LTL Course Outline_Midterms Coverage-1

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LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGICFirst Semester, SY 2012-2013

First Year LawBulacan State University College of Law

Atty. Raquel R. T. Pineda-Dolores

Suggested Reading Materials / Sources:

Aldisert, Ruggero J., Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking (3 rd ed.,1997)Epstein, Richard L., Critical Thinking (2nd ed., 1992)Moore, Brooke Noel and Parker, Richard, Critical Thinking (7 th ed., 2005)

COURSE OUTLINE

I. Introduction

A. Basics of logic and its application to legal thinking and legalargument

“Thinking like a lawyer”

B. Civil Law Tradition v. Common Law Tradition1. Definitions and differences

Civil Law Tradition Common Law TraditionCodified Uncodified

Updated Customs and Traditions

2. Is the Philippine legal system a civil law or common lawsystem?

Hybrid, Under the rule of stare decisis wherein it states that “do not disturb whathas been settled. Matters already decided on the merits shall not be relitigatedagain and again.

3. Reasoning and the Common Law Tradition

a. Adjudication of specific cases

Ruling changes upon change of constitution and upon doctrine of finality of judgment.

b. Doctrine of precedent or stare decisis

STARE DECISISIt is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle, and apply it to

all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether

the parties and properties are the same.



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Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been

settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and

again.

“Stare decisis et non quieta movere” (follow past precedents and do not disturb

what has been settled.

C. The Role of Logic1. Case law stands or falls on the reasons articulated to justify it

a. “Where stops the reason, there stops the rule.”b. Elegantia juris subordinated to the objective of social

utility 2. Value Judgments

II. Legal Thinking

A. Moral, Aesthetic and Legal Reasoning

1. Moral reasoning and moral deliberationa. Moral relativism – what is right and wrong depends on

and is determined by one’s group or culture

Subjectivism – extreme form of relativism; whatis right and wrong is just a matter of subjectiveopinion

b. Utilitarianism – based on the principle of utility(maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness); if anindividual can feel pleasure or pain, then he/shedeserves moral consideration; concerned with theconsequences of actions and decisions; if an act will

produce more happiness than will the alternatives, theact is the right one to do

problematic aspect – when we deliberatewhether or not to do something, we do notalways take into consideration just the effect of the action on happiness, e.g. other people haverights that we sometimes take into account, aswell as our duties and obligations; utilitarianismalso seems to discount people’s intentions(mugger example)

c. Duty theory or deontologism – propounded byImmanuel Kant (1724-1804); when it comes toevaluating an action morally, what counts is not theresult or consequences of the action, but the intentionfrom which it is done

the morally best intention is that according towhich you do something just because it is yourmoral duty

d. Divine command theory – belief that moral duty is setby an authority of some sort

e. Virtue ethics – focuses not on what to do, but on howto be; the moral issue is not one of single actions ortypes of actions but of developing a good character

Cases:



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White Light Corp., et al. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. P-02-1651, 4 August 2003

2. Aesthetic reasoning

Aesthetic principles: An object is aesthetically valuableif:a. It is meaningful or teaches us truths.b. It has the capacity to convey values or beliefs

that is central to the cultures or traditions inwhich it originates or that is important to theartist/s who made it.

c. It has the capacity to help bring about social orpolitical change.

d. It has the capacity to produce pleasure in thosewho experience or appreciate it.

e. It has the capacity to produce certain emotions

we value, at least when the emotion is broughtabout by art rather than life.

f. It has the capacity to produce special non-emotional experiences, such as a feeling of autonomy or the willing suspension of disbelief.

g. It possesses a special aesthetic property(beauty) or exhibits a special aesthetic form.

h. No reasoned argument can conclude thatobjects are aesthetically valuable or valueless(De gustibus non est disputandum – tastescannot be disputed).

3. Legal reasoning

Similarities between moral and legal claims: they areboth often prescriptive (they tell us what we shoulddo); both play a role in guiding our conduct

“Moral offenses”; crimes listed in our penal code thatalso are offenses against morality; exceptions

Grounds for justification of lawsa. Legal moralism – the law should make anything

illegal that is immoralb. Harm principle – harm to others is the only

ground for forbidding an activity

c. Legal paternalism – laws can be justified if theyprevent a person from doing harm to him/herself

d. Offense principle – some behavior is generallyfound offensive

Appeal to precedent – practice in the law of using acase that has already been decided as an authoritativeguide in deciding a new case that is similar

Cases:Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. P-02-1651, 4 August 2003Ebralinag, et al. v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, et

al., G.R. Nos. 95770 & 95887, 29 December 1995



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Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec, G.R. No.190529, 29 April 2010

B. Elements of Legal Thinking

Case method study – study of the logical methods and

principles used to make (court) decisions Socratic method – a dialectical method of teaching or

discussion made popular by Socrates. It involves askingquestions that guide the answerer to a logical conclusion. It isthe art or practice of forcing arguments to be examined withan unrelenting logical process in order to test their soundnessand validity.

Preparing for the Socratic method (for law students)

Logical thought – progression of thought based on the logicalrelation between truths

Reflective thinking – operation in which present facts suggestother facts (or truths) in such a way as to induce belief inwhat is suggested on the ground of real relation in the thingsthemselves, a relation between what suggests and what issuggested

Legal thinking – application of reflective thinking to problemsolving in the law

If p then q; here is p; therefore, here is q.

III. The Language of Logic

A. Basic expressions in logic1. Proposition – statement or assertion which is either

true or false,and can be asserted or denied

Divided into two terms (often Middle-Major, Minor-Middle and Minor-Major) and a copula or a connectinglink between the terms

2. Term – simplest unit into which a proposition, and later asyllogism, can be logically resolved

3. Inference – process in which one proposition (a conclusion) isarrived at and affirmed on the basis of one or more otherpropositions

The key to a logical inference is the reasonable

probability that the conclusion flows from theevidentiary datum because of past experiences inhuman affairs.

Difference with implication

We infer a conclusion from the data; the dataimplies the conclusion.

4. Argument – group of propositions where one proposition isclaimed to follow from the others, and where the others aretreated as furnishing grounds or support for the truth of theone

5. Conclusion – the one proposition that is arrived at andaffirmed on the basis of the other propositions of the

argument



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6. Premise – the other propositions which are assumed orotherwise accepted as providing support or justification foraccepting the one proposition which is the conclusion

7. Deductive reasoning – conclusions are reached from thegeneral to the particular; if the premises are true, the

conclusion is equally true Deductive arguments – the conclusion is claimed to

follow from its premises with absolute necessity8. Inductive reasoning – conclusions are reached from a number

of particulars to the general, or from a particular to anotherparticular

Inductive arguments – the conclusion is claimed tofollow from its premises only with some degree of probability

9. Belief – assertion about a fact or law that we accept;something we affirm, or at least acquiesce in, even though itis a matter of which we have no sure knowledge or proof

In the law, our major proposition – major premise –must have a legal authority.

B. Conclusion testing

A conclusion can be true only when (1) the other propositions(premises) are true, and (2) these propositions imply theconclusion.

Not all means of persuasion are based on reflective thinkingor formal logic; some forms of persuasion do not qualify, i.e.rhetoric.

Exercises (drawing preliminary inferences)

IV. Introduction to Deductive Reasoning and Inductive Reasoning

A. Deductive Reasoning

Two propositions which imply the third proposition, the conclusion,are called premises. The broad proposition that forms the startingpoint of deduction is called the major premise; the secondproposition is called the minor premise. The major premiserepresents the all; the minor premise, something orsomeone included in the all.

B. Inductive Reasoning

In law, as in general logic, there are fundamental differencesbetween the two types of reasoning:

Deductive Reasoning Inductive Reasoning The connection between a givenpiece of information and anotherpiece of information concludedfrom it is a necessary connection.

The connection between givenpieces of information and anotherpiece inferred from them is not alogically necessary connection.

A deductive argument is one whose

conclusion is claimed to follow fromits premises with absolute

An inductive argument is one

whose conclusion is claimed tofollow from its premises only with



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necessity. If the premises are valid,the conclusion is valid. If theconclusion is valid, the premisesare valid.

probability and not absolutenecessity. All that is represented isthat the conclusion is moreprobable than not. Its premises donot provide conclusive support for

the conclusion; they provide onlysome support for it.In a valid deductive argument, if the premises are true, theconclusion must be true.

In a valid inductive argument, theconclusion is not necessarily anabsolute truth; by induction, wereach a conclusion that is onlymore probably true than not.

Moves by inference from thegeneral (universal) ultimately tothe particular.

Moves from the particular to thegeneral (universal) (inducedgeneralization by enumeration of instances), or from the particular tothe particular (analogy).

The core of the difference lies in the strength of the claim that ismade about the premises and its conclusion.

1. Inductive Generalization

The premise, in general form, resulted from theprocess of enumeration; it was created by enumerationof billions of particulars to create a general statement.

The creation of a major premise in law by thistechnique, although not guaranteed to produce anabsolute truth, does produce a proposition more likely

true than not. Formulating a generalization in the law – enumerating

a series of tight holdings of cases (legal rules) to createa generalized legal precept (legal principle) – is at besta logic of probabilities.

2. Analogy

Pursuant to the method of analogy, the courts do notgeneralize from a series of holdings, but proceed fromcertain relevant resemblances and differencesbetween the case at bar and another single case or arelatively small group of cases.

Difference between inductive generalization and analogy:

The force of an induced generalization by enumeration ismeasured by the quantity of instances. The force of analogydepends upon the quality of the positive and negativeresemblances – what is important is relevancy .

V. Deductive Reasoning

A. Categorical Syllogism

Syllogism: an argument containing premises and a conclusion

Categorical syllogism: deductive argument which consists of

three categorical propositions, consisting exactly three terms,



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in which each of the three terms occurs in exactly two of thepropositions.

Categorical logic: logic based on the relations of inclusionsand exclusions among classes (“categories”)

1. Termsa. Major Term – usually the predicate of the majorpremise and also of the conclusion

b. Minor Term – the subject of the minor premise and alsoof the conclusion

c. Middle Term – appears in the two premises, but not inthe conclusion; medium of comparison between themajor and minor terms

2. Premisesa. Major Premise – proposition in which the major and

middle terms are compared togetherb. Minor Premise – proposition which compares the minor

and middle termsc. Conclusion – contains the major and minor terms only

Ex. Major Premise: All men are mortal.Minor Premise: Socrates is a man.Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.

3. Quantity of Propositions or Termsa. Propositions:

i. Broad or general – “universal”ii. Narrow or specific – “particular”

b. Terms:i. Broad or general – “distributed”ii. Narrow or specific – “undistributed”

4. Categorical Propositions and Classesa. Relationship of Classes

i. Containment: Every member of one class is saidto be a member of (included or contained in)another class.Ex. All judges are honest.

ii. No relationship: No member of one class is saidto be a member of a second class.

Ex. No judges are honest.iii. Partial Containment: Some, but perhaps not all,

members of one class are said to be members of (included or contained in) another class.Ex. Some judges are honest.

iv. Partial Non-Containment: Some, but perhaps notall, members of one class are said not to bemembers of (included or contained in) anotherclass.Ex. Some judges are not honest.

b. Standard Forms of Categorical Proposition

(S – Subject Term, P – Predicate Term)



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A: Universal Affirmative Proposition (All S is P)E: Universal Negative Proposition (No S is P)I: Particular Affirmative Proposition (Some S is P)O: Particular Negative Proposition (Some S is not P)

c. Categorical Propositions: Quality and Quantity

Every standard form categorical proposition is said tohave both a quality and quantity.Quality: Affirmative or NegativeQuantity: Universal or Particular

Universal Quantifiers: “All”, “No”Particular Quantifier: “Some”



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d. Categorical Propositions: Distribution

A proposition distributes a term (subject class orpredicate class and middle, major or minor term) if itrefers to all members of the class designated by the

term.

Universal Affirmative (A) Propositions:Subject Term: DistributedPredicate Term: Undistributed

Universal Negative (E) Propositions:Subject Term: DistributedPredicate Term: Distributed

Particular Affirmative (I) Propositions:Subject Term: UndistributedPredicate Term: Undistributed

Particular Negative (O) Propositions:

Subject Term: UndistributedPredicate Term: Distributed

Quantity of a proposition determines whether itssubject term is distributed.

Quality of a proposition determines whether itspredicate term is distributed.

e. Distributed-Undistributed Terms: Universal-ParticularPropositions

Case: MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 227 N.Y. 382,111 N.E. 1050 (1916) – include Chief Judge Bartlett’sdissenting opinion

Summary:i. The first inquiry is whether the subject or the

predicate term refers to the whole class, or partof the class.

ii. If the reference is to the whole class, the subjector predicate term is said to be distributed.

iii. If the reference is to part of the class, thesubject or the predicate term is said to be

undistributed.iv. The subject of a universal proposition is

distributed because a universal applies to thewhole class.

v. The subject of a particular proposition isundistributed because the proposition applies toonly a part of the class.

vi. The predicate of an affirmative proposition isundistributed.

vii. The predicate of a negative proposition isdistributed.

B. Enthymeme – argument where one of the premises or theconclusion is not expressed; argument is stated incompletely, part



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being “understood” or “only in the mind”; found in many legal briefsand judicial opinions

1. Identifying unstated premisesEx. [Premise] You can’t check books out of the library

without an ID card. So [conclusion] Bill won’t be able tocheck any books out. The unstated premise must be “Bill has no ID card.”

2. Identifying unstated conclusionsEx. [Premise] The political party that best reflects

mainstream opinion will win the most seats in the nextelection, and [premise] the Republicans certainly bestreflect mainstream opinion.

The unstated conclusion is “The Republicans will winthe most seats in the next election.”

C. Polysyllogism – series of syllogisms in which the conclusion of oneis a premise of the next

Prosyllogism: the syllogism whose conclusion becomes asucceeding premise

Episyllogism: syllogism in which one premise is the conclusion of a preceding syllogism

Ex. [Premise] Every student who made 90% or better on themidterms has already been assigned a grade of A. [Premise]Since Margaret made 94% on her midterms, [conclusion] shealready has her A.

[Premise] All those students who have been assigned A’s areexcused from the final exam. [Premise] Margaret got an A, so[conclusion] she is excused from the final exam.

The claim that Margaret has a grade of A is the conclusion of thefirst argument but a premise in the second.

D. Premises: Validity and Soundness

The validity of a syllogism and the soundness of the argument’sstructure deal only with relations between the premises. Validitydeals only with form. It has absolutely nothing to do withcontent. Arguments, therefore, may be logically valid, yet

absolutely nonsensical.

Ex.All judges have green blood.Mr. Alpha is a judge.

Therefore, Mr. Alpha has green blood.

E. Six Rules of the Categorical Syllogism (CS)1. A valid CS must contain exactly three terms, each of which is

used in the same sense throughout the argument.2. In a valid CS, the middle term must be distributed in at least one

premise.3. In a valid CS, no term can be distributed in the conclusion which

is not distributed in the premise.4. No CS is valid which has two negative premises.



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5. If either premise of a valid CS is negative, the conclusion mustbe negative.

6. No valid CS with a particular conclusion can have two universalpremises.

Cases:Morales Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-26572, 28 March 1969

Tavora v. Gavina, G.R. No. L-1257, 30 October 1947, including Resolutiondated 11 December 1947

VI. Inductive Reasoning

Critical in the common-law tradition; undergirds the doctrine of precedent: like things must be treated alike

A. Inductive Generalization (induction by enumeration)

In the law, it is the method of arriving at a general, orperhaps, a universal, proposition (a principle or doctrine)from the particular facts of experiences (legal rules orholdings of cases).

Underlies the development of the common law; from manyspecific case holdings, a generalized proposition is reached.

The larger the number of specific instances, the more certainis the resulting generalization; this is simple fealty to theconcept of probability . However, beware of the conversefallacy of accident (fallacy of hasty generalization), afallacious reasoning that seeks to establish a generalization

by the enumeration of instances, without obtaining arepresentative number of instances (“jumping toconclusions”).

B. Analogy

Does not seek proof of an identity of one thing with another,but only a comparison of resemblances.

Unlike the technique of enumeration, analogy does notdepend upon the quantity of instances, but upon the qualityof resemblances between things.

In the law, points of unlikeness are as important as likenessin the cases examined.

Criteria in the appraisal of analogical arguments:1. The acceptability of the analogy will vary proportionally with

the number of circumstances that have been analyzed.2. The acceptability will depend upon the number of positive

resemblances (similarities) and negative resemblances(dissimilarities).

3. The acceptability will be influenced by the relevance of thepurported analogies. An argument based on a single relevantanalogy connected with a single instance will be more cogentthan one which points out a dozen irrelevant resemblances.

Cases:MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 227 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)



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Nielson and Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. L-21601, 17 December 1966

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1257 October 30, 1947

NICANOR TAVORA, petitioner,

vs.

BONIFACIO N. GAVINA and PEDRO O. ARCIAGA, respondents.

Tavora and Zandueta for petitioner.

Mon and Gavina for respondent Gavina.

Pedro O. Arciaga in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

There is no question about the fact alleged in the petition, that the petitioner was

appointed justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, and took possession of his office

on or about April 16, 1916, that he has not resigned nor has been removed therefrom, and that

he has ceased to act as such justice of the peace on December 1941, but reassumed his office

after liberation, that is, on April 27, 1945.

According to section 9 Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, the members

of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior

until they reach the age of seventy years,or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of

their office.

The fact that the petitioner has performed the duties of justice of the peace of themunicipality of San Fernando, La Union, during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines,



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by virtue of appointment made by the Chaiman of the Executive Commission, did not

constitute an abandonment of his office held under the Commonwealth, because the

government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a foreign

government, but a government established by the military occupant as an agency thereof to

preserve order during the occupation. This Court, in its resolution denying the motion for

reconsideration in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113),held among others the following:

(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth continued

in the Philippines by the belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan, and their

judgments and proceedings being acts of foreign courts can not now be considered

valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth Government after the

restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our decision the fundamental

reasons why said courts, while functioning during the Japanese regime, could not be

considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient now to invite attention to the decision of

the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs.

Montgomery, 13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., which we did not deem necessary to quote

in our decision, in which it was held that "the courts, established or sanctioned in

Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing

more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the

conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while

it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and

their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to

interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate

upon a question of prize or no prize." (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13

How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240.)

The appointment by President Osmeña of the respondent Bonifacio N. Gavina as ad-

interim justice of the peace of San Fernando on February 18, 1946, did not oust the petitioner

from his office, not only because such appointment was disapproved by the Commission on

Appointments, but because the petitioner had the constitutional right to continue in office

until he has reached the age of seventy years, and the President of the Commonwealth had no

power to remove the petitioner from office without just cause and previous investigation.

The appointment of the other respondent Pedro O. Arciaga as justice of the peace of the

same municipality made by the President of the Republic of the Philippines and approved by

the Commission on Appointments on July 27, 1946, did not remove the petitioner from his

office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, since the petitioner had theconstitutional right to continue as such justice of the peace until he has reached 70 years; and

upon the cessation of the American sovereignty over these Islands and the proclamation of

the Philippine Independence, the petitioner did not cease to be justice of the peace of said

municipality of San Fernando, La Union. In this connection the writer of this opinion in his

concurring opinion in the case of Brodett vs. De la Rosa (77 Phil., 752), held the following:

The petitioners impugn the validity of the judgment of the respondent judge on

the ground that, as said respondent was not reappointed by the President of the

Republic of the Philippines, he must have ceased to be judge upon the proclamation

of the Independence of the Philippines. Presumably the petitioners' contention is

based on the legal maxim of statutory construction — expressio unius est exclusioalterius, and the provision of our Constitution relating to the officers of the



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Commonwealth who should continue in office after the proclamation of our

Independence, which says:

The officials elected and serving under this Constitution shall be constitutional

officers of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and qualified to

function in all respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall servetheir full terms of office as prescribed in this Constitution.

The Philippine Independence Act promulgated by the Congress of the United

States on March 24, 1944, provides in its section 2 (b) (2) as follows:

(b) The constitution [of the Philippines] shall also contain the following

provisions, effective as of the date of the proclamation of the President recognizing

the independence of the Philippine Islands, as hereinafter provided:

(2) That the officials elected and serving under the constitution adopted

pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall be constitutional officers of the free and

independent Government of the Philippine Islands and qualified to function in all

respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall served their full terms

of office as prescribed in the Constitution.

The last quoted provision which is incorporated in paragraph or section 1 (2),

Article XVII, of the Constitution, constitutes a limitation on the power of the framers

of our Constitution to provide for the continuance or cessation of the officers therein

mentioned. As they were not at liberty to insert or not said provision, its inclusion in

our Constitution can not be considered as the expression of their intention that the

officers therein mentioned shall continue as officer of the free and independentgovernment of the Philippines. Consequently, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, which is based upon the rules of logic and the natural working of the human

mind and serve as a guide in determining the probable intention of the makers of laws

and constitutions expressly mentioning some and not others, can not be applied or

invoked in support of the contention that, from the inclusion of said provision it may

be inferred that it was the intention of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention

which drafted our Constitution that appointive officers and employees and other

elective officials should cease or not continue in office upon the proclamation of our

Independence.

On the other hand, as the framers of our Constitution were free to provide in theConstitution for the cessation or continuation in office of all appointive officers and

employees and all other elective officers under the Commonwealth, if it were their

intention that they should not continue or cease, they could and should have so

expressly provided; but they did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitution

prescribes that "The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts

shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years or

become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office," (section 9, Article VIII);

that "The Auditor General shall hold office for a term of ten years and may not be

reappointed" (section 1, Article XI); that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service

shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (section 4,

Article XII).



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There is no doubt that the Constitution of the Philippines is a Constitution for

the Commonwealth and the Republic. Article XVIII thereof provides that "The

government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of

the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the

United States and the proclamation of the Philippine Independence, the

Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of thePhilippines." The only provisions of the Constitution not applicable to the

Commonwealth are those of Article XVII which became effective upon the

declaration of the Independence of the Philippines; and the provisions of the

Constitution not applicable to the Republic of the Philippines are those of Article

XVI, or the transitory provisions from the former colonial or territorial to the

Commonwealth Government.

The Constitution, referring to the transition from the former Philippine

Government to the Commonwealth, provides in its section 4, Article XVI, that "All

officers and employees of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue in

office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments

are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective offices,

upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is

made within a period of one year from the date of the inauguration of the

Commonwealth of the Philippines." Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution

deemed it necessary to so provide in order to avoid any doubt about their authority to

continue in office; because the said officers and employees were appointed by

authorityof the People of the United States represented by the Congress and the

President of the United States, or the Jones Law; while the officers and employees of

the Commonwealth of the Philippines were to be appointed by authority of the People

of the Philippines in whom the sovereignty resides and from whom all governmentauthority emanates, according to section 1, Article II of the Constitution of the

Philippines.

But there is no similar provision in the Constitution covering the transition from

the Commonwealth to the Republic. Evidently, it was not deemed necessary to

provide expressly in the Constitution for the continuation of all the officers and

employees of the Commonwealth Government, because thay had to continue, in the

absence of an express provision to the contrary, for they are officers and employees

appointed by authority of the People of the Philippines, since the Commonwealth as

well as the Republic are government established by the same Filipino people in the

exercise of their sovereignty, limited under the Commonwealth and complete or absolute after the proclamation of our independence.

That the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government,

though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence

Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not

only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the

Independence Law quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the

declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority

emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of

the United States. The late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress

said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practiceregards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent



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nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood."

(Congressional Record Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173). And it is a principle upheld by the

Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones

vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law ed., 691, 696) that the question of

sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the

legislative and executivedepartments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects."

A contrary construction, that is, that all appointive officers and employees of

the Government of the Commonwealth, from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

to an office messenger had ceased ipso facto or automatically upon the proclamation

of the Independence of the Philippines, would lead to enormous public inconvenience,

a complete paralization of all the functions of the government, since it would

necessarily require a considerable period of time to appoint the new officers and

employees in their place. And if they were to hold over or continue in office until

their successors are appointed, as there is no limitation provided in the Constitution as

to the time within which the appointing powers may or must appoint their successors,

a sort of Damocles' sword would be left hanging and ready to fall over the heads of

said officers and employees for an indefinite period of time, to the detriment of the

proper discharge of their functions and the independence that is to be expected from

judges in the performance of their duties, essential for a good and clean government.

In view of all the foregoing, it is evident that the respondent judge had the

constitutional right to continue acting as judge after the proclamation of the Philippine

Independence, and that, therefore, the judgment rendered by him in the present case is

that of a judge de jure and valid.

The fact that during the pendency of the present case before this Court, the petitioner

reached the age of seventy years, can not affect the question involved in the present case, that

is, whether or not the petitioner was the rightful justice of the peace of San Fernando, La

Union, at the time the respondent Arciaga was appointed on July, 1946, justice of the peace

in lieu of the petitioner, and afterwards until he has reached the age of seventy years.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude and hold that the petitioner had the right to

continue in office until he has reached the age of seventy years, with all the the privileges and

emoluments appurtenant to the office; and that the ad-interim appointment of respondent

Gavina disapproved, and of the respondent Arciaga approved, by the the Commission on

Appointments, had no effect whatever on the status of the petitioner as justice of the peace of San Fernando until he has reached the age of seventy years.

Moran, C.J., Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions



|17

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that petitioner had the right to continue in

office until he reached the age of seventy years, with all the privileges and emolumentsthereto, appertaining, and that the ad interim appointments of respondent Gavina which was

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, and that of respondent Arciaga which was

approved thereby, did not operate to deprive petitioner of his right and title to said office until

he reached the age of 70 years on January 8, 1947. My reasons follow:

Although I am of opinion that the constitutional right of members of the Supreme

Court and judges of inferior courts to hold office during good behavior until they reach at the

age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, is waivable by

the incumbent, and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of abandonment

in proper cases, I do not see from the record that petitioner has waived said constitutional

right nor that he has abandoned his office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union,

to which he was appointed and in which he duly qualified, and which he took possession of

on April 16, 1916. Petitioner's appointment as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La

Union, by the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, and which he alleges to

have accepted "fearful that he might be branded or suspected as being anti-Japanese with

injurious consequences to himself and his family," under which he avers that he "acted, not

willingly, as such Justice of the Peace until July, 1944, but remaining all the time loyal of the

United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and now to the Republic

of the Philippines" (Complaint, paragraph II [c], there being no allegation on the part of

respondents that petitioner acted willfully and disloyally toward his lawful government and to

that the United States), did not in my opinion work an abandonment of his Commonwealthappointment, for the double reason that if under the theory of the majority of this Court the

Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto government, then it was a different

government from the Commonwealth Government, which latter, under such theory, must be

considered as suspended in the areas where such de facto government operated, with the

consequences that when petitioner acted as justice of the peace of said de facto government

his functions under the de jure government were in a state of suspension, which in turn give

rise to the result that hedid not need to abandon his Commonwealth appointment in order to

be able to accept the occupation appointment; and that if the Philippine Executive

Commission was not even a de facto government but a mere puppet organization, under my

theory, then petitioner's appointment thereby was and is null and void so far as the Republic

is concerned; and, lastly, so far as the record reveals, his acceptance of the occupationappointments was under enemy pressure, and for that reason was null and void any way.

Besides, it appears that petitioner after the reestablishment of the Commonwealth

government, more specifically on April 27, 1945, was recalled to the office of the justice of

the peace of San Fernando, La Union, and thereafter acted and continued to act as such

justice of the peace until December 10, 1945, when he fell ill and obtained from the judge of

the Court of First Instance of the province a grant of sick leave, upon which occasion

respondent Gavina, who was justice of the peace of San Gabriel and San Juan, La Union, was

designated to act in petitioner's place "until he (petitioner) shall return to duty," (Exh. 1).

These facts clearly show that the mind of the Commonwealth Government petitioner had not

been guilty of disloyalty or within breach of his oath of office during the occupation.



|18

Pablo and Perfecto, JJ. concur.

R E S O L U T I O N

December 11, 1947

FERIA, J.:

This Court did not exercise its discretion ot require the appearance of the Solicitor

General in this case under section 23, Rule 3, because the action does not involve the validity

of any treaty, law, ordinance,or executive order or regulation; and did not notify him of the

filing of this action, because it is not the duty of the Solicitor General to represent the

respondent Arciaga under section 1661 (b) of the Administrative Code, since this is a quo

warranto proceeding instituted against the said respondent, not in his official capacity as

justice of the peace, but in his private capacity as an alleged intruder or person alleged to be

unlawfully holding the public office of justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, to

which the latter is entitled under the Constitution.

However, we shall pass upon the merits of the motion for reconsideration and new trial

filed by the office of the Solicitor General (signed by the First Assistant Solicitor General

Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon), in order to put in bolder relief the

unassailability of our opinion on the right of the appointive officers of the Commonwealth to

continue as officers of the Republic. For clearness' sake, we shall first state the basis of our

opinion and then the arguments of the Solicitor General.

We hold, in our decision in this case, that the petitioner could not be removed from his

office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, because section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution provides that "the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior

courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or

become incapacitated to discharge their office." The transition from the Commonwealth to

the Republic did not affect those officers appointed or holding office during the

Commonwealth, since there can be no doubt that the Constitution of the Philippines is for the

Commonwealth as well as for the Republic. The Constitution is for both, because Article

XVIII thereof provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known

as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the

sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of the Philippine independence, the

Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the

Philippines."

We stated in our decision that, it cannot be contended that the intention of the framers

of the Constitution to provide that appointive officers of the Commonwealth should cease or

not continue as officers of the Republic, may be inferred from the inclusion of the provision

of section 2 (b) of the Philippine Independence Act of Tydings-McDuffie Law in our

Constitution (as section 1 [2], Article XVII) to the effect that "The officials elected and

serving under this constitution shall be constitutional officers of the free and independent

Government of the Philippines and qualified to function in all respects as if elected directly

under such government, and shall serve their full term of office as prescribed in the

Constitution. Because, the Congress of the United States having required the inclusion of the

above quoted provision in our Constitution, the framers thereof were not free or at liberty toinsert or not said provision therein; and therefore, the legal maxim "expressio unius est



|19

exclusio alterius" is not applicable, for this maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the

natural working of the human mind, and serves as a guide in determining the probable

intention of the makers of laws and constitutions in mentioning some and not others of the

same class.

The only arguments of the Solicitor General in support of his motion for reconsideration and new trial which deserve some consideration, boils down to a syllogism

the premises of which we are quoting verbatim from his memorandum, to wit:

Major premise: "Applying the maxim (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)there can be

no question as to the intention of the United States Congress, in providing that elective

officials should continue as officials of the independent Republic, to exclude those not

belonging to that category of officers [that is, that the latter should not continue in office

upon proclamation of our Independence]. On the other hand, the framers of our Constitution,

by inserting without alteration or amendment the constitutional provision in question must be

deemed to have also adopted the intention of the Congress of the United States as expressed

in the Tydings-McDuffie Act."

Minor premise: "The framers of the Constitution were most certainly free to provide

that other officers of the Commonwealth, besides those mentioned in said provision of the

Philippine Independence Act, should continue in office under the Republic. Not having done

so, the clear inference is that the framers of the Constitution likewise adopted the intention of

the United States Congress."

Conclusion: Therefore, it was also the intention of the framers of the Constitution that

the appointive and other elective officers of the Commonwealth should not continue as

officers under the Republic.

The major and minor premises of the syllogism are not correct, and therefore the

conclusion is untenable.

The major premise is incorrect, since it assumes that it was the intention of Congress,

in requiring the insertion of the above-quoted provision, that the appointive and other elective

officers of the Commonwealth should not continue in office as officers of the independent

Government of the Philippines. For it is evidently clear that the intention of the Congress of

the United States, in requiring that our Constitution should contain said transitory provision,

was to establish only that limitation on the Constitutiton and leave the framers thereof free or

at liberty to provide whether or not the appointive and other elective officers of theCommonwealth should continue as officers of the independent Government of the

Philippines. The Solicitor General admits that "the framers of the Constitution were free to

provide that other officers of the Commonwealth should continue in office under the

Republic," and consequently that they should also not continue. Had it been the intention of

the United States Congress that all the other officers of the Commonwealth should not

continue as officers of the Republic, it should have enacted a provision to that effect among

those required by the Tydings-McDuffie Act to be included in our Constitution.

The minor premise is also incorrect, for it was not possible for the framers of our

Constitution to have adopted by mere implication the assumed intention of the United States

Congress that the appointive and other elective officers of the Commonwealth should notcontinue as officers of the Republic. In the first place, because there was no such an intention



|20

of the United States Congress as already shown. And, besides because even assuming

arguendo that the United States Congress, in requiring the insertion in our Constitution of the

provision under consideration, had the intention that the appointive and other elective officers

of the Commonwealth should not continue as officers of the Republic, it can not be inferred

that the framers of our Constitution, in including said provision and not providing otherwise,

have adopted such intention of the Congress. For the simple reason that the provision of theTydings-McDuffie Law under consideration was not adopted but imposed upon the framers

of our Constitution, and the latter were not free to include it or not. To adopt a constitutional

or statutory provision with its necessary implications into another, presupposes freedom to do

or not to do so. The legal maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" is predicated upon

one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. Therefore, motion is denied.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., concurs in the result.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

The Solicitor General, in a pleading dated November 14, 1947, moved for the

reconsideration of our decision in this case promulgated on October 30, 1947. The main

question raised in the motion refers to the interpretation of subsection 2 of section 1 of Article

XVII of the Constitution which reads as follows:

The officials elected and serving under this Constitution shall be constitutional

officers of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and qualified to

function in all respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall serve

their full terms of office as prescribed in this Constitution.

The movant contends that, applying to the provision the Latin maxim "expressio unius

est exclusio alterius," we should reverse the doctrine set in our decision to the effect that the

appointive officers of the Commonwealth continue, without the need of a new appointment

under theRepublic, as de jure officers of the Republic and may not be removed from office

by the appointment of other persons in their places except in the manner and for the cause

provided by the Constitution or by statutory provision.

The question herein discussed has been raised for the first time in the petition dated

July 29, 1946, filed in the original case of prohibition of Brodett vs. De la Rosa.

Petitioners in said case impunged the validity of an order issued on July 16, 1946, byJudge Mariano L. de la Rosa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, upon the fact that said

judge has been appointed as such before the proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946,

and that not having been appointed under the Republic, he ceased to have authority to issue

the order in question by virtue of the constitutional provision now under our consideration.

Petitioners argued that in accordance with subsection 2 of section 1 of Article XVII of

the Constitution, upon the cessation of the Commonwealth Government on July 4, 1946, all

its officers, with the exception of the elective ones, ceased to have an authority. They

maintain that to retain said authority Judge De la Rosa must have been appointed anew by the

President under the Republic before issuing the order in question.



|21

Petitioner's contention was unanimously rejected by this Court in its decision

promulgated on December 18, 1946. To elaborate upon the Court's theory, Mr. Justice Feria

wrote a concurring opinion, the statements in which have been adopted in the majority

decision in the instant case.

After a careful re-examination of the question, we cannot find our way for reversingour pronouncement as to the inapplicability of the maxim. There is no single valid ground in

the arguments adduced by the Solicitor General to support the reversal.

The constitutional provision in question must be read and construed, not as an isolated

and independent precept, but as an integral part of the whole document in which it is

embodied, and in the light of the history of its enactment and insertion in the fundamental

law.

As truthfully stated by the writer of the majority decision in this case, the provision has

been inserted in compliance with one of the specific mandates of the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

As one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, we are in a position to certify that

this statement is based on fact.

It must be noted that there are three separate articles in the Constitution reproducing

provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act — Article XVI, Transitory Provisions, Article

XVII, Special Provisions Effective Upon the Proclamation of the Independence of the

Philippines, and unnumbered article entitled Ordinance Appended to the Constitution. At the

time we drafted the Constitution we had in mind two paramount purposes, to produce the best

possible constitution and to insure its approval by the President of the United States.

Whenever we felt that there was a conflict between the two,we sacrificed the first for the sake

of the second, having in mind that whatever defects the document might have could later becured by amendment when the metropolis shall have withdrawn completely its sovereignty

over our country.

The draft, as transferred to the Committee on Style, already embodied several

provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Still concerned with the idea of insuring the

approval of the President of the United States of America, the Committee on Style, composed

of the most representive members of the Convention, including some of the foremost leaders

of the two dominant political parties of the country, both committed to the platform of

securing our national independence, added to the next many other provisions taken from the

Tydings-McDuffie Act, so as to drive in the mind of President Roosevelt the conviction that

none of the conditions imposed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act may remain unfulfilled. Wewanted to be sure that the Constitution should come into effect and that upon the termination

of the ten-year transitory period our national independence shall be proclaimed. The complete

success of the political aims of the Constitutional Convention is born out by the events of

more than one decade of our national history.

Reading the provision in question, not as an isolated unit, but as an integral part, so it

is, of the fundamental law, there is absolutely no ground in support of the theory advanced by

the Solicitor General. The provisions of Articles XVI and XVII and of the Ordinance are of

special and transitory character and, therefore, should be strictly construed. Nothing ought to

be read in them which is not clearly intended by their clear wording.



|22

There is nothing in the provision in question to the effect that non-elective officers and

employees of the Commonwealth shall cease in their office upon the proclamation of

independence, or that in the Republic they shall be divested of the rights, prerogatives and

protection guaranteed and afforded to them by constitutional or statutory provisions during

the Commonwealth.

Being declaratory and affirmative, the provision in question cannot comprehend any

matter not covered by the clear meaning of its words.

Section IV of Article XV of the Constitution provides:

No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended

except for cause as provided by law.

There is absolutely no incompatibility between this precept and the specia lprovision in

question. There is no conflict between the provision that elective officials of the

Commonwealth shall complete their full terms of office after the proclamation of

independence and the precept that the tenure of office of civil service officers and employees

shall not be interrupted subject only to removal or suspension for cause as provided by law.

Under section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court

and all judges of inferior courts "shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the

age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office." This

guaranty in favor of all members of the judiciary is not and cannot be affected by the

provision weare discussing. The two provisions may go hand in hand without any conflict.

The philosophy of the Constitution is premised on the idea of continuity and stability asa general principle guiding the transition from pre-Commonwealth to Republic Government

so as to avoid a vacuum or hiatus disrupting the orderly processes of society and leading to

anarchy.

From a substantial point of view, the change and transfer from the pre-Commonwealth

Government to the Commonwealth Government has been more significant and important

than the change from the Commonwealth to the Republic.

As a matter of fact, the last transition has been mostly a matter of form. Under Article

XVIII of the Constitution, "upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the

United States and the proclamation of the Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." A mere matter

of name.

The change from pre-Commonwealth to Commonwealth Government has been

attended by a revolution, peaceful and orderly but no less real. The American Governor

General, appointed by the President of a foreign country, has been replaced by a Chief

Executive elected by the free will of the Filipino people. It seems unnecessary to elaborate on

further details as to the revolutionary change from American government to a Filipino

government, from a foreign to a national government.

Even the fundamental concept of national sovereignty started only to become a realitysince the establishment of the Commonwealth. Such national sovereignty of the Filipino



|23

people has since then become recognized by the United States of America when, by authority

of the Congress of the United States, President Roosevelt approved our Constitution where it

is declared: "The Philippines is a Republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all

government authority emanates from them. (Section 1, Article II.)

In more than one statement issued during the last war, President Roosevelt hasofficially recognized our government of a sovereign country. That recognition of our national

sovereignty has been ratified by all the members of the United Nations, not only when the

Philippines took part in the organization of the United Nations, but when all the other

members have accepted the ratification of the Charter made by our Senate on August 30,

1945, almost a year before the proclamation of independence.

The general rule of continuity and stability, lying behind the philosophy followed by

the drafters of the Constitution, is supported by the fact that, in order that the President of our

people may place in government, especially in key positions, men of his confidence, in

substitution of those appointed by the American Governor General, it has been necessary to

insert the exception provided in section 4 of Article XVI, which reads as follows:

All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands

shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers

whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their

respective, offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such

appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of the inauguration of

the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

It will be noted that this section enunciates first the general rules of continuity and

stability and then proceeds to provide for an exception, which is perfectly understandable if we take into consideration the revolutionary change resulting from the replacement of a

foreign appointive Chief Executive by an elective Filipino President.

The transition from the Commonwealth Government to the Government of the

Republic being merely formal, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention did not

perceive any reason why the appointive officers should be disturbed in their positions. By the

same token by which we did not feel it necessary to disturb in their positions the minor

officers and employees upon the advent of the Commonwealth, because their functions are

strictly administrative and are regulated by Civil Service rules, in accordance with Article XII

of the Constitution and pertinent statutory provisions, and there was no reasons to believe that

the continuation in office of Commonwealth minor officers and employees may offer anyobstacle to any administrative policy which the Filipino President may adopt or any

legislative policy which the Filipino President may adopt or any legislative policy which the

National Assembly may enact, in section 4 of Article XVI we circumscribed, the exception to

officers whose appointments are vested upon the President on the ground that many of them

were exercising policy-determining functions to control and supervise which the President

should have a free hand for the success of his administration.

Upon the advent of the Republic, policy-determining officers derived their appointment

from the elective President of the Philippines and not from any other Chief Executive. Under

our System of representative democracy, as established by the fundamental law, their

authority emanated from the sovereign people, the latter being represented by the electiveofficialswho will continue holding their offices after independence. There was absolutely no



|24

reason why we should have authorized a new revamping of the government, prone to provoke

unnecessary political complications, uncertainty and uneasiness in public service, set aside

merits in the service, and give rise to understandable machinations, each and all of which are

not conduciveto the bolstering of the public interest but, on the contrary, are highly

detrimental to the general well-being of the people.

Movant's theory, besides lacking any basis in the clear text of the Constitution, is

highly dangerous. In effect, it will give the President unlimited discretion to change part of or

the whole membership of the Supreme Court, the great majority of the judges of inferior

courts, and other officers whose appointment is vested in him by the Constitution, and high

executive officers unlimited discretion to replace with outsiders, excluding political favorites,

thousands upon thousnads of officers and employees in the civil service, the overwhelming

majority of whom have been rendering long years of honest, faithful, efficient, and

meritorious service to the government and to the people. Shall any one be surprised if under

such situation the backbone of our judicial system and the solid body of our civil service shall

be broken into pieces to be used as pawns in political maneuvers? After smashing the

principle of stability which guarantees the independence of the judiciary and an honest and

efficient civil service, the resulting situation of insecurity will not fail to lead to evil

consequences, highly detrimental to public peace.

No one can ignore the possibility that the situation may be used to further entrench in

government the political party in power, no matter what the people may feel about it, and

wipe out all opposition to insure the existence of a one-party system, a step beyond which lies

a truculent dictatorship. Judicial independence and civil service stability are indespensable in

the democratic system of government established by the Constitution. Their necessary

alternatives will be an unpardonable betrayal of our conscience and of our people.

The other grounds alleged in the motion for reconsideration being also unmeritorious,

so much so that we deem it unnecessary to waste any time on them, we hold and so vote that

the motion should be, as it is now, denied.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing resolution, without prejudice to my concurring opinion when

this case was decided originally. I only wish to add that when Article XVIII of the

Constitution was included therein, providing that "upon the final and complete withdrawal of

the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the

Commonwealth of thePhilippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of thePhilippines, "the framers must have intended the Republic of the Philippines, which was there

provided to automatically come into existence upon the happening of the event therein

mentioned, to be a republican government complete with the same three great departments,

their respective bureaus, divisions and subordinate offices, and their respective personnel ,

that made up the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which was thus to be

transformed into the Republic. By its very nature a republic, as that contemplated by the

Tydings-McDuffie Act and the Constitution of the Philippines adopted pursuant thereto, is a

tripartite form of government composed of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial

departments. Most assuredly, the framers did not intend that upon the withdrawal of the

sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of the independence of the Philippines

there should emerge a republic without a judicial department and without all other governmental offices occupied by appointive officials, as well as elective ones not



|25

constitutional in nature; and just a certainly can be assumed that said framers did not intend to

leave with the newly born republic upon its emergence only the names of the offices and

positions constituting the judiciary , as well as such other appointive and elective offices as

were not constitutional in nature, without their incumbents who were occcupying them under

the Commonwealth Government at the very moment of its transformation into the Republic.

If it be considered, as I think it should, that the framers of the Constitution in Article

XVIII therefore intended that all the great departments of the Commonwealth government,

with all their personnel, should continue intact and go with the government when it was

automatically transformed into that of the Republic of the Philippines upon the happening of

the historic event therein spoken of, it will follow without saying that those of said officials

whose offices were constitutional would continue in their respective offices by virtue of the

same constitution, among whose provisions section section 9 of Article VIII would still

continue to govern. Concretely referring to the judiciary, as we have to in the present

incident, it is elementary that a court can not exist without a judge (21 C. J. S., p. 214, section

139).

Therefore, judicial officers referred to in said section 9 were under the Republic, just as

they had under the Commonwealth, to "hold office during good behavior, until they reach the

age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26572 March 28, 1969

MORALES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and HERMENEGILDO DESEO and SOCORRO DESEO

respondents.

Alberto R. de Joya for petitioner.

Francisco Mendioro for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Petitioner, Morales Development Co., Inc, — hereafter referred to as Morales —

seeks the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the

Court of First Instance of the Province of Quezon.

Hermenegildo Deseo and Socorro Deseo, respondents herein and plaintiffs below,

brought this action to annul a sale to Morales of lot No. 2488 of the Cadastral Survey of

Catanauan, Province of Quezon, and to secure the registration of a deed of conveyance of

said lot in their (Deseos') favor.

Lot No. 2488 used to belong to Enrique P. Montinola and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15687 of the Register of Deeds of said province, in his name.



|26

Alleging that his owner's duplicate copy of said certificate had been lost, Montinola

succeeded in securing, from the Court above mentioned, an order for the issuance of a second

owner's duplicate, with which he managed to sell the lot, on September 24, 1954, to Pio

Reyes. Upon registration of the deed of sale to the latter, said TCT No. T-15687 was

cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 21036, in the name of Reyes, was issued on

November 18, 1954, Lupo Abella, married to Felisa Aguilar — hereafter referred to as theAbellas — purchased the land from Reyes, whereupon the deed of conveyance, executed by

Reyes, was registered and the Abellas got TCT No. 21037 in their name, upon cancellation of

said TCT No. 21036. About seven (7) months later, or on June 16, 1955, the Abellas sold the

land, for P7,000, — of which P4,500 was then paid — to the Deseos, who immediately took

possession of the property.

It appears, however, that the first owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-15687 was either

never lost or subsequently found by Montinola, who, making use of it, mortgaged C, the lot

in question, before February 21, 1956, to the Philippine National Bank, for P700. Then, on

the date last mentioned, Montinola sold the property to Morales, for P2,000, from which the

sum due to the Bank was deducted. Upon presentation of the deed of sale in favor of Morales,

the latter was advised by the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon that said TCT No. T-

15687 had already been cancelled and the property sold, first, to Pio Reyes, and, then, to the

Abellas. Thereupon, Morales filed a petition for the annulment and cancellation of the second

owner's copy of TCT No. T-15687. After due notice to Reyes and the Abellas, but not to the

Deseos, said petition was granted on March 12, 1956.

Having been unable, in view of these developments, to register the deed of

conveyance executed by the Abellas, the Deseos commenced, in the court aforementioned,

the present action against Morales, for the annulment of the subsequent sale thereto by

Montinola, and the registration of said deed of conveyance in their (Deseos) favor, allegingthat the same enjoys preference over the sale to Morales, the Deseos having, prior thereto,

bought lot No. 2488 in good faith and for value, and having been first in possession of said

lot, likewise, in good faith.

Upon the other hand, Morales claimed to have a better right upon the ground that it

(Morales) had bought the property in good faith and for value, relying upon the first owner's

duplicate copy of TCT No. T-15687, unlike the Deseos, whose predecessor in interest, Pio

Reyes, had relied upon the second owner's duplicate, which — Morales alleged had been

secured fraudulently, and that the sale to Reyes and that made by the latter to the Abellas are

null and void, because both sales took place under suspicious circumstances, so that —

Morales concluded — they (Reyes and the Abellas) were not purchasers in good faith and for value.

After appropriate proceedings, the court of first instance sustained the contention of

Morales and rendered judgment in its favor, which, on appeal taken by the Deseos, was

reversed by the Court of Appeals. The dispositive part of the latter's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another

one entered in favor of the plaintiffs (Deseos) and against the defendant (Morales)

declaring said plaintiffs to be the lawful and absolute owners of Lot No. 2489 of the

Cadastral Survey of Catanauan, Quezon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

T-21037 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon; declaring the deed of saleexecuted by Enrique P. Montinola in favor of defendant covering the same property as



|27

null and void; ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon to register the deed of sale

executed by the spouses Lupo Abella and Felisa Aguilar in favor of the plaintiffs

dated June 16, 1955, marked Exhibit A, without cost, not having prayed for in the

brief for the appellants.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari by Morales, which insists that theCourt of Appeals should have upheld its (Morales') contention adverted to above. We,

however, find therein no merit.

Morales maintains that the sale by Montinola to Reyes and that later made by Reyes

to the Abellas are "suspicious"; that, consequently, Reyes and the Abellas were not

purchasers in good faith and for value; and that these two (2) premises, in turn, lead to the

conclusion that both sales are "null and void."

This syllogism is obviously faulty. The major premise thereof is based upon the fact

that the consideration stated in the deeds of sale in favor of Reyes and the Abellas is P1.00. It

is not unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to the Anglo-Saxon practice of

stating that the consideration given is the sum of P1.00, although the actual consideration

may have been much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of P1.00 is

suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify the inference that Reyes and

the Abellas were not purchasers in good faith and for value. Neither does this inference

warrant the conclusion that the sales were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad faith and

inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a conveyance inexistent, for the

assignor's liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract 1 , whereas fraud or bad faith

may render either rescissible or voidable although valid until annulled, a contract concerning

an object certain, entered into with a cause and with the consent of the contracting parties, as

in the case at bar.

2

What is more, the aforementioned conveyance may not be annulled, in thecase at bar, inasmuch as Reyes and the Abellas are not parties therein.

Upon the other hand, the Deseos had bought the land in question for value and in

good faith, relying upon the transfer certificate of title in the name of their assignors, the

Abellas. The sale by the latter to the former preceded the purchase made by Morales, by

about eight (8) months, and the Deseos took immediate possession of the land, which was

actually held by them at the time of its conveyance to Morales by Montinola, and is in the

possession of the Deseos, up to the present. Then, again TCT No. T-15687, in the name of

Montinola, had been cancelled over a year before he sold the property to Morales, who, in

turn, was informed of this fact, what it sought to register the deed of conveyance in its favor.

It should be noted, also, that TCT No. 21037, in the name of the Abellas, on which theDeseos had relied in buying the lot in dispute, has not been ordered cancelled.lawphi1.ñet

Since the object of this litigation is a registered land and the two (2) buyers thereof

have so far been unable to register the deeds of conveyance in their respective favor, it

follows that "the ownership" of said lot "pertain(s)" — pursuant to Article 1544 of our Civil

Code 3 — to the Deseos, as the only party who took possession thereof in good faith. 4

Morales argues that it was not enough for the Deseos to have gone to the office of the

Register of Deeds and found therein that there were no flaws in the title of the Abellas, and

that the Deseos should have, also, ascertained why the Abellas had paid only P1.00 to Reyes,

and why the latter had paid the same amount to Montinola. To begin with, the Deseos did notknow that said sum was the consideration paid by the Abellas to Reyes and by Reyes to



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Montinola. Secondly, the Deseos were not bound to check the deeds of conveyance by Reyes

to the Abellas, and by Montinola to Reyes. Having found that the owner's duplicate copy of

TCT No. 21037, in the name of the Abellas, was a genuine copy of the original on file with

the Office of the Register of Deeds, the Deseos were fully justified in relying upon said TCT

No. 21037, and had no legal obligation to make farther investigation.

Thirdly, were we to adopt the process of reasoning advocated by Morales, the result

would still be adverse thereto. Indeed, if it were not sufficient for the Deseos to verify in said

office the genuineness of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 21037, much less would Morales

have been justified in relying upon Montinola's copy of TCT No, T-15687 in his name. In

fact, had Morales, at least gone to the Office of the Register of Deeds as the Deseos did —

before purchasing the property in dispute, Morales would have found out, not only that TCT

No. T-15687 had long been cancelled , but, also, that the property had been previously sold by

Montinola to Reyes and by Reyes to the Abellas. In short, the negligence of Morales was the

proximate cause of the resulting wrong, and, hence, Morales should be the party to suffer its

consequences. 5

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals should be, as it is

hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner herein, Morales Development Company, Inc. It

is so ordered.

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