Military Review April 1968

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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

,.-,. FORTY-SIX YEARS OF M IL IT ARY i& iV& ~ ~~

ArmY of Israel . . . . . . . BG S. L. A. M arshall , USAR, Ret 3Sk i l l Short age Delpi pn or Di lemma? . . COL Geral d L. Overst reet , USA 10PsychologicalWarfare Key to Succ essin Viet nam . . Reuben S. Nathan - 19Searchfor Equi l i br ium in t he Mi ddle East . . . . Howard C. Reese 29St at e-DefenseOf f i cer Exc hangeProgram . . . LTC Bil ly W. Byrd, USA 41Roleof Nucl ear Weaponsfor t he West . . . . . Robert E. Walt ers 46Scandi navi aand Fut ure of NATO . . . . COL John E. Dwan 11,USA 54From Ox Wagon t o Armored Car i n Rhodesi a . . . . Lewi s H. Gann 63TargetAcquisi t i on Viet nam St yle . . . LTC David H. Hack wort h,USA 73BurmasChina Cri si~ The Choic esAhead . . .,. John H. Badgley 80TheBatt al ionand Zero Defect s . . . . . MAJGene T. Sherron, USA 85Soviet M it i t aryPenal Unit s . . . . . . Vyacheslat iP. Artemiev 90M i l i t ary Not es. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97M i l i j ary Books. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

The VIE WSexpressed in t his ma ga zineARE TH EAU TH ORS nd not necessarilythose of theU SArmyor th e Comma nd nd G enera lSt a ffC ollege.


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Editor in ChiefCOL Donald J. Delaney

Associate EditorCOL Thomas J. Cleary, Jr.Army War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Faatures EditorLTC Charles A. Gatzka

Production EditorHelen M. Hall ISpanish.American Editor

MAJ Juan Horta-MerlyBrasilian Editors

LTC Samuel T, T. PrimoLTC Romero Lepesqueur

Publication OfficerLTC Edward A. Purcell

Art and OasignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY mont hlyby t he U . S . ArmyC omma ndE VIE W-P ublished a nd G enera lS t a ffCollege,For tlea venworth,Ka nsa s,in En glish,Spaniah,and P ortuguese.U se of funds for printin gof th is publica tionha sbeen approvedby Headquarters,Oapartmentof t he Arm y,28 Ma y 1965.Second-cla ssposta gepa id a t Fort Lea venwort h, a nsa s.Subscriptiona te%$4.00 (U Scurr ency)ya a r in th e Un ita dSt a tes,U nitedSt a tesmilita rypost offices,a nd th osecount riesw hicha re membersoft he P a n-America n P r iceost a lU nion(includingS pa in);$5.00 a yea r in a ll ot her coun t rie%ingleC OP Y50 cents. Addr esssubscriptionma il to t he Book Depa rt ment ,U . S. ArmyComma nda nd G enera lSt a ffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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IISRAELBrigadier GeneraI S. L. A. Marshall ,U nited St a tes Armu R e8erue, Retired

M ANY bouquets, possibly morethan the f acts wa rrant , havebeen tossed t o th e a rmy of Isra el inrecent month s. No soIdiery ha s beenso lionized since t he drop of the firstat om bomb ma de wa r t he dirtiest ofth ree-lett er words. I t has been saidover a nd aga in tha t Isra el succeedsdra ma tica lly with a rms beca use herfighters a nd th eorists believe in th efundament a ls a nd keep the designsimple.hpril1968

This, how ever, is one of t hose glit tering genera liza tions tha t , in i tself ,is of sma ll va lue to milita ry men unless th ere is a n a ccompa nying expla na tion of wha t thinking simplymeans wh en a pplied to stra tegy, ta ctics, w eapons usa ge, a nd a ll oth eraspects of fighting operations.

I would sa y that Isra els genera lsta f f ,their

planners,fai th in these

Surprise.and operators

principles:stake

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ISRAELI ARMY Mobility. Flexibility. Concentration.They a re ra ted a nd exercised in

about that order. Had Israel t r jedesca lat ion, w hich is not a principlebut a modern gimmick tha t forfeitseurprise, she still might be fight ing.

Simplicity shines in Isra els stra tegic a pprecia tions. H ere, is a sma llsta te surrounded by sw orn enemies,yet its milita ry men are not confusedby the fact .Main EnemyEgy pt is tbe ma in enemy. If Egyptca n be bea ten, then the oth ers m ustyield. On tha t fa ct , tbe Sina i P enin.su]a must be th e decisive ba tt ]e.ground. Sina i ie good ta nk count ry,despite its rough w a dis, impassabledunes, a nd mounta in ba rriers. Egy pta nd Suez lie to th e w est ; ma in linesof commu nicat ion, th erefore, rt rn eastto west .

Thus in J un e 1967, a rm ored column s ba d to be th e chief mea ns ofoverrunning a nd destroying the Egy p.t ia n Army based on the peninsula. I tha d to be done swift ly lest tbe Un itedNa tions or the great pow ers inter.vene. Four to five days was reckoneda s the ma ximum time allowa ble fora tota l conq uest of Sina i. With outth is, possession of. th e ba se overlooking Tira n St ra it could not be a esured.

B riga dier G enera l S. L. A. Ma rsha ll, U n{ted S ta tes Arr rr u Reserve,Retired, served in World Wa rs I a ndII a nd in Korea . A columnist a nd wa reorr eepondent, he ha s served for ma nygears a s a n editorial w riter a nd milita ry crit ic for th e Detroit News. Hismost recent book is Sw ift Sw ord: TheH istorica l Record of Isr a els Victory,J une, 1967, a review of w hich a ppea rsin th e B ook Review eection of th isissue.4

Yet every practical avenue intoSina i wa s blocked by hea vily fort ifiedworke, front a lly mined, an d fixed wit hmanned trench systems running threeto five miles in depth. The area wasstrong in ant i tank guns and bunkereda rm or a nd enclosed five io seven ba tta lions of field a rt illery so ba sed th a tth ey could bar ra ge th e a pproaches.

The main hedgebogs ha d been builtund er the supervision of Soviet miiita ry engineers. They w ere designedto repel armor, and no reasonableperson would say they were properta rgete for direct a ssault by a rmor,Actua lly, th ey w ere broken by directa ssault in very few insta nces. Thema nner of a t ta ck w as ae varied asw ere the condit ions of th e ground. Itsuffices to a dd tha t the impression inthe U nited St a tes is decidedly w rongthat great armored sweeps, maneuvering ever for the rear , colla paed theEg yptia n Arm y. They ba d decisiveeffect here a nd th ere after th e frontwa s smash ed, but they did notbreak it .Akpower

Wha t t he a rmored columns w rought,however, cann ot be considered w hollyapart from what tbe a ir force bada lread y a chieved before ita planesw ere hit t ing in combinat ion w ith tbetanks.

B riga dier G enera l Mordecha i Hod,C hief of tbe Air Force, is one of th esimple-th inking Isr a elie. H e felt certa in he could thr ow everyt hing a tEgypt and gamble tha t J ordan, I raq ,and Syria would not at tack bis basesw hile he did so. Why ? B eca use E gyptwould not tell her allies the truth ofwhat was happening.

H e felt it sa fe t o concent ra te hisstrike a gainst 11 Egyptia n bases,ign oring t he ot her 14. Why ? The 11w ould include a ll bomber a nd MiG -21

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bases, the real threat to -Israels interior. Furt her, th e shock to th e 11bsses w ould probably para lyze t heenemy a ir force a s a wh ole.E ight ocIock in th e morning seemeda n hour w hen surprise w ould n ot hepossible. only a ma dma n w ould th inkof going head-on at a t ime w hen theoth er ca mp w a s cert a in to be wide

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ISRAELI ARMY

shiftin g to fly cover for th e a rm oredcolumn str iking into Sina i.

In 492 sort ies, th ey dest royed 402enemy planes on th e ground, no doubta n a ll-time record. They did it prima rily by eoncentr rking on perfectionin gunnerynigh infallible marksma nsh ip w ith th e 30--millimeter can non, a ta ctic lightly rega rded else-

This scene at the Mitla Pass at tests to the accuracy of Israeli gunnerya wa ke. B y inverse reasoning, G enera lH od concluded th a t 0800 w a s the perfect hour for surprise.

B y th e end of 80 minutes, G enera lHods planes ha d stricken Egypt beyond a ny likelihood of recovery. Itshould be ca lled th e 80-minut e w a r;it w a s effectively over a pproxima telytw o houre before a nyone in the Un itedSt a tee knew it ha d begun. AfterHod ha d crush ed t he Egyptia n AirForce, giving Isr a el9 field a rmy a noverwhelming a dvant a ge, his fighterbombers before noon of 5 J une beganADril1S8S

w here. It is one of G enera l H odssimple ideas, so simple th a t corre:spondents credited him w ith ha rboring a secret wea pon.

How did the a rmored column sha tter a nd destroy Egypts far hea viera rra y of ta nk pow er, superior in numbers, moderniza tion, a nd w eight ofca nnon ? Mobility wa s one a nsw er,a lthough deployed forcesw ith a ll-a round protection, s elf-propelled a rtillery, a nd a bundan t a rmor--cannever be wiped out by movementa lone. Isra els ta nkers a nd gunners,

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ISRAELI ARMYlike Hods flyers, d id it th rough WI.perior ma rksma nship. They a re bett ergunners; th ey a re tr a ined t o fire a ccura tely hy day and night , a nd underany condition.Superior Gunnery

There a re a few exa mplee of success th rough a rmored shock in th isca mpaign w here ta nks cha rged in a ndrouted a lar ger force by velocity a ndth e th rea t of violence. They a re th eexception. Also, t here a re num erousmelees where forces either got mixedor were sh ooting it ont a t close ra ngewith each other. And there were episodes towa rd th e end w here t he Egy p.tian tanke, guns, and vehiclee were inpan ic flight a nd the soldiers w ould n ottu rn to fight; so Isra els a rmor enga ged in, w ithout enjoying, a ca rniva lof destructiveness.

How ever, th ese a re merely th e un.dertones a nd a sides of a ca mpaignw on hy better shooting a t fa irly longra nge by Israel s ta nkers a nd gunnersin th e first sta ge w hen E gypts op.posing a rra y did try to sta nd a ndfight ba ckmore stoutly tha n basbeen reported.

The ba tt le w a s not a pushover a tthe sta rt . However, a fter the first 24hours, it w a s ma de a deba cle t hroughsuperior gunn ery. In spite of th is,Israeli tanks were getting knockedoff by tank fire on the third day.

The a verage ta nk-a ga inst-ta nk enga gement in th e early a nd decisivepha se w a s fought out a t betw een 900a nd 1,300 ya rds, w ith th e a rmor onboth sides holding still. The armor.piercing round of a Cent urion, Sh erma n, P a t ton, or , for that mat ter , the75-millimet er roun d of t he AMX, w illgo th rough th e front a l a rmor of aX% T54, or T55 a t t hese r a ng es. Theba tt lefield proved t his point Or, th eother way around, the 100-millimeter

of the T5.4 or th e 122-millim eter ofthe J SS a re equally kil ling at thesera nges w hen th e shooting is a ccura te.One shell seems t o be a s effective a sth e oth er a lthough th e J .l? round iscumbersome a nd ma y only be fired a tthe rate of two to three per minute.

Figure 1.The T54 can fire seven to eight roundsin the same time.

U sually, Isra eli t a nkers got off tw oor more rounds before th e Egy ptianta nks fired a t all, a nd, w ithin tha tbracket , they were a lrea dy on ta rget .Once the Egyptian s began ta kinglosses, their tanks almost invariablystopped a nd sta lled on th e line w herethe at ta cking a rmor a lready had therange.

In one night fight on 5 J une, sixIsra eli Centurions enga ged t he frontof a n Egy ptian a rmored briga de moving in line a cross th e El Arish w a dia t a ra nge of 800 ya rds. Th first

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ISRAELI ARMYbecome predet ermined. These t w oma neuvers, t herefore, ha ve par ticula rinterest.

G enera l Ta ls w a s mu ch th e simpleropening ma neuver. At the sa me time,his over-all problem was more complex since enemy fortified ground la ybeyond t he 7th Division front formore th a n 30 miles, blocking th e ma inroad. Cr a cking th e front , h e w ouldha ve to overcome th e Sh eikh Zuwedi

the enemy flank. That done, the armorw ould st rike th e heavy w eapons to th ewest , a nd the infant ry w ould at ta ckth e ent renched line to th e east . Thema neuver a lmost fa iled since th eha lf-tra cked infant ry wa s not able tokeep up w ith th e a rmor in th e hea vygoing. So out of disar ra ngement ca mea da ylong ba tt le (Figu re 1.).

The a rmored infa nt ry bat ta lion ofpara tr oops w ere cut off a nd sur-

BRIGADIERGENERALARIEL SHARON SANEUVER +Figure 2.

a nd J erar di hedgehogs, th e defensesof E l Arish, a nd th e hedgehog of B irLa fha m to th e south of it .

Three Egy ptian brigades w ere inline, each w ithin a fort ified box, th ew hole extending north a nd south sixmiles, from Ra hfa to th e sa nd dunes.Su pport ing th e boxes were seven ba tta lions of a r t i l lery a nd a t lea st threebat ta lions of a rmor.

G enera l Ta ls solut ion w a s to feelhis wa y southw a rd for th e l imits ofthe mined front a nd ta ke the cha ncetha t he could put tw o ba tt a lions ofa rmor a nd one of ha lf-tr a cked infa ntr y th rough th e deep sa nd to breach

rounded betw een th e tw o low er briga de boxes. U ltima tely, one ta nk bat ta lion reversed, a t ta cked eas~ a ndfreed it.

In cont ra st to G enera l Ta ls a ssaulton th e Egy ptian ma in poeitions southof Ra hfa , a ll of which wa s ca rried outduring th e da ylight hours of 5 J une,G enera l S ha rone a tt a ck on th e fortress on Umm G a ta f , a more formida ble position, w a s done by night .This need not have been. The divisionsta rt ed off from the neighborhood ofNitza na . The desert to th e w est ofthere is not too difficult , and the earlyhours produced lit t le fighting. B y mid-

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afternoon, the main body of tbe division wa a conf rOnting tbe Egyptia nhedgehog, and Ieraeli tanks had itonder fire.Still, Sharon held off. That isthe surprising thing. His plan wasextraordinarily elaborate, involvinga bout five ma in a nd t hree seconda rymovement e w hich ha d t o be coordina ted a nd roughly synchronized if hewa s to succeed w ithout paying toomuch in men a nd ta nka. Yet he gambled tha t h e w ould ha ve a bett er cha nceof doing it a fter da rk beca use th eEgyptian fire would be less, and hismen w ould get some rest ; a nd he won.

Um m. G a ta f, the hedgehog, liesa bout six miles ea st of t he village ofAbu Agueila . It is solidly fort ifiedfor four a nd one-ha lf miles in depth,th e w orks being a bout tw o miles inbreadt h. The flanks rest on tw o bar riers, high dunes to the north a nd asolid line of rid ges to th e sout h, Theta nks ha d to come th rough U mmGataf by the main road or not a t a l l .Tbe plan wa s as follow s: One a rmored bat ta lion w ould strike pa ra llelto th e ma in body, moviug nort h of thedunes, a nd go a t Abu Agueila fromth e ba ck d oor. One ta sk force w ouldswing southw est a nd form a block t obold back the Egyptia n a rmor basingon Queisima . One infan try brigadew ould a dva nce a foot a long t he shoulders of t he dunes a nd ent er upon t heenemy position from th e nort hernflauk. A par a tr oop bat ta lion w ould belan ded from choppers a top the dun esa nd a tt a ck directly the six art illerybat ta lions w ithin the hedgehog.

The infantry brigade tha t ha dslogged along the dunes was to descend, mop up th e E gyptia n frontline,th en open a gate for a n engineer part yto come th rough. The engineers w ouldclea r the mines from at least tw o

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ISRAELI ARMYlanes so that the tanks could advance.The par a tr oops, ha ving finished th ea rtillery, w ould clea r a wa y w ith theirca sualt ies a nd retur n to th e dunes.That done, so that the field of firecould be used w itbout da nger tofriendly troops, t he ta nke w ould ad.vance via the main road and engagethe Egypt ian a rmor. This wa s anelabora te pla n. It seemed so involvedtha t , just hefore t he a tta ck w ent on,the Ch ief of St a ff , Major G enera lIt zha k Ra bin, ca lled in a nd saidhe w ould be ha ppy enough if th e opera tion w a e postponed unt il morning.Sha ron wa s indignant . Schema tica l ly ,the plan went as shown in Figure 2.

As dia gra med, th is looks like adrea m by Rube Goldberg. The a ma zing sequel is th a t every bit of itworked, a pproxima tely a s pla nned, a lmost exa ctly a ccording to th e timeschedule. The hardest blows weretaken by the column of outflankingarmor north of the dunes. The mainbody a tt a cking th e strongest Egy p~tia n position in Sina i took fa r lighterlosses tha n did Ta ls division a t Ra hfa .It would be too much to extractfrom this ca mpaign th e lesson tha ta uda city a lwa ys pays off . I t is enoughto say , ra t her, tha t Isra els a rmy believes that it does, most of the time.Tha t it paid off ha ndsomely in J une1967 is beyond dieput e.

B ut a udacity is of t he wil l a ndspirit , a nd is not to be pra ised a boveextr a ordina ry painsta king a nd endlesspra ctice in w ha t is often considered asma ller a nd more technical sort ofth ingprecision in ma rksma nship.Isra els milita ry lea ders say a uda cityshould come nat ura lly to free men,but those wh o a re soldiers st ill ha veto w ork for tbe skills and strength toendure batt lefield stress tha t validat ethe proposition.

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SKILL SHORTA6EP a st personnel policies h a ve, per

ha ps, considered, but cert a inly ha venot provided for, t he solut ion of t hefunda menta l problems of requirements, utilizat ion, a nd perisha bility ofskills.Actual RequirementsThere is a strong and a lmost habitua l t endency to oversta te a ctua l requirements, not so much in qua ntit ya s in t he degree of proficiency a ctua llyreq uir ed. The tit le of t he positionrather than the level of skill actuallyrequired is often used a s th e measur eof the number and type of qualification required. Automa tion a nd computeriza tion ha ve seemingly obscuredour perspective.

While 100 percent ut iliza t ion ofhighly skilled specia lists ie desirable,in rea lity, th is is seldom a chieved.Aft er 29 w eeks of forma l t ra ining inelectr onic ma intena nce, th e a utoma ticdat a processing equipment repa irma n,for example, often perform s only minor or prevent ive unit ma intena nce.This is beca use contra ct ma intena nceis frequent ly used in high er echelonsin the U nited St a tes a nd in ma ny overseas areas. The special skills of thespecia list t hus tend to become lostt hrough lack of use.

S pecia lized skills a re perisha ble w ithchan ges in technology, a nd th e tech;nician s must const a nt ly be retra ineda nd upda ted to keep pace w ith th eequipment. With rapidly advancingt echnology , loss of skill level ca n occur ra pid] y. This problem is especia llyserious with highly skilled specialistsw ho can only be ut ilized oversea s, ort hose for wh om more positions a re esta blished oversea s th a n in th e U nitedSta tes .

Regula tions a ut horize th e a ssignment of a specia list out of his specia lty

when he rotates to the continentalU nited St a tes (CONUS ), with the proviso that he will be sent back overseasa fter th e minimum period in CONU S.Having just returned from overseasdut y, t he specialist is norma lly a pproa ching th e end of his enlistment .The prospect of a yea r or less inCONU S, outeide of bis specia lty , a ndth en an oth er oversea s t our is oftennot a n inviting one compa red w ithcivilia n life, par ticularly w ith th ema ny ent icing job offers a va ilable t ohighly skilled t echn icia ns. E ven if th eman decides to reenlist, the Army haslost almo@ a yea r of productive output from his epecial ta lent w ith a relat ed diminut ion of his skill.RealityIn seeking a eolut ion t o th e problemof retention, w e must recognize th a tthe mili tary grade a nd pay s tructurerule out effective competit ion w ith indust ry. The milita ry pay eystem presupposes only 23 levels of responsibilityynine enlisted, four w a rra nt officer, a nd 10 officer gra des; how ever,th is furt her na rrows to only nine levels in t he principal a rea of concernthe enlisted grades.La rge a nd diversified corpora tions,such a s G enera l Motors or G enera l DYna mics ha ve hun dreds of w a ge Ievele,each geared to a special ty pe a nd levelof w ork. In th e milita ry syetem, ahighly skilIed individual such a s a na vionics repa irma n ca n obta in gra deE-4 and, perhape, E-5 after threeyears , an d then must s truggle upwa rda gainst the t ime in grade a nd promotion quota restrictions.

At the end of the same three years,a ma il clerk, a tr uck d river, or a n orderly can beat th e sam e level a nd pay.The VRB is a one-t ime inducement :a nd proficiency pay ma y, or ma y not,

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SKILL SHORTAGEstr a ddlers w hen th e time comes fort he decision to reenlist.

Anoth er fa cet in t he problem of procuring a nd tr a ining skilled specialistsis th e tendency to oversta te th e a ctua lt echn ica l r equirement . The complexityof modern equipment is rela tive to th edegree of fam iliarit y w ith th e equipment . The a ut omobile, w hen first developed, wa s considered extremelycomplex since new terms and princi.,ples w ere involved. W]t hin a fewyear s, teena gers w ere tea ring downa nd rebuilding car s. The present w orldof a utoma tion a nd sophistica ted elect ronic a nd mecha nical devices shouldnot produce a cont inued outcry overt he short a ge of specia lists. America ningenuity is etill here, but w e a rera pidly burying it by convincing ourmen tha t only a highly tra ined a ndepecia l t ype of ma n can possibly un der.sta nd or opera te th e new complexequipment.Indirect Benefits

We fail to realize that the highschool gra dua te of today a ctua lly possesses a broad ba se of knowledge a ndfam iliarit y w ith complex equipment.We overempha size our ow n syst emssince t here is a preva lent feeling inthe services tha t every ma n w hopushes a butt on must know th e th eorya nd intr ica cies of th e ma chine w hichhe sets in motion. This is, perha ps,tbe ideal, but it ie not a necessity.

The loss of highly skilled personnelto civilia n indust ry should not beview ed a s a n a ll-bad situa tion becauseindirect benefits a ccrue to tbe milita ryservices a nd to our count ry.

Many of the men who are trainedin highly skilled jobs w ould not otherw ise receive the tr a ining a nd w ouldrema in a par t of the low er skilled la borforce.

The highly technical equipmentth a t t he milita ry services possess, a nd.for w hich th ese specialists a re rsqu ired, is developed by civilia n indus.try . I t is to the a dvant a ge of the mili .ta ry services th a t civilia ns developingt his equipment ha ve experience of itsmilitary use.

P ersonnel w ho do not cont inuein th e service beyond t heir init ia l corn .mitment a re pla ced in th e Army Reserve a nd are thus a vailable in theevent , of emergent y to provide a reservoir of highly skilled specialists.The ApproachA new approach toward solving theretention problem can be ta ken a longfive lines:

Ident ifica tion of reqnirements.. Retention policies.. Tra ining a nd cont ribut ion of in.

dus try . Utilization policies.. Incentive policies.E very position n ow requ iring long.

t erm forma l schooling should beclosely evalua t ed t o determ ine t he degree of skill which is actually required. There a re tw o wa ys t o obta ina fa ir return on our investmenteith er reduce th e a mount of investment or obta in a longer a mortizat ion.B oth of t hese meth ods should be used,w ith requirement s considering botbshort-term a nd long-term tr a ining.

The more detailed and technicalma intenance, part icular ly in nonta ctical units in CONU S, ehould be performed by cont ra ct ma intena nce or bypermanently assigned civilian personnel w ith the required technica l tra ining.

As a n individua l progresses in ra nkto a position of leadersh ip, t he requ irement for deta iled, specia lized skill diminishes, a nd th e requirement for

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SKILL SHORTAGEr - - general applicationtence. The retentioncentage of specialistsperiod should not be

1,. tration efiould be on

gains in imporof a large per-for an indefinite

our goal. Concena selective reten.

tion of th ose individuals w ith potent ialfor leadersh ip of other skilled specialists.

A 10 percent ret ent ion ra te of first

exceed the current actual grade breakdown in each gra de from E -5 t o E -9

*by 15 to 50 percent.D oes 10 yea rs seem too long? Theequipment now crea tilng critical per

sonnel short a ges w a s eith er in existence or in development 10 years ago.These suggest ed ra t ee of 10 percenta nd 60 percent a re now essent ially be-

US AmyAssembly a nd much of th e technica l ma intena nce on complex equipment can be, and

is, performed by contract or permanently assigned civilian personneltermers a nd a 60 percent retentionra t e of car eeriete w ill provide a dequa te ma nning of a given specialt y. In10 year s, asa uming a bsolutely no initia l input of skilled personnel, t hesera tes w ould provide th e epecialt y w ith59.2 percent first t erm ers (E -2 t oE -4), 19.2 percent of second t erm ers(E -5), 14.4 percent t hir d t erm ers(E -6), a nd 7.2 percent fourt h t ermers(E -7 t o E -9). All of th eee percent a ges

ing met in th e critical a reas; howe ,er,the men being retained a re not alwa yeth ose w ith fut ure leadership potent ial.

Our reeea rch a nd development personnel should work closely with indust ry in developing eimplitied inst ruct ions for field opera t ion of newequipment. In 20 year s, a nd, perha ps,even five yea rs from now, toda ysequipment w ill seem relat ively simple,but why wait unti l some future date


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SKILL SHORTAGE

ta lent s of highly skilled specia lists, itis obvious tha t t here is a great degreeof similarit y in th e functions to beperformed. Manufacturers producingcomplex items of equipment for t heArm y should be requ ired t o a ssist intr a ining milita ry opera tors to th e degree of t echn ica l proficiency requ ired.

Special progra ms should be esta blished to a ssist in meeting specia lizedskill requirement s, th us a mending t he

highly specia lized dut ies. They shouldbe given a modified ba sic tra ining ofrelat ively short dura tion a nd sent toechoole or t o specia lized a dva nced individual tra ining to lea rn the minimumessentials of th e milita ry a pplica tionof the duty they will be performing.On-t he-job a nd onsite tra ining fort echn ica l personn el should be conducted by technica l represent a tivee ofthe civil ia n ma nufa cturer as a part

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y

of the cont ra ct price~ - The longer,forma l tr a ining should be restr ictedto ca reerists with potentia l for futureleadership.P ersonnel poa eeseing a critica l epecia lty should be cent ra lly monitoreda nd a ssigned to a ssure effective utiliza t ion. The num ber of personnel int hese high ly ekilled specia lties ie relat ively small , a nd t ight er cont rolshould not be impossible.Utilization PoliciesP ersonnel possessing skills w hichsre only utilized overseas, or for w hominefficient va cancies exist w ithh th eCONU S, should be a ut horized a specia lbonus for reenlistin g a nd rema iningin a n overseas comma nd. The a mountof th e bonus should be relat ed to th eundesira bility of th e par ticular oversea s a rea. Periodic CONUS lea vesshonld be a uth orized for men in th iscategory.

Skilled a nd dedica ted leadership isrequired for th e ma na gement specia lists to provide challenge a nd responsibilit y. These specia list often ha ve nomilita ry binding force, a nd they aremsde to feel like civilian a in un iformra ther tha n dedica ted soldiers .

Incent ives a lone do not reta in personnel in the eervice. A man remainein the service for t he a dvant a ges a ndinta ngible rew a rds of the Army wa yof life a nd not necessar ily for t hemoneta ry rewa rds. He expects , a nd isentit led to, a dequa te pay t o ma inta ina decent eta nda rd of living; however,he does not expect to become w ealth y.incentives should be used to retaindedicated men to train and lead tomorrow e soldiers ra ther tha n as ameane of buyidg ta lent wh ich ma ybecome obsolete in a few yea rs.

To eingle out cert a in specia lists foreither proficiency pay or th e VRB ma y,

April19%s

SKILL SHORTAGEin the long rnn, be of more harm thanit ie of value. B oth of th ese incent ives a re pointed towa rd a ehorta gein par ticular fields. Wha t h a ppensw hen t he specialt y is no longer required or t here ie a n overa ge in th efield ? These a re short-t erm incent ivesof mora le va lue to only a few individua ls , a nd a re detrimenta l to themorale of th e va st ma jority of eoldiere.Combat a rms personnel a re not a uthorized proficiency paythe mostth ey ca n qua Iify for is 30 dollar e amonth euperior performa nce pay.There a re no comba t a rms pereonnel inthe tw o highest brackets for t he VRB .Amount of ProficiencySin ce th e milita ry pay sca le cann otcompete w ith indust ry, no a t t emptehould be ma de to different iat e betw een highly skilled specia lists a ndoth er men w hose service is equa lly essentia l. In cent ives should be based onservice, dedica tion, a nd proficiency a ndnot on the at ta inment of a highly specialized skill financed by the Army.The a mount of proficiency pay shouldincrease w ith eervice ra th er tha n specialt y. Men in gra des E -4 a nd E-5should be eligible for P -1, gra des E -6a nd E-7 for P -2, and grad ee E -8 a ndE-9 for P-3.

One of th e fa ctors in qua lifying ama n ~ proficiency pay ebould be effect iveness in convin cing good menunder hie supervision t o reenlist . Thiswould place more personal emphasison the reenlistment effort , a nd a lsoprovide a dditiona l incent ive to th e senior dedica ted eoldiere w ho a re in aposition to ma ke th e grea test impact.There can, perha ps, never be a n incentive to a ppeal to th e young soldier th a twill match the example of the dedicat ed soldier w ith a persona l intereetin his men.

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SKILL SHORTA6EThe VRB should be discont inued in

fa vor of a bonus w hich a pplies equa llyto all personnel.

P rior ser vice personn el w ho possessshorta ge specia lties should be permitt ed to reenlist from civilia n lifein th e gra de th ey formerly held, provided they can pass an MOS test ap.plica ble t o th eir gra de. If th eir scorequalities, they should immediatelyupon enlistm ent be a ut horized proficiency pay applica ble to th eir gra de.

Much of th e present problem, ofcours e, is due to t he expa nsion occa

sioned by t he Vietn a m buildup. Thecurrent use of short-ra nge incent iveswill lea ve the Army wit h a surplusw hen the strength is a gain reduced,requiring a nother chan ge in policy onincent ives. G rea ter use of inductees inhigh ly specia lized fields w ill bolst ert he capa bility of t he Reserves. TheReserve should be th e source of t ech.nicia ns durin g a buildup situa tion,a nd th e obliga tion of every reservistis to be prepa red to serve w hen called.H opefully, th is new a pproach can relieve the dilemma.

The objectives of our enlisted promotion system are first: to fill the au-thorized enlisted spaces with qualified men wbo have demonstrated poten-tial for increased responsibility; second: to provide each man with careerprogression and rank which is commensurate with his abiiitiea and potential,and finally: to attract and retain the hrgh cafiher individual for a lifetimecareer in the Army.

Lieutena nt G eneral Albert O. Connor

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From Orbis

April 1988

Ke toSuccessin iehamReuben S. Nathan

T H E ideological th eses t he VietCong purvey have never caughtfire. There ha s never been a popula rmovement in support of th e Viet Conga s th ere wa s of th e Vietm inh. Anydemonstra tions in South Vietna m ha vebeen carefully cont rived by individua ls concerned w ith th eir ow n litt legam es a nd a mbiguous am bitions, a ndform a part of the na tura l t urmoil ofa people groping for self-rule a fterdecad es of st ultifyin g colonia lism.I t ia not easy t o understa nd whysome of th ese demonstra tions shouldha ve so misled t he American publicbecause television, ditferent from the,press, present ed it w ith t be incontr overtible tr ut h. Few of th e a llegedpart ies wh ich ma ke up the LaoDongs (North Vietnamese Communist P a rty) front orga nizat ion, the so-ca lled Na tionaI Liberat ion Front, everexisted; th ose w hich a re more th a n tiction a d~ up to nothing.

Tbe a bsence of a genuin e Comm unist movement conforms to th e genera lpat tern . Tbe Commun ists discoveredlong a go tha t Communist doctrine

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREholds litt le a t tr a ction for people. AllCommunist t id~ tmces ha ve been mw omplished by force, threat of force, conspiracies, coups, a nd terr or. No na tion, wit h th e exception of th e Republic of Sa n Ma rine, ever freely electeda Communist government , a nd tha tgovernment did not last long.

In North Vietna m, more tha n onemillion people fled from comm un ism12 yea rs a go; in South Vietn a m, a nother million, having escaped fromViet Cr mg-dominat ed a reas, prefer th eunenvia ble life of refugees to life un der Commun ist pale. All muss migrations since 1!)45 have been away fromcommunism.A SubstituteInstead of propagating communism,therefore, the Communists, being real-ists, long ago switched to a substi tute:they identify themselves with the as-piration of the people whatever theya re, even th ough th ese ma y be in confl ict with fundament a l Communist tenets. H o Ch i-minh , for inst a nce, prom-

This article was condensedfrom th e origina l, published inORB IS , No. 1 Spring 1967, b~ t l teForeign Policg Research Institut e of the U niversity of P enna glva nia . C opyr ight ed @ 1967 byth e Trust ees of th e U niversity ofPennsylvania .

Dr. Nat ha n is Director of theFa irfield In stit ute for P olitica lP svchologv a nd lnternat iOnalCommun ica tion, a n a ssocia tion ofconsu lta nt s. A ret ired colonel inthe US Armv Reserve, he ha sbeen reca lled to a ctive dut y t w iceduring th e Vietn a mese con ffict t odirect th e P lanning St a ff of theJ oint US P olit ica l Affairs Oncea nd t o develop a Na tiona l P sychological Opera t ions P la n for Viet-.nam.

ised land reform with private own er.ship before he ga ined cont rol of t henorth and started collectivizing.

Some object that today there mightbe a genuine Commun ist revolution inVietna m w ere it not for th e bruta lmet hods of oppression employed bygovernm ent a nd police. Tbe plain fa ctis tha t none of the governments SU C.ceeding Ngo-dinb-D iems ever hd dthat much power or were that etf icient.

Vietna m ma y not be a democra cy byUS sta ndardssta ndards i t took tw ocentu ries t o developbut sh e is n curiously free coun t ry . Not only is criticism of th e governm ent her favoritesport, hut the hamlets rule themselves.Rura l chiefs w ho do not enjoy th e confidence of the people will not be chiefsfor long, and, if thousands of themw ere mur dered by th e Viet C ong, itwa s beca use they reflected, as theymust, the views of their constituents.Revolutionary Warfare

Revolutionuy w a rfare is the mosthighly orga nized ty pe of w a rfa re. Alth ough it can be a nd usua lly is conducted by a sma ll minority, it is tota lwa r in its tr uest sense-politica l, psychologica l, socia l, economic, a nd onlyseconda rily milita ry. It does not a ima t such convent iona l milita ry objectives as defeating a rmies or ta kingground as such; i t aims a t the crea t ion of a political a nd psychologicalvacuum tha t only the insurgents ca nfill.

A Viet Cong deta chment does notnormally cut a roa d to ha mper troopmovement s or tbe flow of milita ry supplies. I f it cuts th e road from Da latto Sa igon, i t a ims a t increasing theprice of vegeta bles in Sa igon, a t contributing to infla tion, a nd a t provingtha t the government ca nnot protectth e people a ga inst rising prices. If it

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cuts the roa d from the coa st , the purpose may be ta xation, for trucks carry ing seafood will EO thr ough a t a price.Yet even th e toll char ge-no ma tt erhow import a nt th e funds derived /na ybe to financing the insurgencyisprima rily designed to demonstra te thegovernm ents ina bility to keep th eroad open. The physica l a ct of thr ow ing up a roadblock a ims a t making apsychological point.Terrerism

Similarly, terrorism, the VietCongs main weapon, is less concernedwith its immediate vict ims than withinspiring fear in the survivors, para lyzirig people, a nd stifling resista nceto Viet Cong policies. It follow s th a tth e Viet Cong w a nt m a ximum publicity for their a cts of terrorism. As longa s th ey a chieve th eir objective of feara nd para lyeis, th ey a re perfectly w illing to pay th e price in term s of popular a nd internat iona l revulsion.

It is th e mea sure of our ina bility togra sp the na ture of revolutiona ry wa rfare that we tend to advance this objective by w idely publicizing incident sof terror. Each outrage unfailinglyproduces US pamphlets featuring pho.tographs of Viet Cong victims, usuallyw omen a nd children. These a re supposed to demonst ra t e-a s, of cours e,th ey do-th e cont empt in w hich th eViet Cong hold Vietn a mese lives. YetNort h Vietn a mese publica tions celebra te th ese ma ssa cres us victoriesa nd often prove t he victorys extentby fea turing the sam e photographson w hich we rest ed our ca se.

Not all tbe ta rgets of revolutionar yw a rfare a re in Vietna m. One of themost import a nt is U S public opinionwhich, Hanoi hopes, will ultimatelycompel Wa shingt on to w ithdr a w fromthe War. Ma ny a t ta cks on U S uni ts

loril 19S2..

.PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

have not only been in contradictionto G eneral Vo Nguyen G iaps ba sicconcept never to enga ge th e enemy un less he is relat ively wea k or demora lized, but ha d no conceivable str a tegic or ta ctical purpose oth er tha n toinflict ca sua lties. The over-a ll purposehas been to persuade the American

H o Chi-minhpublic th a t its leaders pointlessly sa crifice American youth.

Tbe Communist s tend to overra teth e significa nce of th is domestic criticism just a s Adolf H itler overra tedth e influence of th e America FirstCommittee a nd Fritz K uhns Germa n-American B und. I t is one of the t ragicpara doxes of history tha t th ere mightno longer be a wa r in Vietna m if jtw ere not for th ose a t home w ho 5ppose t he U S role.

If mu ch of the confueion to w hich21


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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREth e critics a dmit is caused by th e compJ ex na tu re of revolutiona ry w a rfa re,not a ll of it is . China a nd - Nort hViet na m ha ve sta ted th eir objectivesa s clea rly a s did H itler in MeirrKa rnpf; th ey ha ve done so time anda gain, a nd they began to do so longbefore th e U nited St a tes intr oducedcombat troops into South Vietnam.

One of the first of these statementsa ppea red five yea rs a go in P ekingsPeoptes Daily, the official voice of theChinese Communist Party:

Defea ts of the ta ctics used b~ th eU.S. a dvisors in South Vietn a m provetha t revolutiona ry forces ca n overcome t he superior milita rg st rengt h ofthe United States. The reverses susta ined by tfie U S. in Vietn a m will encoura ge revolut iona ry a ction in othercount ries of Asia, in Africa, a nd inLatin Am&ica.A Test Case

From this, one ca n draw several conclusions. The w a r in Vietn a m is at est case. It s prima ry object ive is t odemonst ra te t he !superiorit y of revolutiona ry w a rfa re t echniques over th econvent iona l pow er of t he U nit edSt a tes. The reduction of S out h Vietnam is secondary.

Success is meant to serve a s a messa ge to ha rd-line Commun ists a ll overthe w orld tha t the U nited St at es isa paper tiger, una ble to protect herfriends, a nd tha t revolutiona ry pla nning ma y sa fely disrega rd US policies. The object ive is not so mu ch th eimmediat e expa nsion of Ch ina s zoneof influence a s th e gra dua l isola tionof ber most pow erful a nt a gonist. Atsta ke in Vietn a m is not merely th erigh t of 15 million people to live asth ey plea se, but the security of theU nited S ta tes, the ult imat e ta rget .

If t he Viet Cong succeed in prov

ing th e ca se of revolutiona ry w a rfa reveraus U S pow er, th e a lrea dy tenuoussitua tion in La os w ill in a ll likelihooddeteriora t e a nd Tha iland w ill fa ce se.rious problems. Neither t he P a th etLa o nor th e insurgents in northeastTha iland need much encoura gement t oint ensify th eir opera tions. The psycho.logical effect of t hese development s onth e rest of south east Asia a nd newlyemerging na t ions elsew here would cer.tainly be considerable.Major Factor

The ima ge of U S pow er is a ma jorfa ctor in w orld affa irs. Wha t if th ispow er w ould seem to ha ve lost its cutt ing edge ? Wha t if a Viet Cong vie.tory, by a rms or negotia t iont he victory of a small revolutiona ry minOrity over 15 million Sout h Viet na mesea nd 200 million America nsw ere t ounlea sh simulta neous Communist a ction in severa l La tin -America n coun.tries or other areas of the globe?China would not have to push buttonsfor scores of litt le r ed Fith rers to getthe point t ha t the America n giant hasa n Achilles heel.

In August 1966, in a n editoria l inth e P eoples Da ily, P ekings leadersupdat ed Lin P iaos doctr ina l st a tement on peoples w a rs. The key sentence reads:

The day when the maiti militargforces of th e U nited Sta tes a re w ipedout zuill ma rk t he out break of revolution in a ll count ries of the w orld, an dtha t mea ns th e utt er colla pse of USimperialism.Not only is the success of revolutionary w a rfa re over th e conventiona lpow er of tbe U nited S ta tes seen a sa signa l t o Commun ist lea ders &dmovement s urging th em to rise a nd tobegin t he encirclement , it is a lsomeant increasingly to suck U S pow er

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-T~

int o th e Vietna mese conflict in orderto para lyze t he United St a tes elsew here a nd, of course, eventua lly todestroy her.

The w ise cour se is to preven t peoplez w a rs from br eaking out a crossth e globe. The fir st st ep is to st opth e Viet Cong. This can not be a ccomplished solely by convent iona l mea ns.

Intelligence comesWhile milita ry str ength is indispensable, U S conserva tive a pproaches tomili tary stra tegy an d the prima cygra nt ed to purely milita ry considera tions reveal that she st ill lacks themodest sophist ica tion w hich, in 1945,I w ould ha ve suggested the w isdom ofI tsking P ra gue a nd B erlin. Nor do essentially tra dit iona l a id, informa tion,a nd pacifica tion progra ms promisemuch by themselves.

Tlie a nsw er t o revolutiona ry w a rfipril1968

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREfa re lies in the integra tion of all mean sof str uggle w ithin t he fra mework ofa single a nd single-mind ed psychologica l operat ions plan designed to deprive th e Viet Cong of th e one fa ctoron w hich th e success of revolutiona ryw a rfa re depends: popula r support .

The empha sis is on integr a tion a ndth e prima cy of psychologica l consid -

Amw New Feat.re.primarily from informerserat ions. Un less the U nited Sta tessubordina tes a ll conventiona l instr uments of w ar fare an d sta tecra f ta ndth e thinking tha t goes into th e employment of each of th emto psychologica l pla nning, she ha s lit t le cha nceto prevail over enemies w ho th ink, live,a nd t ight in terms of psychologica lw a rfa re. She ca nnot do so w hile herfaith in ha rdw a re exceeds h er beliefin ideas.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREevery squa re foot of th e jungles a ndmounta ins of Vietna m. Millions ofmen w ould he needed t o defend everyone of the thousan ds of ham letsa gainst a t t a cks by concent ra ted forcesw hich ca n choose at will their ta rgetsfor tbe day. I t takes only three mento lug a fa ir ly heavy mortar from itshiding place up a w ooded hill in th eda rk of night a nd 10b a dozen r oundsat the most heavily guarded base. B utit w ould t a ke a n a rmy to prevent th osethree from causing a great deal ofdamage, for it iz not ea sy to policevast a reas of jungle a nd keep th empoliced.

There a re th ousa nds of miles ofvita l roa ds w hich ca n be cut by a ha ndful of guerrillas. H ow ma ny men itwould require to keep the roads openis impossible to know, but it is sa feto say that there are not enoughavailable.Intelligence

The only thing that can preventsmall, highly trained units from carry ing out a mbushes successfully is intelligence, informa tion on w here th eyare and what they plan to do. Intel l igence comes prima rily from inform ers.B ut a nyone w ho remembers the Chicago of the 1920s will also recall howdifficult it is to find w itnesses readyto testify a ga inst t errorists.

Norma l people do not like to ta kecha nces w ith th eir lives. To th e extent, th erefore, tha t checkma ting th eViet Cong depends on informa tion, itis necessa ry to persua de th e peopletha t i t is in their interest to a ct asinformers. The Vietna mese pea sa nt isa n extremely sophist ica ted speciee; heha s to be to sta y a live in a count rytha t ha s been torn by wa r for 25 years.As a ny realist , he prefers to be on th eside of the str onger bat ta lions. H e

know s tha t t he Viet Cong in his midstrepresent an immediat e threat to hissurvival, a nd so he ha e tr ied tO a ccommodate them. But he has begun tosense that the US buildup ha s turnedthe t ide against the insurgents .If he ca n be ma de t o believe tha tth e Republic, support ed by th e resources of th e U nited St a tes, w ill in.evita bly prevail , he ma y conclude tha tit is w iser not to ta ke a cha nce of being ident ified w ith t he ult imat e loser.H e is shrew d enough to rea lize thsthe a nd his fam ily a re fa ir ly safe unless th e Viet Cong use his village a sa hideout or a strongpoint .

When he is told of inst a nces w hereinforma tion from villagers on th ew hereabouts of Viet Cong in th eirvicinity led to th e destr uction of th eseunits before th ey ma na ged to infiltra teth e villa ges, he sees tbe point quickly.E nlist ing t he peoples help, eventh ough it ha s been done neither systema tica lly nor consistently, ha s begun to produce results. The resnltscould be much great er if th e U nitedSt a tes und erstood a nd exploited thefull pot ent ia l of psychologica l opera tions.Sense of SecurityThe prevention of terr orism , a ssa ssinat ion, a nd a mbushes ca nnot by itself win the wa r a l though the increasing sense of securit y follow ing fromit w onld be of inca lcula ble va lue. U Smilitary strategy, therefore, apartfrom t he essentia l routine of securin gth e perimeters of our bases, a ime a teea rching out a nd destroying tbe enemys ma in strength units and logist iccenters.

The tr ouble ie th a t Viet Cong a ndNorth Vietna mese regula rs, exceptw hen G iaps conditions a re mettha tis, when they ha ve a cha nce t o hit a t

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num erica lly inferior or demora lizedunit s-do a ll th ey can to a void conta ct. Their purpose is not to sta nda nd f ight a nd ta ke t he heavy lossesw hich superior firepower can inflict;it is to rema in in being, ca pable ofhitting at will with locallY superiornumbers, and so tO tie dOwn manytimes th eir strengt h al l over thecountry.Viet Gong Tiring

The quest ion is w heth er it might bepossible to brea k t he enemy s w ill tofight a t a sma ller price in terms ofmanpower, time, sweat, and blood.Since the U S buildup began in th esum mer of 1965, th e presen ce of UScomba t troops, tbe consta nt thr eat ofth eir mobility a nd f irepower, a nd thedomination of the skies have kept theVlet Cong on th e move. They a re get.ting tired. The more tired th ey get,th e easier th ey-especia lly th e grea tnum bers of conscripts th ey a re nowforced to employsuccumb t o psychological opera tions. They a re probablymore vulnerable t o propaga nda tha nth ey a re to bullets. Thousan ds of interr ogat ions of prisoners a nd defectors, ma ny of them in depth , bea r thisout.

There wa s a time w hen th e VietCong felt fair ly sa fe sta ying in villages, indoctr ina ting th e villa gers(w hich is not a ha rd job if one ca rries a utomat ic wea pons), a nd grow ingrice with t hem and ta king th eir sha re.Since the U S buildup, they can nolonger a fford to sta y put. They mustgra b wh a t th ey need. They extort fourtimes the a mount of t a xes the governmen t imposes. They seize r ice th ey d idnot help t o grow . And in lieu of r ecruiting volunteers, th ey must dra ftevery likely young ma n. The dra ft,more Often tha n not, ta kes the formS@! Wee

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREof kidna pping a t th e point of a gun.

The reason w hy t he Viet Cong ha vetr ouble enlisting volunt eer is, in par t,universa lly huma n and, in part , peculiar ly Vietna mese. As long as th einsurgents seemed to ha ve a cha nceof winning, ma ny Vietna mese thoughtit pruden t to ha ve one son serve wit hthe Viet Cong an d a nother wi th t heVietn a mese a rm ed forces. Toda y, mostof t hem n o longer cons ider it necessa ry to pla y botb sides.

The other reason stems from thebelief tha t the dead wh o a re not r itually buried in ma rked gra ves w ill tur ninto errant soulsa fate worse thandeat h. Now tha t the Viet Cong arehard pressed, they must often leave thebodies of th e dea d on th e ba tt lefieldto rot, uncar ed for, in th e jungle. Itis ha rd enough to lose a son, but itis ha rder to know tha t his soul ma ynever find rest. This is w hy few pa rents toda y wa nt th eir children to become Viet Cong.Peasants Resistance

No peasant likes people who takehis money, his harvest , and his sons.If these sa me people enda nger th e restof his fam ily simply by infiltr a tinghis village a nd exposing it to hostilefire, he likes t hem less. There ha vebeen insta nces of resista nce, ra re beca use it is da ngerous; but grudgingrelucta nce to par t w ith m oney, food,and sons has become quite general.The Viet Cong know it. They a scribethe si tuat ion not only to mili ta ry pressure, but to a miscalcula tion. They ha dth ought in th e summ er of 1965 th a tth ey w ere w inning. Therefore, th eyempha sized milita ry over psychologica lconsidera tionsth e unforgivable ein.Now, they a dmit, i t is. ha rd to revertto fundamentals.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREante under the pressure of t ime, theViet Cong had l it t le a l ternat ive butto increase ter ror. In doing so, th eytook on a nother formida ble enemy:the Vietna mese commitm ent to nha ndoa which means not only dignity andhum a nity , but a bsence of oppression.The inesca pable result wa s a process

Interrogation of a Vietof ever-w idenin g a liena t ion of t he people from th e Viet Cong.Aliena tion of t he people, t o t hehighly indoctr ina ted ha rd-core VietCong, spells defeat. All Communistdoctrine unequivoca lly sta tes tha t successful revolutionar y w a rfa re dependson securing volunt a ry popular s upport .The insurgent must be a ble to tr ustth e people on w hom he must rely forshelter , food, and informa tion. If P OP ula r support is no longer volunt a ry,the tra ined Communist knows tha t hiseffort s a re doomed. H e need not betold. But we can tell the rank and f i le,th e soft-core Viet Cong, th a t their

lea ders know tha t th ey have lost be.cause th eir ow n book tells th em so,

The U S Army a nnounced in J a nua ry1967 that the number of Viet Congw ho ba d defect ed in 1966 by volun.ta rily coming over to th e govern .ment s side a nd registering in C1/euH oi (open ar ms ) cent ers tota led 20..

US Ar%wCong prisoner of war242. The figu re for 1965 ha d been only11,124; th a t for the preceding tw oyea rs combined less th a n 9,000. I t isgenera lly believed th a t th e elimina tionof four Viet C ong cost s t he life ofone Vietna mese, American , Koresn,Filipino, or Aust ra lian . This mea nsthat 5,000 allied soldiers were sparedin 1966. Tha t is a hout 10 ba tt a lions,a nd i t is not the w hole story, for ma nydefectors join the Vietna mese Army .Instead of losing men, the allies gainmen.

The psychological outlook fa vors tbea llies. The U S milita ry buildup a ndU S policy a s sta ted by P resident Lyn-

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k

present order of priorit ies must bereversed. It must be recognized th a tpropaga nda a nd psychologica l w a rfar ea re th e primary wea pon systems ofthe era and tha t tbe function of milita ry opera tions is, in substa nce, limited to support ing th em, principallyby providing them w ith tha t indispensa ble ingredient, th e ima ge of physica lpower.

P olitica l a nd psychologica l w a rfa reha ve been t he stepchild of US sta tecra ft for too ma ny yea rs. The U nitedStates has yet to realize that information is, a t best, a w eak subst itut e forth em. The informa t ion policy on w hichthe stra tegic propaga nda effort isfounded is ba sed on a pleth ora of tr itefallacies a nd disrega rds th e fact tha tth e mean ing of news depends on th eperspect ive in w hich one view s it .

Fortuna tely, the effort in Vietna mdemonstra tes tha t the United S ta tesis chan ging her a tt itude. This is nota reference to th e bombing of Nort hVietna m w hich clearly ha d first beenconceived a s a psychological opera t ion, a messa ge a dvising Ha noi tha ttbe price of directing a nd reinforcingthe Viet Cong wa s increasing a ndmight , in th e end, be prohibitivelyhigh.

I t disrega rded a large number ofpert inent fa cts a nd lessons, includingth a t bombing tend6 to ra ise moraleand unite people behind their governments as i t d id in England, Germany,and J apan; tha t Asian s toicism andCommunist fa na ticism combine to reverse th e messa ges intent ; a nd tha tpeople get used to almost anythingth a t last s long enoughone fear s uncert a inties. The intend ed messageturn ed into a conventiona l milita ryoperation.

The fact is tha t the United St a tes

ha s, in Vietna m, at last begun to a p.precia te th e usefulness of ta ctica l psychologica l opera tions, but ha s not a syet recognized th eir corr ect pla ce a ndtheir true potential .

P sychologica l w a rfa re is not just ama tt er of broa dca st ing a nd of drop.ping leaflets, of bra instorms a ndgimmicks. It is tbe systema tic pur suit of psychological object ives t oa chieve politica l ends. E ven th oughw ords a re still th e most pow erful instrument in the human a rsenal, i t doesnot rely on w ords a lone.

Correctly employed to exha ust itsfull potent ial, psychologica l w a rfa rebends a ll a ctionmilita ry, politica l,economic, a nd socia lt o its purpose.This requ ires recogn ition on t he pa rtof a ll a uthorit ies tha t t he goa l of alla ction is tbe achievement of a psychological object ive. E very a ction must bepla nned a nd conducted wit h t he psychological object ive in mind .

In other w ords, instea d of looking atwa r merely a s an encount er betw eentw o part ies intent on destroying eachother, it must be view ed a s a n effortto ma ke people sw itch a llegian ce fromone set of opinions a nd va lues t o a noth er. The full mea ning must begra sped of the fact t ha t the prima ryta rget in Vietna m is not the deat h ofth e, enemy, but tbe tr ust of t he people,w ithout w hose a cquiescence, volunta ryor involunta ry, revolutiona ry w a rfar ecannot be sustained.

P sychologica l w a rfar e must cease tobe a n a ppendix to a ction a nd becometbe reason for action. The UnitedSta tes must prove that her vaiues a recloser to tbe hopes of man than arethose of th e enemy. U S va lues a re theultima te w eaponth e only w eapon capable of para lyzing revolutiona ry w a rfare.

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MIDDLE EASTin response t o S oviet policy. It is useful, th erefore, to exa mine th e pointsof a greement a nd dif ference tha t theU nited Sta tes a nd the US SR ha ve inthe area , in par t icular regarding Isra el a nd the Ara b St a tes. This is anecessary f irst step in ma king U S policy for th e poetw a r period.limited AccordAs for Israel, the only agreementbetw een the U ni ted Sta tes a nd theU SS R is recognition of tha t count rysright to exist. Alth ough limited, th isa ccord is significa nt in itself. The implicat ion a rises t ha t, if it is convenientfor t he tw o ma jor pow ers to recognizeIsr a el, it could be a ppropriat e for theAra b St a tes to do th e sam e. Beyondrecognit ion of Isr a el, US a nd Sovieta tt i tudes diverge. Towa rd Isra el th eU nited St a tee is fr iendly, th e U SS Rhoetile. It should be noted, however,th a t th is unfr iendly Soviet outlook towa rd Isra el could cha nge a s i t suitsSoviet interest . I t is w ith respect toth e Ara bs, however, tha t both pow ersmarkedly differ.

In th e dispute betw een th e Ara bsa nd the Isra elis , the U ni ted Sta tes ha stried to be neutra l . Tha t w a r haserupted three times does not necessarily condemn th e th eory underlying U S

Howa rd C. Reese is a n Opera tionsResearch Ana lyst with the ResearchAna lfisis Corpora t ion a nd a member ofth e fa cedt fi of th e School of In tern a tional Service, American U niversity,Wa shington, D. C. H e received his P h.D. from New York U niversity. A U SArm fi R eserve oficer, he zoas w ith Supreme H ead qua rt ers, Allied E xpeditiona ry Forces, dur ing World Wa r II ,and served wi th the P ar Ea s t Cosnma nd in th e Korea n conflict . His art icle, The Ara b-Isr a eli Dispa te a nd th eMa jor P ow ers, a ppear ed in th e April1966 iesue of t he MI LI TARY RE VIE W.

policyfriends hip t o both sides. U n.der the best of circumst a nces, neutra l .ity is not a n ea sy course. Yet it isfair to say tha t given th e emotiona l ,cultu ra l, politica l, a nd economic fat .tors hea ring on US policy in th e Mid.dle Ea st , t he U ni ted Sta tes baa , in thema in, conducted tha t policy with rea.sonable skill.

In th e early years a f ter World Wa rII , i t was US policy to keep the USSRout of the Middle Ea st . With tha t endin view, t he U nited St a tes forced theU SS R to evacuate Azerbaija n, Ira nanorth &nm ost province, in Februa ry1946. I n 1954, eigh t yea rs la ter , t heU nited St a tes took th e initia tive inputt ing together the B aghda d P actnow th e Centr a l Treat y Orga nizat ion(CE NTO)to shield th e Middle E a stfrom possible Soviet a ggr ession. Forth e moment, the best criterion for th esuccess of th e pact is tha t no w a r hasbroken out in th e region w ith S ovietparticipation.Hazardous AllianceA regiona l a llia nce, h owever, especial ly one tha t is dra w n together bya n out side pow er, is sometimes risky.Three factors suggest tha t such a lliances can be hazardous:

Geographic closenessin thisca se betw een Turkey, Ira n, and tireU SSR on one ha nd, and between P akista n and Communist China on theother. This closeness induces relationstha t t he a l liance, a t lea st in i ts earlysta ges, sought to prevent. For Ira n,th is rela tion ta kes th e form of Sovieteconomic an d milita ry a ssista nce; forP a kietan, i t is Communist Chineseeconomic a nd milita ry a ssistan ce.

Members ha ve a ha bit of deroga ting comm on goa ls in f a ver of pa rochial, na tional a ims. With respect toKa shmir, P a kietan promotes her ob

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MIDDLE EASTI n 1965, Soviet a id comm itm ent s of

540 million dolla rs , or 80 percent , w entto Ira n, P a kista n, a nd Turkey. Forthe same year, U S a id to these sa mecoun t ries ca me t o 600 million dolla rs,or a bout 14 percent of the tota l U Sa ssist a nce to less-developed coun t ries.Whereas US aid to the three CENTOcoun t ries exceeded th e Soviet equiva lent , th is a ssista nce represent ed asma ller sha re of tota l U S a id to less-developed countries.Economic and Mi l i tary AssistanceIt is ha rd t o ma ke a n exact compiw ison betw een Soviet a nd U S foreigna id to the Middle Ea st for a t leastth ree reasons: First , U S foreign a ssistance has gone on for 20 years, asopposed to 13 for its coun t erpa rt ;second, US aid has been distributedmore w idely w ithin th e a rea, t o 10count ries a s a gainst seven; a nd third,since 1946, U S a id to the region ha sconst itut ed a bout 10 percent of a ll U Sa ssist a nce to less-developed coun t riescompa red to 41 percent for S oviet a idover a significa nt ly short er period.

For t he period 1946-66, U S economic a nd mili ta ry a ssista nce to theMiddle E a st a mount ed to 12,988.6 million dolla rs a nd wa s distributed a sshown in Figure 2.

Turn ing to milita ry a id, it is possible to document U S assist a nce inth is ca tegory, w ith t he exception ofP a kista n. However, the same ca nnotbe done for t he Soviets for tw o rensons: First , relia ble figures a re usua lly classified; a nd, second, a ssigningdolla r va lues to Soviet equipment isnot a simple ma tt er in th e cont ext ofw orld ma rket prices. The best t ha tcan be done is to cite published sourcestha t ha ve genera l a ccura cy, more pa rticularly in such ca tegories a s a ircra ft ,tanks, and trucks.April1968

Cloa ked in a Czech-Egy ptian a rmsa greement , Soviet milita ry a id beca mea fact in the Middle Ea a t in Septem-;ber 1955. The West ern P ower s-t heU nited Sta tes, Bri ta in, a nd Fra nc%ha d hith erto enjoyed a virtua l monopoly in supplying w eapons to th e region.At the B a ndung Conference in thesummer of 1955, Chou En-lai, thenP remier a nd Foreign. Minist& of Communist China , indica ted the a vailabili ty of Communist a rms to P residentNa sser of E gypt. To obta in q non-Western source of ar ms fitt ed in w ellwith Nassers policy of independencefrom th e th ree Western countr ies. B y1964, Eg ypt ha d a cquired 750 milliondollar s in Soviet milita ry credits, a ndby mid-1967 th is figure w a s w ell overtwo billion dollars.Similar AgreementsThe Soviets entered into similara greements w ith Ira q, Syria , Yemen,and Iran. The Soviets also began tosupply th e Ara b St a tes of the Mag~ rebin w est Nort h Africa , sometimes considered wit hin th e Middle Ea st. Algeria beca me a recipient of growingamounts of Soviet arms. With the defeat of t he E gypt ion forces, Algerianow ha s th e second-la rgest a rmy inAfrica , a bout 60,000 t roops; only t hea rmy of South Africa is larger.

The influx of 72 Soviet MiG fightera ircra ft , 200 ta nks, ra da r systems, a ndna val pat rol cra ft to the Algerian a rsenal w orries Morocco a nd ma kes herdependent on the U nited St a tes for therestora tion of a n a rms bala nce. I n theH orn of Africa , th e Soviets ha ve beenliberal with Somalia, reportedly sending 150 MiG figh t er bombers, 20 helicopters, a nd enough a rmored equipment for a briga de. ,

It ca n be seen, th erefore, tha t t hdSoviets ha ve a sizable economic a nd

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MIDDLE EASTmilita ry. investment in th e MiddleEa st, from Algeria in the w est to~ omalia and Ira q in the southea st a ndnorth ea st, respectively. The extent ofthis a id is a n exa mple of S oviet interest in th e Middle Ea st. This interest must be considered in exa mining Isra eli a nd Ara b a ims.

To give politica l mea ning t o mi]i.ta ry victory, the Isra elis report eSEEEii

MEDITERRANEAN SEA +

. Future of tbe G a za St rip. Disposition of th e Sina i P enin.

Sula . Fut ure of th e Sha rmel-Sheik.. Neutralization of tbe Golan

Heights in Syria . P roblem of the West B a nk of the

J orda n River.Apa rt from t hese six points , th e

elusive question of Israels recogni.t ion by the Ara bs ha s a n intrinsic import a nce for the Isra eli G overnment.S hould such a n event come t o pass,perha ps a s a result of th e interim non.belligerency, th e Isr a elis w ould, undoubtedly, rega rd such a developmenta s second in significan ce only to th eesta blishment of tbe J ewish sta te. Ifth e Ara bs should find it possible to,Pd qEADs=put a side th eir feelings w ith r espectISSAELSUEZ CANALv1sun SINAIPENINSULAm, AWJ-. \,% GULF OF ..4(A4BA m% TIRAN c STRAITS . SaAssUNITED a .wms*O SAUDARABREPUBLIC RED< SEA ASAB

m OCCUPIEDYISRAEL~ ve an agenda of six items for nego

tia tion. I neesence, theitems a re basedon territoria l a djustm ents w ith security in mind. Victory ha s a lso motiva ted Isra el to think a bout th e problemof Ara b refugees, a qu estion th e Ara bStates have chosen not to disassociatefrom a genera l settlement.

The six points cover the:. Question of th e J orda nian sector

of J erusalem.

to Isra els qua ra ntine, th eir ow n position might be str engthened ina nyfut ur e negotia t ions. The problem ofJ erusalem w ould seem to be virtua llysettled.Compromise Solution

Isra el a nnexed or, to use th e Isra eli term, a dministra tively unifiedthe J orda nian sector of J erusa lem on23 J une. It would a ppear tha t thissensitive question rega rding the a dministra tion of holy places sacred toJ udaism, C hrist ianity, a nd Islam willfind a compromise solution. E a ch religion w ill ha ve supervision over itsbuildings, a nd Isra el w ill ha ve political control of the city. Notwithstandingpossible effect son Isr a els securit y,the quest ion qf the G a za S trip mightalso be open fo compromise.

In early J uly, Major G enera l MosheDayan, Israels Defense Minister, saidthat tbe Gaza Strip should be incorpora ted into Israel . I t wa s from thisa rea tha t Egyptia n comma ndos ra idedIs ra els south w est hord er in 1955-56,

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prompting Isra els entry into the sec-ond Ara b-Isra eli w a r. After tha t conflict, Isr a el unsuccessfully proposedtha t the strip be pla ced under t heUnited NatiOns, with Israeli troopsproviding security. General Dayansopinion aside, Israel now favors aplebisci te to decide the future of theGaza Strip.Sharm el$heikThe Isr a elis, on th e ot her ha nd,seem to ha ve n o interest in holdingthe Sinai P eninsula. P resent indica t ions a re tha t Isra el would be sat isfied wit h demilita rizat ion of the peninsula so tha t Isra eli forces ca n bewit hdra w n. More critica l, however, isthe eitua tion in Sha rm cl-Sh eik.

This piece of land on the tip of theSinai P eninsula comma nds the a pproa ch to the G ulf of Aqa ba a nd I sra els port of E ilat . E gypt s blocka geof th e gulf, in Isra els view, const itut ed a rea son for w a r. To make certa in tha t such a blocka ge ca nnot bereimposed, Isra el would either ga rrison t he Sh a rm cl-Sh eik herself, ora ccept t he presence of a neut ra l pow erto preside over th e gulf. The Isr a elipurpose is to keep t his seala ne opento ships of a ll flags a t a ll t imes.

With regard to the Golan Heightsin Syria , Isra el is no less a dam a nt ina ma tt er she considers equa lly vita lto her security. P rior to tbe J une wa r,Syria n a rt i l lery f ired on Isra eli farmcommun ities from th e G olan H eights.The Isra eli G enera l St a ff is determined tha t this will not be repea ted.It is likely tha t only a demilita rizedzone could sa tisfy the Isr a elis.

The West B a nk of tbe J orda n is a neven more complica ted problem. In crea singly, th e Isra elis view this areaa s a n a ut onomous region. Alth oughth e precise dist ribut ion of responsi-

MIDDLE EASThili t ies must a wa it a f ina l set t lementbetw een Isra el and J orda n, the presentpla n has the a rea a t ta ched to Isra elseconomy. If J orda n signed a pea cetrea ty, the territ ory w ould be jointlya dminist ered. Defense, however, w ouldbe Is ra els r esponsibilit y. The quest ionof the West B a nk of the J orda n encompasses th e Ara b refugee problem.Those problems, t he recogn it ion of I sra el, and the improvement of a nd unrestricted a ccess to regiona l w a tersconstit ute the critical issues in theArab-Israeli dispute.

The Ara b refugee problem ha s lingered f or 19 yea rs. For encoura gingthe Ara b resident s of P a lestine to fleewhen Israel came into being, Arablead ers must be censur ed. Tbe Ara blea ders undertook this move in th ebelief th a t vict orious Ara b a rmiesw ould soon ta ke over th e former B ritish ma nda te in its entirety. The Isra elis, on the oth er ha nd, a t lea st inth e ear ly sta ges of the 194S w a r, a skedthe P a lest ine Ara bs to sta y where theywere.Positions Reversed

When the war was over, the Arabsa nd th e Isra elis reversed th eir positions. The Ara bs insisted t ha t the 1s .ra elis rea dmit th e Ara bs w ho ha d left ,w hile the Isra elis refused on seturitygrounds. As a result of th e 1967 w a r,th e Isr a elis found it expedient to reexa mine t he problem. The w a rs outcome ha d brought increa sed numbersof Ara bs u nder Isra eli milita ry jurisdiction.

Israel was aware of the psychologica l ra mifica tions of th e problem.Awa re tha t she enjoys the a dvanta geover th e Ara bs in public opinion inthe America s, E urope, a nd south eastAsia , Isr a el could not risk th is incalculabl y vital a sset. The st a tement of


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MIDDLE EASTth e Isra eli G overnment on 29 J uneha d tha t in mind: . . . tha t with thecreat ion of new condit ions in th e region, t here now exist conditions ena bling a genera l immedia te solutionto th e refugee problem.The Israelis are realistic. enough toknow tha t t hey ca nnot gain on a ll s ixpoints. Dela y in moving to th e conference table will obviously make ultima te negotia tions more difficult . Forth e moment, how ever, the Isra elis cana fford to be generous, especia lly inview of a lack of unity a mong theArabs.TheArab PositionFr om th e end of hostilities unt ilnow, th e Ara bs ha ve been groping forsolidarity . Four meetings ha ve ta kenplace: tw o of Ara b F oreign Minist ersin Kuwa it in J uly , and in Kha r touma month lat er, a meeting of five H eadsof Sta te in Ca iro in J uly, a nd a secondAra b sum mit conference in Kha rt oumin September. No unusual results,however, ha ve been a chieved th us fa r.Tha t th ere sh@d be differ encesa mong th ese count ries, seven in Asiaa nd seven in Africa , wit h significa ntgeogra phic, economic, s ocia l, a nd polit ica l cont ra sts should n ot be surprising. Five exa mplesEgy pt, J orda n,Lebanon, Sa udi Ara bia, a nd Tunisiapoint up t hese differen ces.

For most count ries, milita ry defea tmea ns politica l cha nge. At least , suchis th e Western experience. Thus fa r,E gypt seems to be a n exception, forP resident Na sser cont inues to holdhis position a s tigh tly a s before. Noteven th e poor perform a nce of his a rmiea has diminished his a bility to a ttr a ct th e loya lty of the Ara b ma ssesfrom Tunisia to Kuw a it .

It seems proba ble, nevert heless, tha tdista steful decisions ma y be una void

a ble for him in th e postw a r period.As the deepening dist ress of th eE gyptia n economy show s, a dventuresa broa d a nd progress a t home ca nnotgo on a t the same time. Na sser willha ve to choose betw een empha sis ondomestic goa ls a nd extension of Ara brevolutiona ry a ctivities. The qu estionis w het her he could su rvive such areversa l of priorit ies. Whet her Sovietsupport continu es to be a s generonsin the fut ure a s in the past , it is clea rtha t Egypt , under Na ssers lea dershipor not, must have time to recover andreth ink her futur e. As th e most populous a nd stra tegica lly situa ted Ara bsta te, Egypt ha s a crucial role in theArab East .Egyptian Attitudes

In evaluat ing Egypt ian a t t i tudesvis-a -vie Isr a el, it is ironic tha t thereshould be considera ble a greement betw een t heir socia l a nd economic outlooks in this essentia lly ba ckwa rd region. The lead ership of E gypt a ndIsra el is forw a rd looking. From a socia l and economic point of view, t herefore, it is proba bly tr ue to sa y tha tCa iro h a s more in comm on w ith TelAviv t ha n with Riyadh.As their cleava ge over th e Yemenshows, E gypt a nd Sa udi Ara bia seemto a gree on Iit tl*even politica lly,a part from a mutua l desire t o see Isra el eliminat ed. The gulf tha t sepa rates these two key Arab states isnear ly a s difficult to bridge a s thecha sm between Egypt a nd Isra el. Inlight of the gra ve emotiona l differences betw een Ca iro a nd Tel Aviv, t hesimila rities a re, a t best, superficial.If a ny improvement ca n ta ke pla ce,however, th ese likenesses must be emphasized. In some Egyptia n qua rters ,t here a ppea rs to be evidence of th is.

At lea st , in th e rethinking of E gyp-Mt lit a ryRevie


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t ia n-Isra eli problems tha t now is going on in Ca iro, th e fa ctors held incomm on a re receiving some a tt ention.Of significa nce is a sta tement by Dr.Mah mud Fa wzy, formerly ForeignMinister of the U nited Ara b Republica nd now special a dvisor to P residentNa sser. H e is report ed to ha ve sa idtha t, if only Isra el paid a n honora blecompensat ion to th e P a lestinian refugees, everyt hing else w ould be negotia ble. E ven. Na sser himself a t onetime proposed negotia tions w ith Isra el prior to the r ecent conflict.Nsssers StsndIt is in this l ight that PresidentNa ssers intra nsigent 23 J uly a ddress,ca lling for a cont inua tion of the w a ragainst Israel , should, perhaps, beview ed. H is rema rks, delivered on the15tb a nniversar y of the overthr ow ofKhr g Fa rouk, celebrat ed a pat rioticevent, th e sta rt of Egy pts eocial a ndeconomic revolut ion. G iven t he compet ing a nd reca lcitra nt a t t i tudes of P residents H oua ri B omn6dienne of AIgeria, Nur al-Din of Syria, and AbdulRa hma n Arif of Ira q, a moderatesta nd by Nasser w ould h a ve been difficult on such a n occasion. Ch a nges inEgyptian attitudes must evolve slowlya nd subtly. Theeesentia l politica l pre.scription for th e Ara bs is solida rit y.Of necessity , however, each Ara b sta temust spea k for itself.

One of these is Sa udi Ara bia. In therecent conflict , Sa udi Ara bia wa s onlya P a ssive par ticipan t. There wereSa udi tr oop movements, more symbolic, perha ps, th a n determ ined. TheSa udi Ara bian G overnment could notcompletely avoid some display of int erest in th e crisis. B esides movingtr oops, Sa udi Ara bia cut off oil production. on the other hand, KingFa is@, th e ca pable ruler of the coun April1968

EAt ry, wae aware of where his best itereste lay. They were not with Egypt

In Riyadh, the ca pita l , t here warelief that tbe war was short . A drawout str uggle w ould ha ve required aa ctive commit mentwhich th e Sa udw a nt ed t o a void. Oil production w oul

MIDDLE

The Arab refugee problem bas lingerfor 19 yearsha ve been shut dow n fort be dura tiothereby curt a iling th e income thKing Fa isal needs to modernize hcountry. Relatively unpublicized, thprocess is ma king str ides tha t reflethe ca pable royal ha nd. In itself, thta sk is enough to preoccupy th e KinEgy ptia n effort s in the Yemen, h oever, to destroy th e Roya list G overment there force King Fa isal to suport t he forces of Sa if a l-Isla m a l-B aw ith m oney a nd w eapons. It should nbe surprising tha t His Majea ty did na t t end t he Ca iro meeting.


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MIDDLE EASTThere were other reasons. Saudi

Ara bia w a s no$ directly involved a ndthe meeting wa s held under the a uspices of P resident Na sser, w hom KingFaisal does not trust. Also, there arefew close ties betw een th e King a ndthe ra dica l leaders of Algeria , Suda n,a nd Sy ria. Absence of the H ead ofSt a te from a ma jor Ara b count ry tes-

Sudan or Morocco. B Y crea t ive diploma cy, the J orda nian G overnment mustend th is occupa tion or come to t ermswith i t . For this reason, J orda n ma ybe forgiven should she find it neces-sa ry to a lter h er previous policy of norelat ions w ith Isra el in f a ver of some.thing more in a ccord w ith r eality.

In contra st to J orda n, who suffered

b- Lm!iIntern.,.The U SS R report edly ha s repla ced about 80 percent of tbe equipment lost by E gypt

tifies to th e a bsence of unit y in th eArab East .

Tbe consequenceis a strengtheningtion. It might bepopularit y of King

of the lack of unityof Na ssers posi

expected that theFaisal among the

Ara b ma sses w ould rise a t this moment . The inst itut ion of mona rchyfa ils to dra w th e response it once didfrom Ara bs, par ticula rly from theyouth. The services tha t King Fa isalmight be a ble to offer t he Ara b caus emust , therefore, be confined to th estr engthening of his ow n count ry.

J orda n, her richest soil under Isra eli occupa tion, is obviously in a position m uch different from th a t of the

so heavily in the wa r, neither Lebanonnor Sa udi Ara bia involved herself a ctively. Neither took par t in the Ca iromeeting.

Lebanon is a ty pica l Ara b sta te w ithha lf th e popula tion Chr istia n, ha lfMoslem. Tha t Leba non did not becomeenga ged in t he conflict could be a scribed t o th is distr ibution. The a rm ycomma nder, a Christ ian, refused toobey the order of the Prime Minister,a Moslem, to open a front on Leba nonsborder w ith I sra el. Although this decision wa s, undoubtedly, rea ched onmilita ry grounds, it is conceivable tha tLeba nons evenly divided demogra phicprofile wa s a contr ibnting fa ctor. Any

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r _ --- ----MIDDLE EASTLeban ese policy tow a rd Isr a el w ouldproba bly devolve from th is int erna lheterogeneity.

Tunisia m ight be ment ioned a s afurt her exa mple of Ara b diversity, a lth ough she is only a sma ll sta te a ndonly periphera l to th e hea rt of t heAra b Ea st. Like Leba non, Tunisia isa former French colony a nd a Mediterra nean count ry. H er Chief of Sta te,P resident Ha bib B ourguiba, reflectstbe possible a dvant a ges tha t r emoteness gives t o object ivity .ModerateView

In P ronouncements concerning theArab-Israeli dispute, President Bourguiba ha s ta ken a modera te a nd origina l view . For exa mple, over a yea ra go, he criticized tbe sta nd of the Ara bleadership on th e Ara b refugees a sst erile a nd unproductive. Ca lling fora n end to ha tred, the Tunisia n lea derempha sized t he need for a const ructive solut ion of th e problem und er U Nauspices. More than once, he disagreedw ith Na sser, a nota ble exa mple being. his refusa l to follow Nassers dema ndtha t the Ara b Sta tes break relat ionsw ith B onn over a report ed shipmentof a rms to Israel. In the af termat hof tbe th ird Ara b-Isra eli w a r, B ourguiba cont inues his tempera te pointof view , a dvieing means oth er t ha nw a r to resolve cont inuing Ara b differ. ences wit h Isra el.

G iven Ara b d ifferences a nd th e resulta nt delay in reaching a sett lement,reference can be made to the earlierquestion of how can the U nited St a tesand the Soviet Union a dapt the s trategic cha nges in the Middle Ea st t oth eir respective interest s. First , itshould be decided w ha t th ese int erestsare .

Does this mutua l interest Iie in thepromot ion of par ochial a ims or th eApril19a8

a dvan cement of U nited Sta tes-Sovieta nd intra regiona l rela tions to stimula te politica l a nd economic eq uilibriumin the Middle East in place of tension?It ie idle, to be sure, t o dismiss th eimport a nce of U nited Sta tes and Soviet objectives. For th e U nited S ta testhese a re, f irst , th e territorial integrity of the count ries in the a reas a ndtheir freedom from Communist orother subversion.

Second, the U nited St a tes must assur e herself of continuing a ccess toth e oil of the P ersia n G ulf. However,Ara b oil is not quit e so necessa ry a sbefore beca use of increa sing a va ila bility of oilfields in w est Africa a nd Venezuela a nd th e na tura l gas deposits ofHolland P IU S eventua l use of nuclearfuels. Third, a wkw a rd a s i t ma y be,the United States must strive forfriendship w ith the Ara bs, but not a tIsraels expense.Soviet Aims

Soviet a ims, on th e other ban d, a renot fixed so easiFy. G eogra phic contiguity wit h the Middle Ea st underlies Soviet interest in regiona l developments . U ndersta ndably, the US SRdoes not w ish to feel a thr eat to hersouthern fla nk. U ndoubtedly, however,Soviet milita ry lea ders must know tha tth e dorma ncy of CE NTO constitu tesno rea l da nger. Conceivably, th en;th ere is some hope of realizing a sett led s tate in the area.

The question is w heth er th e Sovietsa re w illing to a ccept t he present equilibrium in the Middle E a st in the sa meway that they seem to have made afavorable response to a similar situa tion in centr a l E urope. The Sovieteha ve not yet indica ted tha t they a rew illing to do so, a s th e renewa l of.th eir a rms shipments in report edlylarge qua ntities to Egy pt suggests.


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WIOLE EASTNor ha ve th e Soviets a greed to a USproposa l to file notices of a ll a rm sshipments wit h th e U nited Nat ions, a nitem of th e a genda betw een P residentLyndon B . J ohnson a nd P remier Aleksei N. Kosygin dur ing t heir discussions at G lassboro, New J ersey. Afa ctor of continuing uncert a inty is thepresence of a Soviet fleet in t he Mediterra nea n, now consist ing of 30 ships,cruisers, subma rines, a nd a mphibiouscra ft. In the summ er of 1967, th e num ber of. ships rea ched 46.

The political purposes of Soviet economic a ssista nce do constit ut e a cha llenge to the U nited St a tes. Since tbeeconomies of most Middle Easterncount ries do not lend th emselves rea dily to a duplica tion of US or Westerneconomic orga niza tion, th e quest iona riees w heth er th ere could be somecoopera t ion in economic a id, how evermodest, betw een the U nited Sta tes andth e Soviet U nion. In this wa y, a n opening could be ma de for eventua l, moresubsta nt ive joint enterprises such a sarms control.

Mean w hile, it w ould seem to be inth e int erest of th e tw o principa l pow ers to restore peace to the area andto ma ke certa in tha t the rights ofeach sta te a re respected. The longer

it takes forto negotiateoutstandingbecomes anSta tes and

Isra el and the Ara b Sta tesa n a djustment of their

differen ces, t he more itobliga tion of th e U nited

th e Soviet U nion to bringth e disputa nt s to th e conference ta ble.U nder idea i conditions, it w ould bebett er for the a nta gonists to settleth eir own problems. In th e a bsence ofth eir w illingness to do so, th e ma jorpow ers, prefera bly in concert w ith th eU nited Na tions, ha ve little option butto take the lead.

Threeenough.vincinglythey northey can

Ara b-Isr a eli w a rs should beThe Israelis have shown con-tha t t hey ca n fight . Neither

tbe Arabs have proved thatma ke pea ce. The fa ilure t o do

so is a n opport unit y for the ma jorpow ers to improve th e situa tion ingood fa ith. It should be th e objectiveof the United States and the USSR topromote th e coexist ence of Isra el a ndth e Ara b S ta tes. Achievement of th isgoa l could cont ribut e to a ditent e betw een t he U nited S ta tes a nd th e SovietU nion w hich the leaders of the tw opowers say they desire. The MiddleEa st, beca use of i ts stra tegic importa nce, is a convenient a rea for the tw oprincipa l pow ers to direct t heir policies to this end.

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Milit a ryReview0


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Lieutenant Colonel Billy

The view s expressed in th is ar ticlear e the a utho+ s and ar e rw t necessa rily those of th e Depart ment ofthe Army, Depart ment of Defense,or the US Army Command a nd G enera l St a ff College.E ditor.

IN TH E sprin g of 1966, officia l ta lksw ere held in London betw een representa tives of the U nited St a tes a ndB ritish G overnments. The ~ Iks ~ en.t ired on a politico-milit a ry subjectha ving import a nt foreign policy implicat ions for both governm ents. Thispetilcular meeting wa s unusual beca use the US S ta te Depa rtment wa srepresented by a Navy capta in , a nd theDepa rt rn&t of Defenee (DOD ) rep-Wil Iw

\. Byrd, Urn-tedStotea Armu \Yresenta tive w a s a Foreign Serviceofficer.

There wae no mixup, the officersw ere represent ing tbe right depart ments. In fact, the Depart ment ofSt a te-Depa rt ment of D efense OfficerExcha nge P rogram celebra ted ite f i fthb ir thday tha t yaa r .

The excha nge progra m ie a na tura lout growt h of effort e by officia le of th eSta te Depa rtment a nd DOD to improve mutua l understa nding of foreign a nd milita ry policy. The conceptfor t he progra m evolved from a growing recognit ion since World Wa r I I ofth e close rela tionship bet,ween foreignpolicy a nd milita ry policy. At the na tional level, there is no pure foreign


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EXCHANGE PROGRAM Across the river in th e P enta gon,

a Foreign Serv ice officer in th e Officeof th e Deputy Ch ief of St a ff for Mili tar y Opera tions, sta f fs a J oint Sta f fpaper in w hich th e Army recommendstha t certa in a ctions be ta ken concerning third countr y a asiat ance to SouthVietnam.

In ISA, a Sta te Depa rtm ent excha nge officer is in th e midst of w riting a DOD policy paper dealing w iththe future of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization.

These items would be accomplishedregar dless of th e excha nge progra m.B eca use of th eir prior tra ining a ndexperience, how ever, th e excha nge officers a re a ble to cont ribut e expertpolitica l a nd milita ry a dvice a t th ew orking level w hich ot herw ise mightnot be a va ila ble to t he immediat e policy and decision makers.Transfer of KnowledgeAnoth er benefit of t he excha nge progra m is th e tr a nsfer of knowledge.After serving tw o year s in a notherdepa rt ment, th e officers ha ve a fa irknowledge of how the host agency opera tes, how i t a cts a nd thinks, an dhow it a rr ives a t policy decisions.U pon returning to th eir

Military Review April 1968

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Transcript of Military Review April 1968