Major Peebles

2.1543 In my opinion, Peebles’ visits to the TDF on Sunday and Monday must have caused him to realise that the Detainees were being mistreated, not only by the guards but also by the very fact of being kept hooded and in stress positions. To let these processes continue for such a long time as 36 hours was, in my view, wholly unjustified and unacceptable.

Vol I, page 371

Lt Craig Rodgers (retired)

2.1472 The fact that Rodgers at no stage remonstrated with or controlled his Multiple or reported what he must have known was going on to a superior officer is, in my opinion, a very serious breach of duty which had very serious consequences. It was a failure to demonstrate the moral courage required of any officer of whatever age or rank. If he had taken action when first he knew what was going on, Baha Mousa would almost certainly not have died.Vol I, page 358

Col Mendonca (retired)

2.1644 If Mendonça had appreciated that there was such a risk, as in my opinion he ought to have, he should have either banned the use of stress positions and hooding as well, or himself raised the matter formally with Brigade. Mendonça’s failure in this regard was a very significant one. As the Commanding Officer, he had a non-delegable responsibility to ensure that detainees were treated humanely. In permitting the process of conditioning of detainees he failed to appreciate that the use of hoods and stress positions to gain intelligence was totally unacceptable.

Vol I, page 391

Lack of discipline and moral courage

2.1330 It hardly needs saying that the events I have described raise very serious concerns about discipline within 1 QLR. The assaults were not perpetrated by just one or two rogue individuals. I have found that at least nineteen different men were involved in assaulting the Detainees. They did so in the middle of the Battlegroup’s main camp, in a building with no doors, apparently with little regard for the consequences of being caught. At least three senior NCOs were personally involved in the assaults. And I have found that several officers must have been aware of at least some of the abuse. There was undoubtedly a severe breakdown in military discipline on this particular occasion.

Father Peter Madden2.844 I find it inconceivable that when Madden went into the TDF he could not have observed what others had seen and described, namely the appallingly squalid conditions in the TDF and the obvious distress of the Detainees. Having reached this conclusion, it is inevitable that Madden, in my opinion, ought either to have intervened there and then or, more realistically, straight away reported it up the chain of command. It is a matter of regret that he did not find the courage to do either. Vol I, page 231

Dr Derek Keilloh

MOD Training

16.356 …. the MoD would do well to reflect and act upon the shortcomings that have permitted ongoing training in breach of the prohibition on the five techniques to continue up until September 2010, seven years after Baha Mousa’s death.

Vol III, page 1248

Harshing

16.191 …. the MoD has previously permitted the harsh approach to include practices which are entirely unacceptable and should never have been taught.

Vol III, page1201

Tactical Questioning Practices

16.157 ….. I have significant concerns that hitherto there has been a systemic failure to scrutinise practices relating to tactical questioning and interrogation with sufficient vigour.

Vol III, page 1194

Systemic Failure

318. I attribute the main fault for the inclusion of inappropriate training and/or exclusion of appropriate material to a systemic failure over a number of years.Vol III, page 1334

293. This position had developed over decades and was the product not only of failings but also of missed opportunities. In those circumstances, although I make comments about the role played by some individuals at certain times, it is fair and appropriate to conclude that the position outlined above was as a result of a corporate failure by the MoD.Vol III, page 1330

Interrogation Policy

7.221….To this extent, in my opinion, the MoD did not have a grasp on, or adequate understanding of, its own interrogation policy.

Vol II, page 698

Why it mattered

7.223….the absence of a clear statement in the Directive that conditioning and the five techniques were prohibited in prisoner handling and tactical questioning operations may have contributed to the failure to prevent such conduct. Had there been such a clear statement disseminated to all units it may have prevented at least some of what happened in the TDF.

Vol II, page 698

MOD Defensiveness

15.177 Against this background, it would have been better had the MoD faced more squarely and more openly the mistakes and shortcomings that had already been identified in relation to hooding and tactical questioning. Many of the difficulties stemmed from what I detect was at times something of a corporate approach of taking overly defensive lines in response to difficult questions.

Vol III, page 1153

Inaccurate MOD statements

15.173 …. I find that there was an unsatisfactory pattern of too many inaccurate assurances and explanations being given within the MoD statements and briefing materials.

Vol III, page 1152