Military Review December 1949

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VOLUME XXIX DECEMBER 1949 NUMBER 9Editor in Chid!COLONEL H. R. EMERY

North American EditionEditor: l,T. COL. M. N. SQUIRES; Assistant Editor: CAPT. K. SUERMAN

Spanish-American EditionEditor: VI'. COL. A. F. BRUNO; A8sistant Editors: MA.'. J . A. ANDINO.

MAJ. W . MARTORANI. LT. L . A. MONSERRATF.Brazil ian Edition

Editor: MAJ. H . A. HERRERA. Brazilian Army.A8HiHtant EditOTR: MA.I. V . P . D . COUTINHO, Ul'azil ian Army.

CAPT. E. C. SANCTOS, Brazilian. Air ForceAdministrative Officer Production Manager

LT. M. M_ SUSINNA CAPT. R . B . WINNINGHAM

CONTENTSEDUCATING THE SOVIET ARMY OFFICEH __ __ ""1: Lt. Col. R. H. Bryant. In!KOREAN OCCUPATIONAL PROBLEMS ________ _________________________________Maj . G. H Huppert, Inf 9THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE __________________________________ Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, Inf 17AME[nCAN AND ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST __________________ _______________ Dr. Louis Morton 22THE LUGISTICAL PLANNING OF .OPEUATION OVERLORD ____________________ Lt . Col. F . A. Osmanski, GSC 40STATI::-;'l'JCS FOR THE GENERAL STAFF OFFICER ____________________________ Lt. Col. Vl. A. Glass, Jr. , Sig C 49THE BATTLE OF SUOMUSSALMI _________________________. _________________Lt. Col. A. J. Peterson. FA 54MILITARY NOTES AllOUND THE WORLD __________________________________________________________ 63FOIU11GN MILITARY DIGESTS ___________________ _________ _ ______________ _________ _ ___________________ 73

lI> orale ___ ____ __ __ ____ ______ _________ ____ ___ _____ ____ ____________________________________ 73The French Fifth Armored Division at Colmar ____________________________________________ 77

enocide-A New Grime? _______________________________________________________ _______ 831.'he RU8sian Threat to the Indies _______________________ . . . __ : : ~ _ _ 87Implications of the Atlantic Treaty ________________________-: _____ __ 90Geographical Studies in Warfare __________ 94A-n.tarctica - - _______________________________________________________ ., ____ _____ ___ ___ 98

: ~ : : ~ : h ~ : : ; l e ~ : S ; ~ t 8 N : ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ = = = ~ ~ . = === ~ ~ :Boo' FOit THE MILITARY READER __________________________________________________________________ 111Mll.!'l:ARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Staff College a t Fort Leavellwoi-th,

l d the Ellgiish. S p a n i s h ~ and POl'tugue::;e langua,p;e5. Entered as second-class matter August 31, 1934. a t the0::., _ > at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: $3.50 (U.S. cur" yeaI' in the United State::; and other countries of the 'Vestel'n Hemisphere; S4.50 a year in all other

Heprints nre authorized, provided credit is given the "MILITARY REVIEW," C&GSC. Fort Leaven..,- ::Ilsns.


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URUTBORS

Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Bryant joinedthe 9th Infantry Division in 1940 andserved in various capacities with the 47thInfantry Regiment until his designationas Division G-2. He served with the 9thDivision overseas from 1942 to 1947 inb(lth the Mediterranean and EuropeanTheaters. He graduated from the C&GSCin 1948 and has been an instructor, Department of Intelligence, since that time.

Major G. Harry Huppert joined the 7thInfantry Division in Korea in 1945 as G-2,and in April, 19>17, he was appointed thesenior US representative to the US-USSRJ oint Survey Group which determined thelocation of the line dividing the Americanand Russian sectors. Prior to service i 1Korea, he was an instructor at the TankDestroyer School, served with the 84th Infantry Division, and was Assistant G-3,XXI Corps. He has been an instructor atthe C&GSC since 1948.

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintnerwrote A Survey of Air Power whichappeared in the April issue of the MILITARYREVIEW. During World War II, he servedin Iceland and with Headquarters,Corps, and in 1945 began a year's assignment with the Intelligence Division,WDGS. He holds a doctor's degree in international relations from GeorgetownUniversity. He has been assigned to theDepartment of Analysis and Research of

t ~ C&GSC since 1948.Dr. Louis Morton is Chief of the Pacific

Section, Historical Division, Departmentof the Army Special Staff. He is the author

of The American Surrender in the Philippines, April-May 1942, which appearedin the August issue of the MILITARYREVIEW. During World Wal; II, he servedas Historical Officer of the Army Forcesin the South Pacific Area .

Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Osmanskiwas one' of the planners of OperationO;oe1lord The first part of his article on.The Logistical. Planning of OperationOverlord appeared in the November issueof the MILITARY REVIEW. A biographicalsketch of Colonel Osmanski appeared inthe November issue.

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Glass, Jr.,was an instructor at the C&GSC in 1943,and again from 1946 to 1948. From May toOctober 1945, he was Assistant G-1 withTenth Army on Okinawa and then went

~ i t h the occupation forces to Korea wherehe served as Civil Administrator, US ArmyMilitary Government in Korea. He is nowserving on the US Military Mission withthe Iranian Army at Teheran, Iran.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Petersonhas been an instructor at the C&GSC sinceJuly 1947 and is now specializing in instruction on arctic warfare subjects. Hisarticle on The Battle of Suomussalmi isbased on an account by an eyewitness ofthat Finno-Russian action. Colonel Peterson served as S-2 and S-3, 175th FABattalion, throughout the North AfricanCampaign. Later, he became S-2, and thenEx(;cutive Officer, of the 34th InfuntryDivision Artillery and served in thosecapacities during the campaigns in Italy.


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EDUCATING THESOVIET ARMY OF,FICER

Lieutenant Colonel Randall H Bryant, InfantryInstructor, Command and General Staff College

N OLD Russia, the doors of the corpsof cadets, the military schools, and theacademies were tightly closed to workers and peasants. Military knowledge andmilitary leadership were the monopoly ofan exclusive caste. The corps of officers,especially the generals, was made up inthe main of representatives of the gentry.In 1912, a large percentage of all Russiangenerals were members of the gentry, andthe rest were scions of the upper middleclass or of the clergy. Many generals andadmirals belonged to titled European families, as princes, barons, and counts, ofother than Russian descent.Pi"ivate soldiers were contemptuously referred to as cattle by their aristocraticofficers. The private could not even dreamof an officer's commission, no matter howcapable. In the pre-revolutionary epoch,officers for the most part were promoted tohigher ranks, not because they showedtalent or had distinguished themselves inaction, but because they had titles andmoney. The system which had existed inthe times of Peter the Great and, Suvorov,when officers' commissions were given tothe most capable privates and non-commi,sioned officers, had long been forgotten.

The new Soviet general staff studied theweaknesses of the old Imperial Army.

Discipline in the old army was such thata mass of men could be drilled in perfectformations, and it could make the formations appear, when led, like, a preciselyfunctioning mechanism. But few of the,officers could read a map. Few officers hadsufficient military knowledge to continue askirmish on his own initiative. The educational level of the enlisted men was evenlower. f an officer fell or was otherwiseeliminated from the field of battle, histroops were lost.

Post-Revolutionary PeriodDuring the years following the Revolution, attempts were made to remedy the

above .situation, but development of educational methods was slow and failed tofollow a definite plan. The army, until it(wuld grow together organically, had toundergo the same process as the rest of thecountry. Everything had to be built up ona new foundation, as Lenin and the revolutionaries were determined to destroy alltraces of the old imperial regime, and theywere initially unwilling to accept anythingfaintly resembling the Russian ImperialArmy.

The establishment of a stable militarysystem finally improved internal conditions of the Red Army, and a period of

orld War hastened the modernization of the extensive educationalsystem of the Soviet Army and in the postwar period the schools h vebeen continued with increased professional and technical standards


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MlLITARY'REVIEWwas originated by

who rose from the ranks of theto become Trotsky's Com

of Defense 1924. During theFrunze gre ltly improved the

educational courses. The short-timecourses of the civil war era were

by military schools withlasting from 2 to 4 years. The ex

academies for higher military tacticsreorganized and enlarged, and newwere created for the different

of service. Thousands of the temcivil war officers were sent to thesefor much needed training and recourses. The material conditions

f the army were gradually bettered, whilenew 'stress on discipline corrected theand enhanced the authority

f the officers. Orders no longer had to bepolitical commissars, al

these commissars were retained infield for years as the authority onThroughout the whole army, but espe

in the groups of officer cadres, classnow played a decisive role. Thethe old officers were mustered

over 4,000 were retained,of whom were in high staff and compositions. To attain homogeneity in

army structure, cultural standards forcandidates were temporarily low

This later had to be corrected duetremendous growth of the Soviet

system.Timoshenko's Reforms

In May 1940, the new Commissar of DeMarshal Timoshenko, inaugurated

period of reforms and drasticin training methods. The main re

improvement of tacticaland leadership of the small

(platoons, companies, and battaland toward eradication of routinemethods, classroom instruction in

of field work, and excess paper work.

Large-scale maneuvers were abandoned;they were replaced by tactical field exercises, using no units larger'than a division.

World War II hastened the process ofmodernization of the educational system.The Soviet Army, lacking a Soviet tradition of sufficient depth to back up t h ~efforts it was called on to make, invokedthe military traditions of Czarist and preCzarist Russia. Generals, like AlexanderSuvorov, who served under Catherine theGreat, became legendary Soviet heroes.Guard units were created. More colorfuluniforms, similar to those of the old Im-perial' Army, w e ~ e adopted, with the sameold shoulderboards. Army pay was adjustedto increase the differential between officersand enlisted men, and additional privilegeswere established.

Since World War II, the Soviet goveinment has taken steps to increase the attractiveness of a postwar career for offi-cers in the army. Once the symbol ofdespised Czarist oppression, the officers'corps has been gradually revived, and itnow enjoys a firmly rooted authority. basedon the success it achieved during the war.

Officer's ifeIn Russia, army' officers are a privileged

class in the literal sense of the word. Theirprivilege is not, as in many other countries,an irrational, immaterial sham, a glossedover poverty, or a mere social glamor. llSoviet citizens are employees of the. state.Among them, the officer is the best paid.But his pay is not the important thing,for even a well-paid Soviet citizen has apretty difficult life. t is hard to find aplace to live, to be properly clothed-inshort, life is full of worries. The important point about the professional armyofficer is that he is relieved of all thesecares. He has everything in his barracks(for everybody--even most generalsLlivein barracks). He has a comfortable apartment there; he is relatively well-clothedand fed; he participates in all kinds of


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EDUCATING THE SOVIET ARMY OFFICER sports; ~ d u c t i o n l facilities, and amusements. The officer is perhaps the onlySoviet citizen who has no cares. All thatthe state expects in return is study. Whenduties are over, he must attend lectures,exercises; and seminars. f he wants toremain in the army, he must, every few'years, pass an examination in some language or in a more intensive mastery ofmilitary science. He is also expected toincrease his general knowledge con-stantly-this, of course, strictly within theframework of the dominant political faith.

The career of the professional officer isstrictly prescribed. The privileges attached to a military career provide a wideand careful choice of candidates. Only thebest' high school students are eligible forthe military schools, and these must, at thesame time, be especially recommended bythe Party. After.3 or 4 years trainingthere, while almost cut off from the world(or, more correctly, in actual daily 'butclosely controlled and supervised contactwith it), they enter the army, are transferred to outlying garrisons of the vastSoviet area, and become completely swallowed by military life.

t is a peculiar accomplishment of Sovietorganization that it leaves to the officernot a single minute of personal life, noteven with his own family. For his familyalso lives in the barracks and is a memberof that family which is the Soviet Army.s such, his family partakes of the com-

munal living arrangements of the regimentand belongs to most of the clubs and socialorganizations of the troop units. This participation is officially a privilege, but inreality a duty. The officers' wives, evenwhen they have their own professions, aregi v n functions in the community life.r.arge congresses of commanders' wivesare lwld in which these functions are dis-clls:;ed. They take an .energetic part inJr;litary sport; commanders' wives havea;'hieved records in shooting, skiing, and inc r , . ~ - c o u n t r y rides.

The absorption of the officer's familyinto military life closes his last loopholeto the outside world. He belongs entirely'to the state. He is patriotic, but his is asingular patriotism, for i t includes theideal of world communism.

The'military schools and academies arethe pride of the Red Army. In equipmentand training systems, they probably rankamong the best in Europe.

Suvorov Military SchoolsIn 1943, a decree created the Suvorov

Military Schools for the purpose of training army cadets. Originally, there werenine such schools provided for, in townsof regions liberated from the Germans,but by the end of the war there were 15schools. These Suvorovtsi, as the youngcadets are called who successfully completethe 7 to 9 year course, are allowed to enterthe military schools for army officers without taking the regular entrance examinations. The Suvorov Schools accept candidates between the ages of 8 and 13;however, the average age upon entranceis 10. The candidates are chosen fromamong the orphans of Red Army heroesand from sons of high officers and rankingparty officials. A few ohler youths whodistinguish themselves on their own arealso admitted. The schools are not,open tothe general public. So great is their popularity that there aTe a hundred times ; lSmany candidates as can be accepted. Theyare boarding schools; the state furnisheseverything, including the uniform of 'black,topped off with the special white crownedhat. The cadets live under strict militarydiscipline. Uniforms are worn in classesand on the street, the day begins and endswith bugle calls, and the military forms 'ofaddress are compuisory.

ed Sta1 , the Soviet Army periodical,states, the Suvorov Schools carry out thebest traditions of the old cadet estabiishments, where many celebrated officers andgenerals of the Russian Army began their


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MI:LITARY REVIEWcurriculum also closely re

the -famous Tzarist cadet schools.fencing, riding, dancing, 'physicaland drill are part of an enlarged

The directors of the Suvorovare regular army major generals

the separate cadet companies are comlieutenant colonels or majors.In 1941, there were approximately 76schools and now there are believedbe more than 100. The scope of their

appears to be a combination.own branch schools and the United

Military Academy. These schoolsannually about 10,000 new junior

after the successful completionf a 2-year course.To qualify for attendance a t these

the prospective student must 'havethe tenth grade (high school in

USSR), must pass a mental and physiexaminatiDn, must be unmarried and

the -ages of 19 and 25. Any youngwho aspires to a cDmmissiDn in themay make application either to the

of the school he desires to atDr to the military commissar of hisor political district. I f he is a nonssiDned Dfficer in the army, he applies

o fiis commanding officer. Upon graduahe is sent to trDop duty. From thison, higher military education is by

However, if he is ambitious,e may take extension courses from the

branch of the school of hisThese are similar to our Dwn excourses.

The Branch SchoolsAfter an officer has served with troops

at least 1 year and has been commisfor at least 4 years, and before hehis 35th birthday, he is eligible for

to attend the academy of hiscourses at these academiesa combination of those of ouradvanced branch schools and the

and General Staff College and

are 3 to 5 years' duration. Graduates areassigned as commanders of b ~ t t a I i n s orregiments. At the beginning of the war,there were 16 SChDOls in existence, butthere' are possibly two or three more bynow. The academies n t only train officersbut also take an active part in researchand development. They also publish armand service journals, inwhich informationon new tactical and technical developmentsis disseminated. As mentioned above, ofparticular importance is theIr function ofconducting and supervising the correspondence courses for officers on active dutywith troops. This has been of considerablesignificance in raising the standards ofoijicers of the arms, large numbers of whomhave received their training for highercommand duties in such courses.

Among the branch schools are the Artillery Academy, which trains both line com-manders and artillery experts; the AirAcademy; the Military Engineering Academy; and the Stalin Military Academy ofMotorization and Mechanization, which isone of the youngest of the branch schools.The latter was founded when the successesachieved in the industrialization of theSoviet Union made it possible to supply theRed Army with modern combat tanks andtrucks Df domestic manufactuz:e. TheAcademy developed with the expansion ofthe Armored Force. Eighteen years agoit had only two laboratories and those werepoorly equipped. Today, it has 40 to 50laboratories with excellent up-to-dateequipment.

The Frunze AcademyThe Frunze Academy is the oldest high-level military educational establishment

of the USSR. Outstanding officers whohave served from 4 to 6 years with frontline units of the Red Army, possess a sec-ondary school education, and have a knowl-edge of either English, French, German,Polish, Japanese, or Persian are eligiblefor selection to the Frunze Academy. How-


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7DUCATING THE SOVIET ARMY OFFICEHever all candidates must pass an entrance

e x a ~ i n a t i o n . Officers sometimes spendseveral years preparing for these examinl!:-tions, which cover tactics, Soviet Armyregulations, topography, and general education.Candidates are given 1 to 2 monthsleave for final preparations for the examination. Preliminary examinations areusually given at the military district headquarters by Academy representatives, andpapers are forwarded to Moscow for'grading. Candidates take their final examination at the Academy, where they also mustappear before a special commission whichthoroughly examines their political background. '

The, course of the Frunze Academy maybe compared to that given at our Commandand General Staff College. However" itlasts from 2 to 3 years. Studies are pursued under the direction of various departments, such as the chemistry and physics,military history, tactics, general militaryeducation, and intelligence departments.The first year deals largely with the tacticsand techniques of the various arms. '1;hisis supplemented during the summer monthsby field exercises. A very interesting factis tbat the intelligence course lasts 3, years,whereas most of the others are only of 2years duration.

The Frunze Academy is equipped withmore than 100 laboratories and indoorranges. The laboratories include equipment for the study of aviation, chemistry,artillery tactics, strategy, military history,mechanization, motorization, camouflage"el0ctl'onics, searchlights, and hydro-technics. Indoor ranges include ranges forfield artillery, antiaircraft artillery, machine guns, and air'craft armament.

Since World War II, all students havebe.,n participating in the conduct of rese.trch, assisted by the faculty. The lessonsof l\.'orld War II are analyzed and studied,a). instruction is based largely on lessonsJGn'ned in combat. The Academy has a

special museum for the history of WorldWar II which is displayed graphically. A'series 'of! bi-monthly conferences is con-ducted on major operations. The transition froIl). defeiIsive to offensive strategyand the pursuit, encirclement, and destruction of enemy forces, from the ,campaignof 1944, are being studied at these con-ferences.

'The objective of 'the Academy is to pre. pare graduates for duty as' division com-manders and the staff of corps or higherunits. After graduation from the Academy,the officer is assigned to field duty. f theofficer displays unusual ability in militaryscience, he. may be selected to remain atthe Academy for research work or dutywith the fa:culty.

General Staff AcademyThe highest school for officers of the Red

Army is the General Staff Academy or the 'Voroshilov Higher Military Academy. ThisAcademy prepares senior officers for dutyas corps chiefs of staff or higher duty.Although there is no age limit for admission, young officers of exceptional abilityusually are selected. The course lasts from. 2 ,to 3 years, with 100 officers in each year'sclass. Another hundred officers attendspecial classes designed to improve thegeneral and military education' of theofficers of the Soviet Army. Thus, 300students are attending this Academy eachyear. The Voroshilov Higher MilitaryAcademy may be regarded as similar to \our own National War College. . '

The curriculum is prescribed by theChief of the General Staff, and it generallyincludes the tactical, operational, andstrategic employment of large formations.The course of the special class is similar tothat of the regular class with fewertheoretical problems and no field problems.The methods of instruction employed areindividual and group solution of assignedproblems, lectures, panel discussions, andfield exercises. The field exercises are con-


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u r i ~ g the summer season. Theyof command reconnaissance of ter

the tactical or operational decisionf the commander; theoretical solutions of

resulting staff' and logistical problems;participation in command or staff

during the fall exercises of theunits.The candidates for the regular coursebe graduates of the Frunze Academy

have a1; least 2 years experience asor staff officers of large units.

for the special class needbe graduates of the Frunze Academy.

In addition to its regular instructionalthe school conducts extensive re

on military subjects. This researchres'ults in the basis for articles pubin the Journal of Military Thought

jourmil of the Academy.

ConclusionsWorld War II has shown that the Soviet

Army has large cadres of efficient com-manders and leaders of men in the fieldMany.Soviet officers have been through theschool of hard knocks in the past fewyears. Some fought in the Civil War andin the Finnish Campaign in 1939. Othersthe overwhelming majority-received theirbaptism of fire on the battlefields in thewar against the Germans.

Since the war, the Soviet Army s educa-tional system is continuing to maintainand raise its professional and technicalstandards and is helping to overcome theeffects of demobilization. t is easy to seetljat the system is organized on a. basis un-surpassed by any other nation and that nosigns of easing or letting up have beenindicated.

It is essential that in our training we select men who possess within themthe potentialities of leadership and, secondly, we develop those potentialities..This is best accomplished by giving the leader responsibility. The mere factof responsibility will increase the leader s powers of decisi, n and make himconfident of his ability to handle any crisis.

Field Marshal Montgonte1 Y

Our every action in training and in handling the young men from 18 yearsold and up must contribute to their development. For in this acid test betweenconflicting ideologies, it is going to take a better citizen and a strongerAmerican to meet the constant and continuing attacks on democratic idealsand institutions.

eneTUI Omar N Briulley


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Korean Occupational ProblemsMajor G. Harry Huppert, Infantry

Instructor, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this articleare the auth01 S and not ~ h o s of theDepartment of Defense or the Com-mane/ ancl General Staff College.-T e Eclit01',F ~ almost 4 years, the United States

Army occupied the liberated country ofKorea, During this postwar period, in-numerable political, economic, and socialsituations produced many unusual prob-

l ~ m s for military personnel.1 A portrayal. of some of these not' intile manual problems may help preparefuture commanders and staff officers tocope with similarly difficult circumstances.To understand better the position inwhich the Army found itself during theKorean occupational period, let us firstexamine the country and its people.

The Hermit KingdomThe 600-mile long and 200-mile wide

Korean Peninsula, which juts out from theAsiatic mainland, is a rugged, mountain-ous land. A 4,000-foot mountain rangeforms the backbone of the northern andeastern sections. What few natural re-S rces the country possesses are foundill the northern sector. As the soil isn,'[ fertile, the vegetation is of the poorest

quality, Cultivation of rice is the prin-cipal occupation. This commodity, pro-duced mostly in the south, is the majorfood of the 30 million Korean people.

The history and culture of Korea goesback 4,000 years. However, for most ofthis time, Korea was subjugated by eitherChinese war lords, Manchurian tribalhordes, or the Imperial Japanese forces.Each of these conquerors left their cul-tural imprint upon the dominated Koreanpeople. Oriental scholars claim, neverthe-less, that the peoples of Korea greatlyassisted both China and Japan in thefounding of many of their cultural traits.During their few hundred years of free-dom, it is small wonder that these peopleexcluded all outside influence. Actually,the Korean people have had very littleopportunity to improve their impoverishedplight or to learn enlightened ~ y s ofgovernment, education, industry, economy,and, above all, democracy. It was one of, the last oriental nations to attempt toabsorb the modern concept of civilization.

The PeopleThe average Korean is a happy, friendly,

simple person. His greatest interest is notfreedom and modern democracy; rather,it is whether he and his family will get

merican troops went into Korea untrained nd ill prepared for thecomplex occupational problems which faced them. o avoid thesec]iFflcu ties in the future, officers must be trained in such duties


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MILITARY REVIEWto eat. The vast majority are not

interested in politics. They willand blindly follow any strong type

leadership. Approximately 65' percentf the people are illiterate; less than 10'

have been exposed to any educaon the high school level. Only about1 'percent have received any

education whatsoever. The Koreanare interested in the outside world

as it affects them personally. Theoccupation has opened a new

of light to them, but only a fewthe intelligence and determinationreceive it. The rest are satisfied as theyA few well-educated individuals are

to lead the country out of igno'Unfortunately, most of these inare attempting to gain. whatto dictatorial powers.

OccupationThis was the country and these were theeople introduced to the Army on its

into Korea. Following the BigThree Agrecment (1944) for the joint oc-hy the armed forces of the USSR

the United States, the ; 8 north parwas ~ c l e c t c d ag a temporary controlbctween thc Soviet and Americanto facilitate the surrcnder of theJapallc8c ArlllY in the Land of the Morning,'Culm."

On 15 u g u ~ t IH45, XXIV _Corps, thenn Okinawa, was instructed to occupy.Korea south of 38. North Latitude on or8 September. Adequate time could

not be devoted to analyzing occupationalroblems inherent to such a mission. Inhort, the American Army entered Korea

unprepared for their occupational ro -uite in contrast with the Russians. The

Red Army knew approximately 6 monthsin adVance what units would occupy theirportion of the country. Further, Sovietplans included the designation of units thatwould occupy specific towns in each of thenorthern provinces. F,or years, the Rus

sians had been training selected Koreansin Moscow. Individual Russians had beeneducated to understand the Koreans, theirstandards of life, ideals, culture, andpolitical history.

On 8 September 1945, the 7th Infantry.Division landed at the west'coast port ofInchon. As was expected, the landing op-eration was unopposed. This, peacefulD-day was high-lighted by the release ofsome 150 American and Brjtish prisonersof war. The division quickly occupied thecapital city of Seoul. On the 9th of Sep-tember, the fofmal terms ,of surrender ofthe Japanese forces in Korea were signedby Lieutenant General John R. HodgeCommanding General of XXIV Corps;Admiral T. C. Kincad, USN; and Lieu-tenant General Yokozuki, Imperial Japa-nese Army. On or about 25 September, the40th Infantry Division landed and tookover the southern portion of the UnitedStates occupation zone. During the latterpart of October, the 6th Infantry Divisionarrived and assumed its occupationalduties. Soon thereafter, the 40th Divisionwas inactivated, but the 6th and 7th Divi-sions 'l'emained until .January IH49 whenthey were transferred to Japan.

During the initial occupation phase, theKorean pcople joyously greeted the American troops. For the first 2 weeks of libera-tion, a tremendous holiday spirit prevailed,and it was necessary for the A I1rricancommand to request the people to returnto work. As time went on, the natives ac-cepted the presence of American troops asa matter of c o u r ~ e t was considered byall concerned, Army personnel and Koreansalike, that the occupation would be termi-nated quickly, as the Koreans planned toassume control of their own country. Dueto the intransigent Soviet attitude, com-plete independence is yet to be realized.

The Political PictureA constant source of concern was the

Korean political situation. Initially, there


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OREAN OCCUPATIONAL PROBLEMSwere two major factions-one within thecountry and a provinCial government in ,exile.

Soon after the announcement of the cessation of hostilities, a so-called Koreanpatriot, Lyuh, Woon Hyung (in Korea thesurname is written before the given name),informed the Japanese Governor Generalin Korea that he, in, the name of theKorean people, was assuming control. Tohis surprise, his many demands wereagreed to by the defeated Nipponese official. On the 8th or 9th of September, Lyuhcontrived to meet the American commandand after politely bowing three times, infodned them that he was prepared to assume the leadership of all Korea with hisNew Peoples Party. Rapid United Statesinvestigation' disclosed that Lyuh, hisdaughter, and brother had received a comIllunistic education in Moscow and that hisNew Peoples Party had been organizedin Russia, during the fall of 1944.

The Army quickly dissolved, at least onpaper, this aspiring organization with thereported statement: There is only onegovernment in South Korea-the UnitedStates Army Military Government. However, this did not stop Lyuh, Woon Hyung,hiH brother, Lyuh, Woon Hong and othercOlllmunist leaders Pak, Heun Yung andHu, Hun from forming, with Russian assiHlance, the ever-present leftist organizatioll, the South Korean Labor Party. Lyuh,Woon Hyung continued to dominate southern communist activities until he wasaHsassinated in Seoul on 19 July 1947.

On the other side of the fence was theKorean Government in Exile. This 01'g'allization had been formed in China bytwo self-styled Korean martyrs, Dr. Rhee,,Syngman, American educated Korean diplomat, and tall, gaunt, bespectacled Kim,KO


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four t h ~ u s n d years of subjugation have retarded Korean development. Above tworice the cultivation of which is the principal occupation in SouthBelow left two Koreans demonstrate a primitive method of shoeing an ox. Below.a young Korean makes straw rope with primitive machinery.-US Army photos.


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KOREAN OCCUPATIQNAL PROBLEMS

American occupation forces remain in South Korea while local security forces aretrained to protect the newly liberated nation. Above a company of Korean soldiers fromthe Kungnung garrison, singing as they march. Below a group of mounted officers ofthe new South Korean National Army.-US Army photos.


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14 MILITARY REVIEWstrong right-wing divided against itselfand opposed by a Russian sponsored .andcontrolled leftist party. t was only bydiplomacy and statesmanship on the partof many Americans that the right wingwas finally reunited under Dr. Rhee justbefore the election supervised by theUnited Nations in May 1948. Dr. Rhee is

the president of the livided nation.he u ~ s i a n S t a l ~ m a t e

To complicate further the alreadymuddy waters was the constant provocation of the Russians north of the 38 parallel.. t became apparent early that theRussians intended to make the line ofdemarcation a definite barrier betweennorthern and southern Korea. In December1945, it was decided to convene a US-USSRJoint Commission in an attempt to resolveoccupational difficulties. At this conference, .a 5-year plan of governmental andeconomic guidance for Korea was agreedupon under the title TrUsteeship.

t is interesting to recall the Koreanreaction to this trusteeship clause. Thisterm implied o only one thing to the people,a continuation of foreign domination. Agreat, spontaneous, mass demonstration byall parties was held in Seoul, the capitalof South Korea. Just after the demonstration started, the Red left wing receivedword that the Russians favored trusteeship.The communists quickly withdrew from thenon-partisan demonstration, rewordedtheir signs and banners, and organizedtheir own we favor trusteeship parade.

All explanations to the Koreans c o n ~cerning the word trusteeship were futile.They would not ~ c e p t the true concept ofthis clause as interpreted by the Americans.' Its incorrect interpretation by theKoreans was the root of considerable misunderstanding and difficulty.

At the first' session of the Joint Com ;mission (1946) held in Seoul, the Russianswould not agree to consultation with anyKorean political party that did not favor

trusteeship, This meant tha t only theSoviet-inspired, leftist South Korean LaborParty would be given representation in anynewly formed government. The UnitedStates command would not, and could not -abide by this doctrine, as under the Sovietdemands only a very small minority wouldbe allowed a voice in the government.Therefore, the i ~ s t Joint Commissionfailed. The second session of the commission convened in the spring 0(1947. Again,the same situation prevailed. When theUnited Nations Commission came to Koreain an attempt to settle this internationalproblem, the Russians would not allowthem entrance into North Korea. Becauseof .this, the country still remains divided.

During both of these US-USSR meetings, especially the second, the Russiandelegation in South Korea furthered com-munistic activities in the American zone ofoccupation. The billets of the USSR Dele-gation and the Russian Legation were con-stantly the scene of midnight politicalintrigue. The South Korean communistleaders received instructions, ideas, andplans f ~ o m their Russian associates-this,despite the fact that the Russians weresupposedly in South Korea to assist in theformation of a unified Korean government.Actually, they were doing everything intheir power to prevent it.

To add to this political confusion, theSoviet-enforced 38 0 parallel barrier placedan unnatural and unsolvable economicburden on the Korean nation. Raw materials found in the north were required forthe daily operation of public utilities andindustry in the south. Likewise, the ricecultivated in the south was sorely neededby the people of the non-agriculturalnorth. The Russian:dominated north produced and controlled at least 60 percentof the electrical power. This power' wasneeded by the south to maintain its industry. Normal trade did not exist betWeenthe two sections, due to Russian insistenceon the continuation of their worldwide


16/113

5OREAN OCCUPATIONAL PROBLEMSIron Curtain. The 8 parallel had be

an armed barrier across which nosafely cross.

Military GovernmentOnly against this background can we

the difficulties inherent to esmilitary government in Korea.

The first troops assigned to military govfrom an antiaircraft

unit stationed on Okinawa. Thesethe nucleus of United States

Military Government in Korea.prior knowledge of, and untrained

intricate details of administeringoverseeing governmental, economic,and political functions, these comofficers and men did the very

they could. A preliminary estimate ofmilitary government situation showedmagnitude of their pressing duties. To

with existing problems, additionalwere required to augment the

troop units. This augmentation wasby assigning other combat

to the supervision offunctions.Officers and men who had been trained'

years in military duties with the majorof protecting the United States

and defeating any aggressor,found themselves removed from

units. A month before, thesehad been engaged in battle with

Japanese. They were placed, withouttraining, in charge of the electric comthe streetcar system, the forming of

safety organization, the reestabof hospitals, the operation of the

system, the reorganization of thel11merce department, and a host of inThere has been considerable criticism ofpei-formance of our military govern

in Korea by many individuals and,J uups in the United States. t is hard

understand how anyorte who has neverpen in Korea and is not familiar with the

situation could' write or discuss the many'varied and peculiar problems encountered.Therefore, i t is difficult to believe thatthese individuals and groups 8,000 milesaway, who complained bitterly about thefailure of military government' in Korea,could have done any better.

The language barrier was a real stumbling block. The Army had some Japaneseinterpreters but very few Koreans. t wasnecessary t inform the Korean peoplewhat to do and, in most cases, how to doit. Therefore, the Koreans who could speakEnglish were selected by military government as the individuals who were to betrained to assume economic control of theircountry. t is understandable that someof these Koreans were not the best-qualified persons for the various tasks to whichthey were assigned. Because of this, military government became known as i'TheInterpreters' Government.

Another complicating factor arose fromthe fact that the Japanese had importedinto, Korea all the skilled laborers, technicians, foremen, supervisors, planners,and advisers from Japan. Most Koreanshad been employed just as common laborers or unimportant clerks. They had never,been allowed by the Japanese to assume aplace or position of responsibility. Thissituation existed for 40 years before ourliberation of the country.

Anticipating these and other difficulties,the Army, early in the war, recognized theneed 'for training occupational experts.Military government schools were established, but, in some cases, personnel wereimproperly assigned to such schools. Tofurther complicate matters, many of thesespecially trained individuals were returnedto the Zone of Interior just when theirspecialty was needed the most. Officerswho were trained after VJ-day at theMilitary Government School, Carlisle' Barracks, Pennsylvania, received practicallyno assistance or guidance in their futureduties.. Many of these Carlisle graduates


17/113

6 MILITARY REVIEWin Korea totally unprepared to as

the serious responsibilities of assistin the formation of a new government.

once on the scene of operation,everyone did his best, constantly

the situation by the trial andmethod.

f We Must o It Again'The lessons learned from the occupation

f Korea should be enlightening and beneto the Armed Forces and the United

government. We must not allowlessons, learned the hard way, to beIf we are again forced to per

occupational duties, preparationsbe made to e'nsure that some of ouroccupational difficulties will

be needlessly repeated.Many occupational problems in K ~ r e a

solved by hard work, long hours, coneffort in the face of difficult circum

and a system' of trial and error.could have been solved more easilyefficiently if definite policies and plans

been established before actual occupain these plans should have

the vital requisite, for trainedwe had had these policies,

and skilled individuals, many of theproblems could have been met in

From this analysis of the Korean occu-problems, the following conclu-

are presented;,1. The State Department and the Departof Defense should, at an early date,

the formulation of long-rangepolicies. This planning shouldthe establishment of definite poli-

and doctrine so that the Armed Forcesbe able to properly prepare for any

mission.2. The Department of Defense shoulda long-range educational profor selected Armed Forces officers inThis program should give care

consideration to the selection of the

individuals for this important task. Thevery few officer s who may be receiving thistype of training will not be able to shoulderthe burden in t h ~ event of future occupa-tion. The officers selected should receive de-tailed instruction regarding the plans andpolicies of our government, including ouraims regarding the occupation of bothliberated and occupied nations. These offi-cers should study the government, thepeople, and the topography of all possibleoccupation targets. Further, and most im-portant, these military minds shoulddevote the major'portion of their careerstoward the possible establishment of mili-tary government in various countries.Their ability should be used in the forma-tion of policy, doctrine, and plans.3. As the Army member of the ArmedForces team will likely shoulder a con-siderable portion of any future occupa-tional burden, the Army should institute aneducational program for all officers in occu-pational responsibilities and duties. Thisprogram should include general trainingin the field of governmental functions. AIlofficers participating in this programshould have a general knowledge of foreigncountries, their history and culture, theirpeople, their government, and their cus-foms. Such a program, properly coordi-nated, could be instituted in our serviceschools system, being taught progressivelyas we teach military science and tactics.Experience in our present worldwide occu-pation could materially assist in such aprogram.

We have learned from experience thatmost plans, hastily conceived, are costly,both in men and money. Therefore, weshould prepare for the future now. Weknow that occupation is a major considcra-tiQb in the aftermath of war. Now is thetime to prepare for this difficult task. I istoo late to commence after war has {Icendeclared. The Army has always been well-tr,ained to win wars. In the future, we l)\Ustbe as well-trained to win the peace.


18/113

heMilitary Foundations of Peace'

MERICAN foreign policy seeks aand a stable world order.

thinking agrees that this objecsurrounded on every side by mili

cOJ:jsiderations.The influence of military factors on

can not be realized withoutconsidering the bleak history of war

There have been innumerable warsrecorded time. Since the rise of

culture, wars have grown astroin violence and intensity. By

wars have increased in magand by every standard, the territax paid to Mars becomes more

In our twentieth century ofwe have already fought twelveas many battles as occurred during

ghastly 30 Years War. The actualof battles has increased from

and months. The numberengaged in conflict has expanded

Proportional advances canfound in the number of men mobilized,and per capita cost.

War is peculiarly a matter of vitl;ll conto the Great Powers. Its major burhave been increasingly borne by them.Great Powers paid 90 percent of the

armament bill in 1937 as well asof the admission fee to the 1939-1945

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintner, InfantryInstructor, Command and General Staff College

hostilities. The Great Powers have beenengaged in almost every battle fought inmodern times. As a matter of fact, theGreat Powers have become great by warand have maintained their position andinfluence only through resort to war. Upto the present time, history reveals thatthe decline and eclipse of a great poweroccurs when the nation in question growspacifistic and refuses to defend itsinterests.

In the face of this trend stands thepossibility that future war may sound thedeath knell for victor and vanquishedalike. The contention is advanced by manythat the very survival of our civilizationdepends upon humanity finding a methodof eliminating war as the final instrumentof international dispute.

f one looks objectively at the ascending curve of war frequency and the currentallocation of treasure for military purposes, the chances of a permanent peaceseem slim indeed. This deduction would bereinforced by two other disturbing characteristics of the world scene. First is theacknowledged and sharp ideological cleavage between East and West. There isscarcely a daily paper which does not carrysome story of the conflict between thesesystems. To this situation, it seems appro-

n this article, the case is m de that the chance to prove that rightmight depends on America s m ~ l i t O r y strength nd her ability to 'nd stri/


19/113

MILITARY REVIEWto apply this observation of Justice

Between twothat want to make inconsistentworlds, I see no remedy except

Equally disturbing to the cause of peacethe shift in world power relations soonly the United States and Russia

within their immediate spheresstrength to wage modern war.

of these titanic powers are compelledthe nature' of separate sovereign ex-

observe each other's con,ductdiscreet and watchful eyes. The

States and the Soviet Union stridemodern power heap in a manner

the ancient rivalry betweenRome. The known Mediterworld was too small for both thoseFor this reason, some have alleged

the present world, stripped of theservice rendered by four or five

defunct powers, will be consolidatedforce.Fortunately, the picture can not: be

so simply. I t is a fact that ansplit, bi-power world hason for several years without reto the violent form of conflict

war. On the other hand, few haverash as to describe the volcano

which the world is so precariouslyas a nesting ground for the dove

peace.War weariness has been offered as thewe so anxiouslyDoubtless, it plays a significant

in restraining conflict, but a deeperinto the present absence of w ~ r

be found in the celebrated q,ictum ofthat war is a continuationpoficy." The policies of separate states,the most peaceful, are always indegree of conflict, and war is only

violent expression of conflict betweenopposite policies. From this

of view, which history substantiates,never has been a peaceful period.

There have been less warlike times andperiods more ,warlike, but the underlyingrelationship between peoples has alwaysbeen one of competition. and conflict. Thusfar, history reveals that the causes of warhave been a permanent condition of humanlife. Rivalry over a wide variety of issueshas always split the world into numerousopposing camps.

Aggressive governments have exploitedthis rivalry as the basis for war when-ever it suited their policies. C In a clashof policies, some governments seek tmaintain their position. Others strive toadvance their power position accordingto the dominant interest of the day,' beit religious, economic, or ideological. Gov-ernments which pursue expanding poli-cies are the aggressive governments. Allgovernments, good, bad, or indifferent,have one trait in common; they are formedof men who desire and enjoy p o w r ~ Notimid, retiring violet ever became presi-dent, or dictator, or prime minister. Theindividuals who head governments have apower urge. Since the desires of theaggressor can be realized only at the ex-pense o other governments, demandswhich require a diminution in nationalprestige and importance have never been

c c ~ p t e d without the use or threat offorce.The expansionist policies of 'power-

seeking men, fortified by their egoism,have been the basic cause of war. A ctualwars are fought over concrete issues whichmask the real reasons for their appear-ance. Warlike periods, generally coincidewith periods of great change, or to usethe Russian expression, in times of trouble.In the modern era, the aggressor hasevoked war either to destroy the balanceof power or t o export his domestic poli-cies for foreign consumption.

Covering and obscuring the underlying.causes of war is the' minor detail of inci-

'dents. Incidents are really of little im-portance. Enough incidents have occulTed


20/113

19HE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEthe last several years to havea hundred wars during the reignstyle diplomacy. Similarly, inci-

occur or can be manufacturedthe overt cause for any future

I f the causes of war are permanent, andincidents are frequent, why do particularbreak out when they do? The cor-

answer to this question is that warsbreak out. Instead, wars are made.are made by some ambitious, aggres-ruler, whenever general conditions

to believe he can advance hisby war. A 'potential aggressor

favorable opportunity, s'lll as asplit between his prd'Spectiveor the acquisition of some knock-

which he believes will guar-victory.

I t is a historical fact that no aggressorstarted a war which he thought he

The aggressor entersto gain more power, not to lose whatalready has. Many nations, in self de-

have accepted war thrust upon them,defeat to be inevitable, but nohas taken up the aggressor's swordthe firm conviction that it would be

Every aggressor, down to andHitler and Tojo, has made war

after a careful analysis of the gen-military situation. The general staffpotential aggressor constantly sur-

the military strength of his intendedWhen these victims let their guardown, a new war takes its place in thehistory books.

The aggressor's military estimate n ~ el l l t necessarily be correct. His general4aff may make a faulty' analysis of a,.)mplicated military situation, as Hitler's l rl T,ojo's evidently did. But their mis- kes are beside the point. What is im-

" ,rtant to remember is that, rightly or'\ , ongly, the aggressor willfully under-'a kes to make war only when he is con-that he can win.

This fact, so boldly written in the pagesof history, may enable America to leadthe world to peace. The enormous costand the immense resources which modern'war demands permit the few remainingGreat Powers to establish within theUnited Nations a reign of internationallaw to which tne lesser states must sub-scribe. Disputes between the lesser statescan thus be arbitrated. Wars between thelesser states and the Great Powers arElikewise unthinkable. The only danger tothe peace of the world lies in the fact thatthere is no authority on earth which canforce the major, powers ,to settle their dis-putes except the mutual respect they havefor each other's strength. Ev.ery experi-enced observer has commented upon theunconcealed admiration the Soviet leadershave for power. History has thrown theUnited States and the Soviet Union to thesummit of world power simultaneously.Serious differences exist between thesenations. These differences lead someAmericans to consider Russia as a poten-tial aggressor. Need this fear lead to war?

The untold calamity of such a war canbe prevented if the United States will con-tinue' to maintain sufficient militarystrength to convince the Soviet General, Staff that war against us would be futile.If this strength were maintained for asufficiently long time, ways might befound to settle some of the apparentlyinsoluble difficulties that exist betweenus. Until the hope of a successful majorwar is eradicated from any possibleaggressor's mind, the world may have tocontinue to put up with recriminationsand name calling. But there will be littlelikelihood of overt war as long as ourpeace loving nation can flex a biggermuscle than any potential troubie maker.Common sense teaches that no weakerperson picks a fight with a Joe Louiseither in the Boxing ring or in the largerarena of international affairs.

The military path to peace boils o ~


21/113

MILITARY REVIEWthis: Prevent any potentially hostile

s general staff from ever makingn estimate that the United States could

defeated. The United States c ~ n walkpeace only if it is willing

maintain time of peace forces capableblows of any possibleOur b:urden can be made easier

we can maintain an unbreakable assowith like-minded nations-if pos-

the structure of the UnitedIn the past, the American peacetime

to protect this nation hasbeen impressive. Until recently, our

leaders have turned away fromproblems. of defense in a-reminiscent of the fabled ostrich.

opinions of American military menbeen ignored. As a result, our demeasures have alternated between

of total unpreparedness and timesf frenzied and wasteful purchase of mili

might.In 1937, 4 years after Hitler announced

plans of aggression, we had propormen under arms than the

men which were authorized a disGermany by the treaty of Versailles.

Jlame year, the cost of our militarybenefits beingto World War I veterans, amounted to

percent of our national income. At thetime, the other Great Powei s were10 percent of their respective

incomes in preparations for war.Under the special conditions of the impostwar period, a higher percent

of the American -national income hasearmarked for military purposes. The

return of this appropriation hasconsiderably lessened by occupation

non-militai y items charged toThe USSR has been spending for mili

purposes approximately the sameas the United States. The

value of the Soviet expenditure

has ~ e n increased by the_low pay scales~ s t b l i s h e d for the ranks of the Red Armyand the absence of occupation costs whichhave trimmed the other military items inour own budget.

f nations of approxfmately equalstrength remain equal, there is no possi-bility of war breaking out between them.But if one of these nations invests; overa span of years, several times as much ofits entire national effort into militaryforces as the other, a great disparity instrength will inevitably develop. Simi-larly, if one nation demands that all ofits citizens be trained for war while theother relies on the inducement of decentpay to attract men into its Armed F o r c ~ sthese two nations will pull further apdfurther apart in relative strength. ome-where along this easily discernible line,one power will become immensely strongin comparison with the other. f thestronger power happens to be pursuingaggressive policies, the fatal hour willcome when its general staff will decide thata military victory over its rival lays withinits grasp. f we ever permit this hour toarrive, the responsibility for war can becharged to American inability to read andTeact to history.

Eternal vigilance is the price of peace,more so now than ever before. To objectivethinkers, a realistic program of matchingstrength to strength in order to guaranteepeace makes sense. Yet, there are dartgersto s u ~ h a program. Unless we pursue itprudently, we face the possibility of anarms l ace which might be instrumentalin forcing a war which our securitymeasures are designed to prevent.

This vicious circle can be broken if theUnited States pledges to use its armedforce for the only rational and moral pur-pose for which any force can be uped:self defense. Power allied to moral pur-pose has never menaced society. In per-sonal affairs, self defense is the first ruleof life. In these affairs, a body of law has


22/113

2HE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEestablished the rule that the individualwho commits the first overt act againstanother in a dispute is the aggressor.Mere preparation or mere words andthreats never comprise assault-only the_actual deed of violence does. I f thissimple test could be applied to ~ n t e r n a -tional disputes, there would be chance ofa durable peace.A statement that American forces wouldnever commit the first overt military actwould cut the feet from those individualswho contend that necessary American military power is a challenge to world peaceand is the main inspiration of the vastSoviet armaments. The United States ispreeminently suited for waging a strugglefor peace by renouncing aggression. Thefact that our government operates withinrestricted constitutional powers would insure that a renunciation on our part ofaggressive war would receive the enthusiastic and sincere support of peopleseverywhere.Such a declaration of national policywould, contribute a refreshing moral advance to the confused standards of international conduct. I t would be a clearrefutation of those in our midst who havelost their sense of balance under the pressure of continuing world crisis. Overawedby the atomic bomb, frightened by thepossibility of other novel forms of warfare,and fearful of threats against the United,States, some of our citizens plead thattll United States consider preventive war.Tllese people reason that, because of thepower of modern weapons, the next war\\ III be won by the side that strikes first.This they advocate we do. Needless to


23/113

American and Allied Strategy'n the ar East

Dr. Louis Morton'Historical Division, Special Staff, United States Army

This article is abl'idged from achapter with the same title in Dr. Mor-ton's forthcoming book, The Fall of thePhilippines, in the series, The U. S.Army in World War II. Copyright1949 by Orlando Ward; permission forrepl'Qduction may be obtained on re-quest from the Chief, Historical Division, Special Staff, United StatesAl my, Depal tment of the Al my, ThePentagon, Washington 25, D. C.-TheEdit01'.

T The Orange PlanHE defeat of Germany in World WarI and the postwar treaties altered funda-mentally the problem of the defense of thePhilippines and America's strategic posi-tion in the Far East,

Th'e mandate to Japan of the Germanislands in the Central Pacific gave thatnation numerous bases which lay astridethe United States Fleet's line of commu-nication. This fact, coupled with the de-Velopment of aviation, made it necessaryto capture or neutralize Japan's bases inthe mandated islands before Americanforces could be sent to the Far East.

Aside from these changes, the peacetimestrength of the US Fleet relative to thatof Japan so declined following the Wash-

i n g t o ~ Treaties of 1922 that it was doubt-ful if it could have met the latter on equalterms in the Western Pacific, But therewas no weakening of America's determina-tion to retain the Philippines, or to with-draw naval and military forces, "leaving

the Islands a prey to any powerful nationcoveting their rich soil and potential commercial a d v a n t a g e ~ ~ __J .The changed sItuatIOn In the PacIficafter 1920 was effectively presented inDecember 1921 by the War Plans Divisionof the Army's General Staff. The rmyplanners argued that Japan's desire forexpansion and her ambition to dominatethe Far East ran counter to the interestsand established policy of the United States.Unless either or both countJ,;ies indicateda willingness to give way, this conflict ofinterests was certain, sooner or later, toproduce a situation that could not beadjusted except by force. They urged,therefore, that a war plan be prepared forsuch a contingency.

The Joint Plannipg Committee of theJoint Board of the Army and Navy, afterstudying for over a year the Army's estimate of December 1921, recommended thata war plan be prepared. The committeepointed out that a war with Japan 'wouldbe primarily naval. in character, and thatthe aim of the United States should be toisolate the enemy by control of his vitalsea communications and by offensive seaand air operations. To accomplish this objective, the joint planners stated, theUnited States must secure naval superiority in the Western Pacific. Since the bestavailable base west of Pearl Harbor lor alarge naval force was at Manila Bay, itwould be essential in case of war to hold itand deny its use to the enemy. The Phil-ippine garrison should, therefore, be pre-


24/113

23AMERICAN AND ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE FAR EASTmaintain its positions until the

Department could send reinforce-,strength to maintain

of the United States on ManilaThe Joint Board approved the esti

its planning committee and recomthe preparation of a basic planbe followed in case of a war in the

First range PlanWar Plan Orange ,. the Joint US Army

Navy plan for war in the Pacific, withas the probable enemy, was com-and approved by the Joint Board

Secretary of the Navy in August 1924the Secretary of War' on 3 Sepalmost 3 years after the idea

advanced by the Army planners.general concept of operations em-

in the plan was essentially that

The mission ,of the War Department'under War Plan Orange was to provide allArmy forces and supplies required. Possible theaters of operations n a war withJapan would include the ContinentalUnited ,States, the Canal Zone, theHawaiian Islands, the Marshall and Caroline Islands, Guam, the island of Luzon inthe Philippines, and. Japanese home territory.

On the basis of the existing mobiliza-tion plan, the Army was to make available30 days after D-day 15,000 men for suchislands in the Pacific as it was decidedto seize and hold. By that time, troopsrequired for raising the garrisons of Oahuand Panama to war strength would heavailable on the east and west coasts ofthe United States. To reinforce the Philippines, one Army Corps of 50,000 men, inaddition to the other troops already men-

policy prior to orld ar dict ted that the U efenbut in the best opinion of military dvisers the

were indefensible with existing naval and military forceshad been stated in the study made by

Joint Planning Committee. The Unitedthe Orange plan stated, wouldan offensive war, primarily naval,toward the isolation and harass

of Japan, through control of hersea communications and through

sea and air operations againstnaval forces and economic life, fol-

if necessary, by such further actionmay be required to win the war. The

of the United States and theof the Army and Navy in

war with Japan would be to establishen power in the Western Pacific in" ~ 1 g t h superior to that of Japan. Such1 ;'lIl,as the Joint Committee had pointed

would require the establishment of a,, in outlying base in that area. Manila.. \ was considered as the best location fora base.

tioned, was to be ready to sail from theWest Coast in time to reach Oahu 10 daysafter the opening of hostilities. Four dayslater, these reinforcements would sail forthe Philippines. Supplies for this forcewere to be stored in the Philippines duringpeacetime. t was not considered practicable to bllild up the local defense of thePhilippine Islands to a strength sufficientto hold 'out against a determined attack byJapan for an indefinite period without relief from the United States.

To e x e u t ~ such a plan was far beyondthe capacities of either the Navy or theArmy in 1925. The entire military establishment in the Islands did not numbermore than 15,000 men. Neither the base atCavite nor Olongapo was equipped for morethan minor repairs, and neither was adequate for the maintenance of a large fleetMoreover, the US Fleet was divided be-


25/113

MILITARY REVIEWthe Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, andU$ Fleet base even partially

of supporting major vessels was atHarbor. While Pearl Harbor was

located to defend the westof the United States and, with Samoa,

Panama Canal, it could offer littleto the' Philippines 5,000 milesFrom Japan's southernmost naval1,500 miles distant, an expediforce could reach Manila in 3 days,the i ~ s i g r i i f i c a n t or non-exshore defenses, and make itselfmaster of Luzon.

Revision of PlanBetween 1925 and 1938, the range planrevised many times; and commandersthe field made their own plans based

the assumptions in this plan. Anfactor,in these revisions was thewhich had been growing among

since the end ofWar I, that the Philippine Islandsindefensible and a military liability.view was based on many factors: theof air power, Japan's possesof the mandated islands and controlthe line of communications across thethe failure to carry out the earlyfor the construction of a naval base

Cavite, and the weakness of the USTo carry out the present range plan,commander of the harbor defenses of

and Subic Bays wrote in 1933,the provisions for the early dispatchour fleet to Philippine waters, i t wouldliterally an act of madness. This

on an added significancethe fact that its author, Stanley D.a brigadier general, was theofficer who, with Colonel F. V. Abbottestablished the fortifications

Corregidor. General Embick by nowbecome one of the strongest advocatesabandoning the Philippines if the United

was unwilling to expend large sums

in its defense. Corregidor, he admitted,could probably withstand attack for abouta year. But the defense of Corregidor wasdesigned only to deny to the naval vesselsof an enemy the use of Manila Bay. Itspossession could not ensure the US Fleeta sheltered harbor in which to overhauland repair major fleet units as long as anenemy could command the waters of ManilaBay from the land side. The Army's' de-fenses in the Philippines were not strongenough to prevent a determined andaggressive enemy from reaching Manilaby land in a short time and denying theuse of the Bay to the American fleet. Thebest that could be hoped for in the e v e ~ tof ':lar with Japan, General Embick felt,was that wise counsels would prevail,and that the American people wouldacquiesce in the temporary loss of the Philippines until such t ime-2 or 3 years-asthe fleet conld return to Far Easternwaters.

Since the question of granting independence to the Philippine Islands was thenbeing widely considered in the UnitedStates, and there was little likelihood ofincreasin'g the expenditures for their de-fense, Embick's views found ready support.The commander of the Philippine Department, Major General E, E. Booth, endorsedGeneral Embick's views. He pointed outto the War Department that the enemycould be expected to attack without warning and that a plan of defense had to bebased on the existing peacetime militaryorganization. Corregidor, he, stated,

can resist invasion as long as food andammunition hold out, but the Manila andCavite areas would fall with little if anyresistance. But what was the reason forthe defense of Corregidor, he asked? Theanswer was implicit in the question. Sinceit could not be used by the US Fleet if theenemy controlled the land area aroundManila Bay, the sale purpose of defendingCorregidor, General Booth concluded, ' isto keep the American Flag flying. He


26/113

25MERICAN AND ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE FAR EASTtherefore recommended, with GeneralEmbick, that the United States arrangefor the neutralization of the Philippines,withdraw our military garrisons and navalshore establishments from the Philippinesand China, and adopt the line AlaskaOahu-Panama as our strategic peacetimefrontier in 'the Pacific. "

On the basis of these recommendations,the War Plans Division of the GeneralStaff recommended to the Chief of Staffthat, if the concurrence of the State Department could be obtained, the troops inChina be withdrawn, and that the rangeplan be reviewed by the Joint Board. Thewithdrawal of United States forces fromthe Philippines, which was clearly a political question to be decided by the President and Congress, was never consideredby the War Departmen t or the Joint Board.

Dissatisfaction with the existing plandid not end with this proposal. In March1934, when the Tydings-McDuffie Act waspassed, the Army and Navy commandersin the Philippines presented a joint letterto their respective departments. Theyargued that, in view of the reductions inmilitary and naval strength in the Philippine area, it was impossible for them tocarry out their assigned missions. Nationalpolicy with regard to the Philippines, theyfelt, was not clear and they asked for adefinite statement on which to base theirplans. f the United States intended t< ldefend the Islands whether or not they",el:e granted their independence, then thlnaval and land forces should be increased,ant an adequate base be built in the area.j ,'eaties prohibiting such construction,

i. The Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922;,-l,ould be abrogated. f the United States:.tended to withdraw its forces and volun, t, "ily relinquish its control over the Phil ,,,ines and responsibility for their de ,e , then only such forces should be, :ained in the Islands as would be re" red to maintain internal order during

the transition period leading to i n e p e n ~en,ce.This letter, with General .Embick's

memorandum avd General Booth's indorsement, led to a re-examination of defenseplans for the Philippines. The Army planners opposed the reduction of militarystrength to the Islands pending the finalgrant of independence and wished to maintain the fortifications there in as higha state of efficiency as is practicable. Inhis instructions to the Army members ofthe Joint Planning Committee of the JointBoard, Brigadier General C. R Kilbourne,Chief of the War Plans Division, statedthat joint plans contemplated that theArmy in the Philippines should be reinforced promptly in case of war and thatsuch reinforcements would be convoyed bynaval 'forces. About 2 years earlier, herecalled, the Chief of Naval Operationsand the Chief of Staff had discussed thisquestion with the President who had statedthat he was pleased to learn of a planwhich promised the successful holding ofthe Philippine Islands in the event of war.General Kilbourne felt that the existing force in the Philippines was still sufficient to give reasonable assurance thatManila Bay can be held if reinforcementsare sent as contemplated. The War Department view, he said, was that the jointletter should be disapproved, and that theAsiatic Fleet should carry out its mission.f the Navy Department felt, that it was

impossible to convoy reinforcementspromptly to the Philippines and undertakeimmediately operations in the WesternPacific, and this was really the importantquestion, then the mission of the commander of the Philippine Departmentwould have to be changed.

Apparently, the Navy still felt that itcould perform its mission, for the JointBoard recommended that the proposals ofthe army and navy commanders in the Philippines be disapproved, and that the miss'ion of the army forces remain unchanged.


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MILITARY 'REVIEW

did state, however; that the forces inPhilippines should be increased, thatair force should have 155 planes, andAsiatic Fleet 24 submarines and 15planes." Harbor defense, antiair

and mobile troop strength shouldaugmented, and Mindanao should befor possible airfield sites.

In transmitting the decision of the Jointto the commander of the Philippine

General Douglas MacArthur,Chief of Staff, stated that the policy

United States Government towardPhilippines was guided by the Tydings

Act in which this country acfor the defense of the

until final independence wasAfter that time, the United

was to give up all military installain the Philippines, but, subject to

negotiations,' might retain navaland fueling stations in the

- .A year later, in May 1935, the Jointrevised the mnge plan. This

was made to bring the plan intowith the 4-Army organizationthe War Department, the Mobilization

of 1933, and the Navy's recommendatbat the Pacific Fleet's line of advance

the Central Pacific be a progresmovement. fhe first operation, to be

as soon as practicable, was tothe Marshall and Caroline IslandsJapan in order to develop advanceand secure the lines of communica

to the Western Pacific.The next year, 1936, range was revised

Previously, the mission of ArmyNavY forces had been twofold: to hold

to Manila Bay, and to holdM ~ n i l a Bay area itself as long as pos

The second part of the mission wasin 1936, and the Army was

to defend only the entrance toBay, but was authorized to under

"such delaying action . asbe practicable without jeopardizing

the timely withdrawal of mobile ground'forces to the Bataa'n Peninsula. "The Asiatic F-leet, which was only a smalltask force, was to divert Japanese navalforces from opposing the westward advance of the main US Fleet.In the same year, 1936, there was asignificant change in the Army's strategical

plan which was the result of the development of a Philippine Army. Although themission of Army forces in the,Philippinesremained the same, the 1936 revision madeno definite provision for reinforcementsfrom the United 'States. Instead of planning on the use of a corps of 50,000 men,the Army planners in the General Staffdecided that the defense would be conductedby the peacetime garrison in the Islands(the Philippine e p a r t ~ e n t consisting' of10,000 US Army troops)' l),einforced bythe Philippine Army troops raised under,local defense plans, and such Americantroops in China as could be sent' to thePhilippines. Thest: defending forces wouldhave to hold out for a t least 6 months,after which, presumably, the Navy wouldhave been able to open the line of com-munications across the 'Central Pacific

The next, and final, revision of the Jointmnge plan came in 1938 and was due to

the increasing threat of Japanese aggression in the Far East and the rise 'of theFascist Powers in Europe. Since November1937, the planning staffs of the Army' andNavy, as a result of a Joint Board directive to prepare a new estimate of the worldsituation, had been studying their ownplans in the light of international developments. To the Joint Board, it appearedthat American plans dealing with a waragainst Japan were "unsound in general"and "wholly inapplicable to the presentcondition." For the first time, apparently, 'the strategic planners considered the fj>os-sibility of a two-ocean war, but the solution accepted was not that which wasfollowed when war came. The Army m,'lllbel'S of the Joint Planning Committee, be-


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27MERICAN AND ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE FAR EASTlieving that the US Fleet could not secure

~ o n t r o in the Western Pacific, proposedthat the United States maintain a defensive position east of the 180th meridianand exert economic pressure .againstJapan. The Navy members of the Com-'mittee continued to advocate an offensivewar in the Western Pacific and the rapidprojection of strong naval forces intoPhilippine waters in the belief that the USFleet was strong enough to support suchoperations.

The plan finally approved by the JointBoard on 21 February 1938 compromisedthe Army and Navy views. It stated that,in the event of war with Japan, the operations of American military and navalforces would be guided by the followingconcept: military and economic pressure, made progressively more severe, untilthe national objective is obtained. Initialoperations would be primarily naval incharacter, and would be coupled with measures designed to insure the security of thecontinental United States, and the strategictriangle, Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. TheNavy, in a series of operations, was to extend its control of the sea westward asrapidly as possible, while maintainingsecure its line of communications. Together, the Army and the Navy were toconduct operations against Japanese armedforces and sea communications in order tobring increasing military and economicJll'essure against that nation. The jointmission of the' forces in the Philippines),Plllained the same: .to hold the entranceManila Bay in order to deny the use of

Bay to Japanese naval forces.I'he planning for the defense of the

:lilippine Islands shows clearly the di, nma in which the United States found' If. National policy dictated the defensean ,insular possession, which, in the

,t opinion of American military advisers,dd not be defended with existing navalmilitary forces. Plans were made fordefense of the Philippines, but these

.plans were based on conditions which fewof. the responsible planners believed couldbe fulfilled.

General Embick, who became chief ofthe Army's War Plans Division in 1935,expressed the views of these men when hestated that America's military position inthe Far East was indefensible, and thatthe United States could not prevent thecapture of the Philippines by the Japanesein the early stages. of a war with thatnation. The Philippines, he claimed, couldbe held only if the Navy could control thesea lanes in the Western Pacific, and afterthe mandated islands were taken.

In the light of these views, GeneralEmbick proposed, as he had some yearsearlier when he was commander of theharbor defenses in the Philippines, that theUnited States give up any idea of holdingthe islands, and instead adopt as its peacetime frontier the strategic triangle,Alaska-Hawaii-pimama. The last wasadopted and found expression in the finalrevision of the mnge plan in 1938.

Despite America's political commitmentsin the Far East which required thf;l defenseof the Philippines, Congress was extremely reluctant to grant funds for menand supplies, to increase the size of thefleet, or to strengthen American positionsalong the line of communications to theWestern Pacific. After 1935, Congressionalreluctance to spend money on Philippinedefense was strengthened by the feelingthat such military installations would, ina few years, probably revert to Philippineownership. The War Department, therefore, was required to limit its defensemeasures to t1 .e maintenance of the Philippine 'garrison and existing installations., -

Orientation of Strategy, 1938-1940The conditions which had led to the re

vision of the range plan in 1938 led alsoto the re-examination of plans for a warin the Pacific. International events forcedon Army and Navy planners a reorienta:


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MILITARY REVIEWstrategy which placed an entirely

emphasis on the defense ofpossessions in the Pacific. ]' arctic warfare. They had apparentlyfailc d to comprehend the magnitude of thed . mands of arctic warfare on specializedt, :lining and equipment. The winter equipnknt of the Russian troops wascharacterj:c of their s u p e r f i ~ l preparation for

winter combat. Many of the Russian troopswore summer footwear. Naturally enough,this resulted in frozen feet, and loweredmorale and fighting ability. The problemof winter mobility was grossly neglected,To illustrate this, the trucks of the 44thDivision contained several hundred pairs ofskis, apparently intended for the Russianscouts. The scouts, however, were nottaught how to use them. Large boxes ofnew ski instruction manuals were foundby the Finns, unopened. The inevitableresult of this was that in heavy snow theRussians were badly road-bound. The Russians should have known from experiencein their own country that there are fewroads in the arctic. Generally, Russian infantry was able to move only about 300 to400 yards from the road on either side, andits speed of advance through deep snow byfoot was extremely slow. No warm tentswere provided for the troops. Men were:forced to dig snow caves to keep warm,and they quickly lost much of their fightingenergy in the process. Equipment forplowing snow and opening roads was nonexistent or very primitive. The result wasthat it was exceedingly difficult to moveartillery and motorized equipment intopositions off the roads.. The Red commanders and troops. sent to

face Finland's subarctic conditions founda very sparse road net, few settlements,deep snow, severely cold. weather, anddensely forested terrain. They were con-fronted with insurmountable problems ofwhose existence they had not imagined.They placed their dependence on superiority of numbers, firepower, and materiel,not realizing that this was not enough.They were unable to deploy and advance inthe roadless, deeply snow-covered terrain,and thus they failed to use their entirestrength to the best advantage. Theirmovements were slow and road-bound.Their fire did not reach maximum effective-ness in the heavy forests and deep snowagainst the highly mobiJe Finns.


63/113

MILITARY REVIEWDuring the entire battle of Suomussalmi,

air forces had air superiority.fact, however, did not affect the situa

The forest-covered terrain, longquickly changing weather con

were all used by the Finns to theirthe effectiveness of Red airwas reduced almost to insignificance.

The combat strength of the Finnishwas based on mobility and the ability

o maneuver. The over-snow mobility ofentire army was developed to the

This made it possible to conductthat were not dependent ont opened the way to wide envelop

at times, even the main body of theforces were TIl ved to the Russian01 rear. t made possible the cutting

f Russian lines of communication,. theup of their forces, and their subse

in detail.The use of sUl'prise attacks was a pri

characteristic of Finnish tactics. Theforesfs, long dark nights, snow

and other phenomena typical ofsubarctic were invariably used to adby the Finns.

In contrast to the Russians, the Finnsspecial emphasis on the importance

f rll,connaissance. Reconnaissance was alalways performed by ski patrols.

in peacetime trainingplaced on operations in forests.

Harassing the enemy 'played an impart in Finnish combat. This

the enemy to remain in a constantof combat readiness and kept himgetting vitally needed sleep. Haras

attacks tended to mislead the Russianskept them in a condition of uncer

An obvious example of the successf these tactics was when the 44th Divisionoff its attack and set up an all

defensive position at a criticalin the battle.

Leadership and MoraleAn account of this battle would be in

if it did not touch upon the chief

factor in this clash' between the Finns andthe, Russians-that is, the soldiers andtheir leaders. The Finn, a free soldier ofa free country, showed' himself, above all,to be the mental superior, of the coercedRussian soldier. The Finn's daily struggleagainst arctic nature gave hin1 physicalstrength and resourcefulness on the fieldof battle. His morale was braced by hispatriotism and by his belief in the immorality of such an attack by a largepowerful nation on a small country.

The Russian soldier had very little ofthis to bolster' his ,morale, The Finnishcommand was characterized by its courageous leadership, its determination to destroy the enemy, and its ability' to find waysand means despite marked deficiencies inweapons and equipment. These meansthey found in arctic nature. By makingthe best use of what he found, the Finnishsoldier with courage destroyed the powerful mechanized Russian divisions, unsuitable as they were for arctic warfare.

t is as the mocking of fate. A Russianfield manual of 1936 contains this' paragraph:

Troops who have not received efficienttraining, or who are not properly equipped,quickly lose their fighting ability, as technical fighting equipment, unsuitable forwinter conditions, proves to be a ' heavyburden for them.

Truer words were never written. '['hat isexactly what happened to the Red Armyitself in the Battle of Suomussalmi, andgenerally speaking, that is what happenedin the entire Finno-Russian War.

ConclusionWhether or not the Russians thoroughly

learned the lessons in arctic warfaretaught them by the Finns is open to conJecture. t is reasonable to assume thnt thepresent-day Russian Army places muchgreater emphasis on training in arcticwarfare than i t did prior to the FinnoRussian Winter War of 1939-1940.


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UNITE ST TES

A 1,341,637 contract for a survey in 37and Alaska, to determine suitable

areas for the manufacture offuels, has been awarded

the Department of the Army.The Bureau of Mines, the agency having

responsibility for the syntheticfuel program, designated the rawconsidered in the survey.are coal, oil shale, natural gas, and

impregnated strippable deposits. TheMines also will select the procof manufacture to be considered

furnish other technical data. TheStates Geological Survey and theof Reclamation will provide tech

experts for consultant service.Factors to be considered in determininggeneral area suitable for the manu

liquid fuels will inthe availability of raw materials in

quantity and quality as well assupply, power, transportation, labor,

and markets. The survey ofwill be limited to the coal deposits

that portion' of Alaska between theand 152nd meridians and south ofArctic Circle.-Department of Defense.

Germ isposalThe military's bacteriological warfare

plant is faced with the same problem perplexing the atomic material factoriesdisposal of highly dangerous wasteproducts.

This came to light recently in an Armyreport disclosing new details on the operation of the Germ Warfare ResearchProject at Camp Detrick, Md., where theArmy started the bacterial warfare project during World War II The laboratorycurrently is the only one operated br themilitary.

, Both the waste matter, which is extremely virulent, and the

Military Review December 1949

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Transcript of Military Review December 1949