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PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITAG.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011,

FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows: a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles2. But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 nautical miles2.  If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.NOTES: Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereigntyb. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zoneNote: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

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Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &183962) (14 October 2008)

Facts: Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and M I L F   w e r e   s c h e d u l e d   t o   s i g n   Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and a n c e s t r a l l a n d s   o f   t h e   B a n g s a m o r o — d e fi n e d   a s   t h e   p r e s e n t g e o g r a p h i c a r e a   o f   t h e   A R M M c o n s t i t u t e d b y   L a n a o   d e l   S u r , Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD a l s o   d e s c r i b e d   t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p   o f   t h e   G R P   a n d   t h e   B J E   a s “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the e x i s t i n g   l e g a l f r a m e wo r k ”   s h a l l   t a k e   e ff e c t   u p o n   s i g n i n g   o f   a Comprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued TRO directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

 Issues and Ruling:1 . W / N t h e P r e s i d e n t h a s t h e p o w e r t o p u r s u e r e f o r m s t h a t w o u l d   r e q u i r e n e w l e g i s l a t i o n   a n d   c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments.Y E S .   H o w e ve r ,   t h e   s t i p u l a t i o n   i n   t h e   M O A - A D   t h a t   v i r t u a l l y guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may n o t   u n i l a t e r a l l y   i m p l e m e n t   t h e m w i th o u t   t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n   o f   C o n g r e s s , o r a c t i n a n y w a y a s i f t h e a s s e n t o f t h a t b o d y w e r e assumed as a certainty.

2. W / N   t h e r e   i s   a   v i o l a t i o n   o f   t h e   p e o p l e ’ s   r i g h t   t o information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No.7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:a. E O   N o .   3 ,   w h i c h   e n u m e r a t e s   t h e   f u n c t i o n s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s   o f   t h e   P A P P ,   i s   r e p l e t e   w i t h mechanics for continuing consultations on bothnational and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant i n f o r m a t i o n ,   c o m m e n t s , a d v i c e , a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s   f r o m   p e a c e   p a r t n e r ’ s   a n d concerned sectors of society;

b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program c r i t i c a l   t o   t h e   e n v i r o n m e n t   a n d   h u m a n   e c o l o g y including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, i s   i m p l e m e n t e d   t h e r e i n .   T h e   M O A - A D   i s   o n e  peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally v e s t s   o w n e r s h i p   o f a   v a s t t e r r i t o r y   t o   t h e Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a g r e a t   n u m b e r   o f   i n h a b i t a n t s   f r o m   t h e i r   t o t a l environment;

c . R A   N o .   8 3 7 1   ( I P R A )   p r o v i d e s   f o r   c l e a r - c u t  procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, t h e   o b s e r v a n c e   o f   t h e f r e e   a n d p r i o r   i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t   o f   t h e   I n d i g e n o u s   C u l t u r a l Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).

3.W / N t h e   G R P P e a c e P a n e l a n d t h e   P A P P   c o m m i t t e d g r a v e   a b u s e   o f   d i s c r e t i o n a m o u n t i n g   t o   l a c k o r   e xc e s s   o f    jurisdiction.YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

4.W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional. NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJEa n d   t h e   C e n t r a l   G o v e r n m e n t   i s ,   i t s e l f ,   a   v i o l a t i o n   o f   t h e Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, itv i r t u a l l y   g u a r a n t e e s   t h a t   t h e   n e c e s s a r y   a m e n d m e n t s   t o   t h e Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to makes u c h   a   g u a r a n t e e .   U p h o l d i n g   s u c h   a n   a c t   w o u l d   a m o u n t   t o authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only inCongress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselvesthrough the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through anundue influence or interference with that process. 5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.  N O .   R e s p o n d e n t s   e ff e c t i v e l y   w a i v e d   s u c h   d e f e n s e   a f t e r   i t unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Carpio-Morales, J.The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.T h e   I P R A   d o e s   n o t   g r a n t   t h e   E x e c u t i v e   D e p a r t m e n t   o r   a n y government agency the power to

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delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.A n   a s s o c i a t i o n   i s   f o r m e d   w h e n   t w o   s t a t e s   o f   u n e q u a l   p o w e r   voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internalself-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, En Banc (Carpio, J.) The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.

Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

I.      THE FACTS

 Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).  They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,  the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

                                                                                           xxx                              xxx                              xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion ; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

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The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)March 16, 2001

Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig.The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units. By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit"Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcomingUnpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63. Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303. In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH. In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims. Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees. Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997

Issue: WON the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheldWhether or not the State is immune from suit

Holding:While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition. The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality "in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit. Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims  2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injusticePetition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

HELD: The principle of state immunity finds no application in this case. Under the circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and hide under the state’s cloak of invincibility against suit. Considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The rule is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important that there be fidelity to legal

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norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law is to be maintained. The ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this instance, the state’s immunity from suit. This court - as the staunch guardian of the citizen’s rights and welfare- cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument of perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the state’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated, on the basis of quantum meruit, for construction done on the public works housing project Petition GRANTED.

Calub and Valencia vs. CAG.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products. Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: WON the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent. 

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO[G.R. No. 154411.  June 19, 2003]

FACTS: National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to NHA’s power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of execution has been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to determine the amount for just compensation. Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has been rendered. After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR on the amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and support. Both MR was denied by the court.While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion for execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same. Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE1)      WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;2)      WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE3)    WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;

HELD: The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed. ·         On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and executory. In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained. ·         Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.·         The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.  It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”  An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits.  So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.”·         The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than

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three (3) commissioners.  The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.  It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.  Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise.  Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal there from.·         On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for the public used and that the public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has fixed.·         On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA, although it is “public in character”, it is only public in character since it is government-owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

Notes:Important Discussion in the case: 

When does the Doctrine of State Immunity not applied in the government agencies?

1. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law

2. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.  This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

GARNISMENT AS DEFINED BY BLACK LAW DICTIONARY:Garnishment-       A judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or  a potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who is indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn over to the creditor any of the debtor’s property (such as wages or bank accounts) held by that third party.-       A person can initiate a garnishment action as means of either prejudgment seizure or post judgment collection.-       In short, it only means whether the Heirs of Guivelendo can file a case to NHA to compel the latter to give to them the amount of the just compensation as rendered by the court.

City of Caloocan vs. Allarde GR 107271, 10 September 2003

Facts: Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through Ordinance 1749, abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected employees of the City Government assailed the legality of the abolition before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City Government of Caloocan appealed to the Court of Appeals. Santiago and her co-parties moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but the appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on certiorari before the Supreme Court (GR L-39288-89, Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al.) In the Supreme Court's Resolution dated 31 January 1985, it held that the appellate court "erred in not dismissing the appeal," and "that the appeal of the City Government of Caloocan was frivolous and dilatory." In due time, the resolution lapsed into finality and entry of judgment was made on 27 February 1985.In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530,761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full. In 1987, the City of Caloocan appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. This was included in Supplemental Budget 3 for the fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release the money to Santiago. Santiago exerted effort for the execution of the remainder of the money judgment but she met stiff opposition from the City Government of Caloocan. On 12 February 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a writ of execution for the payment of the remainder of Santiago’s back salaries and other emoluments. For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan went up to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to stop the trial court from enforcing the writ of execution. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of issuance of the writ of execution. One of the issues raised and resolved therein was the extent to which back salaries and emoluments were due to respondent Santiago. The appellate court held that she was entitled to her salaries from October, 1983 to December, 1986. For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan appealed to the Supreme Court (GR 98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The petition was dismissed, through its Resolution of 16 May 1991, for having been filed late and for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The resolution subsequently attained finality and the corresponding entry of judgment was made on 29 July 1991.On motion of Santiago, Judge Mauro T. Allarde ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution on 3 March 1992. The City Government of Caloocan moved to reconsider the order, insisting in the main that Santiago was not entitled to backwages from 1983 to 1986. The lower court denied the motion and forthwith issued the alias writ of execution. Unfazed, the City Government of Caloocan filed a motion to quash the writ, maintaining that the money judgment sought to be enforced should not have included salaries and allowances for the years 1983-1986. The trial court likewise denied the motion. On 27 July 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government of Caloocan (SBH-165) for P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were turned over to Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a balance of P439,377.14, inclusive of interest. The City of Caloocan and Norma M. Abracia filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction sale of the vehicle with plate SBH-165, and a supplemental motion maintaining that the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. In his Order dated 1 October 1992, Judge Allarde denied both motions and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three more vehicles of the City of Caloocan. All the vehicles, including that previously sold

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in the auction sale, were owned by the City and assigned for the use of Norma Abracia, Division Superintendent of Caloocan City, and other officials of the Division of City Schools.Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan sought clarification from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on whether Santiago was considered to have rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to backwages for that period. In its Resolution 91-1124, the CSC ruled in the negative. On 22 November 1991, Santiago challenged the CSC resolution before the Supreme Court (GR 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al.) On 8 July 1993, the Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit; however, it reconsidered the dismissal of the petition in its Resolution dated 1 August 1995, this time ruling in favor of Santiago, holding that CSC Resolution 91-1124 could not set aside what had been judicially decided with finality.On 5 October 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. Pursuant to the subject ordinance, Judge Allarde issued an order dated 10 November 1992, decreeing that the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto Azarcon be ordered to deliver to the Court within 5 days from receipt, (a) manager’s check covering the amount of P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of Delfina H. Santiago in accordance with Ordinance 0134 S. 1992 and pursuant to the final and executory decision in these cases. Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended as payment for Santiago’s claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment. On 29 April 1993, Judge Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City Mayor of Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the check which had been pending before the Office of the Mayor since 11 December 1992. Acting City Mayor Malonzo informed the trial court that "he could not comply with the order since the subject check was not formally turned over to him by the City Mayor" who went on official leave of absence on 15 April 1993, and that "he doubted whether he had authority to sign the same." Thus, in an order dated 7 May 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. On the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan City. When PNB immediately notified the City of Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a letter-advice informing PNB that the order of garnishment was "illegal," with a warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding of the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a manager’s check amounting to P439,378. After 21 long years, the claim of Santiago was finally settled in full.On 4 June 1993, however, while the present petition was pending, the City Government of Caloocan filed yet another motion with the Supreme Court, a Motion to Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde, Santiago and PNB. Subsequently, the City Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental Petition formally impleading PNB as a party-respondent in this case. The petition for certiorari is directed this time against the validity of the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan, as well as the validity of the levy and sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City of Caloocan.

Issue: WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.

Held: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, was the "corresponding appropriation as required by law." The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

LANSANG vs. CAG.R. No. 102667 February 23, 2000

FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent. With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by

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the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages" according to the Court of Appeals.Hence, this petition.

RULING The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.17 Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.19 Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI from their office and kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to administer Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement with GABI21 and order the organization's ejectment. The question now is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private respondents. We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010

FACTS: The complaint filed by Lim Chao for collection of money alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Municipality. Trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to attach the estate, real and personal properties of the Municipality. Municipality filed a MTD on the ground that the claim was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, that there was no written contract or document that would evince the agreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao counters that Municipality’s claim of immunity from suit is negated by LGC, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued. CA affirmed the trial court’s order.

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipalityof Hagonoy is valid.

HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.

Republic of Indonesia vs. James VizonG.R. No. 54705, June 26, 2003

FACTS: Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counselor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand,

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respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counselor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE: WON the Republic of Indonesia can be sued.

RULING: Supreme Court on the matter ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.

The Court stated that the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment is still part sovereign function of the State. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.Public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

Francisco I. Chavez, Petitioner, V. Hon. Alberto G. RomuloG.R. No. 157036, 09 June 2004

The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. Acting on President Arroyo’ directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents. The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines 2. Whether or not the citizens’ right to bear arms is constitutional right 3. Whether or not the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property 4. Whether or not the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power

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HELD: Petition Dismissed. First Issue: Both P.D. No. 1866 And R.A. No. 6975 Authorize the PNP Chief to Issue the Assailed Guidelines. The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislature’s tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. Subsequently, the Office of the Governor-General delegated this authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. Later on, several laws and executive orders were promulgated which allowed more authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the PC. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the PNP.

R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations jointly issued by the DOJ and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community. Clearly, both P.D. No.1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies the power of control of Chief Executive over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office.

Second and Third Issue:The Right To Bear Arms Cannot Be Classified As Fundamental Under the 1987 Philippine

Constitution. The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. Petitioner’s assertion that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his “vested property right” without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law is unmeritorious. The test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority.

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.

At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR which the Court believes to be reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

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Fourth Issue:Reasonable Exercise Of The Police Power

Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, the Court is convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.

Bureau of Fisheries v. COAG.R. No. 169815 August 13, 2008

 FACTS: BFAR Employees Union, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1999 requesting BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living, i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted the cost of food commodities, has greatly affected the economic conditions and living standard of the government employees of BFAR Region VII and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, food, shelter, clothing and education. It also relied on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS). The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives that will help employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and dedication to public service. Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Cebu City disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance under Notice of Disallowance. BFAR Regional Office No. VII, moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance the welfare and productivity of the employees. Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specific authority for its release. COA-LAO Regional Office No.VII, Cebu City denied the motion. BFAR appealed to the COA. Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) National, Quezon City. The appeal was denied. ISSUE: 1. WON disallowance in question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987Constitution, which provide as follows:

SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

SEC. 10.The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

2. WON the Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-ego of the President. His approval was tantamount to the authority from the Office of the President, as contemplated in DBM Budget Circular No.16, dated November 28, 1998.3. The grant of the Food Basket Allowance is in conformity with Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law.

HELD: We deny the petition. First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality. BFAR invokes the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on social justice to warrant the grant of the Food Basket Allowance. Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is required.  As we held in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

Case Digest: Pamatong vs.   Comelec Prefatory Statement:Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called “Manok” (because apparently he can mimic a cock’s crow), a six-star general, and a future “emperor of the world.” Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx.” Would the Comelec’s act of disqualifying the so-called “nuisance” candidates violate this constitutional provision?

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified

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among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.ISSUE:Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?RULING:No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong’s contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

ASSOC. OF PHIL. COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITYG.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998

FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities.  The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation.

HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6

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and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

ASSOC. OF PHIL. COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITYG.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998

FACTS:Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES: At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

International Law and the Constitutionality of the Milk Code of the Philippines

In the very fresh en banc constitutional case of PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al., G.R. NO. 173034, October 9, 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL AND VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 ofAdministrative Order No. 2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, for beingultra vires and prohibited the Department of Health from implementing the said provisions.

With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute the case as the real party-in-interest, the Court held that the modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation; however, they do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformationpursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that“[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

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The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the landand adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions embodies the incorporationmethod.

Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as bindingresult from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and apsychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, andpacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of “generally accepted principles of law” has also been depicted in this wise:Customary international means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris].” This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. “Soft law” does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Rañada and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.

The Court stressed that for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). However, according to the Court, the respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature. Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

May the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?

Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.

The crucial issue was whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy.

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months,

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extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.The Milk Code does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes but instead specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion. A total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature. The Court emphasized that only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.

The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is not limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on thekind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.

Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as “a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics”; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to “any food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant.” An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.

But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as “any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose.” This section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.

To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, the Court had to discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it.. However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. The 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is “to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.” To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to “(6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health implications.”When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power tocontrol such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code tocontrol the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products. The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absoluteas the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.

Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that “our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

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In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III(GR 173034, October 9, 2007)

Facts: Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct.28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.

(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS),a code adopted by the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.

In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and  should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.- F r o m 1 9 8 2   – 2 0 0 6 , t h e W H A a d o p t e d s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e e ff e c t t h a t breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured   tha t  nu t r i t i on  and hea l th   c la ims a re  no t pe rmi t ted   fo r  b reas tmi l k substitutes.-May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes-June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.-Augus t 15 , 2006 – the Cou r t i s sued a Reso lu t i on g rant i ng the TRO, en jo i n i ng the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.-P e t i t i o n e r   a s s a i l s   t h e   R I R R f o r g o i n g   b e y o n d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f   T M C   t h e r e b y amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.-DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.

Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?Sub-issue(s): W/n   the R IRR   i s   in  acco rd w i th  TMC?  W/n pe r t i nen t   in terna t iona l agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international agreements?

Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.Ratio:1.Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of  the land?-The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:(1)The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child; (2)  The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights(3)Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instruments which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes-Under the 1987 Cons t i tu t i on , in terna t iona l l aw can become pa r t o f domest i c l aw in 2 ways:

(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation

 Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant toArt 7, Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate”  The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t be enconcurred in by the required 2/3 vote. HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local legislation that is TMC.  Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law butit’s TMC. While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Insteadthe MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are approved by a committee.

(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration,  international law isdeemed to have the force of domestic law. This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generallyaccepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

 I n  M iha res  v .  Ranada :   I n te rna t i ona l   l aw  becomes  cus tomary   ru les accepted as binding as a result of two elements: 1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state 2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity. Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally. F r .  Be rnas as  a  defin i t i on   s im i l a r t o   the one above . Cus tomary international law has two factors:1.)Material factor – how states behave The consistency and the generality of the practice2.)Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the way they do. Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it our of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is obligatory)

When  a   law sa t i sfies   the two   fac to rs   i t   becomes  pa r t   o f   cus tomary international law which is then incorporated into our domestic system2.Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any

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local legislation, havethey attained the status of customary law and hence part of our law of the land?-The Wor ld Hea l th Organ iza t i on (WHO) i s one o f the i n te rna t i ona l spec i a l i zed agencies of the UN.-According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the policies of the WH O,   the fo rmer a l so  has the  power   to   “adop t r egu la t ions conce rn ing advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and similar products” and “to make recommendat i ons   to  members on  any  mat te r w i th in   the  Organ i za t i on ’ s competence”-Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite different(1)Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states(2)On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field of health.- The WHA reso lu t ion adop t ing the ICMBS and the subsequent WH A reso lu t ion s urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.-Hence , un l i ke the ICM BS wh i ch has become TMC th rough l eg i s l a t i ve enac tment , the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.-WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of no rm  c rea t ion , i n  o rder   to   reflec t  and respond   to   the chang ing  needs  and demands of constituents (of the UN.)-As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).- I n the case a t bar , r esponden ts have no t p resen ted any ev idence to p rove tha t the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further,they   fa i l ed   to  es tab l i sh   tha t  p rov i s i ons  o f  pe r t inen t  WHA  Reso lu t i ons  a recustomary international law that may be deemed part of law of the land.-Hence , l eg i s l a t i on i s  necessary to t rans fo rm the WHA reso lu t i ons i n to domest i c law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.

On other issues: W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest of its

members are affected by the action. An organization has standingto assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)

-The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to represent itsmembers because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. (PurokBagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)-In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the associationi s   fo rmed  “ to   rep resen t  d i rec t l y  o r   th rough  app roved   rep resen ta t i ves  thepharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government andany of its agencies, the medical professions and the general public.”-Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its avowedpurpose of representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to bring to the attention of thegovernment agencies and courts any grievance suffered by its members whichare directly affected by the assailed RIRR.-The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should beconsidered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured byany judgment in the case.W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the RevisedAdministrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the provisions of theMilk Code. (as per the discussion above)-Sec t i on 3 , Chap ter 1 , T i t l e IX o f the RAC o f 1987 p rov ides tha t the DOH sha l l define the national health policy and can issue orders and regulations concerningthe implementation of established health policies.-A .O . No 2005 -0014 wh ich p rov ides the na t iona l po l i cy on in fant and young ch i l d feed ing ,  does  no t dec l a re   tha t  as  pa r t   o f   i t s po l i cy ,   the adver t i sement  o rpromotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. - O n l y t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e M i l k C o d e , b u t n o t t h o s e o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t W H A Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not all of them-Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2] imposingexclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute banon advertising and promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additionallabeling requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance inresearch and continuing education Although the DOH has the power under theMilk  Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilksubstitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no power to impose anabsolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilksubstitutes. Several provisions of the Milk Code attest to the fact that such powerto control information is not absolute.-Sec t i ons 11 and 4 ( f ) o f the R IRR a re c l ea r ly v io la t i ve o f the M i l k Code because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion andmarketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided for in the Milk Code.Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so.Other assailed provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code.

W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.-Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes found to be in consonance with the Milk Code. T h e   p r o v i s i o n s i n   q u e s t i o n p r o v i d e r e a s o n a b l e   m e a n s   o f   e n f o r c i n g   r e l a t e d provisions in the Milk Code.

W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?-Section in question only repeals orders,  issuances and rules and regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-making power.-An admin i s t ra t i ve agency has quas i - l eg i s la t i ve o r ru l e -mak ing power .  However , such power is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute and the

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Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The power, which inc ludes  amend ing ,   rev i s ing ,   a l t e r i ng  o r   repea l ing ,   i s  g ranted   to a l l ow   fo r flexibility in the implementation of the laws.

W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)?-Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a po l i cy ,   i t none the less   reserves   to   the  government   the  power   to   in tervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare… free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations.It must be clearly explained and  proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.-Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policy making body; Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and children; Section 32 –giving  of assistance, support and logistics or training; Section 52 – giving of donations-In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned sections hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to establish that these activities are essential and indispensable to their trade.

Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned.

ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYG.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002

Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention.

Issue: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .’activities” arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de GuzmanG.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work.

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ISSUES: Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatoryWhether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidenceWhether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD: There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she wascontracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. de Guzman [GR 14681, 21 June 2004] 

Facts: Arlene V. De Guzman, et al are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination by the Board of Medicine (Board). PRC then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Board observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. 11 Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and 10 got 100% in OB-Gyne, another 11 got 99% in Bio-Chem, and 21 scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. Board issued Resolution 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. PRC asked NBI to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred Physician Licensure Examination. Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination. Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees of Fatima College in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions." Arlene V. De Guzman et al filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction with RTC of Manila. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution 26 charging de Guzman, et. al. with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It

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recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified (Adminstrative Case 1687) by the PRC. RTC issued an Order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by de Guzman, et. al.. It ordered PRC to administer the physician’s oath to De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. PRC, etc/ then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ. CA granted the petition, nullifying the writ of injunction issued by the lower court against PRC, etc. De Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to the SC. SC's Resolution denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court.PRC’s counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court ruled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses. PRC filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than 3 days prior to the hearing. Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Administrative Case 1687, De Guzman, et. al. moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted. PRC filed with SC a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of the trial court. SC referred the petition to CA. CA granted the petition for certiorari, and thus allowing the PRC, etc. to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties. A day before the first hearing, PRC, etc. filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision for the outright dismissal of Civil Case and for the suspension of the proceedings. CAppeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration. Thus, PRC filed with SC a petition for review PRC’s counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. The day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, PRC failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case deemed submitted for decision. Trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case in favor of De Guzman, et. al., ordering the PRC to allow De Guzman, et. al. to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians.As a result of these developments, PRC filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari praying inter alia, that the decision of the CA be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and be re-raffled to another branch. PRC filed their Notice of Appeal thereby elevating the case to the CA.Court disposed of CASE by dismissing them for being moot. The petition was likewise dismissed on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the CA. While CA was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners, joined by 27 intervenors, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by 22 other intervenors. CA ruled that its decision would not apply to them. CA decided affirming the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal. PRC, etc. filed the petition for review, seeking to nullify the decision of the CA.

Issue: Whether De Guzman, et. al. may compel the PRC, etc. to administer them the Hippocratic oath, even in light of unusually high scores acquired by the examinees from Fatima College.

Held: A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, PRC, etc. "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959. However, the surrounding circumstances in the present case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by De Guzman, et. al. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of RA 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. Herein, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adminstrative Case 1687 against De Guzman, et. al. to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of RA 2382. Further, Section 830 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that De Guzman, et. al. "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the latter. Thus, while it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements; like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. Herein, the guidelines are provided for in RA 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements

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imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

OPOSA vs. FACTORANG.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.

Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." 

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.(3) Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a

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balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. 

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. 

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONAG.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.

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Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority,he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also aminority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

Majority leader informed the body chat he wasin receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as theminority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and    exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as theminority leader?

HELD:FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUEThere was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of theUpper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shallautomatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUEUsurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitledby law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUEGrave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoinedby law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizingRespondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

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Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007

FACTS Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.

Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.

Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order  provisionally approving the computed amount as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.  On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation

without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.

Respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends:

1) Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.

2) It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.

3) Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax , that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.

4) Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.

PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165.Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR. ISSUE 1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.

HELD

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1st ISSUE

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made . If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed. From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.

2nd ISSUEThere is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.  In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.

1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself.  Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC

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officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE: WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional

HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns  post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes anencroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional lover sight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.  Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIESG.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006

FACTS: This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the RTC which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp , and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal. The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void.

ISSUES: 1. WON the Private Respondents have the legal standing inquestion aing the said law? 2. WON Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-legislative power.

HELD:  1. YES. Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and tax exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or trading of used cars. The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied in the instant case.The broad subject of the prohibited importation is “all types of used motor vehicles.”

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 Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor vehicles andspare parts, except “used cars.”  Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the validity of EO 156.2. YES BUT Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society . It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites:(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and(4) It must be reasonable.The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases. Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO. In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third requisite as administrative issuances must not beultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry.EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."  Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable. Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area maybe stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-informer Subic Naval Base area.

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CASE DIGEST: Belgica v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, 2013)FACTS: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.

As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

* ISSUES:A. Procedural Issues1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…1.) …separation of powers2.) …non-delegability of legislative power3.) …checks and balances4.) …accountability5.) …political dynasties6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”WON the phrases:(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:A. Procedural Issues

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No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing.Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – theconstitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given thatthe issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the

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damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa andLAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court.Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passedand hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” whichsubverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

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Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending(i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that theappropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends theadoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.However, the Court  cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject

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phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 - it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 ofPD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.