Honora=hnmO&M;rah Jr.

Lieutenant General Gerald T. Bartlett CmImyIdmL USACGSC

Major Ganeral Gordon R. Sullivan

OePuly Commandant, USACGSC

Military Revl& Staff

colonel James A, Rye, lntenm Eddor/n Chief L&denant C&met Lynn Havach, Assoaate Eddor L.!euleflant Colonel Thomas E Conrad. Managing Eddor Mrs. Patdcia L, Wilson, Secrbtaiy F9atures Mr. Phflt!pR Daws, Books Edmm Production Stafl Mrs Dw!e R Dommg.ez, Pmducbon Editcw Mr. Charles A Mamnson III, Art and Design; Mr. D. LL Giangrecb, Destg Ed#Or, Ms, Patricia H. Norma% Manuscnptllndex Edt. toc Mrs. Cynth!a L. Teare, ManuscnptlEddorm/ A@stan?; Mr Amos W Gallaway, Pm?tmg off,. cer

laUrrAmedcan Editions: Spariish-Amwican Eddron Lieutenant Colonel F,del A, Camales,Chderm Army. Span)sh-A.men can Eddor; Mr. flaul Aponte and Mrs .%xa L DWIZ,Eddom: Mrs Margaret M Blue.,Tfamlamc Mm Wlnona E, Stmble, Eddon.@Aswsttmt Brazilian Edttion Colonel Franc,scv S C Pam. plon.a,Bra,?kw Army, Combmed Arms center Liaison Off{cerlMddary R9viaw Advw3r, Mr Atmensio Et.Lopes, Eddoc Mr Carlos M Chacbn and MIS Lore C. Rezac, Translators Ms Bslva K WMOn, Eddom91Ass@ant Administration: Staff Sergeant (P) Earn~st Stephens, Admm!sfrabve NCO, Mrs Eumce E Ovetfreld, Mrs Merrtam L Clark and Mtss Donna. mane I DeLarenzo, SubSCi7Pt10rIS .

MR Advisory Sosrd. CUlone!Orwe N Butts, A.wManf Lfepuiy Commadat, Ch.wma: COILI. nel Cre,ghlon W. Abrams Jr., Ccmbmed Arms and Sewices Staff School; Colonel M,chael T Chase. Depwtnwm of A.cadenvc Operahos, colonel Howard Dan!el Jr., Dep.mrment of Sustainment and Resourc!ng Operations; Colonel Leonard A. Fiore, Schcel for Pm fess!onal Deva/. opmenc Colonel Lows D F. Frasche, Combat Stud(es Insbbde; Colonel George K Hastmqs, AMTY~~~ Guard Adviser Colonel John R Landry, Center for Army Tactics: Dr. Peter Mas!owski, John F. kfomson Ch&r of Mmtary ffstwy; blond Richard H&t Smnfesh. school of Advanced Military Studies. C-alonel Rcivlrd H Taylor, DepattmentofJoint and CQmbmed Oper. abons; Colonel Frederick W T&mmennan Jr.,

Military Review The Professional Journal of the US Army

Published by US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

VOLUME I-XVII 0 APRIL 1987 NO 4

CONTENTS

2 Beyond Duty, Honor, Country by Lew/s .SOr/ey

14 Deployable Armor Today by Lfetienant Colonel A J Bacewch, US Army, and tiaurenant Colonel Robert R. Ivany. US Army

(24 Heavy/light Operations

by Colonel Wdham W Han20g, US Army, and Colonel John D. Howard, US Army

34 Soviet Reinforcement in Europe by Lieutenant Co/one/Kenneth M. Ke/fner, US Army, and Graham H. Jurb!wlle Jr.

44 Perspectives on Force Projection: 46 A Difference in Style

by Ma/or Stephen E Runak, US Army

51 A Fiord Too Far? by tvfajorJohn Moncwe, US Army

59 Battle Rhythm tJy Ma/or Robert F Dees, US Army

65 Lost Island? by Vlad!mrrGorshemn

68 The Warrior Spirit by Major Robett L Magmms, US Army

80 Insights

81 Summaries the best from other/ourna/s

84 Letters

88 News

91 Book Reviews ~$;:zzzf~g

96 Bulletin Board

Centsrfor.4nny Lbadershlp m!,.. mv,cm ,s,s 4,, ,30, .s3ss.0026 4>.8

From the Editor

One of the few constants within the military is change, and a major change has taken place at Military Ret.ieco. The editor in chief, Colonel Frederick W. Timmerman Jr., has been named asthenewdirector of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) here at the US Army Command and General Staff College. His education and experience make him uniquely qualified for this position.

His leaving Miltturyliewew come< at a very critical point in the journals history. He has been the driving force behind many of the changes in the journal that we hope our readers have taken notice of over the past 21 months. New features such as Insights: Dialogue and the Bulletin Board have been added. Innovative graphic design incorporating more photographs and artwork, an increase in the number of articles providing the opportunity for more professionals voices to be heard on a wide range of subjects and the behind-thescenes efforts to make the journal more effkient in this time of constrained budgets are but some of the contributions made by Colonel T.

The sailing has not all been smooth. Changes are not always met with ready acceptance, The focus, talents and efforts of many people have to be balanced, guided and sometimes nudged along for maximum effect. There are even those who would let the journal fade away if there were not someone who is wilhng and able to articulate the need for forums that enhance the professional and educational development of those in the profession of arms. Colonel T has done all of this for Mditury Reuteu,, and it is with our highest esteem that we wish him the best for the future. His influence will be felt for a long time.

What bas ;11 this to do with this issues focus on force projection? Not a whole lot except that, were it not for some of the Colonels efforts, there would not be a focus to talk about. For that matter, there would be no editorial space to introduce it.

Git thar fustest with the mostest is how one professional ISsa]d to have described force projection. But getting there is only the first part of the job. The mostest part involves ensuring that the right forces get there, are used effectwely and are sustained and that adequate follow-on forces are available. This issue provides a wide range of thoughts on this far-reaching subject (no pun intended).

Colonel Timmerman has joined a distingmshed list of former Jfflrimy Remew ed]tors who have contributed immeasurably to the prestige and influence of the journal through the years. But perhaps no one has done more to help the Jouznal git thar fustest with the mostest than Colonel T. ,

TEC

.

m The EztansionTrahlng Management

(m) rdmstmata, UK Acln,y Cmnmand and Qeneral Staff College 0J3MG3@, shmgsd w name dur@ Jimmy to the Sohooi of C&reapondlng 2hxiles, or SOCS&&GwmQJt jo- the lo-month hnmand 2tAd70fflo8re C9Urea (CGSCC), the C!Onlbhled Arm9 and E9rvlsea 3taff &hOol (OAW), the &hOOl for Profesaionaf Davalopmant (SPD) andtha&hcd of Admncad Mllltarg 3tudles (2AM2)as tbeflfth sshOO1atthe LJE@W0. 3CCS offlsials ask that alf mrrsapondenoe with the ashool US-Sths new Utle, but lmtrwtional material containing Dre printsd envalopea with the old ~1% title wi119tiu bad.eHver&l

El S&-x The C!mnsil for International Exchange

of 3ch01ars W Snnounwd tha Opanmg of wmpatition for the 1933-39 Nbrlght @iltlta ill rasearoh M tiW1S@ Iedmring abroad More than 300 maearoh @anta and 700 lmturing grants are available for perfcda cftbnamontbs taafldl timis year in mar 100 wu.ntrlw, Nbrf@t awardaam granted inna@ye wry diEICi@M m Scholm% of all r@3d9nlic ranks. APPlloation dedlines are atsggemd between 15 June 1987 and 1 I%brumg 1923. For more tiormation and applications, writs the Caunsfl for IntarnstiOneJ Exchange of 2sholam, 11 Dupont Circle NW, Wasblngton, DC 2003&1267, or will (202) 932-3401.

g :=-ml&l

The U3 Navy Memorial, a llving trifmts to the men and women who have emwd m the NaWI aim% its founding, will be dedicated in Wash@tQn. DO, on Navy DW m Ostober. The memorial will lnolude the Naw Memoriaf @g Worn sontalnlng a sompute- data Msa of names of Navy vetmane. For more information on the dedic&ion or w contrlbuta to the memorfals sonstmotion, writs the U3 Navy Memorkd Foum5atio& Post 0ffls8 Box 12723, AI.lin@Jn, VA 22209-3723, or oaD 1-300-321%892.

g~~ma~ An affortW under ww to enowmge

ratfred and aeon-teretlrg nUltary pammmel toaeeksemndssmars Inteaohmg and sohool admMatmttOn. The US Department of Edusatton has prepared a paoket of materials Which lnsludmabook16t, A 2a00nd Os?aerfiu Yom, thatex@ina how, tn find a job in elementary, aewndmg and p+xkweondmy wlmofs and the oertfflcation proscss tYOm W@ military standpoint To obtain the infomnatfon pwket, write the US Department of Education, CMloe of Public Affaira, Room 2039, 400 Maryland Avenue ~+:5ES&@3Q DO 20202, or safl (202)

El~~ The annual reunionof the 43th @abee8

of World War II will be held 7-9 May at the Green Oak Inn and Cmferenra Center, Fort WOxtlATemw. Fur more Mormation on the munioz write to I&my Holllway, 1333 Northwest llth, Oklahoma oi~, OK 73103. Anyone deah9ng mom reservations at the reunion site shoufd OSU 1-80043S2174 f calllng fkcsn Within Taxaa, cdl 1400-

.772.2341.

I tL-4.

The first ravkion ~.p~,I -r.x-fInowrthrea years of the bwk, Military the- _. I-...Ev, Oamping & neo- I &au AYJnlldtha 1 World, is nowavailable W milltary lfbrarle8, mareation centers and exohange6. The bmkllsts mmethan223mdlitary

-P- ~ ~th rates and range of s+3mima offered ateaoh Italm liskIaD dlxarg rest and recreation sentars worldwide. H you oannot find it Iocdly, Wllta to Military Living Publications, Pbet Office EQX 2347, Falls Chursh, VA 22042, or @ (703) 237-0203.

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..: L-. . ..25th Divis!on troops observe white phosphorous artillery rounds falling on Chinese Commun!sr posmons, 1951

.

By early April 1951, all indications were that communist forces in Korea were preparing for a major offensive. The US Eighth Army, under Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, continued its advance northward with full knowledge of these preparations. Defensive positions had been organized, and Van Fleet was prepared to gradually fall back if pressed. Once the enemy offensive had been stopped, he planned to counterattack.

The offensive started 22 April. After shrugging off the initial assaults, the United Nations (UN) forces were pushed back, but communist successes were dearly bought. By the end of April, the UN lines had stabilized, and limited friendly countertitacks were being launched by early May. During the subsequent series of thrusts and counterthrusts throughout the summer, UN forces regained all the lost territory and more. By November, a defensive line was established that essentially became the truce line between the two Koreas in 1953.

1986 was the year of Beyond Values in the US Army, and the ideals and

reflections surfaced by this focus continue toDuty,

receive atteution in 1987. This article reviews the ethical staudards withinHonor, the Army and snggests

some precepts that may aid all professionals in living up to what is expected of them Countr by peers, subordinates

aud superiors.

\Lewm Sorley -J A

I

THE professional ethic of the US military establishment is based on the concepts of duty, honor and country. Derived from the teachings of the military academies, these concepts stress devotion tQ duty, personal honor and loyalty to country aa the fundamental elements in professional conduct. From them have been derived subsidiary concepts of dedication, bravery and self-sacrifice that are widely accepted within the profession.

Despite disparities between these precepts and the practices observable within the ofiicer corps, the concepts of duty, honor and country still provide a useful and workable ideal for the motivation and guidance of the military professional.1 But the concern is often expressed that the ethical standards taught to cadets do not serve them well when they move into leadership positions in the real world of the Armed Forces, that the motto Duty, Honor, Country cannot or does not snftice to guide the actions of t~ose charged with day-to-day leadership in the field.

This is a profoundly important iesue. The Special Commission on the US Military Academy(the Berman Commission) held, in its final report, that the Honor Code must be viewed as a goal toward which every honorable person aspires, and not as a mini. mum standard for cadets alone. This assertion pushes the imperatives of the Honor Code forward into the real world of the professional soldier, countering the assertion that such dictates can or do apply only within the raretied atmosphere of the mihtery academies.

But ifduty, honor and country and the elements of the Honor Code are reasonable and practicai guides to professional behavior, they are, at the same time, znsufficzent guides. This is what leads to the difficulties so often cited in moving from the military academies to the field. Those difficulties stem from the need for augmentation if these

touchstones are to serve as practical guides . to ethical professional conduct.

The Need for Supplemental Precepts

The Berman Commission report also stated a fundamental truth but one that is not universally recognized. Following Upon its characterization of the Honor Code se a minimum standard of behavior, the commission obsem-ed that

its proscriptions do rwt encompass all fo~rn~ of dishonorable conduct; the test of whether conduct is honorable or dishonorable does not depend solely upon whether it is proscribed by the Horwr Code.3

The Drisko Report, a wide-ranging survey of the views of Army ofiicers from second lieutenants to colonels, indica~s that serving otlicers share this view. Only about one

. . . ifduty, honor and country and the elements of the Honor Code are

reasonable and practical guides to professional behavior, they are, at the same time, insufficient guides. This is what leads fa the di~culties so otlen

cited in moving from the @ilitary academies to the field.

third of the respondents indicated they thought the concept ofduty, honor and country was effectiue in promoting ethical behavior, but they were far from rejecting it or its impact. Junior officers in particul=

. reflected w a group a deep commitment to the ideal of Duty, Honor, Country which to them charactertied individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence and unselfish motivation .

As the author analyzed these responses, he concluded that they seemed to be saying

MILITARY REVIEW APnl 19e7

I

that Duty, Honor, Country was all right, but it was not enough.3

) It is not difiicult to see why something more specific might be helpful in determining the proper course of conduct, ethically

Sehfom is there disagreement over the rightness or wrongness of

actions directly contrary to the generally understood ethical code @the

officer corp. . . . in many other cases, the dichotomy is not so clearly

between that which is right and wrong but among competing values, each

having its own ualidity and claim on our ethical consciousness, yet cannot

be fully reconciled.

speaking, in many of the situations confronting military professionals. The classic case involves values in confl icttwo or more goods to he served but no apparent course of action mutually satisfactory from the standpoint of competing claims on our loyalty or conduct.

Philosopher Sidney Hook has articulated this complexity with clarity and compassion: .

Most human beings (except fanatics) haue plural and, taken in speczf?c contexts, con flictmg ends in life. In our own mora~ econ omy we medtate these conflicts by assessing the consequences ofalternatwe actwns on the whole constellation of values that are rele. uant to the problem at hand and selecting what promises to be the most prosperous issue with the least costs. But there are always costs. Thephenomenology of the moral experience reveals that our starting point IS always g confhct between the good and the good (or the right and the right):

This is a most relevant observation. Sel

4

dom is there disagreement over the rightness or wrongness of actions directly, contrary to the generally understood ethical code of the officer corp. Lying, cheating or stealing, even when they are tolerated or even rewarded, are known to be wrong, and their perpetration is viewed as evidence of corruption. But, in many other cases, the dichotomy is not so clearly between that which is right and wrong but among cornpeting values, each having its own validity and claim on our ethical consciousness, yet cannot be fully reconciled.

Of course, the professional soldier is expected to have already resolved some of these potential conflicts in ways that are not demanded of those in other walks of life. Se] f-interest is to be subordinated to the publlc interest which is to be served not in addition to but, when necessary, instead of self-interestthe extreme case involves sacrdice ofones life in the service of others. L]kewwe, it is part of the professional ethic that the commander looks after his mens needs before he attends to his own. The professional soldler has already renounced the competing claims of some kinds of otherwise legitimate goods when he accepts the responsibilities of service.

But there are other nonpredetermined conflicts in which soldiers are faced with difficult decisions as to which values should have pre-eminence, something that cannot depend solely on rules and mottoes so general they cannot be applied without informed individual judgment. Ofcourse, supplemental precepts would not eliminate the need for informed Judgment either. Judgment is an essential and integral element of the ethical person. But some precepts could help to clarify issues and increase awareness of how frequently there is an ethical component to be considered in determining therigbt thing to do.

Cyberneticist Stafford Beer once provided a delightful illustration of the futility of de-

April 1987 MILITARY REVIEW

Relationships with peers are at the heart of the satisfactions of service in any true profession. Peers become ones lifelong friends and provide the bulk of the

meaningful support and encouragement one requires. Their approval is, in many ways, the most important reward of service.

manding that an organization be fully capable of foreseeing its future and laying plans to deal with it:

KIww where you are going, and orgaruze to get there cou[d be the motto foz-stedon to us and on to our firms [read organizations or units]. And yet we cannot know the future, we have only rough ideas as to what we or our firms want, and we do not understand our environment well enough to marupulate events wtth certitude. Binds euolved from reptdes, it seems. Did a representatwe body of kzards pass a resolution to [earn to fly? If so, by what means ccndd the llzards have organized their genetic oariety to grow wings? One has only to say such things to reeogruze them as ridiculousbut the binds are flying . ...

Likewise, we cannot envision all of the circumstance requiring ethical decisions and choices in which professional soldiers

military REVIEW APIII 1987

will find themselves, but some sup~lemental precepts could help to bridge the gap between simply duty, honor and country however interpreted and embellished and the demands upon ones ethmal Judgment ofservice as a leader In a mditary unit.

There must be any number of ways to approach the problem of developing a tentative collection of such precepts. The central element in many situations appears to mrevolvehuman relationships. Thus, exploring the matter in terms of the various relationship typical in military units might be productive. For our purposes, we will concentrate on relationships with superior off]cers, peers and eubordinates. This approach owes a debt to Major General Orrw E. Kelly, a distinguished officer who served as chief of chaplains. He put it very simply: Ethm are somehow related to what happens between people. For that reason, the ethical pro

5

cepts to be suggested key on relationships between the leader and other peopIe in the organization and the values to be transmit. ted in the course of those relationships.

Relationships With Peers

Relationships with peers are at the heart of the satisfactions of service in any truelmofession. Peers become ones lifelong friends and provide the bulk of the meaningful support and encouragement one requires. Their approval is, in many ways, the most important reward of service. Shared experiences with peers form not only the folklore of professional service but also many of those crucial episodes which define a life.

For anyone aspiring to be a member ofa profession, his most precious possession is his professional reputation. That reputation rests on the dual bases of character and competmce. Peer relationships are the principal basis for professional reputation. Two key precepts seem to follow

. Conduct yourself so as to enhance the profession of which you area part. It sounds so simple, and yet it is so comprehensive in its application. During another period when there was widespread concern about the professional standards of the officer corps, then Chief of StatTGeneral W]llism C. Westmoreland addressed an open letter to Army officers. In it, he reminded his colleagues at every level that the good repute of the officer corps is a responsibility shared by every oflicer. Each of us stands in the light of his brother officer.. .8 while the imperatives of constant awareness of ones obligation to his peers are many, a more recent Army chiefof staff, offering his views on the essential professional military values, has given high priority to selfless service which he has described as the opposite of Yhe sustainedpursuit of self-interest, a characteristic destructive to all the other values we cherish.g

Encourage and acknowledge the accomplishments of fellow soldiers. This precept focuses attention on the unproductive and, in fact, destructive nature of too much of the competition which occurs within the profession. It is part of the professional ethic to expect every oflicer to do his best and to seek the highest level of responsibility he can at. tain. Ethical considerations enter the picture when success is achieved by, and is con- , ceived by the striver as involving, beating out the competition. There have always been more than enough tough and demanding jobs to go around in the military services. [n fact, the first problem confronting anyone who gets promoted to a new and more challenging post is to find some help.

If, in the course of getting there, the incumbent has alienated his peers through destructive competition and has likewise damaged his professional reputation, help is going to be hard to find. It is not only t the advantage of the profession as a who re for every oflicer to help and encourage his peers to develop to the limits of their capacities but also to the advantage and satisfaction of every officer as we] 1. Those officers who have been generous in recognizing and acknowledging the achievements of their colleagues have found a far more rewarding stance than those who have begrudged and envied the successes of their fellow officers.

There is at least one other point relating to the success of ones peers that should be made. Admiral James B. Stockdale pointed it up when he recalled some years after his extended period of captivity thati

when we were in prison we rem em bered the Book of Ecclesiastes: 7 returned and saw that the race zs not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wme nor rzches to.men of under. standing, nor favors to men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all. 10

This is an essential reminder for every officer, for the professional environment is not

April 1987 MILITARY REVIEW 6

Zf . . . the incumbent has alienated his peers through destructive competition and has likewise damaged his professional reputation, help is going to be hard to find. It is not only to the advantage of the profession as a whole for every officer

to help and encourage his peers to develop to the limits of their capacities but also to the advantage aad satisfaction of every officer as well.

now and nev& will be ideal. Some who do not deserve to do so will prosper, while others who have earned advancement will sometimes find themselves disappointed. It is the essence of both professional and ethical conduct to adhere to standards no matter the outcome. Johns Hopkins University Professor Stephen M. Schwebel, newly appointed to the International Court of Justice, stated the obligation well at a gathering honoring his selection. What do you hope to do? he was asked. Comport myself respectably was his reply.

Dealing With Superior Officers

The context of a military organization provides commanders with influence and leverage probably greater than that in any other relationship between leader and follower. This imposes enormous demands and responsibilities on the military leader. There are also great opportunities for the

MILITARY REVIEW Aprd 1987

foUozvertoexert ethical leadership in the relationship. Certain precepts thus seem pertinent to dealing with a superior oftlcer. They include:

Give a supercor oficer euery bit ofloyalty to which he is entztled. The essence ofthis admonition is to avoid confusion as to what the . requirement to be loyal to ones superior does and does not entail. It does not mean, for example, that only an able-commander deserves the loyalty of his suborditites. Probably arrinept commander needs loyalty more (and will be more grateful for it).

One must assume that every commander who is not behaving unethically is doing the bestjob he can do. Loyalty from his subordinates requires that they do not undercut him, either to their own subordinates or to others inside or outside the organization. It requires them to do all in their power to compensate for his shortcomings and to teach him gracefully those things he needs to know to be more effective in, his job. It re

1

quires them to attempt to carry out his instructions, at the same time working diplomatically to help shape those instructions to ensure that they will be as appropriate as possible. It is easy and rewardlngto be loyal to an outstanding commander who can set the example in every respect, but it is no less

The context of a military organization provides commanders

with influence and leverage probably greater than that in any other relation.

ship between leader and follower. This imposes enormous demands and

responsibilities on the militarg leader. There are atso great opportunities for the follower to exert ethical

leadership in the relationship.

important or obligatory to give unstinting loyalty to less able ofiicers entrusted with leadership.

Where the line is drawn, however, isat the bounds of ethical conduct. This was the point lost on many of those involved with the Watergate affair and itsaftermath. They failed to realize, or to act appropriately if they did realize, that one never has an obligation out of loyalty to aid or abet a superior in unethical behavior or to cover up for him should he conduct himself unethically. Quite the contrary, one is obliged, in such cases, to look to ones own ethical conduct andtOdO what isnecessary andappropriate in the situation. Richard A. Gabriel has expressed the imperative succinctly:

Loyalty toonessuperiors is neuer anythirzg buta condztzonal relationshzppredicated upon the continuing perceptions of ones subordinates that their superzor is acting honorably in hw position of command.

. Inform superiors when you do not or cannot carry outthezrorders. Superior off]

cers are entitled to assume obedience on the part of their subordinates. Most vigorous soldiers like to operate on a long leash, getting mission-type orders rather than de- , tailed instructions and being lett to get the job done without being oversuperviserl. The price of this privilege, and it haa an essential ethical element, is accountability to the superior officer who provides such an operational climate.

Superiors keep abreast of what is going on in their subordinate units by avariety of means, including personal observation, statYvisits, ;eports and what they are told by their subordinate commanders. Of these, the last is, or can be, by far the most important. Once a subordinate has earned his commanders trust and confidence by demonstrating that he can be relied upon to report fairly, completely and on time, he will become the most valued source of information for that superior officer. The reporting channel will take on many of the aspects of a tutorial relationship (what the Army is now calling mentoring) in which the senior brings along atrusted andvaluedjuniorof- ficer by gradually imparting to him the sum of the older mans experience and reflection.

This can only happen when the element of shared trust is strongly present. The subordinate seeking to improve his perceived performance by withholding bad news orreporting incompletely, especially when he has not complied with the orders he has been given, will find (usually too late and to his regret) that he has forfeited something infinitely more valuable-a priceless professional opportunity.

Establish yourethical stance early on in a new assignment. This is probably the best means of protecting oneself against being asked or pressured to perform dishonorable acts. It can also serve to inspire, instruct and support a weak superior who might otherwise ba tempted to compromise his own ethical standards. Virtually every officer can re-

ADrIl 1987 . MILITARY REWEW

I

8

late an experience in which some petty dishonesty was expected of him or it was made clear to him that it would he to his (supposed) advantage to cut a few corners in terms of hk personal integrity. Examples range from the intlation of scores on the rifle range through certifying the destruction of classified materials without witnessing it, signing for joint inventories of property that have not been conducted and boosting head counts in the company mess.

One officer assigned to inspect expended rounds on the rifle range (to ensure the primers had been detonated before the brass was packed for shipping and salvage) was told by his company commander to just sign the certificates and get in the jeep, as he was in a hurry. The lieutenant declined to make the certification without completing hk inspection which he proceeded to carry out. For his trouble, he got to walk the 5 miles back to the company area. But he was never again asked to do anything dishonest by that comm?nder who, in fact, boosted the younger officer ahead of others to take over the command when the commander was reassigned.

Deal dwectly with questionable orders. While most pressures to compromise ones integrity are subtle and implied, occasionally an ofticer will receive an order to do something he believes is dishonest or illegal. Some people have found that an effective technique is to talk the matter over quietly and privately with the person who issued the order, explaining why it would be improper to carry it out and requesting that it be withdrawn. Impossible, an alternative solution that M not ethically flawed maybe offered. If the senior persists in his original course, it can be effective to ask for the gmder in writing. In some cases, this request will by itself be sufficient to get the officer involved to change his mind, while, in other cases, the written order can be the basis for further discussion with higher level com-

MILITARY REVIEW April 1987

manders or with appropriate staff advisers. Form alhances wzth colleagues of like

mind on ethical matters. This may sound as though it belongs in the realm of peer relationships, but actually this precept constitutes an element of dealing successfully with superiors. There are cases in which officers who refused to compromise on matters ofprinclple have been penalized by their superiors for that refusal. While it might simply be observed that such is life, there is more to be said.

A book reviewer once made the point, acknowledgingthat some readers might think It unfair that he had been assigned to review the second volume of a projected trilogy after having dealt unkindly with the first. Life is unfair, he aftirmed, then went on to denounce the second volume as well. He closed with the only positive comment in the entire review, conceding that (the print is legible and the volume is sturdily bound.

But given that life is unfairsometimes unfair even within the bounds of an institution that is philosophically committed to

9

fairness-there are still some things that can be done to head off ethical crises. One of the most important is to form alliances with other of fkers of like mind on. ethical matters. It is diflicult for a brigade commander, for example, to demand intlated readiness statistics when three of his battalion commanders and several of his principal staff officers have discussed the matter informally and agreed that they will not be parties to such dishonesty. It might be a different matter if he could pick them offand lean on them one by one, each not knowing that he is not the only holdout. Likewise, such links of shared values with staff offkers at higher levels, and with other cornmandera throughout the unit, can do a great deal to curb pressures for unethical conduct.

Never bet the come where integrity is concerned. Some officers, unhappy with what they view as dishonest or unprofessional practices in a unit or on the part of their commanders, rationalize that they

~ will not openly object lest they jeopar ]ze their own further progress. But, they ell themselves, when they get to a high enough position to really have some influence, then they will be able to bring about reform. This is an Insidious approach, with the result nearly always being that the individual who takes it wakes up one day to find that he can no longer recall the values he once sought promot]on to advance.

Working With Subordinates

Leadership studies usually concentrate on relationships with those who are assigned as subordinates of the Ieader. Although we have sought to illustrate that one can and shouId lead ones peers, and even ones superiors, in appropriate ways, there ISmuch to be said about the ethical dimensions of leading subordinates as well. Some suggested precepts are:

Be guided hy considerations of dzm.in

ishirzg returns. Writing on a proposed set of ethical guidelines for public administrators, George A. Graham suggested that administrators are obliged in exercising the power and discretionary authority with which they are entrusted to be informed, to be fair, to be rational, and to be reasonable. Those are eminently sensible points yet, in unit after unit, one finds commanders who cannot or will not discriminate the more important tasks from those of lesser consequence and who recklessly spend the time, effort and good will of their men on marginal incremental returns where the results are inherently insignificant.

The average soldier has a remarkably well-developed sense of what is or is not important, and there is no quicker way for a commander to lose the respect and the willing support of his men than to demand of them unstinting efforts on an unimportant task. The commander who does nol%xercise judgment and restraint in so tasking hb+ troops is operating in an exploitative, ethically flawed and unwise manner.

Establish priorities and accept respon stbtlity for the consequences. Military units, almost by definition, exist in a resource-constrained environment. This means that the normal condition is not enough of anything time, people, money, repair parta, range facilities, whateverto go around. Wise leadership in such a situation entails the establishment of priorities and the allocation of the available assets to the various tasks according to those priorities. But, in practice, doing so requires the commander to exercise a good deal of self-discipline (lest he continually change the priorities in an effort to cover all bases, by definition an impossibility, and, in the process, cause everything to be first priority which means that nothing is).

It also requires some moral courage, for the time will crnne when smnemie higher u?

Apr!l 19S7 MILITARY REVIEW 10

[Some senior oficersl did not want to acknowledge or be involved in trying to deal with some very difficult problems, including drug abase, racial terwioas and

dissent in the ranks, even as they were holding junior officers accountable for failing to eliminate such problems. Such unwillingness to recognize and help deal with real

problems constitutes a patently unethical stance.

will ask about or point out an area in which the unit has not done well or bas done noth. ing, on purpose, as a result of having assigned a low priority to that function. Many commanders do well when it comes to establishing priorities, but the harder part comes when one has to stand up and be counted m terms of defending the results of having done so, Weak commanders are then sometimes tempted to blame subordinates for the consequences ofhavmg implemented tbe priorities which the commander himself dictated.

Eualuate subordinates fazrly and equz tab[y. This seems simple enough but, in practice, is a precept often ignored. A commander sets certain standards which he wants his subordinate units to achieve, such as a certain operationally ready rate for key pieces of equipment or a percentage qualiticatlon rate for crews in gunnery, and then collects statistics on bow the various subordinate units do in meetmg the standards. He then evaluates the various commanders on the basis of their units performance,

This sounds fine at first hearing, but there are some flaws so serious and so cen

tral to effective leadership that they amount to ethical shortcomings. Many things that affect the performance of a unit are beyond the capacity of its commander to influence. These include the strength of the uni~ the experience and ability of the people assigned, the resources provided to perform the mission; the prior state of training and competence of the unit when he took it over and how long he has had to affect those factors; the number, difficulty and diversity of the missions assigned; and so on.

General Bruce C. Clarke used to say that the outstanding officer is the one who gets superior results from average people. Clearly, there is something to that but, for many years, certain Army divisions got the lions share of everything when it came to assets, including more experienced and better qualified o~lcers. It was also clear that performing successfully in any assignment in such divisions was a great deal easier than it would be in those units getting only routine support. The point could be extended indefinitely, but it is really simple. The responsible (and ethical) evaluation of subordinates should be based not on how well

MILITARY REVIEW APrll 1987 11

I

. . .performing successfully in any assignment in [certain] divisions was a great deal easier than it would be in those units getting only routine

support. . . . The responsible (and ethical) evaluation of subordinates should be bused not on how well they did the job but how well they did it considering what they were given to work with.

the~~did the job but how well they did it con .submg what they were given to work wtth.

s Neuer prom we anything you cannot deliuer. This maxim derwesfrom an old saying of Alfred E. Smith and is as useful for professional officers as it was for politicians. Trust, and particularly mutual trust, is at the heart of whatever it is that makes a unit something more thanJust a collection ofcollocated individuals. While reliability in word and deed is an ethmal imperative, it is equally clear that it is a practical attribute as well. V. S. Na]paul explained through the character Sal Im in his famous novel A Bend (n the Rluer.,

My fam z[y have been traders and merchants in tbe Indian Ocean for centunes un der et,e~ kzndofgouernment. There w a reason why we have [asted so long. We bargazn hard, but we stzck to our bargain. All our contracts are oral, but w< delmer what we promzse. It zsn t because we are saints. It w because the who[s.thmg breaks down otherwise.

It breaks down just as quickly in a unit and stays that way once the men learn a commander is not to be trusted. Thus, there is a caution here for commanders who wish to be honest and to be regarded as honest. Beyond simply keeping ones word vn matters that one controls, it is important not to make commitments on things that cannot be controlled, for there is the hazard of de

faulting withaut being able to help it, and the loss of credibility will be the same.

. Cast your lot with the unit. There are many things which come under thk rubric, and many of them are ethical in nature. First is the admonition to linkones own success with that of the unit which means that only by working to build a successthl unit can one prosper. The commander who seeks to shift the blame for a units failures to others, thereby protecting his own future pros; pects, may get away with it but, in the process, will earn the disdain of his peers and subordinates.

Casting ones lot with the unit also means a willingness to recognize problems affecting the unit and to accept them as ones own, including accepting responsibility for SOIV- ing them or for the lack of a solution if one cannot be found. Much of the bittetiess in the Acrny a decade ago stemmed from feelings on tbe part of many otllcers that their seniors did not want to acknowledge or be involved in trying to deal with some very ditilcult problems, including drug abuse, racial tensions and d]ssent in the ranks, even as they were holding junior oflicers accountable for failing to eliminate such problems. Such unwillingness to recognize and help deal with real problems constitutes a patently unethical stance.

For the past several years, there has been a more or less continuous discussion as to whether the officer corps should have a written code of ethics. Those opposed say that such a code is unnecessary, that everyone already knows what is expected of otiicers in terms of professional ethics. But at every conference on the topic and in almost every informal discussion of it as, well, there has surfaced enough disagreement about the elements of such a code to question whether the supposed consensus really exists. Even so, continue the opponenta, a written code would descend into a legalistic device that would cause officers to seek loopholes and to

April 19e7 MILITARY REVIEW 12

DUTY,HONOR,COUNTRYo

sail close to the wind in ethical matters. It among competing goods. Very few are in would, they argue, therefore, do more harm search of a detailed prescription that will than good. lift from them the burden of having to apply

On the other hand, those who favor a writ- ethkal judgment. But most would be grate-ten code point to the apparent confusion, or ful for some guidance a little more specific lack of agreement, among ofi%ers about than a mottc-however admirable it is as what constitutes the tenets of appropriate the bedrock for a philosophy ofprofessionalprofessional behavior. This, they argue, is ism-can provide. proof positive that something more concrete Perhaps some precepts, ampIified by and more specific than a collection of incon- short discussions of their meaning and apgruent notions is needed to ensure that ev- plication, could help bridge the gap between ery ofilcer understands what is expected of admittedly divergent understandhgs of the him. But every effort to produce a written oral tradition, as it now exists, and a de. code has broken down due to the inability to tailed written code. If so, then perhaps servdraft a code that the officer corps would ing ofticers will subject these preliminary agree to and support. -. efforts to updating, correction and amplifi-

Given the amount of effort that has been cation, and wiil provide yet other suggesexpended on this matter, it seems unlikely tions for precepts based on their owa experithat it will be resohed in the near future. ence and outlook. The result could be a sort . Perhaps it does not need to be. What every of perpetual work in progress, serving to foofiicer aware of his ethical obligations is cus the dialogue while maintaining the Kind looking for is some heIp in deciding where of vigor and adaptability dit%cult to ach]eve his duty lies when he must make choices in a permanent written code. % ~.

NOTES ,!,ly 01 7980 p 62

. . .. . . . . . . .e and 7 St?,{imdseer s,,,.} ,/7, ,=

Much ot%he debate concerning the employment of light infantr~ fimx?s in various contingencies centers on its survivability when can.fnmting opposing armored forces. [Corps plugs and other add-an elements have been considered to obviate this. Here is a . potential solution to this problem that the authors contend is feasible now. )

DEPLOYABLE ARMOR I TODAY Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, US Army,* and Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ivany, US Army

DESPITE the acknowledged primacy of US interests in EuroDe. the ArrnYs.

attention in recent years has focused on other contingencies. This tendency does not mean that the Army is taking any less seriously its mission to defend Western Europe. Even a brief review of US Army, Europes, tremendous ongoing modernization atlirms the continuing importance of our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Rather, the heightened interest in other contingenciesmost frequently in the Third Worldstems from the belief that the next war will prohahly begin anywhere but the Fulda Gap where we have so carefully prepared ourselves to defend. The success of US military policy in Europe-and of the whole Atlantic Alliance-lies in its contribution to a stable balance of power in Europe. Although ours is an age of uricertain ty, that balance seems likely to survive for the foreseeable future.

Outside o~Europe, little stability existeand only the most precarious balance of power. US interests in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Latin America are in greaterjeopardy. In these regions, the United States maintains only weak military forces or none at all. Should defending US interests in these regions require the use of force, deployment-getting an effective mix of combat power to the battlefield quickly looms as a potential show-stopper. In anticipation of this problem, deployability has assumed increased importance in the minds of force designers. To a surprising extent, the shape of our Army has become a function of the size of equipment that can tit inside a cargo plane and of the Military Airlift Commands aircraft availability rate.

In the field army, this concern for deploy-ability manifests itself in enthusiasm for *light infantry. Even die-hard tankers can,not fail to recognize that light infantry is a good idea. Light infantry initiatives are

MILITARY REVIEW APrIl 1987

making our Continental United States (CONUS)-beeed Army more deployable. They are expanding our appreciation of where and how to employ dismounted forces. Most interestingly, in an Army that historically has shied away from creating military elites, the developers of light infsutry unite have shown a hold appreciatio~ of how elitism contributes to military effectiveness.

Yet, even the most imaginative wrrrplsnner must pause when contemplating the limitations of light forces-in particular, their vulnerability when opposed by ar- mored or mechanized forces in open terrain. HOWcan we compensate for such vulnerabilities? One solution is to limit the employment of light infantry to close terrsin cities, mountains and jungle. Doing so, however, excludes light forces from several regions of great potential interest. As an alternative, force developers talk of offsetting light infantrys weaknesses with augmentation packages-additional forces that will provide capabilities needed for a particular scenario.

In other words, the much-discussed question of whether light infantry can play a role in heavily urbanized Europe as part of a larger mechanized force is not the issue. Rather, the;ssue is whether that same light force deployed elsewhere can defend itself against an armored threat.

The prospect is not an idle one. It is difficult to envision a scenario in Southwest Asia that would not involve significant indigenous enemy armor. In our own hemisphere, Cuba and Nicaragua have acquired a substantial fleet of tanks and personnel carriers to augment their peoples armies.!?

Nor should we overlook the Soviet Unions ability to project conventional forces. Each of seven Soviet airborne divisions boasts more than 300 BMDs and 30 85mm self-propelled assault guns. A single 6,500man airborne division thus equipped would

15

*. Soviet BMDairborne combat vehicle following airdrop. Note that suspension has yet to be lowered.

.

3

a variety of ideas. In our search for a deployable acrnored force, we have flirted with the LAV25 armored car. We toyed with the notion of resurrecting the M551 Sheridan in a

2i:;

g

i~..~

In our own hemisphere, Cuba and Nicaragua have acquired a substantial tleet of tanks and person

nel carriers [and each] ofseven Soviet airborne divisions boasts more

than 300 BMDs and30 85mm selfi propelled assault guns. . . . This near certainty that any adversary will have some armor, combined with the Armys

growing reliance on light forces, defines our challenge.

seriously challenge a US light infantry division despite the latters larger size. These seven Soviet divisions represent a formidahlc threatmobile, potent and survwable.

This near certainty that any adversa~ will have some armor, combined with the Armys growing reliance on light forces, defines our challenge. It is to create a mobile, all-weather, antitank force enjoying at least moderate survivability and capable of rapid, worldwide deployment.

The qualitier about weather is an important one. Our reliance upon Army aviation to supplement ground-based antitank systems m steaddy increasing. Even so, until

J they operate without regard to weather and light conditions, attack helicopters alone cannot provide light infantry w]th the tank-killing capability it needs. Light infantry also needs armor.

How has the Army responded to this challenge to reinforce light infantry with rapidly deployable armor? Readers who have followed the issue in journals such as MdztnryReuzew and Armor have been treated to

16

variety of configurations-as is, with a new turret or with no turret at all but with a hypervelocity automatic cannon instead. We designed a new light armored regiment-but failed to find space in the force structure to establish it. The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) continues to conduct brave experiments based on the ahistorical notion that making ground combat vehicles fast enough absolves them of the nee~ for any protection at all.

These ideas testify to the imagination and creativity of our Army. All have merit. Still, none bas tilled the bill. Like it or not, the de- velopment of an adequate light armored forcewith equipment and organization tailored specifically to compensate for the vulnerabilities of light infantryremains an expensive and distant prospect. We may never see it.

Ironically, even as we have experimented with exotic vehicles and innovative organizations, a deployable armored force has come into existence all but unnoticed. It is here today, waiting for us to grab it off the shelf. That force is the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) as modified by its new J-series table of organization and equipment (TOE).

Our failure to recognize the regiments potential as an instrument for reinforcing light infantry is understandable. The standard doctrinal view of the ACR is that it is a heavy force to be employed in conjunction with even larger heavy forces. Indeed, recent changes to the regiment have been intended not to make the ACR into an ar. mored plug for the light corps but to correct weaknesses that have limited its effectiveness as a heavy force. Some of the weaknesses were cavalry platoons that were too unwieldy, aviation that was poorly

APrIl 1987 MILITARY REvIEW

..

@

.7W*., .- 6W,I,,, ,,60,

Mu-,,,,ms,,! 0..! ,,!,, ,,.,,,.

,?!-S,W.

Uamb.1 ..1,0 !!s0 @zlQaJIa61

,,, . ,,.!,. .,, mm!,..,

,!,4-. 1 I 0,?.,,...1 -,.. .,,,, !,,,

u-,,,,!, ,* ,.,,0

mr- .$!..,, ,[.,4...1 iwmw Km, ,,!,,,,,,,, EmlQml

Figure 1

organized and combat service support assets that were preposterously weak. The new ACR organization has remedied these deticieneies by improving the regiments flexibility and self-sustainabdity while retaining its compactness and combat power (see Figure 1).

These changes, combined with cavalrys traditional capabilities, have made the ACRhowever inadvertentlyinto an ideal complement for light infantry. The regiment has acqumed unanticipated usefulness for contingency operations, a product of the convergence of related changes in equipment and organization. .

Prior to the changes mandated by the J-series TOE, the evolution of armored cavalry weapons reflected a consistency dating back to the end of World War II. To conduct the reconnaissance and security missions that were the regiments bread and butter, cavalry scouts relied on thin-skinned vehicles of limited fighting value. Tanks overmatched the scouts and were expected to

bear the brunt of whatever fighting cavalry units might encounter. Ligh~ness~ndowed the scouts with speed but left them utterly I dependent upon tanks for protection.

Today, the regiment isexcharrging itsolder generation vehicles for Ml A &rams tanks and M3 Bradley tigbting vehicles. For cavalry, this re-equipping hae a special significance. Recalling how recently cavalry meant gun jeeps, Ml 14 reconnaissance vehicles and the unlamented Sheridan, we can appreciate the importance of the change. Bristling with powerful new weapons, a regiment that was once primarily a scouting force is becoming explicitly a fighting force of startling authority.

Adding the Ml to regimental cavalry does not account for this transformation. In a sense, the A brains represents a logical extension of the M48 tanks that tbe Ilth ACR, used in Vietnam and of the M60-series tanks that armored cavalrymen hav$ employed in more recent years. The Bradley m~es all the difference. Doubts are wide- .

.

MILITARY REVIEW Aprtl 1987 Ii

spread about how well the M3 cavalry tighting vehicle (CFV) will serve in a pure sccu&ing role-end for good reason. On the other hand, theBrcdleys lethality permits scouts, for the first time, to fight largely independent of tank ,support. This significant departure radically alters the character of armored cavalry.

Organizational changes under the J-series take into account th; increased fighting power now available to scouts. In the past, armored cavalry has compensated for the smuts traditional weakness by assigning tanka to each cavalry platoongueranteeingtheir availability to bail the scouts out of tight comers. The J-series organization creates platoons consisting entirely of scOutssix CFVS per platoon, two such platoons per cavalry troop. Tanks are still found in the armored cavakytroopbut in separate platoons. Are these tank platoons available to support the scouts? Obviously. Yet, that support necessarily becomes less responsive than when tanks were organic to each cavalry platoon.

In other words, the J-series organization obliges scouts torelysubstsntirdly less on tank support. The increased fighting potential of the CFV U[1OWSscouts to do so. As a result, scouts in the new regiment will operate on their own to an unprecedented degree.

That, some die-hards claim, ispreciseIy the problem. Traditionalists lament the fact that each cavalry second lieutenant will no Ionger lead his own miniatm-e combined arms team into the fray. Such arguments miss the point. This ability of scouts to stand on their own in no way diminishes the regiment. Instead, it invests in the ACR hitherto untapped potential as a tighting force not least of all in support of contingency op erations.

How do these changes in equipment and organization facilitate the ACRS employment in contingency situations? By permit

ting the regiment to deploy by echelons, lighter elements leading with heavier elements following as airlift or sealih permits. If it implies that each echelon must be prepared to tight on its own, deployment hy echelon is usually a bad idea. The Army designs units to tight as a whole, not in pieces. The ACR stands out as an exception to this rule. The regiment can configure itself in such a way that even an easily deployed lead echelon retains an impressive tank-killing capability as well as adequate organic cbrnbat support and combat service support. As a bonus comes a command and control apparatusnotonly sufficient fortheleadechelon but alsueasily able to-accommodate succeeding elements and interface with a division or corps headquarters.

Figure 2 shows how a regimental armored cavalry squadron might deploy in three echelons. Inaddition toasquadron headquarters, the lead echelon provides three scout/ antitank troops, each equipped with two platoons of six Bradleys each. Each troop also deploys its organic mortar section, providing the squadron with indirect-tire support as soon as it hits the ground.

The lethality of 36 Bradley CFVS (?8 if we count the two in the squadron headquarters) hardly needs commentary. The lead echelon of even a smg[e squadron would

Figure 2

18 APrll 1987 MILITARY REVIEW I

ARMOR

vastly increase the antitank fires of engaged light infantry forces. Moreover, that squadron could deploy without overly taxing limited airlift assets. With its lead echelon configured as in Figure 3, a squadron could deploy with only 10 C5A and 12 C141B sorties

The squadrons second echelon would augment the logistics capability provided hy the lead echelon while increasing available combat support, most notably with the addition of the howitzer battery. This echelon would deploy in an additional four C5A and six C141B sorties (see F@re 4).

The trail echelon would make heavy demands on airlift, requiring 30 C5A and 12 C141B sorties. Getting this echelon to the theater of operations is essential if the squadron is to acquire an offensive capability. Depending on the situation, however, a commander might prefer to send the third echelon by sea, taking more time but allowing airlift to be diverted to other priorities. He could mak.p that decision confident that, even without tanks, the squadron would constitute a coherent, self-contained force. It would function, in essence, as a mobile, protected antitank battalion, providing light forces with precisely the assistance needed to neutralize an armosfmechanized attacker.

If the entire regiment were called upon to react to such a contingency, it would deploy in a similar three-tiered fashion. The regiments lead echelon would consist of the CFVS and mortars of three armored cavalry squadrons, plus appropriate command and control. With more than 100 tank-killers, this force would deploy in 45 C141B and 39 C5A sorties.

The regiments second echelon would provide three squadron howitzer batteries, three engineer platoons and the combat aviation squadron. That squadrons three air cavalry troops and two attack helicopter companies wou~d be especially welcome,

HHT Cavalry Troop (3) 2 CFV(TAC) 12 CFV 3 M577(TOC) 1 M577(CP) 1 M577(loglstlcs CP) 1 rps:truck withwater 1 M577(ald station) 1 5-ton with trader 1 2Vz-ton supply truck

(squadron ma~tenance) 1 M713(maintenance) 1 M578 (recovery) 1 Ml f3(medlcal, . 4 HEMTT tanker 3 HEMTT carao 2 %%-!h

1 I,z.tan truck with 1 5-tonwrec~er

trailer (mamtenance) 1 ~esgrtruck w!th water 2 1/4.tOntruck

1 1/4.ton tra,ler 1 2Vz-ton supply truck 4 1/4-ton truck with trailer 1 ~713(FlST) .

HHT-HH+u.E,s 8rd Ma.@mifn(Stinger) 7 I/4.tOntruck cFv&-hl?ghbrgw+xi+T.&r.- .,- m

,Cc-,x.xa mm 2 l/4-tan trailer Cwti m .,MnAww .-*,* m1 wheeled ambulance

1 %ton wth trailer (FAC) ~%%s%%I= Figure 3

HHT HWB 1 M88(recovery) 6 MI09A2 2 HEMTT(tanker) 6 M548 2 1,,.ton truck with trailer 1 M577(FDQ

(Stinger) 1M561 (BOC) 2 HEMTI(cargo) 1 M561 (survey) 4 MIKJ enwreerwrad) 1 /#f13(maintenanCe) (oPco&

.1 rn?ssrtruck with water

1 2Vz-ton supply truck 1 2Vz.ton truck with

H,-.H,.*U.HS am mxaa,iem trailer (mamtenance) HwdKLr ,,.

WT+mw ,- m,,q .- 1 M561(ambulance) OKON-Owaw m, 3 V4-ton truck

FW,re ,,* m. 0-.. Wral.m m,., 2 V4-ton trader

Ftgure 4 .

MILITARY REVIEW April 1987 19

C141BSorties W&e! lead Eohelon sO-s1-7 8 9-10 11-12 13 14-1516-17 18 19 20 21 22 Sorties

M3 59 3s, M977 HEMIT 31~1

M978 t+EMIT 2 ! A M706 . 3 6.; J M151A2 4 :41 18

FISTV 3 3 M773 3 6 M476 */d-ton trailer 41 10 M35A2 332 11 M54A2 1 1 Ambulance 1 1 Wrecker 1 1

M577 32 5 HEMFH,.v ..Pan&l.mOb,kly tsti,ca ,,uck

FISWF,re ,UPLMXI ,,, veh,de

Figure 5

Tm#l Second Echelon , c:sorti: 4 , , 4;Bso;ies , 10 Sortiee

M709A2 42 6 M88 1 1 M977 HEMT7 2 2

M978 HEMT7 2 2 M577 1 i Ml 13 32 5 M35A2 2%-ton 1 1 2 M151 41 s M567 1 2 3 Water trailer 1 1 M705 trailer 1 1, M548 42 s MZ76 trailer 4 9 Class I pallet 1 1 Ammumtlon 81,000 39,82058,311 3

Pax d V HE!JTT-H,w exP,,06dm,b,l,lyIafll.!altrue

Pa - Persnnne, Figure 6

20 April 1987. MILITARY REVIEW

. .

ARMOR

providing combat intelligence of enormous terraindictate. And he can do so without en-utility for the ground squadrons. No less im- gaging in the slapdash task organizing of portant, the squadrons 26 attack helicop- ground maneuver, aviation, combataupport ters would further augment the regiments and combat service support elements that antitank capability. do not know one another. A caval,ry regi-

The full combat power of the regiment ment enjoys the inestimable advantage of would makd itself felt only upon deploy- being small enough that all of its compoment of the third echelon. In addition to 123 nents train together routinely using com-Abrams tanks, this echelon would consist of mon procedures. an imposing array of combat support and Deploying from a single lecation, cavalry combat service support assets. Included comes task-organized. From the forward-would be a support squadron with its main- most aeroscout to the rearmost truck driver, tenance, medical, adjutant general, and cavalrymen fight as part of a unified, cohesupply and transport troops; a combat elec- sive team. tronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) compa- We cannot illustrate the value of this ny, and the heavy equipment ofa combat en- proposition to use tbe ACR as light armor, gineer company. however, merely by citing the panoply of re-

Fully deployed, the regiment would con- sources available to a regiment. Nor does asstitute an asset of incalculable value. The serting the feasibility of echeloned deploy-ACRS unique character-its self-contained ment prove our case. The critical measure of structure of all arms-translates into flexi- the proposals merit lies in how well the regbility for thesupported Iigbt force com- iments lead echelon could tight in the abmander. He can employ the entire regiment sence of follow-on elements. These quesor portions of it as the mission, enemy and tions demand our attention:.

C5Sorties Cf41BSorties I Total Tmil Echelon 1. 120 21 22-2324-27 20 29 30 31

IMIA1 2 it:~ i M88 1 2; ! M977 HEMIT ; 3

31 ,M978 HEMIT AVLB t !2 ,11 I 3 M577 !2

4 IM113 ,3 2 ! 5 ,,5-tonwrecker I 1 1

Zl,z.ton I ,2: 12

5-ton trader 1.22 7 Wster tratler ~

,,

1 ,,! 1, i 2

MI05 tra{ler } I 11221 18 Pax or pallets ]V]ti = VI v

,

Ammunition ! HEMpHe,vyexPandedlob!l,ly What tm.k

AvSAm3res veh!cle launched mow Paa-Pemnel Ftgure 7

MILITARY REVIEW April 19e7 21

1

what missions could that lead echelon conduct?

How would its fighting elements best be employed?

. How would the presence of this lead echelon on the battlefield contribute to the victory of a larger light infantry force?

Consider this scenario. A light infantry division, deployed somewhere in Southwest Asia, is conducting combat operations in conjunction with allied forces under a US corps. Expectations of a iarge-scale attack by enemy armor and mechanized infantry oblige the corps commander to assume a defensive posture. To augment US forces, the national command authority directs the lead echelon of an armored cavalry regiment to deploy from CONUS.

Anticipating the ACR lead echelons arrival, the corps commander considers its employment. He outlines three options:

Commit the regiment as it arrives to thicken the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the light infantrys sector.

Assign the regiment a piece of the corps sector, giving it the mission of blocking the most likely armor approach.

. Retain the ACR as a mobile reserve to counter enemy armored thrusts anywhere, in the corps sector.

Of the three options, the corps commander determines that the first is least preferable. Still, operational or political circumstances requiring a rigid forward de-

Bradley WIUI 25mm chain gun

fense could justify such a course of action. Such circumstances could persuade a commander to reinforce his FLOT by parceling out individual cavalry troops ta reinforce each light infantry battalion on its battle position. Any battalion commander would welcome the addition of 12 CFVS to augment his collection of light antitank weapons, Dragons and unprotected TO Ws. Piecemealing the ACR woufd dissipate its effect, however, and should be considered only in the absence of more desirable alternative.

The corps commander recognizes that h better idea would be to employ the regiment to block the primary armor approach into the corps sector. Conce~trating the regiments antitank tires makes sense. He can count on the TO Ws and 25mrn cannon of more than 100 CFVS being able to parry even a determined attack. What if the terrain does not readily allow the commander to predict where the enemy will employ his armor? If he guesses wrong, the ACR lead+ echelon becomes a w asted asset, bypassed as the main fight occurs elsewhere, the regiments mobility counting for nothing because of its static mission.

With this in mind, the corps commander concludes that the preferred option for employing the ACR is as a mobile reserve primed for employment anywhere in sector. Maneuver is the etyle of warfare for which the ACR is optimally designed and equipped.

Freeing the regiment from a static mission brings into play the mobility that is one of cavalrys principal assets. The division already has forces suited to holding terrainits infantry battalions. Yet, no matter how stubborn that infantry, the corps commander knows that penetrations of his forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are inevitable. The ACR lead echelon provides him with the one capability that his corps lacks-a rapid reaction force able to move on the battlefield under any conditions.

April 19S7 MILITARY REVIEW 22

ARMOR

Keeping cavalry in reserve enables the fires but also the synchronized efforts of the corps commander to counter enemy success- entire combined ermsteam-close air sup- es. He maneuvers cavalry quickly to the port, Army aviation, fieldsrtillery, engiflanks of those penetrations and uses mis- neers and CEWI. We believe, however, that sile and carmon fires to break the momen- armor represents an irreplaceable. ingreditum of the attack. He does not engage in ent in that combined arms formula. There is pitched battles with enemy tank regi= no substitute for the qualities that armor ments-his cavalry lacks the heavy armor brings to the battlefield-survivability, w do so on equal terms. Instead, he employs matchless mobility and long-range precicavalry much as the Wehrmacht need anti- sion tires. Without armored support, the tank weapons against numerically superior light infantry concept is badly flawed. Allied forces during World War IL He skill- Ifour Army is serious about light force% fully uses terrain for protection and as a if those forces are expected not just to deter platform for long-range shots that capital- but to tight should deterrence fail-we must izes on surprise, causing a material and psy- find away to provide armor to support those chological effect far out of proportion to the forces iq the tield. The ACR provides that forces employed. wayavailable now without added cost in

Of course, such a scenario represents a manpower or equipment. All we need is the vast oversimplification. Defeating theene- imagination toseize the opportunity lying my will require not only the ACRS antitank before us. %

NOTES t (m. s.,5!raqkm possessmge.wmo.edfomes,rm nas,wprox, Thelnt,niatkaal I,httie for SkatW,C Stud,.,, Lcm6.an, Eng

matdy l.ccelanks ammngmem %CO T72s and34W Ch$msms Omerar 2 N,~r8gua h-&stead(ly eWd,,gffih,aVl_ lb(v,mo!y wrti!,ghbng von,a.: tnclud. 180 BMPsar,dw STR. lraqha3aDpmX# now ,nclde5 aDPfOX,mal,ly 120 TW, T55$ 30 P77SSand rrcf. Own WC 8P m?.tely2,S031ank3 wstlyfrom lhe Easternblm adaOth,r3 CCOam10?eC II?Qredprsm. elcarrmm NMg.. amhSti,llsVmgrq .Dtol5mm f,ghtmg veh.].s Bath .at,orw .1$. nav. exiemrve arsmds 01 I(ght and mti, 3 me BMD1,ghtamm ven,aefeatiwa 73mmwwn, -anm. uman,llwy A!}Ollh~l)WreS.lehcm The M!l!l.rYBaIance 19851986 wan!. gu,aso mssm am WOvloes Sonm r,ro!ecllo agalo,t tlmllery

Lm&vumt COIWUZIA.J Bacaxch s the comman&r, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regt merit,FortBlns, Texa.sHerecewedaBS fromthe US Mdztary Academy and an M.A. and a PhD from Princeton Unwer.mtyand t-sa graduate of the USACGSC. Heprevwusly serueda.san tn(erna. twnalaffatrs fellow wtththe Councdon Foregn Relattons H=arttcle-FwhtaWttiCouerzWFome Battleappearedm the Aprd1985MdKaryRe. view.

Lwutenant CoiorwlRobert R. Iuany t.s{k commander, 1st Squadron, 3dArmored Caval?yReg$ment He rececuedaB.S. from the US Milttary Academy (uSMA) andaPhD from the Unwers@ of Wuconszn and B a graduati of the USACGSC He has serued m armored caualryregzments z. the ContLIZentnlUnited States, Vietnnmand West Germany, asanm.structoratthtUSMA;zn the War Plans Dw.smn of the Army staff; and as the Army a~deto theprcscdent.

23MILITARY REVIEW. Apr!I19S7

ONE of the most striking developments in Soviet military capabilities since the end of World War II has been the creation of aviation and naval resources that have given Soviet general purpose forces truly global reach. Long-range airlift and aealift capabilities--through the delivery of military materiel and the transport of surrogate forces-have, for some years now, played an integral role in supporting Soviet foreign policy initiatives and goals throughout the Third World. hr addition, the development of increasingly capable airborne and amphibious assault forces have at least raised the specter of direct Soviet military intervention worldwide.

These aspects of Soviet strategic mobility have justifiably received the closest attention from Western military analysts. Accompanying these visible and often dramatic demonstrations of Soviet long-range power-projection capabilities, however, has been a less-studied development in Soviet strategic mobility. This development has centered on enhancing theater war-fighting potentialthe creation of heavy equipment transporter (HET) units for the rapid, long-distance movement of large mihtary forces to, between and within the vast continental theaters of strategic military action (teatr voennykh deistvii (TVDS)) around the Soviet periphery.

Soviet mihtaryplanners view HETresources as a means of rapidlyand, in some cases, decisivelyshifting the correlation ofarmored forceson future theater battlefields. In recognition ofthis potential, major components of the HET fleet are designated by the Soviets as strategic movement assets.

The establishment oftbese strategic heavy litl units constitutes a new Soviet response toa longstanding Russian military imperative. That is, contemporary Soviet planners-like their czarist predecessors= ere compelled to deal with the many complexities of mobilizing, moving and sustain-

MILITARY REVIEW April 19S7

ing large force groupings tasked to conduct combat operations at the end of long, tenuous lines of communication (LOGS). while road, rail, inland and coastal waterway, and air transportation means will all be drawn

. . . contemporary Soviet pkmnera like their czaristpredecessora-are

compelled to deal with the fiany comptsxities of mobilizing, moving and

sustaining targe force groupings tasked to conduct combat operations

at the end of long, tenuous lines of communication (LOCS).

upon, land LOCS, asin the past, will bear the greatest burden in Soviet strategic movements today.

In the Soviet view, these land LOCS have become more fragile due to the accuracy and destructiveness of modern weapons systems. Meanwhile, the time available to mobilize and deploy large armored and mechanized forces has been greatly reduced by the threat of these same systems.

HET Development

During the course of World War II, the Soviet armed forces shifted from strategic defensive operations to successive and some-t]mes simultaneous strategic offensives. This shift increasingly focused the attention of Soviet planners on the employment of strategic transportation resources. Trans. portation management became far more centralized within operational formations and at the national level. A central transportation management body coordinating all movement means was established under Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services (and Red Army Chief of the Rear) General A. V. Khrulev.

Designated the Military TransportaServ

35

ice (Sluzhba Voyennykh Soobshcheniy(VOS0)), this central transportation management organization was also represented on ermY and fi-ont rear servim staffs. There, it was subordinate to a deputy commander for rear services/ch]ef of the rear at each level?

Today, the Soviet military press is tilled with retrospective analyses of World War II

Zrt the Soviet expenence, particular emphasis is placed on the

movement and commitment ofstrategic reserves and the regrouping of

forces within and between theaters of , military operations. Certainly, the

most notable example of[thk] was the strategic concentration of

units and matenel in the Soviet Far East prior to the August 1945

Manchuria opemtion.

operations in which success hinged on the effective strategic movement of large armored and mechanized forces. These assessments address Soviet and foreign military experience. They include examples of every form of strategic movement conducted as well as the various ways the whole spectrum of transport means available in the period were employed.8

In the Soviet experience, particular emphasis is placed on the movement and commitment of strategic reserves and the regrouping of forces within and between theaters of military operations. Certainly, the most notable example of Soviet strategic movement in World War 11identified by the Soviets themselves as the wars greatest regrouping of forceswas the strategic concentration of units and materiel in the Soviet Far East prior to the August 1945 Manchuria operation.

This effort included the transfer of a tank

and three combined arms armies over dietances that, in some cases, exceeded 12,000 kilometers. Included in the theater High Command of Forces controlling the three-front operation was a rear service body directed by the Red Army deputy chief of rear services. Thisofflcer, his subordinate VOSO representative and other rear service officers

planned shipments of incoming materiel, distributed andredeployedthis rmzterie{ wlthm tkeater boundaries, as well as controlled the actiuittis of the fronts rear service staffs.

Transportation statistics from the Manchuria operation and from World War II as a whole support the judgment of contemporary Soviet planners. They feel the effective use of all forms of transportation was essential for the support of the vast and sweeping combined arms operations characterizing the Soviet war effort. While motor transport and aviation became increasingly important at the tactical and operational levels and the waterway +when open and in proximity to designated delivery points-transported large amounts of men and materiel, the railroads stood as the principal Soviet means of long-dietance strategic military movement.

The railroads were capable of rapidly moving large combined arms unite, supplies and the heaviest equipment over great distances in the most severe weather conditions. Recognizing its importance, German efforts to interdict Soviet rail lines were extensive. German aircraft attacked Soviet rail facilities to depths of up to 400 kilometers. The Soviets estimated that 44 percent of all German bombs dropped on the Soviet-German front were directsd against rail facilities. In addition, the Germans destroyed the rail system as they retreated and assigned sabotage squads to interdict rail lines in Soviet rear areas.

Despite the many difficulties encoun-

AM 1987. MILITARY REVIEW 36

Antieircraftguns guard Soviet railroad trestle from marauding German.eircraft, 19$3

tered during World War II, Soviet planners ended the conflict convinced that their approaches to strategic movement had been lergelysuccessfil. During the early postwar yeers, lessons learned were carefully studied. Based on an expectation that future military operationa would resemble those large strategic offensives, by 1947, Soviet transportation planners believed they had actually solved the problem of wartime military transportation.

This judgment was short-lived. By the end of the 1950s, the significance of the growing number ofnuclear weapons in military arsenals, and the likely consequences ofnuclesr war, shook the Soviet view ofmilitary requirements in every area.

As a restricted Soviet source put it, the appearance of nuclear weapons meant that mlhtar-y transportation had entered a completely new stage-one for which the experience of past wars did not entirely provide answers,,, Enemy nuclear strikes, unlike the deep strikes carried out by enemy aviation in World War II, werejudged capable of decisively affecting the operation of Soviet transportation systems as well as inflicting massive damage to the Soviet homeland.

Perceived as a primary target, railroads, in particular, were seen as highly vulnera-

MiLtTARY REVIEW April 1987

The Soviets estimated that 44 percent ofall German bombs dmpfled

on the Soviet-German tint were directed against mil facilities.

Enemy nuclear strikes, unlike the deep strikes camed out by enemy aviation in World WarZZ, were judged

capable of decisively affecting the operation ofSoviet transportation

systems. . . . By the early 1960s, faced with this apocalyptic vision of future

theater battlefields, Soviet logistic planners had turned their attention to the development of what they generically

term heavy tractor-tmilers . . . as a means ofstrategic movement.

ble to nuclear strikes. Railroad beds could be restored at a maximum rate of only 40 to 50 kilometers a day and rail bridges at a rate of no more than 120 to 150 meters per day. Therefore, it was judged by the early 1960s that, in theaters of [strategic] military action, railways can no longer ensure the delivery of materiel means to the troops. . ..3

Rather, a heavier burden would have to

37

fall on motor transport, and new approaches to moving combat units and their heavy equipment would have to be developed. In addition, the requirement for the rapid strategic movement of combined arms units and all types of supplies would be greater since the need te reinforce and regroup heavily attrited theater fo}ces could be present from the first hours of a nuclear war. 1s

By the early 1960s, faced with this apoca1Iyptic vision of future theater battlefields, Soviet logistic planners had turned their attention to the development of what they generically term heavy tractor-trailers (tia.dwlye autopoesda) ae a means of strategic movement. Heavy tractor-trailers, for which comparable Western designations such as HET and tank transporter may also be accurately used, were certainly not new innovations.

Between 1943 and 1945, the United States provided the Soviet Union with some 531 45-ton tank transporters under lend

38

Iease. At a minimum, these heavy lift assets were used in limited numbers for moves of tanks and self-propelled artillery. Typically, however, when the current employment and ~alue of HETs are di cussed, no historic examples are given. Th1s suggests that HET~while clc.+wly used for tactical movesplayed no significant role in the major troop regrouping and concentrations that have been so carefully analyzed by the Soviets.a

In any event, their utility for at least the local movement of tank% and other tracked combat equipment was reflected in the postwar indigenous production of prime movers capable of towing tank-transporter trailers. This became apparent in the mid- 1960s with the appearance of the MAZ537 tractor truck and ChMZAP5247 semi-trailer and their subsequent variants.m The significance of these heavy tractor-trailer rigs for strategic movement was made explicit in a Soviet book. This 1966 publication, The

ARrIl 1987 MILITARY REVIEW

Long-Diskwwe Move ofSmall Units, pointed out what the two Smiet authors saw as a pressing requirement of modern w=

Under modern conditions, the significance of long-distance rnouementa of small units haa grown imrnsasumbly. This is explained by ths fwt that wio% employment of nadsar weapons in the ue~ beginning of a war can result in great losses of foxes. It is possible that the combat effectiveness of many small units and organizations may be considerably lowered or even lost in ths first days of war. Therefore, timely mauerrwnt of motnrizedrifle and tank small units from the interior of tke country acquires important significance for reinforcing advance operat

iwfowes. lti movement of small units ~ill be carrisd out over very great distances?

The authors aleo described the spectrum of enemy nuclear and conventional combat means threatening the effective movement of small maneuver unite and addressed how various transportation modes could operate in such an environment. Included was a substantial discussion of the long-distance movement of tank unita by heavy tractortrailerrige explicitly identified as MAZ537s and ChMZAP524 ?S.

The strategic movement potential represented by the Soviet Unions growing fleet of HETs was strikingly illuetratsd in summer 196S when military forces of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. Accompanying the invasion force were several hundred Soviet tanks and other tracked combat equipment towed on C/ukfZAP semitrailers by MAZ537 truck tractors.

By rapidly moving armored vehicles from the Soviet Union, these heavy lift resources were judgd by one US government study to have >layed a key role in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia end to be instrumental in a change in Soviet doctrine that previoua-Iy relied primarily on railroads to transport armored vehicles.n While the 1968 movement may have been deemed an operational

SOViETREINFORCEME~

necessity by Soviet invasion planners, the mass use of these vehicles also cone$ituted a tsst of heavy lift unite in a strategic movement role.

The soviets were seemingly satisfied with the perforrasnceoftheir heavy lift units and

Soviet ana@@s haue noted that prsczkion-gui&d munitions

(PGMs) have been equated with %wyield nuclear weapons, and they

believe that mi.%?ury transportation and logistic resources will be primary

PGM ta~ets.. . . The capabilities and employment options for heavy track

tractor units then become all the more important.

the correctness of the decisions that led to their creation. This was reflected in the continued growth of heavy truck tractor inventories and indoctrinel assessments of their utility on increased lethal theater battlefields, By the early 1960s, the Sovieta saw nuclear weapons as creating new requirements for the operation of military transportation systems. Likewise, the ongoing introduction of conventional deep-strike syeteme with precision gaidance hea been cbsractsrized as constituting anew stage in weap 00s technology with grave consequenaw for transpetition eyetem operation.

Soviet analysts have noted that precisiongnided munitions (PGMs) have been equated with low-yield nuclear weapons, and they believe that military transportation and logistic resources wilI be primary PGM targeta.x Thus, the threat to transportation resource=ven in the course of conventional operatioms+is judged extensive. The capabilities and employment options for heavy truck tractor unite then become all the more important.

MILITARYREVIEW A9nl1987 39

Capabilities and Employment

Today, the Soviet heavy truck tractor fleet designated for strategic movement mmprises some 3,500 MAZ537S with ChMZAR5247 trailers organized into heavy lift regiments.z These regiments constitute Reserves of the Supreme High Command (Rezervy Verkkounogo Glauno konsandovanila 02 VGK))assets employed under the direct supervision of the Supreme High Command (VGK) or al located to field commands at the VGKS discretion. Operating under the system that preyed so effective in World War II, the employment of these regiments would be planned by the armed forces chief of the rears VOSO organization.zs

Strategic heavy lift regiments may well be allocated by the Supreme High Com

mand to the ZVD High Commends established in 1985.a As noted, VOSO representatives were included in the High Command of Forces in the Far East which directed the 1945 Manchuria operation, and their presence in current TVD High Commands seems likely as well.

Strategic heavy lift units will be employed to support a broad spectrum of strategic land movement-from the concentration of forces in the prewar and initial period of war phases, to the strategic regrouping or maneuvering of combined arms forces throughout a conflict.w Heavy lift regiments have the potential of supporting all five continental TVDS around the Soviet periphe~. For purposes of illustrating one employment option that is heavily weighted for the Soviets most important theater, it is as-

Heavy lift regiments could at-so be ased to rapidly concentrate supplies of all tgpes, a role suggested by the exktence of low-boy trailers configured for

the transport of tracked armored vehicles and bulk cargo. . . . It is worth noting that the US Army in World War H made use of 45-ton tank transporters to

move large quantities of supplies after the Normandy landings.

40 April 1987 MILITARY REVIEW

sumed that about two-thirds of the strategic heavy liftassets-some 2,300 heavy tractortrailer%have heen allocated to support the High Command of the Western TVD.

These assets would he adequate to simultaneously move all tracked vehicles of either 10 tank regiments, 10 BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments or perhaps two to three tank or motorize