearfromthemthanhedidfromhisownparty.

Nogooddeedgoesunpunished,andthisprovedtrueforModisoonafterhisreturnto Gujarat at the successful conclusion of the Ekta Yatra. He was ambushed byShankersinh Vaghela, long-term president of BJP, Gujarat, recently also elected anMP.Vaghela ‘declined to includeNarendra inhis team’, as one journalist delicatelyphrasedit.23ItwasadeliberateinsulttoModi,whohadperformedwellforthepartyover the last four years, andwhose efforts on the groundhadhelped to lead it intogovernmentinGujaratforthefirsttime.

Thequestioniswhetherthiswasbecauseofwhatiscommonlysupposed–Modi’sreportedegotismandself-promotion–orwhetheritwasamoremundanecaseofenvyat a junior doing sowell that he outshone his seniors.Moreover,Modi had helpedVaghela’s rival Keshubhai Patel on the Lok Shakti Rath Yatra a few years earlier.Whateverthereason, itat leastprovestruewhattheysay inWestminster, thatyour

opponentssitonthebenchesopposite,butyourenemiesareinyourownparty.ItwasatthispointthatthemostconsistentelementinModi’spersonalitycameto

the fore:hispatience,alongwithhis shrewdness. Inamodeofactionthathewouldrepeatseveraltimesoverinhislatercareer,makingitalmostatacticalsignature,ModireactedtoVaghela’sattempttosidelinehimbywalkingaway.Hecouldaffordtodothisbecauseheknewbynowthathewouldbemissed.IfVagheladidnotwanthim,othersinthepartyclearlyappreciatedhistalents.

Modisaidnothingpubliclybutretiredfromthefraytogoonwithpartywork.Hissteppingbackwasnotaturningawayorasulk,andhesoonreturnedtohisback-roomduties, organizing the BJP base in five states in preparation for upcoming assemblyelections.

Duringourconversations,Modirepeatedlysaidhehadveryfondmemoriesofthisperiodofalmostnon-stopnomadismashe travelledaroundUttarPradesh,MadhyaPradesh, Rajasthan, Assam and his beloved Himachal Pradesh. To begin with,however,hedevotedalotofhisenergytotheestablishmentofaparticularsecondaryschool called Sanskardham, in Ahmedabad. It was his homage and duty to VakilSaheb,anddoneinhismemory.

Theschoolwouldinculcateinitsco-educationalstudentstheethosofanationalist,Gandhianoutlook.Therewasbothyogaandcurrentaffairs,withelementstakenfromthe RSS debating forums alongside a government-prescribed curriculum. It was apeaceful, meditative environment designed to produce self-reliant, imaginativecitizens.ModispentalotofhissparetimehelpingoutatSanskardham,anditappearsto have been reminiscent of the duties he performed during his early years atHedgewarBhavan.Theschoolopenedon6June1992.

Narendrawas available on anymatter concerning the functioning of the school.Hewould give out theminutestofinstructionsonhowtoreceiveandentertainvisitors,howtoholdexhibitions,andhowtoseethatchauffeursofVIPs,whowerevisitingtheschool,werefedandnotlefttofendforthemselves.Nodetailwastooinsignificantforhimtoattendto.24

Modi had responded creatively to political disappointment and setbacks instead ofgrowingangryandplottingrevenge.Hehadseveraloptionsopentohim,butchosetoserve at the school in honour of his deadmentor. It almost seems that the schoolbecameasubstitutefamilyforhim.Modiremainsinvolvedwiththeschooltothisday.

The idea that there was something more to Modi’s withdrawal at this precisemoment in time lingers in the mind. His new mentor, L.K. Advani, was busyarranging for the events that would lead to the destruction of the BabriMasjid in

December1992.AndyetModihadabsolutelynothingtodowithwhatAdvaniwasplanning.WhiletheBJP’ssenior leaderswouldbeatthespotthatfatefulday,Modiwouldnot.Hisowntrialbyfirewouldcomeadecadelater.

Criticswouldarguethatplacinghimself inpoliticalpurdahwasmerecalculationonModi’s part, and that he did not wish to be associated with the rough edges ofHindutvainordertomakehimselflookbetterlateron.That,though,wouldrequireperspicacityvergingonthetelepathic.Modialsostoodtolosetractioninthepartybynottakingpart:hewouldhavebeenabsentatafamous‘victory’.

ItisarguedbythosewhoopposeModithathewasdesperatetoaddan‘Ayodhyamoment’tohispoliticalCV,andwasfrustratedbybeinguninvolved.25Hadhewantedto,consideringhisclosenesstoAdvani,hecouldhavebeenthere.

But the facts are established:Modiwithdrew temporarily from active politics inearly1992asthemoodofthecountry,inthewakeofcommunalviolence,insurgencyandRajivGandhi’sassassination,grewevermorefraught.Modistayedwellaway,andin the end it was fortuitous he did so. To their frustration his critics are forced toadmittodaythatheplayednopartwhatsoeverintheeventssurroundingthebuild-upto,andtheactualtearingdownof,theBabriMasjid.ButnoevaluationofModi’slifehassofartakenaccountofthesimpletruththathechosetositouttheAyodhyasaga,and insteadworkwith the children of the Sanskardham School.Any objective andbalancedassessmentofhislifeandworkmustnotethis.

HugecrowdsforegatheredatAyodhyainafestivalatmosphere.TheywererestiveandexcitablebythetimeAdvaniandotherleadersarrivedon5December1992.Astone-layingceremonythenextdaywouldsignifytheintenttoconstructanewRamtemple.Theceremonyitselfon6Decemberquicklyranoutofcontrol–manycommentatorsbelievedthatwastheplanallalong–andthousandsofkarsevaksmanagedtoreducethemosquetorubblewiththeirbarehandsorsimpletoolsinamatterofhours.

Blameandaccusationsafterthebloodycommunalriotsthatfollowedflewinmanydirections,withanunapologeticBJPat thecentreof the storm. Inall,2,000 lives–mostlyMuslim–werelostacrossthecountry,withgreatbloodshedinDelhi,MumbaiandGujarat,particularlyinAhmedabadandSurat.

ThemoodofHindus,especiallythoseontheRight,wasangryandaggressive,and

yetithadacontext,thoughcertainlynotanexcuse,arisingasareactiontothepoliciesoftheCongressduringthe1980s,beginninglocallywiththeKHAMprogrammeandthe cynical push forhigher reservations, alongsideRajivGandhi’s artless strategyonShahBanoattheCentre.

TheworldsawinthedemolitionoftheBabriMasjidthe‘threattothesurvivalofamodern,democratic India’.26Anewschoolof secularismwasbeing fashionedand itwouldimbuethewordwithameaninguniquetoIndia.

PrimeMinister P.V.NarasimhaRaomeanwhilewas in a terrible position, not leastbecausewhathappenedatAyodhyawasdonewiththeassistance,tacitorotherwise,ofsomeCongresspeople.Hecameinforstingingcriticismthathedidnotdoenoughtohaltthedemolitionofthemosqueandmetaphoricallysleptthroughitsmostcriticalhours.Inhislonelyretirement,RaorevealedtotheveteranjournalistShekharGuptawhyhehadnottakenfirmaction.‘Whydidhenotaskthecentralforcestoopenfire?’Guptaasked.

What were the mobs attacking the mosque shouting? he asked, ‘Ram, Ram.’ What would the soldiersopeningfireatthemhavebeenchantingtothemselveswhilefollowingmyorderstokillmaybehundreds?‘Ram,Ram.’Readingtheconfusiononmyface,hesaid,whatifsomeofthetroopsturnedaroundandjoinedthemobsinstead?ItcouldhaveunleashedafirethatwouldhaveconsumedallofIndia.

Gupta askedRaowhyhehad trusted theBJP leadersnot to cause troublewhenheallowedthegatheringatAyodhyatogoahead.‘ItwasAdvani,’hesaid,‘andhewillbemade topay for it.’27Advanidid indeedpay for it,whenRao implicatedhim in thehawalamoney-launderingscandal,butitwasapyrrhicvictory.

Inmanyways theBabriMasjiddemolitionmarked thenadirof a longperiodofvexedrelationsbetweenHindusandMuslims–andtherewereverymanypoliticiansacrosspartieswhowereresponsibleforthat.Inretrospect,thedemolitionalsomarkedthe culmination of a virulent and chauvinistic Hindu nationalism that made fewconcessionstoIndia’sminoritypopulation.

AtAyodhya,andinitsaftermath,anintolerant,politicalpointhadbeenmadeinthenameofHindutva.Butafterthatpointtheairbeganveryslowlytoleakoutoftheballoon. ‘Hard’Hindutva would continue but increasingly become the province ofhectoring, marginal ranters such as Pravin Togadia and irrelevant, fringe militantorganizationssuchastheHinduJagranManch.AwideningchannelgraduallyopenedupinIndianculture,dueinparttothebenigneffectsofeconomicmeasuresinstigated

by Prime Minister Rao and Manmohan Singh as finance minister. It allowed thedraining away of the most intense nationalist frustrations as structural economicreforms at last brought a measure of prosperity to India. A more relaxed Hinduidentitybegantodevelopwiththecountry’smodernmiddleclassbeginningtoexpandduringthe1990sandintothenewcentury.

The energies of religious nationalism, whose original anger and resentment waswrapped up in aggressive Hindutva, started to dissipate. Affluence and economicfreedom broadened and softened it until eventuallyHindutva began to look like avesselthatcouldholdsomethingmoreakintoaconfidentculturalnationalismamongthat newmiddle class enjoying the demise of the licence raj and the pleasures of agloballifestyle.

ThistransformedthefortunesoftheBJP.Advanilatergaveaninterviewwherehepointedout to a journalisthow ‘apartybasedon ideology can at themost come topowerinasmallarea.Itcannotwintheconfidenceoftheentirecountry–neithertheCommunist Party nor the Jana Sangh in its original form.’ The journalist objectedthat the Jana Sangh’s appeal had been increasing at the time it disbanded. Advanireplied:

Theappeal increased to theextent the ideologygotdiluted.Wherever the ideologywas strong, its appealdiminished.28

PerhapsthislessonwaslearnedbytheBJPintherubbleoftheBabriMasjid,forsoonafteritceasedtotrumpetHindutvaasitscoremessage.Modi,onthesidelines,quietlyabsorbedallthis.HetooknewthatIndiacouldonlybegovernedfromthecentre,notthe extremes. Hindutva, he shrewdly judged, could initially win votes but it wasdevelopmentthatofferedsustainedelectoralpower.

HewouldemploythatprincipleaschiefministerofGujaratwithinadecade–buttheoutcomeatfirstwasfraughtwithunintendedconsequences.

A

6

RISINGTORESPONSIBILITY

Icomeonwalkingoff-stagebackwards.–RobertLowell

S EXPECTED, TROUBLE FLARED inGujarat after theBabriMasjidwas torn down:riots erupted on the streets. The next ten years would be riven by communal

tension.Gujaratwasagainatinderbox.What had changed by 1992 was that the Congress in the state had reaped the

whirlwindofthedivisiveandultimatelyshort-sightedKHAMrevolution.ForallbutfouryearssinceitwascreatedfromtheBombaystatein1960,theCongresshadbeenin government. There were two brief periods when the state was led by the JanataMorcha or the Janata Party, both times under Babubhai Patel. Then, in 1990,ChimanbhaiPatel tookoverat theheadofaJanataDalalliancewhich includedtheBJP.After thispoint,except for1994–95(and inveryparticularcircumstances) theCongresswasineffectmoribundasagoverningforceinGujarat.Ithasnothadasniffof power in nearly twenty years. That is the source of considerable angst for localCongress leaders who, off the record, concede that they are even today undertremendous pressure from the central leadership to stop Modi’s ascent – usingwhatevermeansavailable.

In1992–93,battleswere about tobeginwithin theBJP itself. Itwas growing inconfidenceandlookingtotakepowerinGujarat inthenextelection.Withvaluableprizes at stake, manoeuvring for position began in earnest. Patel held together theJanataDal alliance ‘like a bulwark blocking theBJP’s avalanche’1 until he died of aheartattackinFebruary1994.Hisfinanceminister,ChhabildasMehta,tookoveraschief minister. Mehta was a Congressman – Patel had ‘merged his party into the

Congressbutwithlittleeffect’in19902–andtheaccessiontopoweroftheCongressinthestateassemblyunderhimwasatechnicality,notapopularmandate.Itwasnowmerelybidingtimeuntilthenextstateelectionsdueinearly1995.

Threenameswould figure in theBJP inGujaratduring thisperiod:ShankersinhVaghela,KeshubhaiPatel andNarendraModi. In1992,Modiwas absent, banishedfrom the stateparty atVaghela’s insistence afterhishigh-profile success in theEktaYatra.Modiisclearaboutthereasonsforhis‘punishment’,andeventodaymentionofVaghelaanimateshim.‘Iwasjunior,myagewassmall,soyoung,butIwaslovedbythemedia–IgothugepublicityalloverIndia.Myoratorywashelpingme.Butbecauseofthat,jealousyaroseasamatterofcourse.It’sinbuilt.VagheladecidedthatnowModiwas here, it could be a problem for him. So in 1992 I was removed from theorganizationset-up.’

Modirecountedthistome–thefirsttimehehasdonesoonrecord–withoutatrace of regret. The calm that characterizes his private personality is diametricallyopposed tohis robust, even raucous,publicpersona. It is thismeditative inner calmthat has enabled him to withstand the most sustained campaign of vilificationmountedagainstanyIndianpoliticiansince2002.

Vaghela,aspresidentoftheGujaratBJP,wasaverypowerfulmanandevenmoreso,avery ambitious one. Vaghela had been present at Ayodhya despite his subsequentdenials,anditclearlyannoysModitoseehisoldfoeontheOppositionbenchesintheGujarat Vidhan Sabha. An article published inMail Today on 26November 2009underscoredVaghela’sroleintherazingoftheBabriMasjid:‘ShankersinhVaghela(inthe Babri Masjid demolition) is one of 68 people indicted by the LiberhanCommission.’

Aboveeverything,Vaghelacovetedthepostofchiefministerandwaspreparedtodowhatever it took to get there, including abandoninghis party, or destroying it ifnecessary.HesawModiasKeshubhai’sman,whichatthattimewastrue.Keshubhaiwas Vaghela’s deadly rival for power in the BJP. This was complicated by Modi’scolleagueSanjayJoshi,withwhomhehadbeendeputedin1987tojointheBJPfromtheRSS,andwhowaswithVaghela.JoshiandModihadworkedwitheachotherformany years, but sides were now being chosen, turning the two men first intoopponentsandlaterbitterenemies.

A last essential element was Advani, who supported Modi and had once again

becomethenationalpresidentof theBJP.ItwasatAdvani’s insistencethat in1994Modiwas sent back toGujarat, ahead of the assembly elections scheduled the yearafter.Advani,who resistedpressure fromVaghela,SureshMehta andnewBJP statepresidentKashiramRana,madeModigeneralsecretaryoftheGujaratBJP.3HethengaveModithejoboftrainingpartyworkers–150,000inall–tohelpthepartywintheupcomingstatepollsusingthenewmodelof‘Organization-CentredElections’.Itwas exactly the sort of ground-level administrationwork thatwasModi’s speciality,andhethrewhimselfintothetask.

The result was a success, with the BJP triumphing over a fractured and risibleCongress towin a two-thirdsmajority. It captured121 seatsof theGujaratVidhanSabha’s182seatswith42.5percentvoteshare,upfrom27percent inthepreviouselection.4 In the subsequent district-level panchayat polls, the party sometimes evenwon100percentoftheseats.Asajournalistpointedout,‘Neverbeforeinhistoryhadanypartymadesuchsensationalprogress’inIndianpolitics.5InGujarat,thephoenixhadatlastarisenfromtheJanaSanghashes,andagoodshareofthemiraclehadbeenModi’sdoing.Thisofcourseconcentratedthelaser-likeenmityVaghelawasbeamingtowards him, which grew more intense when Keshubhai Patel was declared chiefministeron14March1995.

VaghelawasseethingwithrageatwhathesawasDelhi’sinterferenceintheselection,andheblamedModiwhohad just returned fromDelhi.He couldhave been right.Modi certainly saw Vaghela as a dangerous loose cannon who needed to be lasheddown. ButVaghelawas politically senior toKeshubhai, although a decade younger,andactuallycommandedaslimmajorityofsupportamongtheparty’sMLAs.

After the government settled in, which took quite some time with Vaghelaengendering resistance,Modi set about undermininghis support base, ‘weeding outVaghela’s supporters from positions of importance’.6 A rebellion against Keshubhaibegantobrew.SecretlyVaghelawasalreadyinnegotiationswiththeCongresstogainitssupportforwhatheplannedtodonext.

Atthetime,VaghelawasasittingLokSabhaMP.Modihadusedthistothwarthisenemyandpreventhimstandingintheassemblyelectionunderalong-standing‘oneman,onepost’BJPrule.ButVaghelasetinmotionacoupattemptagainstKeshubhaiinlateSeptember1995.Hecharteredanaircraftandflewwithhisforty-sevenMLAsupporters to aposhhotel inKhajuraho,MadhyaPradesh, tohold a councilofwar

whileKeshubhaiPatelwasonavisittotheUnitedStates.ThereherevealedthattheCongress had promised to support him with its forty-fiveMLAs. This would giveVaghelaamajorityandmeant thechiefministershipwas tantalizinglyclose tobeinghis.

‘Atthattime,’recallsModi,‘KeshubhaiandIwereveryclose.ShankersinhVaghelawantedtobechiefministerbutIsupportedKeshubhaiPatel.Thentherewasarevolt,withinsixmonths,andKeshubhaihadtoleave.Butthentherewasacompromise,andinthecompromiseitwasdecidedthatIshouldleaveGujarat.’

Vaghela’splotspelledtheendofKeshubhai’stimeaschiefminister.Keshubhaiwasmadenationalvice-presidentasaconsolationprize–butitdidnotmeanthepositionwas handed to Vaghela. Instead, Vajpayee negotiated a deal using one of the fewremnantsofVaghela’sloyaltytotheBJP.Acompromisecandidateforchiefministerwas chosen: SureshMehta.He could be trusted to do Vaghela’s bidding while thelatter sat in Parliament in Delhi. It suited them both because Mehta was also aVajpayeefavourite.7

SoModiwas banished once again fromGujarat. It looked to be amore permanentarrangementthistimearound.EvenKeshubhaiPatelseemedangryandaccusedModiof causing him to lose the leadership. Had Modi been guilty of underestimatingVaghela’s support, andof allegedly tellingKeshubhai it consistedofnomore thanadozen MLAs? This was a calamitous miscalculation if true, but according to onejournalist, itwasmorelikelyarumouremanatingfromSanjayJoshi,nowanavowedopponentofModi,partlyatleastbecauseJoshithoughtthatModihadtriedtoclaimcreditforhisworkintherecentelectioncampaign.8

Modi today contradicts this.He sayshewasbusyduring the time after the stateassemblypolls,workinghardfortheevengreatermajoritiestheBJPwouldwininthepanchayats in September 1995. But it is undeniable that he viewed Vaghela as anunprincipledmercenaryouttoseekpowerforhimselfattheexpenseoftheparty,andas a threat to the new BJP electoral hegemony in Gujarat. For that reason Modiworkedagainsthim.Hewasnotwronginhisestimation,ashistoryhasproved,butatthetimeascapegoatwasneededandModifittedthebill.

WithVaghelaholding court inKhajuraho,Modi tenderedhis resignationon28September 1995 in a letter he remains proud of. In it he set out his view of thesituation:

Iquotedoneincident–inIndiansocietythisstoryisveryfamiliar.Whathappenedisthatthereweretwomothers,theywerefightingforonechild,andbothwereclaimingthattheyweretherealmother.Andthematterwenttocourt.Sothejudgesays,‘OK,whatwewilldo,wewillcutthisboyintotwopieces.Therealmothercriedno,no,no,giveittoher!Andthejudgedecided,thisistherealmother,thisisthefake.AndIwrotethatIcannotcutmypartyintotwopieces.SoitisbetterthatIgivethispartytoyouandIamleaving.

Itisagoodstory–a3,000-year-oldstory–actuallyapericope,the‘JudgementofKingSolomon’,fromtheJewishscriptures(1Kings3,verses16–27).Modi’spenaltywassettobeequallybiblical:exiletoAssamandGuwahati,theretomoulderandperhapstomeetupwithhisoldfriend,thehermit.

Instead, Advani stepped in, and on 20 November 1995, Modi was appointednational general secretary of the BJP, suggesting that his efforts inGujarat had notgoneunappreciatedwhereitcounted.9

ModiwasnowbasedinDelhi.HewasaprotégéofAdvani,whoseearandcompanyhehadreadyaccessto.ButModiwasnotenamouredofDelhi.Hestayedthereonlyforalittleoveramonth.10

‘Actually, I amadetachedperson,’ saysModi aswe sit inhishomeone evening,returning to the themeof the ascetic, themonkwhocouldwalk away from it all. ‘Ihaveno attachment, sowherever I am, I am fully involved.And Iwasnot inDelhibasically,IwasinChandigarh.’

In 1996,Modi was put in charge of organizing the BJP in Haryana, HimachalPradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. This was ‘a toughassignment’11butModiwas successfulandsignificantpoll successes followedfor theBJPinthosestates.12

AccordingtoModi,thenextfiveyears,between1996and2001,representedoneofthemostfruitfulperiodsofhislife,possiblybecausehisnewareaofresponsibilitywasinthenorth-westofthecountry.

AndIwassohappybecauseIwasnearertheHimalayas.Thatwasmyfavouritearea[laughs],soIusedtogototheHimalayasagainandIenjoyedit.ButinthatperiodIhadaverygoodopportunitytolearn.DuringthatperiodIvisitedsomanycountries;Ihadthechancetoworkwithsomanystalwartleaders.Duringthattime I tried to learn computers and technology,which is useful today forme. So I used thosedays as anopportunity.

HeevenhadthequietsatisfactionofseeingVaghelalosehisLokSabhaseatin1996.‘Ialwaysturnadversityintoopportunity,always.Inmypersonallifeormypoliticallife,Ialwaysdothat,’Modiinsists.‘Defeat:thiswordisnotinmydictionary.Ineverthink

ofdefeat.Ineverstop.’Modi’stimeinthenorthinchargeofvariousstatesallowedhimtonotonlytravel

abroad extensively but get close to several national-level BJP leaders. In addition tolearning andmastering yetmoreminutiae relating topartypolitics and the internalworkings of the BJP, Modi networked with politicians from every other party innorth-westIndia.Thiswasbecause,inthenewageofpoliticalcoalitionsinIndia,theBJPoftenneededtogovernorcampaigninalliancewithpoliticalpartners.‘TheywerenotallyetinalliancewiththeBJP,butIhadaverygoodchancetoworkwiththesepeople,’ he says. He made many friends among the BJP’s supposed enemies on apersonalaswellaspoliticallevel.

The common perception later in Modi’s career that he was a regional leaderunfamiliarwithDelhipoliticswasclearlyuntrue.Theotherperceptionthathecouldnotbuildconsensusandwasaone-manarmytoodoesnotstanduptoscrutinygivenhisperformanceasaconciliatorinthenorthernstatesunderhisleadershipinthelate1990swhentheBJP-ledNDAwasinpower.

No wonder Modi regards this period of ‘exile’ from Gujarat among the mostproductiveofhislife.Hewasahappynomadagain.Italsoprovedtobegoodtrainingforwhatwastocomenext.

Asiftoprovethatintra-partychaoshadnotemanatedfromModi’smachinations,thesituationintheGujaratBJPdeterioratedafterheleft.VaghelastilldislikedModiandremainedfixatedonpower.‘Yes,Vaghelawantedmetopay,andafterIleftandSureshMehta became chiefminister, Vaghela again did a revolt,’ saysModi. ‘I was not inGujarat at that time.And thenhebecame the chiefminister. So thatwas a timeofinstabilityinGujarat.’

Bymid-September1996,President’sRulehadbeen imposedon the state.SureshMehta was indeed gone, having disgraced himself in attempting to rig an assemblyvote.Theever-mutinousVaghelahadbynowburnedallhisbridgesandlefttheBJPinAugust 1997 to formhis ownoutfit, theRashtriya Janata Party (RJP), fromwhoserampartshewooedtheCongress.AftertheliftingofPresident’sRule,Vaghela’sdreamcame true and he would richly enjoy his 370 days as chief minister of Gujarat,supportedbytheCongress,whichnowseemedmoreVaghela’ssortofparty.

At the Centre things were still arguably leaning the BJP’s way despite its poorshowing in the 1996 Lok Sabha election. The Gujarat by-election victory in the

Sarkhej constituency on 8 February 1997 brought into the state assembly a youngstock-brokernamedAmitShah.VajpayeehadmadeBJPhistorybybrieflybecomingprimeminister of India for thirteen days inMay 1996, after the departure of P.V.Narasimha Rao, before he had to step down in the absence of a parliamentarymajority.

A United Front alliance government led by H.D. Deve Gowda and then I.K.Gujral, and supported from outside by the Congress, would not last long. A BJPgovernment would take office, under Vajpayee, inMarch 1998. It was India’s firstNationalDemocraticAlliance(NDA)administrationandsignalledthebeginningofaneraofmultipartycoalitiongovernments.

By this time economic and administrative reforms, undertaken by Rao as primeministerandManmohanSinghasfinanceminister,werebeginningtoshowresults.In1991,abalanceofpaymentscrisishadbrought theInternationalMonetaryFundtothe country’s rescue. India was almost bankrupt. The treasury had enough foreignreserves for three more weeks of imports. In return for a bail-out, the minorityCongressgovernmentwastoldthatitwouldhavetodroptheruinoussocialistpoliciesthatwerebankruptingthecountry.Chiefamongthedemandswasthedismantlingofthe bureaucratic licence-permit-quota regime which squatted on top of India’sbusinessandindustry,suffocatingthem.

As a patient awakening from a decades-long coma after a miracle injection ofdopamine, the economy began to respond: growth was now up and a measure ofprosperity prevailed, evident in the slow emergence of an aspirationalmiddle class.There was no magic in this: it was scientific, predictable. Rao skilfully guardedManmohanSinghfromreactionaries inthecivil serviceanddynastic interests inthegovernment while he tackled the licence raj and introduced structural economicchanges.

TheironyisthatalthoughtheBJPwouldbethebeneficiaryofthesereformswhenit formed the government in1998, theywould alsohurt theparty in the long termbecause it was never forced to do enough serious thinking on its own economicphilosophy.TheBJPhadalwaysattemptedtodifferentiateitselffromtheCongressbyproclaiming its swadeshi economic policy, although how it differed from mid-twentieth-centuryFabiannotionsofcentrallyengineeredegalitarianismwasunclear.

AsBaldevRajNayarnotedin2000:‘ThereisnothingreallydistinctiveaboutBJP

governanceinrelationtoeconomicpolicy;thatis,thereislittletosetitapartfromtheCongressparty.’13Therewasonethingthoughthatstoodout:theBJP’sinfrastructureprogramme,especiallyofbuildingroads.Itwasa long-termprojectwhosebenefits itwasthenstilltooearlytodiscern.

ShankersinhVaghelahadmeanwhileascendedtothechiefminister’spostinGujaratafter alleging corruption in the BJP. Barely a year later, in October 1997, he washimself ejected amidst charges of corruption. He was briefly succeeded as chiefministerbyhisRJPcolleagueDilipbhaiRamanbhaiParikh,whosurviveduntil freshassemblyelectionswereheldon4March1998.14ThisheraldedthedeathoftheRJP,which gained an insignificant four seats, and soon afterwards Vaghela dropped allpretenceandjoinedtheCongressparty,addingtheRJP’sseatstoitsfifty-three.15TheBJPmadeavigorouscomebackwithanoverallmajority,winning117of182assemblyseats.OnceagainKeshubhaiPatelwaschiefminister.

Sincehis‘banishment’in1995,ModihadreturnedtoGujaratafewtimes,mainlyto visit the Sanskardham School. From February 1998 onwards, until the generalelection campaign ended,hewas oncemore a legitimate visitor.Hishardworkhadpaid off.And again Sanjay Joshi–whoheldModi’s old job as general secretary fororganization–wasneedledbyitbecausehefearedModiwouldbegivencreditforhissuccess.16JoshiwasnowasclosetoKeshubhaiasModiusedtobe,andalthoughtherewasantagonismtowardshimfromthemboth,thesheerscaleoftheBJP’sLokSabhavictoryin1998‘meantthatModistoppedbeingapoliticalpariahinGujarat’.17

BackinDelhion19May1998,ModiformallyacceptedthepostofBJPnationalgeneral secretary (organization), a significantpromotion thatprobably tookaccountoftheelectionresultinGujarat.Hekepthisbriefofthenorth-westernstatesbuthadtospendmoretimeinthecapital–onceagaincampinginaroominafriend’shouseand living,nomadically,outof a single suitcase.18Currentswerenow flowing in thedirectionoffutureevents,butitwouldneedastorm–oranearthquake–torearrangethatfuture.

ThenexttwoorthreeyearsarevitaltounderstandingModi’ssubsequentcareeraschiefminister ofGujarat. From this point,Modi’s enemies – andhewas collectingmany – began to introduce a narrative elementwhich depicts him as conspiring totoppleKeshubhaiPatelandtoeliminateotherrivalsforGujarat’schiefministership.Thatseemsodd,notonlybecauseKeshubhaihadrecentlybeenreturnedwithalarge

majority,butalsobecauseModi’saccessionwas stilla longwayoffandwouldprovecritically dependent on a sequence of natural disasters he could not have foreseen,namely the 1998 Kandla cyclone, the Ahmedabad floods of 2000, and then fourmonthslaterthecatastrophicKutchearthquakeofJanuary2001.

BythattimeKeshubhaihadearnedtheunfortunatenicknameof‘MrDisaster’forhismaladroithandlingofallthesemisfortunes.19Butitwasnotuntilseveralmonthsafter the Kutch earthquake that the national BJP leadership decided he should bereplaced. Their decision was also predicated on disastrous election results in early2000,butthereplacementofKeshubhaiwasadecisionlongdebatedandreluctantlytaken.

PortrayingModiasanambitiousschemeritchingtogethishandsonGujaratfrom1998onwardsmakeshimpsychologicallyplausibleascomplicitintheriotsof2002.Inother words, with hindsight, a narrative about Modi as a ruthless, self-servingpoliticianhasbeenintrinsictothecampaignagainsthimwhichwouldgatherpaceasherosetoprominenceinGujarat,andthenacrossIndia.

ModicontinuedtoimpresstheDelhihierarchyandby1999wonthefullconfidenceofVajpayee,whomadehimpartyspokesman.Hebegantotravelabroadonmissionsof internationaldiplomacyonbehalf of theparty to countries such asMalaysia andAustralia.Itexpandedhishorizons.

Ashetoldme:‘Iwasluckytovisitmorethanfortycountries,andbecauseofthatIgotverygoodexposure.Iunderstoodhowtheworldismoving,whattypeofthingsaredevelopingandwheremycountrystood.Ihadtothinkabout it:why ismycountrylike this? Why are others improving? Israel doesn’t have any rain, but Israel isimproving.Whyarewenot?’

He appearedmore frequently in front of television cameras and proved himselfadeptathandlingbarbedquestionsfromjournalists.ModiwasnowseenintheDelhiBJP headquarters as an astute tactician and a safe pair of hands.Hewas present inKashmirin1999whentheKargilwarbrokeout,acquittinghimselfwell.20Heprovedhe couldhold a firm line in interviews.Modiwas unhesitant in criticizingPakistanpresidentMusharraf’s‘breakfastbriefings’tojournalistswithoutappearingjingoistic.

AllthiswouldhavemadeModiasuitablecandidatewhenanewchiefministerwasneededinGujaratin2001,butatthetimehewashappydoinghisjobinDelhi.

Meanwhile,KeshubhaiPatelwasdoinga good jobdestroyinghisown leadership

statusinGujaratwithoutanyhelpfromModi.Itwassaidthatunderhimcorruptionwasbecomingrampantandthatnepotismwasrife.Thiswasabeliefheldamongmanyneutral observers both within and outside Gujarat.21 Swapan Dasgupta gave hisdiagnosisofKeshubhai’sdecline:

When he started out, he enjoyed the reputation of a relentless crusader against corruption.He is [now]known topatronise bureaucratswhose integrity is suspect.Hehaswrested all authority by ensuring thatcrucialdecisions are referred tohim.TheGovernment’s achievements can’t be transformed intopoliticalcapitalbecauseKeshubhai’simagehastakenanosedive.22

Inthe2000municipalelectionstheBJPlostcontrolinAhmedabadandRajkotcitiesandwas almostwiped out across the panchayats, losing twenty-one of twenty-threedistricts. Its vote share fell from 80 per cent to 20 per cent. It lost the preciousSabarmatiassemblyseatandtheSabarkanthaLokSabhaseat.In2000–01,thepartylost every single by-election in the state.Delhi was horrified and feared the wheelswerefallingoffitsbandwagoninGujarat.Losingthe2003assemblyelectionssuddenlylookedapossibility.Butstillthecentralleadershipdidnotact.

Then in January 2001 came the calamitous Kutch earthquake. Voterdisgruntlementspiralled:therewerealsodroughtsthataffectedseventeendistrictsin2000 and twenty-two in 2001. Relief operations were seen to be tardy. Theadministration seemed at first paralysed by the natural disaster, and then plainincompetent.

‘Official stonewalling anda reluctance topartwith informationmarked the firstfive days after the earthquake. When Keshubhai at last came on TV to warn ofpossibleafter-shocks,hisclumsyarticulationtriggeredapanic,’wroteDasgupta.

InAhmedabad,400kmawayfromthequake’sepicentre,nearly200tallbuildings,shoddily constructed in return for kickbacks, collapsed, causing 750 deaths. Anincipient mood of anti-incumbency began to be detected. ‘Stories were doing theroundsabouthowsomerulingpartynetaswhousedtogoaroundoncyclesandtwo-wheelershadnowbecomeownersofbigcars.’23

While Keshubhai was sinking, Modi was riding the crest of a wave. A criticalmomentwason28June2000,whenhemadeoneofhisbriefvisitstoGujarat.Hewasstill unwelcome, at least by party leaders, but this trip proved that there was agroundswell of enthusiasmbuilding forModi.The occasionwas a reunionof thosewho had been detained during the Emergency twenty-five years ago under IndiraGandhi’snotoriousMaintenanceofInternalSecurityAct(MISA).

Itwasanofficialfunction,soModi’spresencewastolerated.Hewasseatedatthe

veryfarendoftheparadeofdignitariesonthestageandhischair,althoughtechnicallyon the dais, was perilously close to the edge.WhenModi was unexpectedly calledforwardbytheBJPnationalpresidentandpresentedwithashawlandacitationforhisundergroundworkduringtheEmergency,hewasgivenafullfive-minutestandingovationbythecrowd.TheTimesofIndianotedthat‘ChiefMinisterKeshubhaiPatel,statechiefRajendrasinhRana,andothersweretakenaback’.24

What the incident showedwas thatModiwas popular andwell remembered inGujarat, from the time of hiswork during the Emergency to his hard and effectivecampaigninginrecentelections.Peoplealsonowknewhimfromtelevision.Thathehadbeenabsentforthedebacleatthepollsafewmonthsearlierservedtorubsaltintothewoundsofthestartledchiefminister.

‘EvenModiwassurprisedbytheoverwhelmingattentionhereceived,’TheTimesofIndia wrote, which suggests he was not conspiring to take Keshubhai’s job. It isrevealinghowModi’scriticsneverincludethisincidentintheiraccountsofhisrisetopower. No wonder it would lacerate the accepted narrative that Modi was widelydislikedinGujaratandforcedtooutwiteverybodyinordertobecomechiefminister.

AconfluenceofcircumstancesledtoModibeingappointedwhatineffectwasinterimchiefminister.One–bynomeansfavourable–newspaperreportfromthetimesaysthatonlyafterthepoormunicipalelectionresultsandthelostby-elections,‘Fearingasimilar disaster in the assembly elections, the national command decided to sendAdvani’sman toGujarat.’25Another report says thatModi ‘might have remained ageneral secretary inDelhi hadnot theBhuj earthquake of 2001 forcedKeshubhai’sexit.Hewent toGandhinagarasa“caretaker”while the leadershipdecidedbetweenthethenfront-rankingstateleaders.’26

ModiwasunhappyinDelhianddreamedofGujarat,butclearlyhadnotdevisedaroadmapforreturn.Interestingly,hearguesthattheBJPleaderseventuallysenthimback for their own ‘political’ reasons. The party needed someone with experience,organizational ability and discipline to have a hope of rescuing the situation inGujarat.Buttheyalsoneededsomebodywithoutinfluence.BecauseModiasa‘back-roomboy’waswithouthisownpowerbase,andhadneverbeenelectedtoanythingbefore, they thought thatoncehewas chiefminister they could controlhim.27Thissounds plausible. Being himself an ambitious man and well aware of the disastersunfoldinginGujarat,Modimust–atleastsubconsciously–havepositionedhimself,

sothathewouldappear‘amenable’toanoffer.

Modi has given his own account of the events that immediately preceded hisappointmentaschiefministerofGujarat.28At thebehestofnationalBJP leadershehad often been to Gujarat after the earthquake, helping to coordinate the aidprogramme.Buton1October2001hewas inDelhiattendingthefuneral ritesofajournalistfriendwhohaddiedinanairaccident.Whilethere,hereceivedacallonhismobilephonefromPrimeMinisterAtalBihariVajpayee.

Vajpayeeasked,‘Whereareyou?’Theyarrangedtomeetintheevening,andwhentheydid,VajpayeemadeajokeaboutModibeingoverweight;andthatitwasbecausehehadbeeninDelhitoolong,‘eatingallthatPunjabifood’.29

VajpayeetoldModihemustgoandworkinGujarat.Modi’sinitialassumptionwasthat hewas to oversee the state inhis role of all-India organization secretary.Modiasked whether it meant losing the other states he looked after, indicating hemisunderstoodwhatVajpayeewas saying.When toldhewouldbe takingover fromKeshubhai as chief minister and should therefore have to submit himself to anassemblyby-election,Modiimmediatelysaidno.

Instead, he offered to spend ten days amonth inGujarat doing his usual work.VajpayeekeptonpersuadingModitoaccepttheposition–itwasinthenatureofanorder – butModi still refused.Afterwards,Advani telephonedModi to ask how itwent,althoughhealmostcertainlyknewalready.Advaniwasabruptwithhim:‘Look,everybodyhasdecidedaboutyou,’hesaid.

Isthisaccountplausible?TheaircraftcarryingModi’sfriend,formerDoordarshancameramanGopalBisht,TVjournalistRanjanJhaandsixotherpassengersincludingRajivGandhi’s old friendMadhavraoScindia, crashedon itsway toKanpuron themorningofSunday,30September.30

AcremationdateinDelhiof1Octoberfitsintothechronology.Modisaysheheldout for a fewdaysbefore acceptinghis duty to theparty.OnThursday, 4October,Modi was in Gujarat, accompanied by BJP national president Jana Krishnamurthi,andwasformallyelectedasthenewleaderoftheBJPlegislativeparty.

Advani’s tersemessage had been accepted byModi onMonday evening; he hadagreed on Tuesday morning, gathered his few possessions and settled his affairs inDelhi.He then flew toGujarat early onWednesday, 3October, to prepare for thenextday’sbusinessbyhandingKeshubhaithesilkenropeandhiscondolences.

WhilehesitatingoverVajpayee’soffer,ModisaidhewasoutoftouchwithaffairsinGujaratafterbeingawayforsixyears,anddidnotknowanybodythere.Thatwasdisingenuous.He knew everybody; he clearly enjoyed popular support among partyworkersifnotfriendshipfrompartyleaders;andhehadbeeninthestateforelectioncampaigns–andmorerecentlyforpost-earthquakerehabilitationwork.

WhatModicertainlydidnothave–andhemaywellhavebeenpointingtowardsthisinhisinitialhesitationtoVajpayeeonacceptingthechiefministership–wasanygovernmental or administrative experience. Politically speaking, to go from a partyorganizertochiefministerinasinglestepmusthavefeltdauntingeventosomebodyasself-assuredasModi.Hewasclearlysensitiveaboutthelackofanelectoralmandateaswell.

Modiwas sworn inaschiefministeronSunday,7October2001,duringa forty-minute ceremony, six days after Vajpayee’s cellphone call. At least 50,000 partyworkers attended althoughCongress politicians stayed away, claiming they resentedthe expenditure (but perhaps betraying anxiety). Further to the clamour thatwelcomedModi,TheHindureportedthenextmorning:‘Attheendofthefunction,aspartyworkersthreatenedtoclimbontothedaistogreetthenewChiefMinister,Mr.Modiappealedforcalm.’31

Modiwas safe for the present from local enemieswithin the BJP because of hisheavyweight backers in Delhi. But he knew he had to act quickly to tidy up theshambles enveloping the party in Gujarat. Assembly elections were due in March2003; little more than a year remained in which to do it. He likened himself to abatsmaninaone-dayTestmatch,32implyingboththathewasshortontimeandthatbeyondtheassemblyelectionshedidnotimaginehewouldstayon.Thissuggeststhathe viewed his appointment as a duty to his leaders inDelhi and that after he hadfinished he could return toHimachal Pradesh and theHimalayas. Almost the firstthinghedidwastogoandvisithisagedmother.Hermessagetohimwassimple:donottakeanybribes.

Possiblyforthefirsttimeinhisadultlife,Moditookheradvice.

PART3TheReturn

T

7

THERIOTS

Forwithoutacementofblood(itmustbehuman,itmustbeinnocent)nosecularwallwillsafelystand.–W.H.Auden

HE MORNING OF WEDNESDAY, 27 February 2002, dawned clear and dry in theGujarati township of Godhra, administrative headquarters of the Panchmahal

district,near theborderwithMadhyaPradesh.Therewasnotabreathofwindandthe temperature was already climbing fast. At 7:42 a.m. a train, nearly five hoursbehindschedule,pulledintotheplatformwiththesunrisingbehindit.Itwascarrying2,300passengers.

MostofthepassengerswerekarsevaksorRamsevaks,GujaratisontheirwaybackfromAyodhya inUttarPradesh,wherenearlyadecadebefore theBabriMasjidhadbeendemolishedbydevoteessuchasthemselves.Someofthemmightevenhavetakenpart, although many of the children in the train had not even been born then.Returning from their pilgrimage thesemen, women and children had covered over1,200 kilometres in restless confinement and fitful sleep. Now they were hungry,thirstyandtiredbutalmosthomeagainandinhighspirits.Someofthemwereevensingingandchantingslogans.

They were travelling aboard 9166 Up, known as the Sabarmati Express – theSabarmati being the river that flows through Ahmedabad, where the train was toterminateitsjourney.‘Sabarmati’hasasecondreferenceforIndiansasthenameoftheashramestablishedonitsbanksbyMohandasGandhiin1917.Itwasfromtherethathesetoutonhis‘SaltSatyagraha’thirteenyearslater.

Thetrainanditsjourneywererichinsymbolism.AtthefarendofthejourneytoAyodhyaithadhaltedataspotregardedbymanyastheplaceoforiginoftheHindu

faith which was also a place of recent religious and political controversy. TheSabarmatiExpresswouldnowreturntheRamsevakstoasiteassociatedwiththelatestphaseofIndianhistory–thestruggleagainsttheBritish,Partition,Independenceandarenewednationaldestiny.

Nearly a full decade after the BabriMasjid was brought down in Ayodhya, theSabarmatiExpressstoppedforapproximatelyfiveminutesatGodhraJunction.Then,as it pulled away from the platform headingwest, stones began to be pelted at thecoaches,andafteronly700metresoftravelthetrainhaltedagainalittlewaydownthelineatSignalFalia.Thiswasallegedlybecausesomebodypulledtheemergencychain,thusreleasingvacuumpressureandautomaticallyapplyingthebrakes.

It was 8 a.m. By now a crowd of up to 2,000 localMuslims, who lived in largenumbersintheareasabuttingthetracks,hadmaterializedandsurroundedthetrain.1

Theywerehurlingrocksandrepeatingcriesof‘Maro,kapo,badhanejalavido’(‘Burnthemall’),‘Hinduokomaardaloaurjalado’,‘BeattheHindus.Hindusshouldbecutand burnt. Islam is in danger.’2 The voice of the cheerleader of these chants andsloganswas loudlyrelayedoverapublicaddresssystemfromthenearbymosqueandwidelyheard.

Thetraindrivercouldnotmoveforwardbecausetheguard,whenheattemptedtogoandresettheemergencychain,waspeltedwithrocksandforcedtoretreatintohisvan.

The pilgrims under siege closed the windows and doors but burning rags andelectriclightbulbsfilledwithacidwerethrowninafterrockshadshatteredtheglass.Thepilgrimspressedsuitcasesagainsttheopenwindows,butCoachS6wassoonwellalightandthosewhoattemptedtoescapetheflameswereassaultedwithswordsandiron rods as they emerged. One account alleges that a man climbing out wasdecapitated,andhisheadtossedbackin.3Afewpassengersmanagedtoshelterbeneaththecarriagebutthosetrappedinthecompartmentswerequicklyburnedtodeath.Inamatterofminutesfifty-ninepeople,includingtwenty-sixwomenandtwelvechildren,perished.

Thefirebrigadeeventuallyarrived,havingsufferedseveralimpedimentsalongtheway.Firstthefirefightersdiscoveredthatneitheroftheirtenderswasfunctional.Theclutchplateofonehadbeenremovedafewdaysbefore,soitcouldn’tbedrivenatall,and the other’s hose had been put out of action by the removal of one of the nutsconnecting it to the on-boardwater reservoir. The duty crew discovered this whentheycameonshiftat8a.m.andtheywererepairingitwhenthealarmrang.

They set off for the train station but were confronted by a large, angry crowd,

headed by Haji Bilal, a Congress member of the Godhra Nagarpalika and alsochairmanof theVehicleCommittee,whowas sitting astride amotorcycle.4Hehadbeenanunusual visitor to the fire station thepast fewevenings– remaining late towatchtelevision,heclaimed.ThissecondMuslimmobpeltedthetenderwithstones,smashingthewindscreenandwindows.Standingintheroad,a‘tall,well-builtyoungman’daredthefirefighterstomoveforwardandrunhimover.

The firemenwere blocked in from all sides, but judging their own lives to be indanger eventually forced theirway through.They arrived atGodhra station twentyminutes laterthantheywouldotherwisehavedoneandfoundalmostallthevictimsalreadydead.FiremanVijaySinghsawonedesperatewomanatacarriagewindow.Hetwice attempted to reach her but the heatwas too intense. It took half an hour todousetheflamesinthecarriages.5Someforty-threesurvivorsweretakentohospital.

Thepoliceonthescenewereoutnumberedandapparentlytimidorterrified.Theydid almost nothing. Later they fired a few shots in the air to little effect after anescaped passenger pleaded with them for help and offered up her jewellery as aninducement.6

By this point the mob had fallen back somewhat but continued to emit bothslogans andmissilesbefore launching another attack at11:30 a.m. thatwas repelledwith rifle rounds and tear gasby thenewly arrivedRailwayProtectionForce (RPF)reinforcements.Bythistimethenewsofwhathadhappenedwasstartingtospread.

ThecarnageatGodhraJunctionwasonlythebeginning.

Wednesday,27February2002wasstrictlyspeakingonlyModi’sseconddayonthejobafterbeingelectedasanMLA.HehadineffectbeenchiefministersincethepreviousOctober,whenhehadtakenoverfromKeshubhaiPatel.HewasnotyetamemberoftheGujaratassembly.Fourmonthslater,on24February,hestoodforandwonaby-electionfromtheRajkotIIconstituency,wherehismajoritywas14,000,halfwhatthepreviousBJPMLAhad enjoyed.Thiswaspartlybecauseof theunpopularityof theKeshubhai administration. Mostly though, it was down to the reluctance of theVishwaHinduParishadandtheBajrangDaltocampaignforModi.

TheVHPandtheBajrangDalwereapparentlydispleasedwiththeBJP’s ‘not-so-definitestandonbuildingaRamtempleatAyodhya’.7Modihimselfhadhadnothingtodowith it a decade earlier, andwas nomore enthusiastic about theRam templecausein2002.SobeforetheriotshewasatoddswiththeVHP.Modihadbeensworn

inaschiefministerbythegovernoron7October2001.HetookoathasanMLAon25 February 2002, barely two days before the riots began. This is not necessarilyrelevant to how he handled the horrific events in subsequent days but a balancedassessmentmustnotethisfactwhichfewpreviousnarrativesoftheperiodhavedone.

Modi customarily arises at 5 a.m. to perform his yoga exercises. After that he surfsnewsontheInternetbeforehardcopiesof thedailynewspapersaredeliveredtothechiefminister’sbungalow.Allwaspeacefulonthenewswiresasheatehisbreakfastonthatfatefulmorning.

By mid-morning, Modi began to receive garbled reports about a fatal railwayincident taking place inGodhra between9 a.m. and10 a.m.8He acted quickly.Hewantedtosuspendthesessionoftheday’sstateassemblyassoonasheheardthenewsbut the finance minister was scheduled to introduce the budget, a statutoryrequirement.

‘We completed our budget speech – that was compulsory,’ he toldme. ‘At thattimewedidn’thaveanydetailsofwhat typeof incident itwas.Wehad justgot theinformationthattherehadbeenanattackandthatpeoplehaddied.Butwewerenotawareofhowmanypeoplehaddied.Wegot that informationat about2p.m.or3p.m.’

Having no clear idea of the situation, he decided immediately after the budgetspeechintheassemblytosetoutforGodhratoseeforhimself.Beforehedeparted,allhe knew was that there were a certain number of unidentified deaths. It was stillunknown who had launched the attack. Modi convened an emergency cabinetmeeting before leaving forGodhra.He issued a statewide alert to law enforcementagencies,cancellingleaveandcallingtodutyallreservesavailable.

Modiwasreadytoleavebybetween1p.m.and2p.m.Godhrawas115kmfromGandhinagar. He says: ‘I wanted to go to Godhra directly but we did not have ahelicopteratourdisposal.SoIflewtoVadodarabyaircraft.IrequestedONGC[OilandNaturalGasCorporation] for theirhelicopter.They agreedbut said, “This is asingle-enginehelicopter.WecannotallowVIPstotravelinthishelicopter.”AndmyanswerwasthatIwouldtravelbythishelicopteratmyrisk.’

ModireachedthesceneatSignalFaliaataround4p.m.Thesightwasworsethanhehadimagined.‘Ihadalreadysentmyministerofstate(Home)andseniorofficersinthemorning,’Modirecounts. ‘Theywerealreadythere.Theytoldmetherewasvery

hugedamage.’Before leaving forGodhra,Modihad issueda statewidealert to lawenforcement

agenciesandcancelledallleavetotacklethestormeveryonefearedlayahead.Gujaratwas themost riot-prone stateof the Indianrepublic,where ingrainedcommunalismwasarunningsoreincivilsociety.

Havinginspectedtheburned-outcarriages,Modi’sthoughtswereexpressedinhisfirststatementtothepress:‘Thisinhumanterroristcrimeofcollective/massviolenceisnotanincidentofcommunalviolence.’

Clearlythecombinationofthetargets,certainsignsofplanningandorganization,andtheidentityofthevictimsallrangalarmbells.Modifeltfromtheevidencebeforehiseyes that thiswasa terroristact,aconspiracy,notanactofcommunalhatred. Itwasanimportantdifference.Hisinstinctswouldprovecorrect.

Thepressrelease,issuedfromgroundzeroatGodhraadded:‘TheGovernmentwillnotbelackingindischarging(its)duty…Noeffortswillbesparedinensuringlawandorder.’9Tothisendcertainmeasureswereinstantlyeffected.AcurfewwasimposedinGodhraandintwenty-eightothertownsandcitiesthenextday.

Aday later,on1March,thecurfewwouldbeextendedtocoveralmostallurbanareasinthestate.ThepolicehadmeanwhilebegunroundinguptroublemakersfrombothHinduandMuslimcommunitieswhocouldbedependedupontotakethelawinto their own hands whenever the opportunity arose. On 27 February itself 217preventivearrestsweremade:137HindusandeightyMuslims.

WhilestillinGodhra,Modidirectedpolicecommissioners,districtmagistratesandsuperintendents of police to return to their respective headquarters in order tomonitor thedeveloping situation.TheHomeDepartment issuedanalert to imposeprohibitoryordersandprovidesecurityforbothtemplesandmosques.10

ThenModilearnedtohisdismaythattheVHPhadcalledforastatebandhforthenextday,28February.Suchacallhadnothingtodowiththeexecutiveandhecoulddolittletostopit.ButitmeanttherewouldbeamobofangryHindusmillingaroundAhmedabadinthemorning.ModiimmediatelysentarequesttotheGovernmentofIndia to release four companies of the dedicated anti-riot service, theRapidActionForce(RAF),alongwithtencompaniesofCentralparamilitaryforces(CPMF).11

Alltheseordersweregivenbefore8p.m.on27FebruaryinGodhra,beforeModisetoffbacktoGandhinagar,wherehearrivedat10.30p.m.‘Comingback,itwaslatenight,’ he explained tome. ‘So itwasnotpossible to comebyhelicopter. I camebyroadtoVadodara.Again,fromVadodara,IcameinanaircrafttoAhmedabad.FromAhmedabadIcamebyroadtoGandhinagar.’

Ithadbeenalongday,butitwasnotoveryet.

Atthistimenodeaths,apartfromthoseontheSabarmatiExpress,hadbeenreportedanywhere inGujarat– the firstwouldnotbeconfirmeduntil almostnoonthenextday, 28February.Meanwhile,Ahmedabad’s entire regular police force of 6,000hadalreadybeendeployed.

Inaddition, fifty-eightcompaniesofGujarat’sStateReservePoliceForce (SRPF)and fourCPMFcompanieswere brought in.TheRAF–whichhadoneof its twowomen’sbattalionspermanently stationedatGandhinagar–was soonon itsway toAhmedabad, Vadodara and Godhra in an attempt to quell trouble before it had achancetobegin.

Asfortheregulararmy,Modihadalreadyaskedforitsassistance.AccordingtoTheHinduof1March,Modihad‘franticallycalledthearmyunitstoAhmedabad’,whichsuggestshewasdeeplyworriedbydevelopments.

I was talking toModi, carefully going over the events as they unfolded hour byhour,whenhesaid,‘There’sanotherthingwhichIhavenevertoldanyone.’

Indeed,Modihasneverbeforerevealedthedetailsof those fatefuldaysashewasnowdoing:

Onthe27th,whentheincidenthappenedinGodhra,IcamebacktoGandhinagarlateatnight,Iinformallyaskedmyofficerstoalertthearmy.Onthe27thitselfIwastoldthatthearmywasattheborderbecauseofthe attackonParliament thathadhappeneda fewmonths ago.Therewas tensionbetweenPakistan andIndiasothewholeofourarmedforceswereontheborder.AndthatwastheanswerIgot.Thearmyisontheborder,noonecanbespared.ThenItoldthem,‘Yes,Icanunderstandthatthearmyisnotavailableatthismoment,buttheymusthavesomejuniors.Justaslongastheyhaveuniforms.Thattoowillhelpus.’

Unfortunately,OperationParakramensuredthatnotasinglesoldiercouldbespared.Modi thenappealed toDelhi for troops,whichwasdone formallyby faxat2:30

p.m. on 28 February. On the night of 27 February, when he arrived home fromGodhra,ModihadtelephonedL.K.Advani,thenhomeministerinVajpayee’sNDA-2government,andmadeapersonal request for troops.The faxnowmadetherequestofficial.

While atGodhra,Modi had consultedwith the districtmagistrate, JayantiRavi.Onheradvice,asshetestifiedbeforetheSpecialInvestigationteam(SIT)appointedbytheSupremeCourt,ModidecidedtoallowthedeadbodiestobecarriedonwardinthemiddleofthenighttoAhmedabad,wheretheirfamilies,orinmanycaseswhatwasleftoftheirfamilies,awaitedthem.AhospitalinSola,onthewesternoutskirtsofthe

cityjustinsidetheSardarPatelRingRoad,waschosenastheirfinaldestination.12Thehope was this would ensure Godhra did not become a magnet for Hindu riotersseeking vengeance. Moreover, depositing the bodies away from the centre ofAhmedabadforthefuneralsmeantamediacircuswouldbeavoided.Itworked,andjournalistswereabsentwhenthebodieswerehandedoverbeforedawn.

Inthewakeoftheriots,accusationsbegantobemadethatModihadtransportedthecorpsesbacktoAhmedabadindaylightandparadedthemthroughthestreets inorder to stir up anger and aggression amongHindus againstMuslims.The originalscopeoftheNanavatiCommissioninquiryintotheriotswaswidenedinthelightofthis serious charge against him. Yet that inquiry, and subsequent ones, found thecharge untrue. If anything the opposite was underscored. The civil surgeon at Solacertified that fifty-four of the fifty-seven bodies arrived there at 3.30 a.m. on 28February.Therewasonlyasmalllocalcrowdandgovernmentofficialsinattendance,andnocommotionofanysort.Mostofthebodieswereimmediatelycollectedbytheirfamilies and loved ones. The remaining nineteen unclaimed dead Ramsevaks werehandedtotheVHPandamasscremationwasconductedtotherearofthehospitalinthe presence ofmedical officials and Jagdish Patel, amunicipal councillor.13 This iswhatJusticeGanatraoftheMetropolitanCourtinAhmedabadwroteinhisorderon26December2013:

SIT has said in its report that because of the gruesome incident and death of fifty-eight innocentmen,womenandchildrenandmorethanfortyinjuredpersons,thesituationatGodhrawastense.RelativesofthevictimsweretryingtoreachGodhra.MostofthedeceasedpersonswerefromAhmedabadornearbyplaces.In the meeting at Godhra Collector’s office, it was unanimously decided to shift the dead bodies toAhmedabadsothatrelativescouldclaimthedeadbodieswithouttravellinguptoGodhra.Thus,thedeadbodiesweresentbythelocaladministrationtoCivilHospitalatSola,Ahmedabad,whichwaslocatedontheoutskirts at a less populated area. The dead bodies were transported with police escort atmidnight andreachedSolaHospital earlymorning.The local administrationwas there to receive thedeadbodies.Thecourthasobservedthatthedecisiontakenbytheauthorities,consideringtheprevailingsituation,wasjustandproperandcourtagreeswiththefindingsoftheSIT.

Nevertheless, the narrative of the bodies of slain Hindu martyrs being paradedthroughtheangrystreetsofAhmedabadtoinflamemobshasbeenwronglyrepeatedsooftenthatithasacquiredthepatinaofunquestionedhistoricalfact.14

AfterarrivingbackfromGodhraatthechiefminister’sbungalowinGandhinagarat10.30 p.m. on 27 February, Modi held a high-level meeting half an hour later. In

attendance were seven senior administrative and police officers.15 This meeting,according to several political NGOs and activists, was whereModi issued his ‘kill’order against the Muslims of Gujarat – a charge later dismissed by the SupremeCourt–appointedSIT.

Modi slept little the night of 27 February. By 8:30 a.m. the next day, he wasaddressingthestateassemblyagain,updatingitaboutthemeasureshewastaking.HeappealedtoCongressMLAsnottoraisepartisanobjections.

By10a.m.on28February,newsbegancominginoftroubleatNarodaPatiya inthe north-east corner of Ahmedabad.16 Amob ofHindus – the SIT FinalClosureReportstates‘ahugemobnumbering20,000’17–manyofthemVHPthugsintentonburning the area to the ground, had converged on an area wheremigrantMuslimsworked.Theywere armed andhadbegun topursue the terrifiedMuslims–mainlyimpoverishedout-of-stateworkerswhospokenoGujarati–throughthenarrowlanesbetweenthechawls,settingfiretoworkshops,businessesandpeopleastheywent.

Asthefirstsketchyreportsofdeathscamein,theawfultruthofthesituationbeganto dawn on Modi. Where were the police? The fact was he had inherited a statethoroughly marinated in decades of bitter communalism and was left with theconsequences of thishate-filledhistory– a bigotry thathad infiltrated thepolitical,bureaucratic and police structure at every level. By nomeans was it endemic18 butthere is little doubt that communal feelings ran deep. It was wishful thinking thatHindumobswouldbesuccessfullycontainedbypurposefulstateactioninthefaceofsuchcommunalrageashadbeensparkedoffbytheGodhratrainarson.Thisbecameobviousasthedayworeon.

AtNarodaPatiya in eastAhmedabad,BabubhaiPatel,morewidely known asBabuBajrangi,theextremistleaderoftheBajrangDal,accordingtothecourtthatconvictedhim,waspersonallyhackingtodeathhelplessMuslimworkers.Inthishewasaidedbya surprising figure, a lady doctor and the proprietor of amaternity clinic who washandingoutswordstoHinduriotersandfiringahandgunatMuslims.HernamewasMayaKodnani and incredibly shewas the BJPMLA forNaroda, having first beenelected to theAhmedabadmunicipal corporation in 1995. ‘She got down from thecar,’ recalled one traumatized witness. ‘Mayaben said, “kill them”, then the mobattackedus.BecauseofthisattackweallsteppedbacktowardsourMuslimchawls.’19

Kodnani was awarded life imprisonment by the Sessions Court. Bajrangi would

alsobeconvictedandjailedforlife.Buton28February2002,Modihadyettohearoforevenguessattheactivitiesofsomeofthesepeople.TheCongresswouldlateruseKodnani’sconvictiontocallforModi’sresignation,althoughherpositionintheBJPpredatedModi’stenure.Indeed,asasupporterofKeshubhaiPatelshebelongedfirmlytotheanti-Modifaction.

The police, in addition to local politicians from all parties, were often deeplypolarized that day, and their immediate local investigation into the Naroda Patiyamassacre was a travesty later corrected by the SIT. But it must be said that manypolicemenandwomenperformedheroicallyduringtheriots.20IndiaTodayrecordedthatthepolicesaved2,500MuslimsinSanjeli,5,000inBodeliandatleast10,000inViramgam. The out-of-state forces, when they arrived, were also consummatelyprofessional.21

FormerDGPP.C.Pande,whowasatthemeetingthepreviouseveningatModi’sbungalow,wasaccusedbytheactivistTeestaSetalvadofhelpingtherioters.Thiswasavitalelementinthenarrativeofthe‘kill’strategyallegedlydevisedbyModi.ButitwassubsequentlyprovedbytheSITthatPandewasassistingwoundedvictimsingettingthemtohospitalatthetime.22ExamplesofnegligenceonthepartoftheAhmedabadPolicewererifeuntilthearrivalofthearmy.Buton28February,thearmyhadnotyetarrived.Many innocent men, women and children, mostlyMuslim, butHindus aswell,diedbeforeitdid.

Duringthesameearlyhoursof28February,lessthan5kmsouth-westofNaroda,inChamanpura, a gated upper-classMuslim residential development known as theGulbargSocietywasbeingassailedbyanotherbayingmobofHindurioters.BehinditswallsstoodEhsanJafri,aretiredseventy-three-year-oldCongresspartyMP,whowaspreparingtodefendhimselfwithahandgun.

Therumourspreadthathemadeseveralfruitlesscallstothepolicebeforethemobgrabbed,burnedandthenmutilatedhimindeath.23‘AnimportantaspectofthisriotwasthatitwasnotassimpleasBJPvs.MuslimsorjustVHPvs.Muslims,’saysZafarSareshwala, a leading Bohra businessman from Ahmedabad who originally led acampaign againstModi after the riots before changing his views to become aModiacolyte.‘LotsofCongressworkerswereequallyinvolved.IpersonallyknowofsomanyCongresspeoplewhotookanactivepartintheriots.EvenoutsideEhsanJafri’shousetherewerealotofCongressmeninthemurderousmob.SomeofthemarefacingtrialformurderinGulbargsociety.’24SeveralCongressmenhavealreadybeenconvictedintheGodhratrainburningcase.

AtGulbargsociety,however,150peopleweresavedbythepolice.Whatiscertain

is that Ehsan Jafri made numerous calls pleading with his colleagues in the localCongress party to come tohis aid.Theydidnothelphimbecause, asZafar attests,plentyofthem–suchas localCongressmanMehrsinhChaudhry–wereamongtheverymob attacking his house.25 Sixty-eightMuslims died alongside Jafri atGulbargSociety,which today remainsuninhabited exceptonce a yearon28February,whenfamilymembersofthedeadcongregatetheretoofferprayers.

Thenarrativesof2002rarelytakeintoaccountthefactthatmanyCongressworkerstook part in the 2002 riots, just as they did in the Godhra Junction atrocity. AtGodhra, among the guilty were Mehmud Hussain Kalota (the convener of theCongress’sPanchmahaldistrictminoritycellandpresidentoftheGodhraMunicipalCorporation), Salim Abdul Ghaffar Sheikh (president of the Youth Congress,Panchmahal district), Farroukh Bhana (secretary of the Congress’s Panchmahaldistrictcommittee),AbdulRehmanAbdulMajidGhantia(aCongressworker)andofcourseHajiBilal.

In thepost-Godhra riots, bothMuslim andHinduCongressmenparticipated inthe murders. Ahmedabad Mayor Himmatsinh Patel was a Congressman as wereMehrsinhChaudhry andVadodara deputymayorNissarBapu (whowas eventuallyacquitted, although his son and son-in-law were convicted and sentenced to lifeimprisonment).26

Toclaim,assomestilldo,thatthereasonnoCongressmenopposedtheriotswasbecause‘itwasobviousthattheCongresslackedthestrengthofideologicalconvictionto counter Modi’ flies in the face of documented facts.27 Part of the anti-Modipropaganda in thedecade since the riots rests upon the slander that the guiltyhavebeenprotected.But theopposite is trueand foronce,asSareshwalaemphasizes, theguilty irrespective of party or connections were relentlessly pursued: ‘In fact, thereasontheVHP/BajrangDalandasectionofhisownpartyhaveturnedagainstModiis thathe is refusing tohelp themescape justiceorprisonterms.WhydoyouthinktheymadecommoncausewiththeCongresspartyinrecentelections?’28

It is notable that when former Congress state minister and Fisheries BoardchairmanMohammadSurtiwasimprisonedin2008forhis leadingrole inthe1993bombingsinSurat,theCongresswasalsosilentaboutit.Whileveryfewoftheguiltyever face judicialpenalties aftercommunal riots in India, the2002Gujarat riots,onthe BJP’s watch, have been an exception. As Sareshwala said in 2013: ‘Over 200

persons have been convicted and 152 have been awarded life imprisonment.Manymoreare in thepipeline.An importantaspectof theseconvictions is that theyhavebeenonthebasisofthetestimonyofeyewitnesses.Tellme,doeyewitnessesnormallylivetogivetheirtestimonyinIndia’slegalandpoliticalsystem?…Theycameandgaveevidence against Babu Bajrangi – it is not easy to live in Naroda Patiya and giveevidenceagainstpeoplelikeBabuBajrangi.’29

In a fractured argument, balance is essential. In the rest of this chapterwe shallexamine the causes and consequences of one of the worst communal riots sinceIndependenceinwhichover1,000people,754ofthemMuslimand274Hindu,died.Theyear2002wasaturningpointforGujaratandModiinmorewaysthanone.

HereisauthorPatrickFrenchdescribingthe2002riotsinGujarat.Hisbook,India:APortrait,isamodelofeven-handednesswhenitcomestohistoryandpolitics,andhisdescriptionisexemplaryofhowtheeventsarestillseenintheworldbeyondIndia.ItisfairtosaythatFrenchevenplaysdownthebrutalityandhorrorofwhatoccurredfourmonthsintoModi’sleadershipofGujarat.

Inearly-2002,atrainofHindupilgrimswasstoppedatGodhrastationreportedlybyaMuslimmobandsetonfire,killingfifty-ninepeople.Inresponse,organizedHindugangstookrevengeonMuslimsacrosscentralGujarat;familiesweredraggedoutoftheirhomes,cuttodeathandburned;mosquesandMuslimdargahs,orshrines,weredestroyed.Throughallthis,thepolicestoodbyinmanyplacesanddidnothing,followingordersfromabove.Around2,000peopleweremurdered,andlittleeffortwasmadetoprosecutethekillersortheorganizersoftheslaughter.NarendraModimadenoexpressionofregret,andfocusedonthevictimsoftheattacksonthetrain,implyingthattheMuslimsdeservedwhathadcometothem.30

French gets much wrong in just one paragraph, as events have shown, but it is anarrativemany unquestioningly accept. Indeed, so horrific was the situation at thetimethatamordanthumourwasafoot,andthegrimstory inMarch2002was thattherewasonlyonebeardedmanleftinGujaratwhowassafe.

Since thenModi has had twelve peaceful riot-free, curfew-free years inwhich torepudiatehis reputationasa ‘massmurderer’,asone journalistdubbedhim.Despitethislongperiodofcalm,everydaybringsforthadelugeofmediastoriespaintingModiastheGauleiterofGujarat.

And yet, over the past twelve months or so, a pattern of change has begun toemerge in the endless reiteration of Modi’s role in the bloodshed of 2002. Voicesincreasingly question the accepted version of events. An element of a reasonabledebatehasemerged inpublicdiscoursewhereModi’s reputation is ritually trampled

each day ahead of a landmark Lok Sabha election where he is the BJP’s primeministerial candidate. Such new discussions are fraught with tension and difficulty.Anybodywho attempts to ameliorate the descriptions ofModi’smalice is instantlyaccusedofbeingonthewrongsideofhistoryandsoughttobeostracized.

Beneath the surface there are more calculating reasons for Modi’s continuousdemonization.One is the wide and potent electoral appeal of the BJP’s softer andmore inclusive reworking of the Hindutva ideal. Another is that Modi is anuncomfortableexamplefortheCongressandother ‘secular’parties liketheSP,BSP,JD(U) and the Left. His programme of empowerment is a challenge to their ownmodelofentitlementandanalternativedevelopmentpathforIndia.

But what is most striking – regardless ofModi’s role in 2002 – is the narrow-sightednessoftheconventionalcriticalposition.Modiishectoreddailyforariotthatoccurredoveradecadeago,despitethemanyinvestigationswhichhavefailedtoresultinlegalconvictionsorevenchargesagainsthim.

TherecordofriotsinIndiaasawholeisappalling.SincePartition,twomajorfaultlines,actingascuesforsocialviolence,havebeencasteandreligion.YettheCongress,duringitslongtimeinoffice,hasdoneverylittletoclosethem.Itcouldbeargued–and is – that vote-bank politics by the Congress and its allies has contributed towideningthefissuresinthecountry’ssocialfabric.

OfthelastsixmajorcommunalriotsinGujaratbefore2002,theCongresswasinchargeofthestateforfive.Since2002inGujarat,therehavebeennone,buttherehavebeen several in states governed by a slew of other parties, including the Congress.Gujarat is an industrious andmercantile state. It is alsohistoricallyoneof themostpronetocommunalviolence.Therehavebeen440riotsinGujaratsince1970,31andover30,000nationwide since Independence,many farworseand sparkedbyweakerprovocationthanGujaratsufferedin2002.

Soon after Partition inBengal, for example, 5,000 peoplewere killed. InAugust1967,inRanchi,200peoplediedandin1969inAhmedabadover512werekilled.In1970,inneighbouringMaharashtra,aroundeightyweremurderedatBhiwandi,nearBombay.InApril1979,inJamshedpur,Jharkhand(thenpartofBihar),125died;inAugust1980, theMoradabadcommunal riots sawaround2,000deaths.Over2,000peoplewereslaughteredinNellie,Assam,in1983andanother146diedinMay1984,again inBhiwandi. InGujarat, riots over reservations inAhmedabad inApril 1985and then again in 1986witnessed 300 and fifty-nine deaths respectively, andUttarPradeshinApril–May1987sawanothereighty-onekilled.Morerecently,therehavebeenover100smallandbigcommunalriotsinUttarPradesh,includingespeciallyin

Muzaffarnagar.There were ‘pogroms’ too, and some of them accurately match the dictionary

definitionoftheword,mostnotablythemassacreofat least3,000SikhsinDelhi in1984andthedeathsofmanymoreSikhsacrossthenationatthesametime.Almostevery one of the riots listed above (notably excepting the Jamshedpur massacre,presided over by theCommunist Party) took place underCongress rule.At one inBhagalpurinBiharin1989,forinstance,over1,000died.Thesubsequentlydeposedchiefminister,SatyendraNarayanSinha,claimedhisCongresscolleaguesencouragedtheviolenceinordertodestroyhimpolitically.Thatissadlybelievable.TavleenSinghsays thatmostofficials, beingupper-casteHindus, grew so emboldenedby toothlessinquiries into murder that they were uninterested in halting violence againstminorities,andthatRajivGandhi,forexample,waspowerlesstoactagainstviolenceafterhisowninexcusableinactionduringthe1984anti-Sikhpogrom.

Allthis,though,doesnotexplainwhyhisgovernmentin1987remainedinertaftertheCongresschiefministerofUttarPradesh‘allowedhispolicementogetawaywithmassacring Muslims as if they were animals’. Singh is speaking of Hashimpura, inMeerut, when police rounded up Muslim men between the ages of thirteen andseventy-five, loaded them into vans, and riddled the vehicles with bullets beforethrowing thebodies ina canal.Oneman survived to tellhisgrisly tale, andafter aninquirythekillerslosttheirjobsonlytobereinstated‘assoonasthefussdieddown’.32

It isofcourse futile tryingtosettleamoralargumentbysaying, ‘Wekilled fewerthanyou’, or attempting to explainModi’s role in the2002 riotsbynoting thatonotheroccasionsCongressgovernmentsactedfar lessquickly.Themedianeverseemsto hold them to an equal accounting. The only real question is: did Modi doeverything he could to stop the riots and apprehend and punish the guilty? Fromeverythingheardandreadinthemedia,theoppositewasthecase.Thatisthenarrativewhichdeservestobeexaminedinthecoldlightofdocumentedevidence.

OnthefirstfulldayofriotingafterGodhra,Moditriedtosecuremilitaryaidasfastaspossible.Hehad learnedfromAdvani thatbecauseof thePakistanborder situation,troopswouldhavetobeairliftedfromoutsideGujarat.GeorgeFernandes,theveteransocialist politician Modi had first met during the Emergency, was now defenceministerinVajpayee’sgovernment.Heflewinthatnight,meetingModiat10.30p.m.on28February.ThefirstsoldierstoucheddownatAhmedabadairportatmidnight,

andthirteencompanieswererapidlydeployedaroundthecitythenextday,1March.Already,incidentsofmobviolencethathadaccountedforthehighestsingledeath

tollswereover.Fromthispointontheriotingcouldbegintobefoughteffectivelybythe police with lethal force. It is generally unacknowledged, although anincontrovertiblefact,thattheworstofthemassacrestookplaceoverthefirsttwoorthree days, not the next twomonths. At the beginning the police and paramilitaryclampdown was only partially effective but thereafter relative order was quicklyimposed with troops on the ground. Before very long, outbreaks of violence weresmallerinscaleandsporadic.

Soldiersweredeployedagainstrioterslessthanforty-eighthoursafterGodhraandonlytwentyhoursafterthefirstdeathintheensuingcommunalviolence.Itwasnotideal, but it was faster than in any other riot, and far sooner than any Congressadministrationhadpreviouslymanaged.TheriotsinBhagalpurin1989,Hashimpurain1987,Suratin1993andBombayin1992allwentonforlongerandsufferedhigherdeathtollsthantheyshouldhaveasaresultoftheCongress’sdilatoryattitudetowardsrestoringorder.InDelhi,in1984,nosoldierwasseenonthestreetsuntilthekillingswerecompletelyfinished–fourdaysaftertheybegan.

Bytheeveningoftheseconddayofthe2002riots,notawordhadbeenutteredbyany Congress leader in Gujarat against the violence. ‘The Ahmedabad MunicipalCorporationhad aCongressmajority;butdid anyCongressmancomeout into thestreets to protest against the killings and protect thosewhowere getting killed andwhose shopswerebeing looted?’ asked journalist and authorM.V.Kamath. ‘To thebestofone’sknowledge,notonedared.’33OfcoursemanyCongressmenwereoutonthestreets,butastheywereencouragingorevencommittingviolencethemselvestheyprobablyhadlittletimetospareforprotests.

Meanwhile, Modi, sworn in as chief minister just a few months ago, went onDoordarshan’s7p.m.newsbulletinon28February:

Ipraywithfoldedhandsthatthisisthetimeformaintainingpeace,theneedistocontrolthenerves…Itisnecessarytomaintainself-control.Wearedeterminedtopunishthosewhoareguiltyandtheywillnotbespared.WillyounothelptosaveGujarat?Comeandhelpthegovernment.Thegovernmentisrequestingforhelp.Thegovernmentisseekingyourhelptopunishtheguiltythroughlaw.AmidstyourangerIprayyou to display the unique characteristic ofGujarat – of showing restraint andmaintaining peace duringadversities.Come, letusserveGujaratthroughpeaceandself-control, letusstrengthenthearmsof law…Hatredisneverwonoverbyhatred.34

Thusthe‘GujaratHitler’spoke–ofself-controlandrestraint,imploringthepeopleofGujarat tohelp thegovernmentby remainingcalm,maintainingpeaceandallowing

thelawtopunishtheguilty.Allthiswouldcometrue,notnecessarilyinthenextfewdaysbutabsolutelyforthenextdecadeandmore.Evenatthisearlyandperilousstage,mostofGujaratwasindeedrestrained.

To follow thenarrativeof the2002 riots from theperspectiveof sectionsof themedia,NGOsandactivists,itsoundsasiftheentirestatewasaflame.Thiswassimplynotso.

Pocketsofviolencedidflareup,smoulderandincertaincasesreignitebeforetheywerefinallydampeddown,butoveralltheclasheswereconfinedtoveryfewareasofGujarat:fortylocationsoutofatotalof248townsand18,000villages.35Inall,sevenout of twenty-five districts were affected by violence. Throughoutmost of Gujaratthat February andMarch all religious festivals, includingHoli on 28 February andMahashivratrion12March,passedoffpeacefully.

In themidst of the chaos, 6,000Haj pilgrims were currently, or soon to be, intransittoGujaratontheirwaybackfromMecca.ModitoldthepolicetoescorteveryMuslimpilgrimsafelybacktohistownorvillageofresidencedespitethecommunaltensiononinthestreetsoutside.All6,000madeithomesafelyunderpoliceescortby20March.

Mostcrucially,ModiappealedtothechiefministersofGujarat’sthreeneighbouringstates–AshokGehlotinRajasthan,thelateVilasraoDeshmukhinMaharashtraandDigvijaySinghinMadhyaPradesh–tosendaidintheformoflawenforcementandparamilitarypersonnel.Hemadethemodestrequestoftencompaniesofarmedpolicefromeachstate.

ModiconfirmedtomethatletterswerecomposedonThursday,28February,andfaxedtotheirrecipients,thenagaincourieredthenextmorning,Friday,1March.ThemessageforDigvijaySinghdated1Marchwassimilartotheothers:36

GOVERNMENTOFGUJARATNo.SB.V/ISS/102002/173HomeDepartment(Spl.)Sachivalaya,Gandhinagar

Date:-1/3/2002

To:

TheChiefSecretarytotheGovt.ofMadhyaPradesh,

Bhopal.(MadhyaPradesh).

Sir,

Asyouareawaretheghastlyincidentofburningdownof58passengersintheSabarmatiExpresson27thFeb.,2002hashadseriousfallout[sic]onthelawandordersituationinGujarat.Widespreadincidentsofarsoning, looting,murder and other violence have been reported frommost part [sic] of the State sinceyesterday.

TheStateGovernmenthasbeentryingitsbesttoutiliseallitsavailableresourcesandhasalsorequestedGovernment of India to spare additional manpower for maintaining of law and order. However,Government of Indiawasnot in a position to sparemoreparamilitary forces in viewof its commitmentelsewhere.Asthesituationisspreadingtovillagesandmajorhighwaysarealsobeingblocked,ourresourcesarestretchedtothemaximum.WefeelthattheservicesofadditionalforcesfromneighbouringStateslikeyours would help the State Government in handling this precious law and order situation. We wouldthereforerequestyoutofavourablyconsiderourrequestforsparing10companiesofyourArmedPolicetohelptheGovernmentinhandlingthelawandordersituation.

Thankingyou,Yoursfaithfully,

(K.NITYANANDAM),SecretarytotheGovernmentofGujarat,HomeDepartment.

CopyforwardedwithcomplimentstoTheDirectorGeneralofPolice,Bhopal.(MadhyaPradesh).

AllthreestatesModiwrotetowereunderCongressrule.Maharashtraeventuallysenta very limited number of personnel to help, but the others flatly refused.Astonishingly, there was no response from Digvijay Singh in Madhya Pradesh fornearly twoweeks, bywhich timehelpwas no longer required.When a reply at lastarrived,itwasthemerestbrush-off:

No.1523-1557/2002/C-I

GOVERNMENTOFMADHYAPRADESHHOMEDEPARTMENT(‘C’SECTION)

Bhopal,dated13MAR2002

FromR.C.Arora,SecretarytoGovernment.ToTheSecretary,

GovernmentofGujarat,HomeDepartment,

GANDHINAGAR.Sub:-Provisionof10Coys.OfMPSAFtoGujarat

Sir,PleaserefertoyourletterNo.SB.V/MMM/102002/769,dated1stMarch,2002regardingthesubjectcitedmatter.ItisregrettedthatduetoheavycommitmentsofMPSAF[MadhyaPradeshSpecialArmedForce]withintheState,itisnotpossibletosparetheforceatthismoment.

Yoursfaithfully,(R.C.Arora)SecretarytoGovernment

NotonlywastheresponsefromtheMadhyaPradeshgovernmentcurtandlackinginany kind of sympathy for the violence Gujarat was witnessing, the reply was alsomarked ‘secret’ even though theoriginal requestwasnot.Perhaps, characteristically,Modicouldhaveremainedsilentonsuchanexampleoftreachery,exceptthatlateronDigvijaySinghtransformedhimselfintooneofModi’smosttrenchantcritics.

Digvijay Singh’s indifference during the riotsmaterially contributed toGujarat’ssuffering andMuslimdeaths.Thiswas somethingModiwas careful topointout tohiminpersonatapressconferenceafterameetingoftheNationalSecurityCouncilin2011.37

AlthoughModiwasreassuredbythepresenceofthearmyonthestreetsofGujarat,hewas nevertheless a shakenman. In hisDoordarshan statement he had spoken offoldinghands inprayerandof ‘holdingthenerve’.Thesewererawemotionsandhefelt them keenly. The journalist Sheela Bhatt claimed at the time that he wasdevastated, and she was probably right. For the first time in his career he had theunpleasant experience of pulling levers to make things happen only to find thatnothing,oreventheoppositeofwhatheintended,happened.

Thiswasno roadblockcausedbyback-roompoliticking. Itwas real life inwhichhundredsofpeopleweredying. In the end itwouldbehis responsibilitybecausehewas in charge. There was also treachery among his own ranks and opportunisticduplicityfromtheCongress–thelattertobeexpected,perhaps,butunedifying.

All this fails to alter the inescapable fact that he was being tested within a fewmonths of taking office as chief minister and within two days of being elected anMLA.HehadneverheldelectiveofficebeforeandhadtakenoathasanMLAforthefirsttimeon25February.Butthatisnoexcuse.Theriotstookplaceonhiswatchandtheyweretohaunthimforthenextdecadeandmore.

Partofthiswasacampaignofvilification,unprecedentedinscaleandviciousness,thatwaslaunchedagainsthimbyhispoliticalopponents,activistsandNGOs.Someof

the allegations were important because they sought justice for the victims of thecarnage. Others were designed to malign and end the BJP’s rule in Gujarat – andModi’spoliticalcareerthatthreatenedtheestablishedorder.

ThereportbyJusticeTewatia,formerchiefjusticeoftheCalcuttaandthePunjabandHaryanaHighCourts,wasincandescentaboutthedestructiveandinflammatoryroleofthemediaduringtheriots.Hedescribeditssensationalism,muckrakingandsheermisinformation as contributing to the death toll.A prime example, and one that iscommonlythrowninModi’sfaceasproofofhiscomplicity,cameontheeveningof1March.

Modi had delivered a press statement, and agreed afterwards to a ten-minuteinterviewwithSudhirChaudhary,aZeeNewscorrespondent(ashethenwas)attheCircuit House in Gandhinagar. During the course of the interview the murder ofEhsan Jafri atGulbarg Society the previous daywas discussed.Modi, attempting todescribehowtheterriblecycleofbrutalityperpetuateditself,said:‘Achainofaction-reactionisgoingon.’

This was subsequently broadcast amidst much agonized, self-righteouseditorializingabouthowModiwasjustifyingtheviolenceofHindusagainstMuslims.FirsttherewasGodhra,thentherewereriotsasanatural‘reaction’.

But what Modi actually said had been misleadingly edited, so that, when theinterviewwasbroadcast,thecrucialsentenceattheendofModi’sinitialstatement–asentence that would change its meaning entirely – was simply chopped off.WhatModi said in full was: ‘A chain of action-reaction is going on.Wewant that thereshould be neither “action” nor “reaction”.’ (‘Kriya pratikriya ki chain chal rahi hai.Humchahatehainkinakriyahoaurnapratikriya.’)38

Thissentence,deliberatelyrendered incomplete,becamethestaple for thosewhocondemned Modi for either not doing enough to stop the riots or actually beingcomplicitinencouragingthem.Themissedsentencewasrarelyreferredto.

The writer Arundhati Roy asserted that a pregnant Muslim woman had beenmurderedandthenherfoetusrippedfromherwombbyrioters.Whenitbecameclearthat nobody knew of the incident andRoywas asked to come and help the policeinquirytofindtheunfortunatevictim,sherepliedthroughherlawyersthattherewasnopowerwhichcouldcompelhertoattend.SheclaimedinadditionthatEhsanJafri’sdaughtershadbeenmurderedalongsidehimatGulbargSociety.ThispromptedJafri’s

sontowritefromtheUnitedStatesthattherewasonlyonedaughterandshewasintheUSwithhim.

Roy’sresponsewas,asever,dismissive:

This and other genuine errors in recounting the details of the violence in Gujarat in no way alters thesubstanceofwhatjournalists,fact-findingmissionsorwriterslikemyselfaresaying.39

Itwas theChaudhary interview though thatbeganadecade-long sagaof inaccuracyandslanderthatappearstobeasourceofpridetoModi’sopponents.

In the press statement prior to the Chaudhary interview,Modi had announcedthat now – with firepower at his command – a shoot-at-sight policy was beingintroducedforlawbreakingandrioters.Insum,10,500roundswerefiredand15,000teargasshellsexpended.Thisledtothedeathsofmorethan100people,themajorityofwhomwereHindus.

Itisastatisticthattellsitsownstory.Hoursafterthefirstdeathduetorioting,Modi–withGeorgeFernandesalongside

him(andwhosecarwaslatersetalightbyrioters)–hadputtheauthoritiesincombatmode against the maraudingmob, assisting the army with trucks, communicationsand, most important of all, thirty-two executive magistrates, who alone couldauthorizefiringofliveammunition.

By11a.m.on1MarchsoldierswerepatrollingAhmedabadinareassuchasPaldi,Juhapura, Vejalpur, Shahpur, Bapunagar, Rakhial, Gomtipur, Meghaninagar,Dariapur, Kalupur, Naroda and Danilimda. But by then, a murderous attack onVadodara’sBestBakeryon1Marchhadcausedmorethanadozenfatalities.

Within hours, nine columnswere on the streets. Immediately, the tide began toturnagainsttherioters.40

The effect of Modi’s swift action is demonstrated by the death toll: the vastmajorityofthekillings–741outof1,044–occurredduringthefirstweekofseveralmonthsofincreasinglyintermittentclashes.Ofthosefirst741deaths,611tookplacein the very first three days and included the most notorious massacres at NarodaPatiya,BestBakeryandGulbargSociety.

Soldiers,meanwhile,continuedtopourintoGujarat.ThefirstoffourteenmilitarytransportslandedatRajkotintheearlyhoursof2March.TroopswerealsoinGodhraby early afternoonand inVadodarabydusk.ThatSaturday,2March, the shoot-at-sight order had already been executed twelve times, with eight Hindus and fourMuslim casualties. This had an immediate effect on quelling mob behaviour.

Preventativearrests–over700peopleonthatdayalone–werealsoremovingrogueelements off the streets. Records show that 482 Hindus and 229 Muslims werearrestedfor lawbreakingonSaturday,2March2002.Bytheendoftheriots,66,268Hindus and 10,861 Muslims had been detained41 – reflecting the composition ofGujarat’spopulationandindicatinganabsenceofbiasonthepartoftheauthorities.

There was an outpouring of rage from Hindus immediately after the GodhraJunctionatrocity.Butthepatternofconflictsoonmodified.MuslimsbeganfightingbackinpitchedbattlesandattackingHinduareassuchasBapunagar,inAhmedabad,asearlyas28February.Later,frommid-March,well-organizedriotingbyMuslimswasseen intownssuchasBharuch.InModasa,acentreof jihadi fundamentalismwhere123 activists of the Students IslamicMovement of India (SIMI) had been arrestedonlyamonthearlier,amobof1,000Muslimswentontherampage.42

In 2002, a narrow but corrosive seam of extremist Wahabbi fundamentalism,supported and funded by Pakistan, existed across Gujarat. Its adherents weredetermined to advance what Godhra had started but as the weeks went by theirinfluence shrank. It grew more and more localized, brought to heel by lawenforcement.Yet suchwas the toneof reporting in themedia that one could easilyremain ignorant about the254Hinduswhodied in the rioting and the40,000 lefthomeless after Muslim mobs attacked their dwellings and businesses with petrolbombs.

After the rioting had been quelled, attention turned to rehabilitation. The reliefcentres, though unpleasant for those who were forced to dwell in them, had freesanitaryandhealthservicesincludingregularhealthcheck-ups.AndyetthemakeshiftghettosMuslimswereforcedintoevokedsharpcriticism.

Areport inApril2002 fromtheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO),however,commendedthespecialistservicesintheGujaratcampsincludingtheirpsychologicalsupport, thechlorinationandhygienemeasures thathad successfullykept infectiousandwaterbornediseasesatbay,andtheeffectiveimmunizationprogramme.43

ManyNGOs,meanwhile,incensedbythebrutalityoftheriotsandtheconditionof someMuslim colonies, petitioned the courts to prosecuteModi.However, everysinglepetitionwasrejected.TheGujaratHighCourt,instead,issuedacommendationwhichstated:‘TheeffortsputinbytheStateGovernmentinthisbehalf,asindicatedabove,arerequiredtobeappreciated.’44

Theadministration,meanwhile,setaboutensuringthatstudentswouldbeabletotaketheirannualboardexaminationseveniftheyhadtobetransportedtotheexamroomsfromreliefcamps.45Ahugeoperationwassetuptoallowthistohappen,duringthe firstphaseof exams inMarch2002while someviolencewas stillongoing.Thatmonth900,000studentssatin1,000examcentres,withfreshexamsforstudentsfromthe worst affected areas of Ahmedabad and Vadodara rescheduled for mid-April.These arrangementswere alsousedbyMuslim students: they clearlywanted to taketheirexamsbecausetheybravedbullyingbyextremistIslamistsandevenbrokeafatwatofurthertheireducationandprospects,aswasreportedinIndiaToday:

Last week, in a move that provoked widespread derision, a group ofMuslim leaders, dominated by theCongressandunder the influenceof theradicalTableeghi Jamaat,called foraboycottof therescheduledhigh school examinations. The boycott failed but ended up reinforcing Modi’s insinuation that a‘conspiracy’standsbetweenGujaratandnormalcy.46

In the end, despite intimidation fromwithin their own communities, 9,000 out of14,000 Muslim students sat for their exams. These determined and hard-workingyoungMuslimswouldprove tobe verymuchpartofGujarat’s futureover thenextdecade.

Whyhad theSabarmatiExpressbeenattacked in sucha frenziedand lethalmannerand – always the essential question – why then? Chronology again being the firstelement of deduction, the order of events preceding the 27 February atrocity atGodhraJunctionneedstobeoutlined.

Therewasahistoricalandgeopoliticalcontextinlate2001andearly2002.Onlyamatter of months had elapsed since al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked two jetliners inSeptember2001and flewthem into the twin towersof theWorldTradeCenter inNewYork,killingover1,500people.

In Delhi, meanwhile, in December 2001, terrorists stormed Parliament, killingseveral security guards before they were gunned down. ‘Pakistani nationals’ wereidentifiedasresponsiblefromdocumentsfoundontheircorpses–documentsclearlyintendedtobediscovered.TenweekslatertheslaughteratGodhraoccurred,ontheverydaythattheUnitedStatesbeganamajorbombingblitzonKabul.

ThespikeinIslamicfundamentalistterrorinIndiaafter9/11coincidedwiththeUnitedStates’rapidmilitarymobilizationagainsttheTalibangovernmentshelteringOsamaBinLadeninAfghanistan–adevelopmentthatraisedthelevelofparanoiain

thePakistanigovernmentandinitsInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI).Pakistan, as anarrow stripof territory running roughlynorth–south, regards the

deepexpanseofAfghanistanasitsfallbackposition(‘strategicdepth’)intheeventofopenconflictonitseasternborderwithIndia.Tohaveits‘backdoor’slammedshutbythe US/NATO military’s presence in Afghanistan provoked a feeling ofclaustrophobia,anditlashedoutatIndiathroughitsterrorproxies.

AllitswarswithIndiahadbeenbothstartedandlostbyPakistan.Intermsofmenand material it was outnumbered nine to one, and had learned by this time thatinfiltrationwasmoreeffectivethanwaratkeepingitsneighbouroffbalance.ThiswasthethinkingbehindtheISI’sterrorattackonIndianParliamentandotheratrocities.

ByFebruaryoverhalfamillionIndiantroopsweredeployedalongtheborderinatenseeyeball-to-eyeballconfrontationwiththeirPakistanicounterparts.Itlookedbad,butneitherarmywaslikelytoreceivepoliticalassenttolaunchanattack.Terrorism,though,forPakistanremainedanoption.47TheISIneededtoengineerafurtheracttoneutralizeIndia’sabilitytothreatenPakistanatthatdelicatepointintime.48Godhrawould succeed in this beyond all expectations, reaping dividends even today, morethanadecadelater.

Evidencesoonbegantoappearthatindicateddeliberatepreparationforcarnagefarbeyondmere sabotage of fire tenders. Itwas lucky, for example, that the SabarmatiExpress was nearly five hours late. The previous night a mob had foregathered inanticipationof its arrival at the stationbutdispersed after thedelaywasdiscovered.Under cover of the night far more damage could have been inflicted, and this ledJusticeTewatia to conclude that theplanned attackwas in thenature of a terroristoperationinitsclinicalplanningandexecution.‘TheintentionofthemobwastoputtodeathallthepilgrimstravellingbytheSabarmatiExpress.’49

The mob dutifully reassembled at exactly the time of the Sabarmati Express’srevised arrival. This required coordination. The report of Justice Tewatia and hiscolleagues, not long after the event, noted strange movements in the townimmediatelybeforetheatrocity.TheNanavatiInquirylatersuppliedexhaustivedetail.For example, there had been a sudden increase in the number of firearms licencesissued. A number of unemployed Muslims in the area appeared to have recentlyacquiredmobile telephones.Outsiders, lacking ration cards, seemed tohave floodedintotowninthedayspriortothetrainarson.Therewasanoticeablegrowth inthesizeofthelocalpopulationintheperiodleadinguptotheattack.Thiscoincidedwithseveralreligiousgatheringsattendedbyforeigners.

Thelocalconspiratorsarenowwell-knownandhavebeenpunished.Butwhoset

theminmotioninliaisonwithterroristagents?Thesecontacts,theNanavatiInquiryconcluded, had travelled south to Godhra from Jammu and Kashmir. While theKashmiricontacts(GhulamNabiDingooandAliMohammad)allowedtriangulationwithKarachi,theywouldatthesametimebeusedas‘cut-outs’fromtheISIendoftheoperation,providingitdeniability.50

ThisviewwassharedbyModi’sownsecurityadvisor,K.P.S.Gill,appointedatthebeginningofMay2002.HewasPunjab’sdirectorgeneralofpolicewhohadtamedtheterrorism unleashed by theKhalistani secessionistmovement in the 1980s.The ISIhadbeenanactiveabettorofterrorismintheborderstateofPunjab.Gillwasaleadingexpertonsecurityandintelligence.Modispecificallyaskedforhim,accordingtothenUnionhomeministerI.D.Swamy.Gillexaminedtheevidenceandmadeuphisownmindfairlyquicklyaboutwhohadbeentheprimemoverbehindthecarnage–theISI,hesaid,usingKashmiriinfiltrators.51

Godhra presented a cheap, good-value operation from Pakistan’s point of view.Gujarat was fertile ground for unrest. Its Muslims had grown increasinglydisenchanted during the 1980s as the textile sector in the state, where many wereemployed, shrank from sixty-four to only twelve operating mills.52 The industrialcontractionthrewlargenumbersofshiftworkersintodesperateunemployment.Theeconomic depredation among the state’s Muslims had hardly improved over thesubsequent decade and there was a reservoir of resentment and fear among theMuslimsofGodhrathatcouldreadilybetapped.

Nextwasthetimingoftheoperation.IthasbeenpointedoutthattrainloadsofkarsevakshadbeencommutingtoandfromAyodhyaforoveramonthbylateFebruary2002. Many more excursions were planned. But why choose this particular train?Indeed,thiswasoneoftheargumentsthathadbeenraisedagainstaconspiracy(andinfavour of an accident because of a cooking fire on board) before overwhelmingphysicalevidencedisprovedit.

TheSabarmatiExpressstillrunsthreetimesaweek.ButthetrainpassingthroughGodhra Junction, scheduled for the early hours of 27 February 2002, was the oneclosest to the date of the appointment of the new BJP chief minister – supposedapostleofHindutva, allegedenemyofMuslimsandarchitectofAdvani’sRamRathYatrain1990.

Modihaddeliveredananti-terrorismstatementinthewakeofthe9/11attacksin

NewYorknot longbeforehedepartedDelhi toreturntoGujarat. Inthespeechhehad called for the banning of SIMI because it supported al-Qaeda and had beeninvolved in engineering communal riots in several Indian states.53 It was bannedshortlythereafter.

Given that only amonth before, as has beenmentioned, 123 SIMI activists hadbeen arrested in nearby Modasa, what better moment for giving Modi, sworn inrecentlyaschiefminister,atasteofwhathewasupagainst?Andwhatmoresymbolicinsult than setting fire to the Sabarmati Express carrying kar sevaks fromAyodhyawheretheBabriMasjidhadbeenbroughtdownbykarsevaksadecadeago?

TheaimofthemilitantswasnotonlytospillHindubloodbutMuslimbloodaswell.Godhrawasmerely‘asprattocatchamackerel’,agoadingoftheHindustosetoffanentirelypredictableandmuchwiderconflagration.Thustheoperationagainstthe Sabarmati Express was launched in cynical disregard for the well-being of thestate’sMuslims.NevermindthatmostofthevictimswerepoorandilliteratemigrantsworkinginGujarattosupporttheirfamiliesbackhome.

As adispassionateobserver, and after a year ofdetailed research, it is clear tome atleastthat,fromthebeginning,thenarrativeof2002haslackedbalanceandobjectivity.Factswerethefirstvictim.TheinitialbulletinsalmostalldeclinedtodescribethemobasMuslim(evenin2011PatrickFrenchwouldusethemodifier ‘reportedly’,despitetheconspiratorsandmanyof theiraccomplicesalreadybeingconvicted). Itwaswellknown that Godhra was a densely Muslim area, and a pretty volatile one at that.Nonetheless, reports of the Godhra atrocity mostly failed to detail the bare butindisputablefacts.TheAsianAgewroteofamob‘reportedlybelongingtoaminoritycommunity’attackingthetrain,withtheresultthat‘several’–ratherthanfifty-nine–passengersdied.TheTimesofIndiaalsomentionedastrangelyanonymousmob,butinTheHindu itwasonly ‘agroupofpeople’andonNDTVthereportagedescribedtheattackersas‘unidentifiedpersons’.54

Even though the attackers were a mystery the reporters still seemed to knowaccurately the identity of the passengers aboard the train. Justice Tewatia’s reportconcluded: ‘Most of the national newspapers and news channels played down theintensity of the Godhra carnage and projected it as a result of provocation bypilgrims.’55

OnecounterpointwasthatkarsevaksinthetrainhadattackedMuslimvendorson

the station platform. Another version said there had been an attempt to kidnap ayoungMuslimgirlanddragheraboardthetrainfulloffamilies.TheNanavatireportnot only disproved the claims of assault on vendors, but went into minute detailconcerningtheaccusationmadeaboutmolestationoftheyounggirl.

HernamewasSofiabanu.While the SabarmatiExpress paused atGodhra station a cryhad goneup that a

Ghanchi Muslim girl, Sofiabanu, had been abducted by Ramsevaks. It came fromSalimPanwala,whoranupanddowntheplatformrepeating theclaimand incitingthecrowdtoattackthetrain.ButitwasprovedSofiabanuwasnotevenatthestationthatday;thefirsttimeshestatedthataHinduhadattemptedtograbherwasquiteawhile later,aftershewasdeliveredby ‘somebodyfromhercaste’totheIqbalSchool,where a relief centre had been set up. As the Nanavati Commission drily put it:‘Under the circumstances, it becomes doubtful and suspicious why somebody hadapproachedherafteraboutfivedaysandtakenhertoareliefcampandthattooatthetimewhenpressreporterswerepresent.’56

TheCommissiondismantledherstorypiecebypieceinparagraphs67and68ofitsreport.Forexample,thebitofplatformwhereSofiabanuclaimedshewasattacked(by‘saffronpeople’ shouting ‘JaiBajrang’)was in themiddleofwhereMuslimvendors,railway staff andRPFofficerswere congregated.Notonlydidnobodynotice at thetime,but shenever toldanyoneabout the incident–until shewaspresented to thepressfivedayslater.

Themanwho raised the alarmover the abductionof the girl-who-was-not-therewasthesamemanwhothepreviouseveninghadboughtandstockpiledthe140litresof gasoline used moments later to incinerate the passengers in coach S-6. TheCommission also noted that as Salim Panwala ran along the platform shouting hisalarums, his associatesMohammadLatika andSidikBakar,making themost of theopportunityaffordedbyPanwala’sdiversion, ‘hadgonerunningneartheopenspacetowardstheengineside’fromwheretheycouldholdonasthetraindepartedandthenpulltheemergencychainasitapproachedtheawaitingmob.Theywerealllaterfoundguilty.

LikesomanyfalsewitnessstatementssurroundingtheeventsinFebruary2002–includingthoselatercoerced,tutoredandpaidforbyegregioushumanrightsactivists– Sofiabanu’s statement has gone down in history as part of the tapestry ofdemonstrableuntruthsthathavevitiatedasensible,objectiveandbalanceddebateonthetragiceventsofthosedays.

OneparticularlymotivatedchargeisthatthetrainfireatGodhraJunctionwasstartedeitherastheresultofanelectricalshortcircuitorpassengerscookinginthecrampedcarriageandhadnothingtodowithamobthrowingpetrolbombsatthetrain.Thisaccountwasdismissedmultipletimes–bytheJusticeTewatiaCommittee,theSpecialInvestigationTeam(SIT)andtheSupremeCourtthatrevieweditsreport,aswellasbytheNanavatiCommission.Forensicscientistsdemonstrated,accordingtothelawsofphysics, exactlyhow the combustible accelerant thrown into the train carriagebytheaccusedspreadanddiditsdeadlywork.

Only one investigation, the Banerjee Committee of 2004, consisting of a singlejudge in Bihar sitting at the request of Lalu Prasad Yadav – who needed the localMuslimvoteforanupcomingelection–decidedthattheattackingmobhadnothingtodowiththefire.TheBanerjeereportwhenpublished,twodaysbeforeLalu’svitalelection, waswidely discredited for its one-sidedness. It, however, remains a potentweaponinthehandsofthosewhoregard,rightlyorwrongly,theModiadministrationasbeingeithercomplicitorattheveryleastnegligentinthematteroftheriots.57

All this should notminimize the real horror ofMuslim suffering – andHindusuffering too – in the days and even months after the riots. But to ignoreincontrovertible, documented facts and instead purvey unconfirmed, motivatedaccountsisbothunprofessionalandindefensible.

Accordingtoonesuchaccount,theGodhraatrocityprecedingtheriotswaseitheran‘accident’ortheresultofprovocationbyRamsevakhooligans.JusticeTewatia,afterobserving that ‘the editorial pages of local and regional newspapers maintained abalanceinprojectingallviewpoints’,wentontosay:‘NewspaperspublishedinEnglishfromDelhi invariably editorialized the news. Direct and indirect comments in thenewswritingweresotellingthatthepersonallikesanddislikesofthenewsreportersweretooobvioustobemissed.’

What exactlywere these likes and dislikes? JusticeTewatia carefully enumeratedthem:

EnglishlanguagenewspaperspublishedfromDelhiappearedtohaveassumedtheroleofcrusadersagainsttheStateGovernmentfromdayone.Itcolouredtheentireoperationofnewsgathering,featurewritingandeditorials.

TheeditpagesofEnglishlanguagepresscarriedcommentsthatclearlyindicatedbiases:

•AgainsttheStateGovernmentofGujarat,•InfavourofCongress,leftistpartiesandthesecularistintellectuals,•IndifferenttothecarnageatGodhra,

•AgainsttheHinduorganizations,and•AgainsttheNDAgovernmentattheCentre.

Usingunusuallycandidlanguage,JusticeTewatiaalsochargedthatalargenumberofeditorialsandarticles‘projectedGodhraasareactiontoprovocationbykarsevaksandriots in the rest of the state as “state sponsored terrorism”’. TV channels ignoredwarningsfromofficials‘andkepttelecastingcommunalriotslikeinfotainment’andindoingso‘contributedinspreadingthetensiontounaffectedareas’.58

Disinformation was rampant. For example, in early March 2002 there wereprotestsabouttheinitiallevelofvictimcompensation.Moneyforthefamiliesofthedead at Godhra had been increased, while the amount paid to Muslims remainedpeggedat thepreviousamount.TheGujaratgovernmentquickly admitted the faultandannouncedon9Marchthattheentitlementofeveryvictim,HinduorMuslim,wouldbeequal.OnemonthlateraCongresspoliticianvisitingtheUSwasstillloudlydenouncing the discrepancy. Although his accusationwas reported in the press, nojournalistpointedoutwhattheyverywellknew:thatitwasnolongertrue.

Anger among localswasmeanwhile beginning to come to a boil, butnot againstminorities. JusticeTewatia had become ‘alarmed at the intensity of hostile attitudeamongthepeopleofthestatefortheDelhipressandtelevisionnewschannels…Eventhe Tribals [victims ofMuslim aggression before and during the riots] complainedthatthemediahadnotimetohearthetaleoftheiragonyandwasspreadingcanardsagainst theHindus.’He concluded that ‘Telecasting images that spread hatred andinstigatedviolenceisunhealthy,buttheirrepeatedtelecastislethal.Themediaactedasaninterestedpartyintheconfrontation,notaneutralreporteroffacts.’59

Theoneelementof theriots that trulyunitedGujaratis inangerwas this sortofreportage which sought to portray them as saffron stormtroopers and their chiefminister as a genocidal mastermind. The fury was felt by both BJP-and Congress-supportingHindus,andbyasignificantnumberofcivic-mindedMuslims–ofwhomtherewereverymanymorethanthemediacalculated.AsawholethepopulationfelthumiliatedbytheattitudeofseveralTVchannelsandnewspapersaswellaspoliticiansinDelhi.

Out of power in 2002 for six years, the Congress under party president SoniaGandhihad seen inModi and the2002 riots twodangers.One, theemergenceof astrongnationalistleader.Two,thepotentialof2002topolarizevotersinGujaratandlater across India in the BJP’s favour. Shrewd and single-minded, Sonia and heradvisorsdecidedtotreatModiasakeyfutureelectoralthreattoCongresshegemony.

An ecosystem of activists and media to demonize him relentlessly soon emerged.Modi’ssuccesscarriedtoohighaprice.

While it is important to rebalance slanted reportage around the2002Gujarat riots,theunavoidabletruthisthatModiwaschiefministerandthecarnagehappenedonhiswatch.Hehasalways refused toapologize in the formofwordsdemandedbymanyreasonable people but that does notmean he feels no remorse or responsibility, forguiltisnotthesameasresponsibility.Thereisplentytosuggestthatitwasthemostshocking episode of his life and that Modi was shattered by the experience as hedesperately attempted to deal with the rapidly unfolding events. Even without thehostilityofthemediaandpoliticianshewasamanalone,andhewasforcedtocallonallhisreservesofcharactertoholdhimselftogether.

Butthereasonforhisrefusaltoapologize,whileitmayowesomethingtopolitics–theRightwouldslayhim,asModihimselfhaspointedout–ismainlythathebelievesanapologyaccomplishesnothing.HisenemiesontheLeftwouldonlyredoubletheireffortstocondemnandconvicthim.Hesaysthatifheisguiltyheshouldbehanged.Hemeansit.Speakingin2003,Modireflected:

ThisblothappenedduringmytenureandIhavetowashitoff.PeopletoldusModineversayssorry.Isaid,whatdoessorrymean?Wehaveacriminaljusticesysteminthiscountrywhichdoesnotacceptsorry.WhatwillNarendraModi’ssorrymeantous?Wewilljudgehissorryfromhisactualdoings.60

Althoughthedeathsfromtheriotsoccurredduringhistenureandalthoughhemustcarrytheremorsefortherestofhislife,thefactsshowthatModididnotwantthemto happen, did not help them to happen, and did everything within his power asquicklyashecouldtostopthemhappening.ItisirrelevanttohimthatheperformedbetterthananyCongresschiefminister.

In our lengthy and candid conversations, where neither he nor I held anythingback, the subject came up often but his answer was always: ‘I feel sad about whathappenedbutnoguilt.Andnocourthascomeevenclosetoestablishing it.’That istrue.NoFIR or chargesheet has been filed againstModi in over a decade since theriots, and the Supreme Court–monitored SIT has exonerated him, though legalchallengescontinueinthelowercourts.

Modilearnedthehardwayin2002thatpartofleadership,asanthropologiststellus,issometimestobeasacrificeorscapegoat.Thisiswhatismeantwhenitissaidthatallpoliticalcareersendinfailure,becauseapoliticianeventuallyalwayssuffersforthe

wrongdoingofothersifnotforhisown.ExceptinModi’scasethecareerwasnotyetover.

Modisayshewantedtowashtheblotawaypubliclybyvirtueofhisfutureactions,anddealwithhisremorseprivately.Ontheotherhand,hewasincreasinglybeginningtofeelthathispresenceaschiefministerofGujaratwasnothelpingitspeople.

Leaders have no friends when things go badly wrong, and this was the positionModifoundhimselfinfollowingthe2002riotswhenhisparty,completelyrationally,wasmullingtheideaofaskinghimtostepdown.TheBJPnationalexecutivewasduetomeetinPanaji,Goa,on12April2002,andeverybodyknewwhat–orratherwhom–theunofficialfocuswouldbeon.

Vajpayee, despite all that had happened, had not condescended to visit Gujaratuntil4Aprilandapologizedforhistardinesswhenatlasthearrived.HehadamessageforModi that the chiefminister should ‘follow rajdharma’, which of coursemeansthatarulershouldtreatallofhissubjectsequallyandwithoutprejudice.Modiquietlyreplied,‘EvenIamdoingso.’61

Thiscaneitherbeseenasanaffectionateexchangebetweenaprimeministerandhisyoungerprotégéorasadeadlywarning.Itwasneither.Vajpayeesimplyimpliedinhis avuncular way that ifModi were to survive politically he would have to ensurepeaceinthestate.Therewasnosecondoptiononthetable.

Vajpayee’svisitwouldcertainlyhaveunderlinedtoModithedangerhiscareerwasin.YetonhishomegroundofGujarat,Modiwasnotwrong in thinking that therewasagroundswellofsupportforhim.Modiwouldalsohavebeencorrectinbelievingthat he had a chance of survival at home, if not inGoa,where big problems couldawaithim.

But did Modi particularly want to survive? The truth was, he confided to me,possiblyforthefirsttimeinanon-the-recordinterview,thathenolongerwantedtobechiefministeraftertheriotsbecausehehaddecideditwasunfaironthepeopleofthe state, whowere being subjected to extreme abuse in themedia because of him.ModithoughtitwouldbebettertoofferhisresignationinGoa,andthatwasexactlywhatheintendedtodo.

Theresultswerenotwhatheexpected.On arrival in Goa, when all were foregathered the first afternoon, Modi

announced,‘Iwouldprefertosithereasageneralexecutivememberandnotasachief

minister.’Thiswasnotofficiallyaresignationbutwasasclosetooneascouldbe,andit set the cat among the pigeons. Instead of reconvening the morning after theinauguralmeeting, theBJPnational executivedecided tobegin its orderof businessthat very evening – lest a night of plot and counterplot, rumour and faction-mongeringthrowtheconferenceintochaosandresultinunpredictablecasualties.

Modi’s resolve to step down was clear. BJP president Jana Krishnamurthi thendelivered amildlypanic-stricken speech condemning ‘thehue and cry of thosewhodemanded theheadof theCM’.Krishnamurthiwas referring to themedia and theCongressbutModinowknewhewasalsobetrayingthefeelingsofsomeintheparty.ThepresidentfollowedupwithsomeboilerplaterhetoricaboutbeingtoughonterrorandthecausesofterrorbutModiwasnotinterestedinlistening.

Hewaitedpolitelyuntil thepresidenthad finished and then stood todeliverhisshortspeech:

IwanttospeakonGujarat.Fromtheparty’spointofviewthisisagraveissue.Thereisaneedforafreeandfrankdiscussion.Toenablethis,Iwishtoplacemyresignationbeforethisbody.Itistimewedecidedwhatdirectionthepartyandthecountryshouldtakefromthispointonwards.

Modicouldn’tmakeitanymoreplain:hewantedtoresign.Hewaspreparedtoleavetheroomasanex-chiefministerandcontinueasapartyworker.Atthispointitwaswhat he wanted: he had had enough. ‘But the background is this,’ he told me. ‘Iwanted to leave thispositionbutmypartywasnot ready to leaveme, thepeopleofGujaratwerenotreadytoleaveme–thissituationiswhatIhad(todealwith).Itwasnotuptome.AndIwasnotreadytogoagainstpartydiscipline;Idon’twanttofightagainstmyparty.Whatmyleaderssay,Imustfollowit.’

TheBJPhadtocalculatewhatconsequencesmightensuefromModi’sresignation,includingrenewedcommunalchaosinGujarat,quiescentaftertheriots,andnationalhumiliationfortheparty.

ModihadinadvertentlyconjuredanexistentialmomentfortheBJP.Hisofferofresignation had the effect of revealing to his colleagues that the futurewas in theirhands. They all knew the true background of the riots – Krishnamurthi hadannouncedinsupportofModithatthefingerprintsoftheISIwerealloverGodhra.NowtheassemblyhadtodecidewhethertheywerehappytobelecturedaboutHindubrutality by the Congress–media conglomerate, whose brand of secularism theybelieved pandered to sectarianism, or whether they were going to take a stand onbehalfofModi.

PrimeMinisterVajpayeesuggestedthatitmightbebettertowaituntilthenextday

tomakeadecisiononModi’sofferbutPramodMahajan, thenparliamentaryaffairsminister,backedupbySanjayJoshi,whobrieflyovercamehisloathingofModiintheemerging spirit of the hour, insisted a decision be taken immediately. Soon, evenVajpayee had breathed in the electrifying atmosphere, and one journalist describeshow,suddenlyandmiraculouslyyoungatheart,‘hedeliveredaspeechthatcouldhavebeenareplayfromhisheadyJanSanghdays’.62

Modi’sresignationwasrejected.TheGoasessionclosedandasastreamofleadersheaded back to the airport, The Indian Express breathlessly wrote on 16 April:‘HardlineHindutvaisbackontheparty’sagenda,butthere’sanewface–NarendraModi.’63

But the Express had got it wrong. What came out of Goa may have been arejuvenatedModi,butitcertainlywasnothard-lineHindutva.Havingassentedtothewillofhispartyandwithdrawnhisresignation,Modiwasdeliberatinghisnextstep.Itinvolveddissolvingthestateassemblyandseekingafreshmandateforhisleadership.

Withinthreeorfourweeks,afterbrainstorming,thinking,thinking–Ineverdiscussedittillthenwithanyofmycolleagues–wehadacabinetmeeting.InthecabinetmeetingIputthisresolution,andallmycabinetcolleaguesacceptedit,thatwewilldissolvethegovernment.64

Heconcludedthatleavingittothevoterswouldbethebest,mostdemocraticwaytodecidehisfuture.Hehadalreadysteppedback,detached,andwascontenttoleteventsnowtaketheircourse.

ForthetimebeingModicarriedonaschiefministerand life inGujaratreturnedtonormal with surprising calm over the summer and monsoon. It seemed as if apoisonousgas, longbottledup,hadescapedanddispersedupwardsandaway.Therewas somethingdifferent about the state in the aftermathof thebloodshed thatwashardtoputone’sfingeron.Theriotswereterrible,butsimilartocountlessothersthathadgonebefore.

Somethingwasdifferent;butsomethingelsewasthesame.On24September2002,less than seven months since the Sabarmati Express had burned, Islamist terroristsstruckagaininGujarat.

The Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar, a stone’s throw from the chiefminister’sbungalow,isapopulartouristattraction.Itenclosesaseven-foot-highgold-leaf–coveredmurti of Lord Swaminarayan.Outside the shrine andwithin a fencedperimeteristheSahajanandVan,ablendofcontemplativegardenandchildren’spark

includingridesandgames,aherbalgarden,alakeandwaterfall.ItwasconsecratedinNovember1992.

Atfour-thirtyonthatpeacefulSeptemberafternoon,twoheavilyarmedterroristsscaledthefenceandonce insidebeganshooting indiscriminatelyandthrowinghandgrenadesatfamiliesenjoyingthegardens.Inalltwenty-ninemen,womenandchildrendied along with the two terrorists who were shot after a night-long firefight withNational Security Guard (NSG) commandos swiftly flown in from Delhi. Onecommandoandonestatepoliceofficeralsodied.Seventypeoplewerewounded.

Andnothinghappened.Therewerenoriots,nomassacres,nocommunaluprisingsat all. An investigation proceeded and conspirators were arrested – yet again, thefingerprints of the ISI were all over the attack – and the law took its course. Thepeople and the government conducted themselves in a civil and mature mannerdespitetheirgriefandanger,asModihadpleadedwiththemtodobackinFebruary.PramukhSwamiMaharaj,thespiritualleaderofthetemple,askedforclemencyfortheaccused.65

SomethinghaddefinitelychangedinGujarat,andmuchmorewasabouttochange.

I

8

FIGHTINGFORGUJARAT

Theimagethathasbeenbuilt,thatIwentintoareactivemodebecauseofGodhra,iswrong.–NarendraModi

N THE MONTHS AFTER the post-Godhra riots, normality appeared to resume. Theworstoftheriotswereoverand122outof129reliefcampshadbeenclosed.1Butto

Modi’smindafreshstartdemandedafreshelection.InJuly2002,havingmulledoverit sincereturningdisappointedfromGoa,hedissolvedthestateassembly: if theBJPwouldn’tallowhimtoresign,thewillofthepeoplemightstillreleasehim.Hewouldabidebytheirdecision.

Modi’spositionwithin theBJPwas settled for the timebeing,buthewanted torenew hismandate inGujarat – to discover whether its people, who had borne somuch trauma, were content to retain the chief minister who had been universallyblamedforitinthemedia.‘IamnotsayingIwanttobeinpower.Iamalreadychiefminister.Iwantelectionsbecauseallegationshavebeenhurledatme,’hetoldOutlookon20September.Modiwasinsearchofredemptionandthepollingboothwaswherehenaturallywenttoseekit.Manysaidtherewascynicalcalculationbehindthemove:Gujarat’spost-riotpolarizedenvironmentpresentedauniqueelectoralopportunity.

Modi’sgrowinglegionofopponentshadofcoursebeenincessantlycallingonhimtoresigninthewakeoftheriots.Butassoonashevolunteeredtoresign,theychangedtheir tune.2 The Congress suddenly realized that Modi was very popular amongGujaratis andbegan toworry that a snap election couldputhimback inpower foranother five years. Thiswas unthinkable, and therefore his opponents decided thatelectionsmustnotbeallowedtotakeplaceuntilmuch later,possibly in2003.Theyarguedthatthestatewasstillinchaosandfairelectionscouldnotbeorganizedunder

suchcircumstances.Modi’s new security advisor K.P.S. Gill had by now been in Gujarat for over a

monthandfeltdifferently. ‘Today,I feel theshockaboutGodhra isover.There isarealizationthatthereshouldbepeaceinthestate,’hetoldajournalistwhointerviewedhimon20May. ‘Thedesirehascomeintothemindsofpeople,andconvertingthatdesireintoactualityisnotadifficulttask…Thestatecanfaceanelection.Becauseifyou look at the state today, the disturbed areas are very limited.’He added that ifGodhrahadhappened in 1992, ‘thewhole ofUP,Bihar andRajasthanwouldhavegoneupinflames.Thistimeithasnothappened.’3

Gill’s point that ‘the process of an election reasserts democracy’ was pertinent.Givenhow loudlyModi’s resignationwasbeingcalled forbyvoices in thepress, theOppositionandeveninsectionsoftheCentralgovernment,thepolityofGujaratwasindangerofbeingundermined.Afreshelectionwouldsettlethematterandallowthestatefinallytoreturntonormal.

ThelatestsittingofthestateassemblyhadbeeninApril2002andelectionsweretraditionallycalledwithinsixmonthsof theprevious legislative session.This spelledout a timetable for elections to take place some time inOctober 2002.Modi knewvery well it was best to take advantage of the popularity he now enjoyed before itdissipated. If his planned programme of economic reforms and development wassuccessful,itwouldaddtohiselectability,butonlyafteraconsiderableperiodoftimehadelapsed.Nowwasthetimetogotothepeople.

TheCongress,notsurprisingly,wantedtopostponeelections foras longaspossible.Despite,orperhapsbecauseof,Gill’swisesummationofthesituationontheground,ateamheadedbythechiefelectioncommissioner(CEC)wasdispatchedfromDelhi.Itdeclaredthatunderpresentconditionsvotingwasimpossible.

‘Isaid,“Thatisnotfairtome,”’Modirecalls.‘“Idonotwanttobeinthispost,wemustdosomething.”ButitwasaconstitutionalcompulsionthatIhadtocarryonaschiefministerforsixmoremonths.’

The Election Commission ruling was based on the assertion that minorities,comprising10percentofthestate’spopulation,weredeemedunlikelytovote,eventhough 95 per cent of themwere by this point back at home rather than in reliefcamps.4

TheCEC,J.M.Lyngdoh,wouldnotrevealhowhearrivedathisconclusion.Modi

thoughsawthesituationasclear-cut:

Forseveralmonths,theOppositionhasbeenaftermetoresign.WhenIdid,theydidnotknowwhattodoandstartedrunningtoDelhitoseekMadam’shelp.TheyrealizedthatJamesMichaelLyngdoh,theChiefElectionCommissionerofIndia,istheironlysaviour.5

Atanyrate,LyngdohnowfoundhimselfinabattleofwitswithModi.Lyngdohmayhave had the power, butModi had the guile. Lyngdohwas likely a prisoner of thewidespread assumptions, kept alive over the years, that Gujarat was deeplycommunalizedbytheriots.Butadystopianeconomicandsociallandscapewasalongwayfromthetruth.Again,intheinterestsofobjectivity,wemustdivinethefacts.

On29April2002,IndiaToday reported: ‘AccordingtoestimatesbytheGujaratChamberofCommerceandIndustry(GCCI),thelosstocommerceandindustryisawhoppingRs10,000crore.’Businesseswereapparentlyontheirknees,withhoteliersparticularlyaffected: ‘Sosevere is the impactof theviolencethatmanyof thehotelsfacecertainclosure,’ saidoneowner,claimingthatoccupancyratesweredownfrom70percent to20percent.Tenthousandhotelworkerswere soontobecastoutofjobsamidstimmediatefinanciallossestotheindustryofoverRs250crore,accordingtoNarinderSaini,generalmanagerofClassGoldHotel.6

Thisishowitmaywellhavelookedamidsttheflamesofthefirstweekofrioting,whenthefutureappearedbleak.ButtheGCCIsoonreviseditsfiguresinlightoftheswiftendtomostoftheviolenceandareturntonearnormality.Itconcludedthat15percentofsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)hadbeenaffectedtovariousextents,but that thevastmajorityhadcarriedontradingasnormal.7ThehotelbusinessdidnotlosetheRs250croreithadfeared,andinsteadof600establishmentsitfoundthatonly 220 had suffered, incurring losses of justRs 10 crore – a small fraction of thehoteliers’guesstimateinthefirsttendaysaftertheriots.

In all, 4,767 insurance claims – a somewhat reliable means of measuring actuallosses–wereregistered,addinguptoRs168croreratherthanthefearedrupeestenthousand crore! Clearly there were many personal, uninsured losses, but not frombusinesses.Someanalystsarguedthatbankingstatisticsunderlinetheresilienceoftheeconomy in the heaviest period of rioting inFebruary–March 2002. If the levels ofbanking activity – numbers of cheques cleared and amount of funds transferredbetween accounts – are compared pre-and post-Godhra, the figures are similar intermsofmoneyvelocity.TotalcashdroppedonlyslightlyfromaboutRs17,700croretoRs16,700crore.

These are dry and bloodless numbers and take no account ofwhat the dreadful

situationlookedandfeltlikeatthetime.Buttheyarehardfigures,andshowthatthesituationbynomeansapproachedArmageddon.FewercarsweresoldinMarch–April2002, down to 1,000 from an expected 3,000, because nobodywanted to buy a caronly to see it goup in flames.Butwhen the riots ended thedelayedpurchasesweremade,andoverallsalesstayedmuchthesamesubsequently.

Similarly,Gujarat’s secondbiggest share of overall national investment remainedsteadyatalittleover16percentin2002.8Readingcontemporarymediareportsonecandetecthoweverynegativestatisticwasslightlyexaggeratedandspun.Forexample,the GCCI’s hoteliers said occupancy rates had fallen to 20 per cent, whereasTheHinduof5Maychangeditto10percent.

Modihadthistosayonthematterinaninterviewsometimelater:

Youmustkeep inmindthatafterGodhra,not fora singledaydidany industryremainclosed.Nobankswereclosedforevenadayaftertheincidents;thisisthereasonwhyIsaythatanyevaluationofmytenurecannotbedoneonthebasisofwhathasbeenwrittenorsaidinthemedia.Whatshouldbetheparameterofevaluation–didschoolsrun,wereexamsheld,didshopsstayopen,didmarketsremainvibrant?Everythingwasrunningbutstilltherewassomuch(ofa)negativecampaign.9

IfGujaratwasstillopenforbusiness,thenext itemonthecritics’agendawasfutureinvestmentwhichmust surelyhavebeenderailed, forwhat sanebusinessmanwoulddreamofinvestinginacommunaltinderbox?

AssoonashebecamechiefministerinOctober2001,Modibegantoworkassiduouslytowardsholdingabusiness–industrysummitwithaviewtoattractingnewinvestment–especiallyforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)–intothestate.HeinvolvedtheGCCIaswell as itsparentnational federation, andattracteddelegates fromAsia,EuropeandtheUS.ItwastitledResurgentGujaratandwastheprototypeofwhatwouldlaterbehis seriesof larger, two-yearlyVibrantGujarat summits.Modihadhosted it from8to10February2002,amerefortnightorsobeforeGodhra.

Inthewakeofthebloodshed,itnowappearedobvioustothemediathatinvestorswouldberowingatfullspeedbacktotheirowncountries.TheHindupointedoutatthe timethat investmentpromisesgeneratedby the firstResurgentGujarat summit,worthRs12,360crore,wouldjustaboutcoverthelossesincurredduringtheriots.Itsanalystsdeclared:‘Investorsarenotonlylikelytoshyawayfromfutureinvestmentbutthe existing industry may also leave the state.’10 But three months after the riotsforeign investors turned their boats around and announcednewprojects inGujarat

worthRs75,800crore.11

Thechiefelectioncommissioner’sinflexibilityoverholdingearlyelectionsmeanwhilepromptedanaggressiveresponsefromModithatAugust,startingatapublicmeetingat Bodeli, near Vadodara, where Modi referred to him using his full name: JamesMichaelLyngdoh.Thiswasdeliberate.Lyngdoh,Modiwastellingthepeople,wasan‘outsider’who shouldnotbe allowed toorder localGujaratis around in suchaway.Modi regardedLyngdoh’s attitude as elitist and supercilious. Lyngdoh’s response toModi,callinghiswords‘thegossipofmenials’,onlyaddedtothisperception.12

When Arun Jaitley informed Lyngdoh of the Gujarat government’s decision todissolve the assembly on 19 July, Lyngdoh refused his subsequent request for earlyelectionswith the remark thatModi’swas a ‘discreditedgovernment’13 and that thecallwasfrom‘afewmadpeoplewhoweresayingitwithoutauthority’.14AstheicingonthecakehealsocalledGujaratofficials‘abunchofjokers’.15

Modiconfirmedtomeexclusively,andforthefirsttimepublicly:‘Hetoldoneofmyofficershewasajoker,’instantlyrecallingtheincidenttwelveyearslater.

ToModi’searsthisdidnotsoundlikeimpartiality,anditwascertainlyanoddwayfor a civil servant to express himself. His suspicion that the chief electioncommissionerwasprejudicedagainsthim,oratleastagainsttheBJP,increasedwhenLyngdohdecidedthatmonth,amidst‘widepublicity’,toappealtoGujaratiswhohadfledthestateforotherpartsofIndiaduringtheriotstovotefromwherevertheynowwere.

ModisaysofLyngdohtoday:

Asfarasacareerofficer,hewasagoodofficer,butbecauseofsomepoliticalreasons,orbecauseofthemediaperception,hehadsomethingagainstme…hedidwhathecoulddo,everythinghecouldtry.ForthefirsttimeinthehistoryoftheIndianelectoralsystem,undertherulesandregulations,ifyouwanttovote,youwill have to go to a particular place to vote. But inmy case he opened voting for theGujarat assemblyelectionsfromanywhereinIndia.

Lyngdoh’srhetoricof‘takingintoaccountthelarge-scalemovementandmigrationofthe affected people from the riot-torn areas to safer havens’,16 was disingenuous. ItimpliedthatGujaratwasindeedthecombat-wrackedwastelandthemediahadmadeitouttobeseveralmonthsaftertheriots.ModisuspectedthatLyngdohwasutilizingalegalbutrarelyenforcedruletoboosttheanti-BJPvotewhenelectionseventuallytookplace–sincethosewhohadfledGujaratwerelesslikelytobesympathetictohim.

Modi pointed out with satisfaction that despite erecting polling booths acrossIndiaforthestateassemblyelections,‘Onecannotimaginethis…butwhathappened,notasinglevotewascastoutsidethestate.’Thisisinterestingasitimpliesthattherewas very little traumatized migration away from the state after the riots, and thatLyngdoh’sdedicationtotheimageofchaosmayindeedhavebeeninaccurate.

ModimadeapointedreferencetoJammuandKashmir,whoseelectionsLyngdohwasalsooverseeingandwherethesituationwasfarworse:‘Ifelectionscouldbeheldinthe terrorist-infested state of Jammu and Kashmir, why not in Gujarat wherenormalcyhasreturned?’17

Noanswercame fromLyngdoh,buton28October2002 theSupremeCourt inDelhiissuedaruling.ItsaidthatbecausetheGujaratstateassemblyhadbeendissolvedprematurely,thesix-monthmandatebetweensittingsdidnotapply.ThisapparentlyundidModi’sruseforasnapelection,whichdidnotnowhavetotakeplaceassoonasOctober.

Yet Chief Justice B.N. Kirpal also had some stern words for the ElectionCommission, which appeared to have inquired whether President’s Rule could beimposed after a period of six months without a sitting of the state assembly. TheSupremeCourt bench observed that as therewas no infraction ofmandate to holdelections within sixmonths of the latest sitting of the assembly, the application ofArticle356oftheIndianConstitutiondidnotarise.

The bench also thundered that Article 324 of the Indian Constitution casts aresponsibility and duty on the Election Commission to hold polls ‘at the earliest’,adding that timely electionswere the essence of democracy and that law and ordershouldnotbegroundsfordeferringthem.18TheHindu,nofriendofModi,reviewingLyngdoh’sownaccountoftheelection,reportedthat‘Oddly,whileLyngdohsetsoutthe EC’s case in detail, he glosses over the fact that the Supreme Court stronglydisagreed…Moreover,itheldtheEC’sadviceabouttheinvocationofArticle356as“gratuitous” and “misplaced”.’19This final point referred toLyngdoh’s ‘observation’concerning thepossibilityofPresident’sRule. If itwas apolitical ruse toneuter theBJPinGujarat,theSupremeCourtwashavingnoneofit.

Elections were finally set for 12 December 2002, which still suited Modi. CriticscomplainedthatthiswouldgiveModitimeto‘consolidatehisHinduvotebank’.Thiswasobviouslynotentirelyuntrue.

In June, well before the decision of the Supreme Court, Modi had initiatedpreparations fora seriesofyatrasdesignedtodrawthepeopleofGujarat to supportthe BJP.Modiwas a yatra veteran, even a yatra addict, having organized statewide,interstate andpan-national yatras inprevious years.Heknew thepowerful politicaleffectsuchmulti-location,many-stagedjourneyscouldhave,withtheiropportunitiesforremotevoterstofeelacloseproximitytotheirleaders,andbereassuredthattheirconcernswerebeinglistenedto.

InJune2002,Modiflaggedoffthe125thJagannathRathYatra.Itsetoffonits35-kmroutefromtheJagannathtempleintheJamalpurGateareaofAhmedabadonthemorningofFriday,12June.Theyatrawasledbyadozenelephantsandfollowedbythirty-threetruckscarryingdevotees,tenbhajanmandalisandfifteensectsofakharas,withsupporterswalkingbehindthechariotsinaprocession1.5kmlong.20

AfterthataShobhaYatrawastakenoutinRajkotonJanmashtamiday(Krishna’sbirthday),31August,witha‘FightagainstTerrorism’theme.Thiswaswell-timed,asitturnedout,becausethepolicesoonafterclaimedtohavefoiledaplottoassassinatebothModiandVHPpresidentPravinTogadia.Itsgeneralsecretary,JaideepPatel,wasshotandwoundedon3December2002.21Itistellingthatatthispointsomepeoplestill bracketed Modi and Togadia together. Within years, Togadia and the VHPwould be marginalized in Gujarat by Modi whose antipathy towards religiousextremismwasnotthenwidelyrecognized.HecouldhavecapitalizedonmajoritariansentimentbyaligningwithHindufundamentalistforcesbutdidnotdoso.

NextcamethefestivalofGanesh,andthentheGaurav,orGujaratPride,Yatra–byfarthebiggest,duringwhichModiproposedtotraversethelengthandbreadthofthe state, visiting all twenty-five districts and 182 assembly constituencies beforeOctober(atthetimedates fortheelectionshadnotyetbeenfixed).22Theyatrawasdelayedtwice.ThefirstoccasionwasimmediatelybeforeitsproposedlaunchfromtheBhathijiMaharajtempleinthevillageofFagvel,whichhappenedtobeinShankersinhVaghela’s constituency. This was because of opposition from the Congress, whichclaimeditwouldbeprovocative.AfterpressureonModifromanervousVajpayee,areviseddatewassetfor3September.

Vaghela,clearlyamanofambitionratherthanprinciple,hadbynowdefectedtotheCongress, and on19 Julywas appointed its party president inGujarat.Vaghelaalso raised a local rabble at Fagvel, which he called the Bhathiji Sena (Army ofBhathiji),andpromisedafightifModipitchedupatwhatVaghelabegantodescribeashisownyatra,coincidentallysetforthesamedeparturedate,fromthesamelocationasModi’sGauravYatra.

ThispoliticalcomedywasenjoyedbyModi,andhecomposedagraciouslettertoVaghela,theimportofwhichwas, ‘Please,afteryou…’,whichnotonlygavehimthemoralupperhandwithVaghelabut calledhisbluff andalso instantlydestroyed theCongressparty’sagitationagainsttheGauravYatra:howprovocativecoulditbeiftheCongresswasplanningoneofitsown?

AfterModi had givenway toVaghela, a final, definite date of 8 SeptemberwasannouncedandtheGauravYatradulycommencedfromthetempleatFagveltomuchfanfare.Accordingtopressreportsitwasadismalfailure,indicativeofhorrificdefeatinthepollstocome.Butthereportoftheadditionaldirectorgeneral(ADG)oftheGujarat State Police to the additional chief secretary (ACS),HomeDepartment inGandhinagar,saysotherwise.Almost150,000peopleattendedModi’sinitialaddress.Thentheyatratrundledoff.Theofficialpolicerecordstated:

Later, theYatrapursued its scheduled routeandatKapadvanj (AzadChowk), apublicmeeting (15,000)wasaddressed.Thereafter,publicmeetingatBayadofDist.Sabarkantha(12,000),(20:34hrs),atDehgamof Dist. Gandhinagar (12,000), (22:45 hrs), at Talod (Sabarkantha) (10,000), at Prantij (8,000) wereaddressed. On dated 9/9/2002 (1:30 hrs) a public meeting atHimmatnagar (15,000) was addressed byHon’bleChiefMinister,RajendrasinhRana,etc.23

Thepolice report reveals that the attendancewas similar throughout the route, andthatalthoughprecautionsweretaken,therewasnoviolencewhatsoever.

On 24 September, in the midst of the Gaurav Yatra, the Akshardham Templeterroristattacktookplace.Butfarfromprovokingmoreriots,thepeaceheld,andafteraninterruptionoftendaysasombrebutevenbetter-attendedGauravYatraresumedon 5 October and drove on without mishap to its conclusion. Modi adjusted histrademark angry rhetoric to attack ‘Miyan’Musharraf, the Pakistan dictatorwhomModiblamedsquarelyfortheterroristattack.24

SinceModihadbeenparachutedintoGujaratfromDelhithepreviousOctobertherehadbeenalmostnothingbutturmoil–hewasforcedtodealwiththeaftermathofanearthquake,twomajorterroristattacksandviciousriots,winhisfirst-everelection(forhisMLAseatinRajkot),resignandpreparetofightanother.Therewasalsoaterribledrought.Most surprising, though, andwhathewasprobably leastprepared for,wasthewayinwhichhehadbecomeapublicfigure,andhencepublicproperty,catapultedontothestageofnationalattentionfromrelativeobscurityintheBJP’spolitical‘backroom’.And that attentionwas almost universally vituperative. It seemed themedia

tookaninstantdisliketoModi.Healsohadplentyofenemieswithinhisownparty.TheCongresshighcommandhadbynowidentifiedModiasitsprincipalthreatin

future elections, both inGujarat and nationally. Party president SoniaGandhi hadshrewdlyseeninhimthemostfieryoftheBJP’syoungleadershipafterVajpayeeandAdvani.Modiwasfifty-oneandSonia,whoherselfhadtakenchargeofherpartyonlyfouryearsagoin1998,agedfifty-oneaswell,knewhowimportantitwastoneutralizehispotential.

AnoutwardsignofthestrainModihadbeenunderforthepastseveralmonthswashis brief hospitalization on Friday, 22 November, just hours after Lyngdoh finallyconcludedthattheGujaratpolicehadprovedthemselves‘quiteprofessional’andwentontoconfirm12December2002asthedateforthepolls. ‘Heisperfectlyallright,’saidDrDholakiaoftheCivilHospitalwhotreatedModi,‘butneedsrest.’25

Perversely, Modi seemed to thrive on the abuse he received. He became moreeloquentas theelectionsapproachedand thecriticism intensified.Bynowthepresswasburstingwithpredictionsofdoom for theBJP in theDecember2002assemblyelections.TheentirepartywassupposedlytearingitselfapartinfrustrationatModi’sfailures.AsTheFinancialExpressputit:

Infact,highlyplacedBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)workersheremaintainthatthecaretakerchiefministerisfastbecomingaliability,bothfortheBJPaswellasfortheRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh(RSS)…evendie-hardBJPsupportersseemto[be]losingconfidenceintheparty’sabilitytowrestbackpowerinthestateintheforthcomingbattleoftheballot.26

Anopinionpoll on6Decemberpredicted that the electionwouldbe a close thing,withtheBJPandCongresseachlikelytowinbetweeneighty-fiveandninety-fiveseatsin the 182-member assembly. It concluded thatwhile theBJPmight attract 49 percentvoteshare,theCongresswasoncoursefor48percent,makingtheoutcometooclosetocall.ResearchapparentlyshowedthatModi’sGauravYatrawasaflopandhadnoeffecton34per centofpeople,withonly32per centof respondentsvoicinganopinionthatGujarat’spridehadbeenrestoredaftertheriots.27

Outlook,withitspredictionof100seatsfortheCongress,foresawModi’seclipse.28

The December 2002 Gujarat state election was described as ‘driven by hatred’ ofHindustowardsMuslims.29More likely itwasdrivenbythemedia’sdislikeofModiandinturntheGujaratis’dislikeofthemedia.‘Littledidthey[themedia]realisetheywerecreatingaconstituencythatwould laterbuy intothe logicoftheGauravYatra

thatMrNarendraModi so successfully enlisted in the cause of route-mapping hiselection campaign,’ wrote Debraj Mookerjee in his coruscating post-electioncondemnationof ‘pseudo secularists’.They failed tounderstand that ‘the triumphalmarchpositedHinduprideonly inthederivative.WhatreallywasbeingralliedtoapitchwasGujaratipride.’30

TheneteffectofthegeneralhostilitydirectedatGujaratanditschiefministerwasto precipitate a voting landslide for theBJP.AsModi said on the eve of polling, ‘IthinkwearefightingtheCongressonlyinthemedia.OnthegroundIdon’tseeanybattle;weremainunchallenged.Rather,IseeafrenzyinfavouroftheBJPwhereverIcampaign.’31

Thesignsofvictorywereverymuchintheair.Butevercautious,Modiwasstillnotcertainof success.SwapanDasgupta recalls a raremomentofdoubt forModiwhileflyingbacktoAhmedabadwithhimonenightafterarally:

Leaningacrosstheaisle,heasked:‘Whatdoyouthink?’‘Looksveryencouraging,’Ireplied.Henoddedandthen lapsed into a reflective silence.Then,quite abruptly, he shotme anotherquestion: ‘Andwhat ifwelose?’Ismiledwarilyandhetoosmiledback.‘ButatleastIfoughtagoodcampaign.Igavemybest.’32

December2002wasprobablythefinaltimeinhiscareerthatModiexperienceddoubtregardinghisfate.Werehetowinamajorityintheassembly,thepoliticallandscapeofIndiawouldbegintoalter.ItwasModi’sfirstelectioncampaignasleaderofhisstate.HehadjoinedtheBJPabarefifteenyearsearlierfromtheRSSandhadfoughthisfirstelection (a by-election)only inFebruary2002 tobecome adebutant legislator afterhavingbeencatapultedintothechiefministershipinOctober2001.Andyethenowcampaignedlikeaveteran.

Bytheeveningof12December2002,withaturnoutof61.5percent,exitpollswerepredictingbetweenninety-threeand109seatsfortheBJPanduptoeighty-eightfortheCongress.Muslimshadvoted in largenumbers.Therehadbeensomeanxiety inGandhinagarthattheBJP’smiddle-classvotersmightstayhome,putoffbyhavingtoqueue at polling stations.On the other hand, awinter election daymeant that thescorchingsunwouldnotbeadeterrent.

As the results trickled in, the scale ofModi’s victory became clear. L.K. Advanideclared,‘Ihaveneverwitnessedsuchacampaignduringthelast20–22yearssincetheBJPwasformedorinthefiftyyearsoftheJanaSangh’sexistence.’33

TheBJPwon126seats(itwouldeventuallyrisebyoneto127)andtheCongress

wasmore or less annihilated, securing only fifty-one seats.Modi’s government nowhadtwo-and-a-halftimesasmanyMLAsas itsrival.Itwasacleansweep,maybethebiggestever:eveninitsgreatwinof1998theBJPhadnotchedupatallyofonly117.It lost a few seats in Saurashtra and Kutch, possibly because of the previousadministration’sineptnessaftertheearthquake.ButtothedismayoftheCongress,theBJPdidextremelywellincentralGujaratandsurprisinglydominatedthetribalbeltineasternGujarat.

TheCongress’scaste-basedtacticshadcomeundone,andthiswasanomenofthefuture for Gujarat. ‘When the result came it was a surprise for Lyngdoh also,’ saysModitodaywithasmile.‘Ihavenevermetthegentleman,butafterhisretirementhetookanassignmentwiththeCongressparty.’

Modi’s long-term strategywas towork towards an inclusivepolitical communitythroughdevelopmentandefficientgovernanceandneutralizetheCongress’sKHAMagenda.The2002pollgaveanearlybutimportantsignalthatitcouldwork.

TheonlyshockfromthepollwasthatformerchiefministerSureshMehtalostatMandvi – one of the Kutch casualties. But the overall victory had a rationale andDasguptasummedupModi’striumphconcisely: ‘Hesuccessfullyestablishedadirectcorrelationbetweendemonologyandadulation:themorehebecameahatefigureincosmopolitan circles, the more his popularity soared in Gujarat … This was onlyincidentallyanelectioncentredonideology;therealissuewasleadership.’34

For all the fiery speech-making, the election campaign had not been aboutHindutva or even about terrorism. Thanks largely to themedia, it had been aboutModi.

With hindsight, Sonia had accurately recognized the long-term threat Modi’spoliticsposedtotheCongress.Overtenyearslater,withabarelyreducedmajorityintheGujaratassembly,Modiwaselectedforthethirdtime.FewMuslimshadvotedforhim inDecember2002.But inDecember2012,31percentdid(‘TheMuslimvotenowwasmorethan25percent,insomeconstituencies34percent,’Modisaidtome).

Would theCongress belatedly realize that its tactics had backfired and that forevery insult it aimed atModi it handed him another thousand votes?Or would itdoubledownonitslossesandbetmoreheavilyondemonizinghim?Timehasprovedthatitwouldchoosetodothelatter–withinterestingconsequences.

Bythetimeofhis2002electionvictory,thenarrativeofModiastheprogenitoroftheGujarat riotswasalreadybeing laiddownasanunalterable truth.The initiatingGodhra atrocity had been carefully airbrushed out of the picture.35 During thecampaign Shankersinh Vaghela went so far as to accuse the VHP of engineering

GodhratoprovokeriotsagainsttheMuslimcommunity.EventheCongress,amongwhosemembersweresomeofthetrueculprits,thoughtthisanaccusationtoofar:‘It’sa suicidal statementthatcanharmtheCongress inthepolarisedatmosphere,’ saidalocalleaderatthetime.36

ModiwasonceagainsworninaschiefministeronSundayafternoon,22December2002,attheSardarPatelStadiuminAhmedabad.Over100,000peoplewerepresent,not many more than the huge majority he had received in his new Maninagarconstituency.K.P.S.Gillwaspresent.AndforthefirsttimeinIndianhistory,asittingprimeminister–Vajpayee–wasinattendanceattheswearing-inofanewstatechiefminister.

Duringtheelectioncampaign,ominoussignsfromerstwhilecolleagueswereevident.Vaghela,despiteallhiseffortstoplayspoilsport,hadonlyendedupbeinghelpfultoModiandtheBJP.In1998,VaghelahadleapedfromwhathethoughtwasasinkingBJP ship. Vaghela destroyed the Congress’s credibility in the election with hisimitation yatra. This helped Modi enormously. Closer home, another malcontent,KeshubhaiPatel,takingadvicefromSanjayJoshibackinDelhi,wasmanoeuvring.

Under Keshubhai the BJP had lost ground to Vaghela’s Congress party –dramaticallysointhelocalelectionsof2000andtheninaLokSabhaby-electionin2001. Modi had made it plain in off-the-record comments to journalists what hethought of Keshubhai Patel’s administration from its inception inMay 1998, andespeciallyinthewakeofthe2001Kutchearthquake.

Keshubhai felt undermined by Modi’s comments, and soon after wasunceremoniallydismissedbytheBJPhighcommand.IfhewashumiliatedbyModi’sreturn,insultwasaddedtoinjurybyhavingSureshMehtasecondModi’suncontestednomination for the chief minister’s position. But the situation had now changed:seatlessaftertheDecemberelections,SureshMehtawasmarshallinghisforcestojoinoneflankofKeshubhai’sbattlelines.

On the other flank was the RSS, similarly dissatisfied with Modi. It may seemunbelievablethataftersuchaconclusivevictoryModishouldhaveanyenemiesatallwithintheSanghParivar,butModialwayshadenemies,partlybecauseofhissingle-mindedattitude.

With theRSS the problemwas partly formal, partly familial.Modi had been anRSSman.Normally, once you are in younever leave, butModihadmovedon and

become aBJP chiefminister.TheRSS on the other hand still believed that hewastheirmanintheBJP.IntruthModiwasnobody’sman,buttheargumentatthispointwas about who should call the shots in Gujarat. The RSS assumed that as theideologicalparentoftheBJPitshouldbeconsultedondecisionmaking.Modimerelysmiledandnoddedandlistenedpolitely.

TherewasalsothematteroftheVHP,headedbyPravinTogadia,whohadbeenafriendmanyyearsago,buthadmaturedintoaragingextremist.DespiteModi’santi-terroristelectionrhetoric,hewasnoextremist,andtimewouldprovehewasnotanti-Muslimeither.

The dialectic whereby relentless criticism from the Congress and the mediasafeguardedModiagainstsanctionsfromtheRightandallowedhimtoslowlydetachhimselffromtheSanghParivarorthodoxyisfascinating.Itbegantomatterinearnestin2003.WithModi’sdeclarationthat‘thenationismoreimportantthantheparty’,37

hecouldstarttoproceedinhisowndirection.Belief inthepriorityofnationoverparty iscentraltothededicatedworkofRSS

membersbutitmeanssomethingmorewhenanRSS-bredchiefministerreasserts it.Atthistime,freshfromhiselectionvictory,Modiwaspreparingtopointathimself,turning away from the old RSS orthodoxy and to an extent away from the older,stratifiedBJPaswell.Asheconfessedtome:‘InawayIamanapoliticalperson.Iaminthepoliticalsystemandthatiswhypeopleknowmeasapolitician.’

Modi’s ideas and ambitionwerebigger than anyone in thepartyhad envisioned.He had dreams to remake India, and he was to test his ideas in the laboratory ofGujarat. Many of the policies he wished to implement would, however, only beapprovedofbytheRSSandtheBJPaftertheywereshowntobeelectorallybeneficialandeconomically successful.Forexample:Modi’s furtheralignmentofGujaratwithindustry,privateenterpriseandfree-markets.ThisapproachwasstillsomewhatalientotheRSS,whichplacedHindunationalismandthereforesoft-socialistpoliciesattheheartofitseconomictheory.

After the 2002 electoral victory,Modi made significant changes. He first removedGordhanZadaphia,whohadbeenministerofstateforhomeaffairs,fromthecabinet.InexchangeforhissupportwhenModireturnedfromDelhitobecomechiefministerin October 2001, Togadia’s acolyte Zadaphia had been placed in charge of policepostings. Many compromised officers were implicated in the 2002 riots (as was

Zadaphiahimself), and it lookedas thoughextremismhadwormed itsway into theheartofgovernment.Modihadshoulderedtheblamefortheriots.Buttotheextentthatsomeoftheviolencewasencouragedorallowed,heknewwhowasreallytoblame.

Even those who were not actively involved in the riots were sidelined if theirperformanceduring thecrisiswas seentobebelowpar.AshokNarayan,at the timethe additional chief secretary (ACS) of theHomeDepartment, was overlooked byModi forpromotiondespitehis senioritybecausehe ‘wasunable todoa competentjobofcontrollingriots’.38

Onejournalist39relatesarumour:TogadiacomplainedaftertheelectionthatModiwas garnering all the credit when it wasTogadia’smenwho had done all the hardwork of butchery.He apparently said this to makeModi look bad, but it had theoppositeeffect.Italsosummeduphisattitudetoextremistsinhisownpartyandtheirunwantedefforts,becausesuddenly,Zadaphiawasout.ThissentamessagetoTogadiathat he was finished too.Modi ceased consultations with the VHP and also otherSanghParivarorganizationssuchastheBharatiyaKisanSangh(BKS).

ThiscourseofactionwasbehindmuchoftheinsurgencyaimedatModifromthefarRight–especiallyaround2003–04whenmutinousplottingwasafoot–andwasaresultofModidisavowing religious extremismwhichhehad come to see asbad forGujaratandbadforIndia.TheideaofareligiousstatewasanywayanathematoModi.WhentheBKSretaliatedtoitsmarginalizationbystartingafarmers’agitation,Modievicted its members from their state-provided accommodation. One of Togadia’saides,AshwinPatel,sentanangrySMSsayingthatModihadbetrayedHindutva.

WhenModi was re-elected he sawwith renewed clarity that his real supporterswerenottheextremistswhohadledtheriotsandintheprocessalmostdestroyedhimas a politician. Rather they were the peaceful citizens of Gujarat who had recentlyvotedforhimindroves.

The cleansing was an ongoing operation. Even in 2008, five years after he hadturfed the mutinous BKS out of their taxpayer-funded homes, he looked aroundAhmedabadandsawillegalshrineserectedhaphazardlyalloverthecityindefianceofplanningregulations.Thesewereoftenbuiltonpathswherecitizenscouldnolongerwalk.TheywereaperfectillustrationoftheconventionalIndianbeliefthatonceyourpartywas inpower,youcouldgetawaywithwhateveryou liked:ruleswerenowforotherpeople.

Modihadmadeitclearthathewasagainstillegalencroachmentsofanykind.Thisappliedequallytostructuresofalldenominations.Hisdemolitiondrivewas‘agnostic’–ruleswererules.40Modidemolishedseveralhundredillegalshrinesthatviolatedthe

law. Not unnaturally, this attracted opposition from leaders of various religiouscommunitiesaswellascivicofficialshithertounusedtogoingbytherulebook.Intheend, thedemolitionexerciseprovedsuccessful.Modihadmadehispoint: ruleswereforeverybodytofollow.

‘Modi’spoliticalproblems,includingwithinhisownpartystemfromthefactthatheisnotwillingtoshieldanywrongdoer,’writesMadhuKishwar,editorandpublisherofthefeministwomen’smagazineManushi.‘EarliertheCongressandBJPusedtobeinriots together and so they dutifully protected each other. Modi has severed theumbilical cord that connected anti-social elements within both the BJP and theCongress.’41

Oneof themostmemorable comments to arise from the furore over the templedemolitionswaswhenVHPPresidentAshok Singhal likenedModi toGhazni, theIslamic invaderwhohaddestroyed the Somnath temple in ad 1026.Modi had alsodemolishedanillegalSufidargahthatenragedlocalMuslims,buthestucktohisguns,citing the system of ‘anushasan’ – of enforcing the law ‘irrespective of whichcommunityisaffected’.42

The‘Ghazni’jibewasanotherexampleofhowcriticismhelpedModi,foritservedpubliclytoputdistancebetweenhimandHinduextremists,andevencausedGujarat’scynicalMuslimstotakenote.Modihadbeenaccusedofusingthe2002riotsasacovertodestroyanimportantIslamictomb.ThedestructionofillegalHindutemples,andthe caricature of Modi as an Islamic invader, could only help the slow, carefulrapprochement he had in mind: an unbiased friend toMuslims, and an enemy ofextremistsofeveryhue.

If theVHPandBajrangDalwerepuzzledbyModi’s ingratitude for their effortsduring the riots, and offended by his high-handed treatment of them after he wassworn in again as chief minister, they were about to discover the situation wouldbecome a lot worse. The normal way of dealingwith the aftermath of riots was topretend that nothing had happened and that the party had not been involved, the1984anti-SikhpogrominDelhibeingthetemplate.ButevenifModihadwantedtofollowtheCongress’s exampleafter the2002Gujarat riots,hewouldnothavebeenallowed.Themedia’s attentionwas focused like a laser beam on him and it soughteveryday,inthecourtofpublicopinion,toindicthimonchargesofmassmurder–anordealthatRajivGandhineverhadtoendure.

TheSupremeCourthadorderedtheoriginal,cursorypoliceinvestigationsintotheriotkillingstobereopened.ItconvenedaSpecialInvestigativeTeam(SIT)togotoGujaratandre-examinealltheevidence.Modisayshewelcomedthis.Hefelthehaddoneeverythinghecouldhavetodealwiththeviolenceas fastaspossibleunderthecircumstances.He also knewwho the guiltywere. Seeing extremistmembers of theVHP,BajrangDal,BJPandCongressprosecutedfortheirmurderousactswouldgiveModi leewaytodifferentiatehisgovernance fromtheir thuggishactions. Inthe longtermitwouldaidhisrehabilitation.Itwasahigh-stakesriskbutintheenditwasnogamble becauseModi had no choice.Hence his statement: if I am found guilty ofanythingIshouldbehanged.

Over the next few years stunned and baffled rioters from every political party inGujaratbegantofindthemselvesincourt,andtheninprison,astheSITgroundawaywith its exhaustive investigations into the 2002 riots.Why, then, was the extremeRightinGujarat,inalliancewithdissidentelementsintheBJP–notonlyKeshubhaiPatelandSureshMehta,butSanjayJoshiandK.N.Govindacharyaaswell–unabletotoppleModioratleastreassertitscontrol?

Itwasbecauseoftwofactors,oneofwhichdroveinthewedgebetweenModiandcertainelementsoftheBJPevenfurther.Thiswasthe2004LokSabhaelection.TheBJPhadbeenenjoyingitsfirstand–fromtoday’svantagepoint–itsonlysustainedperiod of national government. It hadwon the twelfthLok Sabha election in 1998with Vajpayee as leader and secured 182 seats to the Congress’s 141. Vajpayee’sNationalDemocraticAlliancecoalitionsurvivedforayearbeforefallingoutwithoneofitspartners,theAllIndiaAnnaDravidaMunnetraKazhagam(AIADMK).

InthethirteenthLokSabhaelectionin1999theNDAacquiredtwenty-fouralliesandestablishedamore stableNDA-2coalition thatenabled it to servealmosta fullfive-yearterm.ThatVajpayeehadrecentlyvisitedPakistanaspartofsuccessfulpeacenegotiationswhichledtotheLahoreandIslamabadDeclarations43hadnothurthimintheeyesoftheBJP.

Hopes were high that the BJP had broken the decades-long hegemony of theCongressandthatanewerainIndianpoliticswasdawning.OneoftheelementsthatcontributedtothishopehadofcoursebeenModi’selectionin2002halfwaythroughNDA-2’s term of office, and then successes a year later in other state assemblyelectionsinMadhyaPradesh,RajasthanandChhattisgarh.

Allthiswastakenasanauguryforthe2004LokSabhaelection.Yet,paradoxically,thesevictoriesencouragedacomplacencywithintheBJPthatledtoitssurprisedefeatwhen it called an early general election in April–May 2004. It was a decision thatendedVajpayee’spoliticalcareer.‘ThepartyhaslostundermyleadershipandIdon’tmindsteppingdown,’hesaid,anddidso,handingovertoL.K.Advani.

The BJP had looked at encouraging economic indicators, backed by glowingreviews fromopinionpolls that seemed to guarantee an easy victory. It launched its‘IndiaShining’ campaign inOctober2003.Butmany sectionsof India’spopulationfelt excluded from the country’s prosperity and the Congress played on theirfrustrationwithitsslogan:‘Whatdidtheaamaadmiget?’

OneoftheseminalmomentsofthecampaignoccurredinLucknow.DuringarallycelebratingaBJPleader’sbirthday,22womendiedduringastampedeforfreesaris.WhiletheBJPhastriedtodisassociateitselffromtheincident,theeventwasagiftforoppositionpartieswhowereabletoaskwhy,ifIndiawasshining,wouldpeopledieinanattempttogetasariworthRs40.44

In May 2004 the BJP was crushed at the polls, winning only 138 seats. As M.D.Nalapatwrote,itchangedfromapartywithadifferencetoanorganizationhappytoadopt classic Nehruvian ways.45 In other words, once in office the old socialisttendencies – a sort of political default position in India – had crept back. TheCongress won only seven seatsmore that the BJP – 145 – but formed a coalitiongovernmentwith support of the Left Front’s sixty seats and other allies. The 2004generalelectionmarkednotsomuchavictoryfortheCongressasadefeatfortheBJPcentralleadership.

AftertheLokSabhaelection,ModiandcertainleadersintheBJPweresuddenlyatodds,andcalls forhis removalwerewidelymade.Nonetheless, itactuallyworked infavourofModiintwoways.First,henolongerhadtopayasmuchattentiontothehumbled, shell-shocked national party as he had in his first two-plus years as chiefminister.46Out of power and unpopular, it could exert far less pressure on him. Incontrast,hewasconsolidatinghispowerbaseinGujarat.

Modi’sgrowingpowerwasbeingnoticedaswashisstyleofexercisingit:

Thiswasacriticismincreasinglyvoiced:ModiisnottheBJP.Heisalonewolf.Hemaymakealltherightnoisesbuthereports tonoone, isaccountabletonone.That’swhyhetakesthekindofdecisionsapartymanmaynot,beingforcedtobalancecountervailingforces.47

TheBJP drifted to the Left and seemed content for a while to echo theCongress.EconomistArvindPanagariyarecentlyargued:

PartoftheprobleminthisisthattheBJPhastakenthe2004defeatasthedefeatofreforms.Itisadamagingreadingoftheelectionverdict.ExceptforNarendraModi,alargepartoftheBJPleadershiphasnotcomeoutofit.Whatisthepointofanoppositionwhichsimplygoesalongwithwhattherulingpartyissaying?48

TheBJPseemedtoturnawayfromsomeoftheeconomicliberalismofitssixyearsinpowerbetween1998and2004andreturnedtoasortofnegativeorthodoxy,playingthe parliamentary role of Opposition only by trying to block Congress legislationwithoutsayingwhatitwasinfavourofasanalternative.Itseemedtohaverunoutofideas and lost direction, and retreated into a self-defeating comfort zone. Modi,meanwhile,wasengagedonhisprojectofturningGujaratintoaprosperous,business-friendlyandeconomicallyprogressivestate.

While ithadbeenkeptatbaybyVajpayee,AdvaniallowedtheRSS to return tocentrestage,andhepaidthepriceaftermakingcomplimentaryremarksaboutJinnahinPakistanin2005.TheRSShadnowsuppliedtwosuccessiveBJPpresidents:itwascalling the shots at the national level, which in terms of the popular vote could betermedrisky.ModibycontrastkeptontherightsideofhisRSSmentorsbutensuredminimalinterferenceingovernance.

TheVHPwas,however,implacable:‘MorethantheBJP,thegreatestoppositiontoModi–paradoxically–is fromtheVHP inparticular.TheVHPtopbrass, fromAshokSinghal toPraveenTogadia,detestshim…’49

TherewasasecondfactorbesidestheBJP’spost-electiondepressionthatguaranteedModi a freehand inGujarat andkepthis enemieswithin the SanghParivar at bay.Thiswas the progress hewasmaking in terms of economic and social developmentearlyoninhissecondterm.

In October 2001, on the day after he was sworn in, Modi had enacted his firstpractical and also symbolic decision as chief minister by directing the diversion ofwaters fromtheNarmadaRiver to thedry riverbedof theSabarmati.50 IthadbeenmadepossiblebythecompletionoftheSardarSarovardamtoaheightof100metres,but had taken decades of bitter struggle to achieve. The Narmada flows fromAmarkantakineasternMadhyaPradeshallthewaytosouthernGujarat,throughtheplains ofBharuch and into the sea.The idea of building a damon it,whichwouldeventually irrigate almost 7,000 squaremiles of arid land and supplywater tomorethan 3,000 villages in Gujarat and Rajasthan, was first mooted in the 1960s. The

projectwas eventually given the go-ahead in1979.After that apoliticalwar ensuedbetween environmentalists, left-wing activists and the governments of four states,whichoftenfoughtorobstructedoneanotherduringtheprocess.

Nowfreshwaterwasbeginningtoreachthosewhothirstedforit,andModiusedthe flooding of the Sabarmati to inaugurate a new phase in the development ofGujarat.Inasemi-desertstate,thechangefromdrytowetwasapowerfulmetaphor.Thesuccessofthedamtodatewasofcoursenothisdoing,andModiwasnotclaimingcredit for it,althoughlaterhewouldachieveasignificantheighteningofthedamtoincrease its radius of influence. Now, though, he used the occasion to informeverybodythatchangewashereandwasgoingtohappenfast.

Part of the reason for sidelining the VHP was that Modi wished to push theideologicalandrhetoricalaspectsofreligiontooneside.Hehadseenampleevidenceof where religious-nationalist agitations led, and although he was a nationalist heclaimedtofollowthetenetsofgenuinesecularism:justiceforall,favouritismtonone.

As always, Modi was looking two ways, both forward and back. He wanted torejuvenateandmakerelevanttomodernIndiaitsvastbackwaterofHinducultureandidentity, seeing itas fullofenergyandpotential.Heintendedtodothisbyallowingthem to flourish in a modern, liberal context, not to install a ‘fortress India’economicallyorculturally.

ButbydefiningHindutvaasawayof life rather thanreligiousdogma,ModiwasgoingtoputitintopracticebyincorporatingprinciplesofIndia’sancientphilosophiesandmodernizing them to create a state which was prosperous, demonstrated goodgovernance,washonestandputcitizensfirst.

To tackle the deeply embedded communalism evident in the 2002 riots, Modiknew that he needed to prove to Gujarat’s angry and frightenedMuslims what hestoodforindeedratherthanword.Heremainedrelentlesslytoughonterrorismandlawandorderingeneralbecause,asSardarPatelhadpointedout,governmentmeansnothing if it cannot protect its citizens.51Thiswas part ofModi’s penitential questaftertheriots,aswellasbeingoneofhiskeypoliticalbeliefsmovingforward.

Modinextturnedhisattentiontoreforminggovernment.Hewantedtomakehisadministration more streamlined and efficient, even if he could not shrink it. Hereasoned that the half-million government employees had families to look after. Soevenhavinginheritedover-employmentinthecivilandpublicservices,hewouldnotstart sacking people en masse. Instead, he decided to look at public servants as aresource,andtrytoimprovetheirperformanceatthesametimeasheimprovedtheirlives and careers by enthusing them and granting government employees more

autonomy.52

Modibegantoholdbrain-stormingsessions(chintanshibirs)andletitbeknownthatbonafidemistakeswouldnotbepunished.Usuallycivilservantshesitatetospeaktheirmindsorquerytheirbosses.Modichangedthatandsaidthatbecausehewantedeveryonetodotheirbest,ifasincereideawentawryorfaileditwouldnotleaveablackmark;infacttheopposite.

‘InmyfirstmeetingwithmygovernmentbureaucratsIsaid,“Don’tbotheraboutthepunishment;inmyofficetherewillbenopunishment.Youhavetotaketherisk,youhavetoperform.Ifanyproblemarises,Iamresponsible.”’

Itwouldbeproofthattheemployeewastryingtoinnovateandimprove,andtheperson’s career would benefit by learning from a mistake. This was a radical andpreviouslyuntriedstepandhadamiraculously liberatingeffectontheworkethicofthe civil service. Soon, everybody felt involved. Government employees would gainfromtrainingcoursesandthechanceofbetter jobsatisfactioninreturnforworkingmore conscientiously and efficiently. As he describes these initiatives, Modi’s facelightsup:clearlyinnovation–doingthingsbetterandsmarter–engagesandanimateshim.

Modi started a programme that allowed civil servants to work with the publicaccording to their own personal interests, reasoning that this would make themhappierandmoreenthusiasticabouttheirjobs.‘Itoldthem,“Youchooseanyprojectyou like, which gives you satisfaction, and implement it in your way. Don’t worryabout the resources, Iwill give you all.”What happened?The government officialsweredoingtheirduty,butinanewway–likeoneofficerwhowasinterestedinmusic,but itwasnot a part ofhis duty. I said, “If you arenot satisfiedwith thiswork, dosomething else.” So he called on poor people and tried to give them education inmusic.Itgavehimsatisfaction.Igavehimfullfreedomtodothis.Hewassatisfiedandbecauseofthissatisfactionhisperformanceandabilityinhisotherworkimproved.’

Aboveall,thejungleofredtapewasslashed.Theundergrowthoftriplicateformswashackedbacksothatmorecouldbeaccomplishedandmorequickly.TheInternetwouldbetakenfulladvantageofinapushtowardse-government,andthelumberingbeast of Indian bureaucracy tamed. But there would be a stick to accompany thecarrot,asPravinShethsaidin2006:

Officials,smallandhigh,inhisadministrationhavesurelybecomealertabouttheworktheyareexpectedtocarryout. Itmaynotmean that there is a significantbehavioral transformation inbureaucratic tradition.Buttheyknowthatiffilesarenotdisposedofexpeditiously,ortardinessisnoticed,theofficerliableforhisnon-actionwillbetransferredtoaninhospitablepositionorwillfacesomepenalaction.53

JournalistPremShankar Jha, inhis essay ‘Jha’s India:WhereDemocracyHasGoneWrong’, said that the country had suffered since Independence from ‘the failure toenact provisions that could convert a bureaucracy that had been schooled over acentury into believing that its function was to rule the people (rather than be itsservants)’.54ModibeganinGujarattochangetheossifiedmindsetofthebureaucracy.Thusitwashopedthatgovernancewouldimproveandthe‘consumers’ofgovernment–benightedcitizenswithnochoiceinthematter–wouldbegintounderstandforthefirsttimethatcustomersatisfactioncamefirst.

WhilethisiscommonintheWest,nothingasreformisthadbeenattemptedbeforeinIndia.Modididn’t stopthere.Corruptionwasalsogoingtoend– ‘Hoonkhaatonathikhaavadetonathi’(‘Idon’ttakebribesanddon’tallowanyoneelsetotakebribeseither’). Such a claim sounded bizarre in a country where bribery, graft andembezzlement are often lubricants that encourage the cogs of authority to turnreluctantly.

As with unemployment, corruption will never fall to zero anywhere. But whatModi meant was that the culture of administration would change so that thegovernmentwould become the servant of the people instead of itsmaster; that thevoterwouldbeplacedincharge.Modihadpower,butonlybecauseithadbeenvestedinhimbyvoters.

Thepersonalityofanadministrationdependsonthecharacterof the leader,andhewilleventuallyinfluenceitscultureallthewaydownthechain,forgoodorill.Modiletitbeknowninnouncertaintermsthatanybodyacceptingbribeswastobesacked,withnoexceptions.This filtered throughthearteriesof thepolitical systemrapidly.BecauseModiwasacknowledged tobepersonallynot corrupt– somethingevenhisworstenemiesadmit–hiswordscarriedweight.TheideawastospreadanewspiritofintegrityanddiligencethroughtheGujaratcivilservice,withthebestbeingpromotedandtheworstsidelinedordismissed.Oncethatprocesswasunderway,Moditurnedtomorepleasantmatters.

Thisishowheputittome:‘Itoldeachandeverydepartment,andeverysecretary,“Thinkthatyouarethechiefministerofthisdepartment–whatareyougoingtodoin five years? I will give you the full authority as a chief minister. You are a chiefminister.Thinkaboutit.Whatresourcesdoyouhave?Whatisyouraim,whatisyourgoal?Whatisyourroadmap,andhowareyougoingtoimplementitandhowareyou

goingtoachieveit?”Theyeachhadtopresenttheirnewandinnovativeplanssothatallcouldseewhattheotherswereplanningandhowtheywerethinking.’

Modi believed a major problem in government was lack of communication. ‘Ingovernance, themajorproblem inour system is that thementality isoneof secrecy.One personwho is sitting at the table thinks that no one should knowwhat he isdoing. All is compartmental thinking and in watertight compartments,psychologicallyandphysically.Iwantedtochangethisenvironment.’

TothisendModiassembledallhisseniorofficials. ‘Everyday, intheevening,weused to start our workshop. It went on till late night, ten o’clock. And it was formonths together. The top 250 members of the team sat with one officer giving adetailedpresentation,andthenwediscussedtheissue.Intheaudiencethereweresixagriculturalrepresentatives,fiveindustryrepresentatives,sotheyhadtheirownideas.’

Onceeachdepartmentbegantounderstandthedirectioninwhichtheothersweremoving,theybegantoadjusttheirownplanstocoordinatebetter.‘Sointhisway,ineachandeverydepartment,rethinkingstarted.Ifthisdepartmentisdoingthis,Iwillhavetoadjustmyself.’

Thebiggestproblem,abarrieralldepartmentsfaced,wastheperceivednegativityandintransigenceofthetreasury.Modielaborates:

Alwaysingovernment,thefinancedepartmentisononeside,othersareontheotherside.Theyarealwaysfightingagainstthefinancedepartment,theyalwayscomplainagainstthefinancedepartment:‘Theyarenothelping,theyarenotgiving.’Somanycomplaints.Andalwaystheythinkthefinancedepartmenthasthissecrecy–itcannotbeopenedup.Isaid,‘No,nothingdoing!letmywholeteamhaveknowledgeaboutthefinancialsituation, letthemknow.’Andthefinancedepartmentgaveapresentation.Theyspoke indetailabout their limitations, their problems, everything. Then what happened? The people who were alwaysagainstthefinancedepartment,theysaid, ‘Thisisthesituation?Wewillcooperate,wewillfindaway,wewillreduceourexpenditure.’Soself-disciplinecameoutofit.Andbecauseofthatthethinkingprocesswasina singledirection.Andtheywereall feeling, ‘Yes, I amachiefministerofmydepartment, Ihavebeengivenalltheauthority.’Soitanchoredpeople,andthat’swhythisisthebasisofgoodgovernance.

WhatModihaddoneofcoursewasempowercivilservantsandgivethemasenseofresponsibility andownershipof their respectivedomains.Andyet the criticism thatGujarat’s administration was authoritarian remained. Critics said nothing movedwithout Modi’s go-ahead. He held several ministerial portfolios and, despite theattemptatempoweringbureaucrats,micromanagedallimportantdecisions.

Thisisacriticismvalidformostchiefministerswhoroutinelyholduptoadozenministerialportfoliosandkeepatightreinonthebureaucracy.ButifModiwantstobedifferent,decentralizingauthoritymustbehighonhislistofpriorities.Inanotherway though, Modi has improved the efficiency of civil servants in the state. The

‘transfer industry’ amongbureaucrats is rampant in Indiawith large sumsofmoneyexchanged for transfer of government officers. In Gujarat, however, the transferindustry has been systematically done away with and transfers are made on merit.Manycivilservantsstayintheirpostsforuptoadecadeormore,ensuringcontinuityandoversightacrossdevelopmentprogrammes.

Gujarat was now officially open for business. The prototype Resurgent GujaratexpositionModihadhostedafatefulfortnightbeforethe2002riotswastoappearinits next incarnation as a business summit designed to attract both domestic andinternational companies: Vibrant Gujarat. During the next decade, up to VibrantGujarat 2013, which saw for the first time a large presence by theChinese,55 theseeventswereheldbiennially.Despitetheunquestionablesuccesstheyhaveattractedalotofderision.Thecharge:manyofthememorandaofunderstanding(MoUs)nevermaterialize.Thisispartlytrue,andafairexaminationoftherealityisnecessary.

Theoriginalpre-riotsummitin2001raisedRs12,360crore.TheSeptember2003meetresultedineightyMoUssigned(thirty-threeofthesewouldremainunfulfilled)adding up toRs 66,000 crore.56TheFDI element of thiswas only 20 per cent andmanyofthepledgersweredomesticcompaniesalreadyoperatinginGujarat.

Atthe2005summitofVibrantGujarat,‘amoreorganizedaffair’,Rs106,160croreworthofMoUsweresigned,witheighty-nineof227eventuallyfallingbythewayside.The gross investmentwas nonetheless nearly twice that of 2003. Furthermore, thistime foreign investors were more numerous. That was more important, to Modi’smind,thantheabsolutelevelsoffinancialpromises.

The 2007 Vibrant Gujarat summit differed in that it had the backdrop ofapproachingelectionstolenditacertainreflectedcolouring.Therewasalso,relatedtotheelections,anotherinternalplottodislodgeModihatchedbydisaffectedcolleagues.It was vital for him that a success could be hailed, and he unveiled the slogan, ‘InGujarat there is no red tape, only a red carpet’! In 2007, 343MoUs57 quadrupledinvestment toRs461,835 crore in value. Itwas a good springboard for the electioncampaignandgaveModiammunitiontouseagainstanypotentialcoup:Gujarathadnever before experienced such a large intent for investment and industrialdevelopment.

CriticspointedoutthatmostoftheMoUsremainedonpaper.Officialscounteredthatinvestmentproposals,especiallyininfrastructure,hadlonggestationperiods.

In2009,ahumungoussumofRs1,200,000crorewasraised,nearlythreetimestheamountofthepreviousevent,andin2011italmostdoubledagain,toRs2,083,000crore.This time8,662MoUswere signed58, comparedwithonly eighty in2003. In2013,17,719MoUsweresigned–thefinalinvestmentfigureisstillbeingcalculated.

CriticsroutinelymocktheMoUsas‘paperinvestment’andsomeofthiscriticismisclearlyjustified.However,theinterestforeignparticipantshaveshowninsuccessiveVibrantGujarat summitshasdrawnsignificant investment to the state.Modi’sownvisitstoChinaandJapanhavemeanwhileservedtostrengthenthestate’srelationshipwithglobalinvestors.

Modi’srefusaltoengageinthetraditionalcultureofpatronagestungmany.Thiswasclear as the 2007 assembly election approached. Several were forced to sit on thesidelines, powerless, even as they basked in the reflected glory of Modi’s apparentdevelopmental and economic progress in Gujarat. Such figures ranged across thespectrum:members of the VHP, whomModi had first punished and then kept atarm’s length; some of his own MLAs, whose low estimation in Modi’s eyes waspainfully obvious to them; elements of the BJPwhowere still in disarray after the2004 Lok Sabha debacle; and most of all the man Modi had replaced in 2001,KeshubhaiPatel.

Keshubhai,blindtohisownfaultsandwoefultrackrecordofendemiccorruptionandinefficiency,stillfanciedthathewasdestinedtodislodgethe‘upstarttyrant’.HeregardedModi as autocraticwho had convertedGujarat into a ‘police’ statewith aslewofallegedfakeencounterkillingsbetween2004and2006.KeshubhaihadalargeconstituencyamongthePatelsofGujarat.HethuscarriedapowerfulcastewedgethatcouldbeinsertedintoModi’smajority.59Hisbehind-the-scenesdissentgraduallygrewlouder. It broke out into the open by August 2007. Five MLAs were promptlysuspendedonAdvani’sorders.Soonafter,KeshubhaidenouncedModiasa‘dictator’,tothedelightoftheCongress. It suitedtheireffortstofighttheGujaratelectionbysplittingthevotecaste-wise.ItseemedtheonlytactictocounterModi’spopularity.

TheCongresswas pushing itsKHAMagenda again, andwelcomedKeshubhai’s‘Patels’,whichineffectcreatedaKHAMP.SureshMehtaaddedtothepressurewhenheannouncedhewouldnotsupportModiintheelectioncampaign.AftertheelectionnothingwaseverheardfromMehtaagain.

But the Congress was taking a big risk fraternizing with BJP dissidents. Just as

Vaghela’s maladroitness had damaged the Congress in the 2002 assembly electionwhenitbroughthiminas itsstarplayer,soKeshubhaiandthegroupofmalcontentMLAsthat trailedafterhimthreatenedtomuddythedistinctnessof theCongress’soffering to the electorate. Part of preserving that distinctness meant not lettingVaghela anywhere near the campaign. But then without a clear leader, it was alsoconfusingtotheelectorateexactlywhattheCongresswasoffering.

The Congress was especially worried as Modi’s approval rating settled at analarminglyhigh60percent–remarkableforachiefministerapproachingtheendofhis second term, and in Gujarat the BJP’s third consecutive term. Unsurprisingly,whiletheCongresstargetedsmallvotingpockets,Modidecidedtoturntheelectionintoareferendumonhimself. ‘Whomdoyouwantforthenextfiveyears?’heaskedvotersagainandagain.‘Me,or…?’Allhethendidwasrollhiseyes.

TheCongresscounteredbyattemptingtoenlisttoitscausefarmerstheythoughtwereangryaboutModi’sdecisiontochargethemforpreviouslyfreeelectricity(theyhad shared a patchy supplywith themain industrial cables). Yet it turned out thatordinaryfarmers,enjoyingtheirownnewlyinstalleddomesticpowersupplies,didnotresentpayingforasteadyandreliableservice.

Thisdemonstrated the logicbehindModi’s free-market reformsandexposed theobsolescenceofthesocialisticphilosophythatthestateshouldprovideeverything,nomatterhowshoddyorintermittent.

Realizing that there was unrest among extremists marginalized by Modi, theCongress even attempted to make common cause with disaffected elements in theVHP.TheCongresshadfatallyallowedVaghelatosinkitsshipofsecularismin2002andnowriskeddoingthesameagaininevenmorespectacularfashion.Itconvenientlyforgot that to have any chance of success or even credibility in the campaign, allmentionofHindutvahadtobekeptout.ItaffordedModitheopportunitytodamagethembypointing to thecompany theCongresswaskeepingwhile at the same timeconsolidatingthelarger,moderateHinduvotebehindhim.

A sting operation byTehelka recordedBabuBajrangi of theBajrangDal –whowouldlaterbeimprisonedformurderingMuslimsin2002–boastingabouthisdeedsandclaimingthatModiwascomplicit.60TheexposébackfiredontheCongresswhenthe programme was criticized both for revealing nothing new (it was all in theNanavatiInquirythathadalreadyexoneratedModi)andforusingpeopleknowntobe his enemies. It was also lambasted for partiality, being broadcast so close to theelections.

After the official period of electioneering had begun inNovember 2007, a visit bySonia Gandhi to Gujarat, which local Congressmen believed would sprinkle somemagicdustontheircampaign,upsettheirfragileedificeofvotingalliances.InaspeechatNavsarion1DecembertoalargecrowdoftheCongressfaithful,shecalledModimaut ke saudagar (merchant of death), which clearly breached the ElectionCommissioncodeandledtoanuproar.Thepartyquicklyattemptedtoretreatfromthe outburst by saying that it was not directed atModi, although it obviouslywas.DigvijaySingh,whohadrefusedto sendaid toGujarat tohelpquell the2002riots,thenmadethingsworsebyreferringto‘Hinduterrorism’atapressconference.

IntruthitwasyetanotherinstanceofcriticismworkinginModi’sfavour.ItnowgavehimtheidealopportunitytoharanguehisopponentsforignoringMuslimterrorwhile they demonized the ordinary people of India – and especiallyGujaratis – byinvokingHinduterror.Terrorism,hedeclared,hasnoreligion.Thingshadslidbackto2002,exactlywheretheCongresshadnotwantedthemtogo.NowatralliesModiwouldasktheadoringcrowds,‘DoI,asonofGujarat,looklikeamautkasaudagar?’

‘No’,thecrowdsshoutedback.Andwitheveryresounding‘No’,theCongresswasremindedofthefatalerrorSoniahadmade.

Modi’scritics,however,wereunconvinced.TheHindumadeaconfidentassertion:

Gujarat2007istailor-madeforaCongressvictory.Thecasteequationfavoursit.SectionsoftheRSSandtheVHPareindirectlysupportingit.ThepoliceseemtobewiththeCongressandagainsttheBJP.Asmanyas50BJPrebelsareinthefray,manyofthemstrongintheirconstituencies.Teachersareangry,bureaucratsareunhappy.ItjustcannotgetanybetterfortheGrandOldParty.61

Otherswere equally dismissive ofModi’s chances: ‘Democracy is taking revenge onNarendra Modi,’ wrote The Indian Express. ‘This election may well be the longdeferred moment of truth for the man who invoked popular mandate to bypassnorms,lawsortheConstitution’.62

ThisechoedoneTVanchorwhosaid:‘Iwillbehappythatadictatorhaslost.Inademocracy,thereisnospaceforadictator.’63AnearbyexampleofanactualdictatorhadrecentlybeenavailableinPervezMusharrafacrosstheborderinPakistan,butthemedia seemeduninterested in talkingabouthim.SwapanDasguptaobservedacidly:‘Theelectionwasheldinapeacefulatmosphere.Therewasnoapparenttensionandno fear of large-scale intimidation – although some secular visitors fromDelhi andMumbaiinsistedtherewas.’64

TheElectionCommission certainly had no complaints and an optimisticmedia

seemedhappywithhowitthoughtthepollingwasprogressing.‘Allexitpollsafterthefirst-phase voting in87 constituencies (of182) forecast a vote-swing away from theBJP,’notedthejournalistPrafulBidwai.‘SuchadefeatwillbeaseismicshockfortheBJPandahistoricsetbackfortheSanghParivar.’

ThereportingonmostTVnetworkswentalongthesamelines,havingdiscoveredthat ‘In a dramatic last-day swing in the satta bazar, bookies there have swungsuddenly againstNarendraModi. In fact 24hours before the vote count, theynowgivetheCongresstheedgeoverModiintheraceforpower.’65

Astheysayattheracetrack,youshouldneverarguewiththebookies.Thenagain,asoneTVanchorconcluded,‘Remembertheoldadage,theonewhoisthemostproudalwaysfinisheslast.’

Hindsightisallverywell,butModi’simpendingvictorywasneverthelessplainforall who wanted to see. He had done well in Gujarat during his second term, andthough it remained a work in progress, his mantra of ‘less government, moregovernance’wasgainingtraction.TheBJPwon117outof182seats,upsettingmostforecasts.Morethanthat,ModiseemedtohavecapturedthepopularmoodnotonlyofGujaratisasin2002,butofmuchofthecountry.Atthesametime,itwasclearthatpeoplewereenamouredofModibutnotnecessarilyof theBJP,aphenomenonthatwouldpersistandhaveconsequencesinthefuture.

TheBJP’stallyof117seatswasonlytenfewerthaninthepost-riotatmosphereof2002whenGujaratwasgalvanizedagainstoutsideinfluences.Thistime,evenwithaconcertedmedia campaign and a whole bag of tricks unleashed by theOppositionagainstModi,hehadstillwonahandsomeoverallmajority,withanunprecedentedlylow anti-incumbency vote share decline of 0.5 per cent in north Gujarat.66Modi’smajority inhisownconstituency increased from75,000 to87,000votes.ThePatelshadprovenindifferenttoKeshubhai’sbrandofschemingdiscontent.

ModialsowreckedtheCongressparty’sKHAMstrategy.InSaurashtraandKutch,where ithadbeenpredicted that farmers,Dalitsandtribalswouldvoteagainsthim,Modihadtakentwenty-sixseatsfromtheCongress,withtheBJPgainingelevenofthethirteenseatsreservedforscheduledcastes.EvenMuslimshadbeguntovoteforModi:it isbelievedthatupto25percentofMuslimsvotedfortheBJP,apercentagethatwould rise further in the2012assemblypoll. Somethingwas clearlyhappening thatthemediaandtheCongresscouldnotyetcomprehend.

AsifaKhanwas a journalist before taking on a job as spokesperson for theGujaratCongressparty.SheworkedforitforfouryearsbeforecrossingovertotheBJPshortlybefore Modi was re-elected for a third time in 2012. As a Muslim, she had beenpuzzledbywhysomanyMuslimswerevotingforthe‘enemy’.

It was, she discovered, because of two things: under Modi, development washappeningeverywhereandpoorerMuslimswerebenefitinghugelyfromit–itwasthewealthierMuslimswho still felthesitant tovote for theBJP.Secondly, theBJPwasresponsive at the grass roots to Muslim concerns – unlike, says Asifa, Congresscouncillors–andtheyweregiventheirfullrightsascitizensratherthanbeingtreatedasaminority.

‘Asanoppositionparty,yourjobistoblameandcriticizetheBJP,’shesays.‘Myjobwas to find faults withMrModi and I couldn’t find any. In fact, I started findingfaultswithmyown leaders and sayingwhy aren’twedoingwhat they aredoing?…Becausetheleaderworks,everybodyunderhimisfunctioning.WhyelsewouldpeoplecomeoutinsuchlargenumberstovotefortheBJP?TheMuslimsdidsobecausetheydevelopedanactiveinterestingovernance.’67

Accordingtooneestimate,duringthe2007campaignModiaddressed155Gujaratconstituencies and spokedirectly to crowds totalling thirtymillionpeople– aplainmajority of voters in the state.68NoCongressman achieved the smallest fraction ofthis.Modi tailored each of his speeches to its particular audience, proving that heknewwhomhewastalkingto.Asoneobserverpointedout: ‘TofishermenhespokeabouthisSagarKheduscheme,totribalshedescribedhisVanBandhuplan,andthesubject of his talk towomenwasMahila Sammelan.’ Speakingofwomen, all of theCongressparty’s femalecandidates lost,while fifteenof the twenty-twoBJPwomenstandingforthe2007electionwon.

In addition to personally addressing crowds,Modi had summoned the growingpower of social media and crafted an online campaign movement to contactpredominantlyyoungvoterswhoused the Internet in theirdaily lives.Atonepoint6,500 members of the Orkut Internet community led a silent march throughAhmedabadprotestingagainstthetreatmentofModiinthemainstreammedia.Modiwasbuildingloyaltythroughtrustandcommunicationineverywayhecouldeveninapre-Facebookandpre-Twitterera.Itwasastrategythatwould,inyearsandelectionstocome,multiplymanifoldacrossexplodingsocialmedia.

ForModi the2007victorywasmore important thanhiscareer-saving2002win.

Theearlier electionhadbeenanangryonewithvoters standingbehindhimagainstthe hostility toGujarat coming from themedia and political opponents.This timevoterswerejudginghimfarmoreimpartially,onarecordoffiveyearsofgovernance.

SincehisdaysasanRSSworkerandlaterBJPback-roomplanner,Modihadshownhewasthoroughandmethodical.Heusedthesequalitiesalongwithhis intuitiontogethispoliciesexecuted.Heoftenwentagainstconventionandasaresultfrequentlycreatedfrictionwiththosewhoopposedhim.ForthatreasonModialwayshad,andprobablyalwayswillhave,enemies:emollienceisnothismiddlename.

Wit and self-possession were usually enough to see him through – he is anexceptionalorator–andevenwhentheydidnot,aswithhis‘exile’fromGujaratinthe1990s,healwayshadafallbackplan.Modibelievesthatifaspecifictaskisdonewiththecorrectpressureappliedandintherightorder,apredictableresultwilloccur.Thatwas the reason the riots shook him to his core. The sequence of events unwoundchaoticallyandhisactionsdidnotlead,atleasttobeginwith,toexpectedoutcomes.

That experiencemarkedModi, andhe dedicated the years of his second term aschiefministertocarefullyapplyinghiscustomarymethodstotheeconomyofGujarat,to development and to governance. If it didn’t work, his whole understanding ofpoliticsandgovernmentwasflawed.SinceDecember2002themeasureshehadputinplaceappearedtobefunctioningandmuchhadbeenachieved,butultimatelytheonlyproofofthatwasintheballotbox.

WasModi doing the right thing?Were his theories and assumptions, not onlyaboutpoliticsbutaboutpeople,correct?Werehisdeeplyheldbeliefstherightones?Modiisnotamangiventoself-doubt,butevenso,everythingwasridingontheresultofthe2007election.Ifthepeoplehadrejectedhim,hewouldhavebeenfinishedasapoliticianofconsequence.

After he won in 2007, Modi was observed for the first time to have somehowsoftened.Hedidnotgloatbutthankedvotersandallthethousandsofpartyworkerswhohadcontributedtothevictory.Hesaidthatiftheywereinvisibletoothers,itwasbecausethemediadidnothavecameras‘withgoodenoughresolutiontospotthem’.Modi even forgave themutinousKeshubhaiPatel,not thathe expectedkindness inreturn, and sure enough receivednone.Duringhis various speechesof thanksModiwouldoftenstumbleandbeleftspeechless.Hewouldstandinfrontofhisaudience,silently lookingat theceiling,before resuming.69 It showed thatbeneath theclinicalfaçadelayamanwithcomplexemotions.

WhatwastheeffectofModi’svictoryatthenationallevel?IthadonlyasuperficialeffectontheBJPoutsideGujarat.Thepartywasdelightedandconfidentinthewake

ofthe2007election,butultimatelyModi’spurposefulnessandsuccesswashisandnottheirs.Nationally theBJP remainedwithoutdefinitedirection and itwas inevitablethattheheadyimpactofthe2007assemblyelectionwouldwearoff.

With the 2009 Lok Sabha election looming, the BJP made the fatal mistake ofdecidingthatemulatingModi’stacticsofwinninginGujaratwouldworkforthematthenationallevelwithL.K.Advaniasprimeministerialcandidate.ThecampaignforthefourteenthLokSabhapollmadeuseofallthetechnologiesModihadpioneered:Advanibecamethefaceofthepartyonall theposters,asModihadinGujarat.Thecartoonish‘Modimasks’hadbeenajoyous,spontaneouscrazeintheGujaratelectionsand everybody tried to get their hands on one to the point they became rare andcoveted.

Advani made masks available too, but not this time in response to any publicdemand.Instead,dutifulpartyworkerswanderedaroundwiththemaskofhisfaceontheirs. In an attempt to ‘get downwith the youth’, officialwebsites and blogswerelaunched.ThepartymappedoutanexhaustiveInternetstrategytohooveruponlineattentionvotes.70ThecelebrationsthataccompaniedAdvani’scrowningastheBJP’sprimeministerial candidate were scarcely less than if he had already become primeminister, so infectiouswas the feeling of inevitable success.What could possibly gowrong?

Alot,cametheanswer.Modi’scommunicationshadgrownorganicallyoutofyearsof interactionswith the citizens ofGujarat.Hismethodshaddevelopedorganicallyandvotersknewtheywerebackedbyaction.Modihadworkedconsistentlyhardtoearnthetrustofpeople.Advaniwasamuch-respected figurebuthewasnotgettingany younger. During the Lok Sabha campaign, Advani called Prime MinisterManmohanSingh‘weak’–andhewas–butin2009,aheadofthecorruptionchargesthat would engulf him in UPA-2, Manmohan Singh was a middle-class icon. TheBJP’scampaignwaswoeful,andeachforayagainsttheCongressresultedinaspeedycounterpunch. Modi sat out the 2009 Lok Sabha election and concentrated onGujarat,bidinghistime.

Itwasn’tonlyAdvani’sagethatwasagainsthim.AsSanjeevNayyarpointedout,71thekeyerroroftheBJPcampaignwasitsbetrayalofthethingsithadpreviouslystoodfor.

Advanihadcoinedtheterm‘pseudo-secularism’todefinethewaythattheCongresspanderedtotheminorityvotebank,givingspecialdispensationtoMuslimsandothergroups.TheBJPhad valiantly upheld theprinciple that all citizens shouldbe equalunderthe law,even if inpracticethismeant losingtheminorityvote.Now,though,Advaniwentforasofterposition,thinkingthatitwoulddrawtheminorityvotefromtheCongress.

AllthathappenedwasthattheBJP’scoreconstituencydriftedaway.MuslimsdidnottrustAdvani–eitherdespite,orbecauseof,hisvisittotheJinnahMausoleuminPakistanandtheremarkshemadethere.TheystayedwiththeCongress.Anelectoralcatastropheensued.TheBJPwonamere116seats,twenty-twofewerthanin2004.Itsnationalvoteshareplungedto18.80percent–thelowestintwodecades.

Indianpoliticsissolabyrinthinethatironiescanbefoundwhereveronecarestolook.But surely one of the richest in 2009 was that while the BJP toiled against theCongress,ModiinGujaratwastransforminghisconceptof‘Indiafirst’intoasupple,all-embracing and attractive national identity that would have inclusiveness in itsgovernmentalandphilosophicalDNA.Modihadmadethe simpledecisionthat thejobofgovernmentwastoworkforcitizens,nottoenthronepoliticiansandlinetheirpocketsortoindulgeinextremesofprejudice.

The Congress saw thatModi and not Advani was the existential danger to theDelhidynasty.Thiswaswhy,assoonastheelectionwasconcluded,thebiggunsonitsforedeckswivelledinthedirectionofGujarat.

A

9

DEVELOPMENTANDGOVERNANCE

Whenamaniseducated,oneindividualgetseducated,butwhenawomaniseducated,anentirefamilygetseducated.–M.K.Gandhi

2011SURVEYCONDUCTEDBYPoliticalandEconomicRiskConsultancyofHongKongfoundthatIndiawasthemostover-regulatedcountryintheworld,andthat

its rules ‘were complex and non-transparent, while standards and certificationsprocedureswereonerous’.1

The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto established an index to rate theeconomic freedom of countries – with a strong correlation to their growth andprosperity–bymeasuringhowlongittakestoovercomevariousbureaucratichurdles.Theleastprosperouscountriesarealmostalwaysthemostrule-boundandareusuallyautocratic,dictatorial,African,oramixtureofthethree.2

Forafreeanddemocraticcountry,India’smetricsareextremelypoor.3TheWorldBank’s‘DoingBusinessSurvey’,whichtakesitscuefromdeSoto’sresearch,foundthatinIndiaitcantakesixweekstoregisterpropertyorabusiness(amatterofdaysintheUKandtheUS),‘almost200daystoobtainaconstructionpermit,over1,400daystoenforceacontractandsevenyearstocloseabusiness’.4

Bad governance impedes individual aspirations and restrains the country frommaturingasaworldpower.OrdinarypeopleinIndiaknowwhattheproblemsareandbadlywantthemsolved.Buttheirpowerlessness inthefaceofaloofauthoritygratesthe most. Repeatedly, across the country, across demographics, the complaint is ofpoorandcorruptgovernance.

When opaque and selectively applied regulations are in place, bribery andcorruption thrive. One reader’s comment in theEconomic Times about theWorld

Banksurveyexplainedthesituationwithvexedandtouchingclarity:‘Theycouldhaveadded that apart from being over-regulated, India is also the most under-governedcountry.Thelawsandregulationsareonlyforthosewhowanttofollowthem,othersuse the “rupee” license to freely dowhat theywish to do.Onebig reason is lack ofaccountability among bureaucrats, who have enormous discretionary powers vestedwiththem.’

Thissituationobviouslycouldnotexistwithoutthetacitapprovalofpoliticiansinpower–otherwise,overaperiodofdecades,theywouldhaveworkedtoatleastamendArticle311oftheConstitutionwhichguaranteeseffectiveimmunitytogovernmentemployees.5 While governments of different ideological stripes have remainedcomfortablyensconced,governancehasdecayed.

Ifsubstantialchangeistooccurandallowhigherstandardsofgovernance,severalsteps are necessary: one, ensuring greater economic freedom through slashing aburdensomebureaucracy;two,reducingdiscretionarypowerstominimizecorruption;three,enhancingtransparency;andfour,mandatingtime-bounddecisionmaking.Yettheopposite is the case across the country and so a governancedeficit continuouslywidens.

Modi calls himself ‘a non-political chief minister’. His favourite slogan is ‘lessgovernment,moregovernance’.Butisittrue?

WhenModi became chiefminister ofGujarat inOctober 2001, he immediatelyembarkedonwhatwereessentially‘supply-side’reforms.Thisreferstotheideathatbymaking it easier for people to produce goods and services – to supply the needs ofindividuals and industry – the economy will be stimulated and growth will occur,alongwithlowerpricesandhigherincomes,oratleastrelativelyhigherincomes.

Thebestwayinwhichgrowthcanbestimulatedisnotdeficitfundingbutreducingtaxesandregulations–byslimmingdowngovernmentandreducingitsinfluenceandreach.Thestatecanalsohelpbyinvestingininfrastructureandincentivesthatallowpeople to work more easily and more efficiently: roads, irrigation, education andhealth care. By stimulating growth it can then sustain investment-focused budgetdeficits,asGujarathastriedtodo.6

Supply-side economics is regarded as rightwingmainly because it implies smallergovernmentorlessregulation.Thestatestepsbackfromtryingtodoeverythingandtrustsitscitizensandthemarketstomakethecorrectdecisions.Itisaxiomaticamongthose on the Right – such as America’s Republicans or Britain’s Tories – that theindividual knows best how to spendhismoney, allocate capital efficiently, and thatgovernmentspendingotherpeople’smoneyleadstopoorspendingchoicesandwaste.

ThustheRightfavoursempowermentoverentitlement,ordevelopmentoverdoles.7

Left socialists distrust supply-side economics because it believes ordinary peopleneedgovernmentdirectionandinvolvementoneveryleveltoprotectthemfromthearbitrarypowerofcapitalthathasno‘socialconscience’andprofitasitssolemotive.The Left orCentre-Left, broadly speaking, believes thatmarket-driven growth willinevitablybeunequalandserveonlytheownersofcapital.Any‘trickledown’benefitstothepoorwillbesmallanddisproportionateandpublicassetswill fall intoprivatehands.

The government, theLeft believes,must therefore plan and provide to fulfil therightsof itspeople to food,employmentandhousing,andtothwartcapitalistswithtaxes and regulations. Social progress through big, responsible government is theobjective.

Incontrasttothissystemofbenevolententitlement,theCentre-Rightbelievesthatsmall government is empowering and that the tendency towards ever-greatergovernmentcontrolandlegislationstranglesgrowth,inhibitsfreetradeandresultsindiminutionof individual rights.Butas theUSpoliticalcommentatorP.J.O’Rourkeremarkedcaustically:‘TheRepublicansalwayssaythatbiggovernmentdoesn’twork.Thentheygetelectedandproveit.’

Clearlytherearetwosidestothestory.

Modi rose fromwithin the broadCentre-Left economic consensus that dominatedpoliticsinIndiasinceIndependence.However,hiseconomicphilosophyhaschangedsince he took over as chief minister of Gujarat. He is interesting because hisbackgroundisintheRSSwhosepoliticaloutlookremainsculturallyconservativeandyeteconomicallysocialistic.TheRSShasshownlittleideologicalinterestinespousingfreemarkets. Itbelieves in theauthorityof thegroup,not the individual,whichhascausedModiproblemsinthepast.

YetclearlyhehadbeenimpressedbythereformsenactedbyManmohanSinghandNarasimhaRaointhe1990s.HearrivedinGujaratalreadybubblingwithsupply-sideenergyfullofideasaboutindividualempowerment,thebasisofhisemergingpoliticalandeconomicphilosophy.WhathehasattemptedtodooverthepasttwelveyearsinGujaratisremovegovernmentfrompeople’slivesandreplaceitwithgovernance.

‘WhenIfirsttookcharge,theproblemIwasfacinghereinGujaratwasthesameproblemmycountry is facing [now],’ saysModicontemplatively. ‘Theproblemsare

notnew.TheproblemswerethereinGujarat.Theconfidencelevelswereverylow.’Yetargumentscontinuetorageoverwhethersignificant improvements inoverall

developmentinGujarathaveactuallytakenplaceunderModi.HumanrightsactivistShabnamHashmirecentlyissuedthissummingupofModi’s

timeinGujarat:

ModiprojectshimselfasthemanwhoisdevelopingGujaratinaveryfastpace.Butheispumpinginhugeamountofmoneyforthispublicitypropaganda.Almost40percentofpopulationthereisunderpoverty.Minority groups including tribals,Dalits andMuslims are considered as second grade citizens inModi’sGujarat.HeisnodifferentfromHitler.8

The focus on Modi’s development and governance record is important because itcouldbethe‘model’hisputativeprimeministershipcouldsoonadaptfortherestofIndia.ButhasthemodelworkedinGujarat?

As the general election approaches, the perpetual controversy surroundingModihas shifted fromhis ‘masterminding’ the2002 riots to the rolehehasplayed in thedevelopmentandprogressofGujaratsince2001.IsHashmicorrect inclaimingthatalmost40percentofGujarat’spopulationlivesinpoverty,orthatMuslimsandDalitsare treated as second-class citizens? It is necessary to examine the official figures todiscernobjectively the actual stateof affairs, freeofpolitical or ideological bias.Butfirst it should be explained how Modi changed things and what policies wereimplementedtobringabout,forbetterorworse,thechangeshemade.

Modi first announced publicly in Delhi in early 2003, a fortnight after hisDecember2002electionvictory,whatformanyyearshadbeenbrewinginhismind.Hetravelledtothecapitalon9JanuaryfortheinauguralPravasiBharatiyaDivas–theNon-residentIndian(NRI)Day.There,inameetingwithNRIs,heunveiledhisplantotakeadvantageofnewcomputertechnologytodevelope-governancewithwhichhesoughttobringtransparencytohisadministration.Inotherwords,withhisfirstpost-electionannouncementModiwasplacinggovernanceattheapexofhisambitionsinoffice. Politics was not mentioned. Next, he outlined five pillars of a developmentpolicyforGujarat.Thefivewere:water,energy,people,educationandsecurity.

Gujaratnaturally alreadyhad inplacepolicies thatdealtwith all these areas.ButModi wished to transform them. Specifically, his development agenda brought toGujarat theconceptofan inclusive ‘India first’ ideology. Ithadbeenevolving inhismind, he says, for a while.Modi called the five pillars ‘shaktis’, Sanskrit for ‘sacredforce’:theoriginatingenergyandperpetualdynamismoftheuniverse.ItisimaginedasfeminineandpersonifiedthroughthegoddessKali.Notably,itisthefeminineforceof

shaktithatisresponsibleforallchangeandliberation.AsSandeepSinghpointsout inThirdCurve, it is this ideaof the feminine force

thathasactuallybeenattheheartofallthechangeModihastriedtobringaboutinGujarat. He has even reduced transfer tax on properties and businesses if they areregistered to a woman instead of aman.Modi often emphasizes how India suffersfromitswastageoftheintelligenceandtalentof50percentofthepopulationwhenwomenareunabletomaketheirfullcontributiontosociety.9

Modi translatedhisproposedprogrammeof changeanddevelopment into termsthat would be instantly understandable at an almost subconscious cultural level,entwining themythologicalwith the technological – an organic conception that hecalculatedwouldbudandthenblossomoverthenextdecade.

Taking the five shakti pillars, he grouped them under a collective name,‘panchamrut’.Unlike‘shakti’,whichisasuniversalasconceptsget,panchamrutcomesfrom everyday life and holds within it the elements of the daily puja, or domesticoffering:milk,dahi(yogurt),ghee(clarifiedbutter),honeyandsugar.Themixtureoftheseritualingredientsiscalled‘panch’(‘five’:EnglishretainstheIndo-Europeanrootinwordssuchas‘pentagon’)buttheindividualingredientscarrytheirownsymbolismandguidetheevolutionofthesoul.

Moditooktheideaofthesefivenectarsofthedailydevotionalandinserteditintohis development programme so that each shakti took on the identity of one of theelementsofthepanchamrut.HenamedthedevelopmentofwaterresourcesJalShakti;the energy programme was Urja Shakti; people, or ‘human resources’, became JanShakti; Gyan Shakti was to refer to the power of knowledge and education; andsecurity would be Raksha Shakti. As each was a shakti, constant movement andimprovementwas implicit in them.Andaspartof a cohesivedevelopment ‘puja’, itimpliedthattheywereallinterrelatedanddependentononeanotherforoveralleffect.

DevelopmentinModi’sconceptionwasdynamicandinterrelatedandenfoldedintoacivilizationalethos,butatasub-religiouslevel–relatedtoculturalideasfamiliarevento thenon-religious Indian, in fact to anyone irrespectiveof religion.Ashe toldmereflectively:

I am aware that water, and other natural things in society, from centuries the thinking on these is wellingrainedinoursociety, inIndianculture,our lifestyle.Iwantedtousethesameideas.IfIusedthesameideas,Iwouldgetchange.IfIamgoingtoinjectsomethingnewwithwhichtheyarenotfamiliaritwilltakealotoftime,soIwillhavetousetheirnaturalthinking.

In 2003, fresh water was flowing along the Sabarmati river through Ahmedabad,transforming the prospects of the city andhinting at awider transformationof thelandscapeofGujarat.The economic transformationhadbeen set inprocess, even ifwith small steps, at the Resurgent Gujarat exposition in 2002 and would continuewithVibrantGujarat,scheduledforSeptemberthatyear.

Nowitwastheturnofruralareastobegivenafillip.Already,thedammingoftheNarmada had allowed irrigation of thousands of hectares of arid farmland – a firstinstance of Jal Shakti in action.Water is for everyone but the roughly fourmillionfarmers ofGujarat, a predominantly agricultural state, also needed power. For this,under theUrjaShakti aspectof thepanchamrut,Modi launchedhis ‘lightedvillage’JyotigramScheme(JGS)inSeptember2003tobringdependableandsteadyelectricitytoeverysingleoneofthe18,000ruralvillagesofthestate.10

Suchambitionwasnotonlyphysicallyandtechnologicallydaunting,italsoflewinthe face of accepted politicalwisdom. Indian farmers everywhere constituted a votebank, and still do.Theyhadbeenbribedwith free electricity across the country fordecades.Thissupplywas‘industrial’,forpoweringpumpsandothermachinery.Itwasalso typically ramshackle, and much produce was ruined by surges and cuts in thesupply that meant, for example, irrigation pumps could not be depended on. Inaddition, theofficialblindeyeallowed farmers– thewealthieronesatanyrate– tostealelectricityfromthemainindustrialsupplyfordomesticusage.

Indian agriculture absorbs a significant portion of total electricity generated, sogivingitawayfornothingtofarmersmeanthugefinancialdamagetothepowersector.Yetcharging farmers forpower seemedelectorally impossible: theycouldeasilyholdpoliticianstoransomthroughtheirinfluentialruralvote.Anexpensive(becauseitwasfree)andinefficientsystemofdistributionensuredthatgovernmentscouldnotaffordto improve the country’s power grid infrastructure. It also meant most powercompanieswereineffectbankruptandthereforestate-subsidized,whilecitizensoftenlivedindarknesscausedbyerraticandweaksupplies, iftheywereevenconnectedtothegridinthefirstplace.

Modi’s plan to change this was counter-intuitive. First, he decided that becauseelectricitywasvaluablepeopleshouldpayforit–includingfarmers.Thisstrategymayhaveseemedlikepoliticalhara-kirievenafteramajorelectionvictory,andthedetailsappearedsuicidal:notonlywouldhechargefarmersfortheirelectricity,butinsteadofallowingthemtohaveitforallthedaylightperiodhewouldrestrictthesupplytoonly

eighthoursoutoftwenty-four.Itwasalmostdesignedtoprovokeaninsurrection.Theplan, costingRs1,250crore,was to lay another completenetworkofpower

lines–adomesticone–alongsidetheagricultural supply.Theoverall systemwouldusepowerful400-voltthree-phaseelectricalpower(insteadofthericketysinglephase)which would stop ruining farm and pumping equipment, while also providingpreviously‘dark’villageswithareliableandcontinuoussupplyatasingleor220-volttwo-phaselevel.

‘We are giving farmers a subsidy of Rs 1,700 crores every year,’ theminister forenergy,SaurabhPatel, reportedat the time. Itwas simplyunaffordable.Nowenergywould cost farmers money but if the plan worked they would have reliable,uninterruptedpower.

Foratimeitseemedasifrevoltwasindeedonthecardsbecausethepowerfaminewas linked to an already acute water shortage. Without continuous power free ofchargefordrawingwaterfromtubewells,howwouldthecropssurvive? ‘Thecanofwormshasbeenopened.ForhowlongwilltheModigovernmentbeabletocontainthe crisis?’ wrote Dionne Bunsha in Frontline in February 2004, shortly after theJyotigramSchemehadgonelive.11

‘Actually,’recallsModi,‘whenItookchargeaschiefminister,Ihadalotoffrictionwiththefarmers.’Headds:

AndevensomepeoplewhobelongedtotheSanghParivarwerealsoagainstme,becausehereinGujarat,thefarmers are always fighting for electricity. I told them that this is not the real solution. Forget aboutelectricity;thinkaboutwater.IfyouwanttofightagainstModi,pleasefightontheissueofwater,notontheissue of electricity, because for the last thirty or forty years you are always doing agitations for therequirement of electricity and not a single government is in a position to provide you with sufficientelectricity.

Modiheldfastandfaceddownthefarmers’rebellion.Meteredelectricitysoonprovedthe sceptics wrong.12 The new infrastructure, after limited trials in themost needydistricts, was put in place across the entire state in the space of 1,000 days.Manyfarmers at first disliked the restricted hours, and therewas undeniable hardship forcertainmarginal farmerswho found it temporarilymoredifficult tobuywater fromtube-wellpumperswhenpricesroseasaresultofmeteringandrestrictedsupply.Yetsomethinghappenedthatchangedtheirattitude:

Farmersfoundtheycouldnotmakeunauthorizeduseofpower;theyalsodislikedtheeffectiverationinginforce.But then, for the first time they enjoyed largelyuninterruptedpower supply at full voltage along astrictly adhered schedule. Farmers were also happy that they were spared the very high repair andmaintenancecostthatpoorpowersupplyimposedonthem.13

In2001,whenModi came topower,Gujarat faceda shortfallofnearly2,000MW.From a power deficit state, Gujarat is now a power surplus state. By providinguninterrupted power to all households, Gujarat under the Jyotigram Yojana hastransformed lives in rural Gujarat. The scheme, launched in 2003, covers 18,000villages.

In rural areas where milking buffalo mechanically had been a hit-and-miss affairbecause of power cuts, there was now regular electricity supply and a surge inproduction. The animals reportedly even gave extra milk because they werecomfortable standing beneath cooling electric fans. Schoolchildren also foundthemselves able to concentrate in classrooms that summer heat usually madeinsufferable.

Likewise, workers in shops and homes, hospitals, colleges and workshopsdiscovered that in addition to feeling cool for the first time, their equipmentfunctioned reliably. Tailors were surprised that despite the new charges they couldprofitbyboltingelectricmotorsontotheirsewingmachines.Newbusinessessuchasdiamondpolisherswerestarted(ormovedoutfromtownsforthelowerruralrents),and existing businesses increased their profitability not only because of dependablepowerbutalsobecausetheycouldplanandscheduleefficiently.

Thishadaknock-oneffectthatslowedtherateofmigrationfromruraltourbanareasasthecountrysidebecamemoreprosperoustolivein:drinkingwaterandstreetlighting improved,andpeoplebegantoenjoytelevision, labour-savingdevices in thekitchen,refrigerationtopreservefood,andofcoursethecoolingbreezeofelectricfansinGujarat’ssearingsummers.

Secondary agribusinesses such as rice and flourmills savedmoney thanks to thenewelectricalsupply–asmuchasathirdoftheirpowerbills–whilesimultaneouslybecomingmoreproductive.A2008reportontheJyotigramSchemeconcludedthatit‘offers a case study of astute political management by intervening in an arenasurchargedwithanimatedmasspolitics’.

In our assessment, JGS has pioneered the real-time co-management of electricity and groundwaterirrigation.Ithasunshackleddomesticandnon-farmruralelectricitysupplyfromtheclutchesofaninvidiouspolitical economy of farm power subsidies… JGS has transformedwhatwas a highly degenerate power-pricing-cum-supplyregimeintoarationalone.14

The Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited (GSECL) recouped its

infrastructural outlay in only two years. ‘When I took charge,’ says Modi, ‘myelectricitycompanyhadanannuallossofRs2,500crore.Wehavenotincreasedanytariff.WenowhavethehighestpowergenerationinIndia.Therearesomanystates,they don’t even have 5,000 megawatt power. In only one district of this state wegenerated10,000megawattspower–onedistrict.’

Asapointofcomparison,Pakistanproducesjustover13,000megawatts(MW)ofusable power. ‘Yes,’Modi smiles. ‘One district inGujarat produces nearly asmuchpowerasPakistan.’15

As Saurabh Patel summed it up: ‘Gujarat has achieved 149 per cent increase inpower generation since 2001. In 2001, our installed power generation capacity was8,657MW,which increased149percent in thepast12years to reach21,567MWnow.’16In2012–13,totalpowergenerationwasmorethan23,887MW.17

From being as good as bankrupt, GSECL’s revenues rose from Rs 850 crore in2004–05toRs1,473crorein2008–09.In2010,itssurpluswasRs123crore.Peoplewere happily spending more on electricity because they were making much moremoneyfromtheirbusinesseswithreliablepower:overheadswereupbutprofitmoreso. Growth was occurring. They were working and also entertaining and studyingmorebecausetheeveningswerenolongerdark.Acivic(aswellaseconomicandevenpsychological) revolutionhad takenplace:people saw thatpaying for electricitywasfar superior to having unreliable electricity free of charge.AndGujarat nowhad somuch electricity to spare it began to sell it to other states, which helped to keepdomesticcostsdown.

Jyotigramwas the beginning of the panchamrut transformationofGujarat.But thefiveshaktipillarswereinseparableinModi’splan.Soitwasthatwhenelectrification,part of Urja Shakti, had been conceived, it was twinned with Jal Shakti, thetransformation of Gujarat’s water resources. Electricity was congruent with waterbecauseoftubewells,whichwerebeingpumpeddrybeforepeoplehadtostartpayingforelectricity.Besides,powercutsoftenresetirrigationprocessesbacktozerosothatwaterwasconsistentlywasted.By linkingelectrificationwithaplantorevolutionizethe husbanding and distribution of water, a related and self-reinforcing positivechange–avirtuouscircle–couldbesetinmotion.

Aswithalltheshaktis,itwasdonewiththeessentialcooperationandinvolvementofordinaryfolkthemselves.Enthusiasm,commitmentandsupportwereredoubledby

peoplefeelinglinkedtotheimprovementstheysawhappeningaroundthem.Modi’sappealonDoordarshan, in themidstof theworstphaseof the2002riots, comes tomind: hands folded, he had pleaded, ‘Come, help the government.’ Now peopleunderstooditwasintheirintereststodoso.

Gujaratenjoysonly80cmofannualrainfallandjusteightofits185riversstaywetallyearround.Thestatecovers6.39percentofIndia’sterritorybuthasonly2.28percent of its water, and that toomostly in the south. It was worse before the SardarSarovar dam was activated in 2001. Lack of water was a principal contributor topovertyandunderdevelopmentinthestate.Droughtswereendemic.

Thewaypowerwasbeingusedonlyexacerbatedthesituationandfurtherdepletedthe water table: a negative resource loop. Often there were water riots. The statetreasurywasbeingdrainedbysupplyingdrinkingwaterbytruckandeventraintoitscitizensandcattle(recallModi’syouthfulidea,describedinanearlierchapter,tomovethecattletothewaterinstead).

As thewater table slowly sank, the remaining liquid becamemore pollutedwithgreaterandgreaterconcentrationsofminerals,chemicalsandtraceelements.Fluorosishadbecomeamajorproblem,leadingtoillnessanddeformity.Modi’sJalShaktiwastoactonboththepotableandagriculturalwaterproblems.

Soonafterhiselectionwinin2002,the‘State-WideDrinkingWaterGrid’begantobelaidacrossGujarat.Almost2,000kmofwatermains,115,000kmofsubsidiarypipes,11,000watertowersandanequalnumberofsumpsandreservoirswere,liketheJyotigramelectricitygrid, speedily installed.Over150watertreatmentandfiltrationplants,andmorerecentlycoastaldesalinationplants,ensuredthat2,250millionlitresofdrinkablewaterreached10,000villagesonadailybasis.Again,nothingonsuchascaleorwith such speedhadbeen seenor evenattempted in Indiabefore.Fluorosisrapidlydeclined,andreverseosmosisbeforelongrenderedthewatersafeagain.

Depopulationwasaverted.‘WewerethinkingwehadminusgrowthinthedesertdistrictofKutch,’Modisays.‘Minusgrowth–peoplewereleavingthedistrict.Todaythey are coming back.’The infrastructure quickly paid for itself through savings onroad and rail distribution.Costs fell from almost Rs 43.6 crore in 2000–01 beforeModitookofficetounderRs1.4croreby2008–09.18

Again the help and involvement of citizens were encouraged. The Water andSanitation Management Organization devolved responsibility to the local level,enabling village committees to manage their own facilities and water conservationschemes.

As drinking water supply improved, agricultural supply was also replenished. A

programme was begun to construct 113,000 check dams (small dams across waterchannels that irrigate a maximum of 10 hectares, built through the Sardar PatelParticipatoryWaterConservationScheme),stockpiling56,000sandbagstores–‘boribunds’–foruseintheeventoffloodstotrapwater,diggingquarterofamillionnewfarmpondsanderecting60,000otherstructures.19

Everydropofwaterwasnewlyclassifiedasprecious.Farmerswereeducatedtoseethetransformativeeffectsofeffectivewaterconservation,orpaanibachao.Ithasbeenestimated that if India conserved just 30 per cent of its rainfall, the countrywouldhavenowatershortages.

After the initial infrastructural effort of ‘microwater harvesting’, the next phasebegan–ofteachingfarmershowtomicro-irrigate,usingfarsmallerquantitiesofwatertoattainthesameeffects.DripirrigationwasthemessagespreadbythenewlycreatedGujaratGreenRevolutionCompany.Thetechnologysavesbothwaterandfertilizerby allowing water to drip slowly to the roots of plants through valves, pipes andtubing.Itsgeniusistomoistenonlytheminimumnecessaryamountofsoilaroundtheplantitself.

Modisoldtheideatofarmersbyusinglanguagetheycouldunderstand.‘Imagine,’hesaid,‘tryingtofeedababybydunkingitinapailofmilk.’

Itoldthem,ifyourchildisnotwell,hisweightisnotincreasing,andyouhaveonebucketofmilk,andifyourchildistakingabathinthatmilk,willhishealthbeimproved?No.Ifyouwanttoimprovethehealthofyourchild,youwillhavetogivehimadropofmilkeveryhour.Thenthemilkwillgointohisbodyandgoodhealthwillbethere.Simplyifhebathesinthemilk,thebodywillnotgetanybenefit.Inthesameway,whenyougrowthecroponthefarm,don’tthinkthatthefloodwaterwillstrengthenyourplant.Onlythedrip will strengthen your plant, so if you want to strengthen your plant you will have to use the sametechniquewhichyouareusingforyourchildren.

As he speaks, Modi becomes animated. It is clear nothing pleases him more thanreflectingonhowevensimpleinnovationcanimprovepeoples’lives.

Dripirrigationrequiresspecialequipment,evenifit’sonlyspeciallyadaptedhoses.Aloansystemrequiring just5percentdownpaymentfromfarmersanda50percentstate subsidy ensured its rapid spread. Itnotonly savedvastquantitiesofwater andimproved agricultural yield, but cut electricity consumption yet further. In 2009alone, 74.1million kWhwere saved.Orchards have nowbeen planted inwhatwasuntilrecentlybarrendesertsoil.

In2001,thewatersituationinGujaratwasasbadas,ifnotworsethan,thepower

supplyproblem.Pronetodrought,70percentofGujarat’s land isclassedasaridorsemi-arid. Before the Jyotigram Scheme began, the water table was dropping by 3metres every year. The further it fell, the more electricity was needed to drive thepumpstobringwatertothesurface.Today,Gujarat is theonlystate inIndiawherethewatertableisactuallyrising,by4metresannually.

Meanwhile, Modi carried on fighting to raise the permitted level of the SardarSarovardam.Heknewthatwitheveryextrametreofheightaproportionateradiusoflandcouldbemadefertile.Inearly2003permissionwasgiventoraiseitto95metres,andconstructionbeganonehourlater.

Itwasraisedagain,to110.64m,in2004.20

On16March2006,Modieventuallyreceivedpermissiontoincreasetheheightofthedamto121.94metres.Thiswasafterbattlingtogetfourfractiousstatestoagree,21

despitefierceattemptsbyNGOsandgreenactiviststoopposeit.Some,liketheauthorandactivistArundhatiRoy,opposedthedamperse:

BigDamsare toaNation’s ‘Development’whatNuclearBombsare to itsMilitaryArsenal.They’rebothweaponsofmassdestruction.They’rebothweaponsGovernmentsuse to control theirownpeople.BothTwentiethCenturyemblemsthatmarkapoint intimewhenhumanintelligencehasoutstripped itsowninstinctforsurvival.They’rebothmalignantindicationsofcivilisationturninguponitself.Theyrepresenttheseveringofthelink,notjustthelink–theunderstanding–betweenhumanbeingsandtheplanettheyliveon.22

Modiignoredtheapocalypticwarnings.Instead,hebegantousethenewwatermadeavailablebythedamtomultiplyitseffectonagriculturebybuildingaseriesofcanals.

Theaimwastodigthirty-eightcanals, stretching2,538km.Todatetwenty-ninecanals (stretching 2,000 km) are in operation, with a projected 5,112 km ofdistributioncanals,branchingoffthemainconduits,plannedforthenearfuture.Thecanals are in the process of being ‘roofed’with photovoltaic solar panelswhichwillgive the twin benefits of preventing evaporation of water from the canals, whilesimultaneously generating electricity. A pilot project by GSECL is generating 1megawattontheSanandbranchcanalatChandrasaninKadi.23

Byconceivingof irrigationandelectricity as related,bothweregreatly improved.And as part of the panchamrut, they led inevitably to yet more improvements inrelatedareas:UrjaShakti grewJalShakti, andboth in turnhelped to transformJanShakti – people: their abilities and potential. In agriculture this meant that theexposureoffarmerstonewandefficientmethodstoimprovetheirlivescouldbetakenadvantageof.Theeducationoffarmerswouldfurtherembedandimproveagricultural

productionandthequalityofrurallife.Thus in 2005 the Krushi Mahotsav scheme was inaugurated – a travelling

roadshow and mobile education centre that visits every single village in Gujaratannually.Itcomprisesanarrangementofboothsanddisplaysmannedbygovernmentemployeesandrepresentativesfromagriculturalcollegesandbusinesses,domesticandforeign, who advise farmers and demonstrate new methods of improving landproductivityandtheproductionofcrops.

Someofficialsused tocomplainofhaving toworkoutside in searingheatduringtheKrushiMahotsav.ButModi ledby example, travelling tomany villageshimself,whichhedoeseveryyear.Thecomplaintssoonstopped.24

Farmerswereissuedwithsoilcardstotestthestateofthesoilandwereeducatedabout how best to nourish and improve it. Further improvements in agriculturalpracticewere aidedbyModi’s decision to splitGujarat’s agricultural university intofour separate institutions to encourage a wider scope of research and greaterspecialization. With more expertise and assured water, farmers have increasinglyswitched to higher-value crops such as mango, banana and wheat, and theirproductionhasrisenyearonyear.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington DCreported: ‘WhileGujarat’s dairy success iswell known,which is growing at 6-7 percentper annumon sustainablebasis, the recentphenomenonofhighgrowthcomesfromfruitsandvegetables(dominatedbybanana,mango,potatoandonions)thathasgrown at almost 12.8 per cent.’25Those figures are from2000–01 to 2007–08, buttheyhaveremainedontrendsincethen.

Seed companies encouraged better strains to be planted, including bajra (pearlmillet,whichishighiniron)andcastorforoil.TheadoptionofBtcotton,immunetoseveralcommondiseasesoftheplant,hasmeantthattheyieldofthatcropparticularlyskyrocketedfrom3.05millionbales(of170kgeach)in2002–03to11.2millionbalesin 2007–08 – again, it has not slowed down since.26 According to 2009 figures,Gujaratwasproducing35.5per centof India’s cottonproduction fromonly26percent of the area under cultivation.NeighbouringMaharashtrawas nowhere near asefficient.27

Toraisethestandardoflivingofthepoor,Modirealizedthatwhilepoliciescouldbemadeandimplemented,itwasimportanttoensurethatbenefitsreachedintendedrecipientsdirectly.Therewereconcernsabout‘middlemen’whopretendedtoactasalink between the government and intended beneficiaries, but actually hustled therewardsaway.Itwasusingthisinsightthatheenvisionedthegaribkalyanmelas.

An ambitious programme for social transformation, the garib kalyan mela hasintegratedbenefitsfrommultipleschemesandeliminatedmiddlemensothatbenefitsreachtheneediest.Reversingtheprocessofbeneficiariesseekinggovernmentofficers,now government officers go in search of eligible beneficiaries to provide assistance.The government thus went to the doorstep of people to bring about a significantchangeintheirlives.TheGujaratgovernmenthassofarconducted1,000garibkalyanmelas and distributed Rs 13,000 crore assistance to around eighty-five lakhbeneficiaries.

Modi’sideaofgovernanceanditsroleindevolvingadministrativeautonomytolocallevelsawayfromstategovernmentledtoinnovationsthatawokethemoribundgramsabha(villageadministration)committees.‘Forme,’saysModi,‘developmentisamassmovement. People think that development is a government agenda. I say no,developmentshouldbetheagendaofthecommonman.Unlessanduntilthecommonman’s agenda is development, government can build the buildings, but that is notdevelopment.’

The drift towards a centralized bureaucracy was reversed by Modi offering abounty,underhis SamrasYojanaprogramme,ofone lakh rupees to any village thatcouldunanimously elect a representative.Withmoney as the bait, over 60per centspeedily did so. This ended the sort of gossipy disagreements among petty villagecliques that had held back decisions being taken at a local level. It additionallyrevitalized rural life as people for the first time saw local improvementsbeingmadearound them thanks to their own decision making, turning entitlement intoempowerment.‘ThechangeinGujarathappenedbecauseeveryGujaratifeelsthatheispartofthedevelopmentprocess,’saysModi.28

The government’s idea was that unleashing the potential latent in people’s livesshould extend across all aspects of society, urban aswell as rural. ‘Development is amass movement,’ Modi says. ‘Each and every citizen of my state is the initiator,creator,implementer;thisiswhatthecitizenisdoing.Andbecauseofthatreason,wecanactuallysetagoal.’

Forinstance,itisuniversallyacceptedthatjusticedelayedisjusticedenied,andthesluggishnessoftheIndianlegalsystemindealingwithitslitigantsisanationalscandalandadisgracetodemocracy.

‘InGujaratwetooktheinitiative:westartedeveningcourts,’saysModi.‘Thesame

infrastructure,whichwasnotusedafter5p.m.,couldbeused.Istartedeveningcourtsfrom6p.m.to10p.m.Igavespecialpaytothejudgesandallcourtstaff.Becauseofthatreason,pendencycamedown.’

Inonlyfourmonths,betweenNovember2006andtheendofMarch2007,50,000casesweredisposedof.29ThestatenowhasthelowestproportionofoutstandingcasesinIndiaat2percent,thoughithas5percentofIndia’spopulation.

Thehealthimprovementsgeneratedbyclean,plentifulwater(oftenmeaningcleandrinkingwateron tap, a rarity in India) and steadypowerwerebuttressedbymanyschemesthataimedtoadd ‘healthtowealth’.These includedimprovedstandardsoffood, education, hygiene, and a drive for cleaner air and a general reduction inpollution.

The state government kept up its role of facilitator, leading to other relatedimprovements.Roadscontinuedtobebuilt,untilover98percentofruralhabitationsat village levelwere connected.30When criticsmocked that inone year, contrary toModi’s‘propaganda’,only10kmofroadswereconstructedinGujarat,theyneglectedtopointout that itwasbecause the entire annualhighwaysbudgetwasbeing spentupgrading the ample roads that were already built over the decade – somethinganybodywhotravelsaroundinGujaratcannotfailtonotice.

In 2005, Modi presented Gujarat with the first revenue-surplus budget in itshistory.31 Red tape meanwhile was slashed for companies that wanted to set upfacilities in the state, andwordquickly spreadglobally that ahelpful administrationwhichdidnotexpectbribesexistedinthewestofIndia.InvestmentbegantoflowintoGujarat,shepherdedbyVibrantGujarat,culminatinginemblematicfashionwiththerelocationofTataMotors’NanomanufacturingplantfromSingurinWestBengaltoSanandinAhmedabaddistrictin2008.32

The arrangements once the company’s decision had beenmade were completedwithintendaysowingtoGujaratalreadyhavinganestablishedlandbankinreserveforindustrialprojects.ThiswasaninnovationModihadputinplace.Itdrewcriticismofcrony capitalism with allegations that land was being sold to industrialists atthrowawayprices.Buttheemploymentthesenewmanufacturingplantsgeneratedandthewealththeycreatedinlocalcommunitiesmutedmuchofthecriticism.

TheNanoprojectinWestBengalhadbeenbedevilledbyworkeragitation,bandhsandevenviolenceasTataattemptedtoreadytheplantforproduction.TheLeftFront

stategovernment,whichacquiredlandfromunwillingfarmersfortheproposedsite–perversely, the most fertile area in Hooghly was chosen – and the oppositionTrinamoolCongress,whichledanagitationagainstTata,hadnothelpedmatters.Indespairat theattrition,RatanTatadecidedtocalloffalldevelopmentat theSingursite and move the business elsewhere. When Modi heard of this he texted theindustrialistasingleword:‘Welcome.’

At the time West Bengal’s chief minister was the communist BuddhadebBhattacharjee,withMamataBanerjeeleaderoftheOpposition.SoonaftertheNano’sarrival inGujarat,ModididamostoutrageousthingbywritingopenletterstobothBhattacharjee(‘I’mdoingthisafterduedeliberation…’)andBanerjee(‘Youarelikeasistertome…’).Althoughheassuredthemthathewasn’tgloatingovertheirloss,heactuallywas.ToBhattacharjee he confided, ‘The fact of thematter is: despite yourefforts,Bengaldoesn’tyethavethework-culturetoproduceaNano.’Modisignedoffby explaining that it was ‘the commitment of the people of Gujarat towardsindustrialization,work-culture,andjointeffortbyallregardlessofpoliticalaffiliations,thattheprojectcametoourstate.I’dhopethatsomedayasimilarclimatewouldcomeintoexistenceinyourstatetoo.’

IfanythinghewasevenmoredirectwithMamata,chidingherfor‘oppositionforthesakeofopposition’andissuingabrotherlywarningthat,thoughsheclaimedtobefighting communism, she must not ‘become an ultra-communist [yourself]’. HismessagewasthatWestBengal’sLudditepoliciesweretheequivalentofshootingitselfinbothfeet.Thestate,heremindedthem,hadattemptedtokeepoutjob-destroyingcomputers. ‘Rather, take the rightwing route to build an alternative in Bengal,’ hewrote. ‘Pleasemakedemands formore industry,more roads, andmore jobs in yourstate.’33

Hiscorrespondents’replieswentunrecordedandwereprobablyunprintable.WhydidModi sendthe letters?Was ithelplessexuberanceoradeclarationtomorethanthe recipients and readers of the letters – a declaration to himself? By 2008 thedevelopmentsandinfrastructurehehadputinplaceinGujaratwerealreadybearingfruitandalltheindicatorssuggestedthatgrowthwouldnotonlypersistbutaccelerate.Modi’s referenceto the ‘rightwingroute’wasbynowareferencenot tochauvinisticHindutva–howdistant, even irrelevant thatnow sounded–but to the ideaof thefreemarketandinnovativegovernance.

Theopen letters stoodnotonlyasadvicetoWestBengalbutalsotoelements intheSanghParivar.TheyannouncedhowfarModihadtravelledfromhisroots.Theyevenimpliedthedifference,orratherthegulf,thatimplicitlyseparatedhiseconomic

outlook from that of the old BJP guard. The party had remained rudderless andrelativelypolicy-freesinceitsdefeatinthe2004LokSabhapoll,falselybelievingitwastheir1998–2004reformsthathadlostthemtheelection.

In 1994, the southernGujarat city of Surat, thenwith 1.2million inhabitants, fellvictimtopneumonicplague,acomplicationofbubonicplague.Hundredsdiedwhilehundredsofthousandsattemptedtofleethecity,whichbyallaccountshadbecomeanimpoverished hellhole (the plague was spread by fleas) and whose emergency andmedicalinfrastructurewasquicklyoverwhelmedbytheYersiniapestisbacterium.

But by 2006 when the city suffered another disaster, being inundated bycatastrophicfloodwaters,itwasadifferentplacealtogether.Therewerenow500,000high-techloomsinusebyitsweaversand10,000diamondpolishingunits.Forinthemeantime the city had risen to the top of the league in the diamond industry andproduced annual exports worth Rs 55,000 crore, representing 90 per cent of theindustry’sworldtradeandpracticallyallofIndia’sown.Astate-of-the-art,all-weatherseaportwasbeingconstructedbyShell,anditwouldbewellservedbythenewroadsandflyoverslacingtogetherthebusycity.34

Unliketheplaguethatstruckin1994,Surat’sfloodswerehandledreasonablywellbytheauthorities,thoughthereareconflictingreportsofdelayedhelp.Normality–bynownormality inSuratmeant growth andprosperity– swiftly resumed.Critics saythat Modi was initially slow to react. But once relief operations got under way,documents andanecdotal evidence suggest the local administrationmoved relativelyswiftly.

It isusefultoexaminethefullfactsbeforestudyingtheclaimsofbothcriticsandthegovernment.Today,Surathaswaterdistributionwhich,likeitsdrainagesystem,iscomputerized.Suratevenoperatesa sewage treatmentplantwhich transformswasteintoenergy,aswellasoneofthebestwatertreatmentplantsinIndia.35

Every street in Surat now has drains beneath its sidewalks and pavements, withstreet lights above them. Over 95 per cent of its autorickshaws and mass transitvehiclesusecompressednaturalgas,helpingtokeeptheairclean.E-governance is inplacealmosteverywhere, speedingupandslimmingdowninteractionsandprocessesbetween Surtis and the state, and cutting out many of the opportunities officialspreviouslyenjoyedtoaskfor‘donations’tohelpgetroutinethingsdone.

Notsurprisingly,astheeconomyboomedandthestandardoflivingrose,sodidthe

city’spopulation,whichmorethantrebledfrom1994.Suratofcourseisexceptional.IthadthefastestgrowingGDPinIndiauntilrecentlyandcurrentlyrankseighth interms of city GDP (it basically doubled in size from 2001 to 2008). Nevertheless,Surat exemplifies the cross-fertility of Modi’s panchamrut development. With itsmodernized manufacturing in clothing and jewellery, Surat has been transformedfromtheplague-riddencityitoncewas.

‘Isaidwemusthaveafive-stepformula,’saysModi. ‘Farm;farmtofibre;fibretofabric;fabrictofashion;fashiontoforeign.Thenthefarmerwillbethebeneficiary.Sowemusthaveavalue-additionchainrightuptoexports.’

This demonstrated how a dirty, chaotic eyesore with hopelessly inadequateinfrastructure and an inefficient municipal government – and even visitations ofmedieval mass death – only two decades ago can be changed under reformistmunicipal commissionerswho receive supportbut also independence fromthe stategovernment.‘SuratwasknownasthedirtiestcityofIndia,’Modisays.‘TodayitisthecleanestcityinIndia.’

DevelopmentisModi’sfavouritetopicofconversation.Helikesitbecausehebelievesthat apart frommaking individuals’ livesbetter,developmentmakes everybody’s lifebetter.Modiisapoliticianandthistranslatesintovotes.DoesModi,inmodernizingGujarat in the energeticmanner he had done, not fear he is following theWesternpath? What is the cost of cultural tradition being hammered into oblivion byrelentlesschangeformaterialbenefitalone?

Modi’sanswertomyquestionaboutIndiarushingforwardbutleavingbehinditsheartwasa simpleone: ‘Modernizationwithoutwesternization,’he says. Itcertainlysoundsbetterthanwesternizationwithoutmodernization,ofwhichIndiaalreadyhasasurfeit.Butwhatdoesitreallymean?

ModifirmlybelievesinremainingtraditionallyIndianwhileembracingmodernity,and especially technology, of integrating it with cultural traditions rather thandestroying tradition with progress, as arguably theWest has done. In other wordsmodernizationwithoutwesternization:rememberthatyouareIndian,andgoforwardinanIndianway;findawaytorenewyouroldrelationshipsasyoulearnnewones.

This liesbehindModi’sdeepest inspiration forhisdevelopment shaktis: theyarecharacterizedasfemininebecausethisallowsprogresstobeheldwithinthetraditional‘mamta’,thenurturingmaternalethosofthehomethatcarrieswithinitthetraditions

andreassurancesofIndianfamilylife.36

‘TheGangaisanincarnationoftheMother,soisIndia,’Modisaid.‘EventhecowisreveredasaMother.Thepositionofwomenhasalwaysbeensupreme,therearenotwoviewsonthis.’37

It has to be stressed how fundamental the idea of the feminine is to Modi,something that is not immediately apparent to the observer, especially because themediaembellishesModi’s imageas exceedinglymasculine.Butat theheartof allhisdevelopmentphilosophy is a strikingly feminine ethos, as theword ‘shakti’ suggests.For as Jan Shakti nurtured the talents and resources of Gujarat’s farmers, so theeducationaldevelopmentrandirectlywithintheGyanShakti,knowledgepower.Andhere, the emphasis on improving educational institutions – especially science andtechnology – is juxtaposed with an emphasis on the most traditionally neglectedaspectofJanShakti–thepeoplepowerofwomen,whoseabilitiesandpotentialModidecidedwereunderusedeverywhere.Itwas,hesaidrepeatedly,ashockingwasteofthetalentsofhalfthepopulation.Hencetheconcentrationoneducatinggirls.

Education though is precisely one of the areas where critics deride Modi forGujarat’s lack of social development, so the record needs to be carefully examined.Again,hisprogrammebeganearly inhis tenureas chiefminister.Adrive for schoolenrolment(spearheadedby initially reluctantbureaucratswhofoundthemselvesoutof their offices and in distant village schoolrooms) was quickly launched, withattention paid especially to girls. Beginning in 2002 a ‘Narmada Bond’ was issued,worth Rs 1,000 for girls to put away towards their educational expenses. Theassumptionwas that societymust improveorganically and sustainablyover the longterm, and that FDI in industry would not alone accomplish an even spread ofprosperityacrossGujarat.

SoisGujarat’sprogress illusory?Or, is it simplythatGujaratwasalwaysprosperous,even before Modi arrived on the scene? What can be done to logically settle theargument is to compare various socio-economic parameters from beforeModi waschief minister with the same parameters after he took charge. Comparisons withindicesofadvancementinotherstatescanalsoyieldfactualinformation.Therateofprogressovertime,morethancurrentsnapshotindicators,revealtrueperformance.

Forexample,back in1991,adecadebeforeModibecamechiefminister,Gujaratstood in sixth place in the human development index (HDI) of Indian states. The

HDI was invented the year before, in 1990, and is a composite statistic of lifeexpectancy, education and income.38By2007–08,whenModiwas reelected for thesecond time, Gujarat’s all-India state ranking inHDI had slipped by five places toeleventh,apparentlyasteepdecline.Butthisfigureneedstobeexaminedmoreclosely.Itmust be remembered that in 1991 states such asDelhi,Himachal Pradesh,Goa,JammuandKashmir,thenorth-eaststates,Uttarakhand,JharkhandandChhattisgarhwerenotincludedintherankings–andthreedidnotevenexist.39Iftheyareremoved,Gujaratrisestoexactlywhereitwasin1991–sixth.

ThefiguresrevealthatGujarat’sHDIactuallyrosefrom0.431in1991to0.527in2007–08,anincreaseof22.3percent.Isthatimpressive?The1991all-Indiavaluewas0.381, lower thanGujarat’s at the time. In2007–08, the all-IndiaHDIwhich tookinto account thenewly included states and territories– all small and relativelywelldeveloped that pushed Gujarat down the table – was 0.467, well below Gujarat’s0.527,meaningGujaratwasstillaboveaverage.40

Even includingall thesenewsmall states, theall-India increase inHDIhadbeen22.5percent,almostexactlywhatGujarat’swasoverthesameperiod.WhenModiisaccusedofbeinglaggardlywithregardtopoverty,health,malnutritionandeducation,hecaninallfairnessreplythatitisconsistentwiththenation’sfortunes,whichwere(very slowly) on the rise throughout the period 1991–2008.Without some of thenew, smaller states, and their sometimes extremely highHDIs, which in part are afunctionoftheirsize,Gujarat’sstatisticswouldlookevenbetter.ThisdoesnotabsolveModifromfailingtogetGujarat’sHDItorisefaster.Buttendentiousinterpretationslendneitherbalancenorobjectivitytoanimportantdebate.

It is true that in the real story of growth and development that Gujarat hasexperiencedunderModi’s stewardship, education,healthandother social indicatorshavenotdoneaswellcomparedtootherindicessuchasGDPgrowth,whichhasfaroutrun Indian averages. While it is relatively easy to start up a factory and beginproducingunitsof economic value, themoredifficult areasof improvement are thehumanonesofeducation,healthandhygiene,whichcantakeatleastonegeneration,possibly more, to show significant transformation. They depend upon a change ofoutlook,habitandbehaviour,oftenintheprivatesphereofthebathroomandkitchenwhereitismostdifficultforthegovernmenttoexertapositive,oratleastmeasurable,influence.

It is also true thatGujarat spends lessoneducation (13.9per centof itsbudget)than it should.Bihar spends18per cent.Butbecauseofpoorgovernance, success isnotalwaysaboutabsolutelevelsofspending;itisrathertheefficacyofthespend.

To illustrate this, literacy levels should be examined. The official Indiangovernmentfigures41arealsousedbyProfessorBibekDebroyoftheCentreforPolicyResearch in Delhi in his book, Gujarat: Governance for Growth and Development,referredtohere.42

Goingbackagainto1991, theaveragerateof literacy inIndiawas52.2percent.Twentyyearslater,in2011,greatstrideshadbeenmade:ithadrisensignificantlyandstoodat74percentoverall.InGujarat,overthesameperiod,literacyrosefrom61.2percentto79.3percent,wellabovethenationalaverage.

Debroypointsout that in the increase in literacy among females, thedifferentialgrowth between Gujarat and India as a whole is even more pronounced43 –underlining thepointsalreadymadeconcerningModi’sdrive toemancipatewomenintoalargerandmorefulfillingroleinIndia’seconomyandsociallife.

In the twodecades since 1991 Indianwomenhave improved their literacy from39.3 per cent to 65.5 per cent and inGujarat from 48.9 per cent to 70.7 per cent.GujaratiwomenarethusmoreliteratethantheIndianfemaleaverage.WhileaverageliteracyforIndianwomenincreasedbetween2001and2011–duringModi’stenure–from54.2percentto65.5percent,itincreasedfrom57.8percentto70.7percentforGujaratiwomen.TheincreaseinfemaleliteracyinGujarat–thoughhigherthantheall-India average – must be tested qualitatively as well to arrive at an objectiveconclusion.Theeffectoflaggingindicatorscan’tbeignored:Gujarathasatraditionofnoteducatinggirls.Modihadtoovercomeculturalprejudiceandchangeconditionedbehaviour.

There is further evidence of overall improvement in educational outcomes fromschool dropout rates, argues Debroy. Again the improvements for girls have beenespeciallysignificant.Dropoutratesforgirls inprimaryschoolplummetedby90percentduringModi’s,tenure,from20.81percentin2001toaverylow2.08percentin2011. The later years of school are naturally more difficult for pupil retention,especiallygirls,butundertheModigovernmentthedropoutrateforgirlsinStandardsI–VIIfellfrom36.90percentin2001to7.82percentin2011-12,meaningover90percentofoldergirlsnowremainineducation.Thissuggeststhatinthenearfutureafurtherimprovementinfemaleliteracyistobeexpectedasthelageffectdisappears.

Theseofficial figures are at variancewith the criticism levelled againstGujarat–that while it is hospitable to industrialists, it is less so to women, the poor andMuslims.

Anotherlaggingindicatorishealth.Hereagain, it is importanttocompareGujarat’saverage or slightly substandard infant mortality rate (IMR) with all-India statisticsfrom 1991 to 2011, and thenmake a further comparison underModi’s leadershipfrom2001to2011.

In India, baby girls are less favoured than baby boys, and sometimes undergofoeticidebecauseoftheirsex,resultinginmorebirthsofboysthangirls.Debroynotesthat this situation worsened nationally between 2001 and 2011, from a ratio of927:1,000 girls:boys to 919:1,000. That initially strikes one as strange in a rapidlydevelopingcountry,butperhapsareasoncouldbethatmedicalscansidentifyingthesexofthefoetushavebecomemorecommon.

InGujaratforthesameperiod(2001–2011)theratioimprovedmarginally,from883:1,000 girls:boys to 890:1,000. That remains below the national average, and isanywaypoor,butitisaproblemGujaratspecificallyhassufferedfromforalongtime.Modiwaswellawareofthis,andin2005beganhis‘BetiBachaoAndolan’(‘SaveOurDaughters’)campaign.

Ina speech inApril2013,he said that in theeighteenthcentury,babygirlswereoftendrownedinmilk. ‘SometimesIfeelwehavebecomeworsethantheeighteenthcentury, where at least the girl child was allowed to be born. In the twenty-firstcenturythegirlchildiskilledbeforesheisborn.’44

Theimpactofgovernmentpolicyonredressingtheimbalanceinsexratiosamongchildren isbestobserved inthestatistics forsexratioatbirth.Thismeasureshowsasignificant improvement in Gujarat from 837 to 909 under Modi’s stewardshipcomparedwith894to906nationallybetween2001and2011.Statefiguresforchildmalnutrition inGujarat between 2007 and 2013 (oddly, no national statistics existbefore 2005–06) fell from 71 per cent to 29 per cent, which correlates with thepositiveeffectsofagriculturalprogressinthestate.Thesearestillhigh,thoughlowerthaninotherlargestates,andGujaratclearlyhasmuchworktodotoimprovechildmalnutritionandgenderratios.

DoesModi’s chiefministership look as if it deserves Prof.Amartya Sen’s commentthat‘Gujarat’srecordineducationandhealthcareisprettybad?’

Thefiguresusedhereareallofficialcentralgovernmentstatistics.JagdishBhagwatiandArvindPanagariyaofColumbiaUniversitydisagreewithProf.Sen’sconclusions.‘CriticswhoinsistonviewingeverythingrelatedtoModithroughthe2002lensand,

thus,failtoseparatetheireconomicsfrompoliticshavefallenshortof20/20vision,’saysProf.Panagariya,perhapsdrawingnearertowhattheargumentisreallyabout.45

Panagariya concludes that ‘critics frequently deride the exceptional growth inGujaratbypointingtoitslackofachievementinsocialsectors.Buttheyoftendosobyfocusing on selective indicators.A consideration of a broad set of indicators hardlyoffersanindictmentofthestate,eveninsocialsectors.’

Compared with contentious social indicators, there is less debate on economicgrowthinGujaratsince2001.EvenRahulSachitanand,writinganotherwisecriticalpieceintheTheEconomicTimes,admitted:‘InthefiveyearsbeforeModitookcharge,the state’s averagegrowth inGSDP(gross statedomesticproduct)was2.8percent.Under him, between 2002-03 and 2011-12, it was 10.3 per cent.Only three smallstates–Sikkim,UttarakhandandDelhi–havegrownfaster.Gujaratisaheadofthenationalaverage(7.9percent).’

Considernowthepovertyfigures.In2004–05,31.8percentofGujarat’spopulationwasdefinedaslivinginpoverty.By2011–12thathadfallento16.6percent,almosthalvingthenumberofpeoplebelowthepovertyline.Duringthesameperiod,NitishKumar’sBihar,whichcriticsoftencomparefavourablywithGujaratunderModi,sawits own levels of poverty fall from 54.4 per cent to 33.7 per cent. Some, such asSachitanand, contend that there has been little ‘trickle-down’ effect even thoughGujarat’spercapita incomehas trebledunderModi.Yetahalvingofpoverty in thesevenyearsunderreviewlooksentirelyinkeepingwiththestate’s10percentannualGSDPgrowth.Somesectionsofthepopulationhavedonebetterthanothers–OBCsbetterthantribals,forexample–butthetrendispositiveanditisofcourseaworkinprogress.

InanelegantanalysisinTheTimesofIndia,aseniorjournalistdemolishedNitishKumar’s argumentswhile stressing that it is a futile and irrelevant contest.ThoughperhapsstillunderestimatingGujarat’ssocialsectorachievements,hepointedoutthatBihar’s levelsofpoverty remain twiceashighasGujarat’s (33.7percentvs16.6percent)andshowedthedangersof‘mixingappleswithoranges’–ofdrawingmisleadinginferencesabouttheperformancesofstatesbyignoringtheirdemographics,sizesandpopulations.Hediscoveredthatwhenthetenmostpopulousstatesarecomparedintermsofpercapitaincome(PCI),onlyMaharashtrarankshigherthanGujarat.Biharistenthandlast.Whenthe‘unfairweightage’ofIndia’sfinancialcapital,Mumbai,is

removed fromthecalculationofMaharashtra’saveragePCI,Gujaratmovesabove itintofirstposition.Biharremainsanchoredatthebottomofthelist.46

Modi, through the several interviews we had, continuously stressed that hepersonallyhadno interest ingrowth for the sakeofgrowth. ‘Inclusive’developmentgave better rewards, he stressed.Other states such asMaharashtra andTamilNadumay have grown as fast, but ‘the real story of Gujarat’s relative underperformancecomparedtoitsobviouspeers–MaharashtraandTamilNadu–maybeexplainedbythesimplefactthatGujarat’sgrowthisbasedonmanufacturing,notservices.’47

In termsof generalprosperity the focusonmanufacturing rather than services isvery important. For example, underChandrababuNaidu, chiefminister ofAndhraPradesh from 1994 to 2004, the software industry grew rapidly. Yet outside ofHyderabad and beyond its high-tech clusters, development in the largely rural statewas neglected.48 Unalleviated droughts and unevenness of progress,mixedwith thedespair of farmers who committed suicide in the thousands, contributed to hiselectoraldefeat.In2004Naidu’sTeluguDesamParty(TDP)wononlyforty-sevenof294constituenciesinthestateassemblyandfiveoutofforty-twoLokSabhaseats.

What manufacturing does steadily, rather than speedily like IT and financialservices,istocreatelayersofjobsinthecommunity,andthussuccessive,cumulative,sustainable waves of prosperity. Back-office IT companies employ people whosesalaries aremostly paid directly into their bank accounts, with relatively little local‘spillover’benefit.Anewcarfactory(basicallyanassemblyplant),ontheotherhand,willcreateworkformanylocalsuppliersofallthebitsandpiecesneededforthecars.Theiremployeesinturnwillcreatedemandintheareaforshopsandotherservicesaswagesarespentlocally.

Arippleeffectdevelops.At27.4percentofGSDPin2009–10(againstanationalaverageof15percent),Gujarathasthehighestmanufacturing-to-GSDPratioamongthe states,49 and this is an important element in itsoveralldevelopment: itdoesnotsimplyhavehigh-techislandsofprosperityasinsouthernIndia,oraconcentrationofbanks and financial institutions as in Mumbai. The industrialization, and theemploymentitcreates,ismorewidespread.

It is alsoworth asking towhat degreeGujarat’s prosperity has percolated down.Therehasindeedbeenalargeincreaseinincomes,andthoughtherearedisparitiesinprosperitytheyarenotextreme:allboats,includingeventheleakyones,arerisingwiththetide.Mostimportantly,everybodyisaboardoneboatoranother.ThedisparitiesinincomelevelsarefurtheramelioratedbecausemuchoftheprosperityinGujaratisin the formof ‘publicgoods’: roads, electricity,water, education, jobs–allofwhich

arise fromdevelopmentprojects that aim tobenefit thewholepopulation,notonlythosefortunateenoughtoalreadyhavethebeststartinlife.

By concentrating first on agriculture and manufacturing – Gujarat’s traditionalstrengths–andonlyafter thaton technologyand latterly finance,Modiplanned toensureawideandroughlyegalitarianbaseofprogress.ThisisapointmanycriticsoftheGujaratmodelhavemissed.

The fifth and last pillar of Modi’s panchamrut is Raksha Shakti: security. Theprosperityandqualityoflifethataccruefromthecommonbenefitsofinfrastructureaffectotherareasaswell.Foremostamongthesecollateralbenefits is that for twelveyearsGujarathas seenno riots. People of all communitiesnowgo about their dailyliveswithouttheever-presentfearthatusedtohaunttheirsteps.Nocomparisoncanbe made between Gujarat now and the ghettoized tinderboxModi inherited fromKeshubhaiPatelinOctober2001.

Life is a daily struggle for many Muslims still living in closed, segregatedcommunitiestwelveyearsaftertheriots.Buttheshadowofmassviolencehasmeltedaway – alongside strictly unprejudiced treatment from the administration towardseverycitizeninaccordancewiththeConstitution.Intryingtotreatcitizens‘blindly’as equals, ignoring pleas for special treatment for minorities, Modi believes he hasdonewhathesaidhewoulddo:demonstratingthroughactionratherthanwordshisideaofsecularism.

Civic peace and security helps the poor and Muslims who suffereddisproportionatelyduringviolentdisturbances inthepast.Itwasalwaystheirhomesandbusinessesandlovedoneswhowerehurtthemost.Itwastheywhosufferedmostfromhunger anddeprivation as curfewsmade it impossible for them to goout andearna living.Now,withsomeexceptions, theycanworkandgetonwiththeir lives.Andastheydoso,thetensioneasesfurther,becausewherehopeandopportunityexistthereislessinclinationtoresentorfearone’sneighbours.

Somebelievethat‘underModi’scleanimageandadministrativeethics,corruptionhasrathergoneunderground.’50ItistruethatinIndiacorruptionwillnotdisappear,andGujaratisnotanisland.ButbycommonconsentfarlesscorruptionexistsinGujaratnowthanbefore,andfarlessthanitdoesinotherstatesorattheCentre.

InasenseModiwaslucky(‘Iamaluckyfellow,’heagreeswithasmile).TodayinIndia,itcostsanaverageofRs15croretobeelectedanMP.Fewaspiringpoliticianspossessthatsortofmoneyandmustrelyondonations,usuallyincash,tohelpthemontheirjourneytotheLokSabha.Oncetheyaretherethismoney,andallothersortsof favours received along the way, have to be repaid with interest. This is fertilebreedinggroundforcorruption.

Modi,bycontrast,neverhadtoraiseanymoneytofightanelectionsimplybecausehehadneverconsidered standing forpoliticaloffice.Modibecamechiefminister inOctober2001,athisparty’sbehest,withouteverhavingfoughtanelection.Notowinganything in favours or cash, he was beholden to nobody. As a result his ideas andprinciplesremainedintact.Hesays: ‘Godhasgivenmethisopportunitytoservethepeople,nottoserveModi.’

Modiseemsuninterestedinamassingpersonalwealth.Hisnetworthatthetimeofhisre-electionin2007amountedtoalittlemorethanRs40lakh,Rs30lakhofwhichwastiedupinasmallpropertyhehadboughtinGandhinagar,probablyincasehewasturfedoutofthechiefminister’sbungalow.Atthetimeofhisre-electionin2012,hiswealthhadtrebledtoRs1.3crore,butRs70lakhofthatwasaccountedforbytheriseinthevalueofhisstilluninhabitedhouse.51HehadunderRs4lakhcashinthebank.IncomparisontoanyotherIndianpolitician,Modiisapauper.

Inpolitics there is thecorruptionofmoneyandthecorruptionof favours,withonenormally leadingtotheother inbothdirections.Modi, fromthestartofhis timeaschiefminister,made it plain hewould tolerate neither.He assumed people aroundhim accepted his opinion regarding the grave illegality of taking bribes and rarelymentioned it afterwards. But woe betide any member of his party or anyadministrative officer found to be financially corrupt. Favours and influence on theother hand, endemic in theway that government and political parties did business,were previously unremarkable and everywhere visible in Gujarat. Modi’s zerotolerance on that score came as a great shock to nearly everybody. It soon arousedresentmentandsedition,eventuallyoutrightmutiny.

Shortly after he was sworn in as chief minister, Modi gathered his officers andlegislators and told them that they should not come to himwith any requests thatwerenotstrictlyrelevanttotheirwork,orwereinanywayunethical.‘Youshouldtalkabouttheinterestoftheparty(BJP).Icannotentertainawrongfuldemand.Don’tdo

any work which will flout ethical norms, even though important political leadersapproachyouandtrytoinfluenceyou.’52

Next,hevisitedtheBJPheadquartersinAhmedabadandmadeitclearthatinanimportant way he was no longer one of them. ‘You should support me and mygovernment for implementingourparty’sprogramme,but youwillnot come tomewithunrealisticandunreasonableexpectations.’53

ForModithecitizensofGujaratnowdeservedhisloyalty,andthismeantthattheinterestsoffriendsandpartycolleaguesweresublimated.Heactedsodecisivelyinthisregardthatitshockedthosearoundhimandstirredsuchkeenemotionsofbetrayalinsomecolleaguesthattheycurdledintohatred.

‘AsayoungenergeticSanghpracharak,ModiwasquitepopularintheBJPcircuit,butafterhebecameCM,hehasnotremainedthatpopularinhisknowncircles,’saysPravinSheth,Modi’soldtutorfromthetimehetookanMAinpoliticalscience.‘Onereason is thathewouldnot submit tousehispositiontodoanyunfairwork.’54ButModiknewfromthebeginningthatifhedidnottakethisharshcourseofaction,hisplans for reformwouldgonowhere.Theywould inevitablybedraggeddownby theendemiccultureofprivilegeandcorruptionthathadeatenawayatIndianpoliticsandcivilsociety.

Sheth also says thatModi had an ‘abrasive manner of saying “no” to seekers ofunduefavour’andwouldeven‘rundownaministerforcomingtohimforapalpablyimproper demand – sometimes in the presence of their supporters from theirconstituency in theveryprecinctofSachivalaya.All thiswasunheardof inpreviousgovernments.’55

What then is the verdict on Modi’s governance and development? Is the Gujaratmodel a myth? Can it, with modifications, be adopted nationally? Beyond thestatistics ofGSDPgrowth,HDI,heath care, infantmortality andpoverty levels liesthe principle of economic freedom without which no society can be called fullyevolved.

In2012, theFraser Institute, aCanadian think tank thatmeasures thedegreeofeconomic freedom in the world’s nations in its annual Economic Freedom of theWorld (EFW)survey, rankedIndia111thoutof144countries. In2005, soonaftertheCongress ledUPA-2 governmenthad come to power after defeating theNDA,India had stood in seventy-sixth place. India is quickly travelling in the wrong

direction.56

Incontrast,Gujaratwas fifth in the rankingsofeconomic freedomacross Indianstatesin2005.In2012itwasinfirstplace.Biharwaslast,belowWestBengal.57

PART4TheFuture

I

10

ANDNOW,PRIMEMINISTER?

IamluckythatIdonotbelongtotheDelhiclub.InmycaseitistruethatIamnotfromtheDelhiclub.Ibelongtothecommonman.

–NarendraModi

NSEPTEMBER2006ApartymemberspokeanonymouslytojournalistSabaNaqviattheBJPnationalheadquarters inDelhi. ‘We’re justbiding time till the real leader

cantakeoverandfixthemess,’hetoldher.‘Narendrabhaiistheonlyonewhocansaveus.’1

Seven years after thewhispered admission that the BJP neededModi to ‘fix themess’,andafterseveralmonthsofspeculationfollowinghisappointmentaschairmanof the BJP election campaign committee for the 2014 Lok Sabha poll, Modi wasdeclaredtheparty’sofficialprimeministerialcandidate.Theautumnof2013thussawoneoftheBJP’scardinalrules–thatnomembershallholdmorethanoneofficeatthesametime–brokennotoncebut twice,byamanwhoalreadyheldofficeasachiefminister.Anewchairmanoftheelectioncampaign,RajnathSingh,wassubsequentlyappointed– againbreaking theone-job rule, ashe remainsBJPpresident–becauseModicouldnotafterallcampaignforhimself.ButitremainstruethatattheheartoftheBJPsomethingfundamentalhaschanged.

As usual Modi had to fight the intransigence of the system, which distrustsmavericks and free thinkers, and whose mills grind not only slowly but grindexceedinglyfine.

The anti-Modi camp in BJP calculated that by advancing slowly, and eventuallysecuringjustenoughseatsintheMay2014LokSabhapoll,itwouldbeabletoformacoalition only slightly larger than theCongress-ledUPA.Thiswould guarantee the

smallesttiltinthesee-sawofpowerandensurebusinessasusualinDelhi.Furthermore, by turning away from the challenge ofwinningwell over 200Lok

SabhaseatsthatwouldgivetheBJPanditspre-andpost-pollalliesanoverallmajority,a compromise prime ministerial candidate would emerge acceptable to ‘secular’politicalallies.

Attheageofeighty-sixandhaving lost thepreviousgeneralelection,Advanisawthe possibility of political resurrection. But after Modi’s elevation, as onecommentatorputit,Advaniisnowreveredasamentor,aroleheshouldhavechosenhimselfratherthanallowingittobefoistedonhim.Andyet,AdvanitohiscredithasbeenfulsomeinhispraiseforModioncetheissuewassettledwithanudgefromtheRSS.TheBJP’s top leadership, includingSushmaSwaraj, toohaspresentedaunitedfrontunderModi’sleadership.

RamJethmalani,themaverickpoliticianandlawyer,pointedoutsuccinctly:‘Manyin India have become so accustomed to dynastic succession that a democraticsuccessionexercisedthroughcontestinthetruespiritofdemocracyisconstruedasagreataberration,oranindicationofadysfunctionalpoliticalparty.’2

The ‘quiet’ internal contest for leadership in the BJP was unlike the robustprimariesintheUSandpartyballotsintheUK,butitreflected,intheend,popularopinionofwhoshouldleadthepartyintothe2014generalelection.

ItissaidthatinIndiavotersusuallyvoteagainstthecandidatetheydislikeratherthanin favour of the candidate they like. This favours the mildest and least offensivepoliticianandwouldusuallyruleoutafiguresuchasModi.Itisalsosaidthat‘votersinIndia dislike ambition and are pulled towards renunciates’, and that this workedagainst Advani in 2009, when he clearly nurtured the illusion of himself as India’sablest candidate as primeminister.3 Such reasoning shouldmean thatModi is alsolikelytosufferfromself-promotion,ifonebelieveswhatpartofthemediasaysabouthim.Yettherearecertainsignsthat2014willbeverydifferentfromotherelections.

TheBJP’schoiceofModireflectsachangeof tactics:unleashingadaringcavalrycharge against the Congress instead of sticking with the safer, attritional trenchwarfare, advancing and retreating yard by yard. It may be seen as a revolution ofyouthfuloptimism–orimpatience–andperhapsasignthattheIndianpeople,ifnotitspoliticians,cravechange.ItisalsoasignthatthecentreofgravityofIndianpoliticsisshiftingfromDelhitothestates.

DrManmohanSinghhasbeenprimeminister for tenyearsdespiteneverhavingwonaLokSabhaseat,althoughhecontestedandlostinSouthDelhiin1999.Modi,onthewestcoast,hasneverwonaLokSabhaseateither,buthasbeenchiefministerfor four termsover twelve years,winning three state elections.Whohas the greaterclaim on democratic legitimacy? During that time Gujarat progressed while thecountryslidbackwardsandManmohanSingh,dutifultodynastyratherthannation,remained in place to silentlywitness his previous economic reforms unravel.WhenSinghvisitedtheUSinSeptember2013,astheRepublicanswerelockedinbattlewithPresidentObamaoverthebudgetceilingandpublicservicesgroundtoahalt,thejokein India was thatDr Singh went to America and evenAmerica’s government shutdown.

WhateverpoliciestheBJPhasespousedduringthischargedandpolarizedelectioncampaignareflavouredbyModi’sowncombativepersonality.TheCongressstilldoesnot realize (or perhaps it does) that giving poor people free food will not abolishpoverty;andneitherapparentlydoestheBJP,whichhelpedtovotetheFoodSecurityBill(FSB)throughtheLokSabhainAugust2013.TheFSBisofficiallyestimatedtocostRs1.25lakhcrore,butislikelytocosttheexchequeratleasttwicethat,includinginfrastructural,storageandlogisticalexpenditure.Itmandatesgrainandricehandoutstoover800millionofIndia’s1.2billionpeople,muchofwhichwillbemisdirected,stolenorlefttorot.4

Critics have argued, among other things, that anyway it is not grain that poorpeople need, and that ending malnutrition requires a diet including milk andvegetables, which many destitute Indian children have never tasted. Creating anecosystemofsanitation,hygieneandcleandrinkingwaterratherthanjusthandingoutcheapwheatandriceiswhatisneededtotacklemalnutritioninIndia.

AC-voterpoll inKarnatakabeforetheassemblyelectionsinMay2013showedthat62percentofvotersbackedModiasaprimeminister,whileonly25percentwantedtheBJPtoreturntopowerinthestate.5

The voters were not bluffing, and the Congress went on to win an absolutemajorityovertheBJPinKarnataka.ItwaswidelyassumedthatthespectreofModi-as-PMwastoblame,despiteitbeingcommonknowledgethatassemblyelectionsaredeterminedby local issues and that theCongress, in spiteof anti-incumbencyandavote split among BJP supporters due to B.S. Yeddyurappa’s breakaway party, had

increaseditsownvotesharebyonly1percent.Modi’sopponentsinthepartybegantoarguethatheshouldbeannouncedasthe

prime ministerial candidate (if at all) only after the five state assembly electionsscheduledinNovember–December2013sinceModiwouldbetaintedifthepartydidbadly.Yet,everyopinionpoll showedthatModiwas thecountry’s leadingchoiceasprimeministerandwouldspiketheBJP’sLokSabhaseattallysignificantly.

The sixteenthLokSabha electionwasnow fautedemieux, apresidential-patternelection.M.J.Akbar,theveteraneditor,wrotethatIndiansaredesperatefordecisiveleadership: ‘IfMrsIndiraGandhiwereseekingre-electiontoday,shewouldwin400seats.’6

Thatsuggestsatpresentideologyissecondtocharacter.ButisacharactersuchasModi’s–brusque,decisive,combative–whatisneeded?InModi,Indiawillcertainlyhaveadecisiveleader,andthatiswhatworriesmanypeople.ItcertainlyalarmsDelhi’sstatusquoelite.

Several years ago theBritishwriter Frederick Forsyth noted that Left andRightwereoutdatedlabels,relicsoftwentieth-centuryconflictsbetweenlabourandcapital,nolongersuitableascompassoranchorpointsinanewtechnologicalera.Henceforth,argued Forsyth, from the dissolving of the old battlelines would emerge a situationwhere radicalson theRight sharedmore in commonwith radicalson theLeft thanwithconservativesintheirownparties.

IfacomplacentCongressandBJParerepletewithconservativeswhowantnothingtochange,Modiappearsasaradicalwhowantstotransformthecountry.Hissortofadministration,withbureaucracyminimized and governancemaximized, potentiallyhas appeal across the political spectrum, especially to the young. It is a newformulation,andalongwithitssuccessinGujarat,isinlargepartresponsibleforModibeinghailedasa leader–thesortoffigure,goodorbadasonlytimemaytell,thatamajorreorientationofpoliticscallsforth.

IfForsythiscorrect,Modicouldattractsupportfromreformersfromeveryquarter(includingMuslims) and, ironically, disapproval from conservatives from all partiesincluding occasionally his own. It does notmatter if anti-Modi ideologues think ofthemselvesasliberalsorbelievetheyaretheonlyguardiansofminorities:thatisonlyoneofthecurrentcontradictionsaspoliticsitselfrealignstonewpolesofpowerandabsorbsunconventionalideas.

Those who seek dramatic reformation and change will be found across politicalideologiesbecausepeoplewithallsortsofpoliticalpersuasionswillrecognizethatnoonepartyiscompletelycorrectandthatthesystemitselfmustbetransformedforthe

greaterbenefitof thenation.Onecouldcall thesepeoplepro-Indiaratherthanpro-party and it is partly why individualistic political figures instead of parties areincreasinglypopularwithvoters.

Indiaisgrowingwearyofideologicalbickeringandpointscoring,whichleadsonlyto stasis and stagnation. Instead, its young thirst for akindof sweepingchange thatthreatens every vested party interest. They will probably not get it until leaders gobeyond party boundaries and enthuse a sufficient number of voters to break themathematics of coalitions. The success of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in theDecember 2013Delhi assembly elections, spearheadedbyArvindKejriwal, is a signthatanewkindofpolitics–andpolitician–isgainingtractioninIndia.

The electoral effectiveness of appealing to aminor but significant section of thepopulationhasmeantinrecentdecadesthatvote-bankpoliticssloweddowntherateofpoliticalandsocialprogress.Modiexplainedhisviewofvotebankstomeasfollows–itisprobablythefirsttimehehasexpoundedonthispubliclyandatsomelengthinhischaracteristiccolloquial,earthystyle:

InIndiawehaveaverage60percentpolling.Onehundredpercentofthepeoplearenotgoingtovote.Outof60percentifyouwanttowintheelectionyouneedonly30percent,andiffourorfivepartiesarethereitwillrequireonly25percentor26percent.Sooutof100percent,thepersonwhoisonlyhaving25percent or 26per cent is ruling. In this situationhe is always taking care of the combination of two sets ofvoters.HeisalwaysthinkingthatIhavetotakecareofthese26percentofpeople.Whatevergovernmentbenefitsgo,willgotothese26percent.Whateverschemeshewillbring,hewillbringforthese26percent.

Andbecauseofthisreason,75percentareleftwithoutanybenefit.Becauseofsuchvote-bankpolitics,thewholecountryisnotrepresented.Alwaysthat75percentisleftout,soIamagainstvotebanks,butitisnothingtodowithreligion.Iamagainstvote-bankpoliticsandIsay,whosoevervotedforyouisnotsimplyforyou,andyouarenotforthemonly.Youareapartofthedemocraticsystem.Soyouworkforthosewhohavevotedforyou,butyoushouldalsoworkforthosewhohavenotvotedforyou,andevenforthosewhohavenotvotedatall.Youhavetotakecareof100percentpeople.

‘Enthuse’ is an important word, and is being used increasingly as the electionapproaches,becausethemessagemustbeoptimistic.IfvoterschooseModi,itwillnotbebecausetheylikehimbutbecausehemakesthemfeelsecureaboutthemselvesandtheirfutureprospects.

Paradoxically, it is because he has been painted as a ‘divisive figure’ that Modimightbethemanwhounitesvoterssufficientlytocomeclosetothe30–35percentvote sharemark that couldmarginalize vote-bankpolitics in the future. In theUK,Margaret Thatcher was just such a figure and her elevation to leadership of theConservative Party was fiercely opposed within her own party andmocked by her

politicalopponents.Butshewonalandslide–comingtopowerin1979with43.9percentvoteshare.ItchangedthepoliticalgeographyofBritainforever.

In his book, Breakout Nations, Ruchir Sharma writes about the conditionscountries need to breach a particular economic benchmark. Stretching the analogy,Modineedstomakehimselfbeseenasa‘breakoutleader’whobreachesoldelectoraltrendlinesandsetsnewones.

Modi’stake-chargepersonalityispartofwhoheisandhasbeen,aswehaveseen,fromayoungage.Butitisusefultolookonelasttimeatwhatexactlythatpersonalityconsistsof,becauseitmayhelpustounderstandwhatwillhappenintheforthcomingelectionandbeyond.

Every observation made about Modi ultimately reverts to the riots of 2002 asdefinitive evidence about his personality and politics. Initially, the evidence waspresented to suggest that the accusations made against Modi, even allowing forexaggeration because of political reasons,would contain some substance.Therewassimplysomuchofit,andsomuchofitin2002wasunanimous:theriotswerelabelledModi’spogrom.HehadrisenthroughtheranksoftheRSSandthentheBJPinaneradominatedbytheloudandangryadolescenceoftheHindutvamovement.Thosewerethepost–BabriMasjiddayswhen Indiabred a generationofkar sevaksupset at themarginalizationofHinduisminnationallifeandafraidforthefutureofwhattheysawasIndia’strueidentity.ThosewerethedaystoowhenL.K.Advaniwasagimlet-eyedhardliner.

Itwasatimeofregularandfrequentcommunalriotsacrossthecountry.Theseledtoingrainedresentmentbetweencommunities.TensionsfromoutsideIndiaaddedtothosewithin.IntheMuslimworld,radicalIslamwasontherise–fromShiasaftertheIranian revolution under Khomeini and from Sunnis in the wake of the SovietinvasionofAfghanistanandtheoutrageofAmericanarmiesonholyArabsoilduringthe liberationofKuwait.Wahabbismwason themarch.Pakistanwas turning itselffrom a defeated military aggressor into a terrorist facility, and still pursuing‘imperialisticIslamicfantasies’.7

Thiswas thepolitical landscapeModioperated in,mostlybelowthemediaradarand before India’s economic reforms truly began to modernize the country in the1990s. It was also a period before the BJP had come to power at the Centre andlearnedwhatitwastogoverninsteadofmerelyoppose.

Butviolencedoesnotonlyresidewithindividuals,itresideswithinorganizations,andultimatelywithin the state itself.Thiswas clearly observable in the 1984Delhigenocide of Sikhs after the assassination of IndiraGandhi.Not only the police but

Congresspoliticiansencouragedandactivelytookpartintheslaughter.Fortheentireperiodofthepogromtherewasnocountervailingpoliceforcedeployedonthepartoftheauthorities,andlittleattemptatinvestigationorjusticeinitsaftermath.Itshowedhowdoingnothingcansometimesbethemostviolentactofall.

Likewise, but not so extremely, the state apparatus inGujarat whenModi tookover was psychopathic. The authorities – police and political – were infected withcommunal hatred. This was the outcome of a long process, a thousand years ofantagonismsincethedestructionoftheSomnathtemple,andthemorerecentperiodofcommunalriotingfrom1969.The2002riotsweresparkedbytheGodhraatrocity,a slaughterofHindusbyMuslimswhich fewwould evenhaveheardof if they readonlytheEnglish-languagepress:manypeopleabroadwhoknowoftheriotsstillknownothingofGodhra.

Yetinconclusion,itiscleartomebeyondanyreasonabledoubtaftermyextensiveresearchthatModidideverythinghecouldtomaketheviolenceceaseandabate–butthat he faced resistance on several fronts. These were within his own party andadministrationaswellasintheCongressandthemedia.Tostatethisismerelytoechoofficial judgements, reports and inquiries that have already been quoted andwhichfoundModiinnocentofallchargeslevelledathim.YetitisundeniablethatforoveradecadeModihas been subjected to anunprecedented campaignof propaganda thatseeks to blamehim exclusively for all thathappened.Regardless of one’s opinionofModi–andtherecanbeconflictingones–includingthosewhichholdhimnegligentifnotcomplicitinthe2002riots,thisappearsexcessive.M.D.Nalapatsummeditupconcisely:

Therehasbeenawell-plannedefforttodefineNarendraModibythesixdaysinhis12-yearrulewhichsawriotsacrossGujaratwherebothHindusaswellasMuslimsdied.…Althoughhehasbeencondemnedforhislackof success inpreventing the riots, the fact remains that they tookplace at such speed andwith suchvirulencethatitwasdoubtfulifanyoneelsecouldhavedonebetter.Atthattime,Modihadspentjustafewmonthsinhisnewjob.However,heclearlylearntfromtheexperience,forsincethentherehasnotbeenasinglecommunalflare-upinGujarat,norasingleindividuallosinghisorherlifeasaresultofthemadnessofcommunalhatred.

ButevenNalapat assumes that theworstof the riots endured for sixdays, althoughtheydidnot.TheybeganthedayafterGodhra,on28February,andwerelargelyundercontrolby2March.ModisaidtomethatpeoplealwaysseemtoforgetFebruaryhasonlytwenty-eightdaysnotthirty-one,andthatasaresulttheyunconsciouslyextendtheperiodofthebloodiestclashes.Disturbancesrumbledonafter2Marchofcourse,but the armywas already on the streets. By then, in contrast to theDelhi pogrom,

justice was already in the process of being administered despite a partiallycommunalizedpoliceforce–anoldlegacy.

One of the important thingsModi is never given credit for is keeping safe thewitnesses – often illiterate Muslim migrants to Gujarat – so that later they couldtestify against their tormentors.His government is routinely accused of influencingwitnessesbutnotofprotectingthemforwhichvoluminousevidenceexists.It isonemoresignofhowthedebateover2002hasbecomehostagetovestedinterests.

OnthepublicationofhisautobiographyTheParamountCopinlate2013,K.P.S.Gilldefended Modi over the 2002 riots. ‘In law and order situations, it is the policeleadershipwhichhas to respond andnot the political leadership,’ he said,8which isclearlyapoliceman’sview.ButwasnotModithechiefministerinoverallchargeandultimatelyresponsibleforthepolice?

‘Mr Modi had become the CM only a few months back,’ Gill stressed. ‘Theadministration and thepolice forcewerenot inhisproper grip and it takes time todevelopsuchagrip…Frommyfirst-handexperienceof theGujarat situation, IcansaywithconvictionthattheGujaratriotswerenotthefailureofMrNarendraModi;instead it was the failure of the Gujarat cops as well as the intentions of theneighbouringstateswhichhadthendeniedforcestoGujaratwhentheriotsstarted.’9

GillalsoconfirmedthatitwasModiwho,followingthe2002riots,askedhimtocometoGujarat–not,asiscommonlybelieved,theUniongovernment.

ThestarklydifferentversionsoftheextentofModi’sculpabilityfor2002willnotdisappear.The fact that after twelve years of themost thorough investigations, notevenanFIR,muchlessachargesheet,againstModihasbeenfiledshowstheweaknessof available evidence. Dozens of convictions, including those of ministers close toModi as well as Congressmen involved in the rioting, have taken place. And yetinvestigations, monitored by the courts, continue in order to give closure to thevictimsofthetragedy.

IsthelongperiodofpeaceGujarathasenjoyedunderModiattributabletothefactthat he has browbeatenMuslims into sullen silence?Or is it rather that conditionshave improved to the extent that, in the 2012 assembly election, it is said aroundtwenty-fivepercentofMuslimsvotedforhim?

In the 2013 by-elections held shortly afterModi’s third victory in the assemblyelections, theBJPwonsixoutofsixseats formerlyheldbytheCongress,a featonly

feasiblewithMuslimvotes.Likewise,sixoutofeightMuslim-majorityassemblyseatsinGujaratarerepresentedbytheBJP.ButModiclearlyneedstobringMuslimsintotheassemblyashehasdoneinlocalcorporations.

M.J.Akbarpointsout:‘MuslimsbelievethattheyenabledtheCongresstowintwogeneralelections,andinreturngotillusionswrappedincheaprhetoricinsteadofjobs.The discovery thatNarendraModi’s government hadmoreMuslims on its payrollthanBengaldidnothelpModimuch,but it certainlydestroyedtheLeft inBengal.’ThenumberofMuslimsinpublicserviceinGujaratsimplyreflectsthecompositionofthepopulation.Therearenoreservations,nospecialtreatment–inconsonancewithModi’sphilosophyofequalityforall,preferencefornone.

‘NowMuslims learn thatModi’s Gujarat has many moreMuslim constables inevery police station than any Congress state, or indeedMulayam’s UP,’ concludedAkbar.10Whathestatesistrue,butcanlifeforMuslimsinGujarattrulybeasbenignasitshouldbe?

FollowingtheSupremeCourt’sacceptancein2011oftheSIT’sreportexoneratinghim in theGulbargSociety case,Modihad goneon a seriesof sadbhavana fasts– agestureofreconciliation.

Butitwasonlyafterthemetropolitancourton26December2013upheldtheSITreport and decisively rejected Zakia Jafri’s protest petition against the report, thatModiopenedupinabloghewrotethedayafterthejudgment:

IhadappealedtothepeopleofGujaratonthedayoftheGodhratrainburningitself;ferventlyurgingforpeace and restraint to ensure livesof innocentswerenotput at risk. Ihad repeatedly reiterated the sameprinciples inmydaily interactionswith themedia in those fatefuldaysofFebruary–March2002 aswell;publicly underlining the political will as well asmoral responsibility of the government to ensure peace,deliverjusticeandpunishallguiltyofviolence.Youwillalsofindthesedeepemotionsinmyrecentwordsatmy Sadbhavana fasts, where I had emphasized how such deplorable incidents did not behove a civilizedsocietyandhadpainedmedeeply.

However,as ifall thesufferingwasnotenough,Iwasalsoaccusedofthedeathandmiseryofmyownlovedones,myGujaratibrothersandsisters.Canyouimaginetheinnerturmoilandshockofbeingblamedfortheveryeventsthathaveshatteredyou!

The Gujarat Government had responded to the violence more swiftly and decisively than ever donebefore inanypreviousriots inthecountry.Yesterday’s judgementculminatedaprocessofunprecedentedscrutiny closely monitored by the highest court of the land, the Honourable Supreme Court of India.Gujarat’stwelveyearsoftrialbythefirehavefinallydrawntoanend.Ifeelliberatedandatpeace.

On Sunday, 27October 2013, sixteen bombswere planted, andmany exploded, atModi’s Hunkaar rally in Patna, Bihar, killing several people and wounding scores

more.ChiefMinisterNitishKumar,despitebeingalertedbyDelhitothepossibilityofaterroristattack,11failedtoprovideadequatesecurity–orindeedmuchsecurityatall–fortheevent,whichseverallakhsofhisowncitizensattended.Visitmystateatyourownrisk,seemedtobeKumar’smessagetohisoldfoe.

ThePatna rallywasa testofModi’s character.Though livebombshadexplodedminutes before he arrived at the rally venue,Modi kept calm, delivered a powerfulspeech inwhichhe exhortedHindus andMuslims to fightpoverty, not eachother,andensuredattheendthatthemassivecrowddispersedpeacefully.Afewdayslaterhevisitedthefamiliesofthosewhohaddiedintheexplosions.

Modi’s rallies across the country have drawn large crowds, running into severallakhs, unprecedented in recent years, withmost paying to attend – a stark reversalfrommostpoliticalrallieswherecrowdsarepaidtoattend.However,onthesamedayashisPatnarally,TheNewYorkTimesinits‘SundayReview’rananextremelyhostilearticleaboutModi.AmongotheraccusationsitclaimedthatMuslimsweremiredinpoverty in Gujarat to a far greater extent than in other states. This animosity wasroutine:theUSworriesaboutModiasprimeministerbecause,unliketheCongress,he cannot be relied upon to act indulgently towardsAmerica’s client state Pakistanwhenever it launches a proxy terrorist attack on India just in order to protectWashington’sinterestsinAfghanistan.

ButthepointmadeinthearticleaboutMuslimpovertyinGujaratisimportanttoinspect, because it can settle the argument about Modi’s decade or more ofdevelopmentinthestate.ThereisananecdoteaboutthetimeajournalistconfrontedModiandaskedhimwhathehaddoneforMuslims:

‘Nothing,’Modianswered.Thejournalistwasscandalized:‘Soyouadmitit?’Modisaid,‘AskmewhatIhavedoneforHindus.’‘WhathaveyoudoneforHindus?’‘Nothing.EverythingIhavedonehasbeenforGujaratis.’

ButifGujarat’sMuslimshavenotinfactenjoyedcomparableprogress,havenotbeenincludedinthegeneralprosperity,theninawayallModi’sclaimsaboutinclusivityarehollow, andperhaps allhisother claims aswell.His actions towardsMuslims, asheexplicitly stated, were supposed to speak louder than any words of apology for the2002riots.

TheNewYorkTimesquotedfiguresissuedbytheNationalSampleSurveyOffice(NSSO) based on the Tendulkar Committee’s poverty cut-off line. They showed

povertylevelsforMuslimsinGujaratat39.4percentin1999–2000andstill37.6percentin2009–10.ConsideringthegrowththathadoccurredinIndiaoverthatperioditisanastonishing,anomalousfigure,aremarkableoutlier,althoughnobodyseemstohavequestionedit.ForGujarat’sMuslimsnottohaveimprovedtheirfortunesatall–tohaveexperiencedbycomparisonacatastrophicdeclineasoverallpovertyinGujaratfellby47.8percentfrom2004–05to2011–12–wassurelyasearingindictmentofModi’spolicies.

In fact, the NSSO had already released a newer set of data for 2011–12 thatshowedthenumberofGujaratiMuslimsbelowtheofficialpoverty lineatonly11.4percentcomparedwithanationalaverageof25.5percent.12ThiswasthefifthbestperformancebyastateinIndia.InruralareasthenumberofGujaratiMuslimslivingin poverty was now only 7.7 per cent, almost the very lowest of any state in thecountry.Povertyforthemhadbeenfallingatarateof7.6percentperannum,notattherateof0.18percentthattheoriginaldecadalfiguresimplied.13ThisprovedexactlytheoppositeofthepointmadebyTheNewYorkTimes.

Itmeant in only two years the numbers of the poorestMuslims inGujarat hadsupposedlyplummetedby26.2percentagepoints,from37.6percentto11.4percent,such that two-thirdsof the state’sMuslimspreviously inpovertyhadbeen suddenlylifted above the Tendulkar line – and this after a decade of near stasis.HadModitravelledaroundhandingoutsuitcasesfullofrupeesorhadthehigh2009–10estimatebeenwildlyinaccurate?

Almostunnoticed, somebodyhad indeedquestioned the2009–10 figureof 37.6per cent. In a recent paper,14 Professor Arvind Panagariya and Vishal More ofColumbiaUniversitydiscovered that therehadbeena consistentdecline inMuslimpovertyinGujaratthroughoutModi’speriodaschiefminister.Byusingothersourcesand by casting their research net wider than the NSSO, Panagariya and MorediscoveredadeclineamongGujarat’sMuslimminoritybelowtheTendulkarpovertyline‘of23.3percentagepointsinruralareasand27.7percentagepointsinurbanareassince2004–05’.15Thesefigures‘flattenthecurve’considerablyandplacethemmuchmore in linewithother statistics ofGujarat’s developmentover theperiod,provingthatMuslimpovertyhadactuallyfallenslightlyfasterthantheaverage.

Sowhyhadnobodyelsenoticed,andwhywasthe2009–10figurebeingtakenatfacevalue?

InDecember 2012, Surjit S. Bhalla wrote an article, ‘TheModiMetric’, inTheIndianExpressseverelycriticalofModi.ThearticletookitscuefromtheNSSO’s37.6per cent figure forGujaratMuslims inpoverty. ‘Inclusion is anotherword for good

governance and good governance generally implies equitable growth,’ he said, andcontinued: ‘An argument for prime ministership that all can respect, including allcontenders, is that thebestchoice forPMisonewhocandeliver themost inclusivegrowth.’AlthoughModihaddeliveredgrowthforGujarat,Bhallaadded,‘suchgrowthhasbeenneitherequitablenorinclusive.Itisunlikelythatavailabilityofdataforthelasttwoyears,2010to2012,willchangeanyofthefindings.’16

ThisanalysisrepresentedtheconventionalviewofModi’sstewardshipofGujaratsince2001:hehadenabledaheartlesscapitalistexpansionthathadruinedthepoor,andespeciallypoorMuslims,exactlyasitwasdesignedtodo.Modiwasthusunfittobeprimeminister.

Whenthefindingschangedtothe11.4percentfigureintheNSSOdatafor2011–12,Bhallawroteanotherarticle.‘Today,’headmittedinOctober2013inTheIndianExpress, ‘the contours of the debate have changed somewhat.’ There followed anhonourablemeaculpaandanotheradmission: ‘TheGujaratdevelopmentmodelhascome under increasing criticism. Sometimes, this criticism comes in the form offantasy’ –not least fromDigvijay Singh,whohad claimed thenumber of poor hadactuallyincreasedunderModi,andfromtheCongress’sBhalchandraMungekar,whoin2012assertedthat31.8percentofGujaratislivedbelowthepovertyline,evenafterfigureswerereleasedshowingtheactuallevelwashalfthat.17

‘There isaconsiderableamountofmolestationof statisticsgoingaround’,Bhallanowagreed,althoughhedidnotgosofarasPanagariya,whosaidModi’sideologicalopponents‘wanttoturnthebestintotheenemyofthegoodtogiveawalkovertothebad,butthatwon’twork’.

The resistance against accepting evidence of progress under Modi’s regime,especiallyprogressamongstMuslims,appearstobelinkednottoconspiracysomuchas to an ingrained impression left in the public mind about the 2002 riots. Manypeople simply refuse to believe thatModi is capable of benign behaviour, especiallytowardsMuslims, and are therefore disinclined to believe good news. But as Bhallawrote: ‘If one looks jointly at poverty reduction and poverty levels, the preliminaryconclusion has to be that the “Gujarat model” of development seems to haveperformedmuchbetterthanmostmodelsonoffer.’18

ZafarSareshwalahasbeenaccusedofbeingaMuslimwho‘soldout’toModiafterearlierbeingafiercecritic.HenowownsaflourishingBMWshowroom.HesaysthisoftheconditionsofMuslimsunderModi:

ZakatistheeasiestindicatortojudgeaMuslim’swealthprofilebecauseyoupayzakatonyourwealth.Zakat

iswhatyoupaytotheneedy.It isessentiallyusedforhelpingmeetsomepoorman’sbasicneeds.SupposethisyearIpaidRs2,500Zakat,youcanimmediatelyextrapolatethatIamworthRs1,00,000.NextyearifIpay Rs 5,000 Zakat, it means my wealth has increased from one lakh to two lakhs. Zakat has beencontinuously increasing inGujarat year after year. In fact, youwill find that 50per cent of theZakat ofmadrassas across the country comes fromGujarat and 50 per cent from the rest of India. IfModi haddestroyedMuslims,theirshareofZakatshouldhavefallen.Butinthelast10years,thewealthofMuslimshasincreased.19

TheNewYorkTimes subsequently issuedacorrection,concedingthat ithadgotthefigures forMuslim poverty in Gujarat from old data. The latest data, it conceded,showedsignificantimprovementinpovertylevelsofMuslimsinGujarat.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the prejudice against Modi since 2002 is that it hasactually helped him. It has provided Modi with a smokescreen for amending orevolving Hindutva in ways the VHP and its cronies would never have allowedotherwise.

So longas themediawasvilifyinghim,despitehisongoing feudswith theVHP,Modi could count on the broad support of all the organizations under the SanghParivarumbrella.Theyassumedthathemusthavebeendoingat least someof theirbidding ifhewascriticized soharshlyby the liberal establishment.Each iterationofModi’sHindufanaticisminnewspapersandonTVhelpedtobluntattacksfromtheforces of the Right against him, and there were many. Without his perpetualcondemnationbytheLeft,Modiwouldneverhavebeenallowedby‘hisownpeople’–and they were always much less his own people than is commonly believed – totransform the ideology of cultural nationalism so that it appealed to the broadelectorate,Muslimsincluded.

Paradoxically,without the condemnation of activists,NGOs and sections of themedia– andwithout SoniaGandhi callinghim the ‘merchant of death’ andNitishKumarcallinghim‘Hitler’–ModicouldneverhavebeenabletorestoresuchIslamicmonumentsinAhmedabadastheSeedheSaiiyadkiJaali,theJhooltaMinaraandtheSarkejRoza.20NorwouldhehavebeenabletoorganizefestivalsofSufimusicwithoutawordofcriticismfromtheVHP.

‘InIndia,withoutthehelpofthemedia,itisverydifficultforapoliticiantolive;Iamonlyaexceptionalcase,’Modisaystoday.‘Oh,media-bashingofmehasbeengoingon for the last thirteenyears, but I adopted this strategy: let themediado itswork,thereshallbenoconfrontation.Letthemenjoy,Iwilljustdomywork.AndIdid.’

RelentlesslybeingcalledcommunalallowedModi toact inconcrete secularwayswithout political costs in his own ideological backyard. When he became chiefminister, the SanghParivarwas campaigning to change thenameofAhmedabad toKarnavatiinordertoeclipsethecity’sMuslimheritage.Itneverhappened.

Modi’sconsideredapproachhasbeentonotcontradicttheslurs:‘Idon’twastemytimeinconfrontation.Ineverwastemytimeindebating,’hesaysimpassively,sittinginhislarge,high-techoffice,deskunclutteredwithpaperandfiles.Headds:

Whateverpeopleused to say,whateverallegationsare there, I alwayskeep it inmymind.And if genuinecommentsarethere,Imust improvemyself. Iwasnotarrogant;Iamnotagainsttheircriticism,Iamnotangrywiththeirallegations.Whatevertheysay,Ipatientlyreadthroughthenewspapers.AsfarasallthatisconcernedIalwaysconsiderwhattheysayasveryimportant,eventhenegative.Thatismyapproach.ThenIthink,howcanIminimizemyfaults,howcanIcorrectmyself?Alltheallegationsactasmyfodder,allthecriticismismyfodder,whichimprovesme.

ThisiswhatModihasbeendoingforovertenyearsnow,ploughinghisownfurrow.Andremarkableasitseems,neithertheCongressnortheSanghParivarcouldspotitbecause they were too busy gazing on the double-faced Janus image of him thatbetweenthemtheycreated.Now,asprimeministerialcandidate,ModihasgiftedtheRSStheprospectofoneofitsowninpower.

The Right cannot now acknowledgeModi’s softening ofHindutva, which theywouldotherwisehavedisapprovedof,becausetheyhavemadeModitheirposterboy.Likewise, the Left cannot admit thatModi has becomemore ‘inclusive’ because heremainsmore than ever their hate figure. But ordinary voters can detectModi hasaccomplishedsomethinginGujarat–eveniftheyarenotquitesurewhat–andthathemighthavesomethingtoofferthenation.

IndiaisnotenamouredoftheBJPbutalargeswatheofitiswillingtotrustModionce.Histactichasalwaysbeentotriangulatewithordinary,non-politicalpeople(‘Inademocracy,whoisthefinaljudge?Thefinaljudgeisthevoter,’hesays)andinthatmannerheoftensidestepspartypolitics,outflankingboththeBJPandtheCongress.

Modifrequentlyrepeatsthatheisa‘non-political’chiefminister.Hardlyanybodytakesthestatementatfacevalue.Hiscriticscannotfigureoutwhathemeans.Hencewhen he says, ‘I always welcome criticism from the media,’ he means it.Modi hascalculatedthatonbalanceitboostshispopularity. ‘Thosewhothrowstonesatme,Icollect thestonesandmakea staircase,andIamgoingupandup.WiththehelpofthosestonesIamrisingandrisingandrising.’

Thetragedywhichliesbehindthefailureofthedecade-longvilificationofModiisthat theCongress knew all along that itwasnot basedon facts. It pursuedhim forideologicalorelectoralreasons,nothumanitarianormoralones.

Modi’scriticssaythatheisaschemeranddevious,covetingonlyultimatecontrol.Like Alexander Pope, they believe, Modi can hardly drink a cup of tea without astratagem:‘Hisrealgoalwaspoliticalpowerandhewouldchooseanyrouteprovidedhethoughtthatthepathwouldtakehimtothecitadel,’saysonecritic.21

Thekeyquestionremains:willModieverbeprosecutedforhisroleinthe2002riots?

HeissurelyguiltyofderelictionofdutyunderSection166oftheIndianPenalCode.Thepunishmentforthis? Simple imprisonment for one year, or fine, or both – Non-cognizable – Bailable – Trialable byMagistrateofthefirstclass–Non-compoundable.22

So that is all.Non-cognizable, non-compoundable, bailable.The entire campaign isnot designed to prosecuteModi, since prosecution is not a realistic option, but tomalignhimsothatheposesnoelectoralthreattotheestablishedorderinDelhi.

Modi’s‘negligence’–ashedidnothingactivelyillegal–istheonlypossiblechargethat can everbebrought againsthim.A surfeit ofhard evidence testifies thatModiactedquicklyandfirmlyinthefaceofalmostuncontrollablemassriotandperformedbetterthanmanyotherpoliticiansinIndiabeforehim.

NotonlyistherelittlechancethatachargewilleverbebroughtagainstModi,butevenifthereis,itwouldprobablybethrownout.Thatiswhy,aftertwelveyears,theSupreme Court–monitored investigation has so far found nothing tangible againsthim–notevenderelictionofduty.

Andyetreasonabledoubtsremain.CouldModihavedonemore?Whyhashenotapologizedforsuchaviciouscommunalupheavalonhiswatch?WhyhashenotfullyrehabilitatedsomeoftheMuslimvictimsoftheriots?Whyhashenotbeentougherincondemning the convicted rioterswho served inhisministryorparty such asMayaKodnani?

On26December2013, ametropolitanmagistrate’s court inAhmedabadupheldthe SIT’s closure report exoneratingModi in theGulbarg Society case.The protestpetition filedbyZakia Jafriwas rejected. Jafri said shewill appeal the judgment inahigher court but the adverse observations in JusticeGanatra’s order against SanjeevBhatt and othersmakes a reversal by theHighCourt or SupremeCourt extremelyunlikely.

The Court has held that it is not established that Sanjeev Bhatt was present in the meeting called on27.2.2002.IthasalsosaidthatnoneoftheofficerswhoattendedthesaidmeetinghavegivenanystatementtoSITregardinganyillegalinstructionshavingbeengivenbytheCMinthesaidmeeting.TheCourthasacceptedintotothefindingsoftheSITregardingthis.[p.106–107]

Thecourt judgmentalsonegatedtheoft-repeatedchargethattheModigovernmentwasslowtorespondtotheriots.

SIThascometotheconclusionthatfrom27.02.2002,StateGovernmentwas inconstanttouchwiththeCentralGovernment toprovide thehelpof theArmy.ChiefMinisterhad a talkwith theUnionHomeminister on28.02.2002.Awritten requestwas sent by theStateHome secretary to theCentralDefenceSecretary.DuetotheattackonParliament,Armywasatforwardpositions.40aircraftwereusedtoair-liftthe army personnel to Ahmedabad. First plane landed at Ahmedabad Airport at about 23.00 hrs on28.02.2002 and the last plane landed at Ahmedabad Airport on 11.00 p.m. on 01.03.2002. FromAhmedabad some columnsofArmywere sent to affectedGodhra,Vadodara andotherdistricts.LogisticsupportofSDMandpilotingvehicleswereprovidedtoconductflagmarchinAhmedabadcity.TheCourthas observed that for this allegation, the SIThasmade thorough investigationon this issue andhence itagreeswiththefindingsoftheSIT.[p.223–229]

ThechargeofauthoritarianismisoftenlevelledatModi.IsGujaratrunlikeapolicestate?Theallegationof intrusivesurveillanceofawomanarchitectwhichtookplacein 2009 has been used byModi’s opponents to show that theGujarat governmentsnoopsillegallyonitscitizens.Therearethreeinfirmitiesinthisargument.One,itwasthewoman’sfamilywhichaskedthegovernmentforprotection.Two,thewomanwasallegedlybeingstalkedbyanaccused(andsuspended)IASofficerPradeepSharma–fromwhomthewoman’sfamilyhadsoughtthegovernment’sprotection.Three,thewoman architect hasnot lodged a complaint against the surveillance even five yearsaftertheevent.

Nonetheless, the fact that the Gujarat government was compelled to appoint atwo-member commissionof inquiry toprobe the allegationof intrusive surveillancethatoccurredin2009demonstrateshowvulnerableithasbeenrenderedtopublicandmediaopinionbytheconstantbattering ithasreceivedforoveradecade.Italone ispresumedguiltytillitprovesitselfinnocent.

PursuingModiwasnotaboutprovidingjusticeforMuslims.Itwasjustpoliticsasusual,andnoxiouspoliticsatthat.Modiwasidentifiedearlyonasanelectoralthreat,not only by the Congress but the entire political elite, because he proposed analternative to the payola and patronage that was the system’s stock-in-trade.Morethan anything, it was a case of the inside against an outsider. When the corruptcitadels of Lutyens’s Delhi are threatened, those who live off its riches, as well ascrumbs,closeranks.

‘After1947,itwasexpectedthattherewouldbeare-lookatthecolonial-erasystemand its laws,’ wroteM.D.Nalapat. ‘Instead, thosewho stepped into the shoes (andhousesandoffices)oftheBritishsoondiscoveredthatcoloniallawandprocedurewasideally suited towards theirmorphing intowhatmanyof them secretlywished theywere,Britishcolonials.’23

InthisscenariotheCongressisthenewRajanditstartstomakesensethatSardarPatel and Mahatma Gandhi both said it should have been disbanded, or at leastremodelledfornewpurposes,afterIndependence.24Fromthemomentheshowedupon their scanners,Modi represented a threat to thisnewRaj, including some inhisownparty.Hewasaman–apoorman,anOBCfromamofussiltown–whomeantbusiness,andonewhohadtobestoppedatallcosts.

Therewasabitterjokebeingtoldin2013,shortlyafteroneofthemanybreachesbyPakistanoftheLineofControl.FiveIndiansoldiershadbeenmassacredonthenightof5August.Duringanearlier incursionon8January, twoIndiansoldiershadbeenmurdered, one of them beheaded. The Indian public, incensed, was becomingimpatientforretaliatoryaction.DefenceMinisterA.K.Antonysubsequentlyreadouta statement which contradicted the army’s earlier one, and pleaded in the mostabjectly pusillanimous terms that themurderers of the five Indian soldierswere ‘20heavilyarmedterroristsalongwithpersonsdressedinPakistaniArmyuniforms’.Thisimplied that the Pakistan military and therefore the Pakistan government wereinnocent. It was an insult to the dead soldiers and failed to explain how a largecontingent of irregulars could repeatedly pass through the heavily fortifiedPakistandefencesonitssideoftheLoCandgobackagainwithoutdifficulty.

Everybodyonthesubcontinent,includingAntony,knewwhatcompletenonsensethis was, and after listening to the statement in the Lok Sabha, the anger of theOpposition NDA boiled over at yet another instance of state helplessness andcowardice.Hencethejoke:Pakistanhastwoweapons:AK-47andA.K.Antony.

Tobefair,Antonywasonlydoingwhathewastold,andhewasnotbeingtoldbyPrime Minister Manmohan Singh, who long ago ceased to tell anybody to doanything. And anyway, the US needed India not to upset its terrorist-harbouringneighbourbyretaliatingwhileAmericantroopsremainedinAfghanistan.

Itwasalowpoint;thepointatwhichthespineofIndia’sintegrityandself-respectbentsofarthatitsnapped.Antony’sstatementcameastherupeewasgatheringspeed

in itsdescentdownhill, scattering foreign investors.Themediawas fullof the latestdevelopments in government-inspired scamsofunbelievable audacity and reports ofcommunalriotinginMuzaffarnagar.

India’sdefenceand foreignpolicyhad formanyyearsbeenwoefullyweak-kneed,notonlyundertheCongressbutearliertoo,whentheBJPwasinpower.25AdvaniwashomeministerinVajpayee’sadministrationwhenterrorists,followingthehijackingofIndianAirlines flight IC814,were released.Oneof these,MasoodAzhar, leaderofJaish-e-Mohammed,mastermindedtheDecember2001attackonIndianparliament.TheensuingborderconfrontationdeprivedModiofthesoldiershewouldotherwisehavehadonhandtoniptheGujaratriotsinthebud.

Bycontrast,Modiasprimeministerwouldnothave topeddle,or even speakof,‘hardHindutva’indefenceandforeignpolicy:hisreputationprecedeshim.SpeakinginRewari,Haryana, in September 2013 at a rally comprising ex-servicemen amongothers, it was noted that his hawkish remarks directed at Pakistan were alreadybeginningtobemoderatedowingtohisnewpositionasprimeministerialcandidate.26

ModiishonouringPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt’sinjunctionto‘speaksoftlyandcarryabigstick’.Modi’s‘credibility’asarelativehawkhasbeenbackedupbyadecadeormoreofdemonstrableactionfightingterrorisminGujarat,wherealow-profilebutverysuccessfuloperationwascarriedoutagainstPakistan-sponsoredterroristsandtheIndianMujahideen.Thisoccurredlargelywithoutalienatingthelaw-abidingMuslimcommunity.Thepollsindicatethatinfacttheyapprovedofit.

In Gujarat, the police and intelligence services have uncovered many caches ofweapons,explosivesandfakeIndiancurrencynotes(FICN),anddisruptedmorethan100mostly ISI-funded terror cells since 2007 and verymanymore prior to that.27

Most of the actions taken against terrorists have been legitimate, but someof themwereextrajudicialkillings,or‘fakeencounters’.Such‘fakeencounters’arepartofthepoliceandintelligenceculture inIndia,andinadditiontotheofficial investigations,arrests or killings of terrorists and gangsters (there is often a wide overlap), runs aparallelundergroundoperationofpoliceassassinations.

Between2002and2007inIndiatherewere440casesofallegedfakeencounters,the majority in Uttar Pradesh with 231, then Rajasthan thirty-three, Maharashtrathirty-one,Delhitwenty-six,AndhraPradeshtwenty-twoandUttarakhandnineteen,accordingtotheNationalHumanRightsCommissionofIndia.28

Statistics for 2007–09 are hard to find but from 2009–10 until February 2013therewereanother555suchkillingsacrossIndia.29Again,UttarPradeshtoppedtheleaguewith138killings,followedbyManipurwithsixty-two,Assamfifty-two,West

Bengalthirty-fiveandJharkhandthirty.In all there are records of more than 1,500 such police and intelligence-driven

murders. Currently only eighteen are being investigated by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation(CBI).Ofthese,seventeencasesarefromGujarat,despitethemajorityof fake encounters occurring in Congress-controlled states.30 Modi says that theinvestigations are politically motivated. He brackets these as Congress malevolencealongside the recent phenomenon of investors signing MoUs at Vibrant Gujaratevents suddenly finding themselves targeted by tax inspectors for hostileinvestigations.31

But a crime is still a crime even if the police see it as performing a service topoliticiansratherthanlawandorder.Delhi’suniquefocusonGujaratbeganin2004aftertheshootingoffouryoungpeopleallegedlyinvolvedinaterrorplottokillModi,accordingtoRajinderKumar,thenGujaratstationchiefoftheSubsidiaryIntelligenceBureau(SIB).32Oneofthem,anineteen-year-oldfemalestudentnamedIshratJahan,was supposedly not, unlike her three companions, a member of the ISI-sponsoredLashkar-e-Taiba(althoughsubsequentrevelationsindicatedthatshemightwellhavebeen).

The police officer in charge, Deputy Inspector General D.G. Vanzara, was laterjailedforhispartinanotherfakeencounter,thatofSohrabuddinSheikh–aLashkar-e-Taiba operative with links to the local Muslim mafia’s extortion rackets, and inwhosedwellingfortyAK-47assaultrifleswerediscoveredafterhisdeathin2005.33

InitssecondchargesheetfiledinFebruary2014,theCBInamedfourIBofficers,including Special Director Rajinder Kumar, for murder in the Ishrat Jahan case.Kumar,nowretired,hashoweverchallengedthechargesheetandpubliclyreferredtotheevidenceagainsthimandhisIBcolleaguesas‘notworththepaperitisprintedon’.While this remark has been widely published in the media, the CBI continues topursuethecase.

Moresignificantly,KumaraddedinhiswidelypublishedcommentsthattherewaslittledoubtIshratJahanandherthreecompanionswereterrorists.Thatofcourse isnotthecruxofthecaseinwhichthecourthasaskedtheinvestigatingagencytoprobewhetherornottheencounterinwhichthequartetwaskilledwasgenuine.

WhatseemstobeanunfortunateconsequenceoftheCBI’spointedinvestigationinGujarat, however, is the damage it has done to anti-terrorist operations in Indiagenerally.TheCBIhasbeenintentinpursuingRajinderKumar.TheIBsaysitsimplypassedoninputsfortheGujaratpolicetoactonaspartofnormalintelligencework.Otherlocalbureauchiefsandpolice,fearingafatesimilartoVanzara’sandaccusations

similar to those levelled againstRajinderKumar, are refusing to act on informationfrom IB national headquarters unless in writing, which will of course not beforthcoming.

Withoutinformationtoacton,statepoliceforceshaveincertaininstancesceasedtoactatall(perhapsingenuineaswellasfakeencountercases)becausetheyarenotinreceipt of the latest intelligence. This potentially leaves future terrorist plotsundisruptedandarguablycontributedtothesixteenIndianMujahideenbombsthatexplodedatoraroundModi’sHunkaarrallyinBiharon17October2013.IftheCBIisbeingpoliticallydirected,thesecurityimplicationsaregrave.

Modi tougheningIndia’s stanceonterrorandPakistanhasnotpleasedeveryone.‘ThatWashingtonhasasmuchinfluenceoverDelhisinceManmohanSinghbecamePM in 2004 as London had over India’s capital city during the British Raj is aperceptionwidelysharedwithinthecountry,’saysNalapat.34

However,themeetingbetweenUSambassadortoIndiaNancyPowellandModion13February2014underscored two issues.First, that theUSnow recognizes theincreasing possibility of Modi becoming India’s prime minister at the end of May2014.Ifathawhastotakeplaceinadifficultrelationship,itcannotbeleftfortoolate.Second,theeconomicpartnershipwithIndiaremainsparamountfortheUS:Modi’stough approach to Pakistan and on national security will be less of a concern toWashington in a post-2014world following theNATOwithdrawal of troops fromAfghanistaninDecember2014.

Inthewakeofthe2009LokSabhaelection,authorTavleenSinghwroteadespairingarticleburyingtheBJPoldguardanddescribingthepartyasentering‘whatcouldbedescribed as a post-Hindutva phase’ where the young of India were no longerinterestedintheAyodhyastory.Asaresult,shewrote,‘TworoadsstretchbeforetheBharatiya Janata Party. One will take it straight into history’s dustbin. The othertowardsrebirthasacentre-rightpoliticalparty.’Thatrebirth,shethought,wouldhavetobebasedaroundgreaterinternaldemocracyandalesseningoftieswiththeRSSsothat a talentedpolitician freed fromoutmoded right-wingHindu chauvinismcouldrisetoleadtheBJP.

‘Wherever I travel I meet young people who are unhappy with the country’spoliticalleadersbecausetheybelievethemalltobe“corruptanduseless,”’Singhwrote.

Theywillvoteforapoliticalpartythatoffersthembetterroads,cities,schools,hospitalsandjobs.Theywill

voteforapoliticalpartythatoffersthemlesscorruptionandbettergovernance.TheBJPcouldbethatpartyifitchoosestomovetowardsbecomingamodernpoliticalpartythatcanofferusin2014agranderideaofIndiathantheshabby,rundownideathattheCongresshastooffer.35

DespiteeconomicandpoliticalturbulenceIndiaappearsonthecuspofchangeforthebetter,stillbrimfulofwhatV.S.Naipaulcalled‘thesocialantagonismsthatgivesavourtolife’,36andallthemorealiveandvigorousforit.

India will never be a calm, cool, ordered nation like Switzerland or Sweden orCanada, and in temperament is more akin to the US – a boisterous, colourful,imaginative,innovativeandirrepressiblerepublic.IndiasharesthediversityoftheUS,its religious and commercial enthusiasms, and most important of all its freedoms.Indiatoohasawiseconstitution.LikeAmericans,Indiapossessesacomplexskeinofbeliefs, languages and histories, and these are still being woven into a pattern ofidentitysufficientlyintricatetofullyincludeallitsinhabitants.

Economically, India is a caged tiger, prowling back and forth and snarling at itswarders. Itmerelyneeds tobe released from the vestigesof a feudalmentality– forwhichitspooranddependentcannotbeblamedbuttherichandprivilegedcertainlycan – and to remake its government so that it is for the people and by the peopleinsteadofforthepoliticianandbythebureaucrat.

India’s greatest strength lies in itspopulation: youthful andenergetic,optimistic,aspirational. Its fathomless and undeveloped internalmarkets and natural resourceshave hardly begun to be exploited; its agriculture is crying out for irrigation andpower; Internet penetration is barely 25 per cent; its regulations may still beburdensomeandinefficient–butallthisspellsopportunity,readytobegarneredbytherightleadership.

Onlyabout3percentofIndianspaytax.Iwasn’tsureaboutthissoIaskedModi.‘Yes,andmanyofthemaregovernmentemployeesoremployeesofgovernmentPSUsand government companies,’ he said.With such a tiny tax base, this means that ifIndiagrowsonlyalittlemoreprosperous,publicrevenueswillincreaseexponentiallyasmoreofthepopulationcrossesthetaxationthresholdandbeginstocontributeforthe first time. Ifonly10per centof thepopulationpays tax, the fundsavailable forinfrastructure,ifnotusurpedbypoliticians,willrisesharply.HepointstootherAsiancountrieswheretaxtoGDPratiosarehigherthanIndia’s.

Modi has long regardedChina and Japan as pivots of India’s future foreign andtradepolicy.HevisitedChinainNovember2011toaredcarpetwelcome.Overthe

five-day trip,hemetChina’s toppolitical andbusiness leadership.The receptionhewasaccordedduringhisfour-dayvisittoJapanafewmonthslater,inJuly2012,wasequallytelling:thetwoAsiangiantshadclearlydecidedwherethecentreofgravityofIndianpoliticshadshifted.

A criticism of Modi’s speeches is that while he attacks – rightly – Congressmisgovernance,hedoesnotprovideanalternativevision,especiallyontheeconomy.

Modi, contrary to this view, has often articulated his own vision of an open,liberalizedeconomywithafocusoninfrastructure,jobcreationandfiscaldiscipline.ItisoneofthereasonsglobalinvestmentbankslikeGoldmanSachsandbrokerageslikeCLSA have upgraded the ‘India story’ in the months leading up to the generalelection.‘Itissimply,’saysonebankerinLondon,‘areflectionofsupportforModi’sbusiness-friendly,decisiveleadership.’

WhatthenshouldbeModi’sfutureeconomicagenda?AsauthorandeditorMinhazMerchantwroteinTheTimesofIndiaontheday,13

September2012,ModiwasanointedtheBJP’sprimeministerialcandidate:

India’shugeconsumermarketmakesitamagnetfortheworld.BadgovernanceandretrospectivelegislationinrecentyearshaveledinvestorstolosefaithintheIndiastory.Credibility,likereputation,takesmuchtobuild,littletolose.

For centuries, India was exploited by foreigners. Indian resources were used forWestern benefit. It is time to use Western money for Indian benefit. An openeconomywithfirm,fairandfastlawenforcement,areliabletaxregimeandasensibleregulatoryframeworkcouldattractwellover$100billioninFDIannually.

ForanewgovernmentledbyModi,thekeyissueistore-liberateaneconomyswathed(onceagain)inredtape.Simultaneously,itmustrescueourinstitutionsfromthedamagetheyhavesufferedoverthepastnineyears.Police,administrativeandjudicialreformswillgivetheeconomythesteelgriditneedstoallowIndiatogrowintoamodernworld-classnation.

The BJP’s victories over theCongress in theDecember 2013 assembly elections inRajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh echoed the mood of anger amongvoters.ThescaleoftheCongress’srout,especiallyinRajasthanandMadhyaPradesh,couldbe apointer to theoutcome in the2014LokSabhaelection.Modi addresseddozens of rallies across the states, drawing large crowds, and with competent localleadersinplace,provedtobeaforcemultiplier.

Modi’s campaign tobuild the StatueofUnity, inhonourof SardarPatel, is alsolikelytodrawvotestotheBJPfromGujaratandtherestofthecountryfromavast

constituencyof Indianswho feelPateldidnotgethisdue inaCongressdominatedafterIndependencebyNehru.

WorldleadershavemeanwhilebeguntoprepareforaModi-ledgovernmentattheCentre. British, European Union (EU) and Australian envoys have increased thefrequencyoftheirvisitstohisGandhinagaroffice.TheUStoohasannounceditwillgrant Modi all diplomatic privileges should he be elected prime minister. Globalinvestmentanalystspointtoa‘Modiwave’revivingtheIndianeconomy,boostingthestockmarketandfirminguptherupee.

InIndiathethreattodemocracyisbureaucraticanddynastic;itcomesfromredtapeandnepotism.TheonlydictatorshipthecountryhasenduredsinceIndependencewasunder Indira Gandhi. That today would be unthinkable, and constitutionallyimpossible.

Indians today are at easewith religion rather thanparanoid about it. Ithasbeensubsumedintoacultural identity.PluralityanddiversitycoexistwithIndia’sage-oldtraditions.

Modisayshehimself isnotreligious.HeadmiresSwamiVivekanandaandvaluesspirituality, crediting his yogawith giving him stamina.He breathesHindu cultureandhistoryandvalues itsbenefits inhisownlifeandthe lifeof thecountry.Buthesayshehasnouseforritualorritualobservance.

‘Idonotbelieveinrituals.Thosewhobelieveinrituals,Iamnotagainstthem.Itistheirstrandoflifeandforthemitmayberequired.Inmystrandoflife,ritualsarenotrequired.’Thiseasy-goingattitudeiswhatModiofcoursewouldclaimistheessenceofHinduism:amodernbutveryancientfaiththatbothpredatesandupdateswhatisconventionallyunderstoodasbelief.Itcontainsnarrative,philosophyandspiritualityaswellasworship.Itisvast,tolerantandvaried.

ItisnowtheturnofthepoliticalsysteminIndiatocatchupwithitspeople;timeforitsrulerstostopactingliketheBritishRajandnoticethatIndiaisnowmaturelycontenttobeIndian.

Modi is regarded by the establishment as someone with rough edges, the OBCchaiwalawhohasnorighttocrossthethresholdof7RaceCourseRoad.

HecallsittheDelhiClub.‘Iwillneverbepartofthat,’hesays.TheDelhiClub–a

metaphorforanoverratedIndianpoliticalelite–isanywayacolonialrelic,soontobeovertakenbyanew,meritocraticIndia.ThatisModi’sconstituencywherewhatyoudoandhowwellyoudoitmattermorethanwhoyouareandwhereyoucamefrom.

Thatisalsoaprinciplewhichahistoricgeneralelectioncouldsetinstone.

NOTESANDREFERENCES

Prologue1. Modi’s protection was further upgraded after the bomb blasts at his Patna rally on 27 October 2013.

‘NarendraModinowhasthreelayersofprotection:onegrouptotakeonanyattackers,asecondtoprovidecoverandathirdtogethimtosafety.’(‘GovtthrowsringsofprotectionaroundBJPPMcandidateNarendraModi’,TheTimes of India, 4 November 2013) (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-throws-rings-of-protection-around-PM-candidate-NarendraModi/articleshow/25206558.cms)2.AmitabhSrivastava,‘NarendraModiNo.1targetofIM,saysBhatkal’,IndiaToday,3September2013

(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/yasin-bhatkal-says-narendra-modi-is-no-1-target-of-indian-mujahideen/1/305242.html) 3. The Indian Express, ‘Both Prime Minister and rupee have turned mute, saysNarendraModi’,(PressTrustOfIndia),24August2013

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/both-prime-minister-and-rupee-have-turned-mute-says-narendra-modi/1159560/00)1:TheEarlyYears

1.A‘kund,calledNagdharo,withalake,pool,locks,andfeedingchannel,builtduringtheSolankiperiod,isaspecimenofhighqualityengineering.ItisbelievedthattheHatkeshwartempleandSharmishthaLake,nowontheoutskirtsofVadnagar,oncestoodinthecenteroftown,testifyingtojusthowvastVadnagarwasatonepoint.’

(http://www.gujarattourism.com/showpage.aspx?contentid=277&webpartid=773) 2. M.V. Kamath andKalindiRanderi,NarendraModi:TheArchitectofaModernState,NewDelhi,Rupa&Co.,2009,p.12

3.AakarPatel,‘SeparatingfactfromfluffaboutNarendraModi’,LiveMint&TheWallStreetJournal,27April2013: ‘Modi is a Ghanchi, from the trading caste of oil-pressers and grain sellers called Teli in north India.GhanchisarecategorizedasOtherBackwardClass…Ghanchisare“savarna”(uppercaste)inGujarat.IfeventhisManuSmriticategorybecomeslow-caste,then90percentofIndiaislow-caste.’

(http://www.livemint.com/Leisure/PGoQ9lXh0mliPwWrMXbVhI/Separating-fact-from-fluff-about-Narendra-Modi.html)4.SandhyaJain,‘Thenationalistsdonothavetobedefensive’,TheDailyPioneer,24September2013.Modimaymodifythisstanceduringthegeneralelectioncampaign:‘…attheveteransrallyatRewari,Haryana,onSeptember15…Mr.Modiwiselyusedthisplatformtoinformthenationabouthisbackground,unfulfilleddreams,andaspirations…DescribingwithelanhowpovertyfrustratedadesiretostudyattheSainikschoolinJamnagardistrict…heskilfullynixedthedemeaningfactoidsputoutbysomeadmirersabouthiscasteandclassorigins.’

(http://www.dailypioneer.com/cloumnists/edit/the-nationalists-do-not-have-to-be-defensive.html for how hecanuseittogoodeffect)5.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.16

6.KamathandRanderi,ibid.,p.157.KamathandRanderi,ibid.,p.138.M.D.Nalapat,‘Theprophetofenlightenedliberalism’,Organiser,10November2013:‘Ratherthanspending

timeonthesurfaceoffaith,Vivekanandaentereditscore,anddiscoveredthatasheprogresseddeeperanddeeperinhis intellectualquest, thedifferent faithsgot subsumed intoacommon insight related to theuniversalityandomniscienceoftheDivine.’

(http://organiser.org//Encyc/2013/1/19/The-prophet-of-enlightened-liberalism.aspx?NB=&lang=3&m1=&m2=&p1=&p2=&p3=&p4=) 9. Pravin Sheth, Images of Transformation: Gujarat andNarendra Modi, Ahmedabad, Team Spirit (India) Pvt. Ltd, 2007, p. 27: ‘Again, the internal relations andtransactionsamongthecitiesandvillagesofGujaratarecomparativelystrongerthanotherstates.Thisisprimarilyduetointerlinkedeconomicactivitiesandtransportation.’

10.The term ‘Left’ isused in itsBritish senseof referring toabroad spectrumofpoliticalopinion fromsoft

socialism to communism, whereas in India it appears to apply more strictly to parties at the communist andNaxaliteend.InthisbooktheCongresspartyisreferredtoasoftheLeftbecauseofitssocialisticpoliciesandstatistoutlook.

11.V.S.Naipaul,AnAreaofDarkness,London,AndréDeutsch,1964,p.258

2:OntheRoad1.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.172.NilanjanMukhopadhyay,NarendraModi:TheMan,TheTimes,NewDelhi,TranquebarPress,2013,p.303.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.214.NarendraModi,Jyotipunj,Ahmedabad,PravinPrakashan,20085.27°47'27"N91°42'40"E6.Naipaul,op.cit.,p.2487.SeealsoHiranmayKarlekar,‘Spareathoughtforourbravejawans’,TheDailyPioneer,24October2013(http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/spare-a-thought-for-our-brave-jawans.html8. Tavleen Singh recalls that before the Chinese attack ‘that scoundrel Menon’ had given over munitions

factoriestoproducingcoffeepercolators(Durbar,Gurgaon,HachetteIndia,2012,p.10)9.Seenote4,Chapter1:InthatspeechModiconfirmedforthefirsttimethatitwaslackofmoneywhichpreventedhimfromattendingtheSainakschool.

10.DavidBlair,‘Prisonersoftheirownignorance’,TheDailyTelegraph,6October2013(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10359567/Prisoners-of-their-own-

ignorance.html)11.KingshukNag,TheNaMoStory:APoliticalLife,RoliBooks,2013,p.3812.RefertoArticle14andArticle51(A)oftheIndianConstitution13.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.1814.Ibid.,p.1915.Ibid.,p.1816.RupakBanerjee,‘ModiwantedtobeRamakrishnamonk’,TheTimesofIndia,10April2013(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-10/kolkata/384329401belur-math-ramakrishna-

mission-rkm)17.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.1918.Ibid.,p.1919.Banerjee,‘ModiwantedtobeRamakrishnamonk’,op.cit.20.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.2021.SyedFirdausAshraf,‘Mysonloveseveryone:Modi’smother’,Rediff.com,7December2002(http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/07guj2.htm)22.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.21

3:PoliticalAwakening1.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.492.AchyutYagnik and Suchitra Sheth,Ahmedabad: FromRoyal city toMegacity,NewDelhi, PenguinBooks

India,2011(section:‘RiotsandthePoliticalEconomyofUrbanLand’)3.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.504.Thebestaccountoftheplightofrefugeesin1970sCalcuttaremainsGeoffreyMoorhouse,Calcutta:TheCity

Revealed,NewDelhi,Penguin,1994(4thEdition)5.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.226.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.1117.Ibid.,p.111

8.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.239.Ibid.PravinShethalsomentionsModi’spoliticalsciencestudies(atMAlevel)atvariouspointsinhisbook

becausehewasforatimehisuniversitytutor.10.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.11211.ShubhamGhosh,‘AcorneredMrsGandhiroaredback’,OneIndiaNews,Thursday,27June2013(http://news.oneindia.in/feature/2013/1975-emergecncy-cornered-mrs-gandhi-roared-back-1245655.html)

12.TavleenSingh,Durbar,Gurgaon,HachetteIndia,2012,pp.26–2713.Ibid.,p.2514.PatrickFrench,India:aPortrait,London,PenguinBooks,2012,p.4515.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.2316.KishoreTrivedi, ‘NavnirmanMovement (1974):When studentpower rattled theunhealthy statusquo!’

www.narendramodi.in:CitizenJournalism,15June2012(http://www.narendramodi.in/navnirman-movement-1974-when-student-power-rattled-the-unhealthy-status-

quo/) 17. Shubham Ghosh, ‘What happened after Emergency was imposed’, OneIndia News, 26 June 2013:‘EffortswerealsomadetodefametheRSSbyclaimingweaponswerefoundinitsofficewhiledocumentarieswereusedtodemonisetheOppositionparties,includingJayaprakashNarayan.’

(http://news.oneindia.in/feature/2013/what-happened-after-emergency-was-imposed-1245682.html) 18.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.31

19.ChhayankMehta,‘Emergency,GujaratandNarendraModi’,www.narendramodi.in:CitizenJournalism,26June2012

(http://www.narendramodi.in/emergency-gujarat-and-narendra-modi/)20.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.3021.Ibid.,p.3122.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.12323.Atthesametime,BalasahebDeoras,leaderoftheRSS,hadgonesofarastowritealettertoIndiraGandhi

seekingrapprochementandimplicitlyacceptingthestateofEmergency.Itmayhavebeenhisattempttogetoutof,orstayoutofprison.SeeTavleenSingh,op.cit.,p.57

24. ‘The inexplicable torture that thepolicehadconductedononeof thebrothersofoneof theOppositionleadersGeorgeFernandes is still fresh in thememoryofmanywhohad followed those times closely.’ ShubhamGhosh,op.cit.,26June2013

25.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.12326.Singh,op.cit.,p.5727.TheEconomistof4December1976hailedtheRSSas ‘theonlynon-leftrevolutionaryforceintheworld’,

andsaid‘itsplatformatthemomenthasonlyoneplank:tobringdemocracybacktoIndia’.28.Singh,op.cit.,p.58

4:LearningTheRopes1.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.382.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.1253.Ibid.,p.1264.Ibid.5.BarunS.Mitra,‘“Our”socialistagenda:thetimetooustithascome’,LiveMint&TheWallStreetJournal,

16January2008(http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/85pBNYJBwJc3PTSkEU433L/8216Our8217-socialist-agenda-the-

time-to-oust-it-has.html)6.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,pp.132–33

7.M.J.Akbar,‘Whysomepoliticalpartieslosttheplot’,TheTimesofIndia,15November2009(http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/TheSiegeWithin/entry/why-some-political-parties-lost) 8. V.S.

Naipaul,AWoundedCivilisation,London,Macmillan2010,p.1609.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.13510.Ibid.11.See JapanK.Pathak, ‘WhendovotersofGujarat change thegovernment theyelected?’,DeshGujarat,10

December 2012, for an excellent discussion of the disaster thatwas theAnamat andolan (partial imposition ofRaneCommissionrecommendationsunderSolanki).

(http://deshgujarat.com/2012/12/10/when-do-voters-of-gujarat-change-the-incumbent-government/) 12.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.41

13.Ornit Shani,Communalism, Caste andHinduNationalism: The Violence inGujarat, Cambridge, CUP,2007,pp.57–58

14.Pathak,op.cit.,10December201215.Forthesheerdifficultyinaccuratelyidentifyingminoritiesandunderprivilegedcastesandclasses,seeA.

Ramaiah,‘IdentifyingOtherBackwardClasses’,EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,6June1992,pp.1203–07(http://web.archive.org/web/20051230030051/http://www.tiss.edu/downloads/ppapers/pp1.pdf)16.GailOmvedt,ReinventingRevolution:NewSocialMovementsandtheSocialistTraditioninIndia,EastGate,NewYork,1993,p.69

(http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Wlxb0uacnRcC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad= 0#v=onepage&q&f=false) 17.Mukhopadhyay,withoutevidence, impliesModi instigated the riots: ‘It cannotbeconstrued thatModiwas thepuppeteeroftheanti-reservationstirof1985,butgiventhepenchantofthemantobeinthethickofthings,itisdifficulttoenvisagethathewasdisconnectedwithsuchamajorupheaval.’(ibid.,p.146).

18.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.4119.Pathak,op.cit.,10December201220.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.14621.AseemaSinha,TheRegionalRootsofDevelopmentalPolitics inIndia:ADividedLeviathan,Bloomington,

IndianaUniversityPress,1995,p.17722.INTHESUPREMECOURTOFINDIA(OriginalCivilJurisdiction)WRITPETITION(CIVIL)NO.

98OF2002.pdf,pp.10,1823.S.Gurumurthy,‘Boss,readthetruehistorybeforespeaking’,TheNewIndianExpress,6April2013(http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/article1532597.ece)

5:TheYatraToPower1.Sheth,op.cit.,p.12.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.423.Ibid.,p.454.YagnikandSheth,op.cit.,(section:‘RiotsandthePoliticalEconomyofUrbanLand’)5.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.1476.PrashantDayal,‘LatifwasstateBJP’sfirstwhippingboy’,TheTimesofIndia,12June2008(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-06-12/ahmedabad/277835311bjp-ticket-bjp-leader-

assembly-elections)7.Nag,op.cit.,p.518.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,pp.138/1489.Singh(op.cit.,p.249)usestheword‘fundamentalist’inrelationtotheMuslimclericsagitatingovertheShah

Banocase.

10.Singh,ibid.,p.25011.‘TheShahBanoLegacy’,TheHindu,10August2003(http://www.hindu.com/2003/08/10/stories/2003081000221500.htm)12. SarvepalliGopal (ed.),Anatomy of aConfrontation:Ayodhyaand theRise ofCommunalPolitics in India,

NewDelhi,PenguinBooks(India),1991,p.15(http://books.google.co.uk/books?

id=47AARF595dUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad= 0#v=onepage&q&f=false) 13.FromthesecondoffourlecturesdeliveredbyUpadhyayainBombayduring22–25April1965(See‘ACompleteDeendayalReader’,http://deendayalupadhyaya.org/leacture2.html)14.Spokenat the fourteenannual sessionofthe BJP in Calicut, December 1967, when Deendayal was elected president(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deendayal_Upadhyaya)

15.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.15316.Nag,op.cit.,p.5317.Naipaul,op.cit.,2010,p.15818. Modi has wisely begun to refer to his background in election rally speeches: high stakes demand big

sacrifices,andhenowappearswillingtoexposehispastforthesakeofleadingthecountry.19.SeePriyaSahgal,‘1990–L.K.Advani’srathyatra:Chariotoffire’,IndiaToday,24December2009(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/1990-L.K.+Advaniper

cent27s+rath+yatra:+Chariot+of+fire/1/76389.html)20.RajeshKumarPandey,‘AdvaniremembersMassanjore’,TheTimesofIndia,18January2005

(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-01-18/patna/278334551lal-krishna-advani-dumka-guesthouse) 21.NeeraChandhoke, ‘The tragedyofAyodhya’,Frontline,Volume17, Issue13, 24 June–7 July2000

(http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1713/17130170.htm)22.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.5523.Ibid.,pp.57–5824.Ibid.,p.6025.SeeforinstanceMukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.19326.Ibid.27.ShekharGupta,‘TearingdownNarasimhaRao’,TheIndianExpress,7September2011(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tearing-down-narasimha-rao/547260/0)28.ChristopheJaffrelot,TheHinduNationalistMovementinIndia,p.314,quotedinBaldevRajNayar,‘The

Limits Of Economic Nationalism: Economic Policy Reforms Under The BJP-Led Government’, McGillUniversity2000,p.5[.pdf]

6:RisingtoResponsibility1.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.602.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.1943.Ibid.,p.1954.Nag,op.cit.,p.615.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.626.Nag,op.cit.,p.617.Ibid.,p.638.Ibid.,p.629.‘Shishya’scoup:HowModi,Advanifellapart’,TheTimesofIndia,10June2013

(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-06-10/india/398722071sitabdiaral-k-advani-advani-and-modi)10.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.216

11.KamathandRanderi,ibid.,p.6912.Ibid.,p.69;forChandigarhMunicipalCorporationvictoryseeibid.,p.71andMukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.

217;forHimachalvictoryseeNag,op.cit.,p.74;forPunjabassemblyin1997–ninety-threeoutof117againstfourteenforCongress,seeMukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.218.

13.BaldevRajNayar, ‘TheLimitsOfEconomicNationalism:EconomicPolicyReformsUnderTheBJP-LedGovernment’,McGillUniversity,2000,p.3[.pdf]

(http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/Nayar.pdf)14.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,pp.66-6815.Nag,op.cit.,p.6616.Ibid.,p.7717.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.22418.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.6919.SwapanDasgupta,‘IsKeshubhaiuptoit?’,IndiaToday,12February2001(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gujarat-earthquake-gujaratcm-keshubhai-patel-hardpressed-to-explain-

sluggish-response/1/233050.html)20.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.7121.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.23022.Dasgupta,op.cit.,12February200123.Nag,op.cit.,p.8024.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.8025.DionneBunsha,‘Anambitiouspracharak’,Frontline,Volume19–Issue26,21December2002–3January

2003(http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1926/stories/200 30103007400800.htm) 26. Sandhya Jain, ‘The

nationalistsdonothavetobedefensive’,TheDailyPioneer,24September2013(http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/the-nationalists-do-not-have-to-be-defensive.html) 27. Nag,

op.cit.,p.7828.Thebest–mostcomplete–versionisinKamathandRanderi,op.cit.,pp.81–8229.Informationforforeignreaders:manySikhsandHinduPunjabismovedtoDelhiafterPartitionwhenthey

wereforcedoutoftheirhomelandinwhatbecamePakistan.TheytookoverneighbourhoodsvacatedbymigratingMuslims.

30.Obituary:‘TheLastAssignment’,IndiaToday,15October2001(http://archives.digitaltoday.in/indiatoday/20011015/obituary.html)31.ManasDasgupta,‘ModisworninGujaratCMamidstfanfare’,TheHindu,8October2001(http://www.thehindujobs.com/thehindu/2001/10/08/stories/02080001.htm)32.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.83

7:TheRiots1.Reportby theCommissionof InquiryConsistingofMr JusticeG.T.Nanavati andMr JusticeAkshayH.

Mehta[TheNanavatiInquiry],p.952.Ibid.,p.873.JusticeTewatiaCommitteereport[TheTewatiaReport],p.23:‘7.HeadofapassengerofS-6coachwascut

whenhetriedtogetoutofthewindow.Theheadwaslaterthrownbackintothecoachtoburn.’(http://soc.culture.indian.marathi.narkive.com/JcK2YZNy/full-text-godhra-carnage-justice-tewatia-report) 4.

TheNanavatiInquiry,op.cit.,p.88

5.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,p.206. Ibid.,p.19: ‘Crying and shoutingShakuntla tookoutherbangles andoffered themto the twopolicemen

withrifles.Thepolicemenfiredafewshotsintheair.Thatdidnotdeterthemob.’7.V.Venkatesan,‘Avictoryandmanypointers’,Frontline,Volume19,Issue5,2–15March2002(http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1905/19050240.htm)8.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.259,confirmsthis;Modialsoconfirmedtheapproximatetimetome.9.Chiefminister’spressrelease,Godhra,27February2002(quotedinKishwar,Modinama,p.33)10.Kamath

andRanderi,op.cit.,p.10111. Kishwar, op. cit., p. 34: ‘62 Companies of State Reserve Police Force andCentral ParaMilitary Forces

companiesdeployedonFebruary27;Outof62,58wereofSRPFand4wereofCPMF.’12.Kishwar,ibid.,p.8513.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,p.17;Kishwar,op.cit.,p.8614.ManasGupta,‘NoevidenceofModipromotingenmity:SIT’,TheHindu,9May2012:‘TheSITwasalsoof

theopinionthatthebodieswerebroughttoAhmedabadinthedeadofnightanddisposedofquietlythenextdaywithoutbeingparadedbeforetheriotousmobaswasallegedbytheChiefMinister’scritics.’

(http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-evidence-of-modi-promoting-enmity-sit/article3398456.ece)15.PresentwereAshokNarayan,additionalchiefsecretary(Home);P.K.Mishra,principalsecretarytothechiefminister; K. Chakravarthi, director general of police; P. C. Pande, chief of police for Ahmedabad City; AnilMukim,additionalpersonalsecretarytothechiefminister;M.K.Nityanandam,secretary(Home)andPrakashS.Shah, additional secretary (Law andOrder ). (SeeKishwar, op. cit., p. 78) 16.Exhibit : 2671before the specialcourt,designated for conducting the speedy trial of riot cases, situated atoldhigh courtbuilding,Navrangpura,Ahmedabad.[NarodaPatiyaCommonJudgement],p.15

17. ‘Report in Compliance to the Order DTD 12.09.2011 of theHon’ble Supreme Court of India in theComplaintDTD08.06.2006ofSmt.JakiaNasimAhesanJafri[SITFinalClosureReport]:“Onthedayofbandh,i.e. 28.02.2002, ahugemob comprising about20,000Hindus gatheredunlawfully, armedwithdeadly arm [sic]weapons,infurtheranceoftheircommonintentionandindulgedinattackontheproperties,shopsandhousesofMuslims.”’

18.NarodaPatiyaCommonJudgement,op.cit.,p.281onwards19.Ibid.,p.65520.Kishwar,op. cit.,p.17,quotes theSpecial InvestigationTeam(SIT) report that5,000peoplewere saved

fromNooranimosquebyAhmedabadPolice;240weresavedatSardarpurainMehsanadistrict;450weresavedinPore andNardipur villages; 200 personswere saved in Sanjoli village; 1,500were saved in Fatehpura village inVadodradistrict;3,000peopleweresavedinKawantvillage.

21.ManmathDeshpande, ‘Aflawedjudgement,badinlaw’,TheOrganiser,16September2012:‘IndiaToday(April 22,2002) reported that thepolice saved2,500Muslims inSanjeli, 5000 inBodeli and at least10,000 inViramgamareasofGujarat.HinduswerealsosavedfromviolentMuslimmobsinareaslikeBharuch,JamalpurareaofAhmedabad,etc.’

(http://www.organiser.org/Encyc/2012/9/11/-b-A-flawed-judgement,-bad-in-law--b-.aspx?NB=&lang=4&m1=&m2=&p1=&p2=&p3=&p4=&PageType=N) 22.DhananjayMahapatra, ‘NGOs, TeestaspicedupGujaratriotincidents:SIT’,TheTimesofIndia,14April2009:‘TheSITsaidithadbeenallegedintheGulbarg Society case that Pandey, instead of takingmeasures to protect people facing thewrath of rioters,washelpingthemob.Thetruthwasthathewashelpingwithhospitalisationofriotvictimsandmakingarrangementsforpolicebandobast,Gujaratcounsel,senioradvocateMukulRohtagi,saidquotingfromtheSITreport.’

(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/NGOs-Teesta-spiced-up-Gujaratriot-incidents-SIT/articleshow/4396986.cms?; also see http://ibnlive.in.com/news/guj-riots-exdgp-p-c-pandey-gets-clean-chit/90211-3.html)23.Atleast,thatmuchwasclaimed,althoughthepost-mortemexaminationestablishedthatJafrihadbeen shot three timesbutneitherhackednorburned.SeeChandanMitra, ‘AStingWithoutVenom’,

OutlookIndia,12November2007(http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235985)24.Kishwar,ibid.,p.2625.Ibid.,pp.15,2626.ForthelistofconvictedCongressmenseeManmathDeshpande,‘Congressleadersinvolvedinterror’,The

Organiser,13March2011;‘Fourgetlifeimprisonment’,TheTimesofIndia,16October,2003(http://organiser.org/archives/historic/dynamic/modulesc39f.html?

name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=388&page=7; http://www.gujaratriots.com/index.php/2012/10/myth-21-no-one-was-brought-to-justice-for-the-riots/)27.Nag,op.cit.,p.17

28.Kishwar,op.cit.,p.2429.Ibid.,p.2430.PatrickFrench,op.cit.,p.8231.SeeKamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.44,forstatisticsinGujarat32.TavleenSingh,op.cit.,p.29133.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.104.SeealsoRajeshRamachandran,‘CongsilentoncadreslinkedtoGuj

riots’,TheTimesofIndia,9August200334.Thevideoisathttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CiuBBKJ30Q35.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.11136.DocumentsquotedinKishwar,ibid.,pp.95–9637.Thevideoisathttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSkEZ9hcIdM38. SIT Final Closure Report on Gulbarg, op. cit., pp. 250–54: ‘the so-called utterances by Chief Minister

NarendraModiarenotsufficienttomakeoutacaseagainsthim.’(p.253)39.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.11140.SITFinalClosureReportonGulbarg,p.25141.Kishwar,op.cit.,p.3842.UdayMahurkar,‘Modasa,astrongbaseofSIMI’,IndiaToday,30September2008[http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Modasa,+a+strong+base+of+SIMI/1/16438.html) 43. See Kamath and

Randeri,op.cit.,p.11644.GujaratHighCourtOrder–SpecialCANo:3773of2002,(3May2002),quotedinKishwar,op.cit.,p.2345.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,pp.107-846.UdayMahurkar,‘TheModieffect:Gujarat’,IndiaToday,29April2002(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/despite-gujarat-riots-narendra-modi-rides-the-crest-of-enhanced-stature-

and-popularity/1/220199.html)47.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,pp.14-1548.ForISIinvolvementseeKamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.14349.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,p.3450.Rediff.com,27November2002:‘ThecarefulstudyofabulkyregisterofaguesthouseinGodhrahasadded

anentirelynewdimensiontotheinvestigationintotheGodhracarnage.ThenewfindingsledtothearrestofAliMohammadandGhulamNabiDingooofAnantnagdistrictinJammuandKashmirinthelastweekofOctober.’SeealsoTheEconomicTimes,‘GodhrakillingwasPaksponsored:Probepanel’,27April2002

(http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/27spec.htm;http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2002-04-27/news/273423691godhra-haji-bilal-rioting-mobs)51.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.143.

52.Sheth,op.cit.,p.3253.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.24454.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.9955.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,pp.36–3756.TheNanavatiInquiry,op.cit.,p.5057.Seeforexample,Nag,op.cit.,p.90.Hedoesnotmentionanyoftheotherinquiriesorreports.58.TheTewatiaReport,op.cit.,pp.31–32

59.Ibid.,p.3360.Kishwar,op.cit.,p.1361.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.25662.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.13863.Quotedinibid.,p.13864. That is Modi’s version. An article in Rediff.com, 12 April 2002, stated it somewhat differently: ‘The

Bharatiya Janata Party on Friday night at its executivemeeting inGoa askedGujaratChiefMinisterNarendraModitodissolvethestateassemblyandseekverdictofthepeople.’However,itisalmostinconceivablethattheBJPwouldvoluntarilyhavecontestedGujaratat that time.Mostof theRediff.comdespatches fromGoawerebeingsentbySheelaBhatt,thenacriticofModi,whomayhavebeenexpressingawishnotafact.

(http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/apr/12train1.htm)65.On26July2008,withinaspanof70minutes,aseriesof21bombssetbySIMIandtheIndianMujahideen

exploded inAhmedabad.They resulted in56deaths andover200people injured.Again, there asno riotingorrevenge-taking againstMuslims even though the death tollwas almost identical toGodhra in 2002. SomethingreallyhadchangedinGujarat.

8:FightingforGujarat1.‘TheeffortsputinbytheStateGovernmentinthisbehalf,asindicatedabove,arerequiredtobeappreciated’

(GujaratHighCourtOrder-SpecialCANo:3773of2002,(3May2002),quotedinKishwar,op.cit.,p.26.Seealsop.188,SITFinalClosureReportonGulbarg,ibid.,whichstates:‘121reliefcampswereorganisedbyNGOsorvarious institutionswhichwere closed by 30-06-2002 except 10 camps ofAhmedabad district.’ Pages 182–197containmuchdetailaboutthereliefeffort.

2.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.2753.SheilaBhatt,‘TheRediffInterview/KPSGill’,Rediff.com,20May2002(http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/20inter.htm)4.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.1445.TranscriptofModi speech, ‘Some journalists askedme recently, “Has JamesMichaelLyngdohcome from

Italy?”’,OutlookIndia,30September2002(http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?217399)6.OnkarSingh,‘ViolenceinGujarathitsthehotelindustryhard’,Rediff.com,6March2002(http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/06train2.htm)7.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.1128.Ibid.,p.1139.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,pp.347–4810.V.K.Chakravarti,‘Farfrombusinessasusual’,TheHindu,Magazine,5May2002(http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/mag/2002/05/05/stories/ 2002050500020400.htm) 11. Kamath and

Randeri,op.cit.,p.11312.‘ECshapesGujaratpleaamidLyngdoh-Modiduel’,TheTimesofIndia,24August,2002(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-08-24/india/27326499 1lyngdoh-modi-commissioner-j-m-

lyngdoh-james-michael-lyngdoh) 13.AshokMalik, ‘Modi kept calling him JamesMichael, RSS sent Lyngdoh aletter:youhavemadeusproud’,TheIndianExpress,4July2002

(http://archive.is/PMN3m)14.‘GujaratAssemblydissolved,earlypollsought’,TheEconomicTimes,19July2002(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2002-07-19/news/273372211gujarat-cabinet-polls-gujarat-

assembly)15.MukundPadmanabhan,‘Lyngdoh’struth’,TheHindu,21September2004

(http://www.hindu.com/br/2004/09/21/stories/2004092100221300.htm)16.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.29917.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.14918. ‘SC upholds EC order on Gujarat’, Times of India, 28 October 2002; J. Venkatesan, ‘Supreme Court

upholdsECdecisiononGujaratpolls’,TheHindu,3September2002(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-10-28/india/273175931constitution-bench-gujarat-polls-

assembly;http://hindu.com/2002/09/03/stories/2002090305670100.htm)19.TheHindu,ibid.,21September2004

20.‘ModiFlagsOffRathyatra’,TheFinancialExpress,12July2002(http://www.financialexpress.com/news/modi-flags-off-rathyatra-/51933)21. Dionne Bunsha, ‘NarendraModi’s long haul’, Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 19, 14–27 September 2002.

SheelaBhatt,‘VHPgeneralsecretaryDrJaideepPatelshotatinNaroda’,Rediff.com,3December2002(http://www.frontline.in/fl1919/19190300.htm; http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/03guj2.htm) 22.

‘Modidefershis“GujaratGauravYatra”again’,Rediff.com,2September2002(http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/sep/01guj.htm)23.‘Confidentialno.j/2/BJP/Yatra/525/02officeofadditionaldirectorgeneralofpolice(INT)GujaratState,

Gandhinagar.Date:12/9/2002’,p.3[.pdf]24. ‘Dictator’ because after his coup d’état of 13October 1999 againstNawaz Sharif,Musharrafwould not

graduatetoelectedpresidentuntil10October2002–stillseveraldaysaway.25.‘GujaratChiefMinisterNarendraModihospitalised’,Rediff.com,22November2002(http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/nov/22guj.htm)26.‘Modi’sGauravYatraMayBecomeVaghela’sVictoryParade’,TheFinancialExpress,16September2002(http://www.financialexpress.com/news/modi-s-gaurav-yatra-may-become-vaghela-s-victory-parade/57268/0)

27.‘SurveypredictsclosefinishinGujaratpolls’,Rediff.com,6December2002(http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/06guj4.htm)28.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.16029.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,pp.292,33630.DebrajMookerjee,‘Gujaratandthesecularoverkill’,TheDailyPioneer,28December2002(http://www.hvk.org/2002/1202/292.html)31.SheelaBhatt,‘“IseeanemotionalfrenzyintheBJP’sfavour’”,Rediff.com,12December2002(http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/12guj.htm)32.SwapanDasgupta,‘MasteroftheNationalGame’,IndiaToday,31December2012(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/narendramodi-is-a-player-of-national-politics-feels-swapan-

dasgupta/1/238905.html)33.‘BJPwillgetcomfortablemandate:Advani’,Rediff.com,12December2002(http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/12guj4.htm)34.SwapanDasgupta,‘ModiMania…theFormula’,DigitalIndia,30December2002(http://archives.digitaltoday.in/indiatoday/20021230/cover.html)35.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.17136.UdayMahurkar, ‘Gujarat: ShankersinhVaghela appointment asPCCchief forcesBJP to change its poll

tactics’,IndiaToday,29July2002(http://m.indiatoday.in/story/gujarat-shankersinh-vaghela-appointment-as-pcc-chief-forces-bjp-to-change-its-

poll-tactics/1/219168.html)37.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.30438.Kishwar,op.cit.,p.2639.Nag,op.cit.,p.1340.Sheth,op. cit., p. 226;AjayUmat, ‘OnceHindutva twins,NarendraModi andPravinTogadiano longer

conjoined’,TheTimesofIndia,9February2013(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-09/india/370072051ashwin-patel-hedgewar-bhavan-

maninagar).SeealsoSheth,ibid.,pp.158,210–1141.Kishwar,op.cit.,p.2642.Sheth,op.cit.,p.21143.ShekharGupta,‘NationalInterest:Modiversushisparty’,TheIndianExpress,15June2013(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/national-interest-modi-versus-his-party/1129321/0) 44. Gareth Price,

‘Howthe2004LokSabhaelectionwaslost’,ChathamHouseBriefingNote,July2004,pp.2–3[.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/ Asia/bngp0704.pdf) 45. M.D. Nalapat,

‘Likehimorhatehim,Modiisheretostay’,TheSundayGuardian,14July2013(http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/like-him-or-hate-him-modi-is-here-to-stay) 46. Mukhopadhyay,

op.cit.,p.30547.PritishNandy,‘ModioffersanewCamelot’,TheTimesofIndia,20June2013(http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/extraordinaryissue/entry/modi-offers-a-new-camelot)48.Shekhar

Gupta,‘ArvindPanagariya:Iamalittleworried.Nowthereis10-20percentchancethatwemightsee1991again’,TheIndianExpress,30July2013

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/i-am-a-little-worried.-now-there-is-1020-percent-chance-that-we-might-see-1991-again/1148384/0)49.SabaNaqvi,‘MannaforModi’,OutlookIndia,4September2006

(http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?232370)50.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.24651.‘Thefirstrequirementofanyprogressivecountryisinternalandexternalsecurity.’(QuotedinFrench,op.

cit.,p.25)52.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.21153.Sheth,op.cit.,p.15854. In Atul Kumar Thakur (ed.), India Since 1947: Looking Back at aModernNation, NewDelhi, Niyogi

Books,201355.Nag,op.cit.,p.16556.ExactfiguresforthenumberofMoUssignedatvariousVibrantGujarateventsvaryaccordingtothesource

consulted,althoughtheyareroughlyinalignment.IammostlyusingthefiguresthatKingshukNagquotesbecauseyoucanbesuretheyareconservativeonesandthattherewillbeabsolutelynoexaggerationofModi’ssuccess.

57.AccordingtoWikipediathenumberofMoUswas675.58. Ashok Gulati, Tushaar Shah Ganga Shreedhar, ‘Agriculture performance in Gujarat since 2000’,

InternationalWaterManagementInstitute,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute,May2009,p.2[.pdf](http://www.gujaratcmfellowship.org/document/Agriculture/Agriculturepercent20Performanceper

cent20inpercent20Gujaratpercent20sincepercent202000_IWMIpercent20&percent20IFPRIpercent20Report-_Maypercent202009.pdf)59.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.233

60.ForanamusingaccountofthisseeKishwar,op.cit.,p.2661.VidyaSubrahmaniam,‘ModiversustherestinGujarat’,TheHindu,15December2007(http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/15/stories/2007121556241300.htm)62.YogendraYadav,‘Modi’smomentoftruth’,TheIndianExpress,11December2007(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/modi-s-moment-of-truth/248518/)63.‘GujaratElections2007,beyondModi’,IBNliveChat(http://ibnlive.in.com/news/ibnlive-chat-gujarat-elections-2007-beyond-modi/53948-3-2.html) 64. Swapan

Dasgupta,‘TheModiphenomenon’,IndianSeminar.com,2008(http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/581/581_swapan_dasgupta.htm)65.‘SattabazaartrashesModi,swingsinfavourofCong’,IBNlive,21December2007(http://ibnlive.in.com/news/satta-bazaar-trashes-modi-swings-in-favour-of-cong/54737-3.html) 66. Kamath

andRanderi,op.cit.,p.25267.Kishwar,op.cit.,pp.63,6568.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.254

69.Ibid.,p.25970.SanjeevNayyar,‘WhytheBJPlostElections-2009’,Rediff.com,9June2009(http://election.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/jun/05/slide-show-1-why-the-bjp-lost-elections-2009.htm#8) 71.

Ibid.

9:DevelopmentandGovernance1.‘IndianbureaucracyratedworstinAsia,saysaPolitical&EconomicRiskConsultancyreport’TheEconomic

Times,11January2012(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-11/news/306163061report-malaysia-indian-

bureaucracy)2.HernandodeSoto,TheMysteryOfCapital,NewYork:BasicBooks,20003.SeeWorldEconomicForum,‘TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2010–2011’,p.182pas[.pdf]4.TheWorldBank,‘DoingBusiness:MeasuringBusinessRegulations’,availableonlineat

http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doingbusiness-20125.PremShankarJha,‘UseArgument,NotStones:Whycivilsocietymustnotletkeydemocraticreformsdrown

incynicism’,OutlookIndia,14February2011(http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?270317)6.Forgood statistics and linksonGujratdevelopment andbudget, etc, seeProf.MukulG.Asher, ‘Gujarat’s

budgetreflectssounddevelopmentstrategy’,EastAsiaForum,3April2012(http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/03/gujarat-s-budget-reflects-sound-development-strategy/) 7. For a

discussionofdynastyv.development,seeMinhazMerchant, ‘Left,rightandcentre:redrawingIndia’sideologicalmap’,TheTimesofIndia,8April2013

(http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/left-right-and-centre-redrawing-india-s-ideological-map)8. ‘HumanRightsactivistShabnamHashmislamsNarendraModi’s“Gujaratmodel”asmyth’,TheIndianExpress,10August2013

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/human-rights-activist-shabnam-hashmi-slams-narendramodis-gujarat-model-as-myth/1153706/) 9. Sandeep Singh,Third Curve: Sage ofWomen and Child Development – Gujarat,forthcoming10.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.205;Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.358

11.DionneBunsha,‘DissentintheParivar’,Frontline,Volume21,Issue04,14–27February2004(http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2104/stories/20040227002404200.htm)12.Nag,op.cit.,p.1213.‘AgricultureperformanceinGujaratsince2000’,op.cit.,p.1014. Tushaar Shah and Shilp Verma, ‘Real-time Co-management of Electricity and Groundwater: An

Assessment of Gujarat’s Pioneering “Jyotigram” Scheme’, International Water Management Institute(http://publications.iwmi.org/pdf/H041811.pdf)

15. Central Statistics Office, National Statistical Organization, Ministry of Statistics and ProgrammeImplementation,GovernmentOfIndia,‘EnergyStatistics2013,Seeesp.tableonp.15

(http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_new/upload/Energy_Statistics_2013.pdf.)16. ‘GujaratCongress,NarendraModi government engage in “power” packed duel’,TheEconomicTimes, 3

September,2013(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-03/news/417269441power-generation-capacity-

power-policy-gujarat-congress)17.CentralElectricityAuthority,MinistryofPower,GovernmentofIndia,January2013:‘InstalledCapacity(inMW)OfPowerUtilitiesInTheStates/UTsLocatedInNorthernRegionIncludingAllocatedSharesInJoint&CentralSectorUtilities’

(http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/inst_capacity/jan13.pdf)18. R.K. Gupta, ‘The role of water technology in development: a case study of Gujarat State, India’, paper

delivered at UN Water International Conference (Zaragoza, Spain, 3–5 October 2011), Water in the Green

EconomyinPractice:TowardsRio+20(http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/green_economy_2011/pdf/session_5 technologycases_india.pdf) 19.

‘SecretofGujarat’sAgrarianMiracleafter2000’,Shahetal.,EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,26December2009,p.48 pas (http://www.gujaratcmfellowship.org/document/Agriculture/Secret per cent20of per cent20Gujarat percent20Agrarianpercent20Miracle_EPW_26Dec09.pdf)20.Sheth,op.cit.,p.183

21.Ibid.,p.7122.FriendsofRiverNarmada,‘TheGreaterCommonGood’,April1999(http://www.narmada.org/gcg/gcg.html)23.NewsBharati,‘FocusonAgriculture:ReasonofModi’ssuccess’,14October2012(http://en.newsbharati.com/Encyc/2012/10/14/Focus-on-Agriculture-Reason-of-Modi-s-success.aspx) 24.

AbhishekKapoor,‘KrushiMahotsav:amixoffunandlearningforGujaratfarmers’,TheIndianExpress,23May2008

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/krushi-mahotsav-a-mix-of-fun-and-learning-for-gujarat-farmers/313402/)25.GuillaumeP.GruereandYanSun,‘MeasuringtheContributionofBtCottonAdoptiontoIndia’sCottonYieldsLeap’,IFPRIDiscussionPaper01170,April2012

(http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01170.pdf;alsoseehttp://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/a-decade-of-agricultural-revolution/article4365650.ece)26.VirendraPandit,‘Adecadeofagriculturalrevolution’,TheHinduBusinessLine,31January2013

(http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/a-decade-of-agricultural-revolution/article4365650.ece) 27.SwaminathanAnklesariaAiyar,‘Agriculture:SecretofModi’ssuccess’,TheEconomicTimes,22July2009

(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-07-22/news/27665876_1 _check-dams-gujaratindia-chak)28.NewsBharati,14October2012,op.cit

29.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.264;Sheth,op.cit.,p.20530.Ibid.,p.21331.Mukhopadhyay,ibid.,p.35032.KamathandRanderi,op.cit.,p.26833.Thetextsoftheletterscanbefoundhere:http://www.cricketvoice.com/cricketforum2/index.php?

topic=17589.034.AmrendraJha,‘Fromplagueuglytokhub-Surat’,TheTimesofIndia,31July2005(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-07-31/ahmedabad/278660291city-light-area-ghod-dod-

road-diamonds)35.SuratMunicipalCorporation,‘ProjectOverviewSurat2009’(http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Brochures_Published_surat.pdf) 36. Sandeep Singh, op.

cit.,p.3037.NarendraModi, speech addressing the twenty-ninthAnnual Session of the FICCI LadiesOrganization

(FLO)inNewDelhionMonday,8April2013(http://gujaratindia.com/media/news.htm?enc=KIN4q/

jNm90+toii5qZl5EPC7kzGIsfoo/Golnrswj78NpfESrqE09hRQNO1zOWHO6+qGP23QYeg9ISvQHM1JwgTKh5mjWzFyUYcGIYJgcuXj5kKoHarSdss7d6/Rs/yV4LAgACYdAjfa3YCD/32nw==)38.TheUnitedNationsusesslightlydifferentcriteriatoIndiasosometimestherearevariationsforthesameplaceandyear;also,themeasurementswerechangedin2010.ThefigureshereusetheIndianversion,whichrenderslowerfiguresthantheUN’s.

39.BibekDebroy,‘Gujarat’sdataonsocialindicatorsshowspositiveimpactofpolicies’,TheEconomicTimes,6August2013

(http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/policypuzzles/entry/gujarat-s-data-on-social-indicators-shows-positive-impact-of-policies) 40. Figures taken from Bibek Debroy, ‘Gujarat’s data on social indicators showspositive impact of policies’, ibid. (See alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_states_and_territories_by_Human DevelopmentIndex) 41. All

availableonlineathttp://planningcommission.nic.in/data/datatable/index.php?data=datatab42.BibekDebroy,Gujarat:GovernanceforGrowthandDevelopment,NewDelhi:AcademicFoundation,201243.BibekDebroy,‘Gujarat’sdataonsocialindicatorsshowspositiveimpactofpolicies’,op.cit44.NarendraModi,speech,8April2013,op.cit45. Arvind Panagariya, ‘TheGujaratmiracle:No denying the economic advances the state hasmade under

NarendraModi’,TheEconomicTimes,22September2012(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-22/news/34022206_1_poverty-ratio-narendramodi-

gujarat)46.MinhazMerchant,‘GujaratvsBihar:settlingthedevelopmentdebate’,TheTimesofIndia,2August2013

47.R.Jagannathan,‘IstheGujaratgrowthstoryforreal?Apparently,yes’,FirstPost.Economy,8October2012(http://www.firstpost.com/economy/is-the-gujarat-growth-story-for-real-apparently-yes-483390.html) 48.

Sheth,op.cit.,p.22149.Panagariya,‘TheGujaratmiracle’,op.cit50.Sheth,op.cit.,p.19151.‘Modi’swealthgrewbyalmostRs90lakhinthelast5years’,IndiaToday,12November2012(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-wealth-grew-by-almost-rs-90-lakh-in-last-5-years/1/235503.html;

for Mayawati wealth see http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-mayawati-s-wealth-jumps-to-rs-111-cr-in-2-years/20120314.htm)52.Sheth,op.cit.,pp.166–67

53.Ibid.54.Ibid.55.Ibid.56.‘Economicfreedomin20Indianstates,GujaratisNo.1’,Rediff.com,(RediffBusiness),12November2012(http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-economic-freedom-in-20-indian-

states/20121112.htm#1) 57. ‘Economic FreedomRankings for the States of India, 2012’,Cato Institute, p. 30[.pdf]

(http://www.cato.org/economic-freedom-india/Economic-Freedom-States-of-India-2012.pdf) 10: And Now,PrimeMinister?

1.SabaNaqvi,‘MannaforModi’,op.cit(http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?232370)2.RamJethmalani,‘Indiagetsaleader,finally’,TheSundayGuardian,21September2013(http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/india-gets-a-leader-finally)3.M.D.Nalapat,‘WhytheBJPLostaSureElection’,TheJewishInstituteforNationalSecurityAffairs,29May

2009(http://www.jinsa.org/publications/research-articles/central-south-asia/why-bjp-lost-sure-election#.Uf-

64lMlPrM)4.SurjitS.Bhalla,‘Rottingfood,rottenarguments,TheIndianExpress,4September2013(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/rotting-food-rotten-arguments/1164123/0) 5. M.D. Nalapat,

‘Modimatics:target220,minimum175’,TheSundayGuardian,20July2013(http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/modimatics-target-220-minimum-175) 6.M.J.Akbar, ‘Why

isSyedShahabuddinwritingtoModi?’TheTimesofIndia,2December2012(http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/TheSiegeWithin/entry/why-is-syed-shahabuddin-writing-to-modi)

7.V.S.Naipaul,BeyondBelief,London,Little,BrownandCo.,2001,p.3808.‘NarendraModican’tbeblamedforpost-Godhrariots:KPSGill’,TheEconomicTimes,31October2013(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43561650_1_narendra-modi-security-

advisor-post-godhra-riots)9.VijaitaSingh,‘KPSGill,formersecurityadvisertoModi,giveshimcleanchitonriots’,TheIndianExpress,1November2013

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/kps-gill-former-security-adviser-to-modi-gives-him-clean-chit-on-riots/1189776/0)10.M.J.Akbar,‘Dial“M”fortrouble’,TheTimesofIndia,18November2012

(http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/TheSiegeWithin/entry/dial-m-for-trouble)11.Editorial,‘Catisoutofthebag’,TheDailyPioneer,30October2013

(http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/cat-is-out-of-the-bag.html)12.‘MuslimsinGujaratPoorer:NYT’,IndiaFacts,28October2013:‘Itisemphaticallyclearfromthedatathat

thepovertylevelofGujarat’sMuslims,whichstoodat39.4percentin1999-2000and37.6percentin2009-10hasdeclinedtoamere11.4percentin2011-12.ThepovertylevelofMuslimsnationallystandsat25.5percent.’

(http://www.indiafacts.co.in/muslims-in-gujarat-poorer-nyt/#sthash.wiqEJ6rq.dpuf)13.SukhadeoThoratandAmareshDube,‘HasGrowthBeenSociallyInclusiveduring1993-94–2009-10?’,EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,10March2012,p.45

(http://www.environmentportal.in/files/file/Sociallypercent20Inclusive.pdf)14.ProfessorArvindPanagariyaandVishalMore, ‘Poverty by Social,Religious&EconomicGroups in India and ItsLargest States, 1993-94 to2011-12’,SchoolofInternationalandPublicAffairs(SIPA)andtheInstituteforSocialandEconomicResearchandPolicy(ISERP),WorkingPaperNo.2013-02(ProgramonIndianEconomicPolicies,ColumbiaUniversity)(http://indianeconomy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/working_papers/ working_paper_2013-02-final.pdf) 15.ArvindPanagariya,‘NarendraModi’srealreportcard’,BusinessStandard,29October2013

(http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/arvind-panagariya-narendramodi-s-real-report-card-113102801007_1.html)16.SurjitS.Bhalla,‘TheModiMetric’,TheIndianExpress,13December2012

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-modi-metric/1044536/0)17.SeeBhalchandraMungekar,‘Gujarat:Mythandreality’,TheTimesofIndia,12June2012(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-12/edit-page/321761231gujarat-narendra-modi-

industrial-growth)18.SurjitS.Bhalla,‘LessonsfromtheGujaratmodel’,TheFinancialExpress,26October2013(http://www.financialexpress.com/news/lessons-from-the-gujarat-model/1187332/0) 19. Kishwar, op. cit., p.

3920.Ibid.,p.6421.Mukhopadhyay,op.cit.,p.30022.Ibid.,p.30123.M.D.Nalapat,‘PoliticalclassshouldfollowtheMahatma,notNehru’,TheSundayGuardian,29Dec2012(http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/political-class-should-follow-the-mahatma-not-nehru) 24.

‘MahatmaGandhi andSardarPatel are said tohaveheld the view that the INCwas formedonly for achievingindependenceandshouldhavebeendisbandedin1947’.Jesudasan,Ignatius,AGandhianTheologyofLiberation,GujaratSahityaPrakash:AnandaIndia,1987,p.225

25.M.D.Nalapat,‘WhytheBJPLostaSureElection’,op.cit26.ShekharIyer,‘Modilessthehawk,morethePMcandidateatRewarirally’,HindustanTimes,15September

2013(http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Modi-less-the-hawk-more-the-PM-candidate-at-

Rewari-rally/Article1-1122520.aspx) 27. ‘Terrorism-related Incidents in Gujarat since 2007’, South AsianTerrorismPortal

(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/gujarat_Incidents.htm) 28. S. Gurumurthy,‘Sohrabuddin:Interrogatingthemedia’,TheNewIndianExpress,16May2012

(http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/article482874.ece)29.SandeepJoshi,‘555fakeencountercasesregisteredacrossIndiainlastfouryears’,TheHindu,15July2013(http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/555-fake-encounter-cases-registered-across-india-in-last-four-

years/article4916004.ece)30.‘NHRCstatsshowthereweremorefakeencountersinCongress-ruledstatesthaninNarendraModi’sGujarat’,IndiaToday,4July2013

(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/fake-encounters-congress-ruled-states-narendra-modi-gujarat/1/286891.html)31. ‘VibrantGujaratMoUsunder I-T scanner,Rediff.com, (RediffBusiness), 16March2011;‘NarendraModi:InfosysservedI-TnoticeforpraisingGujarat’,TheTimesofIndia,24May2013

(http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-vibrant-gujarat-mous-under-i-t-scanner/20110316.htmhttp://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-05-24/software-services/395010431policy-paralysis-social-media-kris-gopalakrishnan)32.AmanSharma,‘OurofficerRajendraKumarhadnoplayinfakeencounter:IBchiefAsifIbrahimtoMHA’,TheEconomicTimes,15June2013

(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-15/news/39993113_1_ib-chief-fake-encounter-ishrat-jahan)33.AshishKhetanandHarinderBaweja,‘DeathByFiringSquad’,Tehelka,12May2007

(http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main30.asp?filename =Ne120507Death_by_CS.asp) 34.Madhav Nalapat,‘Defence Minister Antony & “Indian way”’, Pakistan Observer, 9 August 2013.(http://pakobserver.net/201308/09/detailnews.asp?id=215108) 35. Tavleen Singh, ‘Between Hindutva andmodernity’,TheIndianExpress,20December2009

(http://www.indianexpress.com/news/between-hindutva-and-modernity/556702/)36.V.S.Naipaul,AnAreaofDarkness,ibid.,p.33

INDEX

AamAadmiParty(AAP)

accountability

AdivasisAdvaitaAshram,AlmoreAdvani,LalKrishna andModi, asPrimeMinisterial candidateofBJP implicated in

hawala-moneylaunderingscandalRamRathYatraagriculturalcrisisagricultureinGujarat.SeealsopowergenerationandsupplywatersupplyAhmedabad

floods,2000Ahmedabadmunicipalelections(1987),2000,lostbyBJPAkbar,M.J.AkshardhamTemple, Gujarat, terrorists’ attack All India AnnaDravidaMunnetra

Kazhagam(AIADMK)al-QaedaAmbedkar,Bhimraoanti-Sikhpogrom(1984)Antony,A.K.AtmasthanandajiMaharaj,SwamiAyodhyamovementAzhar,Masood

B.N.HighSchool,VadnagarBabriMasjid,demolition,1992followedbycommunalviolenceBachuBackwardClassesCommission:(Baxi)RaneBahujanSamajParty(BSP)

BajrangDalBakar,Sidikbalanceofpayments(BoP)crisisBanerjeeCommittee(2004)Banerjee,MamataBangladeshsolidaritymovementBelurMath,Kolkata

BengalBetiBachaoAndolan(SaveOurDaughters)BhagalpurcommunalviolenceBhagwati,JagdishBhalla,SurjitS.Bhana,FarroukhBharatiyaJanaSangh(BJS)BharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)1998-2004reformsanti-Modicampelectoralhegemony

inGujaratinfrastructureprogrammelost2004LokSabhaelectionslost2009LokSabha polls Modi as National Election Committee member Modi as nationalgeneral SecretaryModi asPrimeMinisterial candidate andRSS, relation role ofopposition swadeshi economic policy won assembly elections in Rajasthan,Madhya Pradesh andChhattisgarhwonGujarat assembly elections (2007)wonLokSabhaelection(1998)BharatiyaKisanSangh(BKS)

BhathijiMaharajtemple,FagvelBhathijiSenaBhatt,SanjeevBhatt,SheelaBhattacharjee,BuddhadebBhujearthquake(2001)Bidwai,PrafulBilal,HajiBisht,GopalBluestarOperation,1984

BoforsscandalBombaycommunalriots(1992)

budgetdeficits

bureaucracybureaucrats,lackofaccountabilitybusinesscultureofGujarat

casteconflictscasteism,castesysteminpoliticsandreligioncensorshipofpressCentral Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Central paramilitary forces (CPMF)

Chaudhary,SudhirChaudhry,MehrsinhChekhov,AntonChengizKhan,Operation

childmalnutritionChinaandIndiawar(1962)Chowdhary,Amarsinhcitizenandstate,relationshipcoalitiongovernmentscommand-and-controlsystemcommunal riots in India in Ahemdabad on Ayodhya issue under Congress rule in

Muzaffarnagar,UttarPradesh.SeealsoGuajartcommunalism

communicationCommunist Party of India (CPI)Congress andBabriMasjid demolition economic

policyfavouringminoritiesandGujaratriots(2002)rejectedbyGujaratelectoratemisgovernance role in anti-Sikh riots (1984) and Modi, as Prime Ministerialcandidate of BJP rule in Gujarat won Lok Sabha polls (1984). See also UnitedProgressiveAlliance(UPA)Congress(O)

Congress(R)

ConstitutionofIndia

corruptionCriminalProcedureCode(CrPC)CubanMissileCrisis

culturalnationalism

culturalprejudices

dairysuccessinGujarat

DalitsDarji,JinabhaiDasgupta,Swapan183Dave,RasikbhaideSoto,HernandoDebroy,Bibek

decisionmaking

defenceandforeignpolicy

democracyDesai,MorarjiDeshmukh,Chandikadas‘Nanaji’Deshmukh,KeshavraoDeshmukh,Vilasrao

developmentandgovernancedharma,declineDholakia,DrDingoo,GhulamNabi

diversityandplurality

dripirrigationdroughts (2000), (2001), (2002) economic and political turbulence Economic

FreedomoftheWorld(EFW)economicfreedom

economicreforms

educationaldevelopmentinGujarategalitarianism

egocentricityandarrogancee-governance

EktaYatra

ElectionCommission

electoraleffectiveness

electoralirregularities

electoralpoliticsEmergencysituationexposedtointernationalmediabyNarendraModiemployment

andhousingEuropeanUnion(EU)

fakeencounterkillings

fakeIndiancurrencynotesfemaleliteracyinIndiaandGujaratFernandes,GeorgefiveshaktipillarsofdevelopmentandgovernancefoodpricesFoodSecurityBill(FSB)

foreignandtradepolicyforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)inGujaratForsyth,Frederick

freemarketfreedomofspeechandrepresentationFrench,Patrick

Ganatra,JusticeGandhi, Indira assassination (1984) lost Rae Bareli constituency (1977) re-elected

(1980) shelvedMandalCommission reportGandhi,M.K.; assassination (1948)Gandhi,Rajivassassination(1991)Gandhi,Sanjay

Gandhi,SoniaGaribKalyanMelasgaribihataoGaurav(GujaratPride)YatraGehlot,Ashok

genderratio

GhanchicasteGhantia,AbdulRehmanAbdulMajidGill,K.P.S.Godhra,slaughterofHindusbyMuslims(2002)Godse,NathuramGoldenTemple,Amritsar

GoldmanSachsGovindacharya,K.N.Gowda,H.D.Devegross state domestic product (GSDP) Gujarat assembly elections (1972), (1980),

(1985), (1994), (2002), 2007, (2012) Gujarat Chamber of Commerce andIndustry (GCCI)Gujarat communal riots (1980),1985, (2002), financial lossesdue toModidissolved the stateassemblyModiofferedhis resignationafter thatrehabilitationGujaratGreenRevolutionCompanyGujaratLokSangharshSamiti(GLSS) Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited (GSECL) Gujarat StateReservePoliceForce(SRPF)GujaratiGhanchis

GujaratisGujral,I.K.GulbergSocietycase.SeealsoGujarat,riots(2002)Gupta,Shekhar

GyanShakti

Harijans

HashimpuracommunalviolenceHashmi,Shabnam

healthcareinGujaratHindu(s)culturedeathsincommunalriots(2002)extremismidentityandMuslims,

clashesnationalismrateofgrowthHinduismHindutvamovementModi’s softening approach human development index (HDI)

ideologicalbickering

ideologicalquibblingInamdar,Laxmanrao(VakilSaheb)inclusion,inclusivepoliticsIndiafirstideology

IndiaShiningcampaignIndianAirlinesflighthijacked(1999)IndianMujahideen(IM)IndianParliamentattacked(2001)IndianPenalCode(IPC)

individuality

industrializationinequalityandsocialinjusticeinfantmortalityrate(IMR)informationtechnology(IT)

IntegralHumanismIntelligenceBureau(IB)International FoodPolicyResearch Institute (IFPRI) InternationalMonetary Fund

(IMF)internetInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI).SeePakistanIqbalSchool

IshratJahanencountercase

IslamIslamicmonumentsrestoredbyModiJafri,EhsanJafri,ZakiaJaish-e-MohammedJaitley,Arun

JalShakti

JanShaktiJanaSangh.SeeBharatiyaJanaSanghJanataDalBJPcoalitionJanataDal(United)[JD(U)]

JanataMorcha

JanataParty

JashodabenJethmalani,RamJha,PremShankarJha,Ranjan

JhooltaMinaraJinnah,MuhammadAliJoshi,MurliManoharJoshi,SanjayJyotigramScheme(JGS)205

Kalota,MehmudHussainKamaraj,K.Kamath,M.V.Kandlacyclone,1998Kargilwar(1999)Karnatakaassemblyelections(2013)KashmiriinfiltratorsKejriwal,ArvindKhalistani secessionistmovement in PunjabKHAM (Kshatriyas,Harijans,Adivasis

and Muslims) KHAMP (Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, Muslims and Patels)Khan,Asifa

Kirpal,JusticeB.N.Kodnani,Maya

KolkataKrishnamurthi,JanaKrushiMahotsav(2005)Kutchearthquake(2001)

Laden,OsamaBinLahoreandIslamabadDeclarationsLaskar-e-TaibaLatika,Mohmmad

LeftFront

legalsystem

LiberhanCommission

Licenserajliteracy inGujarat and India Lok Sabha Elections: (1971), (1977), (1980), (1984),

(1989),(1990),(1996),(1998),(1999),(2004),(2009),(2014)LokShaktiRathYatra

Lyngdoh,JamesMichael

MadhabanandajiMaharaj,SwamiMahajan,Pramod

Maharashtra

Mahendra

MahilaSammelanMaintenanceofInternalSecurityAct(MISA)malnutritioninIndiaMandalCommission.SeealsoreservationManu,lawgiverofHinduism

marginalizationofHinduism

maritimenatureoftrademedia,inflammatoryroleduringtheriots/reportingmedia-bashingofModiMehta,ChhabildasMehta,ChhayankMehta,SanatMehta,SureshMenon,V.K.Krishna

microwaterharvesting

modernityandtraditionmodernizationnotwesternizationModi,Amrit(brother)Modi,Babubhai(uncle)Modi,Damodardas(father)Modi,Hiraben(mother)Modi,Narendra:birthbombsatHunkaarrally,Patnacadenceandtonalitycampaign

to build a Statue of Unity in honour of Sardar Patel as chairman of electioncampaigncommitteefor2014LokSabhapollschargeofauthoritarianismasChiefMinister of Gujarat childhood daily routine destroyed illegal shrines educationegotism an elected MLA future economic agenda imprisoned leader of BJPlegislative party love for domesticity member of BJP’s National ElectionCommittee as National General Secretary of BJP nomadism (wanderings)personal wealth physicality philosophy of equality for all as ‘pracharak’ of RSSprejudice against as Prime Ministerial candidate of BJP offered his resignationafter Gujarat riots reformed his government as sambhaag pracharak of RSSreligiositysociabilityModi,Pankaj(brother)

Modi,Prahlad(brother)Modi,Som(brother)Modi,Vasanti(sister)Mohammad,Alimonsoonfailure(1972)Mookerjee,DebrajMore,VishalMungekar,BhalchandraMusharraf,PervezMuslim(s)andtheAyodhyainvolvedincommunalriots/attackedSabarmatiExpress

—deaths fundamentalismGhanchisofGodhraandHindus.SeeHinduspovertyin Gujarat in public service in Gujarat support to Congress support toModi/votedforwomenMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsonDivorce)Act,1986

Mutiny(1857)

Naidu,ChandrababuNaipaul,V.S.Nalapat,M.D.Namka-ChuBattle

NanavatiCommissionNanocarproject,WestBengalNaqvi,SabaNarain,RajNarayan,AshokNarayan,Jayaprakash.SeealsoSampoornaKraantiNarmada

NarmadaBondNarodaPatiya.Seealsocommunalriots(2002)NationalDemocraticAlliance(NDA),

NDA-2National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) National Sample Survey Office

(NSSO)NationalSecurityGuard(NSG)NavNirmanAndolanNayar,BaldevRajNehru,Jawaharlal

NissarBapu

NitishKumarNorth-EastFrontierAgency(NEFA)NyayYatra

O’Rourke,P.J.Obama,BarackHussein

opinionpollsOrangeRevolution’,Ukraineorganization-centredelectionsOrkutInternetcommunityOtherBackwardClasses(OBCs)PakistanbreachesLineofControlgenocideagainst

Bengalis Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and India war (1965)—Bangladeshliberationwar (1971) infiltration intoKashmir sponsored terrorismPanagariya,Arvind

panchamrutPande,P.C.Pandya,VishnuPanwala,SalimParakram,OperationParikh,DilipbhaiRamanbhaiParikh,Vasantbhai

Parsis

PartitionofBengalPartitionofIndiansubcontinentPatel,AshwinPatel,Babubhai(BabuBajrangi)Patel,ChimanbhaiPatel,HimmatsinhPatel,JagdishPatel,JaideepPatel,KeshubhaiPatel,SardarVallabhbhaiPatel,Saurabh

PatelsPathan,JasoodKhan

PatnaHunkaarrally

politicalinstitutions

politicalselfishness

politicalStockholmSyndromepoliticalsystem,politicsinIndiapovertyinBiharGujaratpower generation and supply in Gujarat Pramukh SwamiMaharaj of Akshardham

TemplePravasiBharatiyaDivas[Non-residentIndian(NRI)]

RailwayProtectionForce(RPF)Rajasthanassemblyelections(2013)RajinderKumarRajkotmunicipalelections(2000),lostbyBJP

RakshaShakti

RamJanmabhoomicampaignRamakrishnaMission,Rajkot

Ramakrishna

Ramakrishnamovement

RamsevaksRana,Rajendrasinh

RanchoddasRane,C.V.Rao,P.V.NarasimhaRapidActionForce(RAF)RashtriyaJanataParty(RJP)RashtriyaSwayamsewakSangh(RSS)rathyatraRavi,Jayanti

redtapeandnepotism

ReddyCommission

reformandempowerment

regionalpoliticaldynasties

religion

religiousdivisions

religiousextremism

religiousidentity

religiousnationalismRepresentationofPeople’sActreservationandcasteconflictsreservationpolicyreservations in public sector jobs and educational institutions riots against (1985,

1986)resourcefulness

roadinfrastructureRoosevelt,TheodoreRoy,Arundhati

SabarmatiExpress(train)

Sabarmatiriver

SagarKheduschemeSaini,NarinderSamajwadiParty(SP)SampoornaKraanti(TotalRevolution)SamrasYojanaprogramme

SanghParivarsanitation,hygieneanddrinkingwaterSanskardhamSchoolSardarPatelParticipatoryWaterConservationSchemeSardarSarovardamSareshwala,Zafar

SarkejRoza

SaurashtraScindia,Madhavrao

secularism

SeedheSaiiyadkiJaaliSen,AmartyaSetalvad,Teesta

ShahBanocaseShah,AmitSharma,Pradeep

SharmishthaLakeSheikh,SalimAbdulGhaffarSheikh,SohrabuddinSheth,Pravin

ShobhaYatraSingh,DigvijaySingh,ManmohanSinghSingh,RajnathSingh,TavleenSingh,V.P.Singh,VijaySinghal,AshokSinha,SatyendraNarayanSino-India(India-China)war,1962

socialantagonism

socialfactors

socialmedia

socialismGandhianNehruvian

SofiabanuSolanki,MadhavsinhSomnathTemple,GujaratSomnath-AyodhyaYatra(1990)SovietUnioninvasionofAfghanistanSpecialInvestigationTeam(SIT)spirituality

statisandstagnationStudentsIslamicMovementofIndia(SIMI)SunnisSuratbombings(1993)floods(2006)plague(1994)Surti,MohammedSwamy,I.D.Swaraj,Sushma

SwatantraParty

TableeghiJamaatTagore,Rabindranath

TalibanTataMotors’Nanoplant,Sanand,GujaratTata,Ratan

taxregimeinIndia

technologyTeluguDesamParty(TDP)Tendulkar Committee’s poverty cut-off line terrorism, terrorist attacks on

Akshardham Temple, Gujarat (2002) on Indian Parliament (2001) on WorldTradeCentre,NewYork(9/11).SeealsoPakistanTewatia,Justice

Thangadi,DattopantThatcher,MargaretTogadia,Praveen

TrinamoolCongress

unemploymentinGujaratUnitedFront(UF)UnitedProgressiveAlliance(UPA)UPA-2United States of America interests in Afghanistan military mobilization against

TalibanUpadhyaya,Deendayal

UrjaShakti

VadnagarVaghela,ShankarsinhVajpayee,AtalBehariVakilSaheb.SeeInamdar,LaxmanraoVanBandhuplanVanzara,D.G.

VichyFranceVishwaHinduParishad(VHP)Vivekananda,Swami

votebankpolitics

Wahabbifundamentalism,Wahabbismwaterconservation

westernizationwomaninModi’sregime

WorldBankWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)WorldWarII

Yadav,LaluPrasadYadav,MulayamSinghYeddyurappa,B.S.

Zadaphia,GordhanZagda,Nathalal

Zakat

A

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

BOOKSUCHASTHIS,byaforeigner,whichonehopeswillspeakwithbothaccuracyandperspectiveaboutNarendraModiandIndia,reliesonandinturnowesgreat

debtstothosewhohavehelpedimmeasurablyduringitswriting.Myfirstorderof thanksmustgotoNarendraModihimself, for thebookwould

nothavebeenpossible in the formithas takenwithouthisastonishinggraciousnessandgenerosity.

As a chiefminister, administering a statewith a population equal to that of theUK,andwithverymanydutiesandconcernscrowdinghisunendinglybusyschedule,onemight have expected him to grant a precious hour or two in which one couldbegintoaskthefirstfewofalonglistofquestions.

This, however, was not the case. Instead, Modi made himself available to mewithoutcomplaintordemurforweeks,duringwhichtimewerecordedmanyhoursofconversation.Thesebeganasinterviewsbutendedassomethingquitedifferentthanksto the open and tolerantmanner inwhichModi boremy probing questioning andwillingly spoke at any length on any subject I wished to discuss, no matter howsensitive. He invited me along on his travels and treated me with kindness andhospitalityatalltimes.

The impressive logistical feats involved in jugglingandclearing space in thechiefminister’s schedule were accomplished by Jagdish Thakkar, to whom I also owe atremendous freight of gratitude.Calm and imperturbable, Jagdishwas a thoughtfulandconsideratepresencewhoensuredthatall ranas smoothlyasonecouldhopetoimagine.Alongsidehim,thehelpfulnessofverymanyotherpeopleattheSachivalayainGandhinagarmustalsoberecordedandhonoured.

Secondly, without the advice and oversight of senior journalists and seasonedexperts in Indian politics and psephology, I would have been adrift in a sea ofinformationthatwouldhavebeenimmeasurablymoredifficulttounravel,giventhecomplexitiesthatsurroundthesubjectofthisbiography.TheyknowwhotheyareandtheyshouldalsoknowthatIwillneverbeabletothankthemloudlyoroftenenough.

Mostof all Iowemywife and son,whose forbearancewhile Iwas away in India

humblesme. Yet at least in this instance I am afforded an ongoing opportunity torepaymydeepdebttothem.

LondonFebruary2014

YoungNarendra,aboywithdreams

Narendra,ayoungcadet

AsanRSSpracharak

Sharingamealwithco-pracharaks

ComfortingjawansinKargil

InteractingwithchildreninaGujaratschool

Withspeciallyabledgirlsattheairport

AquietmomentwithSriSriRaviShankar

GreetingtheDalaiLama

WiththelateSyednaSaheb

WithAmritanandamayi(Amma)

WithSathyaSaiBaba

Amassleader

MeetingthegovernorofAstrakhan(Russia)

InconversationwithPresidentPranabMukherjee

IndiscussionwithformerPresidentA.P.J.AbdulKalam

WithseniorBJPleaderLalKrishnaAdvani

StandingbehindPrimeMinisterAtalBihariVajpayeeandRussianPresidentVladimirPutin

MeetingN.R.NarayanaMurthy,ExecutiveChairman,Infosys

WithLataMangeshkar’sfamily

SpeakinganimatedlywithAmitabhBachchan

DuringavisittoChina

OnavisittoSouthKorea

WithJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe

ModeloftheambitiousGiftCityproject

Attheinaugurationofthenewsolarpark,Khadoda

WithmotherHiraben

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

ANDYMARINO,whohasaPhDinEnglishLiterature,isaBritishauthorandTVproducer. He lives and works in London but travels extensively. Marino is theacclaimedbestsellingauthorofAQuietAmericanandHershel:TheBoyWhoStartedWorldWarTwo.Nootherauthororjournalist,Indianorforeign,hassofarhadthekind of detailed access toNarendraModi asAndyMarino.He accompaniedModiaboard his helicopter during rallies and spoke to a range of political leaders, familymembers,friendsandopponentsofModi.

FirstpublishedinIndiainhardbackin2014byHarperCollinsPublishersIndiaCopyright©AndyMarino2014

ISBN:978-93-5136-217-3

EpubEdition©April2014ISBN:978-93-5136-218-0

24681097531

AndyMarinoassertsthemoralrighttobeidentifiedastheauthorofthiswork.

Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisbookaretheauthor’sownandthefactsareasreportedbyhim,andthepublishersarenotinanywayliableforthesame.

AllrightsreservedunderTheCopyrightAct,1957.Bypaymentoftherequiredfees,youhavebeengrantedthenonexclusive,nontransferablerighttoaccessandreadthetextofthisebookon-screen.Nopartofthistextmaybereproduced,transmitted,downloaded,decompiled,reverse-engineered,orstoredinorintroducedintoanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,inanyformorbyanymeans,whetherelectronicormechanical,nowknownorhereinafterinvented,withouttheexpresswrittenpermissionofHarperCollinsPublishersIndia.

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