Memorandum on b.p. Blg. 22

8/4/2019 Memorandum on b.p. Blg. 22

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MEMORANDUM

I. DEFINITION OF TERMSa. Check is a bill of exchange drawn and payable on demand.(Section 185, Negotiable Instruments Law, 2006; Philippine LegalEncyclopedia);

b. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to anagreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide tocommit it. Direct evidence in such instance is not necessary andconspiracy may be inferred from and shown by the acts of theaccused themselves during the commission of the offense. The actspoint to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and

community of interest. (People vs. Lising, G.R. Nos. 106210-11, 30January 1998, 91 SCRA 294).

II. STATUTORY BASIS OF B.P. BLG. 222.1 Under Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22on Checkswithout sufficient funds provides:

Any person who makes or draws and issues anycheck to apply on account or for value, knowing atthe time of issue thathe does nothave sufficientfunds in or credit with the drawee bank for the

payment of such check in full upon its presentment,which check is subsequently dishonoured by thedrawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit orwould have been dishonoured for the same reason hadnot the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered thebank to stop payment, shall be punished byimprisonment of not less than thirty days but not morethan one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not morethan double the amount of the check which shall in no

case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or bothsuch fine and imprisonment at the discretion of thecourt.

x x x

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any personwho, having sufficient funds in a credit with the draweebank when he makes or draws and issues a check,shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain acredit to cover the full amount of the check ifpresented within a period of ninety (90) days from thedate appearing thereon, for which reason it isdishonoured by the drawee bank.

2.2 Purpose ofBatasang Pambansa Bilang 22:

The primordial intention of the law is to ensure the stabilityand commercial value of checks as virtual substitutes for


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currency. This legislative intent will be eroded if inquiry isallowed to determine the reason for which checks are issued,or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before anappropriate application of the legislative enactment can bemade. It is enough that the check is dishonoured under

any of the circumstances provided in BP 22, to bring the casewithin statutory prohibition (Agpalo, The NegotiableInstrument Law, 2006);

Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant indetermining culpability. The terms and conditionssurrounding the issuance of the check are also irrelevant.Criminal intent or whether the intention of the personissuing the check is good or bad is not necessary, for in actsmala prohibitum, the only inquiry is, has the law beenviolated

? (Agpalo, The Negotiable Instrument Law, 2006);

2.3 The Section 25, Rule 123 of 1940 Rules of Court embodiedthe following provision:

x x x Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not meansuch as degree as, excluding possibility of error, produceabsolute certainty. Moral certainty is required, or thatdegree of proof which produce conviction in anunprejudiced mind.

2.4 In this connection, Justice Johnson made a comparisonbetween reasonable doubt and moral certainty in an earlycase, as follows:

A reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved infavour of the accused. A reasonable doubt has beenvariously defined. It is most difficult to define. It has beensaid that a reasonable doubt was the doubt of a reasonableman under all the circumstances of the case. Thisstatement is too general and includes too much. Neitherdoes the rule that the judge must be convinced beyond areasonable doubt that he must be convinced to an absolutecertainty. This construction would preclude a convictionbased upon circumstantial evidence. Proof beyond areasonable doubt does not mean, upon the other hand,proof beyond all possible or imaginary doubt. It meanssimply such proof, to the satisfaction of the court, keepingin mind the presumption of innocence, as preludes anyreasonable hypothesis except that which it is given tosupport it. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a

probability, even though strong, that the fact charged ismore likely to be true than the contrary. It must beestablish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moralcertainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies thereason and conscience of those who are to act upon it (USv. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3, 5-6).

III. ISSUE


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WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED WHO WAS NOT THEDRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE CHECK THAT BOUNCED BUT HISCO-ACCUSED WIFE UNDER THE LATTERS ACCOUNT COULDBE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA

BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.

WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE INVIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKINGTHE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISEDPENAL CODE WHICH STATES:

Art. 10 Offenses not subject of the provision of this Code Offenses which are not in the future may be punished underspecial laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This

Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the lattershould specially provide the contrary.

IV. DISCUSSION OF ISSUESTHE ACCUSED WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWEROR ISSUER OF THE CHECK THAT BOUNCED

BUT HIS CO-ACCUSED WIFE UNDER THELATTERS ACCOUNT COULD NOT BE HELD

LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS

PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR IFTHE PROSECUTION FAIL TO PROVE HISGUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

4.1 Article 8 of the Revised Penal Codeprovides that a conspiracyexists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning thecommission of a felony and decide to commit of a felony and decide tocommit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuanceor furtherance of the complicity(People vs. Pickrell, 414 SCRA 19);

4.2 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of activeparticipation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consistof moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute orimplement the criminal plan (People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424);

4.3 In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitionerperformed any overt act in the furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Astestified to by the lone prosecution witness, complaint Alfred Oculam,petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the

check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068 (Ladonga vs. People of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005);

4.4 Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but bypositiveand conclusive evidence(People vs. Tamayo SCRA 540, 553);

4.5 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence atthe scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy (Peoplevs. Leano, 366 SCRA 774);


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4.6 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate , isnot enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent anyactive participation in the commission of the crime with a view to thefurtherance of the common design and purpose (People vs. Natividad, 411

SCRA 587, 595);

4.7 As the court eloquently pronounced in a recent case provides that aconspiracy is not a harmless iinuendo to be taken lightly or accepted atevery turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specificcircumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any elementof the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which theaccused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold (People vs.Mandao, G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002);

4.8 Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation ofconspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded onthe strength of the prosecution evidence. The Court rules thus in Peoplev. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidenceagainst accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged thelatters criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, whichto us was not attendant in the commission of the crime (People v.Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, April 27, 2000);

4.9 The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must bepredicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and noton the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against himmust survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not bepermitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that onthe defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; thatonly did he perpetrate the act but it amounted to a crime. What isrequired then is moral certainty (Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005);

4.10 Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of theaccused beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome theconstitutional presumption of innocence(Ladonga vs. People of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005);

4.11 In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that theaccused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Incriminal cases, moral certainty not mere possibility determines the guiltor the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defenseis weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not

proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminalcases (Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 141066, February17, 2005);

4.12 All told the prosecution failed to established the guilt of the accusedwith moral certainty. Its evidence fall short of the quantum of proofrequired for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption ofthe accuseds innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted


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(Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 141066, February 17,2005);

CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONSOF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY

INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICHSTATES:

ART. 10 OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT OF THEPROVISION OF THIS CODE OFFENSESWHICH ARE NOT IN THE FUTURE MAY BEPUNISHED UNDER SPECIAL LAWS ARE NOTSUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE.THIS CODE SHALL BE SUPPLEMENTARY TOSUCH LAWS, UNLESS THE LATTER SHOULDSPECIALLY PROVIDE THE CONTRARY.

4.1.1The first clause should be understood to mean only that thespecial penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses thereinspecifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental ruleof statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail overgeneral ones (Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 483);

4.1.2 Lex specialis derogant. In fact, the clause can be considered as asuperfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The secondclause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purposeof the article is embodies in the provision that the code shall besupplementary to special laws, unless the latter should specificallyprovide the contrary(Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.141066, February 17, 2005);

4.1.3 B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletoryapplication of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, the absence ofcontrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPCwhich, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be appliedsuppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case ofYu vs. People, the Courtapplied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonmentunder Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. 22. (Yu vs. People, G.R. No.134172, September 20, 2004)

4.1.4The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in thiscase is analogous to the application of the provisions on principalsunder Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or actionin concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one isthe act of all conspirator, and precise extent or modality of

participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all theconspirators are principals ( People vs. Felipe, 418 SCRA 146);

Submitted by: Genevieve D. PenetranteDate Submitted: September 3, 2011

Memorandum on b.p. Blg. 22

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