Military Review April 1975

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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMM ND NTMajor General John H. Cushman

DEPUTY COMM ND NTBrigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison

Editor in ChiefCOL lohn H. Chitty Jrssociate EditorCOL Alfred J MockArmy War Col/ege

ssistant EditorMAl loseph E. Burlas

Features EditorCPT Robert C MrDonaldManaging Editor

CPT Robert F. Witt

Production EditorDixie R DominguezSpanish merican Editor

LTC Juan Horta-Merlg

Brazilian EditorsCOL 100 0 Olimpio FilhdLTC Haralda Netto

Publication OfficerAJ St en E. Bartels

rt and DesignJerome F Srheele


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ilitaryReviewProfessional ournal of the US rmyFIFTY THREE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE1VOL LV APRIL 975 NO

RTICLESThe Political Problem of the People's Army . CPT William J Gregor, USA 3Clausewitz and limited Nuclear War . lTC William V. Murry, USA 15East German Army: A New look at Indoctrination Dennis Chaplin 29The Australian AIIVolunteer Force

Part I-The Political Evolution Kenneth J Coffey 34Civil Affairs in Transition l TC Philip D. Coleman, USAR 42The Infantry Battalion Revisited MAl Alexander M. S. McColl, USAR 52Bicentennial Feature:Kings Mountain and Southern loyalism MAl David Curtis Skaggs, USAR 56Problems of Contemporary War MG A. S. Milovidov, Soviet Army 58

COL V. G. Kozlov, Soviet ArmyFuture Trends of Communist China's Strategic Policy Niu SienChong 61The American General Staff (190316) MAl Marc B. Powe, USA 71Reader ForumArticles of InterestMilitary NotesMilitary Books

DEP RTMENTS

COVERPainting of elements of the 1st Infantry Division (The Big Red One) entitled RouteRed Clearance by Specialist 4 David Lavender in Vietnam in 1966. This was madeavailable from the US Army Historical Collection through the courtesy of the Chiefof Military History. .

329098

MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English. Spanosh and Portuguese by the US Army Commandand General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for printing this publication approvedby Headquarters, Department of the Army, 8 April 1974. Second ciass postage paid at Leavenworth. KS66048. Subscription; $6.00 per year US and APO/FPO, $7.50 foreign. Single copies $.75 US and APOIFPO,$1.00 foreign. Address all mail to Military Review, USACGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027. Telephone 91316845642 or AUTOVON 5525642. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors andare not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof.US ISSN 0026-4148


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~ I t RE DER ORUMMilitary Professiqn

In his artIcle "The American MilitaryProfession: n Egalitarian View" in theNovember 1974 issue of Military Review,Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Parham addresses an important and currently muchdiscussed topic. Parham's work, however,is s e r i o u ~ y flawed. The article suffersfrom oversimplifications, imprecise delineation of concepts, incorrectly impliedcausal relationships, history according toone interpretation and superficial analysis.The author's egalitarian .definition ofthe military professional is so general thatit is useful neither as a practical dermitionnor as an intellectual construct for gaining further understanding. The statement"The professional in any field either ispracticing' his profession or devoting timeto studying the problems of his profession and postulating solutions" eliminatesa large portion of those included by theegalitarian definition of the military professional.While Lieutenant Colonel Parham,'s ar-guments from analogy and his attemptsto link an obtuse ideology to the DefenseDepartment while simu taneously assign.ing the US military a role that demands itconvert our society t a militaristic -ternal absolutism are indeed worthy of. criticism, his most glaring error is his lackof serious investigation. He notes thatother authors, in their attempts to analyze American military institutions, havefrequently done only superficial researchto back up conclusions alrearly reached.He apparently has done the same thing.Lieutenant Colonel Parham's discussion of civilmilitary relationships on theAmerican frontier illustrates the point. Itis clearly superficial to assert that citiesgrowing where the Army had been garrisoned demonstrates this relationship. Nocausal relationship is shown, and the obvious question is not answered-that iswhy was the Army garrisoned in the locations mentioned in the first place? Fur-

ther, the Frederick Jackson Turner thesisis considered controversial and certainlyh s not won the universal acceptance heimplies.Elsewhere, Lieutenant Colonel Parhamcites General Palmer to show that theSwiss mobilization in 1914 was fasterthan the German. This is no doubt true,but cannot be used to support his argument. The fact that, while time passes atthe same rate on either side of the SwissGerman border, the sheer size of the twoarmies was vastly different is not takeninto account.Later, the author states that the German war machine of Bismarck inexorablydrove Germany toward war. To be sure,the cormections between Gennan militarism and the coming of World War Ihave been examined by many historians.His statement illustrates his superficial reosearch as it is difficult to reconcile withthe fact that Imperial Germany, with Bis-marck at the helm, never went to war. Awar finding Prussia and its allies pittedagainst France was finished, and Gelmanyremained at peace for 43 years-24 yearspast Bismarck's relief from office and 16years past his death. The inexorable driveof his war machine was, it would seem,unsuccessful in his lifetime.Parham's sources include Bartlett sFamiliar Quotations, Quotes for the Mili-tary Writer, The Army Almanac and ageneral History o the United StatesArmy These indicate to me that, in hiswords, "superficial research was donemerely to back up conclusions alreadyreached."

f my criticism seems a bit harsh anduncompromising, it is perhaps because Iwish to resist the downhill trend I sensewhen Lieutenant Colonel Parham compares the military professional, in succession, to a doctor, a composer and, finally,to a sheepdog.

CPT Hartmut H. Lau. USA( ontinued on pnge 111)

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(contlnl1f d from POR I 2.

The American Military Profession:An Egalitarian View by LieutenantColonel Paul B Parham (Military ReviewNovember 1974)-much ado about nothing_ The ever-continuing pseudosociological tlissection of career service peoplesuggests there is a rather painful searchfor a problem instead ~ a serious effortto seek new ways to continue the healthyprogress in terms of professional development. The more empirical efforts in thisarena such as Morris Janowitz' The NewMilitary indicate there has been change inthe makeup of the Armed Forces over theyears, reflecting the broader base uponwhich military units 'are built. Actionmore often is a result of initiative andpersuasion than from domination. Ad-va'lcement accrues from competent performance. These and other changes havetaken place because professional peoplehave sought to find the best possible waysto accomplish the most critical of tasksto ensure survival and protect freedom.Labels for the type and degree of professionalism are not really that important.The principal cnticism I have of theParham article is the author's treatmentof Emory Upton. Too few Army professionals know of Upton's truly uniquecareer, totally dedicated life (there was areal professional), and of his exemplarycontribution to the modernization of theUnited States Army. The elitist labeling, as applied in this article, is not onlyinaccurate but s damaging because itgreatly detracts from the lessons to belearned in how to effect meaningfulchange and reform in institutions such asthe Army. A serious reading of Upton'seffort at military reform will dispel thenarrow perception that he was concernedonly with the Military Academy and itsgraduates. Upton's foremost concernnurtured to maturity on the bloodiestbattlefields of the Civil War - was to provide the leadership necessary to savemen's lives. The ultimate goal of hisreform effort was to ensure that professionally competent officers would beApril 1975

RE DER FORUM

available to lead men in battle, whenbattle was necessary.The essential ingredient of militaryeducation, for which Parham credits ElihuRoot, was born out of the exhaustivestudies and programs of Emory Upton.This is not to detract from the dynamicSecretary of War who was one of the veryfIrst responsible men to recognize theimportance to our profession of Upton'swork. To dismiss this singularly important innovator, strategist and teacher aselitist is simply to be in error.

LTC Hubert K. Bartron, USA

Professional WritingThis is in response to a letter on Professional Writing from Army Major Jose 1h R. Bobbitt III which appeared inyour December edition of Military Re

viewMajor Bobbitt cites a need for a TroopLeaders Journal, dealing with such topicsas leadership problems. race relations,drug abuse and training. I respectfully askthe major where he's l)een in the last sev-eral years that Commanders Call has beenpublished.Commanders Call is published quarterly as a Department of the Army Pamphlet in the 360-800 series. It is aimed at

unit commanders, key officers and noncommissioned officers in leadership POSi-tions. Its purpose is to provide offIcialand professional information on Armyplans, policies, directives, operations andpositions on topical subjects.While Commanders Call has not previously published articles from junior officers, the inside back cover of the winteredition has an editor's note soliciting articles for publication.Commanders ~ l l has long been ac-cured of being dull and uninformative.We on the staff have been trying tochange its image and its content, butchange comes slow.

I m sure the major and many otherswill be pleasantly surprised with the next111


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anl; subsequent editions. And we hopeMajor Bobbitt will be one of our firstcontributors.mil Nazzaro

ommanders all Staff

Generalship of George Washingtont was indeed a surprise to learn thatmy The Generalship of George Washing-

ton (Military Review, July 1974) so distressed Colonel T. N. Dupuy as to provoke a Reader Forum comment (November 1974). am thankful for his correction of my unfortunate gaffe relative toGeneral Thomas Gage being the commarider at Boston m early l776, when itshould have been William Howe. apologize to the readers for this error.My purpose was to summarize the bestavailable scholarly commentaries relativeto Washington's military capabilities. Ei-ther Dupuy has not read the authoritiescited or does not agree with them. Colonel Dupuy may, of course, take exceptionto their and my conclusions, as I likewise

disagree with his criticisms. I t is not, however, worthwhile to engage in nit-pickingover such matters; I made my case and Iwill stand by it. In one instance, it doesappear discussion in the Reader Forum isnecessary. D. S. Freeman and Dupuy tothe contrary notwithstanding, the concept of the Chesapeake encirclement wasRochambeau's, not Washington's. I rec-ommend to all readers the comments relalive thereto to J. T. Flexner's GeorgeWashington in the American Revolutionand Arnold Whitridge's Rochambeau.Let's give credit where credit is due;Washington does not need unwarrantedaccolades to crown his achievements.Finally, despite his faults, and for thereasons shown in my essay, most cer-tainly would include Washington, usingDupuy's words, in the very limited ranksof the great captains of history. ColonelDupuy would do so only i f he had beencalled upon to fight further after Yorktown. Who is damning whom with faintpraise?

MAJ David Curt is Skaggs. USAR

NOTI E

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The continued lIlld rapid increases in production and dis-tributioll costs IZd IN Ilecessitated l l increase ill the M I 1.1-TARY REVIEW'S subscription rates. E j l e c t i ~ e July1975, the follo 1 ing rates lei/I be used:

US & APO /FPOF o r e J ~ r ; 1

8_00 Per Year10.00 Per rear

Single copies: US & APO / FPO - 1 .00Foreign- 1.25

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WIT THANKS AND GRATITUDEApril 1945 marked a milestone in the life of Military Review

for it was then that the Spanish.American and Brazilian editions ofthe magazine first appeared.

On the anniversary of that occasion we pay tribute to themany dedicated people who over the years have used their talentsand experience in translating oftentimes difficult English intoacceptable and understandable Spanish and Portuguese. Theexcellence of their efforts-which began with Colonel AndresLopez and Major Severino Sombra first editors of theSpanish.American and Brazilian editions respectively-contributedimmeasurably toward a better understanding between the armedforces of Latin America and the US Army.

We also take this opportunity to pledge our continuing efforts inbringing to readers of the three editions the latest thinking intactics strategy and changing military affairs.

Colonel ohn H Chitty JrColonel Joao Olimpio FilhoLieutenant Colonel Juan HortaMerly


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nePoliticol ProDlemo tnePeople s Army

Captain William J Gregor, United States Army

T HE social and political revolutions of the 20th Century havebeen characterized by a high level ofpolitical violence. The political violence which spawned these new regimes also created threat of counterrevolution and the consequent need todefine and establish a military forcethat was both militanly effective andpolitically reliable. Although each revolution differed substantially in form,in each case, the national leadershipinitially sought to organize an armyconsonant with their ideology. Forthis purpose, they drew upon the military theories of Jean J au res, aFrench Socialist, who, in 1910, wrotea treatise which he had hoped wouldserve as the basis for organizing theFrench Army in accordance with Socialist principles. His book, L A r }Nou1 elle, failed to move the government of France, but it did, however,influence Leon Trotsky, and, throughTrotsky, the Socialist armies that followed. Jaures principal concern wasbringing democratic-socialistic precepts to the army. To this end, he con-

ceived of a nation-in-arms, basedupon universal service, selection ofofficer candidates by labor organizations, elective promotion and thedispersion of units throughout thepopulace. 2 In order to prevent the reestablishment of an officer caste, heenvisioned permanent ties to theworker. These ties were extragovernmental in that the local populace andlabor organizations were to bear thecost of an officer s education and thecost of supporting local units. Hence,the nation-in-arms was designed to bethe protector of a set of social principles, not a governmental institution.Yet, even though Jaures theory is animportant part of Communist ideologyand has been advocated by prominentCommunist leaders, such as Lenin,Trotsky and Mao Tse-tung, no permanent military establishment is organized as a nation-in-arms. Why doesn tthe people s army of the L Ar))}eeNouvelle exist?

The nonviability of the people sarmy is the subject of this article.More specifically, the effort here will

Copyrij: "ht 1975 by aptam Wdliam J. Gregol , UmtE:'d States A.nny

April 975


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be to explain the changes that oc-curred in the armies of the SovietUnion and the People s Republic ofChina; to display, if possible, the po-litical considerations which forcedCommunist leaders to abandon Jaures''theory in favor of the military con-cepts of Niccoli Machiavelli; and toidentify, where appropriate, the ele-ments of this metamorphosis whichare universally applicable to the prob-lem of creating a politically reliablearmy. t is necessary, however, topause a moment and review some ofthe precepts of Machiavelli s militarytheory.

Writing in the context of the 15thCentury, Niccoli Machiavelli was con-cerned with the problem of buildinga politically reliable army. In his bookThe Art of War Machiavelli ad-dressed this problem for a political,rather than military, standpoint. Fear-ing the political intrigues of profes-sional soldiers and the c p r i c i o u s n e ~ s

. Captain William J Gregor is a stu-dent at the Armor Officer AdvancedCourse Fort Knox Kentucky. He isa graduate of the USMA and holds aMaster of Philosophy degree in Polit-ical Science from Yale University. As-signments include service in the Re-public of Vietnam and with the stInfantry Division Fort Riley Kan-sas.4

of foreign auxiliaries, he looked to-ward development of a citizen s mili-tia. The soldiers were to be chosen byconscription in order to ensure selec-tion of those most suited for the rig-ors of war. Once chosen, intensivedrill and strict discipline were tomold this force into a loyal and effec-tive army. Additionally, Machiavellihoped that, through the inculcation ofmartial spirit and loyalty among thesoldiers, similar sentiments would beproduced in the general populace. Spe-cifically, the militia was to aid increating a civic attitude of loyaltyand discipline, 3 virtues Machiavellideemed essential to a healthy state.'Thus, Machiavelli developed a militiaconcept that saw the armed forces asa defense against external threat, anobstacle to internal intrigue and asource of civic cohesion. The armydeveloped in Machiavelli s theory isprincipally a guarantor of the govern-ment, regardless of the government sform.

During the discussion that follows,it will be necessary to keep in mindsome of the salient features of theaforementioned theories. In particu-lar, it should be noted that Jaur s'theory, the Socialist model, proposesa voluntary army designed to defenda set of social principles. Machiavelli stheory, however, orients upon estab-lishing an army dedicated to the pres-ervation of an institution. The ex-amination of the development of thearmed forces in the Soviet Union andChina reveals that Jaures' theory,when applied, created several seriouspolitical problems for the nationalgovernment. In dealing with theseproblems, the organization of thearmy was altered and the military or-ganization finally adopted was themodel proposed by Niccolo Machia-velli. The formation of the Russian

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Leon Trotsky

Red Army clearly shows J au res' influence upon the Communists. TheRed rmy is seen passing throughroughly three phases of development.In the first phase, t was organizedstrictly in accordance with the pronouncements of Jaures and Lenin.Threatened German offensives and theRussian Civil War, however, forced theRed rmy to assume the mold of tra-ditional regular armies. The finalphase centered upon Trotsky's effortsto convert the triumphant Red Armyinto a people's militia. The phases ofdevelopment are not the subject ofthis study, but, rather, the politicalconsiderations which c a use d thechanges.

Prior to the Russian Revolution, V.1 Lenin and Leon Trotsky were advocates of Jaures' military theory.Writing from Switzerland in March1917, Lenin outlined a military pro-gram designed to create a universalmilitia that would arm, train andeducate the-'masses in order to ensurefreedom and democracy. 5 With Czar

V.I. LeninApril 975

POLITIC L PROBLEM

Nicholas' abdication, Lenin recognized the need t establish a para-military force to promote the Bolshevik rise to power. To that end, theBolshevik military organizations,heretofore engaged in propaganda efforts to disrupt the Imperial RussianArmy, were armed with equipmentlooted from army arsenals. The RedGuard's fo r m t ion was, however,somewhat late. The Kerensky government collapsed long before the RedGuard could develop any significantmilitary capabilities. When the revolution occurred on 7 November 1917, theRed Guard threat wa. confined to thecities of Petrograd and Moscow, witha total force of less than 30,000guards. 6 The Red Guard's lack ofmilitary skills constituted no obstacleto Lenin's rise to power. f ter all, the


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The storming 1 the Winter Palace The Reds take charge 1 the revolution

Red Guard was primarily a politicalinstrument for fomenting unrest andspreading propaganda. Despite severalbloody incidents, the Bolshevik seizu re of power actually occu rred in theabsence of governmental authority.As is characteristic of Western revolutions, the Russian Government collapsed prior to the Bolshevik strugglefor power, not because of it. Afterseizing the government, however, Le-- nin was confronted by the need to defend his government from the invading German armies. In meeting thatneed, the Bolsheviks soon discoveredthat the bravado of the Red Guardwas no substitute for the disciplineand training of a regular army.

The October Revolution establisheda new government, but it did not freeRussia from the threat of additionalGerman. conquests anrl continued war.

This problem was compounded by thecomplete collapse of the Imperial Russian Army. To meet the continuedneed for defense, the All-Russian Collegiate for the Red Army began inDecember 1917 to prepare for thecreation of a Socialist army. The re-sulting Workers' and Peasants' RedArmy provided for voluntary service,elected commanders and regionallybased units. 7 The Bolshevik party.however, had split into two factions.One faction, principally the Left Communists, advocated carrying the Communist revolution to neighboringcountries t h r 0 u h revolutionarywar. Lenin and his supporterswanted, instead, to consolidate the re-gime and negotiate a quick peace. Recognizing that a spirited recruitmentcampaign to fill the Red Army wouldstrengthen the Left Communists, Le-

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merit, then the costs of adopting thenation-in-arms concept would havebeen acceptable. A technical debateonly skirted the fundamental politicaliss\le.' the struggle for a militia did notwait the outcome of the technical debate. On 3 March 1921, the soldiersand sailors of the Kronstadt proclaimed that the Whole of Russiawou d rise a g a i n s t a governmentwhich had w i t h d r w n from themasses. . . . 13 Trotsky and Tukhachevski were dispatched to Petrogradwhere, through eight bloqdy nightsof fighting. they led the Red Army insuppressing the revolt. I Althoughthere were a number of grievancesbehind the revolt, the basic cause appears to have been the growing resentment among local leaders of the central government's control. More specifically, the local soviets and labororganizations wanted to regain theirformer autonomy. Zinoviev, hoping toimprove his own political fortune,sti rred local unrest through appealsto the Petrograd soviet. Using thedemocratic-socialistic principles of theBolshevik movement, he portrayedhimself as a supporter of full democracy and denounced Leon Trotsky asthe source of bureaucratic compulsion. 'o The effect of the revolt wasnot, however, decentralization. Leninwas determined that the position ofthe central government would not bediminished. He certainly was not going to permit military power to slipirom central control. Addressing the10th Party Congress on 9 March 1921,Lenin said, We do not need opposition now comrades, it's not the time,for it. he time has come to putan end to opposition. 16 In this atmosphere; military reforms were notappropriate. Trotsky's supporters didprevent the adoption of the military

opposition's proposals, but their victory was limited for the military commanders associated with Stalin wereelected to the Central Committee. 7

Although the debate over the militiacontinued until Trotsky's replacementas Commissar of War and the implementation of Frunze's military program, the issue actually died at the10th Congress. At that time, the ascendancy of Stalin and the election ofhis supporters to the Central Comittee ensured that no technical debatewould be allowed to produce a militiaand restore Leon Trotsky's politicalposition. Once Trotsky's opponentshad gained political power and thesupport of the Red Army, the nationin-arms was doomed to oblivion.

The development of the Red Armydisplays the changes that occurredbetween the concept outlined by Leninin Switzerland and the army actuallyfielded. Initially, the paramilitaryRed Guard was an instrument ofpropaganda and political violence. Theprocess of instilling ideological commitment in these forces, however, tiedthem strongly to the principles of therevolution. Aiter the revolution. factions appeared within the party andwith them the possibility that locallybased militia units would supportthese factions with their weapons.This was particularly true becausethe units looked to the principleswithin the ideology, rather than acentral institution. for direction. Asa result, party leaders such as Zinoviev were able to gain the support oflocal units in opposing the dictates ofthe central government. Principles.unlike institutions. are subject to interpretation. and units organized uponthat basis are likely to be coopted intostruggles for power.

The decisive weakness of the people s militia, as illustrated by theilitary Review


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Site of the general headquarters of the Chinese CommunistParty during the August 927 uprisingevents in the Soviet Union, seems tohave been its emphasis upon ideological principles. Samuel Huntington hassuggested that ideological commitment, which is indispensable for obtaining power, is dysfunctional to tbemaintenance of the new system.The reconstruction of society after anupheaval requires that authority betransferred to an institution and, in aone-party state, to a party. The paramilitary forces which were designedto destroy the old regime cannot beexpected to become the obedient servant of the new order.

In contrast to the Soviet revolution,the examination of the Chinese Communist movement reveals a situationgreatly different in character and onein which the people s militia played arelatively minor role. At the outset ofthe revolution (the Nanking Uprisingof 1 August 1927), the Communistparty, lacking popular support, facedthe armed opposition of the Kuomin-April 975

tang armies. The Nanking Uprisingwas in fact a military adventure. Ledand executed by Communist elementsof the ~ t i o n l i s t Army, the insurrection failed to generate civilian support. n The ~ n k i n g failure clearlyindicated to the Chinese Communiststhe isolation of their movement frompopular sentiments. Relying upontheir own experipnces, tbe Soviet advisors to the Chinese CommunistParty recommended preparations foran armed insurrection by peasantsand workers. : iI The Chinese howeverfaced a powerful enemy and not aweak and vacillating government liketbe Kerensky regime. Recognizing thedistinctly different situation, Mao Tsetung counseled creation of a regularRed Army. Specifically, Mao Tse-tungsaid:

f I e have only Red Gual ds of alocal character but no regular RedArm1/, then i e can only deal with thehouse-to-house militia the local force


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On 23 April 1949, m m ~ r s of the People s Liberation Army occupied the house of thepresident in Nanking marking the downfall of the Kuomintang regime

,,( the landlm'ds llt not the rl/lllarwhit tro(}p, {. n

Although Mao had to overcome thesupporters of Moscow's program, heobtained suflkient political power to

n ~ u r the outcome of the struggle.As a result, the advocate, of the people's militia never attained politicalstrength cOJJ1parable to tbat of the.Left Communi,[s and Leon Trotsky.

The adoption of Mao Tse-tung'smilitary concepts had a profound effect upon the course of civil-militaryrelations in Chilla, In the absence ofpopular support, the Red Army had tobe established from the personnelavailable which consisted primarilyof deserters from the landlord militias mercenaries nd brigands. 22Builrling a disciplined army fromsuch material not only was a considerable task, but also raised questions of political reliability. u s tas Machiavelli had puzzled over thepoor charadeI' of mercenaries, theChinese could ill-afforrl any assumption of innate peasantvirtue. The con-o10

summate need was to destroy the sol.lier's former pattern of behavior andinstill the party's standard. The actualmethod of discipline. indoctrination,self-criticism and rectification is notimportant to this discussion except tonote the neces ity of producing reliability from within the army structureitself. This a p p ro a c h was clearlystated by Mao Tse-tung: Our pl'inciple is that the party mllst controlthe gun, and the gun shall never beallowed to control the party. Thefoundation was laid for an army loyaland obedient to an institution, notideological principles.

Just as the lack of popular ,pporthad dictated the personnel initiallyattracted to the People's LiberationArmy (PLA), so, too, it compellerthe use of the army as a political instrument. In the face of Kuomintangopposition, political programs cOl,ldnot begin until military forces hadsecured a specific area. Thus, thearmy constituted the initial elementof the movement's advance, the politi-

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On 1 October U49, in Peking, Chairman aoproclaimed to the world the founding of thePeople's Republic of Chinacal vanguard, and as such set theinitial example for the people toemulate.

The achievement of victory in 1949bl'ought serious efforts to alter tbecomposition and organization of thearmy. Although the Korean War delayed the process until 1954, it alsodisplayed some of the serious militaryweaknesses which gave the modernizers within the armed forces considerable political strength. Koreaclearly exposed the lack of adequateindirect fire support and the disadvantages of the infleXIble political command structure. These and otherweakneRSes produced a strong effortto reform along the lines of the SovietUnion's army. The Regulation on theSm.,.ire nf Ofjira , promulgated inFebruary 1955, established a professional officer corps in accordance withRussian doctrine. ', The regulationwas an adjunct to the demobilizationof a portion of the PLA and the introduction of conscription. The positionof the modernizers, explicitly statedby Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, was toApril 1975

POLITIC L PROBLEM

learn from the experiences and example of the Soviet Union. 26 The greatfailure of this position was MarshalP'eng's conception of the army as aninstrument of national defense ratherthan political action.Machiavelli had called conscriptiondelectus, the method by which themost suitable were selected for military service. Similarly, the Chinesesought to ensure political reliabilitythrough the selection of recruits withideologically good recOl'ds and strongpeasant backgrounds. ' Yet the professionalization which was to assistin producing military effecth'eness rancounter to the political purposes ofthe party. Emphasis upon martialcapability led to a decline in partycadre activity, a decline which by July1960 had caused the party committeeto vanish in 7000 companies. 'The attack upon professionalizationhad begun almost with the inceptionof the Regulatinns nn the Service ofOttice>s As early as August 1955, LoJung-huan, the director of the army'sGeneral Political Department, hadcommented upon the estrangement ofthe officers and men and its inherentcontradiction of party principles.By 1958, several changes had occurredto shift the balance of power awayfrom the modernize 's. An effort begunin 1957 was formalized and vigorouslypU;;hed by the General Political Department directive Issued 20 September 1958. The directive ordered allable-bodied officers to ;;pend a monthannually in the ranh as ordinary soldiers. ' This effort undoubtedly wasan attempt to exert political controlover the officer corps. Simultaneously,Mao Tse-tung exhorted the people tointensify the commune effort by organizing along military lines. In conjunction with this appeal, a people'smilitia was established to assist in

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PDLlTIC L PRDBLEMnational defense, but it was not subordinate to the PLA. At this point,the lines were drawn for a politicalstruggle e t w e ~ n the modernizers behind Marshal P'eng and the party.

The militia had never constituted amajor force. During the civil war, themilitia had never consisted of morethan eight percent of the populationin Communist hands and had been directly subordinate to the PLA. 31 Afterliberation, the militia served as a localpolice force. The expansion generatedby Mao was a distinct break from themilitia's traditional role. Under theslogan Everyone-a-Soldier, an attempt was made to enroll every ablebodied adult into the militia. As conceived, the militia was to be trainedand armed by the PLA, but actualcommand was divided between theparty and the army. 32

The popular response to the people'smilitia was reportedly tremendous.Public proclamations, intended forRussian and :-.rationalist Chinesesumption, announced that 225 millionarmed militiamen were prepared torepel any aggressor. ' Actually, thePLA resented the requirement to divert equipment and training personnelto' this amorphous fighting force. Theorganization of the militia outsidePLA control equally aggravated themodernizers. 34 In any event, the fa

~ d e of Everyone-a-Soldier was destroyed When an inspection by themilitia commander in chief revealedthat most units existed only on paper;that some members had used theirweapons to commit crimes; and that,in general, the issued weapons hadbeen rendered unserviceable by inadequate care. 3 , Critical to the reportwas the observation that there hadbeen a serious lack of cadre supervision. The implications were all tooclear. The People's Lib.eration Army2

lin iaohad defended itself by apathetic execution, while the dearth of politicalcadre guaranteed that the militiawould be largely unsupervised.Everyone-a-Soldier revealed to Maoand Lin Piao the extent to which professionalism had diminished politicalactivity within the army. Lin Piao replaced Marshal P'i llg as Minister ofDefense and began strenuous effortsto renew the political fervor of thePLA. Numerous articles appeared inthe armed forces' newspaper stressingthe supremacy of politics over militaryskills, and Lin Piao told the PLA thatpolitics, not military competence,must command. These concepts wereinstituted through regulations governing political activity and a revised setof military manuals. 3r, Finally. on 1June 1965, the egulations on theService of fficers was rescinded. and,along with it. all rank and professionaldistinctions were abolished. Ostensively, the abolition was to eliminateconditions that promoted bureaucracyand ambition. 37 Effectively, it accomplished two important political purposes. The new regulation declaredthat the army would no longer wearthe 8 to 1 device. symbolic of the be-

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gmmg of the PLA at the NankingUprising on 1 August 1927. Mao Tsetung had not participated in the Nanking Uprising, and, thus, removal ofthe 8 to 1 device indicated Mao s supremacy within the party. Secondly.the abolition of rank enabled Mao todismiss old comrades without concernfor their past achievements,38 for,without secure position based uponrank, an individual soldier can onlyhope to retain his position throughcontinual party friendship. Loyalty tothe party as an institution was, therefore, guaranteed.

The cultural revolution perhapsdemonstrates how firmly the army'sloyalty was wedded to the party as aninstitution. The intraparty strugglewhich began in 1966 involved thearmy in several different roles. According to Juergen Domes, the armywas ostensibly neutral until January1967, when Lin Piao called upon thePLA to assist in the movement. 3 Apparently, the request to render all-outsupport produced serious rifts withinthe military, for most units failed tol ' e s p 0 n d. The fundamental factorwhich dictated the PLA's inactionseems to have been the doctrinal tenetthat the army is an instrument of theparty. The party, as defined by Chinese doctrine, was an institution, nota personality, a political theory or afaction. Quite naturally, the attempt touse the army in an internal partypower struggle produced diverse reactions among the commanders. Thedivision not only led some commanders to oppose the cultural revolution,but also created the threat that military units would convert the partyquarrel into an armed contlict. Facedwith the possibility that further efforts to involve the army would dangerously divide armed forces loyalty,Lin Piao wisely withdrew the PLAApril 975

POLITIC L PROBLEM

from the mission and set the units towork restoring order. In this crisis,the army had represented an obstacleto the ambition of an internal partyfaction.

The development of the People sLiberation Army along lines markedly'different from the principles of JeanJaure illuminates an important concept. Niccoli Machiavelli had discovered in the 15th Century that it wasnecessary to develop within the armythose virtues deemed valuable. t doesnot matter whether the principles arepolitical or military, unly that theyare actively inculcated. The properselection of recruits can ensure a favorable position from which to beginthe process of molding the soldier'sattitudes, but it cannot replace theinternal military education effort.Forced to build an army from men ofill-repute, the Chinese, like Machiavelli, chose to inculcate within thearmy the essential beliefs of. theparty, and then through the armycarry their message to the people. Thepolitical contlicts that arose in Russiaduring the attempt to build a people smilitia did not arise in China preciselybecause the army was firmly tied to apolitical institution, and not a set ofdiverse political ideas.

The example of the development ofthe Russian Red Army revealed that,although Bolshevik leaders advocateda people s militia, such an organization represented a constant obstacleto establishing the authority of thecentral government. This was particularly true when ideological differences were accented and local militia units supported ambitious politicalleaders. t was this problem of political reliability which forced Lenin tocentralize the armed forces and abandon the Jaures model. The Chinesecase established that a politically re-

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POLITICAL PROBLEMliable army can be instituted i f organized along t h ~ lines of Machiavelli's militi'a. I t is not possible, onthe basis of these examples, to envision the passing of the people's militia concept from the revolutionaryrhetoric of social movements; the needto maintain the legend of the RedGuard and its emotional appeal certainly precludes that. The implicationto be drawn from these historicalcases is that political reliability, poIi tical activism and so:ne degree of

military efficiency can be establishedwithin the armed forces so long as thearmed forces and its guiding principles emanate from and are stronglycontrolled by a central institution. I fthe missions of the army are seen. tobe the result of universal social principles or the discretion of local political leaders, then the army not onlywill reflect local differences and ideological diversity, but also will represent an armed force that may be employed against the central government.

;l;OTES1 IsaaC' Deut ,h r. TI Prophrt Armed T T ( j f ~ / . ) I .

t ~ ; - 9 _ U I ~ l l . O;o.fnrrl Um\(' ..lty P n . s ~ . NY. 195.tI 'll 4';7:-, N. Y., 1967, p 4:.:-, IbId. p 200: H NIU S i e n - C h o n ~ , "Th(' Rnnk)ess A'm\ ,"l1J l l tary Rf l / f l l . Fpbrual'Y J%6, p 55

: : : ~ G('orge, Oil, CIt , fJ 212';" Ib,d, D 201: 'l [bId., P 20210 Ellis JoffE'. PaTty l lnd Armu PrOlCl 810llttil8m

( / l l d PoltltC o.C Cmltrol 111 thf' Ch'llell(, O(firt.'r Corp8.194Q-1964. Harvard University Pres . , ('ambridge,Mas . , 1965, P 103

:n Jnhn C1ittml s, The Rolr 01 tlte Cltll1('8r Arm1/.O'X(ord Umverslty P r e < ; ~ . NY . , 1967. pp 201-4.12 Joffl" oJ'. ( It. pp 88-8911 Griffith, 01>. ( It. P 271.34 Joffe. oP. cit., p 89.

~ ; . Griffith, op. c i t , pp 27273.~ r . George, op. (',t., pp 205-6..1. Niu Sien-Chong, op. ("It" p '54.

Ibid p 56.m DomE'S, 011. cit.. P 366

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QIlnu5tfnib and limite ~ r ,Lieutenant Colonel William V. Murry, United States Anny

OST Army officers now on active duty were schooled in the

nine principles of war now defined inField Manual 100-5 and were taught.as that manual states, that those principles are fundamental truths. Nevertheless, the principles of war have.been challenged on numerous occa,ions. For over 20 years, the Army hasfailed to develop a politically acceptable doctrine for the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. f theClausewitzian concept of war beingan extension of politics by more forceful means is accepted, the sanctity ofthe fundamental truths of the principles of war must again be challenged.Otherwise, they would have led to a

p o l i t i ~ l l y acceptable tactical nucleardoctrine. Other authors have inter-April 975

preted the prInciples of war underconditions of nuclear combat, but nonehave specifically discussed the validityof the principles in a limited nuclearwar. This article attempts to answerthe question, Do the principles of warapply to limited nuclear war?

Any discussion of nuclear warfareis limited by a lack of empirical dataderived from actual nuclear combatexperience. Valid nuclear weapon employment concepts can only be derivedby the logical combi nation of provenmethodology of military operationsand known phenomenology of nuclearweapon effects. Both the argumentsand counterarguments are affectedequally by this lack of empirical support.

The concept of limited nuclear war5


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is often rejected as unrealistic and impossible. This attitude, a carry-overfrom the nuclear firebreak strategyof the Sixties, is based on the argument that the belligerents will escalate rather than accept defeat. In reality, this suicidal logic becomes anargument against the possibility oflimited war, nuclear or not. Escalationof the nuclear conflict to the level ofmassive strategic nuclear strikes deep

both to rehabilitate himself and toexercise the desirerl control over theloser. t would be a Pyrrhic victory.Thus, the employment of nuclear weapons has utility only in a limited war.Because of the potential of eatastrophic results, the decision to employ nuclear weapons in war is, andwill likely l w ys remam, for all nations, a presidential decision.

For the United States, that decisionwould likely be made under one of twoconditions. First, the United Statesor our vital interests have been attacked by an enemy actually using

nuclear weapons. Second, theUnited States or our vital in-

-- terests have been attacked byan enemy with the capability toemploy nuclear weapons tac-

to gain a significant margintically or sufficient manpowerof superiority in the absenceof nuclear weapons. Nu

clear weapons w{ uld thenbe employed tactically soas to preclude the loss. / . of the object of the con-I , flict by either capture or

destruction. The risk of en-\ \ S my escalation of a nuclearJ J y ~ war to strategic exchanges andthe risk of destruction can be

within the belligerents' homelands islikely only if the survival or most vitalintel'est of the losing side is threatened. The perception of threat is asserious as actual threat; therefore,. the prerequisite for keeping war limited is that both sides have correctintelligence about each other's intentions, t

The destruction resulting from anall-out mutual strategic nuclear exchange will be so great that victorywill lose its meaning. The survivingphysical and psychological assets ofthe victor would not be sufficient15

reduced by constraining the useof US nuclear weapons. Weaponyield, weapon type, target location,

character of target and number of nuclear weapons used must all be constrained in a limited nuclear war

The rinciples of WarThe principles of war are the cul

mination of efforts to establish acause-and-effect relationship betweenthe actions of al'mies and the outcomeof armed conflicts, For more than2500 years, philosopher tacticians havediscussed principles which some reo

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g.ard more as philosophy of war thanprinciples for the conduct of war. 3Napoleon studied the great captainsof antiquity and espoused 115 maxims.While the maxims he derived were un-doubtedly valid in Napoleon's timeand had a timeless quality based upontheir historic derivation, the sheernumber would tend to deny them thest tus of principles of wtar.

In 1812, Clausewitz summarized hismilItary instruction to Frederick Wilhelm IV m a memorandum entitled

The Most Important Principles ForThe Conduct Of War To Complete MyCourse Of Instruction Of His RoyalHighness The Crown Prince. Afterhis death, Clausewitz' wife publishedhis writings. The English translationof this memorandum is simply entitledPrinciples of War. Although it lacksthe detail and depth of discuRSlOn ofhis more famous work, om K negeOn War , P inciples of War was the

foundation for all that Clausewitz discussed in Fa1/ Kriege. In Principlesr War, Clausewitz cites 3 general

principles for defense. 14 principlesfor offense, 8 for the use of troops and17 for the u,e of tenam. In the thirdchapter, Strategy, he cites 4 rule,;.the latter l derived from the first.Thus, the number of prinCIples variesdepending upon how rlausewitz is interpreted. Although rlausewitz doesnot name or title any of his principles,they are readily identified as combina-tions or discussions of the modernField Manual 100-5. All appear to becovered except the principle of sim-plIcity. I

The prmciples of war were recognized by US Army Field Service Regulations as early as 1904 and had beentaught at the Military Academy asearly as the late 1800s. Oddly enough.they _were not listed until 1921. In sub-sequent US Army doctrinal documen-April 975

tation, the principles of war were dis-cussed in context but not listed byname. The first listing and definitionor discussion of principles of war appears to have been in Field Manual100-5 in 1949. British Army doctrinallIterature was similarly plagued, caUS-ing General Fuller to, develop first 8then 11, and finally 9 principles of warwhich the British Army subsequentlyadopted in 1923. These 9 were expanded again to 11 following Wol'ldWar II. -

The lists of the prmciples of warrecognized by different nations aregiven in Figure 1. The lists for theUnited States and Britain are current.The lists for the French and Sovietswere current in 1955 and are likelystill current. Although the lists differ.similarity of content can be recognized without knowing the officialdefinitions of each. The differences inthe principles accepted by variouscountries reflect differences in the de,ired degree of emphasis which eachcountry places on the various princi-ples, The differences in emphasis donot appear to be due to fundamentaldoctrinal or organizational differen-ces_ Rather, they appear to be due to

17
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LIMITED N UCLEAR WAR

diffeTences in national character orhistorical experience and language.

Changes in the weaponry of warhave resulted in hanges in the inter-pretation and importance of each ofthe principles. These changes wereg'enerally slow to impact on militarythought in the Cnited States. Insular,wlation f om the wars of Europe andAsia has allowed the Cnited States toignure the need to update militarytechniques in the past. This isolationprovided a cushion of time and dis-tance. behind which the United States'cou Id leisurely absorb the lessons pain-fully developed in other countries.

The application of the principles ofwal' in nuclear combat has been ad-dressed by many authors. One studyconcluded that smaller unit offensiveaction would be directed toward pro-ducipg situations in which nuclearweapons could be used .to destroy the8

enemy. A ~ l m l l a l F.tudy recognized theneed to limit military objeetivt' '


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of nuclear versus nonnuclear conflictare thus assllmed to have been re-solved and are not discllssed.

The actions of the enemy are a,,sumed to be rational and in accordancewith his perceptions of the intent andcapability of the United States. Thisassumption may be lhe most difficultfor some reader, to acre pt. Detailedanalysis of the Chi nese fPeople s Republic intervention n KOl: ,H, Sovietaction...:: during the Cuban miR,d ecrh:.is and the internnl and externalalfairs of any potential enem,' will.however, prove the rHtionality. Thestated intent of potentIal e l 1 e m i e ~ tne:-.calate nuclear W:11' l'upidly IS in -self a ratIOnal attempt to ensure thatfuture c o n t h e t ~ WIll he n()nlll1l'hann thus under conditions more favor-able to theIl use of armed force. hGiven a choice between natIOnal de:-.trudion uy aU-out nlldear war anda ( o u r ~ e of action le:-.s than uncondi-tIOnal surrender, t is difficult to imag-Ine any nation so irrational as tol'hoose :-.ocial and economic suicide

The definitions and intent of theprinciples of war recognized by theUS Army are assumed to be those inField Manual 100-5, Operations ofrmy Forces in the Field 1968, and

are those discussed in this article.The PrinCiple of the Objective

The principle of the objective isalways listed first because it is thedominant principle. Without a clearlydefined and attainable objective, allthe others become meaningless.Through at least 1960, the princi-ple of the objective proclaimed theultimate military objective and theultimate objective of war to be destruction of the enemy armed forcesand his will to fight. This destruc-tion objective is derived from Clause-witz' philosoph of unlimited war of

pril 1975

LIMITED NUCLE R W Rannihilation. However, attempts todestroy an enemy's armeo force, totally are likely to increase, rather thande,troy. his WIll to fight as long ashe has the means to r e s i ~ t Althoughthe current Field Manual 1005 'lOeSthe word defeat instead of de-

~ t r o y . thE emphasl; ; on d e ~ t r u d l O nis ~ t i l l apparent from the Field ;>'Ian-ual 61-100. The J ivisI


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thought unattainable through less vinlent means. That national objectivemust be foremost in'the determinationof all t c t i ~ l military objectives.When US Army forces in the field employ nuclear weapons, t h e ~ have suf-ficient combat po\\er to attam milital'y obJectives greatel' than that re-quired by a national objective ofcontrol or termination. This excesscapability. if employed, results inoverkill, with the probnble consequenee of enemy escalation of nuclear

\\ eapon employment. r;ven nonnuclearaction, If it does not contribute tothe natIOnal objecth'e, risks escala ion unneeeHsarily.

When the national obJective of warIS limited to less than unconditionalsurrender of the enemy armed forces.the ultimate military obJective is morepolitical than mlhtary. The refusal,or inability, to recognize this factwas the cause for much of the frus-trations, both in the military and P1lb-lie communitieH over Korea antI Viet-nam actionf-;.

The principle of the obJecti ve ascurrently defined does not prOVIde fO 'the attainment of the national objective through coercive use of militaryforce short of defeating or destroy-ing the enemy armed forces. Allowance for a broader interpretation ofthe word defeat is not sufficient. Inorder to minimize the risk of escalation, particularly in a limited nuclearconflict, it will be necessary that boththe US Armed Forces and the enemycunderstand precisely what the limitsof the United States' national objective are. Because of its emphasis ondefeat and destruction, rather

than contra] and termination, theprinciple of the objective does notenhance success of the US Army ina limited nuclear war. Instead, it hasa destabilizing and potentially escala-2

tory effect. Especially in a limited nuclear war, this principle would be bestregarded as the principle of nationalobjective.

he Principle of the OffensiveTacticians are divided on the rela

tive value of the offense and the uefense. Fifteen Decisi 'e attles o fheWorld shows that nine of the victorieswere for the defender. Nevertheless,the prmciple of the offensive is firmly

ingramed in US Army doctrine. Offensive action is regarded as theonly way to ensure ultimate destruc-tion of the enemy armed forces andto retain the initiative. The offensiveis also highly regarded for its decisiveness and value as a mOl'ale factor. This emphasis on destruction,initiative, decisiveness and morale apparently springs from Clause-

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witz' concept of war of annihilationand his concern for the psychologicalaspects of war.

Some authors believe the principleof the offensive will become more dom-inant in a nuclear war. Others be-lieve that nuclear combat favors de-fensive action more than offensivetion. At the strategic le\'el and on atheaterwide basis. the Ifational objec-t i ve will be served as well by thedeCisive act of the enemy to cease

g g r e ~ s i o n as it is by decisive offen-sive action intended to leave him nochoice. Large-scale offensive actionsmay be interpreted as threatening tothe survival of the enemy armedforces. and thus would tend to resultin escalation. At times, even the op-portunity for counterattack might beforegone to preclude further destabilizing complication of the situation,and to allow the enemy time to exercise his option to end the conflict. Ag-gressive offensive actions in a limitednuclear war will likely be confined tobattalion level and lower in order toavoid presenting a target for enemynuclear weapons and to avoid signalIng any intent of escalation. The purposes of the. smaller unit offensheactions will be disruption, Interdictionand punishment, rather than seekingdecisive total destruction of the enemy armed forces. The initiative andfreedom of action can be maIntainedin a largely defensive environment byforcing the enemy to fight when andwhere the US commander chooses orforcing him to become channelized toavoid a battle. In either case, the enemy becomes more vulnerable to USnuclear weapons. Additionally, freedom of action can be improved by preparedness, flexibility, more comprehensive intelligence and contingencyplanning at all levels of command.

The commander cannot adopt theApril 975

LIMITED NUCLE R W R

philosophy, "When in doubt, attack ,"because the corollary is "When indoubt, ignore all the other principIes.' Particularly in nuclear con-flict, the defensive becomes at leas't asimportant as the offensive. Offensiveactions can be escalatory and, therefore, counterproductive to the national objectIve in a limited war. Thebold and daring o f f n s i v ~ actions inUS Army history now regarded asheroic could lead to thermonuclear catastrophe if executed in a limited n\l-clear war. Thus. the principle of theoffensive \\ ll not enhance ~ u c c e s s ina hmite nuclear war

Stressing rational application of theprinciple of the offensive will not suffice. The proper emphasis will beplaced on both the offense and the de-fense and the original intent of theprinciple of the offensive to ensurefreedom of action will be preservedif t is regarded as the principle ofinitiative aetion

The Principle of MassThe principle of mass is often Ques-

tioned in a nuclear environment be-cause. historically. mass has beenidentified \\ ith the concentration ofmen and materiel. Combat power. how-ever. is composed of manpower andfirepower. An increase in the potencyof the firepower element increases thevulnerability of manpower and de-creases the need for manpower inestablishing a given level of combatpower. A greater dispersion of unitson the nuclear battlefield is a well-accepted concept.US commanders have been knownto overemphasize the principle of massto the extent of establishing overwhelming superiority of c o m b tpower. This tendency has been particularly true in the employment of fire-power. Commanders in Korea fre-

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.,quently called for artillery or tacticalair to engage targets even when theyhad the organic capability to neutralize. Employing nuclear weapons ina similar manner would be 'not onlydestabilizing but also wasteful of valeuable combat power.

An element of combat power oftentaken for granted within the USArmy is combat service support. Massive support of the magnitude witnessed in Vietnam will be impossiblein a nudear war. The responsiveness of smallerdispersed combat servicesupport elements will determine to a l rger meas -ure the total combat powerof US Army forces in thefield.

The principle of masswill enhance the success ofUS Army forces in a limited nuclear war so long asall the elements of combatpower-manpower, matedel, fil'epower and combatservice support-are con-

sidered and the real limitations on the availabilityof resources are recognized.Particularly in limited nuclear warfare, the application of appropriate combatpower must observe theprinciple of economy offorce as well as mass.The Principle 01 Economy 01 Force

Classically, economy offorce has been taken tomean the reduction of forcein secondary efforts in order to achieve superiorityat the critical time andplace. The need for econ-omy of force was totallydependent on the need for

mass at some other location. The possibility of overkill with (JUclearweapons is not only wasteful of resources, but it also increases the riskof escalation. Thus, measured application, as well as allocation, of available combat power to both the primary and secondary tasks becomesmore important when nuclear weaponsare employed. As a general rule, ina limited war the smallest amount offorce consistent with achieving the

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objective should be used. 0 Generally,this amount of force will be much lessthan that required to ensure the destruction of the enemy armed forceand his capability to continue combat.Application of the principle of economy of force will be essential to theconduct of a limited nuclear war byUS Army forces and must be appliedin the main as well as fecondary efforts.

The Principle of ManeuverManeuver implies more than meremovement of tactical units and firepower. t includes a consideration of

mobility of support and command andcontrol elements. The British principleof flexibility is perhaps more descriptive of the intent of maneuver, but itdoeR not emphasize movement to theextent tlfat the US principle does.lI.Taneuver is generally regarded as akey to survival in a nuclear environment. However many surveillance ra-dars depend upon movement for tar-

April 975

LIMITED NUCLE R W R

get d e t e ~ t i o n Maneu'ler will be animportant element of survival primarily for units such as headquarters andactive artillery which have other detection enhancing signatures. To beeffective. maneuver must be morerapid than the enemy's capability toaffect the situation. The tendency ina limited nuclear war will be towardthe rapid moves of smaller tacticalunits. Although the air mobility ofVietnam experience can ssist im-measurably in rapid maneuver. thevulnerability of Army aircraft to lowlevels of blast overpressures and pilotvulnerability to flash blindness mustbe considered. In the defense. maneuver will provide a means for maintaining the initiative by complicating enemy offensive planning. In addition.maneuver of small units will be employed offensively and defensively toaid in finding and fixing enemyl n i t ~ for attack with nuclea r weapons.Maneuver will be nece,gary to adddepth to battle when lCS forces areoutnumbered. or when more forceswould only increase nuclpar vulnerability. Application of the principle ofmaneuver WIll enhance the success ofUS Army forces in a lImited nuclearwar.

The Principle of Unity of Commandt has been alleged that the prinCIples of economy of force. objective.

offensive and maneuver can be sum-marized under unity of command forthe reason of gaining unity of effort.The sale purpose of unity of commandis to ensure unity of effort. The FieldManual 1005 definitIOn recognizesthat unity of effort is attainablethrough other techniques- -namely. cooperation which is the correspondingBritish principle of war. Thus. it mustbe concluded that unity of commandis a US Army doctrinal technique and

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100-5 definition-namely, the preservation of combat power. Considering the greater violenceand lethality which accompanies nuclear combat, the importance of the principle ofsecurity and the attention to

its application will begreatly increased.Too often this principle emphasizes the ele

ment of secrecy toavoid sUrprise. Asa result, the intel ;;ligence, counterintelligence, reconnais-

sance an l counterreconnaissance func\ ~ - - - ' : : = = = = = = = ~ t i o n s tend to


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noted If the principle of security isregarded as the principle of preser-v tion o romb t pOlVer

he Principle of SurprisePart of the success of Israel in

battle against numerically superiorArabic forces in 1967 and 1973 hasbeen attributed to application of theprinciple of surprise. 10 Numerousother historical examples support thevalue of surprise as an element ofwar. The real value of surprise liesnot so much in the lack of the enemy'sknowledge as it does in his lack ofability to respond effectively in orde\'April 975

LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

to control the outcome of the encoUllter. In a Ihnited nuclear war, it becomes necess ry to s crifice surpriseto "preclude extending the limits ofthe war as a result of inaccurate evaluation of such intentions." l Nevertheless, a l effort should be made toachieve surprise in the time, locationand manner of action, while leavingno doubt as to the intent. The essen-

tial element is maintenance of superiority of responsiveness whether theaction is offensive or defensive. To

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LIMITE NUCLE R W Rprovide the superiority of responsivE>ness in the use of micleal weapons,the requesting unit or agency mustprovide complete, accurate and timelydata to the release authority so thatthe employment can be most effective.

Application of the principle of sur-prise will enhance the success of USArmy forces in a limited nuclear warif it is confmed to the actions of tac-tical maneuver and firepower unit .This constraint appears to relegatesurprise to a technique of battle. Theintent of this principle of war is clearwhen regarded as the principle of e-

. ~ p m u ; i l e u e ~ s .

The Prin iple of SimplicitySimplicity of plans and orders canbe regarded in terms of simplicity of

st tement or in terms of simplicity ofnpClatiol1 r;isenho\ver s 30-word order to enter the European Continentand undei'lake combined actions to de-

6

stroy German Armed Forces is re-garded as a model of simplicity ofstatement. The almost overwhelmingcomplexity of that operation need onlybe mentioned to be realized. Simplicity is not an end in itself, but a meansto ensu re the most effective action.

Simplicity of operation in a nuclearconflict is inhibited by the need to coordinate maneuvel and firepower athigher staff levels, by the complexlogistical support for nuclear weaponsand by the cumbersome nuclearweapon release procedures, Modernmilitary operations which includenight operations, airmobile and am-phibious operations and nuclear andchemical warfare are inherently complex, The possibility of failure intro-duced by complexity is reduced bytl'aining, task organization and equip-ment.

In light of inherent complexity, ef-fective action can be ensured through

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clarity of plans and orders. Clarity isnecessary to ensure unity of effortconsistent with the objective and tominimize the risk of escalation. Clar-ity is more important than sheer sim-plicity. While the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. c I a r i t Y

'should never be sacrificed for sim-plicity.Application of the principle of simplicity wiII be more difficult but will

enhance the success of US Armyforces in a limited nuclear war. Themore important element should be emphasized by regarding this principleas the principle of clarity

In onclusionIt has been noted that two princi-ples of war do not enhance successtwo do not adequately enhance success

without renaming and redefining andtwo are not true principles of war.Only three principles were found toenhance success in a limited nuclearwar as currently defined. discussednamed and understood.

The principles of objective and of-f nsiv will not enhance Sl ccess in alimited nuclear war because of theiremphasis on decisive destruction ordefeat through offensive action whichis deemed to be destabilizing and escalatory in a limited war.

The principles of security and simplicity through broad definition wiIIenhance success in a limited nuclearwar, but the breadth of that defini-tion is so great as to make renamingof these two principles desirable forbetter understanding.

rhe principles of unity of commandand surprise are recognized as techniques or tools which are doctrinal tothe US Army, but not truly principlesof war. They will enhance success ina limited nuclear war, but without theflexibility of method allowed by trueApril 975

LIMITED NUCLE R W R

principles of war.The principles of mass economy offorce and maneuver as currently defined will enhance the success of US

Army forces in a limited nuclear war.In response to the over-all questionposed at the beginning of this articlethe principles of war as currentlydefined discussed and named do 110tapply to limited nuclear war.

Changes to the names of six of theprinciples of war have been suggestedand the new definitions implied atleast in part. While the purpose ofthis article was confined to limitednuclear war the principles of war, ifthey are true principles, must applyto all wars, limited or general, nonnuclear or nuclear. This constraint wasconsidered in the recommendation of

new names for those six principles(Figure 2).

27


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LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

These principles, therefore, will not so much give com cplete instruction . as they will stimulate and sel've as aguide for your own reflections_, -Kar von C l a u s ~ w i t ,

~ , ~ - :;;'Y ~ ~ ~ ~ , ; '> \ .

Lieutenant Colonel William V.Murry is currently with the Depart-ment of Tactics, USACGSC. He re-ceived a B.S. from the USMA, an M.S.and a Ph.D. tram Rensselaer Polytee/ -nic Institute, and is a 1974 USACGSCYIaduate. Assignments include com-mand of the 1st Light Horse AssaultA rt,/lelV Battery in Vietnam and ofthe Headquarters Company, I Corps(Republic of KOIea/United States)Group in Korea and sel vire ~ i t h FieldCommand, De/elise Nuclear Agency.

;';OTES1 Henry A. K1Ssinger. Nuclear Weapon andFaretgJt ['alrey. Second Edltlon, W. W. Norton &Co. Inc., N. Y., 1969, pp 107-61.

Nuclear WarfllrE'," OrblB. Volume XVI , Number2. 19,3. p 4392 Marshall L Fallwel1. "The Principles of Warand the SolutIOn of MlhtaTlI P r o b l ~ m s . Mll tanl

Rr.'vu ut, May 1955. pp 536&.3 John C Barney, Nur.'lear Wellp0'l18 1 8. TltroPTHlC lple8 o j War, Student ThesiS, US Army WarGollege. CarlIsle Barracks, Pa 1960.t Karl von C'lausewltz, Prtnnples of War. Editedby Hans W. Gatzke, The Military S'rvlce P u b b s h ~ing Co" Harnst


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East German Army:A New Look at Indoctrination

DENNIS CHAPLIN

RECENT information impartedby East German Army (EGA)defectors Indicates a disturbing

angle on the idea of psychologicalconditioning which has often beenignored in the past. Increasingly,cross-examinations of defectors haverevealed that the Communist systemof political indoctrination has alimited effect on Europeans withoutthe objective need to supportsomething like a national liberationmovement. Political training can havesignificant success and produceattitude changes in Vietcong fightersfilled with the group-susceptibilityof the guerrilla spirit, or it can, asin Japan in the last world war, beeffective in people already conditionedto think in terms of a nationalHmisRion,

With its uninspiring uncharlsmaticleadership, frontier restrictions andeconomic difficulties, East Germany,or the Gel man Democl atic Republic(G DR), fails to offer the conditionsfol susceptibility to a stimulatorypolitical indoctl'ination geal ed toproducing wildly enthusiastic gl OUpfeeling. In fact, as indicated bydefector repol ts, the delicate pl oblemsevoked by the division of Germanyand the possibility of an inter-Germancontlict in the context of interalliancehostilities raise constant doubts inEGA soldiers' minds. This is thepril 975

residue of Germany's past fiercelyguarded national togetherness, andthe Communist regime in the GDRhas spent the past 30 years trying tobreak down the links between the twoGerman states.

was not until the early 1960sthat East Gel'mans were actuallyphysically sealed off, a necessaryresponse to the prospects of an everdiminishing labor force. As recentInterviews suggest, however theInter-German links have not erodedenough to facilitate the effectiveapplication of political indoctrinationagainst \ e ~ t iermans. This sitliRtionworsened after 1972 when theCommunist regime in the GDR asforced by the USSR to relax frontierre::;trictions. The result wa s anincreasing rate of defection andincreasing personal contacts WIthWest Germam-the very people thepolitical officers were trying to vilifyas warmongers and imperialistfascists. t Just would not work, andmid-1972 began to see complaintsfrom EGA personnel that thearguments of political educationwere anachronisms in the context ofpolitical relaxation and increasingcontacts with West German tourists.

Political indoctrination's functionof shouting wolf in connection

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EAST GERMAN ARMYwith West Germans w as thusobstructed. Political officers in EGAunits began to encounter morecynicism and complaints duringschooling sessions. especially fromthose conscripts who had Just beeninducted from a civilian environmentfilled with ideas of political relaxationand inter-German contact. t was,therefore, decided to buttress politicalschooling with more positive meansof motivating EGA troops to sensea deep hatred for the West. Defectorinterviews suggest that this modifiedapproach has worked quite 'well andthat, to quote an ex-EGA captain,the troops do in many cases exhibita surprisingly deeply ingrained hatredfor the West. Past inclinations toscoff at the EGA concept of hatetraining as a fanciful aspect ofpolitical indoctrination can now beput aside, for it appears that this formof tr ining i ;; very much a re lity inthe EGA.

his is not to say that politicalindoctrination is the main instrumenthere. The crux of hate training isl)1ore akin to motivational guidancebased upon the EGA principle ofextremely tough, realistic trainingunder harsh conditions. EGApsychologists noted that the pressurescreated during training tended toproduce extremely ill-tempered moodsamong the troops. In view of theincreasing ineffectiveness of politicalschoolmg, it was decided to exploitthe kind of moods generated duringtough training as a basis forpolitical arguments.

The focal point of politicalarguments against the West thuscame to relate to blaming Westernmilitary activities neal' the frontierfor harsh conditions encountered by3

EGA troops. Training principleslike constantly doubled combatreadiness,H I'nonstop efforts,

permanent alertness and ceaselesscompetition are now placed in afresh perspective. EGA trainersargue that constant training effortsto the point of exhaustion areoccasioned by signs of increasingmilitary activity by NATO forces.The object is to help EGA troops toidentify the pressures and discomfortsof training demands with NATOchallenges.

i n c e Easter 1972, leave has beencut drastically; currently, only 12to 15 percent of EGA personnel areallowed public holiday leave asopposed to about 50 percent before1972. The idea is to make EGAtroops nourish a dislike for therelaxed frontier restrictions andinflux of West German tourists. Thepsychology involved is fiendishlysimple but effective. Gradually, the

Dennis Chaplin is a researcher fromthe University of East Anglia, specializing in military-political analysis. Hereceived his B.A. and Ph.D. at theSchool of European Studies, Norwich,England. He writes for various inter-national defense and political journals,and is currently preparing a book examining political training and controlin the East Gel rnan Army. His articleMultidirectional Harassment was inthe May 1974 MILITARY REVIEW.

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soldier comes to feel that his reducedleave and off-duty times are to beblamed on political relaxation, thathis discomfort is the ,Price of others'convenience. Consequently, it is notlong before the EGA man on reducedleave comes to regard the WestGerman visitors with deep resentmentand supports the political officer whoargues against the validity of politicalrelaxation with the West.' Henaturally feels that the return ofthe old restrictions will give himmore leave; therefore, he comes toregard political relaxation with theWest with the exact attitude theCommunist regime wishes to instillt ha t of emotionally charged

rejection.

T he psychology of number onefirst is similarly applied during thetough and "eemingly ceaselesstraining facing the EGA soldier. Ina training system which, accordingto one political officer defector,

knows no rest, there are idealpossibilities for channelIngresentments at focal points. Sincea soldier likes to have somethingspecific to blame for his discomforts,EGA trainers are now instructed tosupply focal points for anger andfrustration. The argument is basedon the theory that political relaxationcould lay the GDR wide open toincreased saboteurism and covertN A TO plans to penetrate thefrontier and that, as long as thereIS supposed to be political relaxation,the EGA must be doubly vigilant.Again, the suggestion is that the endof political relaxation will mean lesstraining pressures.

Alarm training has been steppedup considerably. Reports suggest thatmost.units, especially those near theApril 975

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frontier, tend to enjoy little morethan 4 days a year free from thealarm sirens. In 1973, for example,the lth Armored Division in Eggesinexperienced as many as 320 days'alarm training; the 1st MechanizedInfantry Division (Potsdam), upto 315 days. lJnits are awakened inthe middle of the night and oftenin bad weather. They are expected toreport in full combat kit-plus NBC(nuclear, biological, chemical)protective gear-within minutes andare transported hurriedly to alleged

crisis areas where they are keptunder severe conditions for severalhours until the all clear is given.As far as possible, these suddenalarms are synchronized withexpected exercises or maneuvers byNATO or Eundesqrenzschutz EGS)(West German Frontier Service)formations near the frontier so thatEGA men are provided with visibleproof that their superiors are onlycalling them out at such uncivilizedtimes in response to alarms occasionedby NATO activity. Preference isgiven to the BGS exercises, for thesehelp to draw EGA attention to thecontinued aggressive attitude onthe part of West Germans.

DUr i n g these alarms. politicalofficers activate their arsenal ofsimplistic political arguments andcrude emotional appeals to guideresentments in the appropriatedirection. Reports suggest that thepolitical officers find very positiveresonance when schooling is carriedout during alarms. Nearly alldefectors interviewed confirmed thatthis approach to indoctrination issteadily making EGA morale betterand more reliable than its reputationin the West.

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Part The Political Evolution

Kenneth J. Coffey

N JANUARY 1973, two of, theworld s major English-speakingcountries began to rely on volunteersto man their armed forces. In theUnited States, the last formal draftcalls were issued for December 1972,and the arrival of 1973 marked thebeginning of the US transition to anall-volunteer force. Rased on thepremise that increases in service benefits and reductions in service-life irritants would attract adequate volunteers, the US transition did notresult in fundamental changes inarmed forces capabilities or strategicconcepts.In Australia, however, the adoptionof the all-volunteer force, promptedby the sudden abandonment of thedraft in December 1972 by the newlyelected Labor Party Government, resulted in both major force reductions

and a revised strategic concept witha more limited role for the AustralianArmed Forces.

The abandonment of the draft in1972 was the third time in recent history that Australia switched from aconscript to an all-volunteer force.Like all other major participants inWorld War II, Australia drafted meninto the armed forces during the1939-45 period. At the end of the war,however, the government stopped inductions, and, for more than threeyears, the Australian Armed Forceswere supported with volunteers.National elYice TrainingIn December 1949, the newly established Liberal Party, led by Robert GMenzies, won the federal election. Believing that large-scale deployment oftroops could still be a prime factor in

Part II. The Impact on FOI t e Lev{'ig. will o.PIH o.T in the May 1975 Mtlitaru Review

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many contingencies, the new govern-ment decided to legislate for the in-troduction of compulsory militarytraining. 2 Under the Menzies scheme,almost all young Australian menwould enter the services for two tofour months' initial training. TheLiberal Government proposal met withinitial Labor Party oPPf'sition, butnot nearly as vehement as in the de-bates of the _ World War II periodwhen conscription for service beyondAustralia and the nearby territorieswas not authorized until 1944, fiveyears after Australia entered thewar. 3

Prior to the submission of the mili-tary training proposal, the LaborParty was committed by its platformto the establishment of an adequateand properly balanced defence organi-zation on a voluntary basis and tothe deletion from the Defence Act ofall clauses relating to compulsory

Kenneth J Coffey is Associate Director, Defense Manpower Commission, Washington, D C. He is a NavalReserve Officers Training Corps graduate of Northwestern University andhas spent four and one-half years inthe US Marine Corps. The data forthis two-part article was collectedwhile Mr. Coffey was preparing a research study and evaluation of militarl{ manpower procurement systemsin nine countries. .April 975

LLVOLUNTEER FORCE

training and service. But, when thenew government announced its inten-tion to introduce compulsory training,the 19th Commonwealth Conferenceof the Labor Party in 1951 emphati-cally rejected their previous policyand approved the principle of com-pulsory military training for home de-fence, subject to a proper regard forthe national economy, t also in-structed the Federal ParliamentaryLabor Party not to prevent the pas-sage of the National Service Bill thenbefore Parliament. Following the passage of the N a-tional Service Act (No.2 and No. 63of 1951), National Service Trainingremained in effect in Australia u'ntil1960 although the intakes were ma-terially reduced in 1957. iReinstitutio of ConscriptionFrom 1960 through 1964, Australiaagain relied on volunteers to man itsarmed forces. However, in November1964, the Menzies government an-nounced its proposal for the reintro-duction of compulsory military serv-ice. Unlike National Service Training,the 1964 plan provided for two yearsof conscript service with no restric-tions against overseas duty. 6

The government's case for conscription was set out fully in the PrimeMinister's statement to Parliament.Therein, Sir Robert Menzies arguedthat: the emergence of a greater andmore immediate threat to Aust.raliain the north (through the intransigence of Indonesia and the weaknessof South Vietnam , now ouflceighedthe previously accept cd argumentsagainst conscription. 7

With the exception of the latteryears of World War II, the Austra-lians had never in their modern his-tory conscripted men for other than

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ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

horne defense, and the Labor Partyreacted, strongly to the Menzies pro-posal. Par.ty Leader Aithur Calwelldeclared that the Labor Party op-poses utterly ~ n d absolutely conscrip-tion lor the youth of this country forservice o v e l ~ s e s in peacetime. ' nParliament, the official Labor Partyposition was that conscription wascompletely unnecessary since therewas no immediate threat to Australia.

The Menzies proposal was followedby a nationwide Senate election. Al-though the Labor Party in the cam-paign called the Menzies proposalunjust, inefficient, costly and im

moral 10 and :Ill'. Calwell accuoed thegovernment of dicing with the lives ofthe nation's 20-year-olds, the con-scription issue did not stir the elec-torate, and the Menzies governmentwas returned to power. Shortly thereafter, the enabling legislation foroverseas conscription \ National ServIce Act, No. 2G of 1964) was passedinto law:

Although the Labor Party made thecommitment of troops and conscriptsto Vietnam an issue of the electioncampaign, the Australian commitmentto Vietnam at that time was limitedt,) ground advisors. t was not untilApril 1965-after the Senate electionst ha t the Menzies government an-nounced its decision to send combat

troops to Vietnam. 12 Then, in March1966, the new Prime Minister, Mr.Harold Holt, who had replaced Men-zies as head of the Liberal-CountryParty (LCP), announced that thetroop strength in Vietnam would beincreased and that conscripts wouldbe included in the reinforcements.taReacting to the announcement, LaborParty Leader Calwell stated his emphatic opposition to the despatch ofconscripted youth to VIetnam. 14 At36

the same time, the Labor Party inParliament declared that any futureLabor Government would bring backall conscripts from Vietnam withoutdelay and would insist on the with-drawal of all Australian forces fromVietnam as soon as practicable. 'he Conscription Issue in the966 Federal Elections

Conscription, particularly the as-signment of conscripts to Vietnam,was a major issue for the LaborParty in the 1966 federal elections. 'By this time, opposition to conscrip-tion from outside the formal politicalstructure was growing rapidly. Anticonscription organizations such as.Save our Sons and Youth CampaignAgainst Conscription extended theircounteraction to the Vietnam issueand were joined by new groups suchas the Draft Resistance Movementand the Vietnam Action Campaign.The election cam p a i g n becameheated and violent. Antiwar literaturewith pictures of burned and disfiguredVietnamese women and children wascommon, and government spokesmenwere shouted down at rallies as murderers and fascists selling diggers for dollars. The Prime Ministerwas mobbed and punched, and Arthur Calwell was wounded in a shot-gUh assassination attempt as he leftan anti-Vietnam rally.IR

Although the Labor Party raisedthe conscription issue, it did not materially sway the electorate, and theLiberal-Country Party was returnedto power with a record majoritywhich it maintained in the Senateelections of 1967.

In 1967, Labor's new leader, GoughWhit lam, obtained a modified LaborParty position on conscription. Thenew policy would permit conscriptionin times of th,'eatened attack on Aus-

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tralian territory and would allow conscript service outside of Australianterritory for declared war. 19 At thesame time, the demands of the previous leader, Calwel , for immediatewithdrawal of Australian troops fromVietnam were replaced by a policywhich supported the Australian combat force commitment, but made thecommitment conditional Jon the USending the bombing of North Vietnamand seeking negotiations to end thewar. 20Mr. Whitlam's views were expandedin 1969 by the deputy party leader,Mr. Lance Barnard, in the LaborParty's official position paper on defense. This document, which was usedas the party's defense plank in theirkey 1972 election victory, listed sixbasic defense objectives. Reflecting aFortress Australia concept, all theobjectives but one were related to thedefense of Australian sea. air andland space. 21 The exception provided

for the support of UN peacekeepingoperations. Conspicuously absent wasa commitment to provide military support to neighboring countries faced,,-ith insurgent or Communist threats.The 1972 General ElectionsIn 1972. the Labor Party had beenin opposition to the Liberal and laterthe Liberal-Country Party for 22years. They had not been in officesince losing the 1949 election, and, by1972. the Labor position on conscription had hardened to the point wherethe Labor policies were almost totallyopposite to those of the Liberal-Country Party.

Citing the absence of a real militarythreat to the Australian mainland.Labor Party Leader Whitlam said:

The Labor Party regards if as a dutyto form an all-volunteer army. 22Although the LCP Government an-

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Mr. ough Whitlamnounced in August 1971 that all Australian troops would be withdrawnfrom Vietnam by February 1972. 23the Vietnam commitment and .the useof conscripts for overseas duties reomained critical issues of the 1972election campaign.:'.luch like the protest movement inthe United States, the antiwar andantidraft activities in Australia became stronger and more vocal duringthe 1971-72 period. Teach-ins, sit-ins,acts of civil disobedience, draft evasions and conscientious refusal to enter the service received widespreadattention in the nation's media, andthe protest movement became progressi vely stronger. 2

Mr. Lance Barnard37


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Australian troops depart Vietnam

Although the Labor Party's opposition to conscription certainly contributed to its 2 December 1972 elec-

_tion victory, at least one observernoted that, although the Labor Partysupported the end of conscription, ithad no hard policy positions concerning a desired level of forces or the

Military Review April 1975

Documents

Transcript of Military Review April 1975