Munjal Mehta, et al. v. Power-One Inc., et al. 13-CV-04631...

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Case 2:13-cv-04631-GW-CW Document 1 Filed 06/26/13 Page 1 of 39 Page ID #:15 Frank J. Johnson (SBN 174882) Shawn E Fields (SBN 255267) JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP 110 West "A" Street, Suite 750 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 230-0063 Facsimile: (619) 255-1856 Attorneys for Plaintiff Munjal Mehta 2013 JUH 26 Ali 10: 1 4 8 RT cL CEN1L D 1 Q UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MEHTA, individually and C asUA. 3 04631 , 6 on behalf of all others similarly situated, CTAsc ACTTCJ ~K~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff, V. POWER-ONE, INC., RICHARD J. THOMPSON, JON GACEK, KAMBIZ HOOSHMAND, HARTMIJT LIEBEL, MARK MELLIAR-SMIITH, KYLE RYLAND, AJAY SHAH, RICHARD M. SWANSON, JAY WALTERS, and VERDI ACQUISITION CORPORATION, Defendants. 23 COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY n I I _p •i L LL U 25 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 26 27 28

Transcript of Munjal Mehta, et al. v. Power-One Inc., et al. 13-CV-04631...

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Frank J. Johnson (SBN 174882) Shawn E Fields (SBN 255267) JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP 110 West "A" Street, Suite 750 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 230-0063 Facsimile: (619) 255-1856

Attorneys for Plaintiff Munjal Mehta

2013 JUH 26 Ali 10: 148 RT

cL CEN1L D 1 Q

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEHTA, individually and CasUA. 3 04631,6 on behalf of all others similarly situated,

CTAsc ACTTCJ ~K~

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Plaintiff,

V.

POWER-ONE, INC., RICHARD J. THOMPSON, JON GACEK, KAMBIZ HOOSHMAND, HARTMIJT LIEBEL, MARK MELLIAR-SMIITH, KYLE RYLAND, AJAY SHAH, RICHARD M. SWANSON, JAY WALTERS, and VERDI ACQUISITION CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

n I I _p •i

L LL U

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

Plaintiff Munjal Mehta (“Plaintiff”), a shareholder of Power-One, Inc.

2 (“Power-One” or the “Company”), by his undersigned attorneys, brings this class

3 action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated against the

4 directors and certain affiliated entities of the Company for violation of Sections

5 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and

6 for breaching, or aiding and abetting breaches of, fiduciary duties under state

7 law. Specifically, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants Richard J.

8 Thompson (“Thompson”), Jon Gacek (“Gacek”), Kambiz Hooshmand

9 (“Hooshmand”), Hartmut Liebel (“Liebel”), Mark Melliar-Smith (“Melliar-

10 Smith”), Kyle Ryland (“Ryland”), Ajay Shah (“Shah”), Richard M. Swanson

11 (“Swanson”) and Jay Walters (“Walters”) (collectively referred to herein as the

12 “Individual Defendants”), all of whom are members of the Company’s Board of

13 Directors (the “Board”), Power-One, and Verdi Acquisition Corporation (“Verdi

14 Acquisition”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of ABB Ltd. (“ABB”). Plaintiff

15 makes these allegations upon personal knowledge as to those allegations

16 concerning Plaintiff and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief

17 derived from the investigation of counsel, which includes, without limitation: a)

18 review and analysis of public filings made by Power-One and other related

19 parties and non-parties with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

20 (“SEC”); b) review and analysis of press releases and other publications

21 disseminated by certain of the Defendants and other related non-parties; c)

22 review of news articles, shareholder communications, and postings on Power-

23 One’s website concerning the Company’s public statements; and d) review of

24 other publicly available information concerning Power-One, the Individual

25 Defendants, Verdi Acquisition and ABB.

26 I. INTRODUCTION

27

1. On June 20, 2013, the Individual Defendants caused the Company

28 to issue and disseminate a false and misleading proxy statement (the “Proxy”) to 1

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 shareholders hoping to obtain enough shareholder votes to approve an unfair and

2 grossly inadequate acquisition of Power-One by ABB (the “Proposed

3 Acquisition”). This action arises out of the attempts by the directors of Power-

4 One to leverage their positions with and control over the Company to secure

5 personal financial windfalls to the detriment of the Company’s shareholders.

6

2. Power-One is a manufacturer and provider of power supply

7 products for a variety of industries, with a focus on renewable energy systems

8 and energy-efficient power conversion. Power-One’s products include

9 photovoltaic (“PV”) inverters used to gather and distribute energy from solar and

10 wind farms. The Company serves the global PV market, and has expanded its

11 presence to include North America, India, Australia, Latin America, Japan,

12 China, the Middle East and Africa.

13

3. Power-One has been profitable in recent years and has been debt-

14

free since 2011.

15

4. On April 22, 2013, Power-One and ABB jointly announced that the

16 Board had agreed to a transaction (the “Acquisition Agreement”) in which ABB,

17 through its wholly owned subsidiary Verdi Acquisition, will acquire Power-One

18 for $6.35 per share in cash or $1.028 million equity value.

19

5. The Board entered into the Acquisition Agreement during a time

20 that Power-One’s stock price is undervalued due to difficult current market

21 conditions, therefore the consideration being offered to Power-One’s public

22 stockholders is unfair and grossly inadequate because the true value of Power-

23 One’s stock, given the Company’s recent financial performance and prospects

24 for future growth and earnings, is materially in excess of the amount being

25 offered.

26

6. However, Defendant Thompson and other Company officers will

27 receive substantial payouts through the Proposed Acquisition through cash

28

2 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 severance benefits, and other Individual Defendants will receive substantial

2 payments for options and equity awards, to the detriment of shareholders.

3

7. Further, to ensure the success of the Proposed Acquisition, the

4 Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to deal

5 protection devices in the Acquisition Agreement that unreasonably deter

6 competing bids and prevent the Company’s stockholders from obtaining the best

7 possible price for their shares. These deal protection provisions further the

8 interests of ABB and certain of the Individual Defendants to the detriment of

9 Power-One’s stockholders.

10

8. On May 23, 2013, the Company issued and disseminated a

11 preliminary proxy statement, and on June 20, 2013, the Company issued the

12 Proxy to shareholders, soliciting shareholder votes in favor of the Proposed

13 Acquisition. The Proxy, which was also filed with the SEC, fails to provide

14 stockholders with material information necessary to allow them to make an

15 informed decision.

16

9. For example, the Proxy omits material information regarding the

17 financial analysis regarding the valuation of the Company, and the process

18 leading to the Acquisition Agreement. The Proxy also fails to disclose details

19 regarding other potentially interested buyers and their proposed bids for the

20 Company. These omissions make other statements in the Proxy materially false

21 and misleading.

22

10. The

Individual Defendants, as directors of Power-One, owe

23 fiduciary duties to the Company and its shareholders. The Individual Defendants

24 have violated applicable laws and breached their fiduciary duties by voting in

25 favor of the Proposed Acquisition and disseminating the false and misleading

26 Proxy, knowing that the terms of the Acquisition Agreement were harmful to the

27 Company and its shareholders, and Verdi Acquisition has aided and abetted such

28 breaches. 3

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

11. For these reasons and as set forth in detail below, Plaintiff seeks to

2 enjoin Defendants from consummating the Proposed Acquisition unless and/or

3 until Defendants cure their violations of law and breaches of fiduciary duty, or,

4 in the event the Proposed Acquisition is consummated, to recover damages

5 resulting from Defendants’ violations of law and breached of their fiduciary

6

duties.

7 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8

12. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

9

§1331, as Plaintiff’s claims arise in part out of the laws of the United States,

10 including §14(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 promulgated

11 thereunder, and §20(a) of the Exchange Act. All of Plaintiff’s claims arising

12 under the Exchange Act are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. In

13 addition, this Court has jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

14 §1332, as there is complete diversity between Plaintiff and Defendants, and the

15 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. This Court has supplemental

16 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over all other claims, as the claims

17 are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they

18 form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

19

Constitution.

20

13. This Court has jurisdiction over each Defendant named herein

21 because each Defendant is either a corporation that conducts business in and

22 maintains operations in this District, or is an individual who has sufficient

23 minimum contacts with this District so as to render the exercise of jurisdiction by

24 the courts of this District permissible under traditional notions of fair play and

25 substantial justice.

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14. Venue is proper in this Court because Power-One is headquartered

27 in Camarillo, California. Each Individual Defendant has had extensive contacts

28

4 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 with California as a director and/or officer of Power-One or otherwise, which

2 makes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them proper.

3 III. THE PARTIES

4

A. Plaintiff

5

15. Plaintiff Munjal Mehta is an individual shareholder of Power-One.

6 He purchased 1,250 shares of Power-One stock on October 20, 2010 and has

7 continuously held his stock since that date. He is a citizen of New York.

8

B. Defendant Power-One

9

16. Defendant Power-One is a Delaware corporation with its principal

10 place of business at 740 Calle Plano, Camarillo, California. The Company was

11 originally incorporated in 1973 as a California corporation, re-incorporated in

12 Delaware in 1996, and reorganized in Delaware in 2010 through a merger, with

13 the surviving entity renamed Power-One, Inc. Power-One is traded on the

14 NASDAQ stock exchange under the symbol “PWER.”

15

C. Individual Defendants

16

17. Defendant Thompson has been president and Chief Executive

17 Officer (“CEO”) of Power-One since February 2008. Thompson has also been a

18 director of Power-One since August 2007. Thompson is a citizen of Florida.

19

18. Defendant Gacek has been a director of Power-One since November

20 2008. Gacek is a citizen of Washington.

21

19. Defendant Hooshmand has been a director of Power-One since

22 October 2009. Hooshmand is a citizen of California.

23

20. Defendant Liebel has been a director of Power-One since July 2012.

24 Liebel is a citizen of Florida.

25

21. Defendant Melliar-Smith has been a director of Power-One since

26 2001. Melliar-Smith is a citizen of England.

27

22. Defendant Ryland has been a director of Power-One since May

28 2009. Ryland is a citizen of California. 5

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1

23. Defendant Shah has been a director of Power-One since May 2009.

2 Shah is a citizen of Michigan.

3

24. Defendant Swanson has been a director of Power-One since October

4 2010. Swanson is a citizen of California.

5

25. Defendant Walters has been a director of Power-One since 1999,

6 and Chairman of the Board since June 2007. Walters is a citizen of Alabama.

7

26. Defendants Thompson, Gacek, Hooshmand, Liebel, Melliar-Smith,

8 Ryland, Shah, Swanson, and Walters are collectively referred to herein as the

9 “Individual Defendants.”

10

D. Defendant Verdi Acquisition

11

27. Defendant Verdi Acquisition is a Delaware corporation and wholly

12 owned subsidiary of ABB, formed solely for the purpose of entering into the

13 Acquisition Agreement and effectuating the Proposed Acquisition.

14

E. Related Parties

15

28. ABB is a corporation organized under the laws of Switzerland.

16 ABB maintains its principal executive offices in Switzerland. ABB and its

17 affiliates operate in approximately 100 countries and employ about 145,000

18 people. ABB is traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol

19 “ABB.”

20

29. Silver Lake Sumeru is a private technology investment firm. As of

21 April 21, 2013, Silver Lake Sumeru beneficially owned approximately 33.7% of

22 Power-One’s common stock, making it the largest stockholder of Power-One.

23 Defendant Shah is the Founding Managing Partner of Silver Lake Sumeru,

24 Defendant Ryland is the Managing Director, and Defendant Hooshmand is a

25 Senior Advisor.

26

27

28

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1 I IV. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

2

A. Background of Power-One

3

30. Power-One designs, manufactures, and sells power supply products

4 globally, with a focus on renewable energy systems and energy-efficient power

5 conversion.

6

31. In 2007, Power-One entered the commercial solar market and

7 introduced industry-leading PV inverters providing up to 97% conversion

8 efficiencies. In the years since, the Company has launched a steady stream of

9 innovative products, and by 2010 had become the world's second largest designer

10 and manufacturer of PV inverters. In March 2013, the Company announced that

11 it had surpassed the one million mark for PV inverters sold worldwide.

12

32. The majority of Power-One’s revenues have been generated in

13 Europe, predominantly in Italy and Germany, and the difficult business

14 environment in the last few years led to decreases in revenue. The Company

15 responded by expanding further into Asia and North America.

16

33. Power-One has been profitable since 2010, and since 2011 has been

17 free of long term debt. As of December 30, 2012, Power-One had cash and short

18 term investments of $266 million, as compared with $205 million at January 1,

19

2012.

20

34. On January 31, 2013, the Company filed Form 10-K with the SEC

21 and reported the Company’s financial results for the fourth quarter and full year

22 2012. In the press release announcing the results, Defendant Thompson reported

23 that although weakness in demand in Europe reduced the Company’s sales for

24 the quarter:

25

Despite the difficult current market conditions, our new products

26 continued to be well received in the marketplace as our TRIO family

27 of string inverters posted record sales for the year and our liquid-

28 cooled ULTRA series of central inverters began shipping

7 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 commercially in Europe in the fourth quarter and is expected to ship

2

in the U.S. in the first quarter.

3

4

The worldwide PV market is expected to grow by approximately 7%

5

in 2013, largely driven by growth in North America and Asia-Pacific.

6

We will benefit from this growth through our investment in these key

7 markets and the introduction of industry-leading new product

8 offerings.

9

35. On May 2, 2013, the Company filed Form 10-K with the SEC and

10 reported the Company’s financial results for the first quarter of 2013. In the

11 press release announcing the results, Defendant Thompson reported strong

12 results and increased sales:

13

In the first quarter of 2013, Power-One was able to exceed its revenue

14 guidance forecast as a result of higher demand for commercial

15

inverters in Europe. We experienced a sequential increase in inverter

16 revenue in most of our major markets in Europe, with particular

17 strength in Italy, the U.K. and France.

18

19

In addition to the upturn in demand in Europe, our new liquid-cooled

20

ULTRA central inverters are being well received in North America.

21

While revenue from ULTRA in North America for the first quarter

22 was modest, bookings were strong, giving us confidence that we are

23

beginning to gain traction on this important new product.

24

36. As of March 31, 2013, Power-One had cash and short term

25 investments of $290 million.

26

27

28

8 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 B. Background to the Proposed Acquisition - Silver Lake Sumeru

Investment in the Company

2 37. On April 23, 2009, the Company announced a “significant, privately

3 issued minority investment” from Silver Lake Sumeru of $60 million, consisting

4 of preferred stock, senior convertible notes, and warrants for Power-One

5 common stock.

6 38. Under the preferred stock provisions, Silver Lake Sumeru was

7 granted the right to appoint two people to the Board, and the right to nominate

8 one independent candidate to stand for election to the Board beginning in 2010.

9 On May 8, 2009, the Board increased in size from seven to nine directors, and

10 Defendants Ryland and Shah, both managers at Silver Lake Sumeru, were

11 appointed as directors of Power-One.

12 39. As the Company’s stock price rose, Silver Lake Sumeru sought to

13 cash out on its investment in Power-One. According to the Proxy, in

14 approximately June 2011, Defendant Thompson and Silver Lake Sumeru

15 received several inquiries regarding a potential combination with the Company,

16 including an inquiry from ABB. On June 23, 2011, exploratory discussions took

17 place between ABB and Silver Lake Sumeru.

18 40. On November 23, 2011, the Company redeemed the convertible

19 preferred stock held by Silver Lake Sumeru and converted it into 17.5 million

20 shares of Power-One common stock, making Silver Lake Sumeru the Company’s

21 largest stockholder, holding more than twice the shares of any other stockholder.

22 C. The Proposed Acquisition

23 41. On July 26, 2011, the Board met and approved the retention of

24 Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman Sachs”) as its financial advisor. According to

25 the Proxy, at this meeting, the Board “determined to focus on pursuing a

26 potential transaction with ABB and several other strategic buyers.”

27

28

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1

42. Defendants Thompson, Walters and Ryland were appointed to serve

2 on a special committee created at this meeting (the "2011 Committee") to advise

3 and make recommendations to the Board with respect to a potential business

4 combination.

5

43. On August 24, 2011, a meeting took place in New York City, New

6 York among senior executive officers from ABB, Defendant Thompson, other

7 officers of the Company, representatives from Goldman Sachs and ABB's

8 financial advisor. Prior to such meeting, the Company and an ABB affiliate

9 executed a nondisclosure and standstill agreement dated as of August 23, 2011.

10

44. Also in the second half of 2011, the Company entered into non-

11

disclosure and standstill agreements with several additional potentially interested

12 parties. The Proxy states that each of the potentially interested parties had

13 expressed an interest in a potential transaction with Power-One, in some cases

14 after being contacted by Goldman Sachs. The Company met with and made

15 management presentations to two of the potentially interested parties. However,

16 none of these meetings resulted in advanced discussions with any party.

17

45. On September 13, 2011, ABB submitted a preliminary, non-binding

18 offer to purchase Power-One, indicating that ABB valued Power-One common

19 stock in the range of $11 to $13 per share, which representatives of Goldman

20 Sachs communicated to Power-One.

21

46. In September 2011, Power-One's stock price fell by approximately

22 34% from a closing price of $6.76 on September 13, 2011 to a closing price of

23 $4.50 on September 30, 2011. The Proxy states that “[t]he movement in Power-

24 One's stock coincided with negative developments in the solar renewable energy

25 sector, including the September 2011 Solyndra bankruptcy and changes in the

26 industries and markets in which the Company operates.” During September

27 2011, ABB’s financial advisor contacted Goldman Sachs to notify the Company

28

10 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 that ABB “was no longer interested in pursuing an acquisition of the Company

2 for the foreseeable future.”

3

47. On October 4, 2011, the Board “(i) determined that it was in the best

4 interests of the Power-One stockholders and the Company to terminate

5 discussions regarding a potential business combination, and (ii) adopted

6 resolutions to formally dissolve the 2011 Committee.”

7

48. Power-One discontinued discussions with potential buyers

8 following the Board meeting in October 2011, but discussed potential business

9 combinations at the Board meetings in June and August 2012.

10

49. On September 8, 2012, at a special meeting of the Board, the Board

11 formed a steering committee of Defendants Thompson, Shah, Ryland, Melliar-

12 Smith, and Liebel (the "2012 Committee"). The 2012 Committee included two

13 members who are officers of Silver Lake Sumeru, Defendants Ryland and Shah.

14

50. According to the Proxy, “[f]rom mid-September to mid-October of

15 2012, representatives of Goldman Sachs contacted each of the potential strategic

16 partners authorized by the Power-One board of directors on a confidential basis.

17 None (other than ABB) expressed interest in receiving non-public information

18 about the company or pursuing a transaction.”

19

51. On February 13, 2013, Ulrich Spiesshofer of ABB contacted

20 Defendant Thompson to indicate that ABB was willing to explore a transaction

21 with Power-One at an offer price in the range of $5.50 to $6.50 per share. On

22 March 7, 2013, Dr. Spiesshofer notified Defendant Thompson of an increased

23 offer of $6.75 per share, and “ABB's representative also indicated that ABB

24 would only be prepared to proceed with discussions with Power-One on an

25 exclusive basis.”

26

52. The Proxy states that Defendant Thompson “proposed that the

27 definitive merger agreement the parties would ultimately enter into contain a ‘go

28 shop’ provision, permitting Power-One to seek out competing offers even after it 11

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 entered into a definitive agreement with ABB. Dr. Spiesshofer rejected this

2 request, explaining that ABB would not proceed with the transaction if such a

3 provision were required.”

4

53. On March 9, 2013, ABB submitted to Power-One a non-binding

5 offer letter at a price of $6.75 per share, to be paid in cash, and a proposed

6 binding exclusivity agreement providing for an eight-week exclusivity period for

7 ABB to complete its due diligence and negotiate a definitive agreement to

8 acquire Power-One.

9

54. On March 11, 2013, the Board met to discuss ABB's revised

10 indicative offer. Representatives of Goldman Sachs noted that ABB’s financial

11 advisor “had stated that ABB's proposed price of $6.75 per share was the highest

12 price that ABB would be willing to pay, and that it was a non-binding offer

13 subject to the completion of ABB's due diligence efforts, which could result in a

14 decreased proposed price per share, and negotiation of definitive

15 documentation.”

16

55. The Proxy states that although the Board discussed the possible

17 merits of a “go shop” provision, the Board “determined that failing to pursue

18 ABB's offer, which represented a significant premium over the Company's then-

19 current common stock price, could result in the loss of the opportunity to provide

20 stockholders with value not otherwise expected to be realized in the foreseeable

21 future,” and agreed to ABB’s offer and an exclusivity agreement of up to six

22 weeks.

23

56. During this time, the Company also received inquiries from other

24 potential buyers. The Proxy states that although Defendant Thompson discussed

25 the inquiries with the Board, he noted “that they were not viewed as serious

26 offers by Power-One management.”

27

57. In early April 2012, ABB notified the Company that based on its

28 due diligence, it would be lowering its offer price. On April 12, 2013, Dr. 12

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1 Spiesshofer called Defendant Thompson and indicated that ABB’s "best and

2 final" offer was $6.35 per share.

3

58. The Board met to discuss the offer and, according to the Proxy,

4 “determined that the possibility of consummating a transaction at $6.35 per share

5 on acceptable contractual terms would maximize stockholder value and that the

6 Company should continue to pursue the transaction, seeking as favorable a

7 contract as possible under the circumstances.” On April 20, 2013, the Board

8 unanimously approved the Proposed Acquisition.

9

59. On April 22, 2013, Power-One and ABB jointly announced that the

10 Board had agreed to a transaction (the “Acquisition Agreement”) in which ABB,

11 through its wholly owned subsidiary Verdi Acquisition, will acquire Power-One

12 for $6.35 per share in cash or $1.028 million equity value.

13

60. As detailed above, the Board approved the “best and final” offer

14 from ABB, which was approximately half the price ABB had offered only a few

15 months previously. Instead of seeking a fair price for the Company’s assets, the

16 Individual Defendants were willing to take an unfair offer so that they could

17 benefit themselves by immediately cashing out at a discount, instead of seeking

18 the true value of Power-One’s shares.

19

61. The share price also compares unfavorably to similar transactions.

20 As reported by Bloomberg on April 22, 2013, “[t]he 7.7 times EBITDA [earnings

21 before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization] that ABB is paying for

22 Power-One is lower than the median multiple of 8.5 paid for alternate energy

23 companies in the last three years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.”

24

62. The Proposed Acquisition benefits Silver Lake Sumeru, the

25 Company’s largest shareholder, to the detriment of the other shareholders.

26 Under the Acquisition Agreement, the warrants held by Silver Lake Sumeru,

27 with an exercise price of $1.33 per warrant, will be exchanged at the share price

28 of $6.35, representing an immediate profit of over $43 million for Silver Lake 13

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 Sumeru. Additionally, each of the 36,375 Series C Preferred Shares held by

2 Silver Lake Sumeru will be exchanged for $4,303.70. In total, Silver Lake

3 Sumeru will receive over $325 million under the Proposed Acquisition, a profit

4 of more than $265 million for their investment of $60 million just four years ago.

5

63. Further, in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, Silver Lake

6 Sumeru entered into a voting agreement (the “Voting Agreement”) pursuant to

7 which it has agreed to vote its shares in favor of the Proposed Acquisition and to

8 vote against any other proposal from a third party. The Voting Agreement is

9 designed to further ensure that the Proposed Acquisition is consummated, to the

10 benefit of Silver Lake Sumeru and preventing shareholders from receiving the

11

true value of their shares.

12

64. The Defendants entered into the Acquisition Agreement during a

13 time that Power-One’s stock price is undervalued due to difficult current market

14 conditions, therefore the consideration being offered to Power-One’s public

15 stockholders is unfair and grossly inadequate because the true value of Power-

16 One’s stock, given the Company’s recent financial performance and prospects

17 for future growth and earnings, is materially in excess of the amount being

18 offered.

19 D. Defendants Will Benefit From the Acquisition, to the Detriment 20 of Shareholders

21 65. However, Defendant Thompson and other Company officers will

22 receive substantial payouts through the Proposed Acquisition through cash

23 severance benefits, and other Individual Defendants will receive substantial

24 payments for options and equity awards, to the detriment of shareholders.

25 66. The Proxy notes that certain executives of the Company, including

26 Defendant Thompson, have signed change-in-control agreements with Power-

27 One, which entitle them to cash payments if the Proposed Acquisition is

28 consummated. Defendant Thompson will also receive benefits pursuant to his

14 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 employment agreement with the Company. Defendant Thompson will receive

2 $17.2 million under this “golden parachute,” while four other Power-One

3 executives will receive payments totaling over $18.2 million.

4

67. Further, Defendants Thompson, Gacek, Hooshmand, Liebel,

5 Melliar-Smith, Swanson, and Walters are also entitled to payments for

6 outstanding options and other equity awards. Defendant Thompson will receive

7 $12 million in payments for these awards, while the other Individual Defendants

8 will receive awards totaling $580,895.

9 E. Deal Protection Provisions Further Benefit Defendants, to the

10 Detriment of Shareholders

11 68. Further, to ensure the success of the Proposed Acquisition, the

12 Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to deal

13 protection devices in the Acquisition Agreement that unreasonably deter

14 competing bids and prevent the Company’s stockholders from obtaining the best

15 possible price for their shares. These deal protection provisions further the

16 interests of ABB and certain of the Individual Defendants to the detriment of

17 Power-One’s stockholders.

18 69. These deal protection devices, included in Section 6.5 of the

19 Acquisition Agreement, include the following:

20 (a) a “no-solicitation” clause which prevents Power-One from

21 soliciting, and prevents its directors and officers from participating in discussions

22 that may lead to, an acquisition proposal from any bidder, including potential

23 buyers who have already submitted alternative proposals;

24 (b) a highly restrictive provision that only permits the Board to

25 withdraw its approval of the Proposed Acquisition under very limited

26 circumstances;

27

28

15 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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(c) a provision that requires the Company to advise ABB within

24 hours of any proposals or inquiries received from other parties, including the

identity of such other party and the terms of the proposal;

(d) a matching right provision that allows ABB four business

days to renegotiate with the Board after notice of any bid from another party;

(e) a definition of “Superior Proposal” that requires a third party

to acquire 90% or more of the assets of the Company or 90% of the issued and

outstanding shares of the Company’s stock; and

(f) a termination fee of $20 million, payable by Power-One to

ABB if Power-One decides to pursue a competing bid.

F. The Individual Defendants Disseminated Materially Misleading Proxy Statements

70. In addition to structuring the Proposed Acquisition solely for their

own benefit, the Individual Defendants have also caused Power-One to file and

disseminate the Proxy that materially misleads shareholders concerning the

Proposed Acquisition. The dissemination of this misleading Proxy is a breach of

the Individual Defendants’ fiduciary duties owed to Power-One and the

Company’s shareholders, and also violates §§ 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange

Act.

71. On May 23, 2013, the Company issued and disseminated a

preliminary proxy to shareholders, soliciting shareholder votes in favor of the

Proposed Acquisition. On June 20, 2013, the Company issued and disseminated

the final Proxy, which was also filed with the SEC, announcing that the

shareholder vote on the Proposed Acquisition will take place on July 23, 2013.

The Proxy fails to provide stockholders with material information necessary to

allow them to make an informed decision.

72. For example, the Proxy omits material information regarding the

financial analysis regarding the valuation of the Company, and the process

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

16 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

28

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1 leading to the Acquisition Agreement. The Proxy also fails to disclose details

2 regarding other potentially interested buyers and their proposed bids for the

3 Company. These omissions make other statements in the Proxy materially false

4 and misleading.

5

73. The Proxy states, for example, that Defendant Thompson discussed

6 the inquiries from other potential buyers with the Individual Defendants, “noting

7 that they were not viewed as serious offers by Power-One management.” The

8 omission of material information disclosing the reasons why such inquiries were

9 purportedly not “serious” does not afford shareholders sufficient information to

10 make an informed decision and, as a result, makes the statement materially false

11 and misleading.

12

74. The Proxy also states that the Individual Defendants “determined

13 that the possibility of consummating a transaction at $6.35 per share on

14 acceptable contractual terms would maximize stockholder value and that the

15 Company should continue to pursue the transaction, seeking as favorable a

16 contract as possible under the circumstances,” but this statement is materially

17 false and misleading because the Proxy omits any analysis of the true value of

18 the Company’s shares.

19

75. The Proxy also fails to disclose the impact of government subsidies

20 in the valuation of the Company and the negotiation of the Proposed Acquisition.

21 The Company’s Form 10-K filed with the SEC on February 28, 2013 notes that

22 the solar energy industry relies on “continued dependence on government

23 subsidies,” but the Individual Defendants have not included details in the Proxy

24 about the financial impact of these subsidies. This information would be

25 material to investors in deciding whether to vote in favor of the transaction and

26 its omission makes the statements in the Proxy false and misleading.

27

76. The Proxy Statements were also materially false and misleading

28 because they failed to disclose how the Individual Defendants fulfilled their 17

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 fiduciary duties to exercise due diligence and carefully consider any reasonable

2 unsolicited merger or acquisition offer. In particular, the Proxy Statements fail

3 to disclose how the Individual Defendants could have diligently and in good faith

4 considered offers from other potential buyers, or whether delaying merger

5 discussions until the Company’s share price reflected the true value of the

6 Company would be beneficial for the shareholders. This omission of material

7 information makes the statement in the Proxy that the Individual Defendants

8 considered actions to “maximize stockholder value” materially false and

9 misleading.

10 V. DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

11

A. Fiduciary Duties

12

77. Under Delaware law, corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the

13 companies they serve, which include a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. The

14 fundamental principle of the corporate law governing Power-One is that that the

15 business and affairs of Power-One are managed by and under the direction of the

16 Board. In exercising their powers, corporate directors are charged with an

17 unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in

18 the best interests of the shareholders. The members of the Board, all of whom

19 are named defendants in this action, owe Power-One the highest fiduciary duties

20 and are obligated to protect and defend the interests of Power-One.

21

78. The duty of care includes a duty by each director of Power-One to

22 inform himself, prior to making a business decision, of all material information

23 available relating to that business decision, and to consider all alternatives. The

24 more significant the decision, the greater is the requirement to probe and

25 consider alternatives. In this case, the decisions whether to proceed with the

26 Proposed Acquisition and how to respond to competing bids are indisputably the

27 most fundamental and important decisions to be made on behalf of Power-One

28 and its shareholders. Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty warranted 18

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 careful and cautious deliberation of these matters, after substantial analysis and

2 due diligence to determine that the decisions were in the best interests of the

3 shareholders of Power-One. The Individual Defendants were obligated to review

4 the decision to merge, the Acquisition Agreement, and the value of the

5 acquisition offer before making its final decision. The directors were obligated

6 to conduct that review in a thorough manner and not rush to a decision that

7 would benefit them to the exclusion of all other Power-One shareholders.

8

79. The duty of loyalty is a broad and all-encompassing duty that

9 imposes on corporate directors a special obligation to hold the interests of the

10 corporation above their own interests, and to act exclusively in the best interests

11 of the corporation and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty embodies both an

12 affirmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation and an obligation to

13 refrain from conduct that would injure the corporation and its shareholders in any

14 way.

15

B. Control, Access, And Authority

16

80. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions of control and

17 authority as directors of Power-One, were able to and did, directly and/or

18 indirectly, exercise control over the wrongful acts complained of herein.

19

81. Because of their advisory, executive, managerial, and directorial

20 positions with Power-One, each of the Individual Defendants has access to

21 material, non-public information about Power-One.

22

82. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Individual Defendants was

23 the agent of each of the other Individual Defendants and of Power-One, and was

24 at all times acting within the course and scope of such agency.

25

C. Reasonable And Prudent Supervision

26

83. To discharge their duties, the directors of Power-One are required to

27 exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management of the

28

19 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 Company. By virtue of such duties, the officers and directors of Power-One

2 were required to, among other things:

3

(a) conduct the affairs of the Company in an efficient, business-

4 like manner so as to make it possible to provide the highest quality performance

5 of its business, to avoid wasting the Company’s assets, and to maximize the

6 value of the Company’s stock; and

7

(b) ensure that Power-One was operated in a diligent, honest, and

8 prudent manner in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations.

9 VI. BREACHES OF DUTIES

10

84. Each Individual Defendant, by virtue of his or her position as a

11 director, owed to Power-One and to its shareholders the fiduciary duty of loyalty

12 and good faith and the exercise of due care and diligence in the management and

13 administration of the affairs of Power-One, as well as in the use and preservation

14 of its property and assets. The conduct of the Individual Defendants complained

15 of herein involves a knowing and culpable violation of their obligations as

16 directors of Power-One, the absence of good faith on their part, and a reckless

17 disregard for their duties to Power-One and its shareholders.

18

85. In violation of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty that the

19 Individual Defendants owed to the Company’s shareholders, and with no true

20 consideration of the best interests of Power-One or its shareholders, the

21 Individual Defendants authorized Power-One to agree to a sale of the Company

22 that benefits insiders and fails to provide shareholders with the true value of their

23 shares.

24

86. As fiduciaries of Power-One and its shareholders, the members of

25 the Board had a duty to personally assure themselves that Power-One was not

26 wasting hundreds of millions of dollars in a self-serving transaction. The

27 Individual Defendants failed in that duty. The Individual Defendants instead

28 chose their own self-interest over the best interests of Power-One’s shareholders. 20

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

87. The Individual Defendants in this case likewise abrogated their duty

2 of loyalty to the Company’s shareholders. The decision to go forward with the

3 Proposed Acquisition at all costs and to implement deal protection devices that

4 deter competing bids and prevent the best possible price for Power-One’s

5 shareholders was one based entirely on the self-interest of the Individual

6 Defendants to the detriment of the Company’s shareholders.

7

88. The Individual Defendants put their own interests ahead of those of

8 the Company’s shareholders. Defendant Thompson, who stands to receive

9 substantial payments through the Proposed Acquisition, violated his duties of

10 loyalty to act in the best interests of Power-One’s shareholders, by personally

11 profiting from a transaction that is detrimental to Power-One’s public

12 shareholders.

13

89. Defendants Hooshmand, Ryland, and Shah also violated their duties

14 of loyalty to Power-One’s shareholders by voting for and approving the Proposed

15 Acquisition despite their conflicts of interest due to their association with Silver

16 Lake Sumeru. As such, these Individual Defendants violated their duty of

17 loyalty to Power-One’s shareholders.

18

90. The Individual Defendants supported and ultimately voted to

19 approve the Proposed Acquisition without engaging in a value-maximizing sales

20 process, and have agreed to deal protection devices that prevent Plaintiff and

21 Power-One’s other public shareholders from receiving their fair portion of

22 Power-One’s assets. In committing these acts and failing to fulfill their

23 responsibilities as officers and directors of Power-One, they breached their

24 fiduciary duties to the Company’s shareholders.

25 VII. CONSPIRACY, AIDING AND ABETTING, AND CONCERTED

26 ACTION

27 91. In committing the wrongful acts alleged herein, the Individual

28 Defendants have pursued, or joined in the pursuit of, a common course of

21 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 conduct, and have acted in concert with and conspired with one another in

2 furtherance of their wrongdoing. The Individual Defendants further aided and

3 abetted and/or assisted each other in breaching their respective duties.

4

92. During all times relevant hereto, the Individual Defendants

5 collectively and individually initiated a course of conduct that was designed to

6 provide the Individual Defendants with enormous financial gain at the expense of

7 the Company and its shareholders. In furtherance of this plan, conspiracy, and

8 course of conduct, the Individual Defendants collectively and individually took

9 the actions set forth herein.

10

93. The purpose and effect of the Individual Defendants’ conspiracy,

11 common enterprise, and/or common course of conduct was, among other things,

12 to: (a) disguise the Individual Defendants’ violations of law, including breaches

13 of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment; and (b) disguise and misrepresent the

14 facts and effect of the Proposed Acquisition.

15

94. The Individual Defendants accomplished their conspiracy, common

16 enterprise, and/or common course of conduct by causing the Company to enter

17 into an agreement to engage in the Proposed Acquisition. Because the actions

18 described herein occurred under the authority of the Board, each of the

19 Individual Defendants was a direct, necessary, and substantial participant in the

20 conspiracy, common enterprise, and/or common course of conduct complained

21 of herein.

22

95. Each of the Individual Defendants aided and abetted and rendered

23 substantial assistance in the wrongs complained of herein. In taking such actions

24 to substantially assist the commissions of the wrongdoing complained of herein,

25 each Individual Defendant acted with knowledge of the primary wrongdoing,

26 substantially assisted the accomplishment of that wrongdoing, and was aware of

27 his or her overall contribution to and furtherance of the wrongdoing.

28

22 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 I VIII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

2

96. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of

3 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all holders of Power-One’s

4 stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described herein

5 (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person,

6 firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any

7 Defendants.

8

97. This action is properly maintainable as a class action as it satisfies

9 the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

10

98. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

11 impracticable. According to the Company’s Proxy, as of the record date of June

12 18, 2013, there were more than 131 million shares of Power-One’s common

13 stock outstanding.

14

99. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class

15 and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member.

16 The common questions include, inter alia, the following:

17

(a) whether Defendants violated §§ 14(a) and 20(a) of the

18 Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 by filing a materially misleading Proxy;

19

(b) whether the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary

20 duties to the members of the Class or aided and abetted others in the breaches of

21 fiduciary duties by engaging in the conduct alleged herein;

22

(c) whether one or more of the Individual Defendants engaged in

23 self-dealing in connection with the Proposed Acquisition;

24

(d) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their

25 fiduciary duties to secure and obtain the best price reasonable under the

26 circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in

27 connection with the Proposed Acquisition;

28

23 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

(e) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their

2 fiduciary duties of candor to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by

3 soliciting shareholder votes in favor of the Proposed Acquisition based upon

4 inadequate disclosures;

5

(f) whether the Individual Defendants, in bad faith and for

6 improper motives, have impeded or erected barriers to discourage other offers for

7 the Company or its assets; and

8

(g) whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were

9 harmed by the consummation of the transactions complained of herein.

10

100. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of

11 the Class and Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class.

12

101. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained

13 competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature, and will fairly and

14 adequately protect the interests of the Class.

15

102. This action is properly maintained as a class action under Rule

16 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the prosecution of

17 separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of

18 inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the

19 Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party

20 opposing the Class.

21

103. This action is also properly maintained as a class action under Rule

22 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because Defendants have acted

23 on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters

24 complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with

25 respect to the Class as a whole.

26

104. Preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a

27 whole is appropriate because Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on

28 grounds generally applicable to, and causing injury to, the Class as a whole. 24

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

105. This action is also properly maintained as a class action under Rule

2 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the questions of law or

3 fact common to members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting

4 the Plaintiff, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair

5 and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiff anticipates that there will

6 be no difficulty in the management of this litigation.

7 IX. LOSS CAUSATION

8

106. As detailed herein, Defendants made false statements and omissions

9 in the Proxy, and the Individual Defendants have unanimously recommended that

10 shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed Acquisition. By agreeing to the

11 Proposed Acquisition and a share price that unfairly compensates the

12 shareholders, and by agreeing to deal protection devices that prevent the

13 shareholders from receiving the maximum value for their shares, the Defendants

14 have caused and will cause damages to Plaintiff and the other members of the

15

Class.

16

107. The false and misleading statements in the Proxy have caused

17 economic injury to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by artificially

18 depressing the value of the Company’s stock, depriving shareholders of the true

19 value of their shares.

20

108. Additionally, the payments to executives of the Company under

21 change-in-control agreements, and the payments to directors for their stock

22 options under the Proposed Acquisition, are an unfair distribution of the

23 Company’s assets that belong to the stockholders. These damages are the result

24 of Defendants’ false and misleading statements that these payments are a

25 reasonable distribution of assets, which they are not.

26

27

28

25 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

First Cause of Action

2 Against the Company and the Individual Defendants for Violations

3 of §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act

4 109. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every

5 allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

6 110. Rule 14a-9, promulgated pursuant to §14(a) of the Exchange Act,

7 provides that no proxy statement shall contain “any statement which, at the time

8 and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or

9 misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material

10 fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.”

11 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9.

12 111. Defendants filed a false and misleading Proxy with the SEC on May

13 23, 2013. The Proxy described the terms of the Proposed Acquisition, but

14 misrepresented and/or omitted material information as described in more detail

15 above.

16 112. Defendants solicited action from the Plaintiff and members of the

17 Class by means of this Proxy which contained false and misleading statements

18 concerning, inter alia, the value of the Company and how that value was derived,

19 and omitted to state material facts which were necessary to make their statements

20 contained therein not false and misleading, as alleged above.

21 113. Each of the matters described above would have been considered by

22 a reasonable investor, separately as well as in the aggregate, to have been

23 material to his or her decision in voting on the matters presented in the Proxy,

24 and to have been a material part of the mix of information upon which such

25 decisions were made.

26 114. By reason of the foregoing, the Proxy Statements were materially

27 false and misleading, in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and the

28 rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

26 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

115. None of the Individual Defendants made a reasonable investigation

2 or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements made in the

3 Proxy were true, without omissions of any material facts, and not misleading.

4 Specifically, each of the Individual Defendants are liable under Section 14(a) of

5 the Exchange Act because they provided material information that they knew,

6 understood and intended would be contained in the Proxy, and that was false and

7 misleading and/or omitted material and necessary facts.

8

116. As a result of these Proxy violations, the Class members are

9 threatened with irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law,

10 as well as substantial economic damages.

11

Second Cause of Action

12 Against the Individual Defendants

13 for Violations of §20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act

14 117. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every

15 allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

16 118. Each of the Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of

17 the Company within the meaning of §20(a) of the Exchange Act. By reason of

18 their positions as officers and directors of Power-One, and their ownership of

19 Power-One stock, these Defendants participated in or were aware of the

20 Company’s operations and had intimate knowledge of the false and misleading

21 statements contained in the Proxy. The Individual Defendants had the power and

22 authority to influence and control, and did influence and control, the decision

23 making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the Proxy.

24 By causing the Company to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of

25 herein, these Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the Exchange Act.

26 119. The Proxy contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the

27 Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction, therefore each of the

28

27 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 Individual Defendants was directly involved in the content and creation of the

2 Proxy.

3

120. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' wrongful

4 conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in

5 connection with ownership of Power-One stock.

6

Third Cause of Action

7 Against the Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

8

121. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every

9 allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

10

122. Each of the Individual Defendants owed and owes fiduciary duties

11 to Power-One and its shareholders, including the highest obligations of due care,

12 good faith and loyalty. These fiduciary duties include a duty to conduct due

13 diligence with regard to any acquisition of Power-One and to maximize the

14 benefits to the Company’s shareholders.

15

123. As directors of Power-One, the Individual Defendants were and are

16 required to use their abilities to control and manage Power-One in a fair, just and

17 equitable manner in order to ensure that the Company is in compliance with

18 applicable laws and contractual obligations, to refrain from abusing their

19 positions of control, and not to favor their own interests at the expense of Power-

20 One and its shareholders. The Individual Defendants violated their fiduciary

21 duties to Plaintiff and the Class, including without limitation their duties of care,

22 good faith, honesty, and loyalty, by attempting to unfairly prevent Plaintiff and

23 the other members of the Class from obtaining the true value of their shares.

24

124. By their acts and omissions alleged herein, the Individual

25 Defendants, and each of them, abandoned and abdicated their responsibilities and

26 fiduciary duties with regard to prudently managing the assets and business of

27 Power-One in a manner consistent with the best interest of the shareholders of

28 Power-One. 28

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

125. Each of the Individual Defendants violated his or its duty of care by

2 voting to approve the acquisition of Power-One without acting in the best

3 interests of the shareholders of Power-One. The Individual Defendants violated

4 their fiduciary duties by approving the Proposed Acquisition to protect their own

5 pecuniary interests in disregard of the shareholders of Power-One. The Proposed

6 Acquisition was approved for the benefit of the Individual Defendants, to reap

7 profits for themselves at the expense of Power-One and its shareholders.

8

126. Additionally, each of the Individual Defendants knew of the

9 inherent conflicts of interest in the structure of the relationship among Power-

10 One and Silver Lake Sumeru, but knowingly or recklessly allowed self-dealing

11

in breach of their fiduciary duties.

12

127. As a result of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have

13 breached their fiduciary duties owed to Power-One’s shareholders. Each of the

14 Individual Defendants knowingly aided, encouraged, cooperated and/or

15 participated in, and substantially assisted the other Individual Defendants in the

16 breaches of their fiduciary duties.

17

128. The wrongful conduct particularized herein was not due to an honest

18 error in judgment, but rather to the Individual Defendants’ gross

19 mismanagement, bad faith and/or reckless disregard of the rights and interests of

20 Power-One, and it shareholders. The Individual Defendants dominate and

21 control the business and corporate affairs of Power-One, and are in possession of

22 material private information concerning the Company. Each of the Individual

23 Defendants used this material private information to benefit his or her own

24 interests at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Class.

25

129. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Power-One’s

26 shareholders have suffered and continue to suffer economic losses and non-

27 economic losses, all in an amount to be determined according to proof at the time

28 of trial. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants’ foregoing 29

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 breaches of fiduciary duties, Power-One’s shareholders have suffered or will

2 suffer hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, including, but not limited to,

3 the loss of the true value of their assets through the Proposed Acquisition.

4

130. Unless enjoined by the Court, the Individual Defendants will

5 continue to breach their fiduciary duties to the harm of the public shareholders,

6 and Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law.

7

Fourth Cause of Action

8 Against Verdi Acquisition for

9 Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty

10 131. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above as

11 though fully restated herein.

12 132. Defendant Verdi Acquisition aided and abetted the Individual

13 Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty by its active participation, aid,

14 encouragement, and/or ratification of the breach, for its own benefit.

15 133. Defendant Verdi Acquisition was fully aware of the breach of

16 fiduciary duties being undertaken by the Individual Defendants. Verdi

17 Acquisition was, in fact, created to be the instrument of this malfeasance since it

18 was created as a wholly owned subsidiary of ABB for the purpose of merging

19 with Power-One. As such, Defendant Verdi Acquisition not only provided

20 substantial aid, encouragement, and support to the Individual Defendants, but did

21 so knowingly and intentionally.

22 134. The conduct of Defendant Verdi Acquisition was a substantial cause

23 of the harm alleged herein. If Verdi Acquisition had not provided approval and

24 support to the Proposed Acquisition plan, or if it had prevented the Individual

25 Defendants from breaching their fiduciary duties to Power-One, Power-One and

26 its shareholders would not suffer the serious injuries to be caused by the unfair

27 Proposed Acquisition.

28

30 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

135. As a result of this wrongful conduct, Power-One has suffered and

2 continues to suffer economic and non-economic losses, all in an amount to be

3 determined according to proof at trial.

4

136. The acts of Verdi Acquisition, and each of them, were done

5 maliciously, oppressively, and with intent to defraud, and Plaintiff on behalf of

6 Power-One is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in an amount to be

7 shown according to proof at the time of trial.

8 X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

9

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter

10 judgment as follows:

11

A. An order certifying the Class as set forth herein and designating

12 Plaintiff as the representative thereof;

13

B. An order declaring the Proxy to be materially false and misleading

14 in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act;

15

C. An order declaring that the Individual Defendants violated Section

16 20(a) of the Exchange Act;

17

D. An order against all the Individual Defendants for the amount of

18 damages sustained by the Company as a result of the Individual Defendants’

19 violations of federal securities laws, breaches of fiduciary duties, and aiding and

20 abetting breaches of fiduciary duty;

21

E. An order awarding to Power-One’s shareholders restitution from the

22 Individual Defendants, and each of them, and ordering disgorgement of all

23 profits, benefits and other compensation obtained by the Individual Defendants;

24

F. An order awarding damages against all Defendants, jointly and

25 severally, in an amount to be proven at trial;

26

G. An order awarding a preliminary and/or permanent injunction

27 precluding Power-One and its Board from holding a shareholder vote on behalf

28

31 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 of the Company securing approval of the Proposed Acquisition unless and until

2 adequate supplemental disclosures are made regarding the Proposed Acquisition;

3

H. An order directing Defendants to make substantial additional

4 disclosures to the Company's Proxy to make the Proxy not false and misleading;

5

I. An order awarding any additional appropriate equitable relief,

6 including any injunctive or declaratory relief necessary to change and/or reform

7 Power-One's corporate governance, policies and culture;

8

J. An order awarding restitution, disgorgement of all illicit proceeds

9 generated as a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, and punitive

10 damages;

11

K. An order awarding pre-judgment interest, as well as reasonable

12 attorneys' fees and other costs; and

13

L. An order awarding such other relief as this Court may deem just and

14 proper.

15 XI. JURY DEMAND

Irk' Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

JOHNSON &

By: '\ 7C44 FRANK J

Frank J. Johnson Shawn E. Fields JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP 110 West "A" Street, Suite 750 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 230-0063 Facsimile: (619) 255-1856

Attorneys for Plaintiff Munjal Ivlehta

17

18 Dated: June 25, 2013

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

32 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

28

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Case 2:13-cv-04631-GW-CW Document 1 Filed 06/26/13 Page 34 of 39 Page ID #:48

CERTIFICATION OF PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

Munjal Mehta, declare the following as to the claims asserted, or to be asserted, under

the federal securities laws:

1. 1 have reviewed the complaint with my counsel and authorize its filing.

2. 1 did not acquire the securities that are the subject of this action at the direction of

plaintiff's counsel or in order to participate in any private action or any other litigation under the

federal securities laws.

3. 1 am willing to serve as a representative party on behalf of the class, including

testifying at deposition or trial, if necessary.

4. I made the following transactions during the Class Period in the securities that are

the subject of this action.

Acquisitions: Number of Shares Acquisition Price Per Date Acquired - Acquired Share

-10 125?) hcrs 019 ct

Sales: Number of Shares Selling Price Per Date Sold Sold Share

5. 1 will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party beyond my

pro-rata share of any recovery, except reasonable costs and expenses - such as lost wages and

travel expenses - directly related to the class representation, as ordered or approved by the Court

pursuant to law.

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6. 1 have not sought to serve or served as a representative party for a class in an

action under the federal securities laws within the past three years, except if detailed below:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 4 day of June, 2013.

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. . . . . . . . coO:i CENTRAL DJSTR[CT OF CALIFORNIA . CIVIL COVLR SHE1T

. __•S:....__... . ___________________________________________________________________________________________

I (a) PL AthI I irrs (ChecL box thou aro rprierniJ1g our1fD) DFFFNDANTS MUNJAL MEl-I LA rnditdtcnL rnd on blalfofi11 others simInr1 situned POWER ONE fl4C RtUIARDJ TflOM'SON JON &A(F& kM44IZ

uosmo, HAtTMUT U1tELMARK 1ErL!AR-SMITH, KYLE R?LAND MAY SHAH, RICHARD M SWANSON JAY WALilRS ud

VERDI ACQUISITION CORPORATION ION

(f)) AIUrnyS (17im.Name, Address a.n.d Telephonc Nunibr 1( you ri ept.iiIrng Attorneys (If Known) ..i yourseu: prqVidcsiiii . . : . . . ....... . . . . . . .

JOHNSONWEAVJIt LU! rmnk1 John son (SI3N 174B2)

1IOWstA Sti,Su,t70,&m Drngo CA 92101 (I')6L9 2300063

. 11.1 !3s!s DI JL11TSJJICTION (Pluec nnXin oncbo only) . III. CJTIZENSIJIPoi?PRINcIPAL PAllTIES-3'or DjrsLt Cost1y . .

(PtoC ai))C in ofte:box fer plaintiff and one for defendant

c i us Govniineiit Pliirth (3 reden Queswn[US pj'ç DEl' DEF. Go'emrnetit Not a Pow) Citizen of fins Stale Cl I 0 I 111crproted or Prjiie,pal PJae IJ 4 04

. ... .. . .. . . . . i• . i .. . . . . . :ofBtiiiiesiri thiSLa(e .

132 U $ Gc rntnen bednt 0 4 Di', ersiI (rndie CiIuinshp Cttven ofAncitlier Siate 0 2 '0.2.. Iucoorojed mid Principal Place 0 5 El 5 ofParties m IlcrnlH) ofl3ustucss in Another taLo

. . . . : . . . :.Citiu or SUeCfa Iorjr Coiiit,y, :tJ3 . 03 FO1CgflNaIiOfl: : .:D .6 .

. iv. ORIGIN (1acenniion boxonlyj ....... ...... . . . . . : . •

l,I Onginal El 2 Remmied .Iicm 0 3 Rernoiicbd front '04 RmsI,ted or 0 5 Trinsfened fl-am aiiotlier dstne (specify) 06. Mti1r E17. Appi tDjstrtct Procceding

We Couit AppttIe Court Reopenid Djtriat Judge horn . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIt1jtIQfl . Mis1rifle Iidge

V IEuEsrLD IN COH'LAI? .1 JUIt'L DEMA) IVs 0 No (Check only ifdinanded in complaint,):

CLASS ACTION uiidrFJtCP 11 (Yes. D.No . ONEYThI1MANDEI) .iNCOiSiiLAlNT:.SPrOQf . . ... .

VL CAUSS OF etCTION(Cite the W. Civil Statute itn&r 1iich you are fihugand wTilert brietsim"cor.of cause DO not cite jurisdietiouril statutes unless diversity) Violation of Sections 14a) and2(a)orthcsecuTi1is EchancMt ar934 and 2US: Secion Th616 .. .. . . . . . . . .

VII 1'A2i1I1.E OF SUIT (Place rut \. us one bex only)

S I ATUT7S COi4 PAcT ­1 'owl's TflTTs PRSONFP LA.JiOR .uou, staiv lipionnnt Li 10 Insurnude. £SONAL IURY PERSONAL . PTtTIQiS; U 710 •Fairtebor Standards 0410 Antitrust 0 120 Maruuk 0210 Airpimie

PROPERTY 0510 Motionsto Act 0430 StInks mid Banking 0 130 Miller Act 0315 Auqthiiie Product 0370 Other Pniud V-aate Sentence 0720 Labor/MgmL O 450 Commerce/ICC 0 140 Negotiable Instrument iabt1it 0371 Truth us Lending Habeas Corpus Relations

iales/etc I 150 Recovery of 0220 Assault Libel & Q'390 (3thcrPerona1 0530 GeneraL 0730 Labor/Mgmt 0 460 Deportation Oveiptymeut L SFiridCr Property Damage 0535 Death Penalty Reporting & r1470; 1t.acketei- TI1IILICIItC6 Lptqrtgutent of 0330 Fed Eaiplo CS C A5 Property Daminge £1540 Mimdaniu/ Distlospre At

Liability and Corrupt Judgment , 34

Product Liability Oilier 0740 Ramlwsy I thor Act Organnutmons 0 151 hledic'ire Act

Peo BANKRUPTCV 1355.0 Civil Ri8hhs 0790 Other Labor

£1480 Consumer Credit 11152 Recovery of DOfaulted Liability

itC 0 422 Appeal 28 USC U 55' Prison Contlitmori I icigatmon 0490 Cable/Sat TV Student Loan (Ec1

35Q MOiür Vehicle 158 1 OItrLlTt rtri 0 79 1 Entpl Ret lute

W8l0 Scicctivv Sen ice Veterans) £1355 Motor Vehuc1 0423 \Vmilidrawal 28 PI.1I1AL fl Secunt Act OO SecurntmeslCoinuiiodmtmes/ 0 153 Recovcy . of Productf U 157 U 610 Agnculture PRQPRTY 1UQEiT

Exeltuinge Overpayment of 0360 Othtr Prsouv4 IV R, RIGi ITS b626 Other Food & 0 820 Copyright 0815 Customer Cliidlcnge 1 ,21 Veteran a Benefits 04 11 citing Drug 0 830 Patent

USC 3410 D160: Stoe1Jilders Suut £13 perøI taji 0 442 Thiployment £3625 Drug Related 0 840 1 rudeniark U 890 Other StatutorY Actions 0 190 Other Contract E4ed Ma1pnIuee 0443 Itousing/Acco Seizure of SOCIAl. SECUIJT( £1891 Ageucultuir& Act 0195 Contract Product 0:363 Praonal nu musodations Property 21 USC 0 tul ILIA (1393i T) £1892 FConotme Stabilization Luabu1ih' ProduletLlabulmt) 0444 Welfare 8l 0 a2 BlcLI tmng(23)

Act 0.06 Fmncbiseu 0368 AsbeioPerônt 0 44 American willt 0630 Liquor Laws 0 862 DIWC!DIWW 0893 Emironnienti1 Matters REAL PRO ItTm. 1njur 'radiuçt Disabilities - 0640 KR & I nick (405g)) 0 8%. EnergyAllocitmon Act 0210 Land Condemnation Ua,ilit Einponient £1650 Airline Rags 0 864 5811) Fitle XVI 0; 895 Freedom of InfO Act 0220 ranielosturo lMhitGIttTION 0446 Atnenent with £1660 Occupatrormal 0865 RSI()5(g)) £1900 Appeal of Fee Dteuni 0230 Rent Leqsa &. Ejeclment 0 462 i'Iatutuluzatir,n DisabthtTes- &tfb fflealth JEDEIL LAX IS ' -

nntlrt Under Equal 0240 Torts to Lend Applieihmon Oilier 0690 Other 0 870 taxes (US Plaintiff Avdésto Justice 0245 Tart Product Liability 0463 Habeas CorpUS 7 0440 Oilier Civil or Detbmidant)

0950 Cotiituttonauuty of 0290 All Other Red Property Alien Detainee Rights 0 871' iRS hard Part5 26 State Statutes 0 165 Oiec Inmulgiauion USC 7609 Aclions............ . . .................

ui O4631 rOR orric USE ONLY cim Number V --

AFTER cO\IPLETDIG IHE F1tON1 SIDE or 3ORM CV-11 COMPLETE THE INrOI1MA i to REQUE&TED uFLOs

CV-71 (05108) Cfl II COVFRSFIFET Page 1 of 2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

VI 11(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed? DINO U Yes If yes, list case number(s):

VIH(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed in this court that are related to the present case? l 'No P Yes If yes, list case number(s):

Civil cases are deemed related if fl previously filed case and the present ease:

(Check all boxes that apply) U A. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or

o B. Call for determination of the annie or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or

O C. For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or

Elf). Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright, and one of the factors identified above in a, bore also is present.

LX. VENUE: (When completing the following information, use an additional sheer if necessary.)

(a) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides. U Check here if the government, its agencies or emgloyees is a named plaintiff. If this box is checked, go to item (b).

County in this District:'

California County outside of thin District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country

New York

(b) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides. U Check here if the government, its agencies or ernulovees is a named defendant. If this box is checked, go to item (e).

County in this District:'

California County outside of this District; Stale, if other than California; or Foreign Country

See attached, See attached.

(c) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose. Nate: Inland condemnation cases. use the location of lime tract or land involved.

County in this District:'

CaliforniaCounty outside of this District; Slate, if other than California; or Foreign Country

Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, Ventura, Santa

Luis Obispo Counties Note: In land condemnation cases. use the location of the tract of land i

X. SIGNATURE OF ATI'ORNEV (OR PRO PER): Date 6125113

Notice to Counsel/Parties: The CV-71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sy/et and the inforniatioru contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service ofpleadings orother papers as required by law. This form, approved by the Jldicial Conference of the United Stales in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-I is not filed but is used by the Clerk of the Court for the purpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)

Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:

Nature ofSiiil Code Abbreviation Substantive Statement of Cause ofAction

861 HIA All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program. (42 U.S.C. I935FE(b))

BL

DIWC

DIww

SSID

RSI

862

863

863

864

865

CV-71 (05108)

All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C. 923)

All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))

All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))

All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title Id of the Social Security Act, as amended.

All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 1J.S.C.(g))

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page 2 of 2

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Attachment to Civil Cover Sheet

IX. Venue (b)

Richard J. Thompson - Florida

Jon Gacek - Washington

Kambiz Hooshmand - Santa Clara County

Hartmut Liebel - Florida

Mark Melliar-Smith - England

Kyle Ryland - San Mateo County

Ajay Shah - Michigan

Richard M. Swanson - Kern County

Jay Walters - Alabama

Verdi Acquisition Corporation - Delaware

Power-One, Inc. - Ventura County

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been assigned to District Judge George H. Wu and the assigned discovery Magistrate Judge is Carla Woehrle.

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

CV13— 4631 GIN (CWx)

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to bear discovery related motions.

All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is filed, a copy of this notice must be served on all plaintiffs).

Subs/quent documents must be filed at the following location: -

Western Division U Southern Division LI Eastern Division

T 312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8 411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053 3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516 Riverside, CA 92501

Failure to file at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.

CV-1 8(03/06) NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY