Managing Risk and Crisis: The Cases of Mayak, Chernobyl,

and Kursk

Autumnschool, Tartu September 20, 2013

Dr. Julia Gerlach (FU Berlin)

Our goal is…

… to evaluate risk and crisis management (> nuclear energy)

(1) making sense of risk, risk governance (especially communication), and the nexus of risk and society;

(2) analyzing three cases of crises;

(3) concluding by using the conceptual framework of risk, etc.

Mayak, Chernobyl, Kursk

1957 ff.

1986 ff.

2000 ff. (1) What do you see? (2) Please contextualize!

Energy – Risk – Crisis

risk & crisis management

Energy

Risk Crisis

Risk

• Multiple conceptions of risk, no widely accepted definition

• Two approaches – Economical/technical: focus on probability and

quantity

– Social/political: focus on the impact on human beings/society and quality

• No “real risk”, no “objective risk”, but multiple

risk perceptions that can be affected by sensational occurrences or dramatic events

Risk

• Risk is the potential or probability of loss resulting from a given action, activity and/or inaction (Slovic 2001)

• Risk is an uncertain (positive or negative) consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that humans value (Renn 2007)

Risk • Risk is dependent on human decisions, unlike

catastrophe (Luhmann 1991)

• The antonym of risk is (the social fiction of) security/safety (Luhmann 1991)

(Political) decision-making and communication

Risk governance

Risk

Decision

Uncertainity Future

Risk Governance

• Identification

• Evaluation

• Appraisal

Assessment

• Monitoring

• Decision-Making

• Implementation

Management

• Internal

• External

Communication

Knowledge Challenge: Complexity

Uncertainty

Ambiguity

Risk Communication

get the numbers right

tell them the numbers

explain the numbers

show them that they accepted similar risks in the past

show them that it‘s a good deal form them

treat them nice

make them partners

(Fischhoff 1995)

Risk Communication

Good risk communication is

• delivering the relevant information (no “paralysis by analysis” (Renn 2007))

• balancing science and politics

• between “promoting and protecting” (Sjöberg 1999)

• transparent

• accountable

• sustainable

Risk and Society (1)

• “Thus the question of how misfortunes are explained and handled contains a significant critical potential – critical not in the sense of an appeal to reject the society that finds itself exposed to such misfortunes, but critical in the sense of a heightened, not self-evident capacity to draw distinctions. We are dealing with the other side of the normal form – and it is only by referring to the other side of the normal form that it can be recognized as a form.” (Luhmann 1991)

Risk and Society (2) “In risk societies, the consequences and successes of

modernization become an issue with the speed and radicalism of processes of modernization. […] Under such conditions, a new moral climate of politics develops in which cultural and hence nationally varying, evaluations play a central role and arguments for and against real or possible consequences of technical and economic decisions are publicly conducted. In this process, the functions of science and technology also change. Over the past two centuries, the judgment of scientists has replaced tradition in Western societies. Paradoxically, however, the more science and technology permeate and transform life on a global scale, the less this expert authority is taken as a given. In discourses concerning risk, in which questions of normative (self-)limitation also arise, the mass media, parliaments, social movements, governments, philosophers, lawyers, writers, etc., are winning the right to make

decisions.” (Beck 2009)

Nuclear Energy and Risk

• Nuclear energy is obviously risky – but it serves a number of strategical goals, such as

– increasing the number of sources of energy

– decreasing energy dependency

– guaranteeing energy supply

– meeting cutting edge in science

– …

Cost? Benefit!

Mayak (Chelyabinsk)

film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MVLYPkMlBA

Mayak (Chelyabinsk)

Assessment

• Dumping ~ 76 million m3 of radioactive water into Techa river (1949-1956)

• Explosion of a poorly maintained storage tank, releasing 50-100 t of high-level radioactive waste (1957)

radiation estimated higher than Chernobyl

number of direct/indirect victims unknown

contamination of the Techa river 250 km + x

contamination of land of 8 x 110 km2 15

Mayak (Chelyabinsk)

• Management (ad hoc)

– Exterminating harvest, slaughtering cattle

– Banning (water from the river, agriculture, cattle)

– Evacuating ~ 10.000 people one week after

• Communication

– No public information at all

– Uncovering in 1976, 1979 (Sh. Medvedev)

– Informing IAEO in 1989

16

Mayak (Chelyabinsk)

Lesson learned?

• Management – Mayak still employs ~ 10.000 people

– ~ 280.000 people still live in the contaminated area • Invalidity pension for some people

• No sufficient health care

• Communication – “Something happens – look at the ongoing

evacuation.“

17

Chernobyl

film: http://video.about.com/history1900s/The-Chernobyl-Disaster.htm

Chernobyl

Assessment

• Explosions and fire in the core of one reactor that disperses radioactive fuel and core materials into the atmosphere (1986)

number of direct/indirect victims unknown

~ 100.000 km² significantly contaminated

Chernobyl

Management (ad hoc)

• Immediate set-up of a state commission for investigating the accident

• Immediate evacuation of ~ 53.000 people of the nearby town of Pripyat and surrounding villages

• Setting an exclusion zone (30 km)

• Shortening May 1 celebrations in Kiev

Liquidation process, sarcophagus, etc. (cost bankrupted USSR virtually)

Chernobyl

Communication

• April 26, 1986, 1:23 A.M.: Explosion

• April 28, 1986: USSR admits that something happened (after initial evidence from Sweden)

• May 6, 1986: Press conference in Moscow > USSR

• May 14, 1986: TV address by Gorbachev

Acceleration of glasnost (~ openness, esp. for the field of press) after its confirmation as party policy in March 1986

Kursk

film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNv9q1laBM8

Kursk

Assessment

• Sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea during military exercise (2000)

Death of 118 crew members

Amount of radiation unclear

Kursk

Management (ad hoc) – Failing of the initial rescue operation: Despite

international offers for assistance, international rescue teams were involved four days after the accident

– Setting-up two commissions for investigation

Communication

– 2 days after: Statement by the Navy

– 4 days after: Statement by Putin (vacations)

– 11 days after: Meeting Putin/members of the families

Kursk

Lessons learned? • Management

– no Navy reform – no dismissal/withdrawl from office – compensation for families: apartment, 26.000 US$ +

electricity for free, etc.

• Communication – awarding the “Order of Courage” to all of the crew

and the title “Hero of the Russian Federation” to the submarine's captain

– Putin‘s attendance at the memorial/funeral ceremony

Comparison

Mayak Chernobyl Kursk

1957 1986 2000

Assessment Nature as a factory: maintenance (-) sustainability (-)

Maintenance (?) Maintenance (?)

Management Inappropriate and in detail top secret – secrecy valued higher than human life

Political management “up to a point” from Moscow, attempts to deal with Chernobyl technically

Denial of foreign assistance; “politics vs. military”

Communication Crisis alien to the system/ anti-risk and anti-crisis world view: concealing reframing, no communication until 1989

Delayed communication under international pressure, “up to a point”, facing the crisis

Delayed political communication, facing the crisis, then even emotional support