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Barcelonafast forward? City entrepreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990sTim Marshallaa School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK

To cite this Article Marshall, Tim(1996) 'Barcelonafast forward? City entrepreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990s',European Planning Studies, 4: 2, 147 165

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09654319608720337URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09654319608720337

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European Planning Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996 147

Barcelona -- Fast Forward? City E ntre pre neu rialism inthe 1980s and 1990s

TIM MARSHALL[Paper irstreceived, July 1994; in inal orm, January 1995]

ABSTRACT Since 197 9 the city council of Barcelona has sought to guide the city's destiny by a variety ofmethods, most powerfully by securing the 1992 Olympic Games candidacy, but also by means of two strategicplanning exercises, begun in 1988 and 1992. These strategies are examine d within their political an d economiccontexts in orde r to understand how they relate to changes in Sp anish and Catalan politics, in global/localeconom ic shifts and in thinking on city guidanc e. Significant differences in the three phases of city promotion areidentified. It is concluded that strategic planning within the context of the intense spatial econom ic competitionof the late 1990s may be even more difficult for Barcelona than was its drive up to 1992.

1. IntroductionMany observers of the European urban scene regard Barcelona as a recent success story. Thecity has regularly scored well in the 'league tables' constructed for various promotional ormore academic purposes. The transformation from a city with, in 1980, great services andinfrastructure deficits, in the midst of a dee p econo mic crisis, to the restruc tured, dyna mic an doutward-looking metropolis of the mid-1990s, is seen as testimony that some cities can indeedexercise an influence over their destiny.

The intention here is to examine this generalized impression: to discuss in what sensesBarcelona has been able to advance, using what strategies, within what political framing andhistorical circumstances. It should be stressed that the aim is only to make an initial attemptat assessing the nature and significance of the process; 4 years after the Olympics it is relativelyearly to identify some of the enduring effects of the efforts of the last 15 years. With greaterconfidence, an account can be presented of the stages and forms of the city's proactive stanceand the political movements within and behind this stance.

A number of authors have examined these issues, though these are mainly pre-1992 (deFor n, 1993; Ga rcia, 1991; Guell, 1993; M araga ll, 1992; M arshall, 1992; Ro ldan , 1992;Sanchez, 1992; Varley, 1992). Unpublished work by Kodz (1993) has added to thesetreatments more recently. In Barcelona City Council itself some impact assessment preceded(Barcelona City Council, 1992) and followed (Barcelona City Council, 1994) the Games.Reflection has also taken place within the framework of a second Barcelona Plan 2000, viasome evaluation exercises (Pla Estrategic, 1992a,b,c). Nevertheless, it is important to realizethat the basis for discussion of these issues, from within Barcelona, is rather thin. Most of theTim Marshall, School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP, UK.0965-4313/96/020147-19 1996 Journals Oxford Ltd

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148 Tim Marshallabove m aterial reflects more or less the 'official story' of the city's success, with the only moreextended critiques coming from those outside the political mainstreamsfrom the left(Moreno & Vasquez M ontalban, 1991) and the Greens (Martinez Alier, 1992; BarcelonaEstalvia Energia, 1994). This reflects a genuinely dominant hegemonic view in the city, butdoes not help more distanced judgements.A debate is gathering momentum in Britain on the evaluation of this type of urban policy,whether focusing on 'mega-projects' such as the Olympics (Kodz, 1993), major publicinvestments such as the Birmingham Convention Centre (Loftman & Nevin, 1992), publicinstitutions such as British Urban Development Corporations (Imrie & Thomas, 1993) or, inthe most extended treatment so far, British urban 'flagship' projects (Smyth, 1994). In allcases, one of the prime issues is seen to be 'who gains?', economically and socially. Manyconsider that such urban policy approaches privilege certain already dominant economicinterests over those of the mass of city populations, and that the heavy public expendituregives a poor return. This contribution on Barcelona may bring something to this debate, notso much in terms of precise evaluation, but by placing particular policies within particularconjunctural and ideological histories. As well as calculating specific economic and socialreturns, evaluation needs to understand the 'timing and spacing' of these European urbanprojects.

Barcelona's case is of special interest because of its apparent tendency to be in theforefront of whatever policy directions become widespread among European cities. Hence, itmay be that the examination of the latest initiative, the second Barcelona Plan 2000, will castlight on responses likely to be generalized in the later 1990s. The somewhat turbulentrelationship with a dynamic region (Catalonia), and its government (the Generalitat), makesBarcelona city's example all the more interesting to those concerned with the shifting of urbanand regional power balances within the 'new Europe' (Harvie, 1994; Parkinson, 1992).

2 . The Global, the Local and Strategic PlanningBarcelona's history can usefully be placed within two somewhat separate frames of theorizing.The first refers to the emerging interplay of the global and the local as 'glocalization'(Swyngedouw, 1992)an inelegant invention, but one which catches something of whatappears to be occurring. This is a shift in the forms of capitalism, such that capital movesfaster and with more spatial freedom. This, it is then argued, generates greater competitionbetween places, because economies are less nationally or regionally contained. This thenforms the basis for the 'rise of the local', with growth coalitions in cities or regions seeking todistinguish the attracting characteristics of their places. New economic forms such as strategicalliances between firms and subcontracting systems minimize the risks of long-term fixedinvestment in particular places. This can cause "hectic territorial switching of the process ofover-accum ulation/devaluation" (Swyngedouw, 1992, p. 55). Declining national and inter-national regulation in the face of global capital encourages greater attempts at local regulation.But the increased importance of local/regional conditions is seen as paralleled by increaseddisempowerment and subordination to global forces. There is therefore a struggle over thescales of regulation, which is caught up with processes of "local-territorial reconfiguration"(Swyngedouw, 1992, p. 61). All of this is seen as intensified by the European Union SingleMarket. Much of this framework appears, at first sight, to fit the recent experience of suchEuropean cities as Barcelona. There is not space in this article to investigate fully the degreeof fit, but the account will comment on the extent to which Barcelona appears to be withinthis process.

The second framework for the discussion is that of strategic planning, as developed byauthors such as Bryson (1987). This is in part due to the fact that Barcelona's leaders have

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 1 4 9used these ideas themselves, as the appropriate method or technique to guide their efforts. Butit is also because strategic planning has, in the last decade, become a widely used intellectualapproach to city governance, superseding to an extent earlier methods, such as regionalplanning or urban planning. Strategic planning emerged from the practice of large corpora-tions, and involved a more plural approach by public authorities, based on public-privatepartnerships of many kinds. As in urban planning, many different types have been identified,but common to all are the attempts to clarify overall objectives, to set short-term, achievableprogrammes and to involve a wide range of stakeholders. Three different phases of theattempt to guide Barcelona's future will be examined, involving different conceptions of'strategic planning' (whether or not the term itself was used). It is true that there is an elementof trying to compare apples and oranges; the Olympics phase was fundamentally different, inmany respects. Nevertheless, consideration within the same discussion does cast light on thedeterminants of effective city steering.

Consideration of these two frameworks together suggests a further question: are certainforms of strategic planning the 'natural' political response to current forms of glocalization?The Barcelona case allows reflection on this issue. Such an argument would find support inHarvey's relation of the shift from "urban managerialism" to "urban entrepreneurialism" inthe 1970s and 1980s, due to changes in capitalism's forms (Harvey, 1989).

3 . Phase 1Planning for the OlympicsThe decision to bid for the 1992 Olympics was taken in 1980, by the Socialist group whichhad recently emerged victorious in the Barcelona municipal elections (Enciclopedia Catalana,1993). The political positioning of the Socialists was to remain key to the whole developmentof the three phases: they retained power in the city and, from 1982, in Madrid, but failed towin regional power, in the Generalitat, which from 1980 was controlled by the centre-rightCatalan nationalists, Convergencia i Unio (CiU). Political competition between these twogroupings remained a continuous factor from 1980, with the power balance always with theSocialists until 1993, when their minority government position in Madrid meant a dependenceon CiU votes.

This first phase may be seen as running to 1988, including all the preparatory work onprogramming and financing, even though a few key decisions were taken a little later. Thephase may be analyzed under four headings.

3.1 Aims and MotivationsThe prime drives were economic and social, but with the above political competition factora significant extra incentive for the city council to retain the initiative: bidding for theOlympics was something done by cities, not regions. The economic urgency arose from theeconomic crisis faced by the city in the early 1980s, which involved massive industrial closuresand very high unemployment (see Cheshire and Hay (1989) whose figure showing city"problem score changes" 1971-1984, page 76, shows Barcelona almost off the page, so badwas its position). But the major programmes which were argued to be necessary to stage theOlympics were seen as having social purposes within the city's planning strategyto upgradeinner and outer deprived districts and to massively extend and improve public spaces andfacilities. The ring roads, the new drainage systems, the new telecommunications infrastruc-ture, the new residential districts, the transformed old portall were seen as having bothsocial gains and contributing to economic regeneration. At the same time, these aims werebeing pursued in other forms, through economic and social programmes run from Madrid

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150 Tim M arshallT a b l e 1 . Investments for Barcelona Olympic Games (millions

1992 pesetas)OperationsAreas and subcentresMont Juic AreaDiagonal AreaVail Hebron AreaOlympic Village(Total Areas)Subcentres with accommodationOther subcentresOther venuesCommunicationsSecond Ring RoadCoastal Ring RoadTrinitat Junction and linksBranch Roads(Total Ring Roads)links between ring roadsAccess to AreasHotelsMunicipal Hotel PlanOther hotelsAirportTelecommunicationsTelefonicaCollserola TowerRest COOB InvestmentsTotal

Investments

45 2695 539

21 733161 888234 430

30 9331541132 911

43 91050 2831144930 427

136 07122 89490 785

23 67437 79528 51367 802

5 98326 499

Totals313 688

249 750

61469

28 51373 785

26 499753 707

Source: Barcelona City Council, 1994.

and by initiatives in local economic regeneration (workshops, training, etc.) and in social/cultural action (community centres, sports and leisure programmes), run at city and city-district level (after decentralization in 1986).

3.2 InstrumentsTo a large extent, the Olympics phase can be seen as a classic urban planning strategy, ledby and largely financed by the public sector (Table 1). Th e strategy was one based on the city'saspirations dating back many yearsto the extent that the post-1982 mayor, PasqualMaragall, was often to refer to the Francoist mayor of 19571973, Porcioles, in supportiveterms. Key elements such as the ring roads and the Olympic village dated essentially from the1950s and 1960s. The vital link to finance the infrastructure was the Madrid-Barcelona axis:the 1992 project rested on the national state supporting, continuously, a local administration,with dependable, long-term promises of funding. The Generalitat was also brought into theproject, to create a fully representative alliance, but this was always the weakest link, withtensions emerging in many programmes, and with the Generalitat funding and organizing asmaller part of the work.

As the years passed, the public companies set up to implement the programmes had a

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 151somewhat more entrepreneurial look. This was most obvious in the Olympic Village, whereMaragall 's promise that a large proportion would be social housing was abandoned when itbecame clear that this clashed with private development of the housing areas. However, inmost cases funding and control remained public, via companies controlled in varyingproportions by the public administrations.3.3 Processes and ParticipationDuring these years, the council was still in quite close touch with the residents' movementswhich had been a major political force in the 1970s, and which still had effective existence inthe 1980s. This tended to ensure that the Olympic project remained, by and large, close topopular goals in the-citynot a statement which is easy to prove, but apparently supportedby the Socialists' continuing electoral control and the enormous enthusiasm in the cityfollowing the successful bid in 1986.This does not mean that the project was one informed by 'popular planning' in the moreparticipatory sense. Plans were prepared essentially by the Socialist leaders and implementedby small technical/political teams. Electoral democracy and rule by party has governed thecity since 1979. On occasions pressure from local residents' groups, often represented by thefew (ex) Communist councillors, was responsible for changes in planning, such as thereduction in commercial floorspace in the old port developments or the covering of some ofthose sections of the ring road which were nearest housing. This pressure was easier to exertas the Socialists retained control in some periods due to Communist support.

3.4 DiscoursesThe Olympics project was presented as a 'one city' exercise, in a sense beyond politics,offering so me thing to everyone . It was a successful 'hegem onic pro ject' (H ajer, 1989), bring ingtogether the various movements and powers in the city, from the popular post-Franco forcesto the normally ruling groups controlling the city's economy. The Socialists probablyrepresented neither force very clearly, but they were the only group who could articulate acoherent discourse for a broad enough alliance to win elections.

3.5 SynthesisFrom the point of view of strategic planning, the Olympics constituted a fine example ofpracticebut without the terminology or methodology. Its effectiveness reveals in fact someof the key characteristics that strategic planning theory regards as essential. There were veryeffective motivations, economic and political, especially for the leaders (the Socialists). Therewere built-in deadlines (leading up to 1992), with tremendously public penalties for failure.The exercise had to be fairly comprehensive, to generate support, and therefore included quitea range of stakeholders. Goals and implementation were closely linked, through the under-standing of an overall, simple project, and the (in any case normal) Spanish practice of puttingpolitically sympathetic persons in 'technical' positions.

It can be seen therefore that the Olympics had great advantages for politicians wishing tounite a city around a public project. This was especially the case for Barcelona because allsorts of accumulated services and infrastructure deficits could be quite easily linked to theoverall goal. T h e project was also marked by the link to Ma drid's funding, with a govern men tsympathetic to publicly led exercises (as in the Seville World Exposicion)that is, there wasa coherent approach 'within' the organization.

The only disadvantage, not problematic for the strategic planning argument, but possibly

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152 Tim M arshallfor some citizens, was that if a scheme or programme could not be presented as partof the 1992 drive, then it was less easy to obtain funding. Thus, there were criticismsfrom certain more 'social' quarters that work to improve outer districts had fallen behind,given the council's determined focus on the Olympics. This view was presented in its sharpestform by Moreno and Vasquez Mbntalban (1991), who argued that the post-Francomovement's energy had been diverted by the Olympics project, at a time when it could havebeen incorporated into more progressive channels. This argument is certainly hard toevaluate, as it depends on judgements of the overall direction of Spanish and Barcelonapolitics in the 1980s. But it perhaps downplays the extent to which the Olympics projectcontained social goals, even if the pressures of deadlines and funding led later to the loss ofsome of these (as in the Olympic Village).

Kodz (1993) notes that the GDP per capita increase in the city (24%) was substantiallyhigher than that for Spain or Catalonia (both 17%) for the years 1987-1991. Equally,unemployment fell further in the city than in Spain in the years 1986-199250% as against24%. It is reasonable to assume that most of these improvements resulted directly from theGames investment. It is noteworthy that in December 1993 the city's unemployment figure of11.9% was somewhat below that of Catalonia (12.2%) and well below that of Spain (16.6%).This reversed the position of the early 1980s crisis, when Barcelona's rate had been higher.However, a more general problem was that the Olympics project set off a particularly fastinflation in prices in the city, especially of housing (a 235% increase in prices 1985-1990),lowering citizens' purchasing power (Barcelona City Council, 1994b).

Many of the Olympic investments were genuine gains for the city's residents as a whole,even though one can then argue as to the value of the gains in terms of a long-term projectfor the city. The better physical environment of so many areas, the better telephone system,the ring roadsthese tended to benefit most residents. Other elements gave less clearlygeneralized gains. The sports facilities benefit the activenot a class division probably, simplya cultural split. The airport facilities benefit the most mobile. The Olympic Village, whileproviding new open spaces and a sea front open to all, will benefit mainly the richer residentswho can afford the new flats. The tunnel under Collserola will benefit mainly the higherincome residents living in that area, particularly given the high toll charged.On balance, an assessment of this kind suggests a mainly positive outcome for themajority of the city's residents. A challenge to such a judgement would come mainly

from a Green perspective. This argues that the project was a wasteful and anti-ecologicalone, with too much emphasis on road and air transport, and too fast urbanization of a numberof areas, which could better have been developed for more socially beneficial purposes, at aslower pace (Martinez Alier, 1992). The problem with this viewpoint is that it expresses aposition which is almost certainly a small minority in the city, and one which has been givenlitde political voice.

4 . Phase 2Barcelona 2000In 1988 a process of fully conscious 'strategic planning' was set in motion by the city council(see Marshall (1990) for an early account). Its title was 'Barcelona Economic and Social Plan2000', and its aim was to look beyond 1992 and take full advantage of the Olympicsinvestment. The plan was approved in 1990 and was then pushed forward until early 1993,when the decision was taken to produce a second plan. This decision led to a process ofevaluation of the first plan, as a necessary initial step.

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 153Table 2. Major objectives of Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan

MainobjectiveConsolidate Barcelona as an enterprising Euro pean metropolis, with influence over its macroregion andwith a modern, socially balanced quality of life, deeply rooted in Mediterranean cultureStrategic lines(a) Make B arcelona one of the key centres of the macroregion(b) Imp rove the quality of life and progress for people(c) Sup port for industry an d for advanced services to businessObjectives(a) 1. Insert Barcelona in the network of Eurocities and of me tropolitan centres aro und the world

2. Improve communications within the metropolitan region(b) 3. Improve the environm ent

4. Improve, at all levels, training and research as a means of progress5. Improv e social opportunities for housing and training6. Prioritise cultural infrastructures(c) 7. C rea te basic infrastructure for adv ance d services, in addition to those related to transp ort and

telecommunications8. Prom ote technological innov ation for industrial progress9. Develop sectors with potential within th e m etropolitan area

Source: Pla Estrategic, 1990.

4.1 Aims and MotivationsThe explicit aim of the plan was to "consolidate Barcelona as an enterprising Europeanmetropolis, affecting the macroregion in which it is located, with a modern quality of life,socially balanced and strongly rooted in Mediterranean culture" (Pla Estrategic, 1990).

In this aim, one can identify a more explicit effort to promote the city, an effort whichbecomes clearer if one examines the sub-objectives (Table 2). It may be imagined that theOlympics already constituted an exercise in 'place marketing' par excellence. But I wouldargue that this element followed the successful bidding, which had been motivated much moreby a desire to obtain Madrid funding and to support local political goals. What the B arcelona2000 exercise revealed was the understanding that the evident global public exposure couldbe transformed into a place marketing opportunity, in the changed circumstances of the late1980s. In that sense the explicit adoption of strategic planning methods (with articles byBryson cited in plan documents as sources) was symptomatic of a more 'entrepreneurial'approach.

This is not to say that economic goals completely crowded out social aims. However, theobjectives on more social housing and more employment remained unclear and weaklydeveloped. It was not surprising that the evaluation of 1992 revealed that most more sociallyoriented aspects of the plan (along with most environmental goals) scored low on implemen-tation (Pla Estrategic, 1992a).

4.2 InstrumentsThe plan represented an essentially partnership approach to city guidance, whereby publicand private sectors concerted their investments to the overall gain of the city. Publicinvestment was still seen as essential, above all for infrastructure purposes, and in this sensethe presentation of the plan in Madrid was important. However, the search for international

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154 Tim Marshallinvestment and consumption, whether by multinational firms, by international public agenciesor by tourists, was seen as equally, if not more, important.Here, therefore, one can identify the outward turning tendency which can be seen ascharacteristic of 'glocalization'. While this looking outwards, towards Europe and the world,has long been identified with Catalan society, it seems clear that the search for outward linkswas intensified in the late 1980s. Barcelona City Council was a leading actor in the Eurocitiesgrouping from 1986 onwards, linking at first several 'second cities', and later others. Th eGeneralitat also linked up with three o ther 'Motors of Europ e' regions, to seek to gain synergyfrom successful industrial areas. The model in all cases was a form of state-private sectorpartnership, one primarily oriented to meeting perceived private sector requirements.

4.3 Processes and ParticipationThe plan had a pyramidal structure of participation. At the top was an executive council ofthe 10 leading institutional members (these were Barcelona City Council, the Chamber ofCommerce, the Circle of Economy, two trade union federations, the Zona Franca Consor-tium, the Trade Fair, the Port Authority, the Employers Federation and the (central)university). These met regularly, every two weeks, from 1988 onwards. Their continuingcontact and interaction was regarded as an important element of the process (Santacana,1993), leading key actors to change their views of each other. Twice a year the general councilof the plan met to review progress, and , in 1990, to approve the final version of the plan. Th iscouncil was made up of over 200 organizations, mainly firms and public agencies. Anotherelement of participation lay in the membership of commissions, including 550 individualsduring the plan's preparation: many of these were academics, but there were also numerouscompany and agency representatives. Finally, a degree of public participation was provided bythe exhibition in 1989 of the plan's proposals, when members of the public could note theirviews (if they wished, by video), and by the sessions of the general council, which wereadvertised as open to anyone.

In reality the plan was managed by a quite small elite of institutions 'on speaking terms'with the city council, and especially with the Socialists. Although a genuine effort was madeto maintain openness, this was not supported by any more intensive attempt to involve theunorganized. The structure of working commissions and regular meetings and the discourseof strategic guidance tended to attract certain types of participantand detract others.

It would appear in addition that different sorts of participation delivered different results.It was noted that 25 of the proposals were not progressed effectively because these were eitherunclear, or too general, or 'not strategic'; they had only been brought in because theparticipatory process had obliged the planners to accept proposals from sectors who did notwan t to be left out (de Forn, 1993). Many of these proposals were of a social or environmentalnatu re, regarded by some as 'not strategic', that is not about correcting Barcelona's (economic)weaknesses and promoting its strengths.Another feature of the plan process was its stately pace, taking over 2 years to initialapproval, followed by the equally important 3 years of monitoring. This in itself encourageda certain technical or bureaucratic form, giving the plan a rather professional air. Thetimescale reflects the aspiration of one of the plan's leaders that eventually strategic planningshould become a part of Barcelona's City Council's normal operation (de Forn, 1993)thatis a normal organizational tool, not a plan which might be 'owned' publicly by Barcelonasociety. This may be taken to be based either on a limited conception of democraticgovernance on the part of the council's leaders, or on a realistic understanding of the limitedcivic desires of Barcelona's citizensor both.

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 1 5 54.4 DiscoursesAlready in 1988 the council's leaders must have been aware that the project initiatedby the PSOE at the start of the 1980s, nationally and in the city, was running out ofdirection and force. In Madrid, the divisions within the party between more Socialistand more centrist wings weakened attempts to form a new project. In Barcelona,the dominance of fairly pragmatic viewpoints in the party allowed some attempt todevelop a fresh impetus, equipping the Socialists with new goals and if possible abroader electoral appeal. The Barcelona 2000 Plan can usefully be interpreted as partof such a project, building an on-going hegemonic consensus on the back of theOlympics enthusiasm. For this purpose, the party leaders considered that a 'moderate'discourse was needed, around above all goals of economic growth. This allowed a degreeof incorporation of some business sectors, who trusted the council Socialists to respond totheir needs. (Moreno & Vazquez Montalban, 1991, p. 101, refer to the "AssociacioEmpresarial Barcelona 92", in which each company in this association contributed 50 000to propel the Games).

This more centrist discourse is evident in the plan's objectives and style of operation.It had the disadvantage of alienating to some degree the trade unions and some othersocial groups, but this mattered little to the PSOE, as these forces had, at this date, (unlikein, say, 1980) no strong alternative to which they could defect. The inclusion of somesocial goals was enough to maintain the unions' participation, even if few of these weresubsequently achieved.What the plan did, therefore, was to evolve a new set of formulas for governing

the city in the 1990s, in concert with some of the city's economic powers. (Not allwere involved: the Generalitat refused to participate and thus much of the more CiUinclined business sectors also steered clear of the process.) The plan sought to build aconsensus of the 'elites' around its goals. This element of discourse coalition building(Hajer, 1992) may well have been as important as the substance of the plan, to thecouncil's leadersand explains the Generalitat's decision to keep well clear of the process.The emphases on city promotion, infrastructure and publicprivate partnership were allevidence of a shift in discourse from the rather more populist Olympics drive, basedas that had been on achieving many 'historic' demands of the 1960s or 1970s. However,the consensus around the Olympics did provide the foundation for establishing the newconception of an 'all city' project.

4.5 SynthesisIn many respects, the 1988-1993 strategic planning exercise was more difficult than, and lesssuccessful than, the preceding phasewhich had not been, consciously, 'strategic planning'.The plan's leaders admitted that they had benefited greatly from the Olympics drive and theeconomic boom, and had perhaps, in retrospect, not pushed for enough extra elements. Theyfelt this in part because so many of the objectives had been achieved (de Forn, 1993; this doesnot square with the 1992 evaluationbut it shows, in part, how subjective evaluation mustbe). They had been too modest!

However, as a learning exercise, the plan was felt to have been very valuable. It hadprovided a framework for advancing a number of proposals, which were henceforth seen aslinked pieces of Barcelona's future: the TGV line from France via the city to Madrid, thedoubling of the size of the trade fair site, the infrastructure plan for the Llobregat delta (port,airport, etc.), the promotion of training initiatives (de Forn, 1993).

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156 Tim Marshall5. Phase 3The Second Barcelona 2000 PlanAt the end of 1992, however, there was a feeling that a new and more ambitious plan wasneeded. The body representing the municipalities of the metropolitan region joined theexecutive council, reflecting the wish to broaden the plan's ambit to a wider area. On 30November 1994 the second plan was approved by the General Council of the PlanAssociation. By this stage it seems that the city council had lost some of its enthusiasm for theproject, and very little effort was made to obtain press coverage; the event was only noted,briefly, by one Barcelona newspaper. The 'glossy' version of the second plan was not in factlaunched formally until December 1995.

5.1 Aims and MotivationsThe overall aim of the second plan was "to increase the integration of the Barcelona regioninto the international economy, in order to guarantee its growth in terms of economicprogress, social progress and quality of life" (Pla Estrategic, 1994). The idea behind thisgeneral goal was that Barcelona, through the 1992 drive, had moved up the scales of activity,but that this had to be fully realized, through further developments. This stress on scalechanges was common to a number of the working group reports, most interestingly in that ofthe one on the areas of influence of the city (Pla Estrategic, 'Ambits d'Influencia de Barcelona'1993). This examined four scales at which the city needed to change its operation (Table 3).At the metropolitan scale it was argued that better spatial structuring was required, perhapswith a more polycentric form, via effective transport investment. At the regional level thereshould be more cooperation to secure complementary gains, for example via tourismplanning, infrastructure coordination and educational links (the six cities network, ofBarcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, Parma, Toulouse and Montpelier, was seen as one element atthis scale). At the continental scale it was argued that Barcelona could specialize in certainfunctions for Europe as a whole, with adequate air or land connections, convention centres,hotels, making it attractive to international institutions and investors. Then at the transconti-nental level the importance of links with North Africa, America and the Far East was stressed,via educational, technological and migration policies.

Here the motivation is evidently to respond to the perceived forces of globalization, andensure that Barcelona fits in to these forces in a way that works to its advantage. The draftplan (Pla Estrategic, 1994) claims that an examination of the geopolitical and geoeconomicsituation suggested that cities were faced with various options. One was that of decline, ifremaining dependent on traditional sectors. Another was the world city route, with appropri-ate economic functions. A third was seeking the international specializations most suitable tothe particular city, as a sort of second level international or semi-global city. The latter wasthe city competition form adopted by the second plan.

This overall direction was then detailed via a number of general lines, objectives andmeasures, as in the first plan. Table 4 shows the overall objective, supported by an overall cityaim for 'better quality management', and then the 5 lines and 20 objectives. It is clear thatthe main emphasis is on international economic competition. The social integration strategicline (No. 3) includes significant elements on support for immigrants and the old. But it appearsto be 'stuck on' to the main structure, compared with the strategic lines for sectoral economicdevelopment (Nos 1, 4 and 5). Environmental elements are of lesser significance than in thefirst plan, with only a reference to open space protection within the metropolitan region. Anearlier version of the overall aim had referred to "sustainable development, both ecologicallyand for social equilibrium" (de Forn, 1993); the language of sustainability and ecology wassubsequently removed. In fact, the plan is heavily 'developmentalist', with a strong drive for

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T a b l e 3 . Framework for analyzing Barcelona's territorial relationships: this shows the levels and themes used tostructure analysis. The strategic plan was then filled in, in considerable detail, (not included here)

Seals

Urba

ThemeInformationTrainingCulture

an dregionalp la nn in g In fra stru ctu re Sectoralpolicies InstitutionsMetropolitanRegionalCataloniaRegionalMacroregionRegionalWestMediterraneanContinentalSpainContinentalEUContinentalEuropeTranscontinentalAmericaTranscontinentalN AfricaTranscontinentalEast Asia

ArticulationPromotion

Integration

Penetration

I3 .

raSource: Pla Estrategic, 1993, 'Ambits d'Influencia de Barcelona'.

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158 Tim Marshallinfrastructure creation (building a metropolitan ring road, expanding the airport further,creating a Barcelona city heliport). It appears to be assumed that social and environmentalgoals will best be achieved by vigorous pursuit of the dominant aim, or, possibly, by other'non-strategic' policy instruments.

5.2 InstrumentsThe plan 's leaders stress that the second plan should have an even more 'strategic' nature , lessoriented to particular projects and more focused on generalized policy directions (de Forn,1993). This may respond to an understanding that state funding will in general be less easilysecured than before 1992, and that therefore the plan's success will be more dependent onprivate and external investment. In that case one of the main instruments will be the use ofthe plan (or its spin-offs) as a marketing tool, in the same way as Barcelona City Council wasmounting exhibitions on 'Barcelona New Projects' in 1994, in the city and around Europe(Barcelona City Council, 1994c). Most of the work on promotion of the sectoral strategy(under strategic line 4) has stressed the minority role of the city council and the leadingresponsibility of the producing bodieswhether in logistics, universities, health, tourism orindustry.

5.3 Processes and ParticipationThe form of plan preparation has been heavily technical and limited to small groups ofleading public and private sector actors. The differences from the first plan have included thepresence of rather more non-Barcelona-city participants, and the lower public exposure ofthe plan; there has been no public exhibition, for example, and less discussion in the press.The evaluation stage in 1992 was followed by studies in technical commissions, involvingmore than 300 people, continuing debates on the executive committee and the general council(linked by questionnaires to all council members at key stages) and over 20 sectoral meetingswith a range of selected actors, including for, example, economists' associations, multi-nationals, consulates based in Barcelona, the Generalitat's minister for industry, the press,Barcelona's residents' association federation and some young people's organizations. Theselection reflects the general economic drive of the plan, in most cases. Some attempt has beenmade to place the plan more at arm's length from the city council, with the constitution ofan association for the plan , whose general council is the body which finally approves the plan .The process remains, though, essentially the same.

5.4 DiscoursesThe prime aim described above points to an even more single-minded focus on com-petitiveness, even though this is presented in a language of 'integration'. Thus, whileBarcelona clearly wishes to push itself forward at each of the relevant scales, it wishesto do this (or to appear to be doing this) in a cooperative way, working with the sixcities network, the Eurocities club and through forms of complementary specializationat each level. Th is may be seen as the distinctively Spanish Socialist element within a discourseof globalizing forces: the hope that economic pressures do not necessarily have to leadto naked interurban and interregional competition, but can be civilized by the use of networks,and by EU or other higher level supports. But, as noted above, the classically socialdemocratic early formulation of sustainable development has now been superseded. The

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Table 4. Second Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plangeneral objective, mission, strategic lines and objectives

General objectiveTo increase theintegration of the Barcelona region into theinternational economy, in order to guarantee its growth in termsof economic progress, social progress andquality of life

MissionStrategic Line1. Facilitate the adaptation processes of theregion's economic sectors into theinternational economy

Management programme for quality and efficiency in the city.ObjectiveStrengthen training and technological structuresImprove the efficiency ofprivate servicesImprove the effectiveness ofpublic adm inistration and public

2. Secure the economic and socialarticulation of the Barcelona region3. Create a positive response to the newneeds for social integration

4. Ensure the development of moderninternationally appropriate economicactivity

5. Place the Barcelona region w ithin theinternational economy

Simplify the region's administrative structureImplement programmes at the metropolitan region levelPredict the risks of rising unemploymentCreate newforms of employmentGain from the process of ageing of the populationIntegrate young people's potentialAnticipate a response to increasing immigrationActivities and infrastructures related to mobility and logisticsfor goods transportActivities and infrastructures related to informationsuperhighwaysUniversity centreTourism, fairs, congresses and conventionsHealth sectorsMaintenance of the weight of industrial sectorsMacroregionEuropeLatin AmericaNorth Africa

I

ISource: Pla Estrategic, 1994first draft (there were also 37 sub-objectives and 95 measures). CO

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160 Tim M arshallimpression is that, while the .social concern remains, this is now incorporated within adiscourse which is essentially neo-liberal driven.

5.5 SynthesisThe second plan represents a further step along the path from the Olympics project to a'Barcelona within the world' vision. The different elements of the process appear to linktogether in a coherent way: an attempt to broaden the scale, from the metropolitan upthrough the regional, European and beyond, an emphasis on private investments, andpreparation mainly by elites within a pub lic/private partnership discourse. Here the techniqueand methodology of strategic planning appears to interact comfortably with a genuinelyentrepreneurial approach to city management.

The second plan has perhaps less significance as a tool for changing the Socialists' politicaldirection and discourse, compared to the first, as that task may be seen as in large partcompleted. It is noteworthy that the Generalitat, though still not directly involved, havetaken a somewhat more sympathetic stance in regard to the second plan. Nevertheless thesecond plan could still be significant in giving a further twist to the positioning and ideas ofthe Barcelona Socialists, with social and environmental objectives relegated further beloweconomic imperatives.The second plan appears to fit the 'glocalization' thesis. It is much less focused ontraditional intra-state relations with M adrid, than the Olympics project or even than the firstplan. The interurban competition is expressed primarily in the search for success in inter-national production, consumption and command functions, rather than via state distributionmechanisms, to use Harvey's (1985) distinctions. This does not mean that either 'the global'or 'the local' is very precisely defined in one mode rather than another. 'The global' tends tobe seen as a m elange of forces, partly within tra de , investment and migration processes, partlywithin international public institutions, above all the European Union. 'The local' is seen asa city region (more than the city of the Olympics phase), but with a reduced tension with theregion/nation of Catalonia, given the greater degree of consensus being achieved with theGeneralitat. One can perhaps see here a change in the "structured coherence of the urbanregion" (in Harvey's (1985) terms) and thus the appropriate forms of class alliance. The

increase in scale of the second plan has m eant an easier, less left versus righ t territorial politics,given the decline of the left forces within the region and the dominance of centrist orneo-liberal discourses. Nevertheless, some form of the city versus region conflict, as carrier of'the local', remains alive in this part of Europe, as it will no doubt continue to do in someother regions, unless a conservative form, either neo-liberal or more corporatist, becomesdominant at all levels of governance.

6. Concluding ReflectionThe Projects in Their Regional and Historical Con-texts6.1 The Relationship to Different Econom ic ModelsAll speculation on likely effects must depend on views about the appropriate overall social-economic project for the city. The strategic plan is pressing forward with some elementsbeyond the Olympics project, such as the trade fair expansion or the convention centrescheme, which reflect a certain economic model. This model has been criticized elsewhere(e.g. Loftman & Nevin, 1992) as providing a heavily polarized social pattern, w ith a few highly

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 161paid and many low paid jobs, mainly in the service sector. Criticisms of tourism promotion(boosted, for example, by the airport upgrading, and potentially by the TGV) make the samepoint. At this stage perhaps the most one can say is that Barcelona, through its 1992 project,has pushed along this road, of a high energy, potentially socially polarized, terciarized city; butthat many of the gains made will endure for general social use at the same time. How far thisdouble-sided set of long-term impacts will continue with the next round of strategic planningremains to be seen.

The relationship to desired economic models can be pursued further by discussingHarvey's (1989) identification of four strategies for urban entrepreneurs: seeking gains fromdirect production, from consumption, from 'command and control' functions (from HQs,international organizations, financial centres) and from state redistribution programmes. InBarcelona, the second and third have been pushed particularly strongly, through each phase.Such elements as cultural, leisure, sporting and historical interest promotions stand out in thesearch for consumer spending, by tourists, business travellers and by local residents. The Plan2000 was especially oriented to building up an HQ/finan ce role, partly overlapping with thesecond function, via the trade fair, the airport, the proposed congress centre, the drive forhigh-grade business and related education. Harvey points out that that role is especiallysuitable for cities with large agglomeration economies. The Barcelona region, with 4 millionpeople, is seen as large enough to compete on the continental and global scale in thesemarkets.The degree of competition on these two functions is brought out by a background paperby a professor at Barcelona's business school ESADE (Pla Estrategic, 1992b, J-F V ails). Thepap er discusses the Olympics and Barcelona 2000 projects in terms of creating a 'brand name'image for the city, for both internal and external consumption. Vails concludes that, inside thecity at least, the projects were successful in boosting the idea of a valuable 'product', a city withwhich residents identified, as protagonists. Such local conviction appears to be an importantcomplement to the external success apparent in the international 'league tables'.On the other two functions, there has been variation between the different phases. Therewas relatively little emphasis on attraction of industry in the first two phases, with an implicitassumption that the city's path lay inevitably towards a terciarized role; new industry wouldlocate elsewhere in the region. In the second strategic plan this assumption has beenchallenged, and it is considered that it would on the contrary be valuable to retain existingindustries, keeping at least the current 25% level of industrial employment in the city.With state redistribution this position has been reversed. While the Olympics were over

70% dependent on state funding, the second strategic plan downplays the search for Madridfunding, even though such funding is likely to remain essential for m any projects. Th e sectoraldrives in the fields of health, universities and logistics are obvious examples where privatefunding is almost certainly going to require large state funding to accompany it.The difficulty with obtaining success on the consumption and HQ, etc. functions is thatit will depend very much on continuing attention, on the follow-up in each field. OneOlympics or strategic plan drive is unlikely to deliver the business. It would appear, from the

second plan documentation, that follow-up in some fields is being pushed vigorously (intourism, in the trade fair, in the stock exchange and financial markets), but less so in others(seeking occupiers for office space, exploiting the 'surplus' telecomm unications capacity of thecity). Such longer-term dynam ic must inevitably be more difficult, with funding drying up , 'fat'being consumed, political problems emerging, a generation of leaders tiring. This relates tothe deeper problems of inter-urban competition: that there may be no respite in a world ofincreasing place pressures, and this will put great strains on almost any kind of urbangovernance, whether more elitist, more participatory, in whatever kind of left/right, capital/labour, rich/poor urban alliance.

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162 Tim M arshall6.2 Multi-tier Governmental ActionIt is worth reflecting on the possible effects of multiple action by governmental levels over thelast 10-15 years. Has this element of conflict, of somewhat cross-cutting efforts, tended to helpor hinder Barcelona-Catalonia in the 'place race'? It seems quite possible that in fact thenon-m onolithic efforts may have helped, by linking in to different sorts of networks and forces.The Generalitat's search for internationally mobile investment has tapped some sources thatwould have been difficult for the city, or Madrid, to access. On the other hand, the Socialistswere able to promote much urban and metropolitan infrastructure investment, effectivelyboosting the city's attractiveness, but to some extent in relation to other investing sectorsproperty investors, perhaps international public institutions, hotel and urban tourism sectors.Some basic degree of inter-tier cooperation no doubt helpedand this in fact existed,imposed first by the Olympics and then, from mid-1993, by the ballot box. But thepolitical/ideological configuration of government in the city/region since 1980 may have,against appearances, created an effective balance of public and private oriented policies. Theelement of inter-tier competition perhaps promoted greater effort on behalf of the administra-tions, and gave points of entry for outside investors. This may constitute a good example ofthe 'unintended consequences' of political actions.

This is not to claim that Barcelona and Catalonia operated, by luck, the ideal placemarketing strategies. There was no doubt also considerable waste of effort via such inter-tiercompetition. It is possible that, without anything like the efforts made, the city and regionwould have done relatively well in the hunt for investment. Catalonia has, in past booms,always tended to be a winner, and its aim had to be to confirm this tendency, rather than themuch harder task facing normally 'losing' regions. In many respects the relative success of thearea matches that of a region like South East England, which benefited in the same periodfrom some massive infrastructure investmentsthe M25, new airport investment, the Londonwater ring main, the Docklands project. In England, these investments were essentially due tocentral government, not to inter-tier competition or to other political forces. The South Eastemerged a winner in the late 1980s, jus t like Barcelona/C atalonia, and also only fell backrelatively in the following depression. What these regions therefore represent, perhaps, is thecapacity of 'winning' regions to secure the supporting investment they need to keep up in therace, via a variety of political configurations, depending on political and ideological conjunc-tures. They can draw on the 'fat' of previous periods, exploit their political and economic'capital' to influence governments of all kinds, and use their international networks muchmore effectively than, say, Andalusia or North East England.

What this generalization disregards is the specificity of the Barcelona case. As I haveargued briefly before (Marshall, 1992), the Olympics effort was set in a quite unique historicalcontext, and hence any imitation by other cities would have to be extremely careful, andwould be more likely to lead to wrong conclusions than useful recipes. The same applies, butwith decreasing force, to the two rounds of strategic planning. These are more standardizedexamples of city boosterism, but even here the particularities of city/region politics andeconomics are key to the forms of planning adopted and the degrees of success.6.3 The Olympics versus the Strategic Planning ExercisesThe fact that the most successful (at least so far) of the 'strategic planning' exercises (theOlympics) was not framed in strategic planning terms, may carry several lessons. One is thatthe methodology is not so important, it is the project's political dynamic which is essential tosuccess. Another is, perhaps, that 'glocalization' is making city strategic planning ever moredifficult. The second plan 's authors consider this to be the case (de Forn, 1993), and this would

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City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 1 6 3fit in with Swyngedouw's fears. He sees the ever faster movement of capital, the "hecticterritorial switching" (p. 55) via bo th generalized and place specific devaluation, as meaningthat success may be very short-lived. He argues that "a reduction in the scale of regulatory-institutional organisation increases the power of capital over space and constrains thecommand of territorially-organised interests to control territorial organisation" (p. 16). Part ofthe political struggle then becomes a struggle over the scale of regulation.

These points fit the Barcelona and Catalonia case well. Barcelona city appears to havedeclining control over its destiny, after successfully exploiting its historic chance in the 1980s.It is now 'reduced' to seeking international investment via marketing, like any other Europeancity. The Generalitat has been in the same position for some years, chasing Japanese, US andEuropean capital via its network of 'sales offices' round the world. The feeling of limitedpowers in both institutions may be one factor encouraging some greater recent cooperationbetween these government tiers.

6.4 The Continuing Power of the Central State Against Glocalization?Meanwhile, it is in some respects the much derided state level which appears to have takenthe initiative in the early 1990s. The national infrastructure plan (Ministerio de ObrasPublicas y Transportes, 1993) was prepared by the newly merged public works and transportministry, to guide mainly road, rail and water investment. It constitutes an impressive pieceof state investment planning, with a 15-year horizon, with for the first time some attempt totake environmental impacts into account. It contains plans for six areas of particular nationalsignificance, including that for the Iiobregat delta (port, airport, road and rail connections,wetland protection) next to Barcelona. The agreement signed in April 1994 by state, regionaland local authorities, to implement an investment programme for this area, contains a majorpart of public spending in the region in the next 10-15 years (a full account is in Marshall,1994).

While Barcelona's strategic planning drive may well have had some influence over theDelta Plan, one must see the key actor here as the state. In this case the 'glocalization' logicis far from evident. It is true that, unlike in previous eras, the investment has been agreedbetween tiers ('concertation' being the key phrase), and all tiers are aspiring to EU cohesionfunds to support the project. But the greater part of funds and power behind the project looks,at present, as likely to come from that traditional European actor, the central state. This planmay be fruit of the particular political (Socialists at centre and city, + agreem ent with regionalCiU) and economic (crisis, need for public investment projects) conjunctures. It may fall victimto privatizations or to the search for public-private partnership ventures. But that does notmake the Delta Plan any less real than the phases of urban policy making by Barcelona city,analyzed here. The state, in any case a core actor in the Olympics project, remains centralto future local action. Its involvement remains a very powerful element within the recent playof the global and the local in Barcelona city and region.

6.5 Local and Regional Influence On the Wane?Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude by giving the impression that the Barcelona casesuggests that nothing has changed. There has been one attempt, apparently partially success-ful, to guide the city from a local vision of the city's needs. The local scale of regulation hastherefore been boosted, and supported by new localist, regionalist and partnership discourses.These have transformed the objectives and language of local politics, creating new, morecentrist, political alliances. The relationship to broader movements of capital and to economic

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164 Tim Marshallcrises has meant that these local efforts have been in part responding to the increasinglypowerful neo-liberal framing of politics, and in p art reinforcing this political direction.

Because Barcelona/Catalonia have the advantage of a 'good hand' , a relatively strongeconomic position, this strategy has been moderately successful. But there are signs in theapproach to the second strategic plan that the city's competitive advantage in this sense maybe less than it was, given the ever increasing openness of the Spanish economy and therapidity of capital movements. This may reduce the effectiveness of such proactive cityboosterism, and make even powerful cities such as Barcelona more dependent on the 'oldpowers 'the state, transnational corporationsas well as seeking help from the newEUand regional governments. There could then be a shift away from much effective democraticcontrol over the city's destiny, at local level, accompanying the considerable element ofdisillusionment currendy present in Spanish politics. This would be a sad ending to the recentenergies with which Barcelona has played the game to influence its future. But it would be atrue reflection of the extraordinary difficulties faced by city governments in the current era ofinterurban competit ion.

AcknowledgementsI would like to acknowledge the help given by officials of the Barcelona 200 Strategic Plan,especially Jo an Ca m prec ios, who has kindly supplied docum ents an d been h ap py to discussprogress. Angels Santigosa, of the city council's mayor's office, was also very helpful, indiscussions of work on the impact of the Games. Other friends in Barcelona have kept me intouch with events over a long period. Thanks also to two referees.

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Marshall Fast Forward Barcelona

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