Mega Puertos
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Transcript of Mega Puertos
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Overview
The Megaports Initiative works with foreign customs andother law enforcement agencies, port authorities, terminaloperators, and/or other relevant entities in partner countries tosystematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclearand other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transitingthe global maritime shipping network. In support of thismission, the Megaports Initiative helps partner countries equipmajor international seaports with radiation detection equipment
and alarm communication systems. In addition, the MegaportsInitiative provides comprehensive training for foreign personnel,short-term maintenance coverage, and technical support toensure the long-term viability and sustainability of installedradiation detection systems.
In addition to its international partners, Megaports collaborateswith the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S.Department of State to counter nuclear and radiological threatsto the United States and its international partners by installingradiation portal monitors (RPMs) that can be used by U.S.Customs ofcers to scan high-risk U.S.-bound containers. The
goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scan as much containertrafc as possible (including imports, exports, and transshippedcontainers) regardless of destination and with minimal impactto port operations. The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100seaports with radiation detection systems by 2016, scanningapproximately 50% of global maritime containerized cargo andover 80% of U.S.-bound container trafc.
The Second Line of Defense Megaports Initiative is a key component of a multi-agency, multilayered,
defensive network that strengthens the overall capability of partner countries to deter, detect, and interdict
illicit trafcking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials at key international seaports. This
program is part of the Ofce of International Material Protection and Cooperation in the U.S. Department
of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA).
DOE/NNSA programs combine with Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. and inter-governmental
efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against threats from illicit movement of special nuclear and other
radioactive materials.
The second line o deense against nuclear
prolieration consists o developing an
inrastructure to deter, detect, and respond
to illicit trafcking o nuclear materials and
related equipment. As the A.Q. Khan networkdemonstrated, gaps in the nonprolieration regim
can be exploited to give prolierators or terrorists
an opportunity. As the second pillar o our
nonprolieration strategy, several NNSA programs
work to strengthen international capabilities to
detect, deter, and interdict illicit nuclear material
and nuclear-related smuggling.
Administrator Thomas DAgostino, testimony on
Addressing a New Generation of WMD Threats befo
the House Armed Services Committee, July 2009
Addressing the Threat
The vitality of most national economies hinges upon globaltrade. Over 90% of global commerce is transported through thmaritime shipping network via cargo containers. Approximatel500 million twenty-foot-equivalent unitsa measure ofvolume in the transport of containerstransit the globe
annually through the maritime domain. The global ambitionsof terrorist organizations in todays world has raised concernthat terrorists or states of proliferation concern may attempt toexploit containerized cargo to covertly transport nuclear andother radioactive materials or use it to deliver a nuclear weaponor radiological dispersal device. The Megaports strategy isbased on the assumption that adversaries have the least control
RPM at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium
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over illicit nuclear and other radioactive materials during thetransport stage. The deployment of radiation detection systemsalso deters nuclear smugglers from using the maritime shippingnetwork, forcing them to turn to other, more easily interdictedmeans of transportation.
Engaging Foreign Partners
To select key ports for engagement, a Maritime PrioritizationModel (MPM) was developed that considers both thevolume of container trafc at the port and the threat leveland/or strategic location of the port. In prioritizing portsof interest, the MPM factors in the percentage of scannablevolume at the port, the origin and destination of containercargo movement through a port, the likelihood that nuclearmaterial might be smuggled through a port, and thecountrys willingness to participate in the program.
Once a country has been identied for engagement, DOE/
NNSA personnel participate in bilateral discussions with theforeign government and key stakeholders on the MegaportsInitiative conduct a familiarization tour of the port(s) ofinterest. Joint cooperation on the Megaports Initiative istypically formalized by signing a bilateral agreement.
Implementing the Program
The Megaports Initiative is implemented by DOE/NNSAwith support from DOE national laboratories and qualieddesign, engineering, and construction contractors. TheMegaports Initiative pursues cost-sharing with partner
countries, where possible, for the design and installation ofthe radiation detection systems.
Integrated scanning lane Puerto Cortes, Honduras
The Megaports Initiative makes a concerted effort to implementthe program in a manner that reduces proliferation threatswithout disrupting the ow of commerce. Throughout thedesign phase, Megaports personnel coordinate closely withterminal operators and port authorities, foreign customsofcials, and other stakeholders to ensure that the placement ofradiation detection equipment and the operational proceduresdeveloped to respond to radiation alarms minimize impact toport operations. The goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scanas many containers as possible (including imports, exports,
and transshipped containers) regardless of destination and withminimal impact on port operations. Imports and exports are
Partnering with Homeland Security
DOE/NNSA has established strong, synergistic ties with CBP, whichimplements several programs directly related to radiation detectionand maritime security.
CBPs Container Security Initiative (CSI), which handles over85% of container cargo coming into the United States, is activeat 58 ports, many of which are operational Megaports or ports
of interest. The Megaports Initiative collaborates with CBPwhere Megaports and CSI overlap to improve CSI inspectionteams ability to identify high-risk U.S.-bound containers. TheMegaports Initiative has committed to providing a radiationdetection capability to all CSI ports to serve as an additionalscreening tool in assessing high-risk containers.
DOE/NNSA and CBP are jointly implementing the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), the goal of which is to scan 100% of U.S.-boundcontainers with radiation detection and imaging systems at select foreign ports. The Megaports Initiative provides RPMs withoptical character recognition technology, communications systems, and integrated RPM/imaging data for CBP and host nation
personnel at SFI ports. Currently SFI is operational at the ports of Salalah, Oman, and Port Qasim, Pakistan.
Operat iona l M egapor ts Implementati on Underway Future Megaports
Freeport
Zeebrugge
Antwerp
Cartagena
Caucedo
Piraeus
Puerto Cortes
Ashdod
Haifa
Kingston
Port Klang
Rotterdam
Salalah
Port Qasim
Colon
Balboa
Manzanillo
Lisbon
Singapore
Busan
Algeciras
Colombo
Kaohsiung
Laem Chabang
Southampton
Santos
Halifax
Montreal
Vancouver
Hong Kong
Shenzhen
Alexandria
Le Havre
Marseilles
Bremerhaven/Bremen
Hamburg
La Spezia
Leghorn/Livorno
Naples
Kobe
Nagoya
Tokyo
Durban
Gotenborg
Chi-Lung
Jebel Ali/Dubai
Felixstowe
Liverpool
Thamesport
Tilbury
Brazil
Canada
Canada
Canada
China
China
Egypt
France
France
Germany
Germany
Italy
Italy
Italy
Japan
Japan
Japan
South Africa
Sweden
Taiwan
UAE
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Buenos Aires
Shanghai
Genoa
Gioia Tauro
Yokohama
Tanjung Pelepas
Barcelona
Valencia
Argentina
China
Italy
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Spain
Spain
Bahamas
Belgium
Belgium
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Greece
Honduras
Israel
Israel
Jamaica
Malaysia
Netherlands
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Panama
Panama
Portugal
Singapore
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
United Kingdom
*SFI Ports
Status of Megaports Cooperation with CSI and SFI
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Transshipment
Whereas gate trafc can be easily captured by taking advantage
o existing chokepoints into and out o a port, transshipped
cargo continues to present a signifcant challenge or Megaports
implementation. Because o shorter dwell times or containers,
space constraints, lack o shipping data, and the difculty o
identiying non-disruptive permanent RPM sites within terminals,
capturing transshipments without seriously impacting port
operations oten requires new and creative solutions. DOE/NNSA
has been innovative in its technological approach to scanning
transshipped containers where permanent RPM installations are
not possible due to terminal confgurations:
A prototype Radiation Detection
Straddle Carrier (RDSC) was developed
to scan rows o containers stacked up
to three high. The prototype consists
o an o-the-shel straddle carrier
that has been stripped o its liting
mechanisms and reconfgured withradiation and spectroscopic portal
monitors. The RDSC was successully
piloted in Freeport, Bahamas, where
it was proven capable o scanning
85% o transshipment containers.
Subsequently, DOE/NNSA awarded a contract to build
additional systems to be deployed to ports that primarily rely
on straddle carriers or container movement.
The Mobile Radiation Detection
and Identifcation System
(MRDIS) consists o radiation
and spectroscopic portalmonitors mounted on a mobile,
sel-propelled rame. The MRDIS
can relocate to scan containers
as they are transerred between
ships or to the container stacks.
Once parked, the MRDIS is used in the same manner as
fxed RPMs. The MRDIS is being piloted at the Port o Salalah,
Oman. Additional systems will be built in the uture and
deployed to heavy transshipment ports.
DOE/NNSA, in close partnership
with CBP and DNDO, is
analyzing the integration oradiation detection technology
into spreader-bar equipment
used to lit containers. DOE/
NNSA and CBP conducted
tests at the Ports o Tacoma
and Oakland, and Los Alamos
National Laboratory. DOE/NNSA, CBP, and DNDO continue to
evaluate the eectiveness o spreader-bar-based detection
technologies in scanning transshipped containers.
Secondary Inspection and
Identifcation Equipment
Handheld Equipment
Personal Radiation Detectors
Radioisotope IdentifcationDevices (RIIDs)
Radiation Survey Meters
High Purity Germanium Detectors
TSA Survey Meter Thermo IdentiFINDER
Germanium-based
ORTEC Detective
typically captured by installing radiation detection equipmentat the entrance and exit gates o port acilities. Scanningtransshipped containers can be challenging and oten requiresinnovative solutions. U.S. contractors selected by DOE/NNSAoversee construction and installation o the Megaports systemsater the detailed design has been accepted by all stakeholders.When cost-sharing, the partner nation typically unds the
design, construction, and installation o the Megaports systemswith assistance rom U.S. engineers and construction experts.
Additionally, the Megaports Initiative trains partner nationofcials to operate and maintain the systems, and helps partnercountries establish an indigenous training capability to ensuresystem operators and maintenance personnel have the requisiteknowledge and technical profciency to support the long-termoperation o the installed systems. The training plan otenincludes technical classes held at DOE/NNSAs HAMMERTraining Center in Richland, Washington, as well as extensiveon-the-job training at the port.
Spectroscopic portals
Personal Radiation Detector
RDSC Freeport, Bahamas
MRDIS Salalah, Oman
Spreader Bar Detection Prototype
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Ensuring Long-Term
Sustainability
In addition to establishing anindigenous training program, thesupply o preventative maintenance andemergency repair support, critical spareparts, data analysis support, and systemperormance testing are other importantelements o the sustainability approachemployed by the Megaports Initiative.Under most Megaports agreements,DOE/NNSA commits to providingmaintenance and training support orthree years, ater which time the partnercountry takes ull responsibility oroperating and maintaining the systems.Moreover, the Megaports Initiative hosts
regional Megaports workshops withpartner nations annually or as needed toencourage inormation sharing betweenregional partners and to exchange lessonslearned. For our prospective Megaportsparticipants, the regional workshops alsoinclude a tour o an operational Megaport.
Cost-Sharing
Where possible, the Megaports Initiative employs cost sharing in the Megaports implementation process. The primary dividend of csharing is buy-in from the host government and terminal operator. Although no set formula for cost-sharing is available, the termin
operator or port authority often pays for design, construction, engineering, installation, or a combination of those costs. Cost-sharin
arrangements are site-specic and negotiated differently for each port.
Layout and trafc control Excavation Foundation placement Conduit installation
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Looking Ahead:
2010 and Beyond
Looking ahead, the MegaportsInitiative will:
Install radiation detection equipment at
100 ports, scanning approximately 50%o global container trafc by 2016.
- Complete 14 ports in FY 2010,bringing the cumulative number ooperational Megaports to 41
Initiate new partnerships and establishormal agreements or Megaportscooperation
Provide mobile detection systems toselect transshipment ports
Develop response protocols with
select nations to address nuclear andradiological threats
Provide training to partner nationofcials, helping to ensure appropriateuse and long-term sustainability o thesystems
Provide specialized equipment and/or training to select ports to enhancepartner nation capability or detection,response, and recovery eorts
Transition operational Megaports
to partner nation ofcials ater thesustainability transition period.
Many of our host nation partners have paid for some or all of the construction
and installation process. The typical construction process is illustrated here.
n Bollard placement Camera installation Restoration Completed gate
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Detection, Response, and Recovery
The radiation detection systems deployed under the Megaports Initiative better equip partner countries to detectradiation, respond to alarms, and safely recover improperly-disposed radioactive sealed sources and/or dispositioncontaminated scrap metal. The following photos are examples of real detections using Megaports equipment thatrequired response from partner countries.
AmBe source Cs-137 source Testing for radiation Testing for contamination Frisking individuals for
contamination
Orphan Sources in Scrap Metal Contamination
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Yearly Metric
Cumulative Metric
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
Megaports goal of
100 ports by 2016
Megaports Initiative Yearly and Cumulative Metrics
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For more information, contact:
William E. Kilmartin, Megaports Program Manager
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585T: 001-202-586-0513
F: 001-202-586-7110
Email: [email protected]
PNNL-SA-74476 September 2010