M¢m¡ms¡ Tradition - Philosophical, Ritualistic and...

CHAPTER - III

M¢m¡ms¡ Tradition - Philosophical, Ritualistic and Linguistic Aspects

Philosophical Aspects- Epistemology- Categories- Qualities- Concept of Ap£rva- Concepts of God, Self, Mind, Heaven,

Liberation and Dharma

Ritualistic Aspects- Types of sacrifices- Eligibility to perform sacrifices- Sacrificial Tradition in Kerala

Linguistic Aspects- P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ Technique of

Programme organisation- Theories of Sentence meaning

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Philosophical Aspects

The word ‘M¢m¡ms¡’ literally means ‘revered thought’ and

was originally applied to the interpretation of the vedic rituals which

commanded highest reverance. The word is now used in the sense

of any critical investigation. The school of M¢m¡ms¡ justifies both

the meanings by giving rules according to which the commandments

of the Veda are to be interpreted and by giving a philosophical

justification for the Vedic ritualism. M¢m¡ms¡ and Ved¡nta are

treated with allied systems of thought. Both are based on and both

try to interpret Veda. The earlier portions of Veda ie, the ‘Mantra’

and ‘Br¡hma a’ portion is called ‘Karmak¡ da’, while the later

portion ie, the UpaniÀads is called ‘Jµ¡nak¡da’ because the former

deals action with the rituals and the sacrifices. While the later deals

with knowledge of reality. M¢m¡ms¡ deals with the earlier

portion of Veda is there fore called ‘P£rva M¢m¡ms¡’ and also


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‘Karmam¢m¡ms¡.’ While Vedanta deals with the later portion of Veda

and is therefore called ‘Uttara M¢m¡ms¡’ or ‘Jµ¡nam¢m¡ms¡.’ The

P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ deals with dharma and therefore it called as

‘Dharma M¢m¡ms¡.’

There has been a long line of pre-Sankarite teachers of Vedanta

of whome Mandanami¿ra seems to be the last, who have regarded

M¢m¡ms¡ and Vedanta as forming a single system and who have

advocated the combination of action and knowledge - Known as -

‘Karma - jµ¡na Samucchaya V¡da.’ According to them the s£tr¡s

beginning with the first s£tr¡ of Jaimini and ending with the last

s£tr¡ of B¡dar¡yana, form one compact á¡stra. These teachers hold

that Karma (Action) and Up¡sana (Meditation) were absolutely

essential to hasten the dawn of true knowledge. Even the great

Sankaracharya who treated action and knowledge as being

absolutely opposed like darkness and light and who relegated karma

to the sphere of Avidya, had to admit that Karma and Up¡sana to

purify the soul, though they are not the direct causes of liberation

and that therefore the study of P£rva m¢m¡ms¡ though not essential


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for the study of Ved¡nta was a good mean for the purification of

the soul. In this connection it is also important to remember that it

is the great Kumarila Bhatta himself who may be rightly regarded

as the link between the P£rva M¢m¡msa and Uttara M¢m¡ms¡.

The word ‘Dar¿ana’ is derived from the root ‘·¤À’ (to see). It

ordinarilly means seeing. In its technical sense it means an act of

seeing which is not tained with any falsehood, or a correct

assertainment of something perceptible or imperceptible. To make

it more explicit, it may difine ‘Dar¿ana’ as an argumentative

deleberation upon a thing of which some knowledge has been

already obtained by perception or some other means, ending in the

discovery of its actual form. So there must be some previous

conceptions derived either by perception or by some other means

to make a Dar¿ana possible. Without such conceptions mere

argumentation will stand without a basis, and will fail to obtain the

desired discovery. The inference arrived after arguementation must

again correspond to reality for “There can be no formal correctness

as opposed to real representation of truth........”1


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A doubt might arise as to whether the treatment of the

sacrificial injuctions of the Veda which has been made in the P£rva

M¢m¡ms¡ at great length, really form the subject matter of a

Dar¿ana. But this doubt will disappear if it consider the traditional

defenition of Dar¿ana. Sacrifices are regarded as the means of

(s¡dhana) the attainment of bliss (s¡dhya) and discussions about

sacrificial injuctions form clearly the subject matter of this dar¿ana.

The main purpose of M¢m¡ms¡ philosophy was a methodical

interpretation of Dharma, or duty embodied in the ritualistic portion

of Vedas. Its philosophical position aims to provide epistemological,

metaphysical and ethical justification to the ritualistic doctrines. In

view of the above purpose, the Mimamsakas has stressed vedic

testimony as a highest source of valid knowledge, requiring no

external test for its validity. They believe in the reality of the world,

pluralism of souls, heaven, hell, impressions of acts lasting till the

attainment of fruits, potency and acts as the regulating force of the

world.


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Epistemology

The best developed aspect of M¢m¡ms¡ philosophy is its

epistemology and the key to the understanding and proper evaluation

of M¢m¡ms¡ theories in this field is the dogma, which however the

M¢m¡msak¡s have put in their best efforts to establish on a rational

basis, that the Veda is the supreme authority. To justify this dogma

they had to make a detailed and critical enquiry in to the nature

and criteria of valid knowledge and other related problems.

M¢m¡msak¡s recognised six pramanas, viz, PratyakÀa,

Anum¡na, áabda, Upam¡na, Arth¡patti and Anupalabdhi. But

Prabhakara and his followers refused to recognise the last one.

Perception (PratyakÀa)

Perception is the immediate knowledge of an object arising

through sense - object condact. A sense organ comes in condact

with its object and gets its impression. This knowledge is the

indeterminate knowledge (‘¡locana’ or ‘nirvikalpa’). Then the mind

interprets it by assimilating it to the past experience which

determinates the class, quality, activity and name of the object. It is


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called determinate (Savikalpa) knowledge. In the first stage it is

like a perception of a child, a bare awareness, free from the

subjective contributions of the perceiver. That is, the object in it is

not determined as belonging to a class, possessing a name and so

on. In savikalpa stage, the consciousness of the object becomes

more definite and its generic and specific features are apprehended

clearly because of the analytic and synthetic activities of the mind.

It should be noted that such features are not imaginated but

discovered by the assimilative operations of the mind.

But perception is not always valid. Sometimes it misleads us,

as when what we see as a ‘snake’ turns out to be a mere ‘peice of

rope.’ This is a case of illusion. The cause in such cases is some

defect in the sense organ or in the condition under which the

perception occurs.

There are two M¢m¡ms¡ theories offered to explain such

phenomena without giving up realism and yeilding to idealism,

Kumarila’s theory is called ‘Vipar¢takhy¡ti’ according to which

in illusion real thing existing elsewhere (Snake) is due to some


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defects identified with another real thing (rope). Another theory

which is offered by Prabhakara is called ‘Akhy¡ti’ or

‘Vivekakhy¡ti.’ It says an illusion consists of two cognitions; one

presentative and the other representative, and since the perceiver

forgets the representative charecter of later he cant apprehend their

difference. On the first theory illusion is a misapperehension, while

on the second it is a non-apprehension or incomplete apprehension,

the former being an error of commission and the later that of

omission only.

Inference (Anum¡na) :-

Inference is the knowledge of one of the relata after perceiving

the other when the invariable association between the two is already

known. It is of two types : - for ones own self and for conceiving

others. The former is informal and does not require all the methodical

steps, while the later consists of three statements - ‘Pratijµ¡’

(Statement of the probandum), ‘hetu’ (Probans) and ‘d¤Àt¡nta’

(example).

áabara defines ‘anum¡na’ as the knowledge from the perception

of one term of a well-known relationship of the other term which is


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not at the time of the contact with the senses. The first term is

called ‘Liµga’, ‘Hetu’ etc. The second one is called ‘Liµgin’,

‘S¡dhya’ etc. Their relationship is called ‘Vy¡pti’ or ‘Niyama’.

The usual division of anum¡na into ‘Sv¡rtha’ and ‘Par¡rtha’

is not unanimously accepted in M¢m¡ms¡. á¡bara and Kumarila do

not mention these kinds nor do Kumarila’s commentators.

á¡bara recognises only two kinds of anum¡na,

‘PratyakÀatod¤Àtasambandha’ and ‘S¡m¡nyatodrÀ¶asambandha.’

The former is exemplified in the inference of fire from smoke and

the latter in that of the sun’s movement from its change of position.

Kumarilabhatta recognize two kinds of anumamas viz.

‘S¡m¡nyatodrÀta’ and ‘Vi¿eÀatod¤Àta.’ The latter is excemplified

in the inference by a father of his son’s presence from hearing his

voice and the former is that of the hill having fire on the basis of

the general relation of the smoke being accompanied by fire.

Prabhakara recognised the two kinds of anum¡nas,

‘AdrÀ¶asvalakÀana- viÀaya’ and ‘DrÀtasvalakÀa aviÀaya.’ The


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examples are being the same as given by á¡bara. In the latter, the

sun’s movement from its change of position. The former is the

inference of fire from the smoke.

Verbal Testimany (áruti) :-

Verbal testimany is the most important source of knowledge,

because it justifies the supreme authority of Vedas as the most

authentic source of knowledge of dharma, which is eternal, absolute

and supreme. It is defined as the statement made by a reliable

authority. Prabhakara restricts it to the scriptural statements only

while Kumarila believes in the authority of worldly persons also.

The Vedas are not composed by any person - human or divine. The

vedic statements give directions for sacrificial ritual or pursuade

persons for the performance of them. The Vedas are eternal and

impersonal in origin and hence are free from all possible mistakes

due to human weakness and are unchallengable and infallible in

authority.


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It is knowledge derived from an authoritative statement which

is either factual or imperetive and again secular or Vedic. Kumarila

recognizes both these types of pramanas while Prabhakara thinks

statements of authoritative persons to be reducible to anum¡na. The

import of Vedic statements is ultimately action and the apparently

factual statements, as of the UpaniÀads are to be constructed as

arthav¡da ie, indirectly commending or condemning some action.

Comparison (Upam¡na) :-

‘Upam¡na’ is the means of knowing the similarity of the object

remembered at the sight of some resembling object. For example a

person having seen a cow in his house happens to come across a

‘gavaya’ in the forest and then he comes to know that his cow is

similar to the ‘gavaya’. Actually upam¡na is postulated by the

M¢m¡msak¡s to get the knowledge of the sacrificial details of a

rite from some other similar rite. Here Prabhakara unlike the Bhatta,

considers similarity to be an independent entity.


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Non-Perception (Anupalabdhi) :-

The Bhatta school believes in non-perception (anupalabdhi) as

a means of cognition of absence of something. For example ‘a jar

on the ground.’ The Bhattas argues that absence cannot be perceived

through senses because it cannot come in condact with the sense

organs. It cannot be an object of inference bacause there is not valid

probans to lead to such a conclusion. Nor can it be a case of verbal

testimony or presumption, because the conditions necessary for them

viz. Words and two seemingly contraditory facts are not present in

this case. Prabhakara on the contrary holds that knowledge of

absence arises through perception of the mere location devoid of

the object to the negated.

Prabhakara says that non-perception of a jar on the ground is

perception of the ground alone, but he is unable to explain what

‘alone’ means.

Postulation (Arth¡patti) :-

Postulation is the supposition of some unperceived fact to

explain some otherwise unexplicable facts. For example when a


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man Devadatta is observed to be fasting in the day time but still

grawing fat, can be presume his eating at night to explain the

contradictory facts of fasting at day time and grawing fat.

According to Kumarila apparent inconsistency is the peculiar

feature in it which makes it different from anum¡na. The

Pr¡bh¡karas thinks that such feature is the element of doubt in it,

which is obviously wrong.

The Categories

The Bhatta M¢m¡ms¡ accept five categories. Viz., substance,

quality, action, Universal and Negation, ie., dravya, gua, karma,

s¡m¡nya and abh¡va. The Pr¡bh¡karas accept eight categories ie.,

dravya, gu a, karma, s¡m¡nya, ¿akti, s¡d¤¿ya, samav¡ya and

samkhy¡.

I. Dravya (Substance)

Dravya is the locus of qualities, action, attributes, etc. The

Bhattas define substance as parim¡a gu¡¿raya ie. that which has

dimension the quality. According to them, the substance and

qualities are produced simultaneously.


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The B¡ttas also admit the nine substances admitted by the

Ny¡ya-Vy¿eÀikas, viz., earth, water, light, air, eather, space, time,

¡tman and manas. They add two more substances, viz., tamas ie.,

darkness and áabda ie., Vara syllable.

The Pr¡bh¡karas do not accept tamas as a seperate category.

They consider ¿abda as a quality of ¡k¡¿a.

Time and Space

Time and space are not to be inferred. These are perceived.

The cognitions, this is earlier, that is later etc. are stated to be the

grounds for the inference of time. However, the expressions earlier,

later etc, are not distinct from the time.

These refer to time itself but not to the ground of time. Unless

one cognizes time, one cannot talk of earlier and later. These very

expressions reveal that time is perceived. The time is perceived by

all senses. All experiences have necessarily a reference to time.

Space is also perceived according to Bh¡ttas. The statements

this is here, that is after it and the other is before it. Clearly indicate

that space is also cognized along with the objects. If the perception


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of space could be denied, then the perception of the very objects in

those places may also be denied. On these grounds the Bh¡ttas

consider other, time and space as perceptible. According to

Pr¡bh¡karas these are to be inferred.

Tamas

Bhattas have a peculiar view that tamas or darkness as a

substance. They argue that darkness have two attributes. Viz., quality

is blue colour and motion which are required for an entity to be a

substance. As it cannot be brought under any other substance it has

to be considered as a seperate substance.2 Bh¡ttas says air has no

colour, it has only touch and even it is considered as a substance.

Similarly, darkness that has colour but no touch, may also be

considered as a substance. It is not necessary that a substance must

have both colour and touch. The presence of one of them is sufficient.

The Pr¡bh¡karas do not consider darkness as a separate

substance. They cannot also consider it as the absence of light, since,

they do not accept the category of Abh¡va, ie., absence.


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áabda or Var a

The Bh¡ttas consider ¿abda or vara as a substance because it

is not located in anything else and it is directly cognized by the

sense ie ear. áabda is all pervasive, for example, one and the same

‘ga’ is found anywhere. It is not correct to say that there are different

‘ga’ syllables pronounced by different persons at different times,

since it is recognized as the same ‘ga’ syllable even when

pronounced by different persons at different times. It is not produced

by the vocal organs. It is only manifested by these. Though the

¿abda is all pervasive, it is heard only in such places where it is

manifested. The variation in the manifestion of ¿abda as strong,

soft etc, is due to the variation in the process of manifestation. A

group of ¿abdas that convey a meaning, is a word. A group of words,

that conveys a unitary meaning, is a sentence. M¢m¡msakas do not

accept the concept of ¿abda for this purpose.

The Pr¡bh¡karas consider ¿abda as a quality of ¡k¡¿¡.

II. Gu a

According to Bhattas quality is that which is not

Up¡d¡nak¡raa ie., the mateiral cause and which is distinct from


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motion. The first cause is intended to distinguish it from substance.

The colour, taste etc., are twenty four qualities.

Twentyone qualities are same as Ny¡ya Vai¿eÀika. Among

these ¿abda, dharma and adharma are dropped and ¿akti, pr¡katya

and dhvani are added by M¢m¡msak¡s.

The concept of pr¡katya is a special concept of Bhatta

M¢m¡msakas. It is a quality invested on objects when the objects

are cognized. It reveals the object. Though it is a quality of

substances it also reveals the qualities, universal etc., present in the

object. It reveals the past and the future objects, and abh¡va also.

Pr¡katya is also called as d¤Àtat¡ and jµ¡tat¡. In the instance where

the objects are perceived it is called d¤Àtat¡; where the objects are

revealed by inference etc., is called jµ¡tat¡. The Pr¡bh¡karas do not

accept this concept.

áakti (Potency)

áakti is a quality present in substances, qualities and action.

Bhattas do not accept the contention that a quality is present in

substance only áakti is of two types: Laukika and Vaidika. Laukika


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is established by arth¡patti.áakti of sacrifice that leads to heaven

is second type. This is to be known through Vedic injunctions. áakti

is also classified as sahaj¡ and ¡dhey¡. The potency of the fire is

sahaja ie., natural. The potency found in the sacrificial context is

¡dhey¡. ie., brought about by the implimentation of the Vedic

injunction. The Pr¡bh¡karas consider ¿akti as a separate category.

They establish it by inference.

III. Karma (action)

Karma is of the nature of movement. It causes conjuction and

disjunction. It operates in the case of non-all-pervasive entities only

and it is perceptible. The Pr¡bh¡karas consider it as inferred.

IV. S¡m¡nya

S¡m¡nya’s nature is universal. It is an important concept and

it is utilized to reject the Buddhist view of KÀa ikatva or

momentariness.

V. S¡·¤¿ya (Similarity)

This is a seperate category accepted by Prabhakaras. It is

comprehended by upam¡na pram¡ a. Pr¡bh¡kara consider it as


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seperate because (1) it cannot be considered as a substance since it

is found in qualities and actions also. (2) It cannot consider as a

quality or action for the same reason. (3) It cannot be included

under S¡m¡nya, as it has no continuity. (4) It cannot be included

under Samav¡ya as it is not a relation.

Bh¡ttas do not consider it as a seperate category. The

P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ utilizes the concept of S¡d¤¿ya in the context of

sacrifices. For instance, ¿aurya and ¡gneya have same deity and

dravya. Therefore these lead to the same result. A section of

Navyanayy¡yikas also accept Sad¤¿ya as seperate category.

VI. Samkhy¡ (Number)

According to Pr¡bh¡karas number is also a seperate category

as it is found in all objects. It canot be considered as a substance,

since it is found in qualities, action. etc. It cannot considered as a

quality because it is found in many. It cannot be taken as an action

because it is observed to be quite different from that. It cannot also

be taken as a universal as it is not eternal. Hence it has to be

considered as a seperate category.


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VI. Samav¡ya (Inherence)

The Pr¡bh¡kara considered samav¡ya as infered. Bhattas do

not accept samav¡ya. They replace it by t¡d¡tmya. According to

Pr¡bh¡karas, if the two relate are eternal then samav¡ya is eternal.

If one of the relate or both are not eternal then, samav¡ya also is not

eternal.

VII. Abh¡va (Absence)

Bhattas accept abh¡va as a seperate category. The cognition

asti is bh¡va, a positive entity. The cognition n¡sti is abh¡va, the

absence of an entity. This absence itself is considered a seperate

category. The absence is of four types, viz., (1) Pr¡gabh¡va (previous

absence) ie. the absence before the object is produced. eg : - absence

of curd in the milk before it is produced from the milk. (2)

Pradhvams¡bh¡va absence after the destruction. eg. absence of milk

when it is made into curd. (3) Atyanth¡bh¡va ie. the absence all

along. eg. the absence of colour in the air. (4) Anyony¡bh¡va

(reciprocal absence) eg :- the jar is not the cloth. This is also called

t¡d¡tmy¡bh¡va.


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According to Bh¡ttas absence is cognized by anupalabdhi

pram¡na. ie., absence of cognition.

The Pr¡bh¡karas do not accept the abh¡va category. According

to them the cognitions are of two types : (1) Sams¤Àta ViÀayabudhi

or cognition of two objects together (2) tadeka viÀayabudhi or

cognition of one only.

The Concept of Ap£rva :-

It does not appear quite reasonable that momentarily

disappearing actions should bring about any such future effects as

the attainment of heaven and the like. But the fact is that, from

certain vedic passages we come to know of the capability of the

enjoyed and prohibitted actions to bring about certain result, and

inorder to render reasonable the production of future effects by

means of momentarily disappearing actions, it can be assume certain

interveining transcendental agencies in the form of Punya (virtue)

and P¡pa (vice). Thus, then the causing of the attainment of heaven

by sacrifices is not immediate, but indirect through the unseen

agency of virtue. This is what is called the unseen force (ad¤Àta)


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leading to a particular effect, and the cause of this unseen effect is

the primary action, filled up with all its various subsidiaries

preceeding and following it, and not the primary action along by

itself. In that case, the effects (the attainment of heaven etc.) too

might be said to be brought about by the primary alone and such a

theory would lead to the inevitable conclusion - the uselessness of

the subsidiaries.

There can be an objection that, is it right to assert the production

of the unseen agency by the primary action together with all its

subsidiaries. For the primary action is no sooner performed than

destroyed, and as such cannot profit by the aid of its subsidiaries.

To this, the M¢m¡msakas replies that though no help of the

subsidiaries is possible to the primary by itself, yet such aid would

be quite possible through an (intermediate) unseen force, brought

about by mere origination of the primary action (such force having

the convensional name of ‘utpattyap£rva’). Because of the

fulfilment to the production by the primary alone of such an Ap£rva

interveining between the primary and the final Ap£rva directly


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leading to the final result. In the same manner, the subsidiaries too,

being only conjointly capable of helping the primary, cannot help

one another direclty by themselves, and as such as the fulfilment of

this mutual aid among the subsidiaries also, it can be assume the

production of intermediate unseen forces - Utpattyap£rvas - at each

steps. (ie, together with every subsidiary the one subsidiary helping

the one following through the Utpattyap£rva produced by itself).

The help of the subsidiary towards the primary as a rule, consists

in turning the primary towards the production of the great Ap£rva

leading to the final result.

Sacrifices are enjoined by vedic injuctions. And all

performances releases some effects. For example

“dar¿ap£r am¡s¡bhy¡m svarga k¡mo yejeta” - the performance of

‘dar¿apurnam¡sa’s result is ‘svarga.’ The act of sacrifice come to

an end as soon as all the items of its are completed. But the result

‘svarga’ does not immediately emerge. The cause should

immediately proceeded the effect. When it does not happen, to

maintain the continuity some intermediary has to be envisaged.


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Hence Ap£rva is envisaged as an intermediary between the sacrifice

and the result.

The concept is envisaged by Arth¡patti pram¡ a. Whenever

there is a conflict between two facts both of which are supported

by appropriate pram¡as, a third fact has to be emerged to resolve

the conflict. Here, performing sacrifice is enjoined by áruti. A result

for it is also stated in that áruti. These statements imply the

relationship of cause and effect between the two. This cannot be

worked out unless the two are interconnected. This difficulty is

resolved by envisaging Ap£rva by arth¡patti.

Ap£rva is a kind of trans - emperical power. It remains with

the performer of the sacrifice. As a trans - emperical power, its

way of functioning is quite different from that of emperical power.

The sacrificial act is emperical. Its continuity, untill the result arises,

cannot be envisaged. However as dharma, it can generate a trans

emperical power and can lead to the result. In Indian philosophical

and religious tradition, the concept of non-emperical power, ad¤Àta

is accepted by all in some or other form at some or other stage. It


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remains with the persons concerned. However, it is not cognized

by him like his cognition, joy or sorrow.

Knowledge According to M¢m¡msak¡s

According to M¢m¡msak¡s, knowledge is the activity of a

cognizer (jµ¡t¤vy¡p¡ra) which is inferred through the effect. viz,

cognizedness characterizing the object cognised. It is of two types,

valid and invalid. The later involves some defect in the totality of

causal conditions and is erroneous in nature. The former is according

to Kumarila, the knowledge which is in agreement with the real

nature of an object, novel and not contradicted by a sublating

knowledge, or according to Prabhakara, the direct experience of an

object as distinguished from remembrance.

M¢m¡msakas theory of knowledge is realistic. They accept the

view of self validity of knowledge. All knowledge is valid by itself.

It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arise from

those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. Prabhakara

and Kumarila both uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge.


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Concept of God

It is true that Jaimini has not discussed the concept of God in

his s£tras, but he has nowhere denied the existence of God. Though

Jaimini has taken great pains for establishing that the fruits of

actions are produced through ‘ap£rva’ still he has recognised God

as the creator or the maker of these fruits.

There are two leading schools belonging to this system; the

school of Kumarila and the school of Prabhakara. Of these two the

school of Kumarila is by far the more prominent. This school does

not admit that one derive the fruits of his action through the favour

of God, but it regards God as the ordainer of fruit in as much God

helps him in obtaining them by creating so many objects of this

world.

Dr. Ganganath Jha has observed in his famous article on the

Prabhakara Mi¿ra3 that Kumarila has denied the creation or the

dissolution of the world as a whole. He has referred in the four

verses of the álokav¡rtika as his authority quoting.4


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It is true that Kumarila has said that, God, corporal or spiritual,

does neither superintend nor is the couse of this creation and that

the creation or the dissolution of the world at any one time is

impossible. But it can be say that Kumarila does not at all intend to

deny creation by God, but he intend to bringout the logical absurdity

involved in the idea of the creation of the world by a God, who

himself is a product of human imagination.

It is also a mistake to suppose that the system of Kumarila is

not a purely theistic one, because it denied the existence of the

physical forms of the Gods. But Kumarila has not actually denied

the existence of such an object. The truth is that he has not been

very keen about this matter. All that he had wanted to make out is

that one do not desire the fruits of his action through the favour of

Gods, and that Gods need not have bodies for that purpose. He has

put forward the view that a cause and its consequence cling to the

same basis. When a man was performed sacrifice, the result will,

as a matter of course come over him. Now the result do not always

come out at once, they may came out long afterwards, and in order


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to show a connection between an act and its result two theories are

generally propounded. According to one theory ‘the result comes

through the favours of the Gods who have been propitiated in the

sacrifice,” while according to the other “an unseen merit (Ap£rva)

arises immediately on the performance of the sacrifice which serves

as a connecting link between the performance and its fruits.”

Kumarila adopt the latter theory. He says that if we admit this

Ap£rva, the cause, the medium, and the ultimate consequence - all

three will take place in ones own self, where as the favour of a God

is not in the sacrificer himself, but is an extraneous thing.

Besides in the text of áruti there is no mention of the favour of

any goal. If any sacrificial injuction be properly constructed, it can

be say that it asks a man to produce a desirable result by means of

performing a sacrifice. Thus it is the performance that is the only

means of producing the fruit, and as the performance does not

continue upto the time of the production of the fruit. An Ap£rva is

imagined as a link, and, so, the interference of any external God is


135

not necessary. Moreover the necessity of the favour of a God is not

only not indicated in the ¿ruti, but is opposed to its spirit. The ¿ruti

tells that the performance of a sacrifice is the cause or means of

producing a particular fruit. Of now introduce the favour of Gods

as the cause of the production of the fruit, the importance of the

performance as the cause will be ignored and this can by no means

be the intention of the ¿ruti. So there is neither necessity for nor

any advantage in introducing the favour of Gods and Kumarila has

not therefore, introduced it. Kumarila would have no objection to a

God having a body provided that he does not interfere in the

dispensation of the fruit. Thus all the necessary elements of an Ëstika

dar¿ana is the system of Kumarila, and hence, it should be treated

as much.

Concept of Self of Ëtma

In the system of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ very little was discussed

about the real nature of the self of Man. Man is entitled to perform

the ordained acts such as sacrifices (Yajµ¡), offering of oblation in


136

the consecrated fire (homa), and charity (d¡na).

Like other dualistic schools of philosophers, M¡m¡ms¡kas

believe in the seperateness of the self (j¢v¡tman) from the body,

sense and mind, and look upon special properties of like,

intelligence, will and effort as the natural attributes of the self.

According to m¢m¡msakas, at the time of sacriice, it is not the

body of the sacrificer that goes to heaven, it is his self ie., ¡tman. In

this context they establish a distinct ¡tman seperate from the body.

According to them; (1) Activities like breathing, winking etc.,

do not belong to body. These are not found after the death even

though the body is found. Therefore these are the attributes of some

other entity that is distinct from the body ie. ¡tman.

(2) Joy, sorrow, etc., are cognized by oneself not by others. The

bodily attributes are perceived by others. Hence These belong to

¡tman.

(3) Ëtman can be inferred by the desire also. A person desire

something that is already known to him. Therefore the knower and


137

desirer should be one and same. This means that there is a permanent

¡tman.

(4) The experience as aham establishes the ¡tman. The ¡tman is

capable of knowing itself. ie. svasamvedya.

Kumarila discuss the nature and functions of atman under

¡tmav¡da in álokav¡rttika and in ap£rv¡dhikaraa in Tantrav¡rttika.

He describes ¡tman as eternal, all-pervasive, that which take

different bodies in different births and serves as the agent and

enjoyer.5

The Pr¡bh¡kara view of ¡tman is briefly explained by

S¡lik¡natha as : 1) it is distinct from body, manas and senses (2) it

is permanent and all pervasive (3) The ¡tmas are many. (4) It is

cognized as the agent along with the object of cognition.

Prabhakara and Kumarila both admit the plurality of the

individual souls. The m¢m¡msak¡ thinkers regard the self as distinct

from the body, the senses and the understanding. They adopt the

theory of plurality of selves, to account for the varieties of


138

experiences.6

Kumarila says the soul is different from the body, which is

eternal and omnipresent. The ¡tman is consciousness itself though

the souls are many.7

Concept of Manas or Mind

Bhattas consider manas as the tenth substance. It is an

instrument to provide joy, sorrow etc., to ¡tman. Bhattas consider

it as all - pervasive. It need not move to be in contact with ¡tman or

senses. It functions within the body as is the case with ¡tman. It is

all pervasive because it has no touch so it has no limit. It is not

produced by anyother. So it is eternal. Manas cannot be equated

with other pervasive objects since it is an instrument for the cognition

of these.

Concept of Svarga

The nature of Svarga is discussed in Svargak¡m¡dhikaraam.

Jaimini and áabara do not seem to be particular in identifying Svarga

with another world. They use the word pr¢ti to express the meaning


139

svarga.

For instance, ‘candanam svargaÅ,’ sandle wood paste is heaven,

“Kau¿ey¡ni svargah” means the silk garment is heaven, and so on.

However áabara cautions that these are not always delightful, nor

are there delightful to all. Therefore the word svarga should be

taken in sence of the dight that is not mized with even a iota of

sorrow.

The concept of Svarga is introduced to induse the undertaking

of sacrifices. The concept of Svarga has psychological, ethical and

spiritual dimensions. It is a complex concept. Such complex

concepts when put into concrete situations take a concrete form in

the context of a particular cultural tradition. In the context of Indian

cultural tradition it has acquired the form of another word. ie., heaven

However Jaimini and á¡bara have not given much importance to

this concrete form.

This is clear from their remakrs in Svargak¡m¡dhikara a.

á¡bara remarks since the svarga in the sence of other world is not

observable it has to be envisaged by arth¡patti. Since the delight


140

unmixed with sorrow is stated to be the result of the sacrifice, and

since, such delight cannot be realized in this world, the other world,

ie svarga has to be envisaged. However even then, it will only be a

means of svarga. But not svarga in its primary sense, viz, delight

The vedic texts such as “This is he, the performer of sacrifices,

who attains heaven thereby”, M¢m¡msak¡ concludes that heaven is

the summum bonum of human life. There is no indication in the

works of Jaimini, Kumarila and á¡bara as to whether this heaven

(Svarga) is idential with bliss or it is a place, where happiness

unalloyed with pain or grief can be enjoyed. Latter M¢m¡msakas

understood the term in the latter sense. But most of the M¢m¡msakas

maintain that heaven does not mean anything, but bliss.

Concept of MokÀa

According to Pr¡bh¡kara, liberation consists in the total

disappearance of dharma and adharma, whose operation is the cause

of rebirth. It is the absolute cessation of the body, caused by the

disappearance of all dharma and adharma.


141

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According to Kumarila, mokÀa is the state of ¡tman in itself,

free from all pain ({É®úÉÉiÉ|ÉÉ{ÉiªÉÉºlÉÉÉÉjÉÉÂ).

There is no clear indication in the M¢m¡ms¡s£tra or the

commentary of á¡bara about the possibility of emancipation (MokÀa)

of the self. According to Kumarila, ‘MokÀa’ is the supreme end of

the self.

M¢m¡msak¡s do not believe in the absolute dissolution

(mah¡pra½aya) of this world. They say that the universe has existed

as it is from eternity.

According to M¢m¡ms¡ philosophy, work recommended by

the scriptures has been declared to be the source of all blessings. It

is through such work man can fulfils his desire and at last attain to

emanicipation, which is equivalent to the extinction of all misery

and sorrow.

M¢m¡ms¡ believes in the existence of souls as eternal spiritual

substances. According to the material world evolves out of atoms

in accordance with the law of Karman, the world comprises :


142

a) Living bodies - in which the souls are subject to the

consequences of their past deeds (bhog¡yatana).

b) The sensory and motor organs - which are the means of

enjoying or suffering from the above consequences (bhoga

- s¡dhana).

c) The objects, Which are the fruits to be enjoyed or referred

from (bhogyaviÀaya)

M¢m¡ms¡ is a combination of pluralism and realism but not

empiricism. It believes in the non-empirical vedic source of

knowledge which is regarded as even more authoritative than the

testimony of the senses.9 It is non empirical also because it believes

as real potential energy, unseen moral principle heaven, hell etc.

which the senses cannot comprehend.

According to M¢m¡ms¡ of the early phase, the highest good to

be aimed at was the attainment of heaven where the soul can enjoy

perfect bliss absolutely free from the touch of pain. When M¢m¡ms¡

pronounces the direction “¿vargak¡mo yejeta” (one should perfom

the sacrifices with the desire of getting acers to heaven) it clearly

indicates that heaven is the ultimate end of rituals.


143

Gradually like the followers of other systems M¢m¡msakas

also come to consider the liberation from the bondage of flesh.

(ni¿reyasa). When a person realises the hollowness of the wordly

pleasure, mixed with pain he ceases from action with desire tries to

controll his passions, and takes to the knowledge of the self. After

leading a life of disinterested action, coupled with the knowledge

of the self, he dies never to be born again. Thus he is liberated from

the suffering that rebirths ential, the letters of his soul, caused by

the body, including the senses, are snapped. The liberated soul is

unconcious. It is in its own pristine state (sv¡rtha) in which there is

absolute cessation of all painful experience.10

Concept of Dharma

M¢m¡ms¡ is primarily concerned with Dharma, the super

structure of the philosophical theories. It is not the ordinary morality.

The ordinary moral values are included in ‘Artha’ and ‘K¡ma.’

Which are distinguished from dharma.

Dharma is something transcendental and is concerned with

the individual’s good in the life beyond. It’s aim is the attainment


144

of Heaven and hence it can’t be known through ordinary empirical

means, not even by mystic intution. The Veda alone can tell what is

‘dharma’ and what is ‘adharma,’ ie, what action leads to heaven

and what to hell. Thus dharma comprises religious duties, viz,

‘Nityakarmas which are to be performed daily and

‘Naimittikakarm¡s which are to be performed on special occation.

There are also ‘K¡myakarmas or optional duties which are to be

performed by those desirers of particular results. ‘PratiÀidhakarm¡s

are those actions which are prohibited by the Veda, for example

injury to animals though killing an animal in a sacrifice is enjoined,

which may create the impression that M¢m¡ms¡ prescribed a dual

system of morality, one set of rules for ordinary condact and

different set for religious purpose.

The central theme of M¢m¡ms¡ is stated in the opening verse :

Now is the eunquiry of duty (dharma).11 This is the basis for the

interpretation of entire Veda. dharma is defined in the text as:

“Duty is an object distinguished by a command.”12 The term

dharma is derived from the root ‘dhar’, ‘to hold,’ ‘maintain,’


145

‘preserve.’ It has reference therefore, to anything that holds,

supports or preserve. When used in the metaphysical sense, it means

those universal laws of nature that sustain the operation of the

universe and the manifestation of all things, that without which

nothing could be. When applied to the individual, it has reference

to that code of conduct that sustains the soul, and enables man to

fulfill his devine destiny. Here it has reference to the actions,

practices and duties that will benefit man in the world to come;

therefore it is that which produces virtue, morality or religious merit

leading towards the development of man.

All rituals and ceremonies enjoined in the Veda are said to

lead to the enlightment of the mind and the spiritual evolution of

the soul. Therefore it is necessary to understand their importance.

On the surface they appear to be fruitless injuctions, therefore,

M¢m¡ms¡ endeavours to show how they are all based on dharma

and lead to the spiritual welfare of man. M¢m¡ms¡ interpret the

Veda on the basis of eternal happiness is attained by the correct

performance of rituals founded on dharma, thereby storing up seeds

of virtue to fructify in the next life.


146

Knowledge of Dharma according to Jaimini can be obtained

only by Verbal testimony (áabda). The six means of knowledge

employed by the other systems are not infallible when dealing with

the invisible effects of ritual, therefore Jaimini accepts only áabda

or the word. To support his position he lays down five prepositions :

1. The word ‘¿abda’ has an inherent power to convey its meanings

which is eternal.

2. The knowledge derived from the word (áabda) is called

Upade¿a (teachings).

3. In the invisible realm, the word (áabda) is authoritative.

5. The word is self-sufficient and does not depend upon any other

for its meaning; otherwise it would become involved in the

fallicy of regressus and infinitum.

Jaimini refutes several objections raised against the eternal

character of the word (áabda).

1. The objector contends that the word (áabda) is a product of

verbal utterance, therefore it cannot be eternal. Jaimini asserts

that only the pronounciation is the product of effrot, the word


147

(áabda) must have existed previously, otherwise it could not

have been pronounced.

2. The word (áabda) vanishes after it pronounced, therefore it is

not eternal. Jaimini points out that only the sound disappears;

the word (áabda) still remains as does the drum after the sound

is produced.

3. The verb ‘make’ is used in connection with the word (áabda),

therefore it cannot be eternal. Jaimini explains that the verb

‘make’ has reference only to sound which manifests the word

(áabda), the word existed previously and the pronounciation

only made it audible.

4. Since the word áabda is heard simultaneously by several people

standing at an equal distance, there must be many sound and

not one; thereofre it is not eternal. Jaimini contends there is

only one sound as there is only one sun, even though seen by

many people, therefore it is eternal.

5. The word (áabda) undergoes modifications, therefore it cannot

be eternal. Jaimini answers that changes of letters are not


148

modifications of the word (áabda) they are new words and the

original word still exists.

6. When several people utter a sound, there is an increase in

volume, therefore it is not eternal. Jaimini argues that the word

never increases, only the sound which manifests the word

increases. Therefore the word is eternal.

After establishing the eternal character of the word (áabda)

Jaimini proceeds to show that the use of words in the sentence of

the Vedas have a meaning just as they have in the oridnary language.

then he defends the devine origin of the Veda.

The method of interpretation of Vedic texts used by Jaimini is

best shown by an outline of the terms used at random throughout

the text. For this the contents of Vedas are classified under five

heads:

1. Vidhi (injunctions)

2. Mantra (hymns)

3. N¡madheya (names)

4. NiÀedha (Prohibitions)

5. Arthav¡da (explanatory passages)


149

I. Vidhi - Vidhi is divivded as,

(a). Utpattividhi :- lays down a command with certain object,

thereby creating a desire.

(b). Viniyogavidhi : - lays down the details of a sacrifice. Six

accompaniments for the interpretation of the procedure enjoyed by

the texts.

A. áruti - Primary sense of a word or a collection of words, not

depending upon any other word for its meaning.

1. Vidh¡tri - Indicated by the verb from-lin

2. Viniyotri - On hearing which one immediately sees the

connection of the subsidiary and the principal.

a. Vibh¡trir£pa :- indicated by an affix of a declension.

b. Ek¡bhidh¡nar£pa :- denoted by one word.

c. Ekap¡dar£pa :- indicated by one p¡da or sentence.

3. Abhid¡tri :- indicates the material used in the sacrifice.

B. Liga - The secondary sense of a word inferred from another

word or collection of words.


150

C. V¡kya : - When the meaning of a word or collection of words

is indicated by the sentence in which it is used.

D. Prakaraa :- when the meaning of a sentence or a clause depends

upon the centre in which it is used.

1. Mah¡prakaraa - when the context relates to the rewards of

the principal part of the sacrifice

2. Av¡ntharaprakara a : When the contexts relates to the

rewards of the subordinate parts of the sacrifice.

(E) Sth¡na : when the meaning depends upon the location or word

order.

1. Pad¡r¶has¡de¿ya - equality of place in the text.

a) Yadh¡samkhyap¡¶ha : relative enumeration, arranging verbs

with verbs and subjects with subjects.

b) Sannidhip¡tÅa : regulated by the text which is near it.

2. AnuÀ¶h¡na s¡de¿ya : The quality of place according to the

performance.


151

(F) Sam¡khya : When it is necessary to break compound words up

into their component parts inorder to assertain their meaning.

Two kinds of actions enjoyed by viniyogavidhi

(a) Principal - That which produces the transcendental fruit

(Ap£rva), the invisible result to mature in another life.

(b) Subordinate : that which leads up to the completion of the

principal action. These are called Aga and are of two kinds.

1. Sidhar£pa : an accomplished thing which consists of class,

material number, and the like and has a visible effect.

2. Kriy¡r£pa : This is action.

(A). Pradh¡nakarma : The primary action.

1. Sannipatyopak¡raka : Actions enjoyed with respect to the

substance. They produce visible and invisible results.

2. Ër¡dupak¡raka : actions which are enjoyed without any

reference to any substance or divinity. It deals directlty to the

ultimate result. It is the essence of the sacrifice.


152

(B). Gu akarma - The secondary action

1. Sannipatyopak¡raka

2. Ër¡dupak¡raka.

(C). Prayogavidhi : The injuction that lays down the order of

performance of the subsidiary or minor parts. The successon or

order (Karma) is of six kinds.

1. árutikrama - the order determined by a direct text.

a) Kevalakramapara - a text indicating an order or sequence

only.

b) Tadvi¿iÀ¶a pad¡rthapara - indicating the order or sequence

in the course of lying down certain other things.

2. Arthakrama - the order dertermined by the object.

3. P¡¶hakrama - when the order of the execution of things is governed

by their order in the text. It is of two kinds :

a. Mantra text.

b. Br¡hmaa text.


153

4. Sth¡nakrama - the transportation of a thing from its proper place

by reson of being proceded by another thing which is followed by

another.

5. Mukhyakrama - the sequence of the subsidiaries or the

subordinate parts according to the order in the principal.

6. Prav¤ttikrama - the order of a procedure, which once begun,

will apply to others as well .

D. Adhik¡ravidhi - an injuction which creates a right in a person.

II. Mantra - A text which helps one to remember the procedure of a

sacrifice.

A. Ap£rva : When a text lays down a new injuction for the attainment

of an object which cannot know by any other means.

B. Niyama - the restrictive rule - when the text lays dawn one mode

of doing a thing that could be done in several ways.

C. Parisamkhya : an implied prohibition.

1. áruti - directly stated by some texts.


154

2. L¡kÀaik¢ - inferred prohibition.

III. N¡madheya - a proper noun used in defining the matter enjoyed

by it.

A. MatvarthalakÀanabhay¡t - a figure of speech in which the Mat£p

afix is used.

B. V¡kyabhedabhay¡t - the spliting up of a sentence.

C. Tatprakhya - a convensional name given to a particular sacrifice,

the description of which is given elsewhere in a seperate threatise.

D. Tadvyapade¿a - the name given to a sacrifice by reason of its

resemblance to another from which it derives its name.

IV. NiÀedha - The opposite of Vidhi. A negative precept which

prevents a man from doing a thing which is injurious or

disadvantages to him.

A. Paryud¡sa - a negative precept that applies to a person who is

undertaking to perform a sacrifice.

B. PratiÀedha - a negative precept of general applicability.


155

V. Arthav¡da - passages in praise or blame of a vidhi or NiÀedha.

A. Guav¡da - a statement made by the text that contradictory to

the existing state of the affair and means of proof.

B. Anuv¡da - A statement made by the text which is in keeping

with the existing state of facts.

C. Bh£t¡rthav¡da - A statement made which is neither against the

existing state of fact nor is it in conformity with it.

Jaimini’s defence of the utility of the Vedas will illustrate the

way he interprets the Veda. Nine objections are raised against Vedic

Mantras. The objections are ;

1. Vedic Mantras do not convey any meaning because they stand in

need of other passages to explain and support them.

Jaimini contends that all vedic words have a significance jsut

as they do in ordinary language.

2. Vedic Mantras are held useless because they depend upon a

complicated system of orthoepy and grammar inorder to understand

them.


156

Jaimini says that vedic sentences have a subject, predicate and

object which are governed by the same rules of grammar as ordinary

language.

3. Vedic Mantras are held useless bacause they teach what is

already known.

Jaimini says that the repitition of things already known is far

the purpose of Gunav¡da (new qualities), parisamkhy¡ (implied

prohibition), or arthav¡da (explanation). It is also to produce an

invisible effect (Ap£rva).

4. Vedic mantras are held useless because they describe what does

not exist. For example it has four horns, it has three feats, two

heads, it has seven hands, the bull being tied three fold, cries ; the

great had entered amongst the mortals. etc.

Jaimini explains that such descriptions are figurative speech,

technically called ‘catv¡ri s¤nga’. For example the sacrifice is

compared with a bull by reason of its producing the desired effects,

it has four horns in the form of four kinds of priests. Its three feet

are the three libations (Savana) (performed three times a day) the


157

sacrificer and his wife are the two heads, the chandas (desires) are

the seven hands. Beings tied up by the three Vedas, viz, Îg, Yaju,

S¡ma. It resounds with the roaring sound uttered by the priests.

This great god in the form of the sacrifice is amidst the mortals.

5. Vedic mantras are held to be useless because they are addressed

to inanimate objects as if they pocessed life.

Jaimini says that it is to extol the sacrifice and induce the

adherent to practice it. The principal use is technically called

‘Kaibhutikany¡ya.’

6. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they have many

self contradictory passages.

Jaimini explains that these passages are descriptive of

subordinate qualities.

7. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they are learned

without understanding their meaning.

Jaimini explains that this is no fault of the Veda which delas

only with the performance of sacrifices. It is assumed that the

meaning will be learned.


158

8. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because there are many

mantras the meaning of which cannot be known.

Jaimini says that every mantra has a meaning. Our ignorance

is due to carelessness and indolence.

9. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they mension

transitory things.

Jaimini explains that the common nouns used in the Vedas

were subsequently used by men for proper noun. For the

interpretation of substantives, Jamini mensions three principles.

1. R£·hi - a word, not compounded with any other word and with a

convensional meaning which must be learned from past authorities,

such as Paini, the most eminent of all Sanskrit grammarians. It

has the inherent power to convey a sense.

2. Yaugika - the derivative word, made up of two or three words. It

is a compound word and is used in the sense conveyed by the

component parts of which it is made.

3. Yogar£·hi - A compound word which has non convensional

sense.


159

Jaimini explains that substantives never convey the intention

of the speaker. This requires the use of a verb, which always denoted

action. He classifies action into two kinds.

1. Pradh¡na or principal - It is that action which produces an invisible

effect called Ap£rva, such as the attainment of heaven. The

recitation of mantras in prose and poetry at the performance of a

sacrifice is said to produce Ap£rva, an invisible effect, therefore

they are the principal actions.

2. Gua or subordinate - It is that action which produces visible

effects, such as the use of materials in the sacrifice, eg. kindling of

fire, preparing of cakes or the prounding and thrushing of rice.

For the application of these rules, the Veda is devided into two

broad divisions, Mantra and Br¡hmaa, which are further subdivided

I. Mantra or Samhit¡ : This is the mandatory portion of the Veda. It

is a collection of hymns that regulate, define and create a right,

impelling men to action. It has three parts.


160

1. Îgveda - a collection of verses which have a metrical arrangement

to convey meaning.

2. S¡ma Veda - a collection of verses which can be sung at the end

of a sacrifice.

3. Yajur Veda - is in prose and has no metre it is of two kinds :

a. Nigada - those which are pronounced alound.

b. Up¡m¿u - those which are pronounced silently.

II. Br¡hma¡s

1. Hetu - reason

2. Nirvacanam - explanation

3. Ninda - Censure

4. Pra¿ansa - Praise

5. Sam¿aya - doubt

6. Vidhi - Command

7. Parakriya - the action of one individual

8. Pur¡kalpa - the action of many individuals or a nation. These are

the historical discriptions of one individual or many individuals

and are indicated by the particles ‘iti,’‘¡ha’ or, ‘ha.’


161

9. Vyavadh¡raakalpana - interpretation of a sentence according to

its context.

10. Upam¡na - Comparison

The principles which are merely anttined here are used

throughout the M¢m¡ms¡s£tra in the interpretation of the many

sacrifices that are enjoined for the benefit of man.

As a system of philosophy M¢m¡ms¡ school made a great

contribution to the branch of epistemology. Its theories of self

validity of knowledge, theories of error and cognisedness or

manifestedness of objects shows great philosophical insight.

Epistemology in general provides a method of metaphysical enquiry

in M¢m¡ms¡, the truth dealt with the Vedas are determined through

these epistemological notions. In view of the fact that the soul

purpose of M¢m¡ms¡ is to asertain dharma. M¢m¡ms¡ school also

deals with nature of self and God. As a philosophical system

M¢m¢ms¡ is a combination of pluralism and realism.


162

Ritualistic Aspects

Vedas consists of Samhit¡, Br¡hmaa, Ërayaka and UpaniÀad.

Among these, Br¡hma as describe a large number of y¡g¡s. The

details required for the performance of these y¡g¡s are also given.

The Br¡hmaas of Yaj£rveda, particularly that of Taittir¢ya á¡kh¡

describe the major sacrifices. However, these are not described in

an organised way. It is difficult to distinguish in different sacrifices

the main and subordinate positions, procedures etc. Here and there

conflicting statements also seen. There are difference among

different á¡kh¡s in respect of same items and procedure. Probably

the priests reconciled these at the time of actual performance by

discussion. At the time of Br¡hmaas, the performance of sacrifices

was a living programme and priests were quite conversant with it.

In due course, árautas£tras were formulated to describe the

procedure of the performance of sacrifices. The largest number of

árautas£tras belong to the Yajurveda, which is primarily concerned

with sacrifices. Bauddh¡yana and Ëpasthambha árautas£tras of the

Yaj£rveda give a fairly good account of major sacrifices.


163

The árautas£tras approach is discriptive. These describe the

details of the sacrifice step by step, following the procedure of the

performance. However, these do not discuss the rational underlying

the introduction of certain items or procedures. These are just a

diary of peformances. In the section called Paribh¡À¡s£tras some

technical points are explained. However a full discussion and the

interpretation of the statements in the Br¡hmaas connected with

sacrifice is not found. M¢m¡ms¡ is formulated to play this role.

vÉÉæ |ÉÉÒªÉÉÉxÉä Ê½þ ÉänäùxÉ EòÉ®úhÉÉiÉxÉÉ

<ÊiÉEòiÉÇªÉiÉÉ ¦ÉÉMÉÆ ÉÒÉÉÆºÉÉ {ÉÚ®úÊªÉ¹ªÉÊiÉ**13

Vedas are the means to comprehend Dharma. M¢m¡ms¡ is an

aid to interpret Vedas.

Giving authoritative rulings on sacrificial matters such as

adhik¡ra, aga, atide¿a, £ha, b¡dha, tantra etc. and fixing the correct

procedure and nature of sacrifices, (Karmabbheda and Karma)

P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ is also called Karmam¢m¡ms¡.

P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ regarded Veda as eternal and authorless and

of infallible authority. It is essentially a book of ritual, dealing with


164

commandments prescribing injuctions or prohibitions. Greatest

impotance is attached to the Br¡hmaa portion of the Veda to which

both the ‘Mantr¡s’ and ‘UpaniÀads’ are subordinated. The aim of

the M¢m¡ms¡ is to supply the principles according to which the

vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical

justification for the views contained therein. The work of finding

the principles for the right interpretation of the vedic texts was

undertaken by the Brahmaas themselves and mainly by the árauta

s£tr¡s. M¢m¡ms¡ continues this work, But it would have been best,

only a commentary on Vedic rituals. The main thing which entitle

it to the rank of a philosophical system is its keen desire to provide

philosophical justification for the Vedic views and to replace the

earlier ideal of the attaintment of heaven (svarga) by the ideal of

obtaining liberation (apavarga). It undertakes a detailed investigation

on the nature and validity of knowledge and into the various means

which produce valid knowledge and also into other metaphysical

problems.

Dharma is the subject of inquiry in M¢m¡ms¡. Jaimini defines

dharma as a command or injunction which implies men to action.14


165

It is the supreme duty, ‘the ought’, the ‘categorical imperative’.

‘Artha’ and ‘K¡ma’ which deal with ordinary common morality

are learnt by wordly intercourse. But Dharma and MokÀa which

deal with true spirituality are revealed only by the Veda. Dharma is

supra sensible and consists in the commands of Veda. Action is the

final import of the Veda which commands us to do certain acts and

refrain from doing certain other. The authoritativeness of the Veda

is supported by social consciousness as well as by individual

conscience. ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ deal with happiness and pain

to be enjoyed or suffered in the life beyond. Actions perfomed here

produced an unseen potency (ap£rva) in the soul of the agent which

yeilds fruits when obstructions are removed and time becomes ripe

for its frutification. The Ap£rva is the link between the act and its

fruit. It is the causal potency (áakti) in the act which leads to its

fruitification. Actions are first devided in to three kinds :- Obligatory

- which must be performed for their violation results in sin, though

their performance leads to no merit, Optional - which may or

maynot be performed. Their performance leads to merit, though

their nonperformace does not leads to sin, Prohibited - which must


166

not be perfrmed. Their performace leads to sin though their non

performance does not leads to merit.

According to m¢m¡msakas dharma is identical with yajµa or

sacrifices.15 Types of sacrifices can be classified into five groups.

Viz; Nitya (compulsory) Naimittika (occassional), K¡mya

(performed for fulfilling certain material desires or personal

advantages), praya¿citta (expiatory) and NiÀidha (prohibitted).

Nitya Sacrifices

As the term indicates, Nitya are to be performed regularly.

They are compulsory and not optional. They do not depend upon

any desire of the sacrificer for any personal gain. On the other

hand, if one does not perform the Nitya sacrifices, he incurs sin.

K¡mya Sacrifices

K¡mya Sacrifices are performed to fulfil some personal desires

of man. The sacrificer should proceed to offer K¡mya sacrifices

only if he is able to perform it with all its auxilary rites, because

Kamya sacrifices are not obligatory ie, compulsory. The performance


167

of sacrifices referring to their fruits, depend on the desire of the

sacrifices.16 á¡bara says ºÉRÂóMÉÉiÉÂ Ê½þ ¡ò±ÉÆ ÉÚªÉiÉä, xÉ EäòÉ±ÉÉiÉÂ ie, the fruit has

been delcared to follow from the principal rite performed with all

its auxilaries and not from the principal rite only.

P¡rthasarathi Mi¿ra in his Ny¡yaratnam¡la having first refuted

the Gurumata and establishes his own siddanta with respect to Nitya

and K¡mya sacrifices.

ÊxÉÊÉkÉÉÉhÉÉxÉÂ ÊxÉiªÉÆ ªÉlÉÉ¶ÉÊHò |ÉªÉÖVªÉiÉä*

EòÉªÉÆ SÉ iÉnù +¦ÉÉÉäxÉ ÊxÉÊJÉ±ÉÉRÂóMÉºÉÉÎxÉiÉÉÂ**17

Naimittika - Occassional Sacrifices

Naimittika sacrifices are held at par with Nitya sacrifices, in

the sense that they are not performed with reference to fulfilling

any personal desire but when occasions occur they are to be

performed compulsory. For example : Taittir¢ya samhit¡ 2.2.2.

enjoins. ªÉºªÉ MÉÞ½þÉxÉÂ nù½þÊiÉ - +MxÉªÉä IÉÉÉiÉä {ÉÖ®úÉäb÷É¶ÉÆ +¹]õÉEò{ÉÉ±ÉÆ ÊxÉÉÇ{ÉäiÉÂ*18 ie. if the

sacrificers house catches fire, he should offer a cake baked on eight

potsherds to ‘kÀ¡mavat agni.’


168

Pr¡ya¿citta sacrifices

According to Jaimini and á¡bara the expiations are of two

kinds. Some are enjoined for mending the lapses and others are

prescribed as a part of the sacrificial performances to be performed

under certain contigencies. (|ÉÉªÉÎ¶SÉkÉÉÊxÉ Êuù-|ÉEòÉ®úÉÊhÉ** EòÉÊxÉÊSÉiÉÂ ÉèMÉÖhÉºªÉ

|ÉÉÉnùÉnÂù +É{ÉÊiÉiÉºªÉ ºÉÉÉvÉÉxÉÉlÉÉÇÊxÉ* EòÉÊxÉÊSÉiÉÂ ÊxÉÊÉkÉä EòÉÉÈMÉÉÊxÉ -)19

There are several expiations laid down to correct the same

discrepancy One should optionally undergo one of the several

expiations.20

Another kind of expiation is not meant to mend the lapses.

Such are not laid dawn for omission of what is enjoined or for

commission of what is forbidden. For example if the sun rises before

the sacrificer has performed the Agnihotra, he should offer the

cooked rise to Mitra, also a cake backed on potshred to Surya. The

sacrificer and his wife should add fuel to fire and restrain their

speech and observe fast during the day. In this case the sacrificer

has not omitted what is enjoined or committed what is forbidden.

There is nothing to be mended here. The vedic texts here describes


169

some rites when the contigency of the sunrise occures before

Agnihotra. EäòÉ±ÉÆ +¦ªÉÖnùªÉä ÊxÉÊÉkÉä EòÉÇ ÊÉvÉÒªÉiÉä*21 In such cases all the

expiations should be undergone by the sacrificer together.22

NiÀiddha Sacrifices

The Vedas have pointed out such sacrifices, which if performed,

lead to hell. The vedic sentence ¶ªÉäxÉäxÉ +Ê¦ÉSÉ®úxÉÂ ªÉVÉäiÉ describes the

áyena sacrifice is for him who desires to destroy the enemies by

means of ¡bhic¡ra, the black magic. The distruction leads the

sacrificer to hell. Therefore it is prohibitted. Himsa is a cause for

leading the sacrificer to hell.

It may be argued that a goat killing in soma or pa¿u sacrifices.

If killing leads to hell, these sacrifices are also lead him to hell and

consequently they be regarded as prohibitted. The answer is, killing

of pa¿u in Soma or nirudhapa¿ubandha is the aga of that sacrifice.

Therefore killing does not have the fruit seperate from the soma or

pa¿u sacrifices. Which is Svarga. (ªÉtÊ{É ¶ªÉäxÉºªÉ ¶ÉjÉÖÉvÉ& ¡ò±ÉÆ xÉ xÉ®úEò& iÉlÉÉÊ{É

iÉºªÉ ÉvÉºªÉ xÉ®úEò½äþiÉÖiÉÉiÉÂ ÉvÉuùÉ®úÉ ¶ªÉäxÉ& +xÉlÉÇÇ&* xÉ SÉ BÉÆ +ÎMxÉ¹ÉÉäÉÒªÉ {É¶ÉÖË½þºÉÉªÉÉ& +Ê{É

ÉvÉiÉäxÉ xÉ®úEò½äþiÉÖiÉÆ ºªÉÉiÉÂ <ÊiÉ ¶ÉRÂóEòxÉÒªÉÉÂ* iÉºªÉÉ& EÞòiÉÉRÂóMÉiÉäxÉ GòiÉÖ¡ò±ÉªÉÊiÉ®äúEäòxÉ


170

¡ò±ÉÉxiÉ®úÉ¦ÉÉiÉÂ**23 So sacrifices come under ¡bhic¡ra are niÀidha

according to M¢m¡msakas.

Obligatory actions are of two kinds; those which must be

performed daily -‘nitya’- like daily prayers (sandhy¡vandana) and

which must be performed on specific occassions (naimittika).

Optional actions are called K¡myakarmas and their performance

lead to merit. For example he who wants to go heaven should

perform centain sacrifices (‘Svargak¡mo yajeta’). Prohibitted actions

are called ‘pratiÀidham’ their performance incurs sin and leads to

hell. Then, there are expiatery acts (Pr¡ya¿citta) which are

performed inorder to ward off or atleast mitigate the evil effect of

the performed prohibitted actions.

The earlier M¢m¡msak¡ believed only in ‘Dharma’ not in

‘MokÀa’ and their ideal was the attainment of heaven (Svarga),

But later M¢m¡msak¡s believe in ‘MokÀa’ and substitute the ideal

of heaven by that of liberation (apavarga). Prabhakara and Kumarila

both believe that the good of human life is liberation, though both

conceive it in a negative manner like the Ny¡ya - Vai¿eÀika. The

soul is chained to ‘sams¡ra’ on account of its association with the


171

body, the senses, the mind and the understanding. Through this

association the soul becomes a knower, an enjoyer and an agent.

This association is due to karma which is the couse of the bondage.

When the cause is removed, the effect also ceases to exist. So the

obstention from karma automatically leads to the dissolution of the

bondage of the soul with the body, senses, the mind.etc. and

consequently the return of the soul to its pure nature as a substance

rid of all qualities and modes including consciousness and bliss

also. It is a state of feedom from all sorts of pain, desire and

consciousness, though Kumarila adds that the soul is here

characterized by potential consciousness. Prabhakara and Kumarila

both admit that obstention from Karma does not mean obstention

from all karmas, but obsention from the optional (EòÉªÉ) and the

prohibited (|ÉÊiÉÊ¹ÉvÉ) kinds of karma, only which leads to demerit and

to hell. The seeker of the liberation has to rise above both merit and

demerit, above both heaven and hell. But even he should perform

the obligatory (nitya and Naimitika) actions enjoyed by the Veda.

Pr¡bh¡kara believes in ‘duty for duty sake’. These actions must be

performed in an absolutely detached manner without any


172

consideration of reward simply becasuse they are the commands of

the Vedas. Kumarila believes in psychological hedonism and makes

the performance of these actions, a means to realise the ultimate

end, ie liberation by overcoming past sins and by avoiding future

sins which would otherwise surely result from their neglect.

Pr¡bh¡kara believes in the utter supremacy of an action, though he

admites knowledge also as a means of liberation. Kumarila believes

in “Jµ¡na-karma - samucchayav¡da”, or in a harmonious

combination of knowledge and action as a means to liberation.

In ‘M¢m¡ms¡dar¿ana’, a discussion occurs on the relative

importance of the diety, the material offered to the diety and the

actual action of offering. It is from the ritual action that ap£rva

originates, that causes the required result. So it is ap£rva that

stimulates ritual action.24 In the view of M¢m¡msak¡s the ritual

action assumed utmost importance while all the ideas regarding

the dieties came to be considered unimportant or of no use from the

point of view of the result that is to be obtained.

In the view of M¢m¡msak¡s, the importance of vedic deities

got diminished to such a level, that they were considered having


173

only a verbal existence. They have the words or names as their

form (áabdar£pa). A passage of Taittir¢ya Ërayaka seems to imply

such an idea according to which all vedic deities live in a Br¡hmaa

who is well-versed in Vedas.25 In refuting the verbal form of Vedic

deities, Sankaracharya says that such a view cannot be accepted

because the word is different from its sense in all cases.26 It is to be

noted that one of the M¢m¡msak¡’s objections to maintaining

physical bodies of the deities is that if they had physical bodies

they would not to be able to present in the sacrifices performed at

different places at the same time.27 If they had verbal form they

would be able to be present at the time of invocation at different

places. Here, M¢m¡msak¡s seem to conceive the deities as abstract

concepts. The concept of point in geometry cannot be understood

without the term point or some other such term. If a point is denoted

by a letter P, it can be imagined anywhere in the space. In the same

way if the deities are conceived as abstract concepts they can be

made present anywhere at any time. Thus m¢m¡msak¡s maintained

such a view regarding deities to keep the sacrificial tradition alive,

at a time when the vedic deities lost their popularity. Later, however,


174

the sacrificer came to be viewed as a form of worship of the supreme

God. S¡yaa begins his commentary on Îgveda saying that it is the

supreme God who is worshipped with all the sacrifices.

Vedas and vedic rituals embodied in them are viewed

divergently from very ancient times. M¢m¡msak¡s held that Vedas

are eternal. According to them the relation between the word and

its sense is ‘autpattikam’. ‘Utpatti’ is interpreted to mean Bh¡va.

The relation between the word and sense was not establised, after

the word and sense originated.28 The sense is the form of the object

denoted by the word. The sense of the word cow is the form of the

cow.29

This can be explained thus : after seeing several cows the

generalised idea of cow comes to the mind. As soon as such an idea

develops the word ‘GauÅ’ also comes to the mind and hence their

relationship orginates with the idea and the word denoting it. The

cowness or the form of cow is an absract one, just like a three

dimensional geometric form. The form of cow is connected only

with the space and as such it can be said eternal. Hearing the word


175

‘cow’, the idea of all the cows in general comes to the mind and

hence the sense of the word is the form. So, the word also should be

eternal in the sense, otherwise the connection between the word

and the sense would not be eternal. Therefore m¢m¡msakas hold

that ¿abda revealed by sound is also eternal.30

According to K.T. Pandurangi sacrifice is a socio-religious

institution in Vedic culture. It represents the world view envisaged

by P£rva M¢m¡ms¡.31 According to P£rva M¢m¡ms¡; (i)The world

is neither created not will it be destroyed. It is ever present. (ii) the

language, particularly the Vedic language, has no beginning nor

end. (iii) For sacrificial activity also no beginnig can be traced in

historical terms. In the first hymn of Îgveda, Agni is described as

Rtvic and Hota. Prayers were offered to him by sages in the past

and will be offered by the sages in future.

“+ÎMxÉ& {ÉÚÉæÌ¦É& @ñÊ¹ÉÊ¦É& <Çt& xÉÚiÉxÉè& =iÉ*”32

In PuruÀas£kta it is stated that, “ªÉYÉäxÉ ªÉYÉÆ +ªÉVÉxiÉ näùÉ& iÉÉÊxÉ vÉÉÉÇÊxÉ

|ÉlÉÉÉÊxÉ +ÉºÉxÉÂ*”33


176

The deities performed the sacrifices, these were the earliest

sacrifices. The G¢ta also informs us,

“ ºÉ½þ& ªÉYÉ& |ÉVÉÉ& ºÉÞ¹]ÂõÉÉ*

{ÉÖ®úÉäÉÉSÉ |ÉVÉÉ{ÉÊiÉ&**”34

From this it is clear that sacrificial acitivity was ever present.

These were not ever present in an isolated way. Rather they made

an impact on one another.

In the context of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡, dharma is primarily a

sacrificial activity. This is elevated on two grounds. (i) these are

enjoined by vedic injuction (2) these lead to trans-emperical results.

Jaimini says, sacrificial activities lead to welfare.35 It leads to

the welfare of men and also the welfare of all others, including the

deities.

In G¢ta,

näùÉÉxÉÂ ¦ÉÉÉªÉiÉxÉäxÉ iÉä näùÉÉ ¦ÉÉªÉxiÉÖ É&

{É®úº{É®Æú ¦ÉÉÉªÉxiÉ& ÉäªÉ& {É®úÉÉÉ{ºªÉxiÉ*36 explains the role of sacrifice in

the form of Yajµ¡cakra.


177

“ +zÉÉnÂù¦ÉÉÎxiÉ ¦ÉÚiÉÉÊxÉ {ÉVÉÇxªÉÉnùzÉ& ºÉlÉÉ&

ªÉYÉÉiÉÂ ¦ÉÉÊiÉ {ÉVÉÇxªÉÉä ªÉYÉ& EòÉÇºÉÉÖnÂù¦ÉÉ&*” 37 (3-15)

Since the sacrifical activity leads to the welfare of all it has to

be carried on forever, generation after generation.

I¿¡v¡syopaniÀad advices to undertake the activities all along

the life.

“EÖòÉÇzÉäÉä& EòÉÉÇÊhÉ ÊVÉVÉÒÊÉ¶ÉäiÉÂ ¶ÉiÉÆ ºÉÉ&*”

Eligibility to perform Sacrifices

The eligibility for performing the sacrifice is briefly stated as,

+ÉlÉÔ ºÉÉlÉÉæ ÊÉuùÉxÉÂ +ÊvÉÊGòªÉiÉä*

ie, a person who desires to obtain the result of the sacrifice,

who has the necessary resources, and the knowledge is eligible to

perform the sacrifice. Whether the person have defective senses

such as blind, deaf or dum are not eligible to perform sacrifices

because there are certain items in the sacrifices that have to be

performed utilizing these senses.


178

Eligibility of Women

Aiti¿¡yana, an early M¢m¡msak¡, argues that the expression

Svargak¡maÅ is in masculine gender. Therefore it seems the

intention is to convey that only men are eligible to perform

sacrifices.

Another argument deny the eligibility of women is the lack of

resources with them. The sacrifices requires various kinds of grain,

ghee etc. The woman does not own these. Infact she herself purchase

at the time of her marriage by offering to her father the cows, chariot

etc.

These arguments are not sufficient to deny eligibility of women

for sacrifice. At the time of marriage bride and groom enter into a

kind of partnership in respect of persuing all ideals of life. The

desire is common to both male and female, hence both are eligible.

If the sacrifice is performed seperately according the singular word

‘yajeta’, certain other items which have to be alone by both will be

wrong. So if a sacrifice is performed, seperately the result will be

incomplete.38


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Eligibility of á£dra

Jaimin¢yas£tras and á¡bara bh¡Àya strongly argued the right

of á£dras for performing the sacrifices, though it is ultimately not

granted. (i) Mere interest in obtaining the result of the sacrifice

will not entittle and to undertake it, and the knowledge of Veda is

not found in á£dras. (2) Studying Veda without Upanayana is a

wrong procedure. Such study and recetition of hymns at the sacrifice

without proper study will not obtain the result of the sacrifice.39

The institution of sacrifice is a programme of achieving welfare

not only for the individual but for the whole society. It is for the

welfare of entire world consisting of all living beings and the nature

around. It is also a sacred programme. Therefore it has to be executed

with competent persons with necessary descriptive. The persons

are means for the programme. The programmes are not meant for

them. In view of this, if any individual or group of persons are

denied participation in the programme, the intention is to accomplish

but not to deny the opportunity to participate to that of person or

group of persons. The programme is more important than the

persons.40


180

The concept of perfection of socio-religious programmes and

procedure go on changing, suitable social changes also go on. It can

be understand their validity in the context in which they are practised

and preached. In due course the change take place. Whether one

like it or not.

Sacrificial Tradition in Kerala

Vedic tradition became poluar in South India with the advent

of Aryans. This had begin in the first centuary of Christian Era. By

the 6th and 7th century many institutions were established to impart

Vedic education. Centres of learning called ‘sal¡s’ were started

connected with temples. The ‘sal¡s’ were institutions where the

Brahmin youth were taught a variety of subjects including the

Vedas. In course of time the teaching of Veda got localized in the

Brahmaswam Madhams at Trissur and Tirunavaya.

According to legend, Mezhathol Agnihotri is believed to have

conducted exactly nintynine y¡g¡s, but the jelous of Indra prevented

him from doing the 100th one becasue, then he would have displaced


181

Indra. It is also believed that expensive yagas like ‘A¿vamedham’

had been performed in Kerala.41 Friz Stall provided a list of about

80 Nambuthiri families who had conducted such yagas during the

last century. Of the various types of such affairs, AgniÀtomam,

Agny¡dh¡nam, Athir¡tram, were most frequently done in Kerala.

The word ‘yaga’ among the Namboothiri usually cannotes the

‘AgniÀtomam’. The person who had conducted it was known as

‘Somayaji’, colloquially named ‘Chomathiri’, ‘Chemathiri’,

‘Chemari’ etc. The seond was known as Ëdh¡nam and the one who

had conducted it was known as ‘Atithiri’ / ‘at¢ri’. The third was

known as ‘Agni’ and the one who conducted it was ‘Agnihotr¢’ /

‘Akkithiri’. As a mark of respect the suffix ‘p¡du’ would be added

to their titles.

Significantly it was laid down that such performances should

be done only between the Korapuzha in the North and the Periyar

in the South within Kerala. It is reported that the then Travancore

Raja, inorder to aquire the merit of having been RakÀ¡puruÀa

(patron) of the ‘yaga’ had to have it conducted in Aluva, on the


182

Northern banks of Periyar, when the area became part of his

territories. He induced the Nambutiries to also by gifting to them

extensive landed properties.

The elaborate ritual performances of the Vedic period and the

supreme importance attached to them in Vedic civilization demand

an explanation or at least an interpretaion. In the earliest Vedic

literature itself rituals along with meters and chants are depicted as

instrumets used by gods and demons to fight and conqure each other,

and sametimes to create even when the aims are not explicit Gods

and demons are frequently described as engaged in rituals.

The recitations that accompany the rites often express specific

desires: for health, strength, sons, victory, heaven and immortality.

The list of wishes and desires is not so different from that of modern

man. It is not exclusively spiritual.

The árautas£tras of the late Vedic period offer several

definitions of rituals. The one that is often quoted, characterizes it

as comprising three things : ‘Dravya’ - the sustance (used in

oblations); ‘Devat¡’ - the deity (to which oblations are offered and


183

‘Ty¡ga’- renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts). The ‘Tyaga’

is a formula pronounced by the ‘yajam¡na’ or patron at the

culmination of each act of oblation. When the priest make oblations

into the fire for one of the gods, eg: -Agni the yajam¡na says. “This

is for Agni, not for me” (‘+MxÉªÉä <nÆù xÉ ÉÉ’). The reason for performing

a specific ritual is stated to be the disire for particular fruit or

effect.42 But this effect renounced whenever yajam¡na utters his

‘ty¡ga’ formula of renunciation. So the effect is not obtained. But

the m¢m¡ms¡ concluded, quite logically that the effect of ritual

activity is temporarily unseen. It will became apparent only later.

for example after death.

There are three kinds of sacrifices, (i) ‘P¡ka Yajµ¡s’ (ii) ‘Havir

Yajµas’ (iii) ‘Somayaga”. P¡ka yajµas are Grhya rites. Other two

are árauta rites.

Seven Havir Yajµas : - agny¡dheya, Agnihotra, Dar¿apura m¡sau,

Agr¡yana, C¡turm¡sy¡ni, D¡kÀ¡ya a yajµ¡, Kunda -

payin¡mayanam. According to Baudh¡yana s£tra43 seven Yajµas :-

AgniÀtoma, AtyagniÀ¶oma, Ukthya, âo·a¿i, V¡japeya, Ëptary¡ma

and Athir¡tra.


184

In Soma sacrifice, ‘soma’ is pressed and its juise is offered to

the deities, during only one day of the sacrifice. Hence, these soma

sacrifices are caled ‘Ek¡has’ ie, having the duration of one day.

Agnihotram : The sacrifice performed in fire (agni). Here the three

Agnis, G¡rhapatyan, Ëhavan¢ya and Anv¡h¡rya (DakÀi agni) are

keeps firing and perform the Ëhuti with milk or curd with chanting

of mantras. There must not have any discontinuation in the

performance, if so from the production of the fire, the sacrifice

have to restart. This y¡ga is performed for the reception of favours

and refusion of dislikes. The one who performed Agnihotra is

known as ‘Agnihotri’. There are eight families of agnihotris -

Poylam, Pukkizhi, Porandaykkadu, Tottupuram, Amayattur, Bhatti,

Cherumukku, N¡r¡ya a mangalam. The most famous Agnihotri is

Mezhathol Agnihotri.

Somayagam :- The offering is somarasa. The aim is eternity

(‘am¤tatvam’). Generally this known as JyotiÀtomam. One who

prepare the Agni for yaga known as ‘Atittiri’, one who performed

Somay¡ga is known as ‘somay¡ji’, One who performed Athir¡tra


185

is known as ‘Akkithiri’ - they have to perform Agnihotra daily till

their death.

In 1984, there performed a Somay¡ga at Thiruvananthapuram.

Then the yajam¡na is Amettur Parame¿varan Somay¡ji. With the

past 50 years seven persons perform ¡dh¡na and became atithiri.

Kaimukku Raman Atithiri was one among them. Among the eleven

somay¡jis Kavapram¡rathu Sankaranarayanan Somay¡ji and

Cherumukku Cheriyavallabhan Somayaji are famous. Daily

performer is áankaranaraya a Namboothirippadu.

It take one day for ¡dh¡nam; for somay¡ga, six days and for

Athir¡tra twelve days.

Kerala has a living sacrificial tradition. The ritualists are highly

respected in the society. In Kerala, at present, four Akkittars

(Agnicits) are there.

Nellikk¡¶¶il N¢lakanthan Akkithar : born in 1905. He performed

AgniÀtoma in 1941 and Atiratra with Agnicayana in 1956. He started

his sacrificial performance at the age of seventeeth or eighteenth.


186

He was well versed in S¡man Chanting. He has participated four

Atiratras and twenty AgniÀtomas. He performed daily Agnihotra

till 1972.

Cerumukku Vasudevan Akkittar : At the age of fourteen he

completed his vedic study and started studying the ritual procedures.

His father Sri Vallabhan Somayaji also was a great sacrificer. At

the age of twenty nine he acted as Adhvaryu in an AgniÀ¶oma. He

performed AgniÀ¶oma in 1954 and Atir¡tra with Agnicayana in

1955. He participated in Atir¡tra at Nellikk¡¶¶ family in 1956. He

did Hautra in an AgniÀ¶oma till 1976.

Puttillat Ravi Akkittar : He is well-versed in Ja¶a and Ratna. He

was awarded by Olappama aaward for Veda pandita. He has

done Ëdhvaryava and Hautra in several sacrifices. He performed

daily Agnihotra.

Taikk¡¶¶ N¢laka tÅan Namboothiri : He was born in 1927.

After completion of his Îgvedic study he studied different types of

rituals and manuals of the rituals. He did Ëdhvaryava in 1955. He

participated in fourteen AgniÀ¶omas as Vaidika.


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C.P. Kuberan Namboothiri : He was born in a family of vedic

scholars near Talipparamba in Kannur district. He studied Y¡jurveda

recitation, Sanskrit and á¡stra like Tarka and Vy¡karana. He

performed many Ottu¶¶us in Malabar.

The M¢m¡msak¡s have attempted to answer the question how

a remote result, the attainment of heaven, is obtained by an action

such as a sacrifice, which belongs to and ceases in the present.

Sacrifice is the means to the result, heaven. A sacrifice is of the

nature of an action which is very soon lost. Hence the instrumentality

of the sacrifice to the fruit which is to take place at a distant time is

hardly possible. To establish this instrumentality, which is

propounded by áruthi, between sacrifice and heaven, an invisible

potency is admitted. This issues from the sacrifice and endures till

the fruit is generated and resides in the soul of the character. This

invisible potency is called Ap£rva. It ceases on producing the result.

It is a power in the sacrifice. Although a nature of potency inhering

in the sacrifice, it is presumable on account of the result. And is

presumed as existing in the locus of where the result is produced,

ie, in the soul of the sacrificer. If this is not admitted, the sacrifice


188

can have no causal connection with their result. In the absense of

such a link, men of prudence would have no disposition to perform

them. In such a situation Vedas, as a whole would have no use or

purpose. And they would be open to objections of fraudulance etc.

To avoid such objections Ap£rva must needs to be admitted.

Linguistic Aspects

P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ is called ‘V¡kya¿¡str¡’ because, it evolves

the rules of interpretation or nay¡s for interpretation of Vedic

passages.

The word in sanskrit that comes closet to this general sense is

‘M¢m¡ms¡’ which literally means ‘investigation’ or ‘inquiry.’ The

word ‘exegesis’ is also be taken as a near equivalent. The

M¢m¡msakas were a school of exegets who were concerned with

the correct determination of the meaning of the Vedic texts and

with the settlement of problematic passages in them. Their method

included not only the fixing of the meaning of particular words,

verbs, names of sacrifices, and so forth but primarily also the larger

task of determining the import of sentences in the light of the overall


189

purpose or intent of the Vedic texts. M¢m¡ms¡ is known as the

science of sentences (v¡kya¿¡str¡), as opposed to grammar, which

is the science of words (Pada¿¡stra).

The M¢m¡ms¡ principles of interpretation were derived from

a long tradition of vedic exegesis and were codified for the first

time by Jaimini (Ca.200 BC) in his book of aphorism called

‘M¢m¡ms¡s£tras.’ This exegetical tradition produced what may be

called a science of interpretation with a body of rules that could be

applied to any linguistic text scriptural or non-scriptural.

According to Jaimini the three major axioms of interpretations

were (1) the autonomy of verbal meaning (ii) its impersonality (iii)

unity of meaning. The first axiom relates to the inherent capacity

of the verbal sign to convey meaning and it is independent of any

external authority or of coroboration by another source of

knowledge. The second relates to the impersonal character of verbal

knowledge and its independence of any passional author who could

give words their significative capacity, or intend their meanings.


190

The third relates to the univocity of all verbal upset and human

discourse itself would be undermined.

While the principle of unity of meaning was accepted by all

schools, opinion was sharply devided, especially between

M¢m¡msak¡s and the logicians, on the question of semantic

autonomy and impersonality and the problem of intention that they

involve.

Vedic exegetes who developed the science of interpretation

were no doubt, dogmatists who believed in the absolute authority

and infallibility of Vedic word. But their observations about the

nature of language and the procedures they set up for the

interpretation of verbal texts were seen to possess a general validity

for all types of discourse. Although they claimed a special status of

infallibility for the words of the scriptures, they admitted that the

validity ascribed to the Vedic word was in no way different from

that demanded of ordinary discourse. The language of the Vedas

was the same as that of common parlance and subject to the same

convention and canons of logic as the other; otherwise, it would


191

not even comprehend the Vedas. Jaimini declares, “but there is no

difference in the signification of vedic sentences.” Not only is the

verbal usage in the Veda the same as the ordinary usage, but the

things spoken of in it are also the same as those of worldly

discourse.44 á¡bara states that vedic usage must derive its sanction

from worldly usage; worldly usage is the only authority as far as

words and meanings are concerned.45

It is comparatively less popular system in the scholastic world,

mostly of its connection with the Vedic rituals, which are more or

less obsolate today. But one feeds that today the system of M¢m¡ms¡

should be focused at from a different angle and should be studied in

a fresh modern percepective. The reason behind this is : that

M¢m¡ms¡ has connection with Vedic rituals is a half-truth. To make

it complete one must remember that this connection is not direct

but is only through the Vedic sentences. In other words, M¢m¡ms¡

concernes itself to the vedic sentences primarily. Though the aim

of interpreting vedic sentences was to help the performance of the

rituals at one point of time, today, when the importance of rituals

has been faded down one should concentrate on the first and foremost


192

concern of M¢m¡ms¡ namely interpreting vedic sentences

meaningfully, and should study the principles of interpretation set

forth by the system. Only because these possess a great potential to

interact meaningfully with modern desciplines like discources

analyse philosophy of language etc. In short, if one study M¢m¡ms¡

today as ancient Indian science of sentence interpetation, its

contribution as such and if one try to findout what M¢m¡ms¡ has to

offer to the modern linguistics, semantics etc. On one hand and to

the fold of machine translation etc. and on the other it will certainly

yeild interesting results.

The term ‘M¢m¡ms¡’ has occured in the Taittir¢ya Samhit¡,

Ch¡ndogyopaniÀad etc. and in all these places it means : “coming

to a certain decision after thinking about all the pros and cons about

something doubtful.” Thus ‘M¢m¡ms¡ system set a goal before it.

To show that each and every sentence, each and every word ie.,

each and every syllable of the Veda is meaningful and purposeful

by interpeting the Vedas. ie., each and every vedic sentence,

meaningfully. This is the reason why M¢m¡ms¡ is basically a

science of sentence interpretation and bears the names like,


193

V¡kya¿¡stra, quite significantly. In short the object of M¢m¡ms¡

is vedic sentences and the main aim of the system is to systematize

all the vedic sentences in a proper manner and to establish the

validity of the Vedas beyond all possible doubts.

Both these tasks are stupendous which Jaimini, the s£trak¡ra

accepted and he made out some principles of interpreting vedic

sentences and wrote them down in a ‘s£tra’ form. He devided the

vedic sentences into five types : Vidhi, Mantra, N¡madheya,

NiÀedha and Arthav¡da on one hand and set forth the main

presupposition of M¢m¡ms¡ that the Veda is meant for including

the man into some action or the other. Action or activity is main

and everything else comes in the context of an activity only as

subordinate to it. These two and all principles of sentence

interpretation aim at systematizing the vedic sentences and

interpreting them.

To establish the authority if the Veda beyond all possible doubt

M¢m¡ms¡ determined and declared its theory of language. It

discussed its philosophy of language in various contexts.


194

If one wants to put the M¢m¡ms¡ theory of language in just

one sentence, he may say, language is a beginningless phenomenon.

Words, their meanings, the relation between the two all are eternal.

Jaimini wrote an aphorism : “+Éèi{ÉÊkÉEòºiÉÖ ¶É¤nùºªÉÉlÉæxÉ ºÉ¤ÉxvÉ& iÉºªÉ

YÉÉxÉÉÂ ={Énäù¶É& +ªÉÊiÉ®äúEò¶SÉ +lÉÇ +xÉÖ{É±É¤vÉ iÉiÉÂ |ÉÉÉhÉÉÂ ¤ÉÉnù®úÉªÉhÉºªÉ +xÉ{ÉäIÉiÉÉiÉÂ*”

While commenting upon this, the commentator á¡barasv¡min

specified, “+{ÉÉèû¹ÉäªÉ& ¶É¤nùºªÉ +lÉæxÉ ºÉ¤ÉxvÉ&” The relation between word

and meaning is not created by any human being.

For example : “+ÎMxÉ½þÉäjÉÆ VÉÖ½ÖþªÉÉiÉÂ ºÉMÉÇEòÉÉ&” means - one who is

desirous of heaven should perform agnihotra ritual. In otherwords,

this sentence states the cause and effect relationship between

agnihotra and heaven. It says that agnihotra is the cause and heaven

is its effect.

According to M¢m¡ms¡k¡s these sentences are beginningless.

Budhists are aruged such sentences that there is no relation between

the word and meaning. According to them, there could not be the

relation of indentity then when one utters the word ‘knife,’ his

mouth should be cut and when he utters the word ‘modaka’ his


195

mouth should be full of the sweets. But this does not happen and so

there is no identity between them. Other relationship such as cause

and effect relationship or substraction - superstratum relationship

are quite impossible because word is in the mouth and the meaning

is elsewhere.

M¢m¡ms¡ answers this question as; the relationship which

subsists between two namely, and named relationship or revealer

and revealed relationship is not mentioned but the relationship

between the two according to M¢m¡ms¡k¡s is ‘bodhya-bodhaka-

bh¡va.’ The word is ‘bodhaka’ and the meaning is ‘bodhya.’ On

explaining the revealer - revealed relation M¢m¡msak¡ says, in every

case experience is proof. They say áabda is revealer of meaning

because one experience that when a word is uttered a meaning is

revealved. One understand that the word does not reveal its meaning

when it is heard for the first time only because he observe that it so

happens. As many times one requires to know that this is the name

of the particular thing or meaning he understand that after so many

times one understands that meaning from that word only through

such an observation.


196

To clear it more, the eyes are seers but unless there is sufficient

light they cannot see. Because of this fact it cannot conclude that

eyes do not see. Eyes require the help of other factors. These are

technically called ‘sahak¡r¢k¡ra¡s.’ In the same manner, a word

is revealer of its meaning only when and if the relationship between

the two is known.

According to M¢m¡msak¡s, the relation between the word and

meaning is natural, inartificial and made by someone. It gives strong

logical basis to say this which is really difficult to refute. This

theory has also been upheld by some of the modern linguists.

By accepting such a theory on one hand, the system has

established the validity and authority of the Vedas beyond all

possible doubt and on the other has done away with the necessity of

postulating God as the speaker of the Vedas. This also contributed

to logical simplicity on one hand and saved the task of answering

many difficult questions which arise if God is accepted on the other.

The Theory of language aquisition accepted to be beginningless

and named as (ÉÞrù É½þÉ®ú&) V¤dhavyavah¡raÅ is nothing else but todays


197

‘direct method of language - aquisition;’ which is considered to be

the best one by sincere language teachers.

Thus, M¢m¡ms¡, theory of language aims at establishing the

entity of language phenomenon, word, meaning, the relation bewteen

the word and its meaning and vedic sentences.

In M¢m¡ms¡ dar¿ana there is one ‘Vy¡karan¡dhikaraa,’ where

discussed issues of grammar. The relation between the word and

its meaning is not created by anyone, it is eternal. This can be

proved on the basis of the process of language aquisition by a child.

The ‘V¤ddhavyavah¡ra’ from which a child learns its language

points to the beginningless of words and their relation with their

meanings.

All words are ‘an¡di’ because it is our experience that even

from the words such as gavi we do understand the animal having

dewlap etc. This is our regular experience and from this it can be

said that the same was the case before one hundred years and even

before so this tradition is beginningless. It has already been stated46

that there was no maker of relation between word and meaning.


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Therefore, all words are standard ones and are may use all words

while speaking. All words make understanding the meaning. For

example hastaÅ, karaÅ, p¡niÅi etc.

The main point to be noted is that words are uttered to convey

some meaning and their result is not something invisible like merit

etc. Another point is that there is no ¿¡stra, which can regulate the

usage of words and therefore one should never say that one word is

standard and others are its ‘apabhram¿a’ forms, one word is ‘s¡dhu’

and others are ‘as¡dhu.’

Kumarila Bhatta has raised various fundamental, thought

provoking and interesting points. These help to understand the

function of grammar on one hand and the limitations of the same

on the other. Vedas does not depends upon grammar neither it have

any expectancy towards it.

“+ÉÊnùÉkÉÉSSÉ vÉÉÇiÉÉÂ

xÉèÉ YÉÉxÉ-|ÉªÉÉäMÉªÉÉä&*

xÉÊ½þ ªÉÉEò®úhÉÉ{ÉäIÉÉ

ÉiÉÇiÉä ÉèÊnùEòÒ ÉÖÊiÉ&**”47


199

á¡barasvamin explains the Jaimin¢yas£tra“¶É¤näù |ÉªÉixÉÊxÉ¹{ÉkÉä&

+{É®úÉvÉºªÉ ¦ÉÉÊMÉiÉÉÂ*”48 as a human being utters words with efforts. He

has given the process how an utterance of a word takes place. The

air comes from the navel region, it expands in the chest, then makes

in the throat. Then strikes the cerebrum and reflects and then moving

in mouth manifests various words. In all this process there is every

likelihood that the speaker, or the utterer may commit a mistake.

All sorts of mistakes are possible on the part of a human being.

And so it cannot accept all words are alike.

The Jaimin¢yas£tra“+xªÉÉªÉ¶SÉÉxÉäEò¶É¤nùiÉÉÂ”49 also explained there.

It is not proper to accept that to express one and the same meaning,

there are many similar words and all are beginningless. One

understand the meaning from all words because he have knowledge

of the standard word and because there is a similarity of other

words with the standard one, he understand the meaning even from

other words. So one among these words is‘an¡di’ or beginningless

and all others are its apabhram¿a forms. There are exceptions like

hasta, kara, p¡i etc.


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To know the words which are beginningless or not, “iÉjÉ iÉiÉÆ

+Ê¦ÉªÉÉäMÉÊÉ¶Éä¹ÉÉiÉÂ ºªÉÉiÉÂ ”50 It is only from the abhiyuktas that it came to

know the distinction between words, whatever they say is a standard

word, is a beginningless and are whatever they say is not, is not.

According to Vy¡kara ¡dhikara a : The function of grammar

is to aquiant a person with the ocean of vocabulary of language

with a pot-ful of rules. The study of these rules gives the capacity

to the student to understand the formation of any word of the

language. It also means without studying grammar one can learn

and master the language in general but the knowledge of grammar

gives the ability to the person to discriminate between

grammatically wellformed words and otherwise.

As a system of interpretation of rules M¢m¡ms¡ is somewhere

similar to that of smritis and later literature.

The Gautamadharmas£tra 1-5 says -

“iÉÖ±ªÉ¤É±ÉÊÉ®úÉävÉä ÊÉEò±{É& ”51

Jaimini says in ‘P£rvam¢m¡ms¡s£tra’ XII-3-10.

“BEòÉlÉÉÇºiÉÖ ÊÉEò±{Éä®úxÉ ºÉÉÖSSÉªÉä Ê½þ +ÉÉÞÊkÉ& ºªÉÉiÉÂ |ÉvÉÉxÉºªÉè*52


201

The Ëpasthambhadharmas£tra 1-1-4-8- says - “ ÉÖÊiÉ& ¤É±ÉÒªÉºÉÒ

+xÉÖÉÉxÉÉnùÉSÉÉ®úÉiÉÂ*”53 Jaimini also says the same in I.3.3: “ÊÉ®úÉävÉä iÉxÉ{ÉäIÉÆ

ºªÉÉnùºÉÊiÉ ÁxÉÖÉÉxÉÉÂ*” Which is independent, is more authoritative than

a smrthi text when there is conflict. Apasthambhadharmasutra I-

4.12.1- says -

“ªÉjÉ iÉÖ |ÉÒiªÉÖ{É±ÉÎ¹vÉiÉ& |ÉÉÞÊkÉ& xÉ iÉjÉ ¶ÉÉºjÉÉÎºiÉ*” Jaimin¢ya s£tra IV.1.2.

resembles this - “ªÉÎºÉxÉÂ |ÉÒÊiÉ& {ÉÖû¹ÉºªÉ iÉºªÉ Ê±É{ºÉÉlÉÇ±ÉIÉhÉÉ ÊÉ¦ÉHòiÉÉiÉÂ*”54

á¡bara’s view of language :- áabda and its characteristics :-

The investigation into d¤À¶a and ad¤Àta as they are presented

by á¡bara, seems to rule out any possibility of any existence which

is beyond the reality which he speeks of. Reality itself is within the

reach of language which cannot be apart from this reality itself.

This is the case because for á¡bara the two dimensions of reality as

‘d¤Àta’ and ‘ad¤Àta’ entail and encompass everything. The validity

of his thesis on Dharma is entirely based on the Veda, when he

supports the sutra: Dharma is the object that is indicated by the

vedic injunctions.55


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According to á¡barabh¡Àya one actually knows Dharma

bacause there is instructions (upade¿as), instructions stands for the

speeking of a particular set of words.56 One also knows acts which

are not known by sense perception and other means of knowledge,

as for example, anum¡n¡ (inference) upam¡n¡ (comparision),

arth¡patti (perception) and abh¡va (negation), non existence

(absence).57 but only through instructions, ie it ultimately implies

vedic injuctions. Hence one could say that the understanding of

reality and especially the knowledge of dharma and whatever is not

visible ultimately falls within the function of language.

M¢m¡ms¡ is also known as V¡kya¿¡stra. It was this school

that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate

canons of interpretation. This was mainly based on individual words

and the word meanings and consequently the relation between the

word meanings and sentence meanings, remained the central

problem of this school. The M¢m¡ms¡ school at first express the

factors of ¡k¡kÀ¡ (mutual expectancy) yogyat¡ (Consistancy) and

samnidhi (contiguity) among the word meaning in a sentece as

constituting the basic for unity of the sentence.


203

According to M¢m¡msak¡s, the primary meaning of a word is

the universal (¡krti) which is the essential quality common to the

particular instances of the class. Both Jaimini and á¡barasvami used

the word ‘¡kriti’ to refer to the universal, but Kumarila Bhatta

makes it clear that the term is used in the sense of J¡ti or universal.58

The Great grammarian Patnjali used the term ‘Ëkrti’ in this sense.

But later writers in the field of M¢m¡ms¡ use the term J¡ti itself.

According to M¢m¡msak¡s the relation between a word and

its meaning is ‘autpattika’ or permanent, which means a word is a

word; only when it has a meaning. The unit of language is taken as

vara or phonemes, these phonemes are permanent and a collection

of phonemes in a particular order of sequence is a word. The primary

meaning of a word is something permanent and cannot be the

particular instances of the class. In a sentence, it is the particular

(vyakti) that enters into syntactic relationship.

P£rva m¢m¡ms¡ Technique of programme organisation

P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ has evolved a systematic method of

programme organisation. Though it is developed for the organisation


204

of sacrificial programme, it can be applied to any other programme

organisation. The rules for this are a kind of metarules designated

in Sanskrit as ‘paribh¡À¡.’ P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ has also developed a

method of debate on philosophical issues and on programme

organisation models.

In Indian Philosophy two methods of philosophical debate are

develped.

Paµc¡vayava - Five stepped argumentation method developed

by Nyaya school. It arranges the arguments in five steps.

(a) Pratijµ¡ - the statement of the preposition (b) Hetu -

the reason (c) Ud¡haraa - example, (d) Upanaya - the application

of reason to the present case. (e) Nigamana - the conclusion.

P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ follows the ‘Adhikara a’ method. It also

arranged in five steps. (1) ViÀaya - the subject under discussion. (2)

Sam¿aya - doubts / the two sides of the discussion. (3) P£rvapakÀa

- the prima - facie position of the issue. (4) Sidh¡nta - the final

position (5) Prayojana - the purpose served by the sidhanta. Within


205

p£rvapakÀa and sidh¡nta there will be ¡kÀepa - some tentative

objections and sam¡dh¡na - a clearing of tentative objections.

In connection with the organisation of a sacrifice, three

questions are raised. ‘Kim bh¡vayet’? what is to be achieved, ‘Kena

bh¡vayet’? by what means it is to be achieved and ‘Katham

bh¡vayet’? What are the other aids or auxilaries to it. In the cases

‘Dar¿ap£ram¡s¡,’ there, answers are; Svarga is to be achieved by

means of ‘dar¿ap£rnam¡sa y¡ga’ with the performance of the

auxiliaries pray¡ja. For any other programme these questions are

essential to organize it intelligently.

M¢m¡ms¡ and Modern linguistics

The contribution of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ to linguistics is equally

significant. M¢m¡ms¡ primarily depends upon ‘áabdapram¡na’ and

therefore it goes deep into ‘áabdapram¡ a.’ ‘ApauruÀeyatva’

concept of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ has made the language autonomous at

three important levels of the linguistic communications, viz, a).

The relation between the word and meaning. b) The formulation of


206

the sentence (c) Determination of the purport of the passage or

discourse.

P£rva M¢m¡ms¡, also considers the relation between the word

and the meaning as natural and permanent. It is not caused by any

human agencies or artificial device. A meaningful expression is

always associated with its meaning. The relation between the two

is autonomous. A vedic sentence is not formulated by human agency.

The words in a sentence are intended to yeild a syntactically

organised meaning. The action is the centre of semantic

organisation. Such an organised communication is the very nature

and purpose of the words in a sentence. Therefore, no human agency

or any other artificial device is needed for the formulation of a

sentence. Thus at the level of the formulation of the sentence also

language is autonomous.

To ascertain the purport of a passage. M¢m¡ms¡ has formulated

certain guidelines such as. ‘upakrama,’ ‘upasamh¡ra’ etc. that are

internal to the language and has made the determination of purport

of passage autonomous. Thus the concept of apauruÀeyatva has far

reaching linguistic implications.


207

The two theories of sentence meaning ‘Abhihit¡vayav¡da’and

‘Anvit¡bhidh¡navada’ are the most important contribution of P£rva

M¢m¡ms¡ to the linguistics. All other systems of Indian Philosophy

have adopted one of these two theories with some modifications.

The concept of bh¡vana and its being the centre of semantic

organisation is also an important point.

The primary purpose of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ is to interpret Vedic

statements that describe the sacrifices. For this, M¢m¡ms¡ has

evolved certain rules of interpretation. These are P£rva M¢m¡ms¡

Ny¡yas. These are used to determine the nature of sacrifices, its

auxilaries and the procedures. P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ rules of interpretation

is used by Vedantins to interpret ¿rutis to develop their doctrines.

Abhihit¡nvayav¡da, Anvit¡bhidh¡nav¡da theories

of sentence meaning:-

A very important contribution of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ to linguistic

is the two theories of sentence meaning; ‘abhihit¡nvayav¡da’ and

‘anvit¡bhidh¡nav¡da.’


208

In Abhihit¡nvayav¡da by Bhatta school, words convey their

meaning and these meanings duly associated constitute the sentence

meaning. For example when a person hears the sentence, “the clock

fell on the ground”, there the person go on grasping the meaning of

the words ‘clock’, ‘fell’, ‘down’, ‘on’ ‘ground’ separately and then

semantically organises them into one unit of thought.

According to Anvit¡bhidh¡nav¡da by Prabhakara school, the

words do not merely convey the objects referred to by them but

also their association with the relevent objects conveyed by the

other words in the sentence. These connected word meaning

constitute the sentence meaning. So in the same sentence, ‘the clock

fell on the ground’ is grasped as a whole.

The word ‘abhihita’ refers to the word meaning expressed.

The word ‘anvita’ means the connected word meaning ‘anavya,’

ie, the association of word meaning is necessary for constituting

the sentence meaning in both theories. However they differ on the

point whether the association is included in the scope of the meaning

of the word itself or it is developed by the word meaning by way of


209

lakÀaa ie, etended meaning. ‘Abhihit¡nvaya’ theory is adopted by

Bhatta M¢m¡ms¡, Ny¡ya and Advaita Vedanta, while the

‘Anvay¡bhidh¡na’ theory is adopted by Pr¡bh¡kara m¢m¡ms¡,

Vi¿iÀtadv¡ita vedanta and Dvaitavedanta. The arguments advanced

for and against these views give deeper insight into the Indian theory

of language.

The idea of these two theories summarised in M¡nameyodaya

by Narayana Bhatta as:

“iÉäxÉjÉ {ÉnùÉMÉiÉÉ&

{ÉÖxÉ& {ÉnùÉlÉÇ& ÊÉlÉÉäxÉªÉÆ ªÉÉÎxiÉ*

<iªÉäÉÉÊ¦ÉÊ½þiÉÉxÉªÉ

ÊºÉrùÉxiÉÉä nùÌ¶ÉiÉÉä%ºÉnùÉÊnùxÉÉÉÂ**

ºÉEò±É{ÉnùÉxiÉ®ú{ÉÚiÉÉÇ-

ÊÉiÉ®ú{ÉnùÉlÉê& ºÉÉÎxÉiÉÆ ºÉÉlÉÇÉÂ*

ºÉÉÇ{ÉnùÉÊxÉ ÉnùxiÉÒiªÉxªÉä¹ÉÉÉÂ

+ÎxÉiÉÉÊ¦ÉvÉÉxÉÉiÉÉÂ**”59

“Therefore, here the meaning of the words, which are

understood, from the words, after words, enter into mutual relation:


210

in this way is shown the doctrine, according to those of my way of

thinking, of the relation of what are expressed. When all the other

words expresses its own meaning as related to the meaning of the

other words: this is the doctrine accordance to others, of the

expression of what are related.”

Dharma¿¡stra texts are also utilize the rules of interpretation

of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡, to determine the exact nature of the religious

programmes. To resolve some conflicts in the statement in

connection with religious programmes, P£rva M¢m¡ms¡ rules of

interpretation are used.

Max well’s rules of interpretations closely resemble the P£rva

M¢m¡ms¡ rules of interpretation. In view of this, the study of P£rva

M¢m¡ms¡ is very relevent even today. M¢m¡ms¡ and Dharma á¡stra

have not been static. Rather these have been highly dynamic.

eg :- 1. The golden rule is that the words of st¡tute must prima

faice be given their ordinary meanings - (Maxwell)

“±ÉÉäEäò B¹ÉÖ +lÉæ¹ÉÖ {ÉnùÉÊxÉ ºÉÊiÉ ºÉ¦ÉÉä iÉnùlÉÉxªÉäÉ” (M¢m¡ms¡)


211

2. Exposition of one act in the language of another in the same

matter - (Maxwell).

- The criterian of Samkhya of P£rva M¢m¡ms¡.

3. The usage may determine the meaning of language - Maxwell.

“ªÉÉäMÉÉiÉÂ °üÊfø& ¤É±ÉÒªÉºÉÒ” (P£rva M¢m¡ms¡)

4. The title is no part of law - Max.

‘N¡madheya’ is not ‘KarmavidhiÅ’ (P£rva M¢m¡ms¡).

5. Construction has to be made of all parts together (Max)

“ÉÉCªÉ¦ÉänùÉä nùÉä¹É&” (P£rva M¢m¡ms¡).

Kumarila’s school of M¢m¡ms¡ generally accept the

metaphoric usage of language everywhere. According to them literal

sense is followed by the purport or ‘t¡tparya’ or ‘v¡ky¡rtha,’ which

is different from ‘v¡cy¡rtha.’60 According to modern linguistics

also, language is the most metaphoric in nature. There are three

ways to convey ideas through the sign system, of which use of

language for conveying is the most complicated one. In it there is

no direct or indirect relation between sound and sense. The relation

between sound and sense is merely attributed and hence metaphoric.


212

The conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning are discussed

mainly from a synchronix point of view.

The meaning of a word in a sentence is determined by the

context only. This modern view is some what similar of the idea

presented by Prabhakara and others in Indian through. Bhart¤hari

in his ‘V¡kyapad¢ya,’ list a number of causes that determine the

contextual elements, as:

“ºÉÆªÉÉäMÉÉä ÊÉ|ÉªÉÉäMÉ¶SÉ ºÉÉ½þSÉªÉÈ ÊÉ®úÉäÊvÉiÉ&*

+lÉÇ& |ÉEò®úhÉÆ Ë±ÉMÉÆ ¶É¤nùºªÉÉxªÉºªÉ ºÉÊzÉÊvÉ&**

ºÉÉÉlªÉÇÉÉèÊSÉiÉÒnäù¶É& EòÉ±ÉÉä ªÉÊHò& ºÉ®úÉnùªÉ&*

¶É¤nùÉlÉÇºªÉÉxÉ¤ÉSUäônäù ÊÉ¶Éä¹ÉºÉÞÊiÉ½äþiÉÉ&**”61

Association, dissociation, mutual association, hostility or

opposition, purpose, context, or situation indicatory sing, proximity

with other word, capacity, propriety, place, time, gender and the

like are the determining factors in fixing up the meaning in a

particular context.

According to P£rva m¢m¡ms¡’s method every arguement has

five parts : Presentation of subjects under discussion (ViÀaya),


213

expression of the existing doubt (Sam¿aya), the prima facie view

of the opponent (P£rvapakÀa), the reply to it and the final view

(Sidh¡nta) and consistency in all related sentecnces (Samgati). This

method is followed by all other schools.

In India the M¢m¡msakas were interested in interpreting the

utterance to get the intended meaning or t¡tparya, objectively using

the rules of interpretation and considering the utterance in their

situational contexts. The M¢m¡ms¡ rules are accepted in legal

interpretations, whether a rule of law is obligatory, semi-obligatory

or optional is to be decided through interpretation. The following

rules of interpretations are accepted by Hindu Law :

(1) When a sentence is complete and explicit in sense and grammar,

no attempt should be made to twist its meaning.

(2) When an expression has more than one meaning, and the normal

meaning does not agree with the context, its meaning is to be

determined by the context.

(3) When words or sentences are not explicitly or clearly

connected, they should be connected in accordance with

grammatical rules so as to form a meaningful sentence.


214

(4) When a sentence or a clause by itself does not make any

complete sense it should be considered elliptical and necessary

words must be added to make a complete sense, suitable to

the context.

According to M¢m¡msak¡, in language or communication,

sentences are uttered to suggest a possible course of actions. The

ultimate aim is to influence the mind of the listener to do some

action, not merely to convey an idea or a matter of fact. If sentences

are devided into propositional statements and imperative commands,

the latter type is obviously to influence the listner to do some action.

But according to M¢m¡msak¡s even the former type of declaratory

statements are ultimately intended to influence the mind of the

listener to do some action and are meaningful only if interpreted

that way. The M¢m¡msak¡s refuse to accept that there can be

communication and understanding even without any intention on

the part of the speaker to influence the practical behaviour of the

hearer and without any such actual influence.

Vedas are discussing the nature of ‘dharma.’Dharma is defined

as the process of activating.62 Like dharma; ‘sabda’ or sound is also


215

of the nature of provocation. Language make some urge in us to do

as directed. There will be no communication and understanding

without an intention on the part of the speaker to influence the

practical behaviour of the hearer. M¢m¡msaka know this power of

language from the early times and they accepted ‘sabda’ as the

only valid means in understanding dharma. The theory of bh¡vana

presented by M¢m¡ms¡ with its two fold nature as ‘¿¡bdi’ and

‘¡rth¢’ is really noteworthy as it projects the power of language in

human activities in a psychic way.

According to Prabhakara school of M¢m¡ms¡ any sentence is

of the nature of potentiality (K¡ry¡nvita). Thus a mere statement

like ‘this is a good book’, may be a potential sentence as it invokes

an urge in us to read or to own that book. Similarly all Vedic

sentences create an urge to do the sacrifices to attain the beneficiary

result of it. And this power resides in the sound itself as far as the

Vedic passages are concerned which are not related to any human

touch.

M¢m¡msak¡s admit the functioning (Vy¡p¡ra) as the most

improtant factor in the meaning of a sentence. In a sentence like


216

‘R¡ma reads book’ is interpreted by M¢m¡msakas as there is a

process of reading book, which is done by the agent, Rama.

According to grammarians, the functioning is centralized on the

agent (karta) and to the logicians, on the capability (k¤ti) of the

agent.63

Prabhakara and his followers accepted only ‘abhidh¡’ as the

only power of language. For them, it is an extrensive one like the

functioning of an arrow.64 Accroding to them the acceptance of

‘lakÀa a’ and ‘vyaµjana’ are useless since they are generated

through the readers contemplation only which is noted as

‘Santar¡rthaniÀtha’64 or connected with some other meaning in the

way.

M¢m¡ms¡ evolves the rules for interpretation of vedic passages.

Which are common and now a days generally used for any such

context. So the name ‘V¡kya¿¡stra’ is apt to M¢m¡ms¡ school. It

contributed a lot to the studies of linguistics and especially to the

modern aspects of language studies. The relevence of the system of

M¢m¡ms¡ in the field of language studies is yet to be accessed in

the fullest sense.


217References

1. Keith A.B. - Indian Logic - 1.25.

2. Melputh£r N¡r¡ya a Bhatta - Manameyodaya P.161. AdayarLibrary Series.

3. Indian Thought. Vol.IV. P.262.

4. “ºÉÉÇYÉÉÊzÉ¹ÉävªÉÉ SÉ »É¹]Öõ& ºÉnÂù¦ÉÉÉEò±{ÉxÉÉ*xÉ SÉ vÉÉÉÇoùiÉä iÉºªÉ ¦ÉÉä±±ÉÉäEòÉnÂù ÊÉÊ¶É¹]õiÉÉ**xÉ SÉÉxÉÖÎ¹öiÉÉä vÉÉÉæ xÉÉxÉÖ¹öÉxÉÉÞiÉä ÉiÉä&*xÉ SÉ ÉänùÉoùiÉä ºÉÉ ºªÉÉnÂù ÉänùÉä xÉ SÉ {ÉnùÉÊnùÊ¦É&**iÉºÉÉiÉÂ |ÉÉMÉÊ{É ºÉÉæ%Ê{É »É¹]Öõ®úÉºÉxÉÂ {ÉnùÉnùªÉ&*ºªÉÉiÉÂ iÉi{ÉÚÉÇEòiÉÉ SÉÉºªÉ SÉèiÉxªÉÉnùºÉnùÉÊnùÉiÉÂ**BÉÆ SÉ ªÉÖÊHòÊ¦É& |ÉÉ½ÖþºiÉä¹ÉÉÆ nÖù{iÉÇ¦ÉÉÖkÉ®úÉÂ*”- álokav¡rttika - ºÉ¤ÉxvÉÉIÉä{É{ÉÊ®ú½þÉ®ú& Verses 114-17.

5. álokav¡rttika - P.75.

6. Sarvasidh¡ntasamgraha. VI. 206 and álokav¡rttika,¡tmav¡da. P.5-7.

7. álokav¡rttika, Ëtmav¡da. P.75.

8. Prakaraapaµcika, Tattv¡loka. P.156.

9. álokav¡rttika I.1.2, Verse. 72.

10. á¡strad¢pika. P.125.31.

11. The M¢m¡ms¡s£tra of Jaimini. I.1.1.

12. Ibid., I.1.2.

13. á¡barabh¡Àya.I.1.1.

14. “SÉÉänùxÉÉ±ÉIÉhÉÉä%lÉÉæ vÉÉÇ&*”


21815. “ªÉÉMÉÉÊnù BÉ vÉÉÇ&*”Arthasamgraha of Laug¡kÀi Bh¡skara.

16. á¡barabh¡Àya on Jaimin¢yas£tra. 6.3.9.

17. Ny¡yaratnam¡la P.146. Varanasi ed.1982.

18. Taittir¢ya Samhita, 2.2.2.

19. áabarabh¡Àya on Jaimin¢yas£tra. 12.3.6.

20. Ibid.

21. áabarabh¡Àya on Jaimin¢yas£tra. 12.3.17.

22. Ibid.

23. Jaimin¢yany¡yam¡lavist¡ra on Jaimin¢ s£tra I.1.2.

24. áabarabh¡Àya on Jaimin¢yas£tra.9.1.1. Edited by Ratna GopalBhatta, Vidyavilas Press, Banaras 1910. P.87.

25. Taittir¢ya ¡ranyaka.2.15, p.246.

26. Brahmas£tra with áankarabh¡Àya. I.38-33. edited by J.L.á¡stri M.L.B.D. 1980. P.273.

27. Ibid. 13.8. 22 & 24.

28. M¢m¡ms¡ dar¿ana.1.5, p.5.

29. “ºÉÉºxÉÉÊnùÊÉÊ¶É¹]õEÞòÊiÉ&” Ibid.P.11.

30. “MÉÉä¶É¤näù =SSÉÊ®úiÉä ºÉÉÇMÉÊÉ¹ÉÖ ªÉÖMÉ{ÉiÉÂ |ÉiªÉªÉÉä ¦ÉÉÊiÉ* +iÉ +ÉEÞòÊiÉÉSÉxÉÉä%ªÉÉÂ* xÉSÉÉEÞòiªÉÉ ¶É¤nùºªÉ ºÉÆ¤ÉxvÉ& ¶ÉCªÉiÉä EòiÉÖÇÉÂ* ÊxÉiªÉä iÉÖ ºÉÊiÉ MÉÉä¶É¤näù ¤É½ÖþEÞòiÉÉ =SSÉÊ®úiÉÉÖiÉ{ÉÚÉÇ¶SÉ +xªÉÉºÉÖ MÉÉäªÉÊHò{ÉÖ +xÉªÉªÉÊiÉ®äúEòÉ¦ªÉÉÆ +ÉEÞòÊiÉÉSÉxÉÉÂ +ÉMÉÉÊªÉ¹ªÉiÉÒÊiÉiÉºÉÉnùÊ{É ÊxÉiªÉ&**”

- M¢m¡ms¡ dar¿ana with á¡barabh¡Àya I.1.19, P.21-22.

31. K.T. Pandurang, The percepective and scope ofP£rvam¢m¡ms¡, History of Science, Philosophy and Culturein Indian civilization, Vol.II, Part 6 page.3.


21932. Îgveda. I.1-1, I.1.2.

33. Îgveda. X.90.

34. Bhagavad G¢ta.III.10.

35. “vÉÉÇ SÉÉänÂùÉ ±ÉIÉhÉ& +lÉÇ& vÉÉÇ&”

36. Bhagavad G¢ta.3.11.

37. Ibid. 3-14.

38. á¡barabh¡Àya.Vii.20.

39. á¡barabh¡Àya VI.1.7.

40. K.T. Pandurangi - The perceptive and scope ofP£rvam¢m¡ms¡, History of Science, Philosophy and Culturein Indian Civilization. Gen. Editer D.P. Chadopadhyaya. Lifethought and Culture in Indian (600 BC - 330 AD). Vol.I.Part.II. 2001 centre of studies on civilization.

41. A Handbook of Kerala edited by T. Madhava Menon.International School of Dravidian Linguistics. TVM. June2000, Vol.I. P.234.

42. “+ÎMxÉ¹]õÉäÉäxÉ ºÉMÉÇEòÉÉÉä ªÉVÉäiÉ” - One who desires heaven shallsacrifice with agniÀtoma ritual.

43. Budh¡yana S£tra.24.4.

44. “ªÉ BÉ ±ÉÉäÊEòEò& .......... iÉ BÉ ÉèÊnùEò&” á¡barabh¡Àya onJaimin¢yas£tra.I. 3.30. Translated by Jha. I.116-117.

45. “¶É¤nùÉlÉÇ¶SÉÉÊ{É ±ÉÉäEòÉiÉÂ” - Jaimin¢ya s£tra 10.3.44. Translated byJha.1.144.

46. The commentary on Jaimin¢yas£tra.I.1.5.

47. Kumarilabhatta - Tantravarttika.I.3.24.

48. Ibid., I.3.25.


22049. Ibid., I.3.26.

50. Jaimin¢yas£tra.I.3.27.

51. Where there is a conflict, two texts of equal authority eithermay be accepted (as pram¡as).

52. There is option between two or more subjects which havethe same utility or purpose.

53. áruti - a vedic text is an authority more powerful than ¡c¡ra(custom, the authoritativeness of which is inferential.

54. P.V. Kane - P£rvam¢m¡ms¡ Systems.P.3. When an action isdue when are he as ready pleasure therefore, there is no inenceof á¡stra.

55. M¢m¡ms¡s£tra I.1.2., P.127.

56. á¡barabh¡Àya.I.1.5., P.127.

57. á¡barabh¡Àya.I.1.5. the quotation of the Vrittikara in thiscontext suggests that á¡bara has endossed the view ofV¤ttik¡ra who referes to six Pram¡as.

58. “VÉÉÊiÉÉäÉÉEÞòÊiÉ |ÉÉ½ÖþªÉÇÊHò®úÉÊGòªÉiÉä ªÉªÉÉ” - álokav¡rttika - ¡kila sectionverse.3.

59. M¡nameyodaya - P.97.

60. K¡vyaprak¡¿a - P.133.

61. V¡kyapad¢ya - P.133.32.

62. “SÉÉänùxÉÉ±ÉIÉhÉÉä%lÉÔ vÉÉÇ&” - M¢m¡ms¡s£tra.I.1.2.

63. “ÉèªªÉÉEò®úhÉè®úJªÉÉiÉºªÉ EòiÉÇÊ®ú ¶ÉÊHòÊ®úiªÉÖSªÉiÉä ÊEòxiÉÖ EÞòiÉxÉÂ ¶ÉÊHò±ÉÊvÉÉiÉxªÉÉªÉÊºÉrùÉxiÉÉÖHòÉÉÊ±É” - P.360.

64. “<Ç¶ÉÉäÊ®úÉ nùÒPÉÇiÉ®úÉä ªÉÉ{ÉÉ®ú& EòÉªÉ|ÉEòÉ¶É&” P.429-30.


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