Mendoza Civ Digests Copy

8/6/2019 Mendoza Civ Digests Copy

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CIVIL LAW MENDOZA DIGESTS ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2002

Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 368)

Facts: Placido Miranda and his wife were owners of a parcel of land. Upon their death, the landwas administered by their son Maximo who, in 1957, sold it to Agerico. In 1984, a free patenttitle was issued to chariot, Agericos daughter. Since then, Agerico has been in possession andcultivation of the land in behalf of Charito who became a resident of USA. In 1991, the heirs ofPlacido entered the land and prevented Agerico from cultivating it. They claimed rightfulownership and possession contending that Maximo was merely the administrator of the land.Thus, Agerico and Charito brought an action for forcible entry against the heirs. Meanwhile, theheirs also filed a complaint for declaration of nullity, annulment of title and deed of sale, andcancellation of title and reconveyance with damages and partition against Agerico and Charito.As they involve the same parties and subject matter and related issues, these cases have beenconsolidated.Issue: Whether or not Agerico, and subsequently Charito, has acquired the land by virtue of thedeed of sale executed by Maximo?Held: Yes.

1.) Agerico acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo. Charito, towhom the land was transferred has the certificate of title, tax receipts, and evidence ofpossession of the land for more than 30 years. Tax receipts and declarations ofownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property canbe the basis of claim of ownership through prescription.

2.) Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by either ordinaryor extraordinary prescription. On the one hand, ordinary prescription entails adversepossession by virtue of a title and in good faith for 10 years. On the other hand,extraordinary prescription is uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without needof title or good faith. In this case, therefore, on the basis alone of possession for morethan 30 years, Agerico and Charitos ownership, acquired through extraordinaryprescription, is beyond question.

3.) The heirs contend that under Art. 1391, CC, they had a period of 4 years within which tobring an action for annulment and that this period commenced to run only fromNovember 1991, when they allegedly discovered the fraud committed against them.

However, 1391, CC presupposes that no acquisitive prescription has set in, for after thefavorable effects of acquisitive prescription have set in, rights of ownership over aproperty are rendered indisputable.

Balogbog v. Court of Appeals (269 SCRA 259)

Facts: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog andGenoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an olderbrother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. Private respondentsRamonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting aginstpetitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that,as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandpaprents.

Petitoners denied this and alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue.Private respondents presented three witnesses: 1.) Trazo, then the mayor of their municipality,testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be married and Ramonito to be their first child.Furthermore, he said that he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina. 2.) Pogoy, a familyfriend of private respondents, testified that they are the children of Gavino and Catalina. Healso said that he attended their wedding and that Gavino and Catalina lived together. 3.)Catalina, the alleged wife of Gavina, tesitified concerning her marriage with Gavino. Shetestified that after the wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate,

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by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that they lived together and begotthree children, namely, Ramonito, Petronillo, and Generoso. Petronillo died after an illness atthe age of six. On cross-examination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived incommon law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private respondentsfurthermore produced various certificates from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, the Officeof the Treasurer, and the Parish Priest of Asturias Municipality that the records of the marriageof Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito must be presumed to have been either lost ordestroyed during the war. On the other hand, petitioners presented three witnesses: 1.) Leonciatestified that Gavino died single at the family residence and denied that her brother had anylegitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before the case wasfiled. 2.) Maranga, the Assistant Municipal Treasurer, testified that there was no record of themarriage in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 3.) Narvasa tesitified that Gavinodied single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Keriado after the war, although he didnot know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children bya man she had married before the war. On cross-examination, he stated that Leoncia, whorequested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case.Issue: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina were married and therefore private respondents, astheir alleged heirs, are entitled to one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents?Held: Yes.

1.) Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure topresent it is not proof that no marriage took place other evidence may be presented toprove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, thatGavino and Catalina were married and they had three children, one of whom died ininfancy; that their marriage subsisted until Gavino died; and that their children, privaterespondents herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as thelegitimate children of Gavino.

2.) An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of thewitnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having awedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would be unusual to have awedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice itsabsence.

3.) In accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, CC, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265,CC, which provides that such status shall be proven by record of birth in the CivilRegister, by an authentic document, or by final judgment, the filiation of children may beproven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any othermeans allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws.

Almendras v. Court of Appeals (269 SCRA 526)

Facts: Petitioner Alemndras is the registered owner of the parcel of land, which is bounded onthe north and on the east by lots owned by private respondents Tan Pang Eng and Yap, on thesouth by the lot owned by Bongo, and on the west by the properties of the Opones. About9.74m of the western boundary of petitioners land abuts an existing private road, which passes

through the lots of the Opones and leads to another private road located on the property ofTudtud, which in turn connects to the provincial road. Soemtime in 1987, private respondentsbegan building a concrete wall on their property on the northern and eastern sides of petitionerslot. Petitioner offered to buy a portion of private respondents lot so that he would have accessto the provincial road, but her request was denied on the ground that there was an existingprivate road on the western side of petitioners property providing an adequate outlet to theprovincial road. Shortly thereafter, Bongo also fenced his property, thus closing off the southernboundary of petitioners lot. Thus, petitioner brought this action for the establishment of a right

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of way through private respondents lot. The Opones subsequently closed off the western sideof petitioners property by erecting a fence on their lot, with the result that petitioners propertybecame inaccessible.Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a right of way through private respondentsproperty?Held: No. The owner of a landlocked property has the right to demand a right of way throughthe neighboring estates. The easement must be established at the point, which is leastprejudicial to the servient estate and whenever possible, the shortest to the highway. If thesetwo conditions exist on different properties, the land where establishment of the easement willcause the least prejudice should be chosen. Thus, where the easement may be established onany of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortestand will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, if these two circumstances do notconcur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even ifit will not be the shortest.

Ong v. Court of Appeals (272 SCRA 725)

Facts: Petitioner Miguela Ong is the surviving spouse of Manuel Ong. The latter died while thecase was pending appeal. Private respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert Ong are children ofSaturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. Manuel Ong introduced himself to Saturnina asAlfred Go and they had an illicit relationship from 1954 until sometime in 1957, during whichthey had repeated sexual intercourses. During this period, Manuel gave support to Saturninaand private respondents, but subsequently stopped. Dolores Dy, Manuels common law wife,treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel by giving them tokens of affection,such as family pictures or Dolores and Manuel and by visiting them in their house. On twooccasions, Manuel gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation gift and,second, for the latters educational support. They brought this case to compel Manuel torecognize them as his illegitimate children and to give them support. Saturnina testified for theprivate respondents. However, petitioner questions the morality and credibility of Saturnina.Petitioner claims that Manuel was sterile therefore it is improbable that he was the father ofprivate respondents.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents are the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong?Held: Yes.

1.) An adult male is presumed to have the normal powers of virility and the burden ofevidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has notovercome this presumption. The evidence for petitioner does not show that Manuel wassterile and could not have begotten private respondents or that even if he was so duringthe war, that he could not have been cured 10 years later of that condition when Alfred,Jr. was conceived.

2.) This case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of ART. 283, CC. The times during whichManuel met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuouspossession of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward his son must bespontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here, there are no acts shown

of Manuel treating Alfredo, Jr. as his son except on the occasions during which they met.In the case of Robert, there is no proof at all that Manuel treated him as his son.

3.) Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation in this case. While Saturninatestified that she and Manuel lived together for 4 months as husband and wife in order to

justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as toconstitute cohabitation. While the parties are not required to hold themselves out ashusband and wife, neither must they act clandestinely or secretly, otherwise they will beconsidered to have merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse.

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4.) Nonetheless, the evidence in this case sufficiently makes this case fall under the lastparagraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing that Manuel was the father ofprivate respondents. This operates as a blanket provision. The testimony of Saturninathat she had an illicit sexual relation with Manuel over a long period is proof that privaterespondents were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidenceof Manuels paternity.

Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676)

Facts: The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of spousesGregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondentRosario, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and privaterespondent Caridad Yap as his heirs. Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans from the Bank ofCalape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated on its OCT. WhenRosario applied again for a loan, offering the land as security, the banks lawyer, Atty. Serna,suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means offacilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted. The extrajudicialsettlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was signed by the heirs, with the exception ofGregorio, Jr., then only a minor. After the document was notarized, the OCT was cancelled anda TCT was issued. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan wasapproved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land. She brought anejectment suit against Jovitas husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the housebuilt on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario hadoffered the land for sale. She informed her younger brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed anaction for partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition against theirmother, she was impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrumentwas simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument, they did notreally intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her toobtain the loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees and forhousehold repairs.Issue: 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against

petitioners?2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the

property?Held:

1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The recordreveals that there was an intention on the part of Jovita and Caridad to cede theirinterest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initiallymotivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082, CC, every act which isintended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be partition eventhough it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.

2.) No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At thetime the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was not

included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land in hismothers name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC, whichprovides that when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legaltitle to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for thebenefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resulting trust arises where such may bereasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts andcircumstances existing at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to beestablished. For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated

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by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear andconclusive evidence. A cestui que trustmay make a claim under a resulting trust within10 years from the time when the trust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive periodmust be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies onlyto the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. Since thisaction by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed byJovita of their mothers effort to sell the property, his claim cannot be considered barredeither by prescription or by laches.

RAMOS VS. CA (275 SCRA 167) [July 1997]

Facts: Remedios Navoa Ramos is an owner of a factory space in QC. She entered into acontract of lase with the Malapit spouses (private respondents). It was stipulated in the contractthat In case of inflation ordevaluation of the Philippine Peso, the monthly rental willautomatically increase or decrease, monthly rental shall be paid every first week of the monthand the contract is terminated if the delay in payment of monthly rentals reaches 3 months.

Ramos then filed a complaint for ejectment for failure of private respondents to complyeith their undertakings. Ramos argued that private respondents failed to pay increased rentbrought about by the inflation or devaluation of the Philippine Peso. RTC ruled for privaterespondents stating that it was petitioner who violated some of the terms of the contract (i.e.changing yakal posts to concrete posts in the 5th year)Issue: whether there is ground to eject private respondents.Held: The SC ruled there is, however it is not based on Art. 1250 of the CC (inflation anddevaluation). The provision of the said article requires for its application a declaration of inflationby the Central Bank. Without such declaration creditors cannot demand an increase of what isdue them. The SC ruled that there is reason to eject for failure to pay rent for three consecutivemonths, resulting in the termination of the lease.

* (1) Failure to comply with a provision deemed by the parties themselves as soimportant is a ground for the termination of the contract.

(2) Art. 1250 requires for its application a declaration of inflation by the Central Bank,without such declaration creditors cannot demand an increase of what is due them.

Ramos v. Court of Appeals (279 SCRA 118)

Facts: Eduardo Yuseco obtained a loan from GSIS and mortgaged his property in favor of GSISto guarantee the payment of the loan. The mortgage contract provided that Yuseco wasprohibited from selling or in any manner disposing of the mortgaged property without priorwritten consent of GSIS. Thereafter, Yuseco executed a Contract to Sell the property in favorof Felipe Belmonte who agreed to assume Yusecos obligation to GSIS. However, Belmontewas unable to comply with his obligation. Thus, with the knowledge and consent of Yuseco,Belmonte spouses asked Andrea Ramos to share in the payment of the amortizations to GSIS.Consequently, Yuseco executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favorof Belmonte spouses and Ramos, who submitted the contract to GSIS for approval. The GSIS

Board of Trustees approved his request for authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale withAssumption of Mortgage even though Yusecos certificate of title had not been returned. Theapproval was made subject to the condition that the Belmonte spouses and Ramos would payto GSIS the monthly amortization on the loan of Yuseco. Ramos and the Belmonte spouseshad been paying the GSIS the monthly amortizations, but for some reason they stopped doingso. GSIS informed Yuseco and the spouses of the arrearages and warned them that if theamount was not settled on time, the mortgage would be foreclosed. As no settlement of theamount was made, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. As the highest bidder, it

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purchased the property at the auction sale and informed the Belmonte spouses of theforeclosure and demanded payments of rents from them for their use of the property. Instead,the spouses and Ramos wrote to GSIS that. As vendees of the property, they were exercisingthe right to redeem the property. Meanwhile, Yuseco sold the foreclosed property to DionisioPalla, showing the latter a photocopy of his title to the property. Palla sought to redeem theproperty so he advanced the redemption price to Yuseco who redeemed the property fromGSIS. The TCT in the name of Yuseco was cancelled and a new one was issued in the nameof Palla. Thus, Ramos and the Belmonte spouses filed an action for Annulment of theForeclosure Proceedings, Redemption and Sale, and Reconveyance. They charged thatYuseco and GSIS acted in bad faith in selling the foreclosed property to Palla even if the samehad already been sold to them.Issue: Whether or not Ramos and the Belmonte spouses have the better and superior rightover Palla as regards the mortgaged property?Held: No.

1.) Because of Ramos and the spouses failure to comply with the conditions imposed bythe GSIS, the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was not perfectedso that Yuseco remained the owner of the property and as such had a right to sell it toPalla.

2.) Because of Ramos and the spouses failure to update their account, GSIS conditionalapproval of the sale of the property and assumption of mortgage never becameeffective. The Deed itself was not perfected since the assumption of the mortgage bythe petitioners was a condition precedent for the sale of the property to them. Art. 1181,CC provides that, In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well asextinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening ofthe event which constitutes a condition. Accordingly, in sales with assumption ofmortgage, the assumption of mortgage is a condition to the sellers consent so thatwithout approval by the mortgagee, no sale is perfected.

3.) Where the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage is ineffective, the sellerremains the owner and mortgagor of the property, and as such, he retains the right toredeem the foreclosed property.

Sadhwani v. Court of Appeals (281 SCRA 75)

Facts: Sawit was the registered owner of a lot with 2 buildings built on it. Under a contracteffective for 5 years, Sawit leased his property to Orient Electronics. The lease wassubsequently extended for 3 more years. Among other things, the lessor gave the lessee theright of first refusal in the event the lessor decided to sell his property. In addition, OrientElectronics was granted the right to sublease the property. Accordingly, it entered into acontract with the Sadhwanis for the sublease of the buildings, for periods coinciding with thedate of expiration of the Sawit-Orient lease contract. 6 months before the expiration of bothlease and sublease contracts, Sawit sold his property to Silver Swan Mfg. The Sadhwanisprotested the sale, claiming they had the right of first refusal because their sublease contractswith Orient Electronics expressly incorporated the Sawit-Orient lease contract as integral part

of such contracts. Thus, they brought an action for annulment of contract of sale, cancellationof title, and specific performance against Orient Electronics, Sawit, and Silver Swan Mfg.Issue: Whether or not under their contracts with Orient Electronics, the Sadhwanis have a rightof first refusal in the event the leased property was sold?Held: No.

1.) A contract binds only the parties to it. The right of first refusal was embodied in thecontract of lease between Sawit and Orient Electronics. The Sadhwanis were notparties to that contract. While their contracts with Orient electronics made the lease

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contract an integral part of the contracts of sublease, there is no proof that Sawitconsented to an assignment of the lease to the Sadhwanis. What Sawit had agreed towas simply to give Orient electronics the right to sublease the property. For that matter,Sawit did not have to give his consent to the sublease because under Art. 1650, CC,when in the contract of lease, there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet thething leased.

2.) However, with respect to assignments of lease, the rule is different. Art. 1649, CCprovides that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor,unless there is a stipulationto the contrary. The Sadhwanis have not cited any provisionof the contract of lease between Sawit and Orient Electronics giving Orient Electronicsthe right to assign the contract. The fact is that Sawit was not a party to the subleasecontracts. Indeed, the consent of the lessor is necessary because the assignment oflease would involve the transfer not only of right but also of obligations. Suchassignment would constitute novation by the substitution of one of the parties, i.e., thelessee.

Salao v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 493)

Facts: This case is a complaint for damages filed by Apolonio for head injuries allegedlyinflicted upon him by Salao. Apolonio testified that on August 24, 1986, he saw a friends jeepparked outside the compound of Salao. Upon entering the compound, he saw his friend havingdrinks with Salao. He therefore decided to join them but Salao saw him and drove him away forbeing a drug addict. As he was leaving, Salao hit him on the head with a gun and threatenedhim with further harm. Only the timely intervention of Apolonios brother, Gary, and Salaosmother, Lourdes, saved him from further injuries in the hands of Salao. Apolonio submitted inevidence a certification and receipts in support of his claim for damages. His claim wascorroborated by Gary Apolonio, his brother, and Dr. Sarrosa, the doctor who operated on himfor a fractured skull at the hospital. On the other hand, Salao claimed that it was Apolonio whotried to assault him and he only acted in self-defense by hitting Apolonio with his gun. Salao,contending that since the court found him not guilty in the criminal case for serious physicalinjuries and grave threats based on the same incident, questions the propriety of the award of

damages and attorneys fees to Apolonio.Issue: Whether or not the award for damages and attorneys fees to Apolonio was proper in thiscase?Held: Yes.

1.) Salao has not shown that the award of damages is not supported by evidence. In fact,the award for actual damages was based on hospital bills and receipts for medicinewhich Apolonio properly identified in court and formally offered in evidence.

2.) This being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moraldamages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, as provided in Art. 2219(1) or(2), CC. The award is consistent with the rule that moral damages are not intended toenrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reasonof the defendants culpable action.

3.) Salao invokes Rule 111 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless theextinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which thecivil might arise did not exist. However, the civil liability referred to in the Rule is the civilliability arising from crime (ex delicto). It is not the civil liability for quasi-delict, which isallowed to be brought separately and independently of the criminal action by Art. 33,CC. The civil liability based on such cause of action is not extinguished even by adeclaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has

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not been committed by the accused. Salaos acquittal in the criminal case for seriousphysical injuries and grave threats is not conclusive of his liability for damages toApolonio. The case is separate, distinct, and independent of the criminal action andrequires only a preponderance of evidence.

Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 511)

Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parentswere Pedro Arreza an Ursula tubil. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo bywhom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Benedicto is thus the nephew of Justa byher half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow anddaughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and ConradoUriarte. Primitiva was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo andJustas father, Arnaldo, were brothers. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives withinthe fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnalso Uriarte. The otherpetitioners are grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa byher cousin Gregorio Arnaldo, the brother of Primitiva. Bendicto brought this action for partitionof a 2.7 hectare land left by Justa. The land had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectareby inheritance from her parents and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Benedicto claimed to be thesole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He contended thatPascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could only claim one-half of the 0.5 hectareland, which Justa had inherited from her parents. On the other hand, the heirs of Pascasio, whosubstituted Pascasio upon his death during the pendency of the case, denied that they weremere tenants of Justa and claimed that the entire land was originally owned by AmbrocioArnaldo, their great granduncle. Two-thirds of the land was allegedly bequeathed to Domingoand the remaining one-third to Juan. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in theirpossession and that, in her lifetime, Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property butonly received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that Benedicto did not have anyright to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of theproperty.Issue: Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her

nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962, CC?Held: Given the fact that 0.5 hectare of the land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justasparents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectare of the 0.5 hectare land as her father Juans share inthe conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectare. In addition, Justainherited her mother Ursulas share consisting of 0.25 hectare. Plus the 2.2 hectares, whichbelonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land.This 2.575-hectare land was inherited by Benedicto as Justas nearest surviving relative.Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and Benedicto. Bendicto is the son ofJustas half-sister Agatonica. Therefore, he is Justas nephew. A nephew is considered acollateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives thedecedent. That Benedicto is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does notdisqualify him from being his aunts heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the

full of half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.

MANANSALA VS. CA (286 SCRA 722)

Facts: Fidela manasala is the registered owner of a parcel of land. She has been in actualpossession of the land since 1955 by virtue of a conditional sale by the National HousingAuthority (formerly PHHC). In 1984, she paid the full price and deed of sale was executed inher favor.

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Then, Corazon Aranez brought an action for specific performance against manansala toenforce a deed of sale covering the same lot allegedly enterd into between her and petitioner.Petitioner denied selling the land and contended that the deed was a forgery. The TC ruled infavor of petitioner since there was no perfected contract of sale because petitioner neverintended to sell the land. On appeal, the CA reversed, it held that there was meeting of theminds between the parties as evidenced by the signature of the petitioner in the deed of salewhich the NBI found to be genuine. The CA further held that petitioner could validly sell the landeven before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the CC which provides that thingshaving a potential existence may be the object of a contract of sale..Issue: whether CA erred in validating the contract.Held: The SC ruled in the negative. The NBI found the signature of petitioner on the questioneddocument to be genuine. The signature is genuine and is a factual finding of both the TC andthe CA which, in the absence of very clear evidence to the contrary, this court will not revise.

There was a meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature ofthe petitioner in the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine. Petitioner could validly sellthe land even before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the CC which provides thatthings having a potential existence may be the object of a contract of sale.

DE LEON VS. CA (287 SCRA 94)

Facts: PRs filed in RTC a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of twoparcels of land against petitioners. Petitioners (spouses De Leon) moved for the dismissal ofthe complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case byreason of PRs nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. They argued that PRsshould have paid docket fees based on the alleged value of the two parcels of land.

PRs on the other hand argued that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract ofsale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be thefixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, section 7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they citedcases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. and Bautista v. Lim where the Court held that If it is primarilyfor the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend

on the amount of claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right torecover a sum of money, or where the claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, theprincipal relief sought.this Court has considered such actions as cases where the the subjectof litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by thecourts of first instance.

The SC ruled in favor of the PRs. Although eventually the result may be the recovery ofland in the case at bar, it is in the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which iscontrolling.

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An action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable ofpecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 asprovided in Rule 141, section 7(b)(1). As held in Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. and Bautista v. Lim, Ifit is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniaryestimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instancewould depend on the amount of claim. However, where the basic issue is something other thanthe right to recover a sum of money, or where the claim is purely incidental to, or aconsequence of, the principal relief sought.this Court has considered such actions as caseswhere the the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizableexclusively by the courts of first instance. Thus, although eventually the result may be therecovery of land in the case at bar, it is in the nature of the action as one for rescission ofcontract which is controlling.

LABASTIDA VS. CA (287 SCRA662)[March 1998]

Facts: The Delestes (private respondents) were the owners of a parcel pf land in Iligan city. Aportion of the lot was leased to petitioners (Labastida). After some time, private respondentsfiled a case against petitioners for recovery of possession and damages. Plaintiffs alleged thatthey served notice to the occupants to vacate the property because the owners would erect acommercial building. The petitioners refused to vacate.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of thedefendants and over the nature or subject matter of the action. In support of their argument,petitioners contended that there is no showing that defendants ever received such notice tovacate and therefore there is no evidence to show that the one year period has elapsed fromthe time petitioners received the written notice to vacate, coupled by the fact that this is a clearcase of Unlawful Detainer and the court that should have jurisdiction over the case is the MTC.MTD was denied by the lower court and CA.Issue: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case filed against petitioners.Held: The SC held that although the action is one for recovery of possession, damages, withpreliminary mandatory injunction, it is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed byprivate respondents that the case was actually for unlawful detainer. Private respondents

alleged that petitioners were paying on a month-to-month basis and despite repeated demandsto vacate the land made by PRs, petitioners refused to leave the premises. This amounts to anallegation that petitioners were unlawfully withholding possession.

Since the action is that of an unlawful detainer, another issue is whether it was filedwithin one year after the unlawful withholding of possession. The SC held that petitioners didso. In case of several demands, SC ruled that the period is reckoned from the date of the lastdemand. The SC ruled further that pursuant to rule 70, section 2 of RoC, no action could bebrought against petitioners for alleged violation of the terms and conditions of their leaseagreement unless a notice to vacate is given to the lessee. On the other hand, if the action forunlawful detainer is based on expiration of leased, no notice is required. Such a notice isneeded only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply with theconditions of lease.

CABARDO VS. CA (290 SCRA 131) [May 1998]

Facts: Jose Peralta was a driver of CIGI. He was on the southbound lane of SLEX when hemet an accident. He claimed that a car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his truck andas a result he was forced to swerve to the left causing the truck to veer and roll over the centerisland of the expressway. With Peralta was his helper and pump operator Cabardo. Privaterespondent Rodil was driving on the other side of the expressway and due to heavy rains, he

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ALMENDRAS VS. CA (293 SCRA 540)

This is a resolution by the SC. Private respondents seek a reconsideration of thedecision in this case remanding it to the TC so that private respondents may file a third-partycomplaint against parties through whose property they claim a right of way in favor of petitionershould pass since it would be the property least prejudiced by the establishment of sucheasement. PRs contend that while it is undisputed that a right of way through their property isthe shortest distance to the provincial road, there is no proof that making the easement passthat way will cause the least damage and as ruled by the SC in another case, if these (2)circumstances ( estate with the shortest way and will cause least damage) do not concur in asingle tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used. In this case, SCsaid that it is not possible to determine whether the estates which would be least prejudiced bythe easement would be those of the owners of Opune and Tudtud properties because they havenot been heard. This is the reason why the case was remanded for further proceedings.In determining where the easement should pass, owners of surrounding property must be heardwith respect to two matters: point which is least prejudicial and point the distance of which is theshortest. If these two does not concur in the same tenement, the way which will cause the leastprejudice should be taken.

RAET VS. CA (295 SCRA 677)

Facts: Spouses Raet negotiated with Amparo Gatus concerning the possibility of buying therights of the latter to certain units at a subdivision in Bulacan developed by PVDHC primarily forparties qualified to obtain loans form GSIS. They paid Gatus a certain sum of money for thisprupose. The spouses applied with PVDHC for the purchase of the units. As they were notGSIS members, they looked for members who could act as accommodation parties by allowingthem to use their policies. They did so and paid PVHDC a sum of money on the understandingthat these amounts would be credited to the purchase prices of the units which will bedetermined after the approval of the loan application by the GSIS. For the meantime, they wereallowed to occupy the unit.

Later on, the loan application was disapproved and PVHDC asked them to vacate theunits. When they refused, a ejectment case was filed against them. They filed a complaint forspecific performance and damages against Gatus and PVDHC.Issue: whether there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties over the subjectunits.Held: The SC ruled there was none. The parties in this case had not reached any agreementwith regard to the sale of the units in question. First, the records do not show the total costs ofthe units in question and the payment schemes therefor. The figures referred to by Raet weremere estimates given to them by Gatus. The parties transactions, therefore, lacked therequisites essential for the perfection of contracts. Second, Gatus was not an agent of PVHDC.The estafa case again Amparo was even dismissed since it was proven that Gatus nevermisrepresented herself. Lastly, Art. 1874 of the CC requires for the validity of a sale involving

land that the agent should have an quthorization in writing, which Gatus did not possess.

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*There was no contract of sale perfected between the buyers and PVDHC. There wasno meeting of the minds as to the terms thereof, especially with respect to the price. Therecords do not show the total costs of the units in question and the payment schemes therefor.The figures referred to by Raet were mere estimates given to them by Gatus. Furthermore,Gatus, the negotiator, was not even an agent of PVDHC. Also, Art. 1874 of the NCC requires forthe validity of a sale involving land that the agent should have an authorization in writing, whichGatus did not have. At the most, it is became only a proposal to sell. They did not go beyondthe negotiation phase of the a contract, which is the period from the time the prospectivecontracting parties indicate interest on the contract to the time the contract comes into existence

the perfection stage.

SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. VS. CA (300 SCRA 20)

This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a cimarron which causedthe death of three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioners truck crashed thecimarron when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused hisvehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.

RTC found Petitioners driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded damagesin favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty ofcontributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations(overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that suddenswerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. Hefurther argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the the doctrine of last clearchance, which states that the person who has the last clear chance of avoiding an accident,notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequencesof the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding anaccident.

The SC found the petitioners arguments to be without merit. It has not been shown thatthere was a casual connection between the injury received and the violation of the LandTransportation and Traffic Code. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law,like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the

injury. Violations alleged in this case were mere allegations unsupported by any evidence andare insufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was thecontributing cause of the injury. Police report did not show that only one headlight wasfunctioning and there is nothing to suggest that the driver of the camarron had no elbow roomfor maneuvering the vehicle due to the alleged overloading of passengers. All these point to thefact that the proximate cause was the negligence of petitioners driver. The argument thatsudden swerving is not negligence per se is untenable since in the case relied on by petitioner,it is sudden skidding that was held to be not negligence per se.

Although it is not required for employees to undergo psychological and physicalexaminations or submit clearances from the police and the NBI, driving exacts a more thanusual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selectionand supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by

law. Finally the formula for determining life expectancy is determined by applying the formula2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).

KALUBIRAN VS. CA (300 SCRA 320) [December 1998]

Kalubiran is the owner of Kalmar Construction (Kalmar), a single proprietorship engagedin the construction business. Private respondent JRCM is a corporation also engaged in theconstruction business. PLDT entered into an agreement with PR for restoration work in Cebu

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City in line with PLDTs expansion program. It was stated in the acceptance letter of the Cebucity engineer informed them that the acceptance of the project did not relieve JRCM of itsobligation to undertake repair works on any failure that may occur in any section of the project.

Thereafter, PLDT wrote the city engineer requesting a permit for a right-of-way in Cebu.The latter informed the former that a permit would only be granted upon restoration of thepreviously restored section affected by PLDTs expansion program. He called attention to someareas that needed immediate repair. PLDT referred the complaint to JRCM as its projectmanager. The city engineer stood pat on his demand for immediate restoration of the areasaffected and denied PLDTs reconsideration of the denial of the application. Then, onNovember of 1983, Kalubiran and Kalmar, through their counsel, wrote PLDT a letter claimingcredit for the restoration work. JRCM filed a complaint for damages against Petitioner, allegingit never authorized Kalmar to undertake restoration work and as a result of letter sent byKalmars counsel to PLDT, the latter ceased giving them major contracts.

The TC found that Kalmar made the repairs. However, the TC said she did so withoutauthority because the person who told her to proceed with the project was a mere laborer whohad no authority to speak for the Private respondent. On appeal, CA ruled that the repairs wereactually made by Private respondent. It also ruled that Kalmar acted in bad faith when it wrotePLDT the letter claiming payment for the restoration work.

First, petitioner contends that the CA erred in reversing the TCs finding that the repairswere made by Kalmar although it was without the authority of private respondent. SC ruled thatthe argument is without merit. The question of who did the repairs is relevant to the appeal ofpetitioner. It is settled that the appellate court can consider issues, although not specificallyraised in the pleadings filed before it, as long as they were raised in the trial court or are mattersof record having some bearing on the issues submitted which the parties failed to raise or thelower court ignored.

It was also contended that petitioner cannot be held liable for the letter which gave riseto this action because it was written by petitioners counsel. It is settled, however, that themistake of counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counselwhen the court step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.

Lastly, the petitioners contention that pleadings filed in a case constitute privilegedmatter and are not actionable is misplaced since the letter written by petitioners counsel was

not one made in the course of judicial proceedings. It was not, therefore, privileged.

CANQUE v. CA (305 SCRA 579 [April 1999])Civil Law/ Damages/ Interest: In spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulationon interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under article 2209 of the CivilCode.

SUMBAD v. CA (308 SCRA 575 [June 1999])Civil Law/Property/Donation: The donation of a certain parcel of land by George to Maria, after

the death of his wife is valid. The evidence on record does not show that at the time thedeed of donation was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-lawrelations. Petitioners testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria became their

stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuouslymaintained common-law relations until the time the donation was made.

Baluyot v. CA (July 22, 1999) G.R. No. 122947

Facts: Petitioners are residents of Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, QC and members of theCruz-na-Ligas Homesite Association, Inc. They filed a complaint for specific performance anddamages against UP and QC government alleging that plaintiffs and their ascendants have

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been in open, peaceful, etc of that parcel of riceland known [as] Sitio Libis, Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, Quezon City. They claim that UP has approved the donation to the petitioners, by theoffice of the President, of the aforestated lands, but conveyance was not executed because ofdisagreements as to the size of the property to be donated, and later, UP backed out of theagreement. An LRC case was filed against UP. Petitioners agreed to the dismissal of the caseprovided that a donation would be made to the QC government which would appropriate theland to the present occupants. UP unjustifiably revoked the donation.Issue: W/N complaint states a cause of actionHeld: YES. While prescription does not run against registered lands, nonetheless a registeredowners action to recover possession of his land may be barred by laches. Thus, laches is adefense against a registered owner suing to recover possession of the land registered in itsname. But UP is not suing in this case. It is petitioners who are, and their suit is mainly to seekenforcement of the deed of donation made by UP in favor of the QC government. Indeed,petitioners do not invoke laches. What they allege in their complaint is that they have beenoccupying the land in question from time immemorial, adversely, and continuously in theconcept of owner, but they are not invoking laches. If at all, they are claiming ownership byprescription which, as already stated, is untenable considering that the land in question is aregistered land. Nor can petitioners question the validity of UPs title to the land. As CA held,this constitutes a collateral attack on registered title which is not permitted.

Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.Held: YES. We find all the elements of a cause of action contained in the amended complaint ofpetitioners. While, admittedly, petitioners were not parties to the deed of donation, they anchortheir right to seek its enforcement upon their allegation that they are intended beneficiaries ofthe donation to the Quezon City government. Art. 1311, second paragraph, of the Civil Codeprovides: If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he maydemand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before itsrevocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contractingparties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.Case remanded to RTC for trial on the merits.

T & C DEVELOPMENT CORP. v CA (317 SCRA 476 [October 1999])Civil Law/Contracts/Lease/Ejectment: Under Art. 1673 of the Civil Code, the lessor may

judicially eject the lessee for any of the causes enumerated therein. The trial court found thatPR had failed to pay the monthly rental of P1800 from Nov 1992 to Feb 16,1993, despitedemands to pay and to vacate the premises. Even if PR deposited the rents in arrears in thebank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of PR since the account was opened in PRsname. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of PR. Although the increase in monthlyrentals from P700 to P1800 was in excess of 20% allowed by BP 877 (Rent Control Law), asamended by RA 6828, what PR could have done was to deposit the original rent of P700 witherwith the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner.

REPUBLIC v. CA (317 SCRA 605 [October 1999])

Civil Law/Land Titles/Issuance of Owners Duplicate Title:Nothing in the law requires that theOffice of the Sol-Gen be notified and heard in proceeding for the issuance of an ownersduplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of PD 1529, involving original registrationproceedings, specifically mentions the Sol-Gen as among those who must be notified of thepetition. Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings mustbe filed by the Sol-Gen, in behalf of the Director of Lands. Considering that the law does notimpose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owners duplicate

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certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Sol-Gen, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was atmost only a formal and not a jurisdiction defect.

OBRA v. CA (317 SCRA 594 [October 1999])Civil Law/Damages: Petitioner who is the Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences is liable for damages under Art 32 of the Civil Code, even in the performance of hisduty in good faith. While there may been illegal mining activities in the area as alleged in theletter complaint of Ms. Gyrbos, petitioner should have conducted further investigation and not

just seize and impound respondents truck absent showing of probable cause. The truck was infact only entering the mining area and not transporting minerals outside the area.

Luis Miguel Ysmael vs. CA (November 16, 1999)G.R. No. 132497

Facts: Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents and obtainedjudgment in their favor The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners wereunable to locate property belonging to private respondents. Before the right of action prescribed,petitioner filed a case for the revival judgment. PRs appealed to the CA, dismissed; appeal toSC dismissed. RTC issued a writ of execution; lands were sold at public auction. Petitionerswon. On July 16, 1996, PRs informed petitioner that PR was exercising their right of redemption.The 12-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996, although the certificate of salewas registered on July 25, 1995, the 12-month period ended on July 19, 1996, considering thatthe latter year was a leap year. However, thinking that the last day of the period of redemptionwas on July 25, 1996, PR went to the office of the Atty on said date and tendered to him 2checks. Petitioner wasnt around, so PRs consigned the amount in court the next day.Petitioners opposed the motinob, arguing that the period of redemption had already expired andthat there was no valid tender of payment because the cashiers checks were insufficient tocover the total redemption price. The consignation was granted, hence this appeal.Issue:W/N the redemption period has expiredHeld: Rule 3930 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within 12 months after the sale, the

judgment debtor may redeem the property sold at public auction. Under Art. 13 of the Civil

Code, a month, unless designated by name, is understood to be equivalent to 30 days, while ayear is understood to be of 365 days. Thus the rulings of this Court under the 1964 Rules statedthat the 12-month period of redemption under Rule 3930 is equivalent to 360 days countedfrom the registration of the certificate of sale. Within the said period, the redemptioner must paythe purchaser the full amount of the redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual.

In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of sale was registered in theOffice of the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the right of redemption should have beenexercised on or before July 19,1996, the 360 th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996was a leap year.

BUT, neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected PRs mistaken impression, leading thelatter to believe the 25 July 1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption.

Salvador and Ligaya Adorable (November 25, 1999)G.R. No. 119466

Facts: PR Bareng was the registered owner of 2 parcels of land. PR and his son (Saturnino)obtained a loan from petitioners amounting to 26,000 in consideration of which they promised totransfer the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the Lot. Saturnino sold to Francisco whosold it to Ramos. The portion of land being rented to petitioners was included in the portion soldto Ramos. As Barengs failed to pay their loan, petitioners were complained to the police, a

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compromise was made. When the maturity date arrived, Bareng failed to pay. A demand letterwas sent to Bareng, but he refused to pay. Petitioners, learning of the sale made by Bareng toRamos, then filed a complaint for the annulment or rescission of the sale on the ground that thesale was fraudulently prepared and executed.Issue:W/N petitioners have a cause of actionHeld:NO. As creditors, petitioners do not have such material interest as to allow them to sue forrescission of the contract of sale. At the outset, petitioners right against PRs is only a personalright to receive payment for the loan; it is not a real right over the lot subject of the deed of sale.

A personal right is the power of 1 person to demand of another, as a definite passivesubject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give, to do, or not to do. On the other hand, a real rightis the power belonging to a person over a specific thing, without a passive subject individuallydetermined, against whom such right may be personally exercised. In this case, whilepetitioners have an interest in securing payment of the loan they extended, their right to seekpayment does not in any manner attack to a particular portion of the patrimony of their debtor,Bareng.

Alfredo Aguila vs. CA (November 25, 1999)G.R. No. 127347

Facts: Petitioner is the manager of a partnership engaged in lending activities. PR and her latehusband were the registered owners of a house and lot. PR and Aguila & Sons, Co represted bypetitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. The parties likewise executed a deed ofabsolute sale, whrein PR sold the subject property to AC Aguila & Sons Co. PR authorizedpetitioner to cause the cancellation of the TCT and the issuance of a new certificate of title in theevent she failed to redeem the subject prop. PR failed to redeem the property w/in the 90-dayperiod. Hence, petitioner caused the cancellation of the TCT. PR was ordered to vacate andsurrender possession; she refused. Petitioners filed an ejectment case, they won. After defeat ina series of appeals, PR filed a petition for declaration of nullity of a deed of sale. She allegedthat the signature of her husband on the deed of sale was a forgery because he was alreadydead when the deed was executed. It appears that PR had filed a crim complaint againstpetitioner for falsification which was dismissed by the Prosecutor. RTC dismissed, CA reversed

ruling that it was an equitable mortgage, and being pactum commissorium and prohibited bylaw.Issue: W/N petitioner is the real party in interestHeld: NO. Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership has a juridical personality separateand distinct from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot be held liable for theobligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridicalpersonality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes. In this case, PR has notshown that AC Aguila & Sons Co. and the MOA was executed between PR with the consent ofher late husband, and AC Aguila & Sons, Co. represented by petitioner. Hence, it is thepartnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involvingproperty registered in its name. A violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of thecomplaint.

ADORABLE v. CA (G.R. No. 119466. November 25, 1999)Civil Law/Real Right v. Personal Right/Rights of Creditor: A personal right is the power of oneperson to demand of another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give,to do, or not to do. On the other hand, a real right is the power belonging to a person over aspecific thing, without a passive subject individually determined, against whom such right maybe personally exercised. In this case, while petitioners have an interest in securing payment ofthe loan they extended, their right to seek payment does not in any manner attach to a particular

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portion of the patrimony of their debtor. As creditors, petitioners do not have such materialinterest as to allow them to sue for rescission of the contract of sale. Their right againstrespondents is only a personal right to receive payment for the loan; it is not a real right over thelot subject of the deed of sale.

HERNANDEZ v. CA (320 SCRA 76 [December 1999])Civil Law/Family Code/Psychological Incapacity: Wife is five years older than her husband, whowas one of her students in her first year of teaching. Wife argues that her husband ispsychologically incapacitated --- he devotes most of his time engaging in drinking sprees withfriends, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child while havingaffairs with different women, beat up their eldest child and her for which she was confined in ahospital because of cerebral concussion, infected her with gonorrhea, and abandoned thefamily. Petition denied.

Reaffirmed the Santos v. CA ruling that the intendment of the law has been to confinethe meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to themarriage. The husbands alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, andabandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from apsychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown thatthese acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make the husband completelyunable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to hisyouth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. CA, the root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the FamilyCode requires that the incapacity must be psychological--- not physical, although itsmanifestations and or/symptoms must be physical.

Expert testimony should have been presented by the wife to establish the precise causeof the husbands psychological incapacity, in order to show that it existed at the inception ofmarriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage rests upon the wife (petitioner).

Armando Jose vs. CA (January 18, 2000)G.R. Nos. 116441-42

Facts: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a publicutility bus (Bus 203). Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insuredwith the GSIS. Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven byMacarubo. Macarubo, and its lone passenger, Abraham, were seriously injured. Macarubofailed to recover and died 5 days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eyewhich had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiplelacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.

Abraham, instituted Civil Case for damages against petitioners MCL and Jose. Parentsof Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed

a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on thetheory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of JuanitaMacarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage toher car. Both civil cases were consolidated and later tried jointly.Issue:W/N private respondent Juanita Macarubo is liable to petitioners.

Held: NO. Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for thequasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those

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specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of theFord Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. Nowhere was italleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent JuanitaMacarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. Theallegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent toan allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the"authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission ofJuanita Macarubo. Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was theemployer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubos negligenceunder Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCLs third-partycomplaint should be dismissed.

DBP v. CA (331 SCRA 267 [April 2000])Civil Law/Land Titles/Land Registration: A degree of registration cut off or extinguished a rightacquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land which wasnot annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon and NOT to the right of ownership thereof.Registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property. Landregistration does not create norvesta title. It simply confirms a title already created and alreadyvested, rendering it forever indefeasible.

HEIRS OF SERASPI v. CA (331 SCRA 293 [April 2000])Civil Law/Property/Ownership/Prescription: The contention of a party of having acquiredownership of a piece of land by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for 10 years isuntenable where he has neither just title nor good faith. There is just title when the adverseclaimant came into possession through one of the modes: occupation, intellectual creation, law,donation, succession, tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and prescription, but thegrantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Good faith consists in the reasonablebelief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could nottransmit the ownership thereof.

HEIRS OF SAN ANDRES v. RODRIGUEZ (332 SCRA 769 [May 2000])Civil Law/Sales/Elements of Sale: The object of the sale is determinate. Since the lotsubsequently sold is said to adjoin the previously paid lot on three sides thereof, the subject lotis capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. The fact that the exactarea of the adjoining lots is subject to the result of a survey does not detract from the fact thatthey are determinate or determinable.

The Court clarified that although denominated a Deed of Conditional Sale, a sale is stillabsolute where the contract is devoid of any proviso that title is reserved or the right tounilaterally rescind is stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid (Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA).The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due andpayable in five (5 ) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale is NOT acondition thataffects the efficacy of the contract of sale.

FRANCISCO v. BOISER (332 SCRA 792 [May 2000])Civil Law/Co-ownership/Legal Redemption/Notice Requirement: The Court reverts to the Buttev. Uy and Sons, Inc. ruling that for a co-owner to be able to exercise the right of legalredemption, the written notification should come from the vendor and not from any other personfor the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners whounder the law must be notified of the sale.

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By not immediately notifying the co-owner, a vendor can thus delay or even effectivelyprevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption. In this case, the sale took place in1986, but it was kept secret until 1992 when the vendee needed to notify the vendors co-ownerabout the sale to demand 1/5 rentals from the property sold. The only adverse effect to thevendor and the vendee is that the sale could not be registered and that it is binding only to theparties. It is therefore unjust to further delay the co-owners exercise of the right of legalredemption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor first before the co-owner canexercise such right. The Court ruled that the receipt by the co-owner of summons in the civilcase filed against her constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which she may exercise herright of redemption within 30 days from the finality of decision.

CUTANDA v. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA (335 SCRA 418 [July 2000])Civil Law/Prescription/Laches/Distinction: While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principallya question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on somechange in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription isbased on fixed time; laches is not.Prescriptive Period/Effectivity When Prior to the 1950 Civil Code: Where a partys possessionof a property commenced way back in 1938, a time when the Old Civil Code was still in force,the prescriptive period is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES,INC. v. HUANG (336 SCRA 737 [July 2000])Civil Law/Sales/Elements of Sale/Perfected Contract: The P1M earnest deposit could not havebeen given as earnest money as contemplated in Art. 1482 because, at the time when thevendor accepted the terms of vendees offer, their contract had not yet been perfected, evidentfrom the ff. conditions attached by the vendees: (1) that they be given the exclusive option topurchase the property within 30 days from acceptance of the offer; (2) that during the optionperiod, the parties would still negotiate the terms and conditions of the purchase; and (3) thevendor would secure the necessary approvals while the vendees would handle thedocumentation.

The amount presented by the respondents was merely a deposit of what wouldeventually become the earnest money or downpayment should a contract of sale be made bythem. The amount was thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of theperfection of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out ofthe sale.

The option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the properties within the periodagreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale which the parties may enter. Whatthe vendees had was just the option to buy which privilege was not, however, exercised by thembecause there was a failure to agree on the terms of payment. The manner of payment of thepurchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist.Moreover, even the option secured by respondents was unenforceable, in the absense of adistinct consideration.

ANACLETO v. VAN TWEST (339 SCRA 211 [August 2000])Civil Law/Compromise Agreements/Requisites for Validity: Like any other contract, acompromise agreement must have consent, object, and cause. A compromise agreemententered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legaleffect. The same is true as regards the judgment based on the compromise.

DOLFO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (341 SCRA 58 [September 2000])

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Civil Law/Land Titles/Land Registration: The applicant and the oppositors are the only parties incases of original applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where partiesmay include the plaintiff, defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants and intervenors. Amotion to intervene in a land registration case cannot therefore be allowed. A party wishing tobe heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and then if lifted, file anopposition to the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in land registrationare in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, not thedetermination of any right connected with the registration.

ALIPIO v. CA (341 SCRA 441 [September 2000])Civil Law/Obligations/Actions/Effect of Death of Spouse: An obligation is presumed to be jointonly. Thus, as held in Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either spouses, no complaint for thecollection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought againstthe surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation andsettlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administratorappointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital (Oct. 3, 2000)341 SCRA 760Facts: Petitioner is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five days before his death, Jorge had beensuffering from recurring fever with chills. After taking some medication, he was taken to theMercy Community Clinic and was attended to by respondent Dr. Rico. As typhoid fever wasprevalent in the locality, Dr. Rico suspected that Jorge was suffering from this disease andordered a Widal Test to be performed on him. Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive fortyphoid fever. He was then indorsed to respondent Dr. Blanes. He was given the antibioticcholoromycetin but his temperature rose to 41o and subsequently slipped into cyanosis. He diedshortly thereafter.

Petitioners filed before the RTC of Cebu a complaint for damages against therespondent hospital and doctors. They contend that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever but thathis death was due to wrongful administration of choloromycetin. That the respondent doctors

were negligent in rushing the performance of the Widal Test and hastily concluding that Jorgewas suffering from typhoid fever and was compatible with the antibiotic administered.Issue: Whether or not the death of Jorge Reyes was due to or caused by the negligence,carelessness, imprudence, lack of skill or foresight on the part of defendants?Held: Medical Malpractice is a form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician orsurgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarilyemployed by the profession generally under similar conditions, and in like surroundingcircumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that thephysician or surgeon would have done , or that he or she did something that a reasonablyprudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that failure or action caused injury tothe patient. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injuryand proximate causation. And in the determination of the reasonable level of care and the

breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. This, the petitioner failed to do. The doctor theypresented as witness was not an expert of typhoid cases and in his autopsy of the deceased; hefailed to examine the head which is necessary in this case.

Nor does this case fall under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor where expert testimonymay be dispensed with. Petitioners assert that such doctrine is applicable since Jorge Reyeswas merely experiencing fever and chills for 5 days and was fully conscious, coherent, andambulant when he went to the hospital. Yet he died after only 10 hours from the time of hisadmission. For the doctrine to apply, there are four requisites: 1) The accident was of a kind

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which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the instrumentality or agencywhich caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charge; and 3) the injurysuffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.While it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance wasrendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to hisadmission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for 5 days unrelieved byanalgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given by his wife. This shows that he had been sufferingfrom a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him.

Petitioner correctly observed that the medical profession is one which , like the businessof common carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the lawimposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilanceover the goods and for the safety of the passengers,1 physicians and surgeons should have thesame duty toward their patients.

The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. Afteryears of education, they may obtain a license to practice through professional boardexaminations where such licenses may be revoked by the government. Aside from suchregulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancientcode of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves. Given thesessafeguards, there is no need to expressly require doctors the observance of extraordinarydiligence. The standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit amongordinarily good physicians.

Nazareno vs. CA (Oct. 18, 2000)343 SCRA 637Facts: During their marriage, Maximino and Aurea Nazareno acquired lots in QC and Cavite.After the death of Maximino, Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate. In theocurse of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed severaldeeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of thedeeds involved 6 lots in QC for the amount of P47,800. Among the lots covered by the deed ofsale was a lot occupied by Romeo, his wife and by Maximino Jr. Unknown to Romeo, Natividadsold the lot to Maximino Jr.. When Romeo found out abot the sale to Maximino Jr., he and his

wife locked Maximino Jr. out of the house. Maximino Jr. brought an action for recovery ofpossession and damages with the RTC. Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of MaximinoSr., the present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino Jr.Then, Natividad and Maximino Jr. filed a 3rd party complaint against the spouses Romeo andEliza, alleging that Lot 3 included in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Natividad had beensurreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing in his name a new title and leasing it to 3rd

parties.Romeo contends that their parents never intended to sell the 6 lots to Matividad and that

Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed ofPartition and Distribution signed by their parents and all of the children. Natividad and MaximinoJr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution was not really carried out and instead,their parents offered to sell them the 6 lots. However, it was only Natividad who bought the 6

lots because she was the only one financially able to do so.The RTC and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties ti their

children by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes.Issue: Whether or not he Deed of Absolute Sale is an indivisible contract and if so whether theestate of Maximino Sr. alone can seek the annulment of the sale?

1 Art. 1733, CC. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to thecircumstances of each case.

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Held: An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may bethe nature of the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation andnot the object thereof. In the present case, the Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the 6 lots toNatividad, the obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot bedone in parts, otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are thereforemistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors.

Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in herfavor is void for being without consideration. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino Sr.intended to give the 6 QC lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deedof Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only female and the only unmarriedmember of the family. She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings.There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.2 There being an implied trust, the lots inquestion are therefore subject to collation.3

Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera (Oct. 20, 2000)344 SCRA 95Facts: The late Nieves Tolentino-Rivera and Pablo Rivera were married in 1921. On 1934,Nieves, still using her maiden name, filed an application for a sales patent over a 13 hectareland in Isabela. Her application was approved and Nieves was issued a sales patent in thename of Nieves Tolentino, married to Pablo Rivera. Pablo Rivera and Nieves sold to petitionerIsabela Colleges 4 hectares of land covered by such patent through a deed of sale signed byboth spouses. Sometime in 1988, the children of the spouses Rivera, entered the propertybought by Isabela Colleges, prompting the latter to bring an action for forcible entry againstthem. The MTC rendered a decision ordering the intruders to vacate the land. Nieves (nowwidowed), thereafter brought the present suit against Isabela Colleges for Nullity of Titles,Deeds of Sale. She contends that she was the exclusive owner of a parcel of land and thatpetitioner occupied 4 hectares of her land, allegedly by virtue of a sale between petitioner andher husband and that the deed of sale was void because the land sold was paraphernalproperty and the sale was made without her knowledge and consent.Issue: Whether or not the land in question paraphernal or not? Is the signature of Nieves forgedor no?

Held: The CA ruled that the 4 hectare land is paraphernal property based on Nieves depositionthat she applied for a sales patent when she was single. However, the sate of the sales patentapplication is irrelevant for that fact alone would not vest in her ownership over the subject land.Neither is Nieves allegation that she was already in possession of the land even before hermarriage to Pablo Rivera material. The land was acquired through the sales patent under CA141 and not through prescription or any other mode of acquiring ownership. Under CA 141, herapplication must be approved and the purchase price paid before Nieves could be granted asales patent and issued a certificate of title. It is undisputed that Nieves was issued a salespatent only after she was married to Pablo Rivera. The land in question was thus acquiredduring her marriage to Pablo Rivera.

Although this court finds that the signature of Nieves on the Deed of Sale to IsabelaColleges was forged, nonetheless, the sale was valid. The fact that Nieves signature in the

deed of sale is a forgery does not render the deed of sale void. For the land was conjugalproperty and, under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the sale is not required.

2Art. 1449 CC: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate istransmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.3 Art. 1061 CC: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the

estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way

of donation; or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of

each heir, and in the account of the partition.

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