Macroeconomic Policy in the Asia- Pacific GECO 6400 Monetary Policy Monetary Policy.
Monetary Policy in a Multipolar World
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Transcript of Monetary Policy in a Multipolar World
MONETARY POLICY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLDJ. E. StiglitzWashington, DCOctober 8, 2013
Motivation Monetary policy by one large country can
have affects on other countries Other countries are likely to respond Key questions:
How to think about the resulting global equilibrium?
How could global coordination improve matters? In the absence of (perfect) coordination, how
can global financial architecture (the rules of the game) improve matters?
Example: QE2 Probably had only minimal effects on US
Effects on LT government rates small Effects on private sector lending rates even smaller Has not led to much more lending to only sector which is constrained, SME
But many other countries believe it had adverse effects on them, as liquidity stimulated their economies Money is going where it’s not needed, and not going where it’s needed Especially with credit channel in US still clogged
These other countries offset the actions Imposing capital controls Buying dollars to keep their exchange rates from appreciation
Fed “sold” dollars, other CB “bought” dollars Does such a move have much effect on US, other countries, global economy?
Monetary policy in a world of globalization, and several “large” players may be markedly different in the closed economy
Second Motivation To move away from “perfect markets” models
which have dominated monetary policy debate
Towards models in which Credit availability is important Distributive consequences are important The difference between T-bill rates and lending
rates (to businesses) is endogenous and important
The market equilibrium, on its own, is not in general Pareto efficient
Outline Monetary policy in a limiting case—
money issued by two monetary authorities are perfect substitutes
Variable exchange rates “perfect” capital markets credit constraints
Why monetary policy has any effects
Monetary policy in a limiting case Single country with two CB, E and W Economies in two regions imperfectly
correlated Two forms of money, ME and Mw , are
perfect substitutes Utility functions Vi (M, T)Where M = ME + MW total money supplyT is transfer paid by one region to other
Nash equilibrium (no cooperation) T = 0 VE ‘(ME + MW , 0) = 0, VW’(ME + MW , 0) =
0Note effects of policy in East (in recession)
on West (in boom) Spill-overs from trade (exports, imports),
from financial flows, from commodity prices
Pareto Optimum Max VE(M, T) + VW(M,-T)Generating f.o.c.(3A) VE
M + VWM = 0
(3B) VET = VW
T
Nash equilibrium is not, in general, Pareto Optimal
Note: “Independence” of central banks makes it difficult to achieve PO, because of the absence of compensatory fiscal instruments
Additional instruments can reduce externalities
Vi = V(M, T, αi )Where αi is a vector of other variablesNash equilibriumVi
αi = 0A coordinated solution would be
preferable: VE
αi + VWαi = 0
Even if compensatory payments are not allowed, cooperative agreements can be reached, i.e. denoting the Nash equilibrium by {Mi*, αi*} , there exists an alternative policy vector {Mi**, αi**} which is Pareto Superior, where each party shifts more of its policy agenda towards variables that have smaller spillovers
Variable exchange rateAdditional channel through monetary
policy exerts its affects—with strong externalities on other country (countries)
Slight generalization of earlier model:Vi(Mi, Mj, αi, αj, βi, βj)Where βi are variables that affect
spillovers (in or out), like capital control
Note: unlike trade liberalization, there is neither theory or evidence that capital and financial market liberalization is necessarily welfare enhancing to both countries And even if it were, there could be strong
distributive consequences that are not easily offset Hence, there are strong distributive consequences
across countries resulting from these liberalization measures Explaining why many countries have to be “forced” to
open up markets
Nash EquilibriumVi
Mi =
Vi αi = Vi β i= 0
Not Pareto OptimalRestricting externality reducing actions
(like capital controls) makes things worse
Credit availabilityIn the real world, what matters as much or
more than interest rate is the availability of credit.
High r can lead to an influx of capital, increasing credit availability, L(r), L’ > 0
Assume potential output is Y*. Actual output is
Y(L(r))Optimal r solves Y(L(r*)) = Y*
Demand side shock Yd = Yd(L(r), ε )Raising r increases capital inflow,
exacerbates inflationary pressureShould use additional instruments. AssumeV (Yd(L(r, α)) , α, r)Optimal policy entails VY YL Lr + Vr = 0 VY YL L α + V α = 0
Optimal policy1) Takes account of the effect of r directly
on welfare (e.g. through distributive effects)
2) Can be improved upon by adjusting regulations (reserve requirements, capital adequacy regulations, lending standards)
Generalization: Composition of output also matters Some sectors (1) more associated with instability (real
estate) Some (2) have greater technological spillovers/learning
benefits Some more dependent on capital inflows (real estate),
affected by restrictions on cross border flows (β) Some more affected by restrictions on domestic
legislation Increase in r increases flow of funds to real estate,
reduces flow of funds from domestic banks to other sector Capital inflows limit effectiveness of monetary policy through
traditional channels
Welfare maximizationV(Yd1(βL1 (r, α), r) , Yd2 (L2 (r, α),r) α, β,r)F.O.C. VY1 Yd1
L L1 + Vβ = 0 VY1 Yd1
L β L1α + VY2 Yd2
L L2α + V α = 0
VY1 [Yd1
L β L1r + Yd1
r ] + VY2 [Yd2L L2
r + Yd2r ]
+ V r = 0.
Implications If an increase in r leads to an expansion of
unproductive sector and contraction of productive sector, we set r lower than we otherwise would (tolerate more inflation)
If we can restrict capital inflows, we should If inflationary pressures related to sum of
outputs, Yd1 + Yd2 = Y*,Any inflation target an be achieved by large
number of policies {α , β, r}. Choose the one which optimizes sectoral composition
Optimal to use multiple instruments Increasing reserve requirements and
lowering interest rates (or raising them less than they otherwise would be) may be preferable to just raising interest rates
But imposing controls (taxes) on the inflow of capital may be still preferable
General point: Pervasiveness of macro-externalities With credit rationing, collateral, incentive
compatibility, self-selection constraints (and/or imperfect risk markets), economy is essentially never constrained Pareto efficient (Greenwald-Stiglitz) Those with access to international capital markets
borrow excessively Public policy should be directed at “correcting”
these market failures No presumption that markets, on their own, are efficient No presumption that market based interventions (“r”)
are the best set of interventions
Some general observations about monetary policy Generalized MM theorem predicts that
monetary policy shouldn’t have much effect Especially with CMA accounts allowing using, in
effect, T bills for transactions purposes But monetary policy has some effects: Why?
Market imperfections (capital constraints) Institutional features Distributive consequences Market “irrationality” (not seeing through public
veil)
Modern monetary theory lives in a half-way house of incompletely articulated assumptions of imprecisely defined market imperfections and distributive effects, leading to speculative observations about possible channels through which monetary policy might yield effects, with ambiguous quantitative significance .
Examples Banks are central—mediate flow of credit to
SME’s Focus should be understanding bank behavior “Liquidity trap”—circumstances in which
monetary policy does not lead to more lending Distinctively different from Keynesian liquidity trap Note that in Great Depression, real interest rate
was greater than 10%, now it is -2%. No evidence that zero lower bound is critical
constraint—would lowering real interest rate to -3% make any real difference?
Temporary interventions With infinitely lived rational individuals,
without capital constraints why should they have any effect?
With life cycle model, elderly with stock will consume more
But elderly depending on interest payments will consume less
Distributive consequences are crucial
Market imperfections help explain ineffectiveness of QE
Domestic lending channel blocked (especially to SME’s) Community and regional banks still weak—
disproportionately responsible for SME lending SME lending collateral based; collateral real
estate; real estate prices still markedly down Refinancing limited
Banking sector concentrated—incentive not to increase lending (take lower government rate as profit)
Large fraction of homeowners who are not underwater have already refinanced
Insolvency vs. Illiquidity A central distinction in Central Bank doctrine But is it totally persuasive?
In a world with perfect information, a firm that was solvent would presumably have access to funds
Of course, every bank will believe the market has “misjudged” its future prospects
But why should a Central Banker believe that his judgments are better than that of market, when no one is willing to supply funds to the bank?
Conclusions In a world of truly free capital mobility, the effects of
monetary policy are different (typically weaker) than in a closed economy
Restrictions on capital flows may enhance the ability of the government to maintain the economy near full employment Macro-benefits more than offset micro-distortions But in more properly formulated model, no presumption
that markets on their own are efficient Cooperation may lead to Pareto improvements
More likely to be true—more likely to be able to obtain cooperation—if there are more instruments
Restrictions on cross-border capital flows and other instruments can reduce cross-border externalities, improve efficiency, and mitigate distributive consequences Strong presumption that markets are not Pareto efficient Strong presumption that optimality requires using a panoply of
instruments Single-minded focus on interest rate has been foolish
Governments/monetary authorities should be concerned about the structure of the economy and the distribution of income If so, they should use a multitude of instruments, not just
interest rates And engage in unorthodox policies
To respond to a potential influx of distorting capital from abroad