Living apart together. British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. Policy Exchange

Living apart togetherBritish Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism

Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran and Zein Ja'far

Policy Exchange is an independent think tank whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas which willfoster a free society based on strong communities, personal freedom, limited government, national self�confidence andan enterprise culture. Registered charity no: 1096300.

Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence�based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with aca�demics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy out�comes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. Wealso believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector.

Trustees

Charles Moore (Chairman of the Board), Theodore Agnew, Richard Briance, Camilla Cavendish, Iain Dale, RichardEhrman, Robin Edwards, George Robinson, Tim Steel, Alice Thomson, Rachel Whetstone.

About the authors

MMuunniirraa MMiirrzzaa writes and broadcasts aboutrace, culture and identity. In 2005 she pre-sented the BBC Radio 4 series, TheBusiness of Race, and she edited a collectionof essays for Policy Exchange entitledCulture Vultures: Is UK arts policy damagingthe arts?. She is currently doing a PhD atthe University of Kent which examineslocal cultural strategies in the UK. She is afounding member of the Manifesto Club(www.manifestoclub.com).

AAbbii SSeenntthhiillkkuummaarraann is a research associateat Policy Exchange. She is currently study-ing for an Msc in Social Policy ResearchMethods at the LSE, having completed herundergraduate studies in PPE at OxfordUniversity.

ZZeeiinn JJaa''ffaarr is a research associate at PolicyExchange. He is doing an Msc in Near andMiddle Eastern Studies at the School ofOriental and African Studies.

2

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Contents

Executive summary 5

Part 11 Introduction 112 The emergence of Muslim consciousness in Britain 20

Part 23 Identification and belonging 374 Cultural attitudes 455 Foreign policy and the ummah 546 Victimhood 647 Who speaks for Muslims? 79

Part 38 Reflections on policy 87

Bibliography 96

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 3

Terminology

There is sometimes disagreement andconfusion over the use of terminologyrelating to Muslims and Islam. To clarify,this report makes a distinction between'Islam' as a religion practiced by Muslimsworldwide, and 'Islamism', 'radicalIslam' or 'Islamic fundamentalism',which are terms that refer to a political

ideology that aims to create a state andsociety in strict conformity with religiousdoctrine. Most British Muslims – eventhose who are devout – are not Islamists.Likewise, we make a distinction betweenIslamists and Islamist terrorists. ManyIslamists reject the use of terrorism toachieve their goals.

4

Executive Summary

This report explores the attitudes ofMuslims in Britain today and the reasonswhy there has been a significant rise inIslamic fundamentalism amongst theyounger generation. It argues that thegrowth of Islamism in the UK is notsolely a foreign problem, but somethingthat must be understood in relation topolitical and social trends that haveemerged in British society over the pasttwo decades. It also examines the impactof public policy on the Muslim popula-tion and suggests that the way theGovernment is responding to Islamism ismaking things worse not better.

Our research into the attitudes ofMuslims in Britain showed that there is agrowing religiosity amongst the youngergeneration of Muslims. They feel that theyhave less in common with non-Muslimsthan do their parents and they show astronger preference for Islamic schools andsharia law. Religiosity amongst youngerMuslims is not about following their par-ents’ cultural traditions, but rather, theirinterest in religion is more politicised.There is a greater stress on asserting one’sidentity in the public space, for example,by wearing the hijab.

86% of Muslims feel that “my religionis the most important thing in my life”.62% of 16-24 year olds feel they haveas much in common with non-Muslims as Muslims, compared to71% of 55+ year olds.60% of Muslims would prefer to sendtheir children to a mixed state school,compared to 35% who would prefer tosend their child to an Islamic school.There is a clear age difference. 37% of16-24 year olds preferred to send theirchildren to Islamic state schools, com-pared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and19% of 55+ year olds.

59% of Muslims would prefer to liveunder British law, compared to 28%who would prefer to live under sharialaw. 37% of 16-24 year olds prefer shariacompared to 17% of 55+ year olds.36% of 16-24 year olds believe if aMuslim converts to another religionthey should be punished by death,compared to 19% of 55+ year olds.7% “admire organisations like Al-Qaedathat are prepared to fight the West’. 13%of 16-24 year olds agreed with this state-ment compared to 3% of 55+ year olds.74% of 16-24 year olds would preferMuslim women to choose to wear theveil, compared to only 28% of 55+ yearolds.

However, there is also considerable diversi-ty amongst Muslims, with many adoptinga more secular approach to their religion.The majority of Muslims feel they have asmuch, if not more, in common with non-Muslims in Britain as with Muslimsabroad. There is clearly a conflict withinBritish Islam between a moderate majoritythat accepts the norms of Western democ-racy and a growing minority that does not.For these reasons, we should be wary oftreating the entire Muslim population as amonolith with special needs that are differ-ent to the rest of the population.

21% of Muslims have consumed alco-hol. 65% have paid interest on a nor-mal mortgage. 19% have gambled. 9%have admitted to taking drugs.


“ The majority of Muslims feel they have as much, if not

more, in common with non�Muslims in Britain as with

Muslims abroad”

59% of Muslims feel they have as much,if not more, in common with non-Muslims in the UK as with Muslimsabroad.

Our research shows that the rise of Islamismis not only a security problem, but also a cul-tural problem. Islamism is strongly colouredby anti-Western ideas. Yet, these views are notexclusive to Muslims and can also be found inwider society. There has also been a weaken-ing of older collective identities, notably theundermining of Britishness and the decline ofworking class politics, which has led to a feel-ing of disengagement amongst young peoplemore generally. Some Muslims are thereforeturning to religion as part of a search formeaning and community. They increasinglylook to the abstract and global ummah.

41% named foreign policy as animportant issue to Muslims but theyare not necessarily more informed orengaged than the wider population.Only 18% of Muslims could name thepresident of the Palestinian NationalAuthority and only 14% could namethe Prime Minister of Israel.58% believe that “many of the prob-lems in the world today are a result ofarrogant western attitudes” – 30% ofthe general population agrees.37% believe that “One of the benefits ofmodern society is the freedom to criticiseother people’s religious or political views,even when it causes offence”. 29% of thegeneral population believes the same.

The emergence of a strong Muslim identityin Britain is, in part, a result of multicultur-

al policies implemented since the 1980s,which have emphasised difference at theexpense of shared national identity anddivided people along ethnic, religious andcultural lines. Islamist groups have gainedinfluence at local and national level by play-ing the politics of identity and demandingfor Muslims the ‘right to be different’. Theauthorities and some Muslim groups haveexaggerated the problem of Islamophobia,which has fuelled a sense of victimhoodamongst some Muslims.

Despite widespread concerns aboutIslamophobia, 84% of Muslims believethey have been treated fairly in thissociety.28% of Muslims believe that authori-ties in Britain go over the top in tryingnot to offend Muslims. We asked themto give their opinion about the actionsof authorities in two different scenar-ios. 75% believe it was wrong for alocal council to have banned an adver-tisement for a Christmas carol servicein 2003 for fear it would cause ten-sions. 64% believed it was wrong for acouncil to have banned all images ofpigs from its offices (on calendars, toys,etc) in 2005, for the reason that theymight offend Muslims’ feelings.

Paradoxically, Government policies toimprove engagement with Muslims makesthings worse. By treating Muslims as ahomogenous group, the Government failsto see the diversity of opinions amongstMuslims, so that they feel more ignoredand excluded.

When asked to name an organisationthat represented their views as a Muslim,only 6% named the Muslim Council ofBritain. 51% felt no Muslim organisa-tion represented their views.75% believe there is more diversity anddisagreement within the Muslim popu-lation than other people realize.

Living apart together

6

“ The authorities and some Muslim groups have

exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has

fuelled a sense of victimhood amongst some Muslims”


Executive summary

We argue that the Government has to changeits policy approach towards Muslims. Itshould stop emphasising difference andengage with Muslims as citizens, not throughtheir religious identity. The ‘Muslim commu-nity’ is not homogenous, and attempts togive group rights or representation will onlyalienate sections of the population further.People should be entitled to equal treatmentas citizens in the public sphere, with the free-dom to also enjoy and pursue their identitiesin the private sphere. The authorities shouldalso try to present a more realistic and bal-anced picture of disadvantage and discrimi-nation in the UK, as ‘victim politics’ can con-tribute to a sense of alienation. We shouldalso recognise that the negative effects ofmulticulturalism are particularly acute forMuslims, but are also experienced by manyother minority groups.

More generally, we need to revive asense of direction, shared purpose and

confidence in British society. Islamism isonly one expression of a wider culturalproblem of self-loathing and confusion inthe West. One way to tackle this is tobring to an end the institutional attackson national identity – the counterproduc-tive cancellation of Christmas festivities,the neurotic bans on displays of nationalsymbols, and the sometimes crude anti-Western bias of history lessons – whichcan create feelings of defensiveness andresentment. We should allow people toexpress their identity freely and in a cli-mate of genuine tolerance. At the sametime, we must also recognize that theGovernment and policy-makers cannotaddress this sense of disengagement alone.We need to work together, as a society, todevelop a renewed sense of collectivitythat asserts our shared British identity andWestern values in a way that will inspirethe younger generation.

Part 1

1Introduction

“It’s a diverse group that you can’t put together

and label as one thing. A lot of people think they

know what young British Muslims think, but

they don’t.” Male, Muslim, 21, London

“What do Muslims want?” is a questionthat has increasingly preoccupied Westernpolicy-makers over the past five years.Since the attacks on the United States onSeptember 11th 2001, Muslims andMuslim communities have been scruti-nised to try and understand the mindsetof terrorists who claim to act on theirbehalf. The public demand for answershas been intense and has fuelled a prodi-gious output of books, websites, lectures,pamphlets and television documentariesabout Islam and its adherents. In late2001, post 9/11, sales of the Qu’ran wentup as people grappled with the concept of“jihad”.1

Nowhere has this search for answersbeen more intense than in Britain. TheLondon bombings of 7th July 2005 raisedchallenging questions about how radicalIslamist terrorist acts could be plannedand executed on British soil. The 30-yearold ring-leader of the bombers,Mohammed Sidique Khan, was an appar-ently mild-mannered and respected class-room assistant from Yorkshire, who hadlived a comfortable life with his youngfamily. Speaking from his grave in his so-called ‘martyrdom video’, released twomonths after the attack, Khan wore a redand white checked keffiyah – an Arabicheadscarf – but spoke in a startlinglyfamiliar Yorkshire accent. Why would aman with such an apparently contented

life in Britain declare himself at war withhis fellow citizens?

On one level it is obviouly impossible toget inside the minds of the Londonbombers and pinpoint the exact motiva-tions or life events that led them to carryout their atrocities. What we can do, how-ever, is try to understand the ideas and val-ues that were already forming in theseyoung minds, and that eventually madethem susceptible to radical Islamist propa-ganda. The aim of this report is to ask whysome British-born Muslims have becomeattracted to Islamic fundamentalism andthe different social and cultural factors thatgive credence to such ideas.

A homegrown problemFor many, the growth of radical Islamistterrorism has raised serious questionsabout the relationship between Islam andthe modern Western world, and whetherthe two can co-exist. It was the Harvardpolitical scientist, Samuel Huntington,who first coined the term ‘clash of civilisa-tions’ in 1993 to describe the cultural andmilitary threat posed by the Muslim world.He prophesied an era of global division –between the modern secular West, and theMuslim, religious East, each pulling in


1. ‘UK sales boost for Afghan

books’, BBC Online, 28th

September 2001

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/enter-

tainment/arts/1568788.stm (last

accessed 13.01.07)

“ For many, the growth of radical Islamist terrorism has

raised serious questions about the relationship between

Islam and the modern Western world, and whether the

two can co�exist.”

their own separate ways. The rise of Al-Qaeda dramatised an inherent clashbetween Islamic fundamentalism and themodern world. When the London bomb-ings happened, this ‘clash of civilisations’seemed even closer to home. Someobservers pointed to the four British-bornbombers as further proof that Muslims liv-ing in this country are simply unable toadapt their strict values to the British wayof life.

Many commentators have argued thatthe rise of Islamist terrorism is caused by afundamental tussle between cultures andthat more is needed to encourage Muslimsto adopt British values. This was reinforcedby comments made by the Chairman ofthe Commission for Racial Equality,Trevor Phillips, who warned in September2005 that Britain was ‘sleepwalking intosegregation’ and that cities were becomingincreasingly divided along ethnic or reli-gious lines. In recent years, theGovernment has introduced citizenshiptests and citizenship ceremonies to ensureforeign nationals have a greater under-standing of the culture, language and polit-ical requirements of being British.

But how accurate is this picture of ‘usand them’? The terrorists who bombed theLondon underground in 2005 were notshaped by a conservative Arabic education,or brought up in a rural South East Asianculture. They grew up in the streets ofBritain, attending state schools and watch-ing British telelvision. It is true that someof them may have learnt the Qu’ran by rotefrom an early age, but these individualsalso spoke fluent English, listened to popmusic, watched football and shared manyother cultural reference points with non-Muslims.

Of course, radical Islam has a globalreach and any explanation for its rise mustlook at geo-political trends. A major factorin the increasing religiosity of Muslims inthe UK has been the influence of Islamistgroups operating from abroad and fundedby the oil profits of countries like SaudiArabia.2 There is a proliferation of propa-ganda targeting young Muslims throughliterature, DVDs, the internet, studentsocieties and charitable organisations. AChannel Four Dispatches documentary,aired on 15th January 2007, revealed howimams trained abroad in puritanicalWahabi ideology are now preaching inprominent British mosques, such as theGreen Lane Mosque in Birmingham. Aninevitable part of Britain’s counter-terror-ism security strategy must be to track theinfluence of such organisations and indi-viduals.

But the absorption of ideas cannot beexplained simply by their profusion. Whyshould the reactionary ideology ofWahabism appeal to modern, secularisedMuslims in Britain? Contrary to expecta-tions, the rising interest in religionamongst second and third generationBritish Muslims is not an outcome ofparental or community influence. In par-ticular, if one looks at young Islamists inthe UK, they are not responding to famil-ial or broader community pressure. Theyare returning to the Qu’ran and readingabout religion of their own volition, oftenhaving experienced the modern, secularlifestyles available to most people of theirage. To suggest that imams or Muslim eld-ers are exerting an undue influence onyoungsters is perhaps missing the funda-mental point – today’s religious extremistsin Britain are largely the products of Britishsociety.

The starting point of this report isrecognition that the rise of radical Islamin Britain is not simply a ‘foreign prob-lem’ which we can shut out; rather, it ispartly fuelled by cultural and political


12

2. GLEES, A. (2005) When

Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist

and Extremist Activity on British

Campuses, London, Social

Affairs Unit.

“ But how accurate is this picture of ‘us and them’? ”

trends that have their origins in the West.The homegrown terrorists we have seenin the UK are not alien to the British wayof life, but are, at least in part, derivativefrom it. Why does Islamism appeal tosome young people who are mainly, butnot exclusively, of Muslim origin? Whatneed does it answer within them, andwhat social, political and institutionalfactors may have encouraged this? Howhas this new form of Muslim conscious-ness emerged, what drives it and to whatextent does broader British society needto engage with it?

The more one looks at today’s self-pro-claimed jihadists, both in Britain and else-where, the harder it becomes to see themprincipally as products of traditionalMuslim society. Marc Sageman’s study of172 Al-Qaeda operatives around theworld indicates that most Islamic extrem-ists have not been brought up with astrong religious influence. Nor are theythe products of economic deprivation. Infact, many come from relatively wealthyhomes. Only 9.4% had a religious educa-tion, whilst 90.6% had a secular educa-tion. 17.6% were upper class, 54.9% weremiddle class and only 27.5% were lowerclass. 9% had a postgraduate degree andanother 33.3% had a college degree.Significantly, 70% joined the jihad whileaway from home, many after being sent tostudy in foreign universities, often in theWest.3

Sageman was able to identify threemajor consistencies, all of which appearcounter-intuitive: the jihadists were usuallyradicalised in Western countries; they werelikely to have had a relatively secularupbringing; and the majority were notrecruited ‘top down’ but actively soughtout terrorist networks. Such findings sug-gest that we cannot isolate the factors thatcreate a jihadist to a single country, lifestyleor religious denomination. Even where theradicalisation process is assisted by Islamistpropaganda and networks, the contempo-

rary jihadist is also a product of wider cul-tural forces.

These findings gain credibility when welook at the backgrounds of some of the ter-rorists who have emerged in Britain:

The four London bombers,Mohammad Sidique Khan, ShehzadTanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and HasibHussain were all British-born Muslims.Lindsay was a convert.Omar Khan Sharif and AsifMohammed Hanif who carried out asuicide bombing in Israel, killing peo-ple at a Tel Aviv pizza parlour in April2003, were from Derby. Sharif went toKing’s College, LondonAhmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, arrested in2002 in connection with the murder ofjournalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, waseducated at a fee-paying school in Essexand at the London School ofEconomics.Saajid Badat, the would-be second‘shoe-bomber’ who changed his mind,attended a Church of England schoolin Gloucester.

A Muslim upbringing is a common factor inalmost all cases, but even that is not a prereq-uisite for becoming a jihadist. A small num-ber of converts have become radicalised inwestern countries.4 In Britain, for instance:

Andrew Rowe, who was convicted inLondon after being caught with dan-gerous materials to be used for terroristattacks and was also suspected of traf-ficking arms to Chechen militants, wasborn to Jamaican parents and had dab-bled in petty crime before convertingto Islam in the 1990s.Richard Reid, the so-called ‘shoe-bomber’ who tried to blow up a plane,had a Jamaican father and Englishmother and grew up in a middle classsuburb, later joining the Brixtonmosque.


Introduction

3. SAGEMAN, M. (2004)

Understanding Terrorist

Networks, Philadelphia,

University of Pennsylvania Press.

4. TOBIAS, M. D. (2006) The

Falcon and the Falconer. Policy,

22. For detailed discussion about

American converts who have

joined the jihad, see KHATCH-

ADOURIAN, R. (2007) Azzam

the American. The New Yorker.

15th January 2007. The most

striking example of this phenom-

enon is Adam Gadhan, the first

American in fifty years to be

charged with treason. Gadhan

grew up in Oregon, rural

California, converted to Islam at

the age of 17, and is now one of

Osama Bin Laden’s senior oper-

atives, acting as a key member

of Al-Qaeda’s ‘media committee’.

Don Stewart-Whyte who was charged,together with co-conspirators, withplotting to blow up airplanes ontransatlantic routes is the son of aConservative Party agent, nowdeceased, and converted to Islam afterbeing a drug and alcohol abuser. Dhiren Barot, who was convicted forplanning a variety of attacks usingchemicals and explosives and had trav-elled to Pakistan to meet senior Al-Qaeda operative Khalid SheikhMohammed, was born a Hindu andconverted to Islam at the age of 20.

Most, if not all, of these individuals wouldhave seen propaganda videos, attended lec-tures and visited websites that nurturedtheir interest. A number of them wouldhave made links to terrorist cells operatingabroad and received encouragement frommore experienced figures. However, wecannot assume they were all personally‘brainwashed’ by senior Al-Qaeda opera-tives. According to the Government’s offi-cial report, ‘The Report of the OfficialAccount of the Bombings in London on7th July 2005’, there is little evidence toprove that the bombers had links to an Al-Qaeda ‘fixer’ and the authors stated that“their indoctrination appears to have takenplace away from places with known linksto extremism”.5 In other words, they mayhave become attracted to radical ideaswithout any direct influence from abroad.Although planning a terrorist act wouldprobably require a degree of training, sup-port and assistance from other experiencedand connected individuals, the first crucialsteps of radicalisation – reading books,surfing the net, talking with like-mindedfriends – do not have to be mastermindedby a terrorist network. Individuals can startthe journey alone, or within a small groupof friends, say at a local sports club, youthcentre, or in a student society at university.

It is almost impossible, therefore, todevelop a robust profile of the kind of indi-

vidual who will become a terrorist. Theycome from a range of religious and ethnicbackgrounds, and vary from university stu-dents to high school drop outs. Some haveclean records, while others have been in andout of jail. They do not have to be poor orhave experienced racism. Like the Londonbombers, they can be “well integrated intoBritish society”.6 Although almost all radicalIslamist terrorists to date have been menand there may be a ‘macho’ or sexualisedelement to the psyche of the jihadist,women are not excluded. Muriel Degauquewas a Belgian female convert who married aMoroccan Muslim and then carried out asuicide mission in Iraq in 2005.

The attempt to understand the contem-porary terrorist threat through the study oftheological writings or “the Muslim mind-set” therefore tends to overlook anotherimportant factor – the cultural and politi-cal influence of living in the West.

A cultural problem, not just a security threatOnly a minority of people described as‘radicalised’ or ‘extremist’ Muslims is likelyto commit or plan terrorist attacks. Thisgroup is extremely small and there is littleevidence to show that radical Islamist ter-rorist groups constitute a mass social move-ment in Western society. In surveys con-ducted in Britain after the London bomb-ings, the majority of Muslims fullydenounced the attacks and disputed thereligious legitimacy of jihadist groups.7

Gilles Kepel, a renowned authority onpolitical Islam, points out that today’sIslamism is qualitatively different to for-mer incarnations of political Islam, whichtended to be less ideologically rigid andonce formed the basis for popular socialmovements in the Middle East. The vastmajority of Muslims are not going tobecome terrorists or support them.8

However, there has been a rise in whatthe French scholar, Olivier Roy, calls ‘reli-

14

5. HOME OFFICE (2006) Report

of the Official Account of the

Bombings in London on 7th July

2005. London, Home Office. p 26

6. Ibid.

7. We know from numerous sur-

veys commissioned that the ter-

rorists do not enjoy widespread

support amongst Muslims in the

UK. In a YouGov poll carried out

in the immediate aftermath of the

7/7 attacks, only 6% thought they

were justifiable, YOUGOV (2005)

YouGov survey results. A year

later, in a Populus survey in June

2006, only 7% believed that sui-

cide attacks on civilians in the

UK were ever justified, although

this figure rises to 16% if the tar-

get is military. Whilst this is still

cause for concern, it shows that

terrorists had no right to claim

they were acting on behalf of the

majority of Muslims. Nearly two

thirds of Muslims believed that

no more than a tiny minority of

their community sympathised

with the 7/7 bombers, POPULUS

(2006) Muslim 7/7 Poll. A more

recent survey conducted for

Channel Four’s programme,

Dispatches, found that 22% of

respondents felt the London

bombings were justified, but it

was young Muslims who were

most likely to take this view (31%

of 18-24 year olds, compared to

14% of those over 45) GFK

(2006) ‘Attitudes to Living in

Britain - A Survey of Muslim

Opinion’, A Survey for Channel 4

Dispatches.

Surveys often ask whether there

may be some sympathy for the

suicide bombers, which can be a

confusing question. Some polls

have shown that sympathy for

their motives can be as high as

20-30% YOUGOV (2005) YouGov

survey results. It is possible that

respondents express sympathy

with some of the views of the

bombers (or even human sympa-

thy towards people so deranged

as to kill themselves) but still

condemn their actions. The peo-

ple who express sympathy for

the bombers are not necessarily

future terrorists. Nevertheless, it

does indicate a degree of social

validation, albeit limited, for the

bombers actions in Muslim soci-

ety at large. Interestingly, very

few surveys ever ask non-

Muslims whether they sympa-

thise with the bombers or their

motives.

8. KEPEL, G. (2004) Jihad. The

Trail of Political Islam, London,

I.B.Taurus & Co Ltd.

giosity’ amongst younger Muslims in theUK, of second and third generation immi-grant origin.9 Whilst the number of actualor potential terrorists remains small, it canbe construed as an extremely acute expres-sion of a broader shift towards the‘Islamicisation’ of identity throughoutEurope, and a growing interest in neo-reli-gious ideas. Various indicators demonstratethis: increased wearing of headscarvesamongst Muslim women; greater culturalidentification with transnational Muslimidentity – the ummah; growing member-ship of Islamist political groups and youthassociations; an increase in anti-Westernand anti-Semitic attitudes in Muslim liter-ature and websites; and greater demandsby Muslim groups for sharia-complianteducation, and financial and legal frame-works. Many more young Muslims are saidby Muslim leaders to be going on pilgram-age to Mecca, which is considered to be aduty for all Muslims before they die.10

Numerical estimates of Muslims going tofight abroad in conflicts such asAfghanistan or Bosnia have been as high astwo thousand a year.11

While such indicators of religiosityrise and fall in different European coun-tries according to the social and politicalcontext, they do suggest a cultural shiftis taking place among second and thirdgeneration Muslims. This is particularlyimportant when taking into account thekey fact of demography: Britain’sMuslims are much younger than the UKpopulation as a whole. Approximatelyone third of Muslims in Britain is underthe age of sixteen. Unlike their parents,they are more likely to identify withtheir religion than with an ethnic ornational label.

Although many younger Muslims willnot ever support terrorism or express rad-ical views, in general the rise of radicalIslam points to a growing disillusionmentwith what is perceived to be the problemsof ‘the West’. In this sense, the influence

of Islamism is not just a security problem,but also a cultural problem. In Britain,the aggressive, anti-Western strain ofIslamism seems to be stronger even thanother European countries. A study by thePew Center, based in America, noted in2005:

“While publics in largely Muslim countries gener-

ally view Westerners as violent and immoral, this

view is not nearly as prevalent among Muslims in

France, Spain and Germany. British Muslims,

however, are the most critical of the four minori-

ty publics studied – and they come closer to the

views of Muslims around the world in their opin-

ions of Westerners”.12

It has been argued that this negative per-ception of the West is a straightforwardresponse to grievances over Western for-eign policy, and the way that Muslim feelabout the suffering of the ummah – theworldwide Muslim community. Numerousauthors have linked the London bombingswith the war in Iraq, using as evidence thetestimonies of two of the London bombersin their valedictory ‘martyrdom’ videos. Insummer 2006, key Muslim public figuressent an open letter to the government inwhich they argued that Britain’s foreignpolicy was fuelling extremist ideas andpushing people towards terrorism.

However, this supposed causal linkbetween terrorism and foreign policy doesnot fully explain the jihadists’ motivations.The Madrid attacks on March 11 2004were already being prepared in 2000-2001– long before the coalition forces invadedIraq or Afghanistan. And, of course, theSeptember 11th attacks were a cause of theIraq war, not a consequence of it. Franceand Belgium refused to support the war inIraq but have both been targeted in subse-quent terrorist planning.13

The appeal of radical Islam is more thanan angry response to Western foreign poli-cy. It appears to reflect a more fundamen-tal shift in cultural attitudes. For instance,


Introduction

9. ROY, O. (2004) Globalised

Islam. The Search for a New

Ummah, New York, Columbia

University Press.

10. AKBAR, A. (2006) ‘Young

Muslims alienated at home find

solace on haj’, The Independent.

29th December 2006

11. MCROY, A. (2006) From

Rushdie to 7/7, London, The

Social Affairs Unit. p 40.

12. THE PEW GLOBAL ATTI-

TUDES PROJECT (2006)

‘Europe’s Muslims More

Moderate’, The Great Divide:

How Westerners and Muslims

View Each Other, Washington,

The Pew Research Center, (5-6).

13. MONIQUET, C. (2005) The

radicalisation of Muslim youth in

Europe: The reality and the scale

of the threat, Testimony of

Claude Moniquet, Director

General of European Strategic

Intelligence and Security Center

at the Hearing of the Committee

on International Relations

Subcommittee on Europe and

Emerging Threats, United States

House of Representatives.

in the ‘supergrass trial’ in 2006 (in whichthe Al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Babarwas a key witness) seven British defendantswere accused of planning attacks on ‘bingedrinkers’ and ‘football hooligans’. Theirtargets included nightclubs, pubs and bars,including London’s Ministry of Sound.One of the defendants allegedly stated, “noone can even turn round and say ‘oh theyare innocent’ – those slags dancingaround”.14 Such targets reflect a deephatred of the supposed ‘decadence’ ofWestern society, which goes far beyondconcerns about foreign policy.

If the motivations are partly cultural,perhaps we can find an explanation in thereligion of Islam? It has been argued bysome that the scriptural tenets of Islampose an essential conflict with modernityin the West. These analysts have adoptedthe ‘cultural essentialism’ approach, whichseeks to explain Islamism as an outcome ofa static, durable culture that is inherentlyprone to violence. But Islam is not a fixedmonolith. While readers can search theQu’ran and find several lines that will legit-imise the use of violence, others will findseveral more that will condemn it. Theinterpretation of religion is never constant,but always subject to social and culturalchange. There are clearly strands of Islamthat are more literalist and revivalist suchas Wahabism, whereas others are far morerooted in folk cultural tradition and inkeeping with ‘popular Islam’, e.g. Sufism.Indeed, counter to the claims of Islamists,many Muslims seek to practice their reli-gion and culture in co-existence with mod-ern, democratic forms of governance andlifestyle, in countries such as Malaysia,Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia. Most impor-tantly, the interplay between religion andchanging political circumstances is crucial.At the height of pan-Arab secularism in thelate 1950s and early 1960s, Muslimwomen throughout parts of the MiddleEast removed the headscarf in a spirit offeminist liberation. Today, their daughters

may wear it as a statement of identificationwith their religion.15

In this sense, a distinction should bemade between Islam and Islamism. Theformer refers to a world religion withdiverse and changing cultural practices andcustoms, many of which can and do co-exist with western lifestyles. The latterrefers to the politicisation of religion; anideology which draws upon religion butpursues a particular political programmeand set of goals.16 It is much more produc-tive to explore the origins of Islamism inrelation to a specific historical and culturalcontext, rather than simply as an interpre-tation of religious texts written almostfourteen centuries ago.

More crucially, although Islamismappears otherworldly to our modern sensi-bilities, we should consider the way inwhich its animosity towards the Westchimes with certain ideological trends thathave long been fashionable amongst theWestern intelligentsia. For instance,prominent members of the anti-globalisa-tion movement attack the ‘greedy’ con-sumerism and materialism of capitalistsociety; culturally relativist social theorybemoans the dominance of ‘euro-centric’scientific and cultural knowledge; environ-mentalist groups celebrate the spiritualrichness of pre-industrial, rural life; andcertain strands of radical feminism con-demn the sexualisation of women in theWest, leading to the bizarre claim by oneMuslim feminist that “just about every-thing that Western feminists fought for inthe 1970s was available to Muslim women1,400 years ago”.17 To understand theappeal of Islamism, we should think abouthow it feeds off a number of broader cul-tural trends in our modern age.

The politics of identityMuslim consciousness in Britain hasgrown steadily with the arrival of newmigrants from countries such as Pakistan,


16

14. ‘London club bombing plan

taped’ BBC Online. 25th May

2006.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/501

6274.stm (last accessed

21.01.07)

15. For an illuminating descrip-

tion of the current fashion for

headscarves in the Middle East,

see STRATTON, A. (2006)

Muhajababes, London,

Constable & Robinson.

16. TIBI, B. (2005) Islam

Between Culture and Politics,

Hampshire and New York,

Palgrave Macmillan..

17. RIDLEY, Y. (2006) How I

came to love the veil.

WashingtonPost.com. 22nd

October 2006. http://www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2006/10/20/A

R2006102001259_2.html (last

accessed 21.01.07)

India, Bangladesh, East Africa, and latterly,Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Africa, and partsof Eastern Europe. According to theCensus 2001 there are approximately 1.6mMuslims living in the UK today – 2.7% ofthe total population.18 Many cities nowboast a sizeable number of mosques,around which Muslim communities live,work and pray.

However, the increased prominence ofMuslim lobby groups and the nature oftheir demands have also been shaped bywider political trends in Britain. In the eraof multiculturalism diversity policies atlocal and national levels have encourageddifferent ethnic and religious groups toorganise politically and fight their cornerfor extra resources. The competitionemerging between groups – a sort of tribalthinking – has reinforced a wider feeling ofsocial fragmentation, in which each groupis encouraged to look after ‘their own’.More generally, in the past few decades,there has been a weakening of older, collec-tive forms of identity, such as nationalism,political parties, or trades unions. YoungerMuslims are more likely than their parentsto feel connection to their religious com-munity as opposed to their country, ethnicgroup or a political movement.

The kind of demands made by minoritygroups has also changed. In the 1970s,anti-racist groups campaigned largelyaround issues of material and politicalequality. In recent years, this has given wayto the demand for ‘difference’, and cultur-al issues such as clothing, halal meat andblasphemy have come to dominate Muslimpolitics. In this context, younger Muslimsare much more conscious of their differ-ence to the mainstream and more aggres-sive in asserting their identity in the publicspace.

In light of these shifts, it is important toconsider the response of Government poli-cy, and the impact it has made on the feel-ings and attitudes of Muslims. For the pastdecade, and particularly after the London

bombings, Government policy towardsMuslims has been to engage with them asa distinct community whose special needsqualify them for particular policies andprivileges. In 2005, the Governmentassembled a group of Muslim representa-tives and leaders, entitled the ‘PreventingExtremism Together’ taskforce, which rec-ommended increased funding of religiousgroups and projects to bolster Muslimcommunity needs.

However, despite good intentions, thisapproach has often seemed inadequate andmuddled. Trying to do ‘community engage-ment’ with Muslims has proved difficultbecause they are not really a coherent andunified community. The Muslim populationis ethnically, linguistically and culturallydiverse;19 and while some younger Muslimsare growing more religious than their par-ents, others are becoming more secular or‘Westernised’. Therefore, what ‘communitystrategy’ would fit all the diverse needs andexpectations of this group?

The emphasis on difference has been along-standing tenet of multiculturalism,but despite concerted efforts to makeMuslims feel included and protected inBritish society, the opposite has occurred.Muslims, particularly amongst theyounger generation, continue to feel vul-nerable, isolated and anxious about expe-riencing Islamophobia. The Governmenthas set up numerous schemes to ‘listen’ toyounger Muslims but they feel no lessalienated and disengaged. The experienceof British Muslims suggests that the mul-ticultural experiment – in some ways atleast – has failed to deliver the kind of


Introduction

18. According to the 2001

Census, Muslims are a relatively

young population - a third are

under the age of sixteen com-

pared to a fifth of the general

population. The majority live in

cities and towns; London,

Birmingham, Manchester,

Blackburn and Bradford. A signif-

icant number also live in

Dewsbury, Glasgow, Leeds,

Manchester and Oldham. The

Muslim population is relatively

disadvantaged in terms of

employment, educational attain-

ment, housing and health. Half of

Pakistanis and Bangladeshi

households live in the 10% most

deprived wards in England. 28%

of Muslims live in social rented

accommodation, the largest pro-

portion of any religious group

and only 52% of them are home-

owners, the lowest proportion of

any religious group.

19. According to the 2001 cen-

sus, two thirds are of South

Asian origin, whilst about 8% are

African and 12% are white.

“ The emphasis on difference has been a long�stand�

ing tenet of multiculturalism, but despite concerted

efforts to make Muslims feel included and protected in

British society, the opposite has occurred”

unity that many expected. So where dowe go from here?

The aims of this reportThis report aims to explore the attitudes ofMuslims in Britain today and to analyse thegrowing religiosity amongst the youngergeneration. It outlines the emergence of aMuslim consciousness in Britain, andexplores some of the key cultural and polit-ical themes that preoccupy Muslims. It alsoexamines the impact of public policy in therise of Islamism and suggests that the waythe Government is responding to radicalIslam risks making things worse. We argue anumber of points:

The growth of Islamism amongst someyoung Muslims cannot be understoodsolely as a foreign or religious problem,but also needs to be understood in rela-tion to political and social trends thathave emerged in British society over thepast two decades. There are certain foreign influencesshaping Muslim consciousness in theUK but the growth of Muslim politicshas also been strongly nurtured by mul-ticultural policies at local and nationallevel since the 1980s. More generally, many youngerMuslims are turning to religion as partof a search for meaning and commu-nity which also exists in wider society.The weakening of older political iden-tities in Britain means they increasing-ly look to the abstract and globalummah.Religiosity amongst younger Muslimstends to be more politicised and thereis a greater stress on asserting one’sidentity in the public space.

Muslim consciousness is dominated bya ‘culture of victimhood’, which hasbred feelings of resentment and defen-siveness. Paradoxically, this has beenfuelled by Government policies toimprove engagement with Muslims.Contemporary Islamism is stronglycoloured by anti-Western ideas butsome of these sentiments can be dis-cerned in the political and cultural cli-mate of the West itself.

We do not offer any quick fix solutions ora handy list of policy recommendations todeal with the rise of Islamic fundamental-ism. This issue cannot be dealt withthrough one-off schemes or projects run bythe Home Office. Rather, we hope towiden discussion about the experience ofMuslims in Britain today, howGovernment policy might change direc-tion overall, and the broader cultural andpolitical battle that all of us need to fight.We make a number of suggestions:

Stop emphasising difference andengage with Muslims as citizens, notthrough their religious identity. Weshould recognise that the Muslim‘community’ is not homogenous, andattempts to give group rights or repre-sentation will only alienate sections ofthe population further. Stop treating Muslims as a vulnerablegroup. The exaggeration ofIslamophobia does not make Muslimsfeel protected but instead reinforcesfeelings of victimisation and alienation.Encourage a broader intellectual debatein order to challenge the crude anti-Western, anti-British ideas that domi-nate cultural and intellectual life. Thismeans allowing free speech and debate,even when it causes offence to someminority groups. Keep a sense of perspective. The obses-sion of politicians and the media withscrutinising the wider Muslim popula-


18

“ This issue cannot be dealt with through one�off

schemes or projects run by the Home Office”

tion, either as victims or potential ter-rorists, means that Muslims are regard-ed as outsiders, rather than as membersof society like everyone else.

Structure of the reportThe first part of this report outlines thehistorical development of the Muslim con-sciousness in Britain, drawing on second-ary and primary sources. It highlights thedrivers leading to a more visible Muslimpolitical identity since the late 1980s.

The second part of the report outlinesfindings from original research conductedbetween July 2006 – January 2007. Thepolling company, Populus, conducted aquantitative survey of 1,003 Muslims inthe UK, through telephone and internetquestionnaires. Telephone interviews weregenerally conducted in English but in aminority of cases the interview was con-ducted in a different language if requestedby the respondent. The answers wereweighted to represent the demographic ofthe Muslim population in the UK. Somefurther questions were asked to 1,025 peo-ple from the general population in anomnibus survey for points of comparison.

We also conducted 40 semi-structured,hour-long interviews with younger

British-born Muslims, exploring theirattitudes towards religion, British societyand values. The respondents were eitheruniversity students or recent graduates,were of either Pakistani or Bangladeshiorigin, and came from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. This smaller sam-ple was not intended to be demographi-cally representative of the entire Muslimpopulation, but it provided useful dataabout the complex attitudes of youngerMuslims. The interviews took place inLondon, Birmingham, Rochdale, andManchester. 17 of the respondents werefemale, 23 were male. The respondentsdemonstrated varying degrees of religiosi-ty; 13 stated they ‘prayed rarely or not atall’ and 27 ‘prayed regularly or quiteoften’. 12 interviews were also conductedwith non-Muslims of similar age to pro-vide points of possible comparison. Theinterviews were transcribed and thenanalysed using computer assisted dataanalysis software. We also consulted arange of experts, academics and practi-tioners about the experiences of Muslimsliving in Britain and the effects of poli-cies.

The third and final section of the reportreflects on the research findings and theirimplications for policy development.


Introduction

2The emergence of Muslim conciousness in the UK

Islam plays a significant role in the politi-cal and cultural life of large parts of theMiddle East, South and Central Asia, theBalkans and parts of Eastern Europe,North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and nowincreasingly in the UK, where approxi-mately 1.6m Muslims reside.20

Great efforts have been made in recentyears to improve the public understand-ing of Islam and how it shapes the lives ofthe Muslim population. A large numberof books, television documentaries andpublic events have helped the British pub-lic become reasonably knowledgeableabout the second largest religion in theUK. However, along with this under-standing there has been a tendency fromsome quarters to make untested assump-tions about the ‘Muslim community’ andwhat it believes. In particular, policy-makers sometimes take for granted theview that the ummah is automatically themost important concern for Muslims inBritain. As a result, the Government’sengagement with the Muslim populationin recent years has ended up privilegingreligious and cultural issues that markthem apart from the rest of the popula-tion.

After the London bombings in 2005,the Government called together a taskforceof Muslim representatives and communityleaders up and down the country to talkabout Muslim youth. The premise of itsreport, ‘Preventing Extremism Together’was that the Government needed to adopt

special measures to help the Muslim com-munity integrate, and which also recog-nised their sense of connection with otherMuslims around the world. Among its 37recommendations, it suggested moreMuslim ‘youth MPs’ to help youngMuslims express themselves politically,more information about Islam translatedinto English, and a moderate Islamicscholars’ roadshow, to teach about the‘true’ version of Islam. The report also rec-ommended the funding of specificMuslim-led organisations, such as theFederation of Society of Islamic Students(FOSIS), and the Waqf al-Birr EducationalTrust, as well as increased monitoring ofpublic services in order to “analyse howmuch of these resources benefit andadvance the Muslim community, Muslimorganisations and Muslim women”. Therewere also recommendations to empowerMuslims through greater awareness of theirculture, such as teaching young Muslimwomen Arabic, and establishing a unit atthe Department of Culture, Media andSport (DCMS) to encourage a more bal-anced representation of Islam in media,popular culture and sports sectors. Whatthese report recommendations implied arethat young Muslims in Britain should pri-marily be engaged with through their reli-gious identity. The taskforce assumed thatthe Muslim identity is a historically con-stant monolith, and that the ‘Muslim com-munity’ has always been conscious of itselfas such.

20

20. According to the 2001 cen-

sus there are 1.6m Muslims in

Great Britain, accounting for

2.8% of the total population.

Some estimates are slightly high-

er, around 1.8m-2m. This makes

Islam the second largest religion

in the country, but still vastly out-

numbered by Christians who are

41m. Around 50% of Muslims

are born in the UK. 50% are

under the age of 30, compared

to a quarter of Sikhs, 21% of

Hindus, and 18% of Christians.

34% of Muslims are under 16.

Muslims are ethnically diverse,

especially compared to Sikhs

and Hindus. 74% of Muslims are

from an Asian ethnic back-

ground. 686,000 Muslims are of

Pakistani origin (43%), 261,000

of Bangladeshi origin (16%),

137,000 of Indian origin (8%).

Muslims are mainly concentrated

in the main cities of the UK,

London (where 38% reside), the

West Midlands (14%), the North

West (13%) and Yorkshire and

Humber (12%). 7% are from

another white background includ-

ing Turkish, Cypriot, Arab and

Eastern European, and 6% are

from black African origin, includ-

ing Somalia.

Outside the realm of policy-making,many academics and commentators havealso discussed the importance of Muslimidentity, and point out that youngerMuslims are angry about British foreignpolicy because they perceive it to be harm-ful to the ummah to which they feelstrongly attached.21 Some authors arguethat the tensions between the Muslimworld and West today stem partly from theMuslim mindset, which, they claim, hasbeen humiliated over the centuries by eco-nomic and military defeat by the West.22

This interpretation of the current wave ofpolitical Islam views it as part of a long tra-dition of Muslim grievance dating back tothe end of the Caliphate under the defeatof the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and pos-sibly even further back to the holy crusadesin the Middle Ages.

It is undeniable that the Muslim identi-ty in Britain is strong and it draws uponthe reservoir of historical memory. But atthe same time, we should also remind our-selves of how relatively novel this identityis, at least in the political space in Britain.Although Muslims have lived in Britainsince the nineteenth century, it is only inthe last two decades that we have seen thedevelopment of a strong Muslim identityin the public sphere.23 Until the 1970s, itwas ethnicity, not religion, which dominat-ed the way Muslims perceived them-selves.24 Older migrants are much morelikely to identify with their ethnic ornational identity, whilst identification withIslam is much more prevalent amongst theyounger generation. Arguably, the strongidentification with the trans-nationalummah is relatively new. While there isirrefutable anger today about the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq, by contrast theBosnian war of 1992-1995 had a lessnoticeable impact on mainstream Muslimopinion, as did the 1999 Kosovo conflict.Foreign policy has been a motor for radi-calisation since the mid-1990s, but usuallyfirst amongst a smaller group of politicised

Muslims who have worked actively overtime to politicise mainstream Muslimopinion.

The ‘Muslim identity’ is therefore notan unchanging, monolithic entity, butsomething that has developed through asequence of historical events and processes.This section will give a brief outline ofsome of the factors and events that havecontributed to this development.

Secularism to religious politicsThe history of Muslims in Britain goesback at least two hundred years, whensmall numbers of Bengali and Yemenisailors entered the port cities of London,Glasgow and Cardiff, taking work in localgarment factories and restaurants.Following the Second World War, theMuslim population grew steadily as youngmen from South Asia migrated to Britainto seek work as part of the post-warrebuilding effort. They settled in London,in towns and cities surrounding the capitaland in specific towns in the Midlands andthe North, where the main industries hada large demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Often living in concentratedareas within these towns, Muslims tookpoorly paid, night-shift work that the localwhite population did not want to do.Chain migration in the 1950s and 1960smeant that friends and relatives followedfrom South Asia and began to settle inneighbourhoods, forming tight-knit ethnicand cultural communities. In the late1960s and early 1970s, other factorshelped expand the settlement of newMuslim migrants. Growing restrictions onimmigration encouraged many migrants tosettle permanently and bring their familiesfrom abroad. The ‘Africanisation’ policiesof some East African countries also led tothe forced migration of many thousands ofIndian families to the UK.25

As families gradually settled and grewmore prosperous, the Muslim population


The emergence of Muslim conciousness in the UK

21. See MCROY, A. (2006) From


Social Affairs Unit..

22. LEWIS, B. (2004) The Crisis

of Islam. Holy War and Unholy

Terror, London, Orion Books Ltd.

23. VERTOVEC, S. (2002)

Islamophobia and Muslim

Recognition in Britain. IN HAD-

DAD, Y. (Ed.) Muslims in the

West: From Soujourners to

Citizens. New York, Oxford

University Press.

24. ANSARI, H. (2002) Muslims

in Britain. Minority Rights Group

International. p18 cited in THE

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY

OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

(2005) The British Muslim

Community in 2005, Wiltshire,

The Institute for the Study of

Islam and Christianity. p.39

25. For a more detailed account

of Muslim immigration, see VER-

TOVEC, S. (2002) Islamophobia

and Muslim Recognition in

Britain. IN HADDAD, Y. (Ed.)

Muslims in the West: From

Soujourners to Citizens. New

York, Oxford University Press,

ABBAS, T. (2005) ‘British South

Asian Muslims Before and After

September 11th’ in ABBAS, T.

(Ed.) Muslim Britain.

Communities Under Pressure,

London/New York, Zed

Books/Room 400. p3-17.

became a more visible presence in Britain.In the late 1960s, some Muslim communi-ties were able to move from their makeshiftmosques in private rooms, to purpose-builtmosques, thereby making a mark on thelandscape of some British towns and cities.New Muslim voluntary and welfare organ-isations also sprung up to provide servicesand support to first generation and secondgeneration migrants in the major cities.

Certainly, religion was an importantaspect of life for first and second genera-tion immigrants, acting as a comfortingsocial glue in an unfamiliar and sometimeshostile world. Muslims almost invariablysettled closely together in areas and set uplocal organisations, mosques and servicesto cater to their needs, as well as providefamilial and communal support. In the1960s, for instance, Haji Taslim Ali, theimam at the East London Mosque, provid-ed a variety of useful services for his 7,000worshippers: he and his wife taught Arabicclasses to local children, collected and dis-tributed old clothes, looked after childrenif the mothers had to go to hospital and hewas an interpreter in the local police sta-tion and courts. This vital support wasreplicated all over Britain’s cities wherever asizeable Muslim population existed.Similarly, successful businessmen woulddonate generously to local mosques inorder to give something back to their com-munity.26

Yet politically, the role of Islam was notprominent in the public domain. In the1960s, Muslim immigrants were largelyinvolved in secular political movementsthat spoke to their ethnic and nationalconcerns (mostly related to developments‘back home’ in Pakistan, Kashmir orBangladesh) or specific problems encoun-tered by immigrants in the UK. A numberof self-help organisations flourished suchas the Pakistani or Bangladeshi WorkersAssociations, which were primarily con-cerned with providing local welfare servic-es – filling out forms, legal assistance,

immigration advice and offering social andcultural amenities. The common problemof racism, encountered by most ethnic andreligious minorities, also led to occasionalcross-ethnic alliances, such as the Co-ordi-nating Committee Against RacialDiscrimination in Birmingham and theBlack People’s Alliance which campaignedagainst discrimination for all minoritygroups.

In the 1970s this secular politics shiftedto new territory as the younger generationconfronted racism head-on. They strug-gled against racial attacks, instances ofpolice brutality, housing discriminationand increasingly tight immigration laws.This new wave of secular, anti-racist poli-tics had a radical edge and sought to chal-lenge the domination of older, more tradi-tional elites. Organisations like the AsianYouth Movement, set up in 1977, made nodistinction between religious communitiesand were created by younger leaders whohad been born and educated in Britain.They often defied conservative attitudes intheir own ethnic communities and tackledissues such as domestic violence. Theychose to focus on problems relating totheir particular communities in the UK,rather than in their homelands. Whilemany of this generation of activists wereprobably Muslim, they did not tend todefine themselves by their religion butinstead by their political allegiance.

The shift to religiously oriented politicstook place over the 1980s and 1990s for anumber of reasons. The first was a shift inthe intellectual climate on the political left,away from the traditional emphasis onclass struggle and economic equality andtowards a new politics of identity andgroup rights. Inevitably, this fed throughinto the activism of radical groups and ledto new kinds of political demands beingmade. Parts of the anti-racist movementbegan to reframe their political demandsfrom equality of provision and treatment,to diversity, which entailed greater recogni-


22

26. HIRO, D. (1992) Black British,

White British, London, Paladin.

p.134

tion of cultural issues. Whereas in the1970s these organisations had campaignedlargely around cross-cultural issues – policetreatment, immigration laws, housing – bythe mid 1980s, they had moved to newissues, such as the provision of halal meatin schools, faith education, positive imagesof ethnic groups and Islamic clothing.27

Many activists in the anti-racist movementalso began to work in the local authoritiesand services around which they cam-paigned.

At the same time, more strident Islamistgroups emerged and started to exert aninfluence on the younger generation. Theycapitalised on the perceived failures andshortcomings of secular groups; many ofwhich were seen to be increasingly irrele-vant or tied to the local state and politicalparties. Picking up on the shift in anti-racist discourse since the early 1980s, thenewer Muslim activists framed their lobby-ing in terms of recognition for their cultur-al rights. They were often more dynamic atthe grassroots level and attracted disillu-sioned youngsters whose future seemedotherwise overshadowed by local crimeand drugs problems. Thus Islam emergedas a new vehicle of political identity.

MulticulturalismImportantly, this shift towards culturalissues from the 1980s onwards was facili-tated by the state, through the introduc-tion of multicultural policies at local andnational level. Urban riots and unrest dur-ing the 1970s and 1980s provoked con-cern about how to engage ethnic minoritycommunities in the political process andgive them some direct political involve-ment in their areas. As a bastion of the newleft, the Greater London Council underthe leadership of Ken Livingstone wasamong the first institutions to give con-crete expression to the importance of iden-tity and diversity in its policies. It pio-neered numerous multicultural initiatives

to appeal to a new ‘rainbow coalition’ ofgroups such as ethnic minorities, gays andlesbians, and the disabled. Even less obvi-ously radical organisations such as theHome Office began to reflect the newintellectual fashion. The Scarman Reportfollowing the 1981 Brixton Riots called fora multi-racial, multi-cultural approach,which would recognise the different needsand ethnic communities in society.

The policies that followed emphasisedthe importance of different cultural back-grounds in determining people’s identity,and the need to engage with communitygroups on this basis. This entailed a shiftfrom the liberal tradition of dealing withpeople in a ‘colour-blind’ way in the pub-lic space, towards differential treatmentaccording to their cultural identities. Theprivileging of diverse identities in race rela-tions discourse meant that people weregradually demarcated into visible culturaland religious ‘communities’. In particular,the idea of cultural assimilation wasattacked by certain parts of the politicalleft because it was considered likely to mar-ginalise ethnic minorities. In its place, ‘cul-tural diversity’ and the recognition of dif-ference was welcomed as an alternative wayof including people in society. For thepolitical left, an additional driver behindthis effort was a desire to connect with newconstituencies of people beyond the whiteworking class, which had traditionallyformed the basis of left-wing politics.

Since the 1980s, official support for‘diversity’ has moved from being a margin-al preoccupation of activists to being a cen-tral concern of all institutions. The idea ofdiversity has spawned a massive infrastruc-



27. MALIK, K. (2005a) Born in

Bradford. Prospect. October

2005

“ The privileging of diverse identities in race relations

discourse meant that people were gradually demarcated

into visible cultural and religious ‘communities’”

ture of policies, funding streams, services,voluntary and semi-governmental organi-sations and professional occupations. Inthe UK, a range of services – housing,healthcare, arts and cultural provision, vol-untary support, public broadcasting, andpolicing – have been restructured toaccommodate the supposedly differentneeds of ethnic users. There are dedicatedethnic housing associations, voluntarybodies, arts centres, radio channels, andpolicing units. This emphasis on diversitywas articulated most clearly in the 2000report of the Commission for Future ofMulti-Ethnic Britain, chaired by LordBikhu Parekh, which argued that equalityalso required “cultural recognition andrespect”.28 If a person’s culture is notaffirmed and given status, this is consid-ered to be denial of equality.

However, some people now argue thatthe official drive to recognize diversity hasbeen counterproductive because it has pre-vented migrants from fully integrating intoBritain. Zia Haider Rahman, aBangladeshi-born human rights lawyer hasargued that many new immigrants are dis-couraged from learning English, pointingout that the government spent £100m inthe past year on translation services: “Weare telling them they don’t have to learnEnglish, let alone integrate. Worse, byinsulating them, we have created commu-nities that are now incubators for Islamo-fascism”.29 The growth in translation serv-ices has coincided with a broader shift ineducation towards recognising differentcultures. In 1985, Ray Honeyford, a head-teacher in Bradford, warned about thegrowing segregation in nearby schools andhow the fear of offending minority groupswas thwarting the teaching of English as afirst language – something he believedmost Asian parents were also concernedabout. His stance against multiculturalismprovoked consternation from local author-ities and Honeyford was pushed into earlyretirement. Today, we can see how his dire

predictions have been borne out. Schoolsthroughout the north of England are high-ly ethnically divided. Honeyford’s oldschool, Drummond Middle School, hasbeen renamed Iqra School and is now100% Asian.30

The privileging of cultural differencemeans that multicultural policies haveoften ignored the needs of less powerfulsections of ethnic communities.Organisations like the Muslim Women’sNetwork have argued that communityleaders silence their own women and pre-vent the criminal justice system from tack-ling problems such as domestic violence,honour killings and forced marriages.Although such crimes are not specific toany culture and have been carried out byMuslims, Sikhs, Christians and Hindus,the patronising – even racist – view ofsome multiculturalists that these crimes arepart of ‘their culture’ has led some critics toargue that the issue of domestic violence inethnic minority homes is not tackled withthe same force as in white people’s homes.31

The logic of diversity and multicultural-ism has also led to a shift in political culture,whereby ethnic and cultural groups areencouraged to make demands based ontheir differences and cultural exclusion fromthe mainstream. In order to gain resourcesfrom the public purse or even garner mediaattention, particular groups have to claimthey are unfairly disadvantaged. The effectover the past two decades has been theemergence of ethnically or culturally specif-ic lobby groups, each arguing their own cor-ner for more money, resources and supportfor their particular identity.

The danger of this growing tribalismwas belatedly recognised in the officialreport into the riots in the northern townsof Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in2001, which raised concerns about appar-ently increasing ethnic segregation andpeople living ‘parallel lives’. The Chair ofthe Independent Review Team, Ted Cantlecriticised the entrenched divisions between


24

28. THE RUNNYMEDE TRUST

(2000) The Future of Multi-Ethnic

Britain, The Parekh Report,

London, Profile Books Ltd.

29. RAHMAN, Z. H. (2006) Hope

of escape lost in translation. The

Sunday Times. 17th December

2006

30. For more detailed discussion

of the Honeyford affair, see

WEST, P. (2005) The Poverty of

Multiculturalism, London, Civitas.

31. GUPTA, R. (2003) A veil

drawn over brutal crimes. The

Guardian. 3rd October 2003

communities caused by ethnically basedregeneration funding from local and cen-tral government. He argued that suchstructures encouraged groups to competeagainst each other. The Review Team alsonoted that habits of self-censorship haddeveloped, which had made cooperationbetween groups more difficult: “In ouranxiety to eliminate forms of insultingbehaviour and language, we have created asituation in which most people are unwill-ing to open any subject which might pos-sibly lead to uncomfortable differences inopinion.”32

Finally, the defining moment of Britishrace relations in the past decade was theMacpherson inquiry into the StephenLawrence investigation, published in 1999.The murder of the black teenager in southLondon, and the substandard police oper-ation into the incident led to a major shiftin the national conversation about raceissues in Britain. It brought to publicattention the concept of ‘institutionalracism’, which the Macpherson reportdefined as “the collective failure of anorganisation to provide an appropriate andprofessional service to people because oftheir colour, culture or ethnic origin. It canbe seen or detected in processes, attitudesand behaviour which amount to discrimi-nation through unwitting prejudice, igno-rance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyp-ing which disadvantage minority ethnicpeople.” The report’s seventy recommen-dations included an increase in ethnicmonitoring, the adoption of race aware-ness training, targets for ethnic minorityrecruitment and promotion, and greaterattention given to ‘hate crimes’.

Although the use of the term ‘institu-tional racism’ ostensibly emphasisedstructural factors behind racism (such asemployment, institutional practices, andstatutory policies), the effect ofMacpherson was to focus authorities’attention on the everyday, low-level expe-rience of racism in the workplace. Today

anti-racist measures concentrate onchanging the organisational culture, androoting out ‘unwitting prejudice’, whichis unintentional and can lead to feelingsof disrespect towards ethnic minorities.Macpherson’s highly subjective definitionof a racist incident, as anything “perceivedto be racist by the victim or by any otherperson” (emphasis added) has turned anyact of aggression, or even criticism, into apotential racial offence.33 Despite its high-minded aim, the preoccupation withmonitoring racism seems to coincide withincreased racial tensions betweengroups.34

Muslim identityThe shift towards multicultural policieshas had a profound impact on the Muslimpopulation at local and national level.Since the 1980s, the authorities havesought to engage with Muslims on thebasis of their cultural difference, presum-ing a common identification based on reli-gious, ethnic or cultural needs. For the lasttwenty-five years local politicians from allthe mainstream parties have made effortsto befriend Muslim community leaders inorder to secure ‘the Muslim vote’ in urbanareas. Numerous local authorities have setup representative bodies to consult withMuslims over local issues. In Bradford, thecouncil helped set up the BradfordCouncil of Mosques, while in Leicester aFederation of Muslim Organisations wasestablished.

Local authorities have found new part-ners in religious institutions and recruitedthem to help with public service delivery.For instance, some people in the 1980sargued that the Muslim community’s reli-giosity should be encouraged because ithelped maintain relatively low crime ratesof young Asian men compared to theirAfro-Caribbean counterparts.35 These part-nerships with the authorities endowed reli-gious institutions with extra prestige. They



32. HOME OFFICE (2001)

Community Cohesion: A report

of the Independent Review Team

chaired by Ted Cantle. London,

Home Office. p.20

33. See also, GREEN et al.

(2000) Institutional Racism and

the Police: Fact or Fiction?

London, Civitas

34. Prior to the summer riots in

Oldham in 2001, the police were

so keen to demonstrate their

commitment to dealing with

racism, that officers went into

local communities and actively

encouraged people to report

racially motivated crimes. Indeed,

the police treated all crimes

between whites and Asians as

racially motivated, even when

they were not reported as such.

It borrowed Macpherson’s open-

ended and highly subjective defi-

nition of a racist incident as ‘any

incident which is perceived to be

racist by the victim or any other

person’. As a result, the number

of racial incidents recorded in

Oldham for 1997-1998 was 238,

almost twice as much as the next

highest, 122 in Rochdale and

over four times higher than in

any other division in Greater

Manchester. Oldham was also

unique in that the majority of vic-

tims were in fact white, 116 out

of 204. The local British National

Party (BNP) was strongly vilified

in the media for pointing to this

figure as evidence of white vic-

timisation by ethnic minorities,

but it was the police who encour-

aged such skewed statistics in

the first place. In light of this and

other ‘anti-racist’ measures that

reinforced the perception of

hatred and tension between

Asians and whites, it is possible

to see why Oldham experienced

an explosion of racial tension in

the summer of 2001. See

O’NEILL, B. (2001) Oldham:

Unasked questions. spiked. 9th

July 2001

35. This theory has been some-

what discredited in recent years,

as today Muslim males are ade-

quately represented in UK pris-

ons at 9% - over 2.5 times more

than their proportion of the total

population. ‘Why Muslims make

Britain a better place’

Commission for Racial Equality

website. 16th November 2004.

http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.asp

x.LocID-0hgnew03s.RefLocID-

0hg00900c002.Lang-EN.htm

(last accessed 22.01.07). This

over-representation is partly

accounted for by the population’s

relative youth and its concentra-

tion in deprived urban areas.

affirmed the status of religious leaders asrepresentatives of the local population,often hiding the tensions between religiousand secular factions beneath the surface.

Local state support, which has becomeincreasingly organised around the per-ceived needs of those with distinct com-munal identities, has created a fierce com-petition for resources in some places. Inmany cases, well-organised and dynamicreligious organisations have played the‘cultural identity card’ better than someless well-resourced secular groups. The newstatus awarded to certain Muslim organisa-tions by local and national government hasarguably given more strident elements theconfidence to challenge the dominance ofolder, secular traditions.36

The shift at local level from secular toreligious partners is demonstrated in EastLondon, where during the 1990s, fundingdeclined for secular Bangladeshi commu-nity organisations but rose for religiousorganisations, such as the increasinglyprominent East London Mosque.37 Overthe years, tensions between different reli-gious and secular factions have arisen. Forexample, local Islamist groups have criti-cised longstanding local Bangladeshi NewYear celebrations for being ‘syncretic’,because they include Hindu symbolismand encourage boys and girls to mix.Meanwhile, many secular activists havecriticised the visits to the East LondonMosque of Islamist politicians from theJamaat-I-Islami party in Bangladesh, whoallegedly committed crimes againsthumanity in the war of independence in

1971. The notion of a singular ‘Muslimcommunity’ belies the internal tensionsthat exist in places such as these.

The 2001 summer riots in Oldham,Bradford and Burnley also suggest a growingpoliticisation of religion. The riots werelargely discussed in terms of an old frame-work of racial tension and discrimination,but there is evidence to show that some ofthe aggression was characterised by Islamistsectarianism.38 Prior to the riots, there werereports of vandalism and violent confronta-tions at local churches, graffiti including slo-gans of support for the Palestinian militantgroup, Hamas and Osama Bin Laden (thisbefore 9/11), and harassment of other reli-gious groups in the area.

At a national level, during the 1980s and1990s radical Muslim organisations beganto cohere into a national voice and exert amore powerful presence than apolitical orlocalised Muslim groups. In 1988, the UKAction Committee on Islamic Affairs(UKACIA) was set up to campaign againstthe novel, The Satanic Verses by SalmanRushdie, which eventually led to a fatwa bythe Ayatollah Khomeini “condemning todeath” Rushdie. The issue drew togetherdiverse Muslim groups who recognised theneed to work together. The anti-Rushdiecampaign was led primarily from Pakistanby disciples of the late Islamist ideologueAbul A’la Mawdudi, who founded theJamaat-e-Islami party in 1941. The cam-paign combined grassroots mobilisation onthe streets of the UK through demonstra-tions and petitions, with diplomatic pres-sure on the British Government throughSaudi-linked networks. The carefullyorchestrated book-burning on the streets ofBradford raised the profile of Islamismamongst younger Muslims, who were moreliterate than their parents and easily pro-voked into anger by an affront to Islam.39

For the first time, anxiety emerged thatsome Muslims would refuse to obey Britishlaw, wedded as they were to a trans-nation-al belief system.


26

36. HUSSEIN, D. (2006)

Bangladeshis in East London:

from secular politics to Islam.

Open Democracy. 7th July 2006

37. EADE, J. & GARBIN, D.

(2002) Changing Narratives of

Violence, Struggle and

Resistance: Bangladeshis and

the Competition for Resources in

the Global City. Oxford

Development Studies, 30.



Social Affairs Unit. p.29-36.

39. For more detailed analysis of

the Rushdie affair, see HIRO, D.

(1992) Black British, White

British, London, Paladin. p.182-

193 KEPEL, G. (2004) Jihad.

The Trail of Political Islam,

London, I.B.Taurus & Co Ltd. P.

p.186-190.

“ During the 1980s and 1990s radical Muslim organi�

sations began to cohere into a national voice and exert a

more powerful presence than apolitical or localised

Muslim groups”

The discomfort about the loyalties ofMuslims became even more pronouncedduring the first Gulf War, and later, thePalestinian intifadas in the early 1990s andlater, in 2000. In 1992, the MuslimParliament led by the late Kalim Siddiquilaunched its own Muslim Manifesto, pro-moting jihad as a basic duty of anyMuslim, regardless of their place of birth.

In the face of the growing number ofMuslim groups competing for attention(and resources) the British Governmenthelped to establish the single umbrellabody, the Muslim Council of Britain(MCB) in 1997. This followed a demandby the then Conservative Home Secretary,Michael Howard, for Muslims to develop asingle representative body. The MCB rep-resents 350 mosques around the countryand its staff work on a voluntary basis,although it has received public moneyfrom time to time (for instance, the gov-ernment awarded it £140,000 to help pub-licise new religious discrimination legisla-tion).40 The MCB has been an importantinfluence in strengthening the politicalidentity of Muslims in the UK, comment-ing openly on British foreign policy, reli-gious discrimination and the problems fac-ing Muslims. In 2001, its ‘Electing toListen’ document was part of a move toencourage tactical voting amongstMuslims in the General Election. It high-lighted issues such as Islamophobia (espe-cially in the media), religious discrimina-tion, and international concerns inPalestine, Chechyna and Kashmir.41

However, in recent times the aims andmethods of the MCB leadership have beencalled into question, particularly since theLondon bombings. Some argue that theorganisation does not adequately representthe diversity of cultural and religiousbeliefs of British Muslims, particularly themajority group of Sufi Muslims in the UK(which has since established its own repre-sentative organisation, the Sufi MuslimCouncil). The MCB has responded by

stating it has only ever claimed to representits affiliate organisations, but there is littledoubt that the Government has tended totreat it as a proxy for mainstream Muslimopinion in general.

More pointedly, others have expressedconcern at the ‘extreme’ opinions of someof the MCB leadership who are linked topolitically radical organisations abroad,such as the Muslim Brotherhood andJamaat-I-Islami.42 Whilst there is little seri-ous suggestion that the MCB endorses theaims of organisations such as Al-Qaeda, itsviews on issues like homosexuality,arranged marriage, the causes of radicalisa-tion of Muslims in the UK and theHolocaust Memorial Day have provokedcontroversy. The MCB’s first appointedleader, Iqbal Sacranie was formerly thehead of the UKACIA and once famouslysaid of the novelist Salman Rushdie,“Death, perhaps is a bit too easy for him”.This has created doubts about whether itshould be considered a viable representa-tive body for Muslims. Other groups, suchas the Muslim Public Affairs Committee(MPAC) and the Muslim Association ofBritain (MAB), and its offshoot the BritishMuslim Initiative (BMI), are even moreunder suspicion of having extremist linksand attitudes.

Political Islam in the UK has, of course,developed under the influence of Islamistgroups operating from Pakistan,Bangladesh, and the Middle East. As theMuslim voice in Britain was beginning todevelop political coherence, it was ener-gised by the Shia-led Iranian revolution in1979, and later The Satanic Verses affair. Bythe late 1990s, Muslim groups had built aneffective national lobbying machine. Thestrength of Islamist groups was significant-ly bolstered by the flow of money fromSaudi Arabia and Pakistan for new reli-gious facilities, buildings, publishing andeducation resources. This shifted the bal-ance from more traditional and apoliticalMuslim organisations, towards more inter-



40. APPLETON, J. (2005) Why

the Extremism Taskforce Will

Fail. Spiked 21st July 2005



Social Affairs Unit.

42. BRIGHT, M. (2006) When

Progressives Treat with

Reactionaries. Policy Exchange,

WARE, J. (2006) MCB in the

dock. Prospect. December 2006

nationalist and politically radical groupswith Wahabi ideologies, as mentioned pre-viously. It has been noted by numerouscommentators that London (or‘Londonistan’; a term originally coined bythe French secret service) became a centreof refuge for Islamist groups in the 1990s,as various governments squeezed theiroperations out abroad. Three prominentIslamist clerics – Abu Qatada, Abu Hamzaand Omar Bakri Muhammed, operatedout of London until recently.

Since 2001 – Muslim self�consciousnessMost decisively, the terrorist attacks on theUS in 2001 have given new significance tobeing a Muslim. Al-Qaeda’s strike signifi-cantly raised the profile of both the organ-isation itself and its cause worldwide. On9/11 violent jihad entered a new phase ofspectacle and attention, and turned theeyes of younger Muslims towards theMiddle East.

The attack on the twin towers increasedconcerns about whether Muslims can liveat peace with the West – and in the West.A series of episodes in Europe have furtherignited passions and exacerbated the feel-ing of division – the murder of Dutchfilm-maker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdamin 2004 by a Dutch-Moroccan; the contro-versy over the Danish cartoons that causeddeep offence to many European Muslimsin spring 2006; the provocative remarksmade by Pope Benedict XIV in September2006 about Islam and violence; and, inBritain, the comments made by Jack StrawMP expressing his concern about thechoice of Muslim women in his con-stituency to wear the veil. These incidentshave all brought Muslims into the spot-light and provoked anxiety about theirrelationship to the West.

This increased attention has occurred ata time when the next generation of BritishMuslims is maturing and starting to con-

sider questions of personal identity. Manyare doing so in a context in which they feelthey are seen as Muslims, and little else.This is emphasised by the way the mediaand politicians, as well as Muslim groups,talk about the ‘Muslim community’.

“If I’m honest, the stuff in the news after 9/11 but

especially 7/7 made me think about my commu-

nity more in terms of the Islamic community. II

ssttaarrtteedd llooookkiinngg aatt tthhiinnggss iinn aa ddiiffffeerreenntt wwaayy

bbeeccaauussee ppeeooppllee ssttaarrtteedd llooookkiinngg aatt mmee,, aatt uuss,, iinn aa

ddiiffffeerreenntt wwaayy..” (emphasis added), Male,

Muslim, 22, Rochdale

Even less religious Muslims are consciousof belonging to a group:

“I didn’t really feel like I belonged to any commu-

nity apart from the London community, but as

soon as the events like 9/11 and 7/7 threw the

spotlight on Muslims, I thought ‘oh yeah, I have a

Muslim background, what’s it all about?’”

Female, Muslim, 22, London

The events of 2001 marked a major turningpoint in Muslim identity in another way. Forthe first time, non-Muslims echoed Muslimfeeling about foreign policy issues. Thegrievance of Muslims was given wider legiti-macy by sympathetic commentators in themedia. In the weeks following 9/11, numer-ous commentators interpreted 9/11 as anoutcome of legitimate Muslim anger. In theGuardian on 15th October 2001, thecolumnist, Gary Younge wrote:

“Three weeks ago it was considered a mixture of

heresy, naivety and plain bad taste to raise the

issue of American foreign policy; now it is widely

accepted that without a just settlement in the

Middle East, networks like Al-Qaeda will always

be able to prey on disaffection in the Arab

world”.43

Although such commentators condemnedthe methods of the terrorists, they accept-ed that Al-Qaeda’s attack was a response to


28

43. YOUNGE, G. (2001) We are

all victims now. The Guardian.

London. 15th October 2001

dispossession and suffering in the MiddleEast, particularly in Palestine. The rapidgrowth of the anti-war movement, spear-headed by the Stop the War coalition, wasan alliance of left-wing groups, Islamist,and anti-globalisation factions.44 Theywalked together on demonstrations, and,through the creation of the Respect party,fought targeted electoral seats. RadicalIslam’s narrative of the victimised ummahhas drawn sustenance from broader publicanger at US and UK foreign policy.

This brief history of Muslim identityshows that it has not been constant. It hasdeveloped out of a combination of factors,and in recent years, it has become marked-ly self-conscious. No doubt, one of theeffects of the increased scrutiny of the‘Muslim community’ is that the more wetalk about it, the more likely Muslims per-ceive themselves to be part of it.Economists use the term ‘informationalcascade’ to describe how people giveanswers based on what they think otherpeople in their group believe. Muslims,who are undoubtedly diverse in their opin-ions, may well tend to give similar answersbecause they are influenced by this kind ofgroup-think. When Muslims are askedquestions about ‘their’ community, theremay be a sense of not wanting to let theside down, and feelings of defensiveness.The Muslim identity, therefore, has, tosome extent, become a self-fulfillingprophecy.

Muslim organisations today – their concerns and aimsThe emergence of the Muslim communi-ty as a political presence has taken placeover two decades. However, up until thelate 1980s, this presence was fragmented,localised and concerned with minorissues regarding accommodation for thepractice of religion – such as facilities forhalal slaughter, clothing for femaleschoolchildren, planning permission for

mosques and funding for voluntarygroups and services.

Since the 1990s, the Muslim voice hasgradually become more politicised andunified, largely under the influence of pro-ponents of radical Islam with links togroups abroad. This has moved the atten-tion of activists away from purely localissues, to concerns that relate to Muslimsas a community in the UK, and the world-wide Muslim community – the ummah.The shift towards the politics of recogni-tion has shaped many of the demandsmade by Muslim groups since the 1990s.The Muslim Manifesto – A Strategy forSurvival (1990) launched by the MuslimParliament, argued for the recognition ofIslam in the legal and constitutional struc-ture of the UK, including a revision to theblasphemy law to include all religions.45

The theme of religious persecution andhatred of Muslims – Islamophobia – hasbeen an important one for galvanising sup-port from younger Muslims. Crucially, theissue of Islamophobia provided a routeinto the existing framework of race rela-tions practice, with its growing interest inthe protection of cultural identities and‘respect’ for minority groups. It was actual-ly a generic race relations body, theRunnymede Trust, rather than a Muslimlobby organisation, that first popularisedthe term ‘Islamophobia’ in 1997, in amajor report on British Muslims.46 Afterthe publication of the Stephen LawrenceInquiry, the Muslim Magazine Q News,asked “Where’s the Muslim inMacpherson’s Black and White Britain?’47

Non-Muslim anti-racists, perhaps stung bysuch criticism, answered the call and incor-porated Muslims into their work. Officialanti-racism laid the foundations on whichMuslim groups would build their owncampaigns.

Following 9/11, Muslim representativeorganisations framed their concerns interms of feelings of vulnerability and theperceived backlash against Muslims. The





Social Affairs Unit. p.41.

45. THE INSTITUTE FOR THE

STUDY OF ISLAM AND CHRIS-

TIANITY (2005) The British

Muslim Community in 2005,

Wiltshire, The Institute for the

Study of Islam and Christianity.

p.50

46. RUNNYMEDE TRUST (1997)

Islamaphobia: A Challenge for

Us All. London, Runnymede

Trust.

47. RUNNYMEDE TRUST (2000)

The Future of Multi-Ethnic

Britain, The Parekh Report,

London, Profile Books Ltd. p.62

Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) calledfor greater protection by authorities, claim-ing that:

“Muslims in the United Kingdom feel particular-

ly vulnerable, insecure, alienated, threatened,

intimidated, marginalized, discriminated and

vilified since [the] 11 September tragedy”.48

Today a range of Muslim-led organisationsactively lobby about Islamophobia. Thesegroups include the Muslim Council ofBritain’s Media Committee, the IslamicHuman Rights Commission (IHRC), theForum Against Islamophobia and Racism(FAIR), MPAC, BMI and the MuslimSafety Forum (MSF).49 Their campaigningefforts helped to secure new legislation in2006, banning the “incitement to religioushatred”.

Many of these Muslim lobby groupshave actively campaigned for greater recog-nition of the Muslim community in thelaw and in public service provision, argu-ing that the Race Relations Act of 1976does not protect religious communities,only racial ones. In 2001 the national cen-sus featured a question about religion forthe first time, largely in response to lobby-ing. The Human Rights Act 1998 andEuropean Union laws have also created anew space for legal discussion about therole and rights of Muslims in the UK. Itremains to be seen how the Government’snew Commission on Equality and HumanRights will progress further the agendas ofMuslim lobby groups.

The Government has accepted the roleof Muslim representative organisationswith regards to welfare provision and pos-sible changes to the law. In August 2006,representatives from the Union of MuslimOrganisations in the UK and Ireland askedRuth Kelly, the Secretary of State forCommunities, for holidays to markMuslim festivals and Islamic laws to coverfamily affairs which would apply only toMuslims. The Secretary General, Dr Syed

Aziz Pasha, said she told him she would“look sympathetically at all the sugges-tions” and also agreed “it should be a part-nership approach”.50

It is important to recognise that BritishMuslim groups are far from uniform inoutlook. Apart from the historic theologi-cal differences between Sunnis and Shias,Muslims espouse a range of political andreligious views, often in contradiction toeach other.

Some are avowedly Islamist and political(Hizb u-Tahrir, MPAC, Al Muhajiroun)whereas others are more culturally and reli-giously orientated (Tablighi Jamaat).51 Thelargest organisations like the MCB and theMAB straddle an uneasy line betweenmainstream political engagement and theimperatives of Islamism. More recently,there has been a growth in secular Muslimorganisations which seek to find points ofconnection with the non-Muslim majority,such as Progressive British Muslims,Muslims for Secular Democracy and theCity Circle.

Despite claims about the ‘Muslim com-munity’, Muslim organisations are deeplysplit over the appropriate way to pursueMuslim aims. Some Islamist organisationssuch as Hizb u-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun(a group that, despite being banned,mutates and resurfaces) denounce demo-cratic politics and consider voting to beun-Islamic. Meanwhile, MPAC stronglycriticises this rejectionism, and arguesthat younger British-born Muslims areneglecting their Islamic duty if they donot vote and harness the political systemto Islamist ends. MPAC preach a unique-ly British brand of radical Islam and havecampaigned vociferously against MPswho they see as demonstrating a pro-Israeli bias. They actively supported theelection of the Respect Party in EastLondon in 2005.

Whatever their differences, these overtlypolitical organisations tend to share a dis-dain for more mainstream groups like the


30

48. MUSLIM COUNCIL OF

BRITAIN (2003) Memorandum

from the Muslim Council of

Britain (404) - Minutes of

Evidence. House of Lords -

Religious Offences in England

and Wales. Parliamentary copy-

right., cited in THE INSTITUTE

FOR THE STUDY OF ISLAM

AND CHRISTIANITY (2005) The

British Muslim Community in

2005, Wiltshire, The Institute for

the Study of Islam and

Christianity. p 65.

49. MSF is an umbrella group

comprising national and regional

Islamic organisations including:

MAB, IHRC, IFE, MCB London

Affairs Committee, YMO UK,

Muslim College, FAIR, Amal

Trust, The London Central

Mosque, London Muslim Centre,

Muslim Parliament, FOSIS, ISB,

Muslimaat UK, Avenues School,

Somali Muslim Community,

UKIM, MPAC, Stop Political

Terror, Muslim Directory, Ershad

Centre, BanglaMedia, Iqra Trust,

Association of Muslim Police, Al-

Khoei Foundation, UMO, Muslim

Welfare House, Women’s Relief.

50. BROWN, C. (2006) Let us

adopt Islamic family law to curb

extremists, Muslims tell Kelly.

The Independent. 15th August

2006

51. The largest Muslim group in

the UK, Tablighi Jamaat, claims

to be a purely apolitical move-

ment which preaches strict reli-

gious practice, although the

leader of the London bombers,

Mohammed Sidique Khan is

reputed to have attended its lec-

tures.

MCB. For more radical groups, the MCBis associated with the Government andtherefore fails to address the demands ofyounger Muslims who are attracted toIslamism precisely because it fiercelyopposes government policy. After theLondon bombings, over forty Islamicscholars and leaders organised by the MCBproduced a statement calling the attacks‘absolutely un-Islamic’, and representativesfrom the 500 strong Muslim Forum stoodoutside Parliament and issued a fatwa inresponse to the bombs saying that suicidebombs were ‘vehemently prohibited’. It isuncertain how seriously this proclamationwould have been taken by Islamist hell-bent on committing terrorist acts.

The MCB has also been criticised bysome younger Muslim organisations forbeing out of touch with their generation.They would prefer to develop a BritishIslam which is more ‘relevant’ and they seethe MCB as a barrier to this. SecularMuslim groups have complained about thefailure of the MCB to discuss the moderni-sation of Islam and religious practice.

The meaning of modernisation is itselfconfusing, and for some, it can mean areturn to Qu’ranic injunctions rather thana relaxing of rules. For instance, MPAChas run a campaign to encourage mosquesto open their doors to women – some-thing that has traditionally been deniedon both religious grounds (regarding thestrict segregation of men and women dur-ing prayer times) but also practicalgrounds because of the limited spaceavailable in most mosques in the UK.MPAC’s campaign has been presented interms of ‘Women’s Power’, and borrowsheavily from the language of contempo-rary feminism, making it highly appealingto commentators who long for a reformedIslam. Yet, the ‘women’s power’ promotedby MPAC is also highly religious. MPAChas supported women who wear the fullveil (niqab) and the headscarf (hijab), say-ing that “they should not be proscribed

but treated with greater dignity andrespect than most”52. The ‘women’s power’it promotes is about protecting women’srights only insofar as they are justified interms of the Qu’ran.

Finally, a feature of some Muslim organ-isations is the association with anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-British andanti-Western ideas. The literature andwebsites of groups like Al-Mujahiroun arevitriolic in their disdain for non-Muslims.Even more apparently mainstream groupssuch as MPAC have been accused of stok-ing up hatred of Jews, gays and non-Muslims. MPAC denies these accusationsstrenuously, but its reputation was severelydamaged when it was revealed by TheObserver newspaper in November 2006that one of MPAC’s founders, AsgharBukhari sent a donation of sixty pounds in2000 to the historian David Irving, wellknown as a Holocaust-denier. The majori-ty of Muslims do not subscribe to suchviews and most Muslim lobby groups areopenly condemnatory of them, but thiskind of sentiment seems to be on the rise.

The considerable range of organisationspresented here suggests that BritishMuslims are not responding to the currentclimate in a uniform way. Young BritishMuslims may be hostile to an older gener-ation’s way of doing things, but there is noconsensus on what a ‘British Islam’ shouldlook like. While some organisations rejectthe ‘Western’ mode of democracy andpolitical participation, others push forgreater involvement and even celebrationof ‘Western’ ideas. Some Muslim groupswish to enjoy the cultural or ‘folk’ aspectsof their religious upbringing and keep



52. See MPAC website, ‘Jack

Straw’s Veil of Deceit’, 6th

October 2006

http://www.mpacuk.org/content/vi

ew/2796/39/ (last accessed

20.01.07)

“ Young British Muslims may be hostile to an older gen�

eration’s way of doing things, but there is no consensus

on what a ‘British Islam’ should look like”


32

them as a valued part of their heritage,while others wish to ‘purify’ Islam of suchtraditions. British Islam might be chang-ing, but how remains to be seen.

Crisis of identityAs outlined above, the growth of Islamismin the UK over the past two decades hasbeen encouraged by a series of politicalevents and, indirectly, by official policies.However, it also reflects a deeper yearningamongst the younger generation ofMuslims growing up in Britain. TanveerAhmed, an Australian Muslim psychiatrist,has written about the way in which youngMuslims growing up in the West may feelcaught between two different cultural sys-tems with competing values. He arguesthat the turn towards a religious identity ispartly a response to a sense of culturalalienation in the West. This might some-times be fuelled by experience of racism, orby a sense of incompatibility with the cul-tural mainstream. According to this thesis,the Muslim is a ‘marginal man’ who feelsrejected by, and alienated from, one orboth parents, wider family or school. Thisconfusion of identity may then lead tohigher levels of deviance, excessive anxietyand psychiatric instability. Ahmed writes,“In lay terms, they cannot carry theirinconsistent selves through to adult-hood…This often involves a dramatic shiftto either side of the cultural divide, per-haps committing to an arranged marriageor seeking refuge in deep religiosity. Or itcan occur in the opposite behaviour, suchas eloping with a partner against their par-ents’ wishes.”53

It seems embracing religion can helpsome Muslims overcome this sense of alien-ation from the mainstream, and give them asense of belonging, which neither Britainnor their parental homeland provides:

“The people who I spend time with at the mosque

and the people who have influenced me – we go

through the same thing… they understand what

it’s like for me to grow up here without any real

sense of belonging. The imams of my parent’s gen-

eration don’t understand, our parents generation

belonged to Pakistan, or India or whatever, that

was their identity.” Male, Muslim, 20,

Birmingham

Certainly, young Muslims can feel tornbetween the culturally strict expectationsof the home, and the more permissive,morally relaxed environment of school andfriendship groups. This is an experienceknown to many new immigrant groups.But it should be remembered that theappeal of Islamism is not limited to youngMuslims who have been brought up in cul-turally strict homes. Some react againsttheir parents’ attempt to ‘fit in’ to Britishsociety and many converts from a range ofbackgrounds have been lured by the strictideology. A range of personal factors maycontribute to their interest in Islamism,but what seems to be a common factor isthe attraction of a morally absolute visionof the world and the sense of belonging toa community.

In this sense, the appeal of Islamism as akind of identity may also reflect a widercultural shift within society. As older formsof political and national identity comeunder attack or have diminished, peoplesearch for new forms of meaning andbelonging. This growing inclination toretreat into exclusive cultural or religiousidentities is certainly not confined toMuslims, and we should consider theextent to which younger people more gen-erally feel a sense of detachment from soci-ety as a whole.

“I don’t feel particularly anything – not British,

European or English.” Female, non-religious,

23, London

Some commentators have observed a smallgrowth in Sikh and Hindu youth organisa-tions which suggests a tendency towards

53. AHMED, T. (2005) The

Muslim ‘Marginal Man’. Policy,

Vol 21.

exclusive identification amongst non-Muslim minority communities too.54

Other people are turning to regional orlocal identities, away from the nation state.In a 1979 poll in Scotland, in answer tothe question, “What nationality bestdescribes you?” 56 per cent of people said‘Scottish’ and 38% said ‘British’. In 2003,in answer to the same question, 73% saidScottish and 20% said British.55 The sametrend can be discerned in Wales. In 2004,60% of people described themselves asWelsh only and this was higher for youngerrespondents.56

It is not only people in Scotland andWales who are reverting to ancient identi-ties. In the last 15 years, Englishness hasgone from being a rather quaint and gentleconcept, embodied by cultural totems suchas parish churches, boat races and Morrisdancers, to a much more assertive, populistidentity. Football has been the most highprofile manifestation of this change butnot the cause. Although none of theseidentities – English, Scottish, Welsh – areracially exclusive they are inevitably moreethnically based and nativist, closer incharacter to national identities in manyother parts of Europe. The inclusiveness ofBritish identity, with its (UK wide) multi-national and Commonwealth roots, isunusual.

Similarly, the rise in religiosity amongstyounger Muslims and the search for mean-ing it represents reflects a growing trend inthe wider population. Spirituality is on therise in Britain. 76% of people admit tohaving a spiritual experience (such as a‘strong sense of God’s presence’ or ananswered prayer), which is up 59% in justten years and 110% in 25 years. Accordingto the Assessment and QualificationsAlliance, there has been a remarkable 21%rise in students taking religious studies at‘A’ level between 2000 and 2004, and a67% rise in students taking Philosophy ‘A’level. Whilst aspects of established religionare declining (for instance, on a typical

Sunday, church attendance fell from justover 4.7 million in 1980 to an estimated3.3 million in 2005), more personalisedforms of religiosity and spirituality seem tobe on the rise.57 The Chaplain forEvangelism at Coventry Cathedral, YvonneRichmond writes:

“Whether through gods or gurus, mediums or mys-

ticism, alternative therapists or spiritual guides,

more and more people are becoming ‘spiritual seek-

ers’, such that prayer rooms or sacred spaces are

springing up at airports and service stations, indus-

trial and commercial chaplains are in demand and

even the media, which has for decades been unre-

lentingly hostile to faith, is picking up on spiritual-

ity and speaking favourably of it”.58

Young Muslims may be becoming morereligious but if they feel increasinglydetached from Britain, it is not primarilybecause their religion is pulling them awaybut because there is considerable confusionin wider society about what belonging toBritain actually means. Recent attempts bythe government to introduce citizenshiptests and education have become mired incontroversy about the meaning ofBritishness itself and what it ought tostand for.

For many observers, one of the principalfactors in undermining British identity hasbeen the rise of the politics of multicultur-alism. Intellectual fashion has dictated thatright-minded people should feel shameand guilt about Britain’s imperial past andembarrassment about overt manifestationsof national pride. In recent years, therehave been many incidents that reveal thedegree of discomfort the authorities feelabout many aspects of ‘Britishness’.

At Aberdeen University, army cadetswere asked by the Officer Training Corps(OTC) to remove their uniforms whenmarching past a mosque after abuse wasshouted at one cadet from a car. This senttwo apparently officially sanctioned mes-sages to Muslims; first, British Muslims



54. ‘The Sikhs are at it too’,

Sunny Hundal, Pickled Politics,

27th May 2006 http://www.pick-

ledpolitics.com/archives/552 (last

accessed 13.01.07)

55. FRY, M. (2006) Scotland

Alone. Prospect. December 2006

56. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL

STATISTICS (2002) Annual Local

Area Labour Force Survey

2001/2002.

57. For further details and

sources, see the Tomorrow’s

Project web-based report pub-

lished April 10th, 2006

http://www.tomorrowproject.net/p

ub/1__GLIMPSES/Individuals__i

dentity_and_values/-187.html

(last accessed 21.01.07)

58. RICHMOND, Y. (2005) A

Spiritual Snapshot. IN AL, S. C.

E. (Ed.) Evangelism in a Spiritual

Age. London, Churchhouse

Publishing. p 8

may legitimately object to being exposedto the uniforms of their country’s armedforces; second, that this objection will takeprecedence over the desire of cadets towear their uniforms or the wishes of themajority to see them. A leading communi-ty figure and a worshipper at the mosque,Habib Malik said, “I am very surprised theOTC has done this…the Moslem commu-nity respects soldiers and thinks the Armyis doing a wonderful job.”59

When the Qualifications andCurriculum Authority (QCA) releaseddetails of the new history curriculum to betaught in secondary schools it was revealedthat prominence was to be given to one ofthe darkest incidents in the history of theBritish Empire, the Amritsar Massacre of1919, regarded even by critics of theEmpire as atypical.

The Chief Executive of the QCA, KenBoston, did not seek to justify the inclu-

sion on historical grounds: “Given themix of nationalities in England, it isimportant to foster understandingthrough learning”, he said.60 Historyteaching that starts from the assumptionthat pupils have no common nationalityis unlikely to foster any shared sense ofBritish identity.

British identity has been underminedfor political reasons but other institutionsthat provided previous generations ofMuslims with a sense of collective identityhave declined through more natural caus-es. Political parties and trades unions havehemorrhaged members over the lastdecade. The anti-racism movement that aprevious generation of young Asians wasinvolved in has been largely co-opted intoofficial race relations bodies. Older ways ofengaging collectively have declined and insuch a vacuum, a politicised religious iden-tity has emerged.


34

59. ‘No uniforms warned army

cadets’ Aberdeen News. 16th

December 2006.

http://www.thebestof.co.uk/aberd

een/news/27046 (last accessed

21.01.07)

60. See the QCA website,

http://www.qca.org.uk/2586_1790

8.html (last accessed 20.01.07)

Part 2

3Identificationand belonging

In September 2005, the Chairman of theCommission for Racial Equality, TrevorPhillips, warned that Britain was in dangerof “sleepwalking into segregation”. Hisstatement encouraged a long period ofreflection in the media about the impact ofmulticulturalism and whether it had madeBritain a more divided society. In October2006, Jack Straw MP wrote in his localLancashire newspaper that he was worriedthat an increasing number of Muslimwomen in his constituency were choosingto wear the niqab (full veil) as a “visiblestatement of separation and difference”.61

His comments provoked heated debate,and reflected an anxiety amongst somepeople that Muslims are consciouslychoosing to live apart from non-Muslims.Others, however, have argued that fearsabout segregation are exaggerated, and thatMuslims are integrating well into themainstream. The reality is that both sides,to some extent, are correct. The Muslimidentity in the UK is more contradictoryand complex than it first appears.

First, it is clear that the majority ofMuslims strongly identify their religion asimportant to them. Our research showedthat nearly half (49%) pray five times aday, whilst 22% pray at least 1-3 times aday (Fig 1). This figure did not vary signif-icantly across age groups, socio-economicclass or region.

86% of respondents also believed thattheir religion was the most importantthing in their life (Fig 2). When asked thesame question, only 11% of the widerBritish population felt the same.

The importance of religion marksMuslims out from the wider population,but their response is comparable to otherreligious or ethnic minority groups.According to a National Office forStatistics (NOS) report about religion inthe UK, compiled in February 2006, morethan half of Jewish, Muslim, Sikh andHindu adults living in England and Walesin 2001 said that their religion was impor-tant to their self-identity. The same NOSreport pointed out that most Muslimsthink of themselves as British. 93% ofMuslims born in the UK described them-


61. STRAW, J. (2006) I want to

unveil my views on an important

issue. Lancashire Telegraph. 5th

October 2006. http://www.lan-

cashiretelegraph.co.uk/blog/index

.var.488.0.i_want_to_unveil_my_

views_on_an_important_issue.ph

p (last accessed 19.01.07)

49%

22%

9%

15%

5%

5 times a day

1�3 times a day

Once a week

Only occasionally

Never

66%

20%

9%4% 1%

Agree strongly

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Disagree strongly

Don't know

Figure 1: How often do you pray?*

Figure 2; “My religion is the most important thing inmy life”

* Percentages in figures throughout this report may not add up exactly to 100% due to rounding

selves as British, English, Scottish orWelsh, compared to 94% of Buddhists,90% of Sikhs, and 91% of Hindus.62

In terms of social and political attitudes,British Muslim opinion is also often in linewith wider opinion. On the controversialsubject of integration into British society,some surveys show that Muslims are moredemanding of immigrant groups to inte-grate than other Britons. In a MORI sur-vey conducted in August 2005, 90% ofMuslims felt immigrants should be madeto learn English (compared to 82% of themain public). 76% of Muslims said immi-grants should be made to pledge their pri-mary loyalty to Britain, compared to 73%of the main public. 65% of Muslimsbelieved that imams should be made topreach in English – a much higher figurethan 39% of the main public. 95% (com-pared to 96% nationally) said immigrantsshould accept the rights of women as equalcitizens.63

Fears about geographical segregation arealso disputed. As one article in TheEconomist explained, “The commonly usedindex of segregation, which measures thenumber of people who would have to movein order to spread themselves evenly over acity, shows that every large ethnic minoritygroup became less segregated between 1991and 2001….Far from cowering in theirinner-city enclaves, black and Asian Britonsare racing to the suburbs’.64 Surveys showthat the vast majority of Muslims do notwish to live apart from non-Muslims.According to a survey conducted for theChannel 4 television programme, Dispatchesin 2006, 94% of Muslim respondents didnot believe that Muslims should keep apartfrom non-Muslims.

Yet, at the same time, the politics ofmulticulturalism have encouraged a greaterconsciousness of difference amongstMuslims so that they increasingly think ofthemselves at odds with wider society.They are much more conscious of theiridentity, which differentiates them fromothers. Younger Muslims are far more like-ly to identify with the ummah than theirparents, who are more attached to theirethnic or cultural identities. TheDispatches survey in 2006 found thatwhen asked whether Britain was “Mycountry or their country”, 55% of thoseMuslims aged 45+ said “my country”,compared to 44% of 18-24 year olds.65

Likewise, although the majority ofrespondents disagreed with the statement,“Younger people living in my area are morereligious today than ten years ago”, olderrespondents were much more likely toagree (56% of 55+ years olds agreed com-pared to 38% of 16-24 year olds (Fig 4)).

Whilst the MORI poll conducted inAugust 2005, cited earlier, showed Muslimopinion to be in line with non-Muslimopinion on most things, there were majordivisions regarding Muslim-specific issues.The most divisive issue was clothing forMuslim girls in schools. A higher propor-


38

62. ‘Country of birth and national

identity’, National Office of

Statistics:

http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nu

gget.asp?id=1383 (last accessed

20.01.07)

63. MORI (2005b)

Multiculturalism poll for BBC.

64. Certainly some migrant

groups are living in concentrated

areas, for instance, the Jewish

population (52% live in North

London) but these are not seen

as a threat: THE ECONOMIST

(2005) One man’s ghetto. The

Economist. 24th September

2005

65. GFK (2006) Attitudes to

Living in Britain - A Survey of

Muslim Opinion, A Survey for

Channel 4 Dispatches. p.8

31%

59%

11%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

42%

10%

48%Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 3: “I feel more in common with Muslims in othercountries than I do with non-Muslims in Britain”

Figure 4: “Younger people living in my area are morereligious today than ten years ago”

tion of Muslims did not think schools havethe right to force Muslim girls to removetheir headscarf (17% compared to 35%national response).66

There has been much soul-searching inrecent months over whether BritishMuslims feel ‘British’ and have an emo-tional connection to the nation beyond aformal identity. There is no single answerfor this diverse group. Some feel extremelyattached to Britain, others feel moreattached to their religious identity. Manyfeel comfortable with being both Britishand Muslim and do not feel there is a con-flict between the two. This finding hasbeen shown in other studies.67

“I do actually feel strongly attached to being a

Muslim – culturally though, in that it does define

part of my identity – and British. Islam gives me

a sense of belonging but I do see myself very much

as British – England is my home.” Female,

Muslim, 22, Manchester

“British. I don’t feel attached to the ‘Muslim com-

munity’ at all, if such a thing exists. I think that

the experiences of Muslims are so varied that you

can’t group them into a community. Hmm, about

the ummah…I don’t relate in that way, because

I’m not religious enough”. Female, Muslim, 21,

London

“Muslim. I belong to that community and that

should be the only community there is”. Female,

Muslim, 23, London

The majority of Muslims feel they have asmuch in common with non-Muslims aswith Muslims (Fig 5).

However, this is less likely for youngerrespondents. 62% of 16-24 year olds agreedwith the statement, compared to 71% of55+ year olds. 33% of 16-24 year olds dis-agreed compared to 20% of 55+ year olds.Thus, while religion is important to theMuslim population, there is also a differ-ence between generations. YoungerMuslims are more likely to identify and feel

a greater connection with their religiouscommunity.

Search for meaning Our conversations with younger Muslimssuggested they are also more interested instudying their religion than their parentsare, having spent more time reading theQu’ran and attending lectures. Some of therespondents we talked to explained thattheir parents had arrived in Britain as poormigrants and probably had had less time toreflect on spiritual issues. Some actuallymentioned that their parents disapproved oftheir increased religiosity, preferring theirchildren to concentrate on educationalachievement and getting a good job. Onerespondent from Rochdale said typically:

“If you were to ask all the teenagers or people my

age what their parents will concentrate on, they

are probably asking them to study more than to go

towards religion or start praying.” Male, Muslim,

19, Rochdale

The discord between parents and childrenshows that the rise in religiosity is not real-ly about parental, or even community pres-sure, but arises spontaneously amongstmany in the younger generation. There is adesire to belong to a community and iden-tify with others.

What propels this turn to religion? Itwould seem that many younger Muslims


Identification and belonging

66. MORI (2005b)

Multiculturalism poll for BBC..

67. ETHNOS (2005) Citizenship

and Belonging: What is

Britishness? London,

Commission for Racial Equality,

FOSIS (2005) The voice of

Muslim students. A report into

the attitudes and perceptions of

Muslim students following the

July 7th London attacks.

Federation of Student Islamic

Societies.

29%

66%

5%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 5: “I feel that I have as much in common withnon-Muslims as I do with Muslims”

take an interest in Islam during theirteenage years, as they are maturing andbeginning to reflect about the meaning oflife. They have ‘returned’ to religion in asearch for answers. Although they mayhave observed religious practices whenthey were younger, many admit that thiswas simply to follow their parents’ wishesand was an inherited aspect of their cultur-al upbringing. It was only on their own ini-tiative, when they had grown older, thatthey wanted to properly understand themeaning of the various rituals and tradi-tions. The turn to religion is sometimesabout inquisitiveness and a desire to thinkcritically, not just to ‘follow the crowd’:

“I sort of came to a cross section in my life where

you have to question why you are here. Just being

here and then you die can’t possibly be it, there has

to be a purpose to your life. And I felt that society

wasn’t providing that, the answer. And the answer

that it was giving wasn’t very good, you know,

‘don’t worry about it we’ll deal with it later, you’re

young do what you want.’” Male, Muslim, 22,

London

Many young Muslims who have becomeinterested in Islam feel that it offersanswers to existential questions – answersthat are not offered elsewhere. For theseyoungsters, the attraction of religion is thatit satisfies their quest for meaning.

Their interest in religion, however, doesnot always lead them to the mosque or tothe traditional community elders who usu-ally hold authority. Many of these areregarded as moribund, particularly byyounger, more radical Muslims. As DrGhayasuddin Siddiqui, the head of theMuslim Parliament told a conference of3,000 Muslims in Birmingham in 2005,“most mosques are not equipped to dealwith young people…Our mosques arelargely tribal and controlled by old men onthe dole with no understanding of thechanging world around them”.68

Many of the younger Muslims we

spoke to regard their local mosques asirrelevant. The imams often do not speakEnglish, rarely encourage any critical dis-cussion about aspects of the Qu’ran, andtend to be more concerned with localsocial and community problems, ratherthan political or spiritual issues. In thecase of violent Islamists, such as theLondon bombers, we know that their rad-icalisation often takes place in privatespaces, and their religious interest canactually encourage a move away from tra-ditional community ties and social net-works. Radicalised Muslims might shuntheir local community mosque in favourof attending lectures in more radicalmosques.69 They may even meet in small-er ‘clique’ structures, such as universityorganisations or private meeting placeslike gymnasiums, or even the internet.

Another major difference between gen-erations is the desire of younger Muslimsto return to a ‘purer’ Islam, which does notrely on received cultural traditions inherit-ed over the generations. This has led to arejection of certain culturally or ethnicallydistinct aspects of their upbringing. Somerespondents we spoke to complained thatIslam had become ‘Pakistanised’ and thatthey wanted to identify with somethingunadulterated, and not tied to the receivedideas of their parents.

“I don’t really accept culture being much of a fac-

tor in Islamic ethics and sometimes if you are too

cultural it takes you away from Islam.” Male,

Muslim, 22, Manchester

It is tempting to interpret the desire ofsome younger Muslims to return to a purerversion of Islam as ‘old-fashioned’ or out ofdate. However, the injunction to followQu’ranic teachings can sometimes appearconfusingly reformist too. Take forinstance, the role of gender in Islam. Onerespondent explained that his mother, whowas brought up in Pakistan, had a muchmore relaxed view about male-female


40

68. “Siddiqui tells Muslim confer-

ence: Confront extremism” Press

Release 2005, Muslim

Parliament website,

http://www.muslimparliament.org.

uk/confrontextremism.htm (last

accessed 21.01.07)

69 According to Muslim residents

in his neighbourhood, the ring-

leader of the London bombers,

Mohammed Sidique Khan, had

never been seen in his local

Daulim mosque in Dewsbury.

JENKINS, R., KENNEDY, D.,

LISTER, D. & MIDGLEY, C.

(2005) The London Bombers.

The Times. 15th July 2005. He

was said to have been a regular

visitor to the larger Tablighi

Jamaat mosque in Dewsbury.

TAHER, A. (2006) Veil teacher

was obeying a fatwa. The Daily

Telegraph. 29th October 2006.

interaction at social events, and that shepreferred women not to wear the hijab. Hetook a more strict view:

“…my mother has a very secular understanding

of Islam in the sense that she’s all for praying and

fasting and reading the Qu’ran, and all the per-

sonal worships, but when it comes to public life

like weddings she’s not keen on having segregated

weddings, she would prefer the mixed weddings.

Or in public life in terms of women covering she’s

not too keen on that. I think part of that is

because the Pakistani version, she’s understood

that to be Islam. That’s the extent to which she fol-

lows Islam. Personally I think that weddings

should be segregated and that women should wear

hijab.” Male, Muslim, 23, Rochdale

However, at the same time, he disagreedwith his mother about whether womenought to work.

“But what I understand is according to Islam and

the texts…even in terms of other areas, for exam-

ple when it comes to the marriage relationship, I

wouldn’t expect a wife to always have to cook and

clean, whereas maybe my mother does because

that’s what they’re used to in Pakistan – maybe

that’s what they see as the role of the woman –

where I see it as if a woman wants to work, she

can work.”

Therefore, the rejection of old cultural tra-ditions and regulations means that the newinterpretation of Islam can appear to beboth in keeping with modern secular val-ues, and yet also opposed to them.Likewise, many of the respondents wespoke to defended the hijab as a Qu’ranicinjunction for women to wear, for the sakeof modesty. Yet, their explanations werevery often framed by the belief that “it’s thewoman’s choice”. What can sometimesappear to be a feminist interpretation ofIslam is what many young people believeto be a purer interpretation of their reli-gion. Clearly, many younger women wear-ing the hijab or niqab are not being forced

by their families, but do so out of personalchoice.

So, in summary, the “return to Islam”has led to a rejection of certain cultural tra-ditions and habits. This can appear, on theone hand, as a more modern and openinterpretation of religion. On the otherhand, the cutting loose from communityor cultural traditions also means youngerMuslims take a more strict or puritanicalapproach to religious practice which pitsthem against the culture of the mainstreamof British life.

A visible illustration of this trend isclothing. 74% of Britain’s Muslim popula-tion is of south Asian origin, but manycommentators have observed how theyounger generation seems to be more‘Arabised’, meaning that they are adoptingthe religious habits, clothing and customsof Middle Eastern culture. The most strik-ing expression of this shift is the growingprominence of Arab clothing for girls, suchas the jilbab (a full-length gown) or theniqab (full veil). Although only a minoritychoose to wear these items, they are notice-ably on the increase in Britain’s towns andcities.

In our survey, respondents were asked tochoose between one of two statementsrelating to the issue of Muslim womenwearing the veil (Fig 6).

Younger respondents expressed a muchgreater preference for Muslim women tochoose the veil; 74% of 16-24 year oldschose this statement, compared to only



53%

28%

19%

I prefer that Muslim womenchoose to wear the veil

I prefer that Muslim womenchoose not to wear the veil

Don't know/Refused

Figure 6: Wearing the veil

28% of 55+ year olds. There was no signif-icant difference between men and womenon this issue. The response to this questionis very surprising, considering how fewwomen actually do choose to wear the veil.One possible explanation for the gap maybe that respondents are making a politicalstatement of support, rather than expressinga genuine desire to see women wear the veil.Alternatively, some respondents may havetaken the word ‘veil’ to refer to the headscarfmore generally, which is far more common-ly worn. Either way, it seems that youngerMuslims consider religious clothing to bemore important than older Muslims.

This suggests that the interest in religionis not simply about ‘keeping one’s culture’and may, in some instances, imply a partialrepudiation of inherited cultural norms.The turn to religion is not shaped solely byan individual’s cultural upbringing.Instead, it seems in part to be a more per-sonal search for meaning and identity. It isa quest to make sense of the world and findvalues by which to live.

Hijab and the assertion of identityAnother aspect of Muslim religiosity is theway in which it has become about makinga visible statement of belonging to a group.In many respects, it is about forging apolitical identity; to say “this is who I am,these are my values, and this is the group Iidentify with”. The issue of the hijab is animportant illustration of this point, as itseems to be more about making a politicalstatement than preserving a cultural tradi-tion.

Muslim women who arrived in the earlywaves of immigration from Pakistan orBangladesh did not typically wear the typeof headscarf that is currently fashionable inthe UK. Some wore no head covering, oth-ers wore the ‘dupatta’ which is a lighter,often colourful cloth, used to cover the headwhile praying in the mosque or elsewhere.Yet since the early 2000s, many more

Muslim girls have begun to wear the head-scarf. The reason is rarely family pressure,though this may be a factor in some cases. Itmight be a mixture of other reasons, per-haps a newfound interest in religion, or away of coping with the slowly changing feel-ings of womanhood and the anxiety ofbeing an object of interest to men. But con-sidering how modish the headscarf hasbecome the most influential factor is proba-bly peer behaviour or pressure and a sensethat the headscarf marks out one’s identityas a Muslim. This is a statement of differ-ence, perhaps more than a desire to be reli-gious. To view it as an old cultural tradition,which some observers have tended to do, isto miss a fundamental point – in some fam-ilies the headscarf is novel and can even becounter-cultural. Some respondents wespoke to explained that their parents did notwant them to wear it as they worried itmight bring them unwanted attention.

The choice of the hijab is therefore nota straightforward sign of cultural identity –a legacy of one’s heritage – but is often apoliticised identity, which is designed todeliberately make a statement of belongingand difference. It is a public expression ofprivate belief that expects recognition. Oneof the reasons some Muslim womenchoose to wear the hijab is that it connectsthem to the ummah. It is not simply aboutmodesty, nor a sign of vulnerability andoppression, but about projecting one’simage quite confidently in public.

“I have a better understanding of Islam now, just

growing up. The 7/7 and 9/11 events did make

me think more about my identity, and although it

didn’t change the strength of my faith, I’ve always

been a strong believer, it made me want to assert

my alliance…Now I wear the headscarf to say,

‘yes I am a Muslim and it is an important part of

my identity and it shouldn’t be threatening to

you…’” Female, Muslim, 21, Birmingham

A key factor in wearing the hijab isundoubtedly the effect it will have on oth-


42

ers. As the academic, Andrew Calcutt,observes wryly about the young Muslimwomen in his home of East London:

“There is knowingness, too: ‘I know you will find

it shocking that I want to be identified by cover-

ing my face (or part of it), the bodily signature of

individuality’. And of course, there is the sense of

community which the wearer achieves by posi-

tioning herself away from the majority and there-

fore in proximity to a small number of fellow-

fashionistas, and by connecting to an apparently

ancient tradition of true believers”.70

Put more bluntly, the reverence of policy-makers towards the hijab as ‘religious’tends to overlook the way in which is hasbecome an exotic brand identity for manyteenage girls who want to mark themselvesout from the crowd. The shock factor ofcertain religious clothing and the way itdraws attention is more akin to vanity thanpiety. It might be more appropriate to seethe hijab as part of that long-established,counter-cultural tradition of bright mohi-cans and nose studs, rather than tradition-al religious observance.

Although adolescents have always exper-imented with their appearance, sometimesin a manner that verges on the narcissistic,the hijab has also acquired political appealbecause of the confused way that theauthorities have responded to it. Recenthigh profile court cases have encouragedyoung Muslims to believe that their choic-es should be respected and affirmed byothers, no matter what. Because the act ofwearing the hijab is now highly politicised,it has become a deeply divisive issue.Schools today have become battlegroundsfor identity politics.

In 2006, seventeen-year old ShabinaBegum won her legal case against DenbighHigh School in Luton in the Court ofAppeal, over its refusal to allow her to wearthe jilbab (full length Islamic robe) inschool. Her barrister, Cherie Blair, present-ed it as a fight for human rights, although

Begum was probably one of only a handfulof girls in the country who wanted to wearsuch untypical clothing and she could havevery easily gone to a different school whichwould have allowed her to wear it. Begum’sgoal, it seems, was not simply to be able towear the jilbab – she could have done thiswithout recourse to the law – but to high-light perceived discrimination. For her, theschool’s decision was a sign of intoleranceof her identity, despite the fact that 79% ofthe students were Muslim, the headteacherwas also Muslim, and that many Muslimscholars do not consider such apparel to bemandatory. The school’s governing bodyhad previously consulted local religiousgroups and had adopted the shalwarkameez, a garment worn by women of dif-ferent faiths on the Indian sub-continent.

The case attracted much attention andsome have pointed out the intimateinvolvement of the schoolgirl’s older broth-er, who was linked to Hizb u-Tahrir. In2006, the school appealed the decision inthe House of Lords and was successful, butthe overall effect of the case reaching courtwas that it implied that there was somelegal and political legitimacy to Begum’sdemand. Begum’s claim was that her reli-gious identity was an inalienable part ofher, and she argued – with some limitedsuccess – that she had been treated unfair-ly because this had not been respected.

Because of the recurrent demand for‘respect’, anyone who publicly criticisessuch clothing runs the risk of beinglabelled an Islamophobe or even a racist.Going back to Jack Straw’s commentsabout the niqab, these were seized upon asan example of intolerance and “stoking upfears”. In fact, Straw’s comments did notuse lazy stereotypes, and he was the first toadmit that the niqab was worn by articu-late, career-minded, educated BritishMuslim women. His argument was moreprofound than the usual feminist criticismof the veil, and it was certainly not a xeno-phobic rant about foreigners. He made the



70. CALCUTT, A. (2006) Hijab in

the hood: Religion, Pop Culture

and Public Policy. Rising East.

May 2006


44

honest point that some Muslim women arechoosing to deliberately mark themselvesoff from the mainstream, and he felt thiscould be alienating.71

As a free society, we should not ban thewearing of the niqab, but nor should wefeel we have to be neutral about it for thesake of a quiet life. It would be wrong(not to mention highly impractical) toban religious clothing and restrain peo-ple’s freedom to practice their religion asthey please, but we should also be willing

to interrogate the motives and rationale ofsuch choices, and feel able to challengepeople who defend it. When some politi-cians come over all sensitive about theniqab, it is because they believe the niqabis about ‘keeping tradition’ or respecting areligious community, and therefore can-not be questioned. As long as we refrainfrom questioning these choices, courtcases like Shabina Begum’s offer a route tonarcissistic self-aggrandisement and gounchecked.

71. Ironically, as Labour

spokesman on Education in 1989,

Jack Straw was one of the few

MPs in Parliament to argue for the

same rights and privileges for

Muslim schools as Catholic

schools on the grounds that con-

troversy about them usually

stemmed from ignorance and

racist stereotypes about women in

Islam. HIRO, D. (1992) Black

British, White British, London,

Paladin. p.190. Indeed, Straw is

widely acknowledged as one of

the main proponents of the multi-

cultural approach; to give recogni-

tion and respect to different cul-

tures in the public space.

4Cultural attitudes

So far we have argued that there is a grow-ing trend amongst younger BritishMuslims to identify with their religiouscommunity. Many show a greater interestin their religion and choose to assert theirreligious identity in public. Although thistrend is by no means uniform (and ourresearch suggests that many other youngMuslims feel less attached to their religionthan their parents generation), there is cer-tainly an overall growth in religiosity.

This interest in religion has led to a shiftin attitudes regarding morality and person-al behaviour. Although usually one expectsyounger people to be more socially liberalthan the older generation, for BritishMuslims, the opposite seems to be the case.Younger Muslims tend to hold more cul-turally conservative views regarding issueslike sexuality, gambling and alcohol.Religion clearly plays a more importantrole in their life and shapes their choices.Again, this is by no means uniform, andour research suggests that some youngerMuslims feel more relaxed about adheringto religious rules than their parents andother peers.

The perceived lack of valuesA major factor in the appeal of Islamismtoday is the way it seems to express youngpeople’s ambivalent feelings towardsmodernity, especially in the West. BassamTibi, a renowned Muslim scholar who haswritten widely about international rela-tions in the Islamic world, argues that con-temporary Islamism does not reject moder-nity outright, and is itself attracted to the

use of modern science and technology (asevidenced by many Islamist groups’ sophis-ticated use of the internet and satellite tel-evision). However, he explains that con-temporary Islamism is ill at ease with thecultural consequences of modernity andthat Islamists seek instead to “Islamicisemodernity” or achieve “semi-modernity” –adopting the technological and materialbenefits of modern life, yet at the sametime, keeping the cultural and socialframework of pre-modern Islamic cul-ture.72

The moral disdain for the West is awidely acknowledged factor in Islamistthinking. It is well illustrated in the writ-ings of the father of modern Islamism,Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian scholar andchief ideologue of the MuslimBrotherhood who was executed in Egyptin 1966. Qutb famously visited Americain the 1950s and was impressed with thecultural sophistication and material pros-perity he saw. However, his writingsreveal disgust at many features of post-war America; the sexually libertineatmosphere, the dominance of materialconsumerism and, to a lesser extent, theexperience of racial segregation. In reac-tion to this secular hedonism and thepercieved damage it would do the Islamicworld, he argued for the need to re-


72. TIBI, B. (2005) Islam

Between Culture and Politics,

Hampshire and New York,

Palgrave Macmillan..

“ The moral disdain for the West is a widely acknowl�

edged factor in Islamist thinking”

impose the strict moral teachings ofIslam. Today, the Wahabist strand ofIslam which is dominant in Saudi Arabiaand is the guiding spiritual doctrine ofAl-Qaeda, also preaches a return to the‘fundamentals’ of Islam, and the strictimplementation of all its injunctions andprohibitions in the legal, moral and pri-vate spheres.73

Qutb’s sense of alienation was particu-larly extreme, and no doubt youngerMuslims in Britain today feel far more atease with life in a modern secular society.Similarly, the puritanism of the Wahabidoctrine is far removed from the experi-ence of the vast majority of Muslims living

in Britain today. Yet our research showsthat while younger Muslims are not goingto such extremes, they do feel a profoundunease with the culture of the West. Thereis a particular concern for the perceivedloss of values in Britain, and a belief thatIslam at least offers a moral alternative.

One way to measure attitudes to theWest is to explore feelings about educa-tion. We asked respondents about whetherthey preferred an Islamic or mixed stateschool for their children, if they had thechoice. The majority preferred a mixedstate school (Fig 7). However, there was asignificant difference amongst ages, withyounger people preferring the choice of theIslamic state school. 37% of 16-24 yearolds preferred the Islamic state schools,compared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and19% of 55+ year olds. There was no dis-cernible difference across socio-economicclass or geographical location. This sug-gests that many younger Muslims value areligious education above a secular educa-tion.

Another way in which one might try togauge Muslim opinion is to measure thedemand for sharia law. The question ofsharia law has become important inrecent years and past surveys have sug-gested that a significant minority ofMuslims is in favour of some implemen-tation of sharia.74 The Government hasshown it is willing to consider this possi-bility. In August 2006, representativesfrom the Union of Muslim Organisationsin the UK and Ireland discussed withRuth Kelly, the Secretary of State forCommunities, the possibility of holidaysto mark Muslim festivals and Islamic lawsto cover family affairs which would applyonly to Muslims.75

Our research shows that the majority ofMuslims do not want to live under sharialaw (Fig 8). However, yet again, there wasa noticeable age difference, with youngerpeople more likely to prefer sharia andmore reluctant to accept reform.


46

73. The Wahabi sect sprung from

an alliance between the ruling

powers of Saudi Arabia and the

puritan reformer, Muhammed ibn

Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792). It is

an important ideological force in

the development of Sunni

Radical Islamism as developed

by Qutb and Mawdudi. KEPEL,

G. (2004) Jihad. The Trail of

Political Islam, London,

I.B.Taurus & Co Ltd. p.50

74. See for instance GFK (2006)

Attitudes to Living in Britain - A

Survey of Muslim Opinion, A

Survey for Channel 4

Dispatches. p.16

75. BROWN, C. (2006) Let us

adopt Islamic family law to curb

extremists, Muslims tell Kelly.

The Independent. 15th August

2006

35%

60%

5%

Islamic state school

Mixed state school

Don't know/Refused

28%

59%

13%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 7: If you had a choice, would you prefer to sendyour child to an Islamic state school that follows thenational curriculum and achieves good results or to amixed state school that achieves equally good results?

Figure 8: “If I could choose, I would prefer to live inBritain under sharia law rather than British law”

16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Prefer sharia law 37 32 26 16 17

Prefer British law 50 52 63 75 75

Don’t know 12 12 11 8 7

Attitudes to specific aspects of shariaalso vary greatly across age ranges (Table1). We asked respondents to give theirviews on particular regulations and pun-ishments, which are widely endorsed byIslamic scholars, in order to ascertain howmuch of sharia law British Muslims would

be willing to adopt.76 They were asked todecide whether they personally agreed withthe scholarly interpretation or disagreed.We found that the younger age groupstended to agree with the scholarly interpre-tation, whereas the older age groups weremore likely to disagree.


Cultural attitudes

76. Islamic scholars disagree

over the understanding of sharia

law and how it should be imple-

mented today. Some argue that

sharia is based solely on the pri-

mary religious texts, the Qu’ran

and the Sunnah, whilst others

argue it should also incorporate

the fiqh - scholarly interpreta-

tions devised through consensus

and analogy over time. Although

there is no consensus on this

issue, we have selected injunc-

tions that are widely recognized

in sharia by a range of scholars,

as well as enforced in some

Muslim majority countries. This is

intended to give a sense of

which particular laws Muslims

are prepared to follow today,

rather than to judge the authen-

ticity of particular interpretations

of Islamic jurisprudence.

Table 1: “The following is a list of laws that are defined in most schol-arly interpretations of sharia law. Please say if you personally agree ordisagree with the law mentioned”.

That a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agree 51 56 55 50 40 42

Disagree 43 40 40 45 54 43

Don’t know/refused 5 4 4 6 6 14

That a Muslim woman cannot marry without the consent of her guardian

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agree 43 57 47 39 25 33

Disagree 51 41 48 56 67 56


That a Muslim male have up to four wives, and a Muslim female is allowed only one husband

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agree 46 52 52 44 38 18

Disagree 48 43 42 52 52 74


That Muslim conversion is forbidden and punishable by death

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agree 31 36 37 27 19 19

Disagree 57 57 50 58 68 74


That homosexuality is wrong and should be illegal

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agree 61 71 65 55 54 50

Disagree 30 24 26 36 36 39


There was a preference amongst ABrespondents that sharia law be interpreted(50% compared to 39% of D1 respon-dents (Table 2)).

Therefore, the majority of Muslims doesnot want sharia law and is opposed to itsimplementation in Britain. Among thosewho would like to live by sharia, morewould prefer to see it reinterpreted thannot. This is important to stress, becausestatistics about sharia can wrongly give theimpression that Muslims who want to liveby it are in favour of the most brutal pun-ishments and strict regulations, whichmany non-Muslims feel alienated by.

At the same time, there is a significantstrand of young Muslims who say theywish to live by sharia and who do not wishto see it reformed. What is the appeal ofsharia law to these younger Muslims, whohave had the benefits of living under amore liberal system? During the inter-views, the respondents who favouredsharia law explained it was superiorbecause it expressed stronger moral codesand was harsher on criminals, althoughthere was little appetite to impose it on thewider British population.

“well, I think life would be better under sharia,

yeah, because society would have direction… but

its hard because it wouldn’t work in a mixed soci-

ety like the UK… but I don’t know, I haven’t

thought about it properly. I know it’s the ideal sys-

tem to live under as a Muslim but I know that it

wouldn’t really work for non-Muslims.” Male,

Muslim, 22, Leeds

The appeal of sharia appears to stem part-ly from disillusionment with the legal sys-tem in Britain, and concern about declin-ing values. A common refrain was that‘criminals have it too easy in Britain’, aremark that seems to be less about carryingout the will of God, and more about lackof faith in the criminal justice system –probably a sentiment that would receive


48

Table 2: We also asked about whether respondents would be willing toaccept reform of sharia law.

“Some Islamic scholars have called for a major reinterpretation of sharia law to reflect

modern ideas about human rights, equality for women and tolerance of religious conver-

sion. Other Islamic scholars disagree with this view and say that sharia law is absolute

and should not be interpreted to fit in with western values. Which of these is closest to

your opinion?”

% Total 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Should be interpreted 45 49 37 49 49 56

Should NOT be interpreted 39 42 44 36 30 32


48%

45%

8%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 9: “British society offers strong moral and cul-tural values to young people” (Muslim population)

(There was a minor difference between different socio-economic groups. 40% of AB respondents

agreed with this statement, whilst, 51% of C1 respondents, 57% of C2 respondents and 50% of DE

respondents agreed).

endorsement amongst many non-Muslims. Many of the respondents wespoke to seemed to prefer sharia because itwas seen as an antidote to the corruptingvalues of the West.

This concern about the immorality ofthe West is a recurrent theme amongstyounger Muslims. We asked respondentswhether they felt British society offeredstrong moral and cultural values to youngpeople and 48% agreed (Fig 9).

We asked all our interview respondentsabout the positive and negative aspects of theWest. On the positive aspects, the vastmajority of respondents cited the following:good standard of living, freedom of speech,tolerance, equal opportunities, personalchoice over lifestyle and values, and a chancefor everyone to have their say. Many of themore religious respondents cited the free-dom to practice their religion as a benefit.

However, there was also a widespreadbelief that the West ‘lacked values’, or thatthey did not know what they were:

“A lot of the values that used to be in Western soci-

ety about fifty years ago have been lost. To me it

seems there are no values left. I find that my reli-

gion at least provides us with a way of life where

these values aren’t lost. Whether we choose to

abide by them or not is a different matter.”

Female, Muslim, 24, Manchester

“…the bad thing, and I don’t know how we can

solve this, is that they [British] don’t really know

what their values are. So when they are attacked

they kind of seem to be making it up…” Female,

Muslim, 22, Leeds

A large number of the respondents felt thatschool education ought to involve moreteaching of values, and a stronger moralcode. Some of them discussed how religionin general could be used as a helpful moralframework, and a way of living that couldensure a harmonious society.

What are we to make of this demand forgreater morality amongst Muslims? Some

commentators have argued that the reli-giosity of Muslims is a welcome trend awayfrom the moral decadence of mainstreamBritish society and is something to be cele-brated, not feared. The Muslim writer,Sarfraz Mansoor, has even called forBritain to integrate into Muslim values,arguing that, “The moral code my parentsinstilled in me could help counter thiscountry’s culture of rampant disrespect”.77

Manzoor argues that the cultural prescrip-tions within Muslim families – to respectone’s parents and not bring shame to thefamily – contain important lessons forwider British society.

Many of us could sympathise with theview that adult authority has been under-mined to too great a degree in Britaintoday. A bit more respect from young peo-ple would be welcome. But how far shouldwe accept the claim that these are “Muslimvalues” or even immigrant families’ values?Many ordinary families in Britain adhereto the common standards of decency thatManzoor defends. To suggest that white ornon-Muslim people need better values is toignore the reality that most people do tryto bring up their children with good inten-tions. There may well be lapses, but on thewhole, people in the West live their livesand engage with others in a trusting andhumane way, and are not the decadent,amoral beings that some Muslims seek toportray.

The discussion about values also leansheavily towards people’s lifestyle choices,rather than socially oriented issues such asjustice, equality or fraternity. When youngMuslims complain about the lack of val-ues, they reveal a remarkable intolerancefor other people’s personal behaviour. Theoverwhelming concerns for the more reli-gious Muslims we spoke to were homosex-uality, the overt sexuality of women, drugsand binge drinking.

“It is seen as good to get drunk, abuse women and

live in sin”. Male, Muslim, 19, Oxford


Control and constraint

77. MANZOOR, S. (2007) Britain

should integrate into Muslim val-

ues. The Guardian. London. 4th

January 2007

“I don’t like the way that women are portrayed as

objects and the way they are encouraged to flaunt

themselves.” Female, Muslim, 19, Birmingham

“Alcohol is a big bug bear for me, it should be ille-

gal let alone part of society… getting drunk is

associated with being social and part of the cul-

ture… this is madness I just don’t understand how

a society formed around this culture!” Female,

Muslim, 23, London

Again, while many non-Muslims wouldprobably sympathise to some extent withsuch concerns, is it an accurate descriptionof life in Britain? Are we really a nation ofhooligans, louts and abusers? Such agloomy picture seems removed from thereality of life for most decent ordinary peo-ple. Certainly Britain has a drinking cul-ture and an open, permissive attitude tosex, but this does not mean that the major-ity of people have stopped behaving well orwithout regard for others. Many people –some Muslims included – value these free-doms and would hate to give up the rightto make decisions about personal conduct.

Many young Muslims growing up inBritain may feel ambivalent about living inWestern society and the temptations theyhave been brought up to resist. Their demon-isation of Western lifestyles is perhaps anunderstandable overreaction. But it would bea mistake to assume that their moral disap-proval is simply a result of their religion. Ithas been noted by a number of commenta-tors that Muslims in the UK can appear quitestrict when compared to Muslims ‘backhome’ in Pakistan or Bangladesh. OneBritish observer recently recounted his con-versations with friends in Pakistan:

“The other puzzlement is about why Pakistanis

living somewhere like Britain do not become com-

pletely ‘westernised’. I’m asked regularly about

how easy it is to buy alcohol, about which techno

DJs I like best. There’s almost a sense that, given

that these delights are so readily available, surely

most young people are unable to resist”.78

The moralism expressed by some youngerMuslims seems to be a particularly Britishphenomenon. If older white people inBritain moralised in this way, they wouldbe unhesitatingly labeled ‘old-fashioned’and challenged about their intolerance.However, for some reason, young Muslimshave been led to believe that their viewsshould be taken more seriously. This canalso create pressures on other Muslims whoare less strict in their religious practice:

“Everyone is in this little community, and there is

this kind of pressure almost to be…to go to these

events, to go to the prayer room. If I admit that I

went clubbing, they really do look down on you”.


Wider ambivalence towards the West.Younger Muslims tend to be more sociallyconservative than their non-Muslim coun-terparts (and in some cases even their par-ents), but it is important to recognise thatsuch views are not alien to British society.In many ways, they are a product of view-points that are dominant in the main-stream of current opinion.

For instance, many of the femalerespondents we spoke to were very negativeabout the treatment of women in the West,but their vocabulary echoed that ofWestern feminism. They claimed thatwomen were treated as “sex objects” andthat only a proper return to Islam allowedwomen to be judged as true equals.

“I decided to wear hijab because I didn’t like the

way that women are portrayed as sex objects and

that’s not how God intended us to be seen any-

way.” Female, Muslim, 21, Oxford

Although there was wide recognition thatmany Islamic societies mistreat women intheir own way, there was greater concernabout how women in the West are treated,being made to look and act a certain wayfor men. This is hardly surprising when we


50

78. NAZEER, K. (2006) Pakistani

Puzzles. Prospect. September

2006

consider how the image of women hasbeen a major campaigning point forWestern feminists in the past threedecades. So politically commonplace is theview that women are ‘oppressed’ inWestern society that in 2000, the thenWomen’s Minister, Tessa Jowell, hosted a‘summit’ over women’s body image, raisingconcerns about the way in which skinnyfashion models might damage young girls’self-esteem. When body image and self-esteem are elevated to being major politicalconcerns, it is perhaps understandable thatyoung Muslim girls have come to believethat they are better off with the hijab on.

Therefore, we can see that negative feelingabout Western society is not simply an out-come of alien cultural or religious beliefs.Very often it expresses an ambivalence whichwould make sense to non-Muslims. The ideathat society ‘lacks values’ was expressed bythe non-Muslims we spoke to, even thosewho were not particularly religious.

“Bad: there are no morals, society is too material-

istic and there isn’t a moral guide or sense.” Male,

Jewish, 22, Bristol

“I do think that society is a bit moral-less in the

sense that there isn’t enough being done to instill

values in children and society generally is slipping

in its moral standards, which is a bad thing...”

Female, Hindu, 22, London

“I think there’s too much irresponsibility from

people. There’s too much of a laddish, hooligan

culture that I don’t like…The way footballers and

glamour models are glorified by the press and act

as idols to so many people. It’s detrimental to soci-

ety and breeds stupidity really. If that’s what peo-

ple want then I think there should be some inter-

vention. People want to smoke crack, but that’s

illegal. If someone wants to get a boob job then I

don’t see why that should be any more socially

acceptable”. Female, non-religious, 23, London

“There is an idea among particularly young peo-

ple, that not to want to discuss sex and such things

continually and openly is a sign of oddity of a per-

son, and there is a laddish culture out there which

talks about women in the most obscene ways,

which can be fun on occasions but goes too far in

general.” Male, Christian, 24, London

Muslim respondents commented on howthey felt much in common with people ofother religions, who were also strugglingagainst what they saw as the lack of valuesin mainstream of society:

“These people who believe in spreading religion,

Christian, Jews what not, I say keep it up because

nowadays to believe in God, is like ‘these guys are

talking crap’” Male, Muslim, 19, Salford

“This isn’t because I’m a Muslim, I think that this

is because I’m religious. I think if you ask any reli-

gious person this question, you will get the same

answer because secular education for some reason

doesn’t teach morals.” Female, Muslim, 21,

Manchester

There is clearly a socially conservative streakwithin the Muslim population at large. Butwhen we discuss the dissonance that someMuslims feel with British culture, we oughtto remember that this is also likely to be expe-rienced by other religious groups. Forinstance, in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey,nearly four in ten Germans and 29% ofAmericans say there is a natural conflictbetween being a devout Christian and livingin a modern society.79 It is also worth remem-bering that the shift towards more liberal atti-tudes on issues like homosexuality hasoccurred only relatively recently in Britain.

Importantly, it cannot be taken forgranted that younger people prefer the sec-ular life once they’ve tasted it. YoungMuslim males in particular had oftenenjoyed considerable freedom in theiryouth (drinking alcohol, girlfriends, drugs)before choosing to become stricterMuslims. Also, there are converts to Islamwho admire the certainty offered by reli-gion, as an escape from moral confusion





Europe’s Muslims More

Moderate. The Great Divide: How

Westerners and Muslims View

Each Other. Washington, The

Pew Research Center..

and limitless liberty in society. Religiosity,for all its restrictions, remains powerfullycompelling.

When is a Muslim not a Muslim?So far we have discussed a discernible trendamongst some younger Muslims towards amore strict interpretation of their religion.We have also argued that there is a broad-er ambivalence towards ‘Western values’and certain types of personal freedom.However, this is countered by a trendtowards secularisation and a more relaxedattitude to religious rules.

Our research shows that many Muslimshave adapted religious rules to a moreWestern lifestyle. A sizeable number ofMuslims surveyed had consumed alcohol,gambled, paid interest and even takendrugs – all of which are expressly forbiddenin Islam (Fig 10). This might seem like anunremarkable finding – after all, manyCatholics use contraception, despite itsprohibition by the Vatican. But withMuslims, policy-makers sometimes take atface value that all Muslims feel the sameway about their culture and beliefs.

Other research shows that Muslims areoften quite flexible about their religious val-ues. A Populus survey conducted in 2006showed that only a narrow majority ofMuslims find displays of affection betweensame-sex couples offensive (44% comparedto 36% who don’t). This compares to 30% ofthe general population that finds it offensive.

29% of Muslims interviewed thought thatwomen wearing low-cut tops or short skirtswas offensive, but so too did 21% of thewider population. 57% of Muslims thoughtthat visible drunkenness in public places wasoffensive, but so too did 54% of the widerpopulation.80 Also, 70% of Muslim houseowners have a normal mortgage, despite reli-gious restrictions on paying interest.81 Thissuggests that whilst certain rules are becom-ing more important to some Muslims, forothers they are increasingly irrelevant.

How can we explain this contradictorytrend towards growing secularisation and alsogrowing religiosity? The French scholar,Olivier Roy, argues that Islam in Europe isundergoing a profound change. While reli-gion has become more important on an indi-vidual level, at the same time it has becomeless important in regulating the cultural lifeof the community.82 This means that olderforms of religious authority – the mosqueand community elders – do not exercise thekind of control that policy-makers oftenassume. As Muslim elders have started to losetheir grip on younger Muslims this genera-tion has developed a much more individuat-ed, personalised approach to their religion.They are not hemmed in by community andsocial mores, but instead act out of personalchoice. For younger Muslims, their attitudeis that religion is ‘between me and God’, andnot to be judged by anyone else.

The effect of this weakening of communi-ty authority is that younger Muslims havechoices that were not available to previousgenerations. As some develop a deeper inter-est in their religion and turn away from theold cultural traditions of their parents, othersadapt their religion in a flexible way andadjust to a secular society. A common remarkwe heard from many Muslims we spoke to –religious and non-religious – was “everyoneshould have their own values”, or “I don’tmind people being religious, as long as theydon’t force it down my throat”. This does notmean that there is no concern about whatother people in the community might think


52

80. POPULUS (2006) Muslim 7/7

Poll..

81.THE INSTITUTE FOR THE

STUDY OF ISLAM AND CHRIS-

TIANITY (2005) The British Muslim

Community in 2005, Wiltshire, The

Institute for the Study of Islam and

Christianity. p.102




University Press.

65%

49%

21% 19%9%

010203040506070

Consumedalcohol

Gambled Done drugs

%

Boughtlotterytickets

Paid intereston a loan ormortgage

Figure 10: Have you ever done any of the following?

– there certainly is – but that there is morereflexivity involved in practicing religion anda resentment about the idea that some thingsshould not be done because they will bringshame.

Some Muslims have a ‘pick and choose’approach to religion, so that they only followthe rules that they personally value. Forinstance, a sizeable minority of the Muslimrespondents we spoke to admitted that theydrink, smoke or have pre-marital sexual rela-tionships; all of which are forbidden in theircultural or religious upbringing. They saidthey preferred to follow their inner con-science, rather than a figure of authority.

“I justified it to myself; that the Qu’ran says you

shouldn’t drink alcohol because of the way it makes

you behave. So it’s not so much a problem with alco-

hol but the way it makes you feel afterwards.

However with pork and ham it’s totally unhealthy.

You see so many other Muslims who will drink but

not eat pork.” Male, Muslim, 24, London

At the same time, some respondentsbelieved in following everything exactly asdone in the Qu’ran and wanted to be morepious. This was sometimes manifest inobserving rituals or rules that parents donot follow. A good example of this is thewearing of the hijab, which young Muslimwomen choose but their mothers often donot. The majority (male and female) ofpeople we spoke to believed that the hijabshould also be the woman’s choice. Theysaid it was about how she feels, rather thansubmitting to a law or even God’s will.

“It’s a personal decision though… I don’t think peo-

ple should be made to wear hijab – that defies the

point.” Female, Muslim, 21, London

The degree of control means that those whobecome more interested in their religion arealmost ‘starting from scratch’, trying tochoose what is the Islamic thing to do, notjust because that is how one’s communitydoes things:

“…because of that process of re-thinking about what

it means, one becomes more scrupulous because you

attach a greater significance to the entire religion and

the smaller things become a bit more important.”

Male, Muslim, 22, London

Young Muslims today are working out theirown understanding of religion, often withvery different and contradictory results.Whilst some may live Westernised lifestylesand reject sharia law, others may wish toobserve religious practices more stringentlyand follow sharia. It would be impossible togroup these individuals together as they allthink and feel differently about their religion.

This raises the important point of how, ifat all, the authorities should attempt to‘recognise’ Islam in public life. The tenden-cy of the government to engage withMuslims as a religious group with particularattitudes and practices misses the three-dimensional, contradictory character ofhuman beings living through cultural tran-sition. Although many people may be ‘cul-turally’ or ‘ethnically’ Muslim they may notbe particularly observant. For some individ-uals, the stereotype of how a Muslim is sup-posed to behave can be a straitjacket. Manyfeel they have to hide a part of their person-al life – drinking, boyfriends, etc – fromtheir families and local community, and itprobably does not help to feel that the restof society expects the same. The introduc-tion of sharia in areas with a high concentra-tion of Muslims (as has been proposed bysome groups) would arrest the freedom ofpeople to choose by themselves the culturethey wish to live by. The willingness of theGovernment to even consider this sends amessage to Muslims that they are presumedto act, behave and feel a certain way abouttheir religion, even when many do not.Therefore, when policy-makers think aboutengaging with young Muslims, they shouldnot underestimate the extent to whichmany of them are willing to adapt to theirsurroundings, possibly even rejecting someof the values they were brought up with.



5Foreign policy and the ummah

An imagined community of victimsOn 7th October 2001, Osama Bin Ladenbroadcast a televised message to the world,celebrating the September 11th attack onthe US and calling on all Muslims to riseup against their enemies:

“These events have divided the whole world into

two sides, the side of believers and the side of infi-

dels. May God keep you away from them. Every

Muslim has to rush to make his religion victori-

ous. The winds of faith have come. The winds of

change have come to eradicate oppression from the

island of Mohammad, peace be upon him”.83

For all the rhetoric, however, Muslimsworldwide did not rush to join his jihad.As Gilles Kepel notes, “Other than an ini-tial outburst of enthusiasm amongst cer-tain youths in the Middle East and South-West Asia, and occasionally in the Westamongst the children of immigrants fromthese areas, very few Muslims attempted tocapitalise on these acts.”84 Despite theclaims of Al-Qaeda to be at the vanguardof a global political movement, it has thusfar been unable to mobilise mass supportamongst the global Muslim population. Itspolitical goals are vague and although BinLaden has talked about the re-establish-ment of the Caliphate, neither he nor anyof his colleagues have put forward a coher-ent programme for how this might beachieved. The appeal of Al-Qaeda remainsconfined to a minority, albeit a dangerousone. Jason Burke, the British journalistwho has trailed Al-Qaeda for a number ofyears argues that it “does not exist”, or at

least not as a conventional political move-ment with a coherent organising chain ofcommand. He describes it instead as a“loose ‘network of networks’”.85

In this sense, contemporary Islamism ofthe kind espoused by Bin Laden is very dif-ferent to previous movements that shapedpolitical life in the Muslim world. Whenpolitical Islam first emerged in Muslimmajority countries, it was a reaction to theanti-democratic secular regimes that pre-dominated in the post-colonial period. Itgave a religious character to what werenationally-oriented political movements,often with high levels of grassroots sup-port. While organisations like the MuslimBrotherhood frequently resorted to vio-lence and preached dogmatic beliefs, theyalso played a strong role in civil society andsustained popularity through their provi-sion of much-needed welfare services.Their goals were tightly linked to national-ist aspirations and they sought to reformstate structures along religious lines.

The strength of Islamist movements likethese waned towards the end of the 1990s asnational secularists began to ground incountries such as Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt,Algeria, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey. Beingsqueezed out of the national political frame-work by moderates in their own countries,some Islamist groups, for instance in Franceand Turkey, have pragmatically overcometheir hostility to democracy and made fruit-ful alliances to enter elections. These groupshave adjusted their goals, focusing primarilyon the implementation of sharia in onecountry.86

54

83. ‘Bin Laden Statement’ The

Guardian. 7th October 2001.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghan

istan/story/0,,565070,00.html




I.B.Taurus & Co Ltd. p.x

85. BURKE, J. (2003) Al-Qaeda.

Casting a Shadow of Terror,

London/New York, I.B.Taurus &

Co. p 16.

86. ROY, O. (2006) Radical

Islamism’s Failure, Islamists’

Future. Open Democracy. 30th

October 2006

Meanwhile, other Islamists haveregrouped around a globally-oriented,abstract struggle against ‘the West’. Indoing so, they have appropriated localisedconflicts around the world – fromAfghanistan to Bosnia to Iraq. However,their grandiose crusade has failed to gener-ate a massive army of political supportersor soldiers. In his detailed account of theemergence of Al-Qaeda, American journal-ist Lawrence Wright describes how BinLaden’s ragged brigade of Arab mujahidinroamed the globe to fight Muslim wars,but they were very often despised or disre-garded by local fighters who had moreimmediate concerns than martyrdom forParadise or the fight against the GreatSatan of America. In Bosnia, the Arabfighters quickly became unpopular withtheir attempts to impose Wahabist ideas onthe local Muslim population which waslargely Europeanised and secular.87

One of the most sriking features of Al-Qaeda is that despite its claims to repre-sent the Muslim world, it seems removedfrom the experience and aspirations ofmost Muslims. Its lack of grassroots sup-port and failure to reach Muslims throughthe usual channels of political engage-ment means that it has turned to creatingspectacular atrocities that will play outrelentlessly in the media, often alienatingthe Muslims it is supposed to attract.88

Olivier Roy argues that the Islamistdemonstrate this paradox well. Theydenounce Muslims in their own countryas secularised apostates (‘kufr’), who havelost the true path but at the same time,they are keen to identify with an abstractummah, which is composed entirely ofvictimised Muslims abroad, such as inPalestine, with whom they have had prob-ably little or no actual contact.89

Radical Islamist terrorism cannot beunderstood as part of a political movementin any conventional sense. Unlike the IRA,ETA or the PKK, Al-Qaeda is not drivenby the pursuit of concrete and achievable

political demands but instead by anextreme religious ideology which precludesall possibility of rational negotiation.90 It isnot dissimilar to extreme-left terroristgroups who operated in Europe in the late1960s and 1970s, such as the Italian RedBrigades or the Baader-Meinhof Gang inGermany, or more recently, the JapaneseAum Shinrikyo cult which launched thesarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in1995. These groups, famous for spectacu-lar one-off stunts that would bring themmedia attention, lacked any coherentobjectives apart from the destruction of thestate. The lack of social base also meantthat these groups operated without anystructures of moral accountability to holdtheir actions in check. Indiscriminate vio-lence characterises groups that answer tono one but themselves, especially whenthey have convinced each other that theyare acting on behalf of the deluded masses.

If groups do not feel compelled to per-suade others of their message, their actionscan become terrifyingly destructive, self-serving and self-righteous. They care noth-ing of what others think because they ulti-mately believe that history or God willjudge them. Their actions are not instru-mentally thought through, in the sense oftrying to gain strategic military advantageor galvanise public support behind a spe-cific policy. The American historian, FaisalDevji, argues that Al-Qaeda takes actionsbut without any serious plan for how theymight achieve change. It only hopes that asufficient combination of terror and faithwill deliver a Muslim uprising, with what-ever consequences that might bring:

“Hence the actions of this jihad, while they are

indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, have

become more ethical than political in nature,

since they have resigned control over their own

effects, thus becoming gestures of duty or risk

rather than acts of instrumentality properly speak-

ing. This might be why a network such as Al-

Qaeda, unlike terrorist or fundamentalist groups


Foreign policy and the ummah



I.B.Taurus & Co Ltd. Also see

COOK, D. (2005) Understanding

Jihad, Berkeley, University of

California Press: “the fact that

the majority of contemporary

Muslims do not actively partici-

pate in jihad demonstrates a

decisive rejection of which the

radical Muslims are keenly

aware”. p 165.

88. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda still

enjoy greater support amongst

Muslims in the Muslim-majority

countries than those living in the

West. However, there are indica-

tions that this is falling, especially

in countries like Jordan which

have been targeted by suicide

bombers. THE PEW GLOBAL

ATTITUDES PROJECT (2006)





Pew Research Center.




University Press.

90. REID, A. (2005) Introduction.

IN REID, A. (Ed.) Taming

Terrorism. London, Policy

Exchange. p.15.

91. DEVJI, F. (2005) Landscapes

of the Jihad, London, C. Hurst &

Co (Publishers) Limited. p 3.

of the past, has no coherent vision or plan for the

future.”91

Al-Qaeda is only a small minority withinthe Islamist movement worldwide, but itrepresents well the contradiction at theheart of the movement more generally. Ithas suffered setbacks in trying to buildpolitical support in Muslim majority coun-tries; yet on the other hand, it has a grow-ing abstract or spiritual appeal for Muslimsin the West who wish to identify with theummah. Islamism offers a potent identitythat allows people to express their feelingof alienation from modern life, and con-nect their own personal story to a larger,global struggle. Younger Muslims who arebecoming increasingly detached or ‘loos-ened’ from the ties in their own communi-ties feel emotionally connected to the suf-fering Muslims they see on their televisionscreens. While feelings of empathy and sol-idarity have always characterised trans-national political movements, they are par-ticularly pronounced in contemporaryIslamism. Foreign policy has become amajor focus for Muslims in the West, as itconcerns the persecution of fellowMuslims – the “imagined community” –worldwide.

The preoccupation with foreign policyOur survey showed that the highest rank-ing issue for Muslims overall was foreignpolicy. 41% of all Muslim respondentscited a foreign policy issue as one of theissues that matter to them most, even thosewho did not pray very often (Fig 11).

Many Muslims are angry about foreignpolicy because they believe it is targeted atMuslim states and involves “double stan-dards”. Predictably, most of the Muslimrespondents we spoke to cited conflictsinvolving Muslims abroad.

“But I go back to foreign policy, all you need is to

see one image, one picture on the internet and it

can snap you”. Male, Muslim, 22, London

Some argued that the motivation behindforeign policy was greed or selfishness onthe part of the US, UK or Israel:

“I think the West has waged war against Islam

and this must stop. Actions are self interested and

pro-Israel, it’s not about values or ideals, its just

about influence and money”. Male, Muslim, 19,

Birmingham

Others gave a more balanced view and saidthat they were angry about foreign policybut not just because they were concernedabout other Muslims. They said they wereconcerned about human suffering in gen-eral. Some believed that the conflicts couldnot reduce everything down to cynicalmotives, even if things appeared that way.

“Israel/Palestine is a difficult issue and I know it’s

not as easy as UK supports Israel and wants to

wipe out Muslim states but to be honest, that’s

how it seems”. Female, Muslim, 22, London

Muslim anger about foreign policy hasbeen confirmed in numerous surveys overthe past few years. However, while emo-tions run high, our survey suggested a sur-prising lack of knowledge about basic factsrelating to international issues. We asked


56

52

45

63

44

33

27

19

13

21

7

11

18

21

20

40

27

34

26

47

35

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

5 times a day

1�3 times a day

Once a week

Occasionally

Never

Public services

Tax/economy/employment

Muslim�relatedissues/discrimination

Foreign policy issuesHow

ofte

n th

ey p

ray

Figure 11: Thinking about the issues that really matterto you in terms of politics, world affairs and how youmay vote at the next general election, what are the twoor three issues that matter most to you?

respondents to name two influential fig-ures in the Israel/Palestine situation – anissue widely accepted to be a cause ofMuslim anger – but only a small minoritycould answer correctly (Fig 12).

The same questions were put to the gen-eral population and only 7% correctlyanswered both questions. The Muslimresponse was higher but not as much asone might expect.

This relative lack of knowledge aboutforeign policy raises an interesting questionabout the extent to which Muslims gen-uinely are engaged with the politics of con-flicts abroad. Many surveys in the past fewyears have shown that Muslims are angryabout international affairs, but it cannot beassumed that they are much more engagedand informed than the wider public. Insome cases, the anger over foreign policymay even be rather superficial. This is par-ticularly worth noting when consideringyounger Muslims. They are supposed to befar more angry about foreign policy issues,but they were half as likely to know theanswers to these questions (9% and 5% of16-24 year olds knew the correct answers,compared to 29% and 30% of 55+ yearolds).

In interviews, most of the Muslimsexpressed their concern about foreign poli-cy but admitted they were not particularlyengaged or knowledgeable about thedetails:

IInntteerrvviieewweerr:: wwhhaatt iitt iiss aabboouutt FFoorreeiiggnn PPoolliiccyy tthhaatt

ddooeess ccoonncceerrnn yyoouu??

Respondent: I think sometimes over involvement

in other territories and laws, the whole Iraq,

Afghanistan… all that rubbish. Sometimes it’s

just a bit unnecessary.

IInntteerrvviieewweerr:: TThhaatt’’ss aass ffaarr aass yyoouurr ccoonncceerrnnss wwoouulldd ggoo??

Respondent: Yeah. I’m not really that interested

to be honest.


The emphasis of people’s comments aboutforeign policy was less on discussing the

details of a precise political situation, andmore about their emotional reaction towhat they considered to be an unjust situ-ation.

“I am not that knowledgeable in that area of the

Israel Palestine conflict, I know bits but at the end

of the day…how would the rest of us feel? If

England was separated and put in Manchester, or

put into a corner, and people took over the rest of

the country how would we feel?” Male, Muslim,

22, Rochdale

The emotional impact of seeing victims ofviolence around the world triggers an under-standable human impulse and probablymany non-Muslims would feel the same way.On one level, we might feel relieved thatalthough some young people are not particu-larly knowledgeable about political affairs,they at least feel moral outrage over the suf-fering of other human beings. But on anoth-er level, the emotionalised engagement inforeign issues can also hinder genuine under-



18%

6%

76%

Mahmoud Abbas

Other/refused

Don't know

14%

16%

70%

Ehud Olmert

Other/Refused

Don't know

Figure 12: Can you name the following people?

The President of the Palestinian National Authority

The Prime Minister of Israel

standing of why conflicts occur, the com-plexity of events and the motivations ofactors. Pity can be a distorting lens,reducing complex political struggles to asimplistic morality play of good and evil.America is an oppressor motivated bygreed, whilst Muslims are innocent vic-tims motivated by desperation. One doesnot need to be a neo-con hawk to seehow such a framework can be highly sim-plistic.

One of the consequences of this dimin-ished understanding of foreign conflicts isa tendency to explain events as the out-come of the manipulations of sinisteractors. Hence, conspiracy theories are rifein Britain. According to the Pew ResearchCentre study in 2006, 56% of BritishMuslims express disbelief that Arabs car-ried out the 9/11 attacks, compared to17% who do not. In a survey conductedfor Channel Four in summer 2006 survey,approximately half of the Muslims aged18-24 believed that 9/11 was a conspiracyby America and Israel (51%), and the fig-ure is slightly higher for younger, secondgeneration Muslims. 36% also believethat Princess Diana was murdered to pre-vent her marrying a Muslim (compared to31% who believe her death was an acci-dent). It should be noted, however, thatconspiracy theories are flourishing morewidely. 36% of Americans believe it ‘verylikely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ that their gov-ernment was involved in allowing theattacks to happen or had even carriedthem out itself.92 Tickets sold out for atalk on 9th September 2006 at London’sConway Hall by the founder of the USgroup, 9/11 Scholars for Truth, ProfessorDavid Ray Griffin, who has suggestedthat 9/11 may have been an ‘inside job’. 3out of 10 of the wider population believethere was a cover up of some kind overDiana’s death.93

“Then I thought maybe it’s a conspiracy… all

this media I see it’s all about terrorists, conspir-

acies. I think 9/11 was a conspiracy. Because

they would have been knocked down anyway.

It’s a way in, to get the oil”. Male, Muslim, 22,

Birmingham

While the anger about foreign policy istherefore genuine, the often superficiallevel of analysis upon which it is basedreally ought to be interrogated, testedand challenged in the court of publicopinion. Is foreign policy really about anew crusade against Islam? Is the war inIraq really about oil? Was September11th really a conspiracy led by the CIA?Should Muslims (as opposed to any othergroup) have a greater say over foreignpolicy decisions?

Instead of subjecting these argumentsto proper scrutiny, however, many com-mentators in the West have come to sim-ply accept Muslim grievance withoutquestion and thus push for a foreign pol-icy that reflects these concerns. In sum-mer 2006, key Muslim public figures sentan open letter to the government inwhich they argued that Britain’s foreignpolicy was fuelling extremist ideas andpushing people towards terrorism.94 The1990 Trust, a race relations organisation,press released its report on Muslim atti-tudes in Britain in October 2006 withthe strap line ‘Foreign Policy to Blame’.In its report about British Muslims andcounter-terrorism entitled ‘Bringing itHome’, the think tank Demos recom-mended that the Government “open upthe foreign policy-making process togreater scrutiny and provide input fromall parts of British communities”.95

There are certainly very strong politi-cal and intellectual grounds to criticiseBritish foreign policy and it is surely rightthat we debate these issues rigorously inpublic, amongst Muslims and non-Muslims. But when commentators andMuslim lobby groups urge us to takeMuslim anger seriously and to respecttheir feelings, they are effectively flatter-


58

92. GILLAN, A. (2006) Full

House as leading 9/11 conspira-

cy theorist has his say. The

Guardian. 9th September 2006

93. ‘Tests ‘prove’ Diana was

drunk’ BBC Online. 8th

December 2006.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/616

2041.stm (last accessed

21.01.07)

94. WOODWARD, W. & BATES,

S. (2006) Muslim leaders say for-

eign policy makes UK target. The

Guardian. 12th August 2006

95. BRIGGS, R., FIESCHI, C. &

LOWNSBROUGH, H. (2006)

Bringing it Home. Community-

based approaches to counter-

terrorism. London, Demos. p.16

ing a worldview that is based largely onemotion, rather than a genuine politicalengagement founded on rational argu-ments. Politics involves emotion and pas-sion, but we should not suspend reasonin the pursuit of moral simplicities. Infact, the call to make foreign policy moreinclusive of Muslims is really to circum-vent political democracy – throughwhich all people regardless of back-ground should make their views known –by awarding a greater say to whichevergroup shouts or emotes the loudest.

In this sense, the anger amongstMuslims about foreign policy is partlyabout “the right to be heard” and a feel-ing that Westminster should be payingmore attention. Some people regard for-eign policy as just one more excuseamongst many to “hate Blair” who is seento be acting without a mandate.

“Foreign policy as well… yeah, Iraq, Iran,

Palestine- Israel situation… Foreign policy is

not reflective of the population as a whole, what

they would want.” Male, Muslim, 23,

Manchester

“Even though there was a lot of people against

this our opinion did not matter, it was just a

personal opinion from the Prime minister”,

Male, Muslim, 22, Rochdale

The moralisation of politicsMany Muslims have been radicalised bytheir anger over foreign policy, but theydo not need to be brainwashed by sinisteroperatives using highly emotionallycharged propaganda. This moralisedworldview also feeds off the broader cul-ture and ideas in society at large.

In 2005, the electoral success ofGeorge Galloway’s Respect party in theconstituency of Bow and Bethnal Greenfused together a younger Islamic religios-ity with a radical left, anti-globalisationpolitics. The focus on the war in Iraq

brought together two camps who saw theworld divided between a neo-conserva-tive cabal in Washington and a vulnera-ble, victimised world population. AsGalloway stated in an interview inSeptember 2005, “it’s Orwellian, it’s1984, the permanent division of theworld into warring blocs, for the profit ofa few at the cost of the misery of themany”.96 Bin Laden himself draws on thelanguage and ideas of prominent left-leaning Western writers, like Robert Fisk,of whom he writes “the latter is one ofyour compatriots and co-religionists andI consider him to be neutral’”.

The Israel/Palestine conflict is oftencited as the root cause of the MiddleEast’s problems, fuelling the anger ofMuslims worldwide. But political dis-course about the region can sometimesgenerate more heat than light. ThePalestian novelist, Samir El-Youssef, com-plained in an article in January 2007about the sentimental ignorance of someWestern academics who “regardPalestinians as a hopelessly passive socie-ty”. Writing about a proposed boycott ofIsraeli academics, he stated:

“As for the idea that what has been taking place

in Palestine/Israel is a simple matter of vic-

timised Palestinians struggling to free themselves

from Israeli victimisers, this is a preposterously

reductionist view that could never help promote

peace and justice”.97

The portrayal of Muslims as a victimisedpopulation is not only exploited by ter-rorist groups, but is commonly held inmainstream political culture.

For this reason anger about foreignpolicy has reached much farther afieldthan just Muslims. Up to two millionpeople marched against the war in Iraqin February 2003. Many of the non-Muslim respondents we spoke toexpressed the same feelings of disillu-sionment:



96. ‘George Galloway MP:

Elements within Government using

terror provocation tactics.’

PrisonPlanet.com. September 13

2005: http://www.prisonplanet.com/

Pages/Sept05/130905Galloway.ht

m (last accessed 08.01.07)

97. ‘A senseless cultural boycott’

Samir El-Youssef, Jewish

Chronicle, January 2007, cited

on Harry’s Place, http://hur-

ryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives

/2007_01.html (last accessed

12.01.07)

“I don’t like the way America and Britain have

gone into this crusade to promote democracy,

which is obviously not actually anything to do

with it…It demonstrates that there’s something

wrong with the way we are represented by our

MPs and other politicians”. Female, non-reli-

gious, 22, Leeds

“We have to think about what we’re doing to

countries which don’t have millions of people in

their armies and what we’re doing to them”.

Male, non-religious, 21, London

Anti�AmericanismAmerica has become a symbol of theproblems of ‘western society’, particular-ly consumerism, capitalism, destructionof the environment, and cultural domi-

nance. Some of the respondents we spoketo expressed their antipathy to Americansociety.

“I guess Sept 11th, July 7th were all kind of acts

of capitalist protests. In themselves they weren’t

the decided factor. But they stand out and make

you think about your religion more.” Female,

Muslim, 22, London

“With the environment you hear about Global

Warming and everything, then you hear about

the U.S, they don’t give a toss.” Male, Muslim,

19, Salford

Muslims tend to be highly scepticalabout the influence of the West in theworld (Fig 13).

Some observers have interpreted theanti-Americanism expressed by Muslimsas signs of a ‘clash of civilisations’, argu-ing that Muslims have values that areincompatible with the ‘Western way oflife’. However, the antipathy towardsAmerica and capitalism is not exclusiveto Muslims. Most of these attitudes arewidespread in the West itself. Our surveysuggested that there was some strong feel-ing in this direction within the generalpopulation too (Fig 14).

Many of the non-religious and reli-gious respondents complained about the‘materialism’ or ‘consumerism’ of theWest:

“[Good things are] ease of living, comfort of liv-

ing, running water, hot water availability of

food, but these could be viewed as bad things

because they are taking away from the rest of the

world. The celebrity culture right now, women’s

cosmetics, it’s such a buying culture”, Male,

non-religious, 27, London

“I also don’t like the way that everything is for

sale and people’s weaknesses seem to be exploited

by advertising as if everything will be solved by

spending money.” Female, Muslim, 19,

Birmingham


60

58%

35%

7%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

30%

39%

31%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 13: “Many of the problems in the world todayare a result of arrogant western attitudes” (Muslim pop-ulation)

Figure 14: “Many of the problems in the world todayare a result of arrogant western attitudes” (Generalpopulation)

Negative views of Western life circulatein the wider culture. A few days after theattacks on the twin towers in New York,the novelist Jeanette Winterson wrote ascathing attack of America and Britain inthe Guardian newspaper:

“American and British foreign policy is not

aimed at world peace; it is intended to enforce a

particular kind of capitalism. We pay poor peo-

ple no money in order to produce goods to sup-

port our lifestyle, and when some of those people

come to hate everything that we stand for, we

shout about wiping them out.

The planes did not fly into hospitals and

schools – this was not the invasion of Iraq. The

planes were out to destroy a prime symbol of

western capitalism, with all that its free trade

has meant to developing countries.

Perhaps we should ask ourselves why we are

so hated. That they are fanatics and terrorists is

not answer enough.”98

Critisism of the West often emphasises adisdain for modern life and the ‘addic-tion to consumption’. More profoundly,it betrays a deep ambivalence to moder-nity and the achievements of Westernculture. Such sentiments exist on bothsides of the Atlantic. Michael Moore’spolemic, Stupid White Men, aboutAmerica’s “pathetically stupid, embarass-ingly white, and disgustingly rich men”99

was a bestseller in America and Britain in2001. There are numerous books, arti-cles, television and film documentaries,which rage against the arrogance ofAmerica and the capitalist West moregenerally, belying the suggestion thatMuslim hatred of the West is unique.

Of course, anti-Western thought hasbeen a long established feature in westernintellectual life since the first half of thetwentieth century. Even before the fatherof Islamism, Sayyid Qutb, wrote hisfierce denunciations of the West in the1950s, philosophical scepticism aboutModernity had been laid down by promi-

nent western intellectuals. The Germancultural theorists Max Horkheimer andTheodore Adorno, who had fled toAmerica from Nazi Germany, famouslydebunked the Enlightenment, claimingits end result had been the Holocaust.For them, the total achievement of west-ern science and culture was overshad-owed by human barbarism on a grandscale. Today, this pessimistic view is partof common parlance. When the ImperialWar Museum in London opened itsHolocaust exhibition in 2003, the postershowed the railway lines to Auschwitzwith the accompanying slogan, ‘See whatman can do when he puts his mind to it’.If an increasing number of Muslimsregard the modern, Western world asmorally decadent, this may be becausethis has become a prevalent view withinWestern culture.

Attitudes to terrorismAfter 7/7, numerous surveys suggestedthat a worrying minority of Muslimswere supportive of the terrorists and feltcontempt for British society. YouGovpublished a poll on 23rd July 2005 in theaftermath of the London bombings thatshowed that 16% felt some sympathy forthe suicide bombers, 6% thought theywere fully justified, 32% of BritishMuslims thought western society wasdecadent, and 16% felt no loyalty toBritain. In 2006, the Foreign PolicyCentre asked how loyal the Muslims felttowards Britain. Nearly one in five feltlittle loyalty or none at all (18%). Similarfindings were reported in a MORI surveyfor the Sun newspaper, on 23 July 2005.86% felt they belonged to Britain, where-as 11% said they did not. Asian radio sta-tion, Sunrise, ran a much-publicised sur-vey of 500 Muslims in Greater London,reported on 30 October. 98% said theywould not fight for Britain, and 48% saidthey would fight for Bin Laden and



98. WINTERSON, J. (2001)

Forgive but don’t forget. The

Guardian. London. 18th

September 2001

99. MOORE, M. (2001) Stupid

White Men …and Other Sorry

Excuses for the State of the

Nation, Harper Collins

100. YOUGOV (2005) YouGov

survey results, BARNES, H.

(2006) Born in the UK: Young

Muslims in Britain, London, The

Foreign Policy Centre, MORI

(2005a) Attitudes of British

Muslims, SMITH, M. & ROY, A.

(2001) Britons who join Taliban

to face trial. The Daily Telegraph.

London. 30th October 2001

101. THE 1990 TRUST (2006)

Survey, Muslim views: Foreign

policy and its effects. London,

The 1990 Trust

102. A famous 1971 poll by the

Allensbach Institute in Germany

found that 5% of Germans would

give shelter to a member of the

terrorist Baader-Meinhof Group

for one night. 9% were undecid-

ed. In the 16-29 age group, ten

percent said yes, and 11% were

undecided, meaning that an

incredible 20% of Germans that

age would at least consider aid-

ing the Baader-Meinhof Gang.

The poll must be understood

with the caveat that it was con-

ducted before the full extent of

the group’s violence began, but it

does indicate the extent to which

its radical ideas had some popu-

lar resonance. ‘This is Baader-

Meinhof’ http://www.baader-

meinhof.com/timeline/1971.html


103. The percentages do not add

up to 100% because the respon-

dents were asked to give two

options based on usage. The

Islam. 91% said they believed the warwas between Islam and the ChristianWest.100

Despite the shock headlines, it isimportant to put these statistics into per-spective. The vast majority of Muslimscondemn terrorism, and even those whoexpress sympathy will probably notbecome violent. The 1990 Trust haspointed out that the questions asked insome surveys can be misleading, and thatexpressing sympathy for the bombers’motives should not necessarily be takenas endorsement of the action itself. In itsown survey of 1213 Muslims, it found arather small proportion – 1.9% – ofMuslims felt it is actually justified tocommit terrorist attacks on civilians inthe UK101. This does not eliminate con-cern, but may put things in better per-spective. The level of support shown forterrorist groups today is also not withoutprecedent in Europe.102

In our survey, 7% said they admiredorganisations like Al-Qaeda (Fig 15).

There was no significant differencebetween socio-economic classes, gender

or geographical regions. More womenexpressed support than men. (8% offemales, compared to 5% of males).

What motivates the feelings of this7%? Although it is such a small sample,we identified some unexpected results.54% of the 72 respondents said theyagreed with the statement that “Britishsociety offers strong moral and culturalvalues to young people”. A narrow major-ity (55%) believed that they had more incommon with Muslims in other coun-tries than with non-Muslims in Britain.18% of them even disagreed with thestatement that “Many of the problems inthe world today are a result of arrogantwestern attitudes”, suggesting they arequite confused about what Al-Qaedaactually espouses.

Nor were those who expressed admira-tion of Al-Qaeda necessarily very reli-gious. Of the 72 people who said theyagreed with the statement, (38%) eithernever prayed or only occasionally. 32% ofthem do not want to live under sharialaw. 52% believe sharia law should bereformed. These are clearly not peoplewho follow Wahabist doctrine. Themajority (54%) even preferred to sendtheir children to mixed state schools.

The majority of those who expressedsupport for Al-Qaeda got their newsfrom mainstream channels (73%) orEnglish speaking cable or satellite chan-nels (56%).103 Only 16% got their newsfrom foreign language channels, andnone from foreign language sites.

It has been claimed by some that sup-port for Al-Qaeda comes from a sense ofpersecution in people’s personal lives. Butthe vast majority (82%) of the groupagreed with the statement “they had beentreated fairly in this society, regardless ofmy religious beliefs”. The majority (56%)said they had not experienced any hostil-ity in the past year.

When the same question was asked ofthe general population, 3% said they


62

7%

87%

5%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 15: “I admire organisations like Al-Qaeda thatare prepared to fight against the West”

There was a marked difference across the age groups.

% 16�24 25�34 35�44 45�54 55+

Agreed 13 6 6 2 3

Disagreed 80 88 87 89 92

“admired organisations like Al-Qaedathat are prepared to fight against theWest”.

It is difficult to know how to interpretsuch statistics. People expressing admira-tion for Al-Qaeda are not necessarily reli-gious, personally victimised, or even hos-tile to non-Muslims. They can be men or

women, and come from any background.Some respondents may even have been“playing to the gallery”. What is clear isthat this 7% do not constitute a coherentpolitical movement with shared ideas orexperiences. More likely is that they areexpressing a vague sense of disillusion-ment with the West.



survey cited Al-Jazeera as an

English cable or satellite news

channel, but note that this serv-

ice was launched only a few

weeks before the survey was

conducted in November 2006.

6Victimhood

“It is now open season for attacks on Muslims.

Hardly a day goes by without another lurid denun-

ciation of the “enemy within”. Salma Yaqoob, The

Guardian 21st December 2006

A major theme in the emergence of Muslimidentity in the UK is victimhood. Muslimsare regularly portrayed in the media as anoppressed group in Britain, subject to viru-lent racism on the streets, suffering fromdiscrimination and poverty, and targeted bythe authorities. Many people argue thatIslamophobia is a new form of “acceptableracism”. After the Danish cartoons affair inFebruary 2006, the Mayor of London, KenLivingstone, held a press conference at CityHall and called for an end to the media’s“orgy of Islamophobia”. The Governmenthas worked actively to promote positiveimages of Islam and Muslims, whileMuslim groups have lobbied hard forgreater protections for Muslims. In aresearch study about Muslims in the UK,one think tank warned that the majority ofMuslims identified with their “imagined

community” because of their own experi-ence of victimisation:

“…distant and global concerns can gain currency

only when they are able to feed off local, everyday,

personal grievances, such as those experienced by

Muslims in the UK”.104

In her article for the Guardian, the RespectParty’s councillor for Birmingham, SalmaYaqoob, argues that Muslims in the UKtoday are “subject to attacks reminiscent ofthe gathering storms of anti-Semitism in thefirst decades of the last century”. Such com-parisons to Nazi Germany are common. Asfar back as 1992, during the period of theBosnian civil war, the Muslim writerShabbir Akhtar wrote in Muslim News,“next time there are gas chambers in Europethere is no doubt concerning who’ll beinside them”.105 Speaking at the launch oftheir publication, Anti-MuslimDiscrimination and Hostility in the UnitedKingdom 2000, the Chairman of theIslamic Human Rights Commission(IHRC), Massoud Shadjareh, said “unlesssomething is done urgently at governmentallevel, Muslims in Britain face the same fatethis century as Jews in Europe in the last”.106

These claims can only be described as hys-terical. It seems remarkable to have to pointout that Jews were persecuted in NaziGermany in a way that does not compare tothe experience of Muslims in Britain today.After 1933, when Hitler came to power, theJews became the “Untermenschen” – thesub-humans. Jewish shops were marked witha yellow star. Buses, trains and even parkbenches were marked with separate seating

64

104. BRIGGS, R., FIESCHI, C. &

LOWNSBROUGH, H. (2006)

Bringing it Home. Community-

based approaches to counter-

terrorism. London, Demos. p.13.

105. Cited MCROY, A. (2006)

From Rushdie to 7/7, London,

The Social Affairs Unit. p.23

106. Cited in Ibid. p.26.

84%

13%2%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 16: “On the whole, I feel I have been treatedfairly in this society, regardless of my religious beliefs”

for Jews. In 1935, under the Nuremberg law,Jews lost their right to German citizenship,and marriage between Jews and non-Jewswas forbidden. On 10 November 1938 –Krystalnacht – ten thousand Jewish shopswere raided, along with homes and syna-gogues. The violence was endemic andendorsed entirely by the authorities.

In our survey, 84% of respondents saidthey felt they had been treated fairly in thissociety – it is doubtful that such a high per-centage of Jews in 1930s Germany wouldhave given the same answer.

Indeed, the majority of respondents hadnot experienced direct Islamophobia in thepast year. Those that had, had experiencedrelatively low-level incidents (Fig 17):

Of course, we know there is anti-Muslim prejudice in the UK today, someof which stems from old-fashioned racism.In a speech given on 3rd July 2006, theLabour MP for Tooting, Sadiq Khan,describes well the feeling of exclusion expe-rienced by some Muslims because they areseen to be different:

“As an ethnically Asian Muslim, but born and bred

in this country, I am unambivalently British. I

have never felt a conflict between my country, my

religion and my background…But somehow a

British born white person is immediately accepted,

whatever their parental origins, while people of

colour are always different. Recently there have

been British voices raised claiming that Islam is

incompatible with British values. But being British

and Muslim are not at odds.”107

There are a number of examples of individ-uals being attacked because of their religionand instances of negative depictions ofMuslims in the media. These contribute toa sense of anxiety and alienation amongstsome Muslims. More observant Muslimsare particularly likely to experience someform of prejudice because of their clothingor appearance.

But at the same time, we should put theseepisodes into perspective. While Muslims

may feel self-conscious because of the clothesthey wear or how they live, they have notbeen frightened off from showing their iden-tity in public. Most Muslims feel confidentabout showing their “Muslim-ness”.

“yeah, well I noticed it when I started growing my

beard… people look at me funny. But I like it in

a way, it shows my identity. No, I never had any-

thing serious…” Male, Muslim, 22, Leeds

Distressing as low-level incidents of racismare, they do not compare to the kind ofdegrading, brutal and systematic treatmentof Jews, which was orchestrated by theauthorities in 1930s Germany.

So why, if the picture is not desparatelybleak, is there so much concern about thevictimisation of Muslims? A paradox hasemerged: while younger Muslims areunlikely to experience significant racism ordiscrimination because of their religion,they are much more conscious and sensi-tive about the possibility of being vic-timised. Muslims in Britain enjoy almostcomplete freedom to practice their religionand many workplaces and public amenitiesmake provision for prayer rooms or halalmeat, and yet many Muslims today feel


Victimhood

107. KHAN, S. (2006) Being a

British Muslim.

52

31

30

25

9

6

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

No, none of these

Felt that you were an object of suspicion because of yourreligion

Felt that at least some non�Muslims were hostile to youbecause of your religion

Been subject to verbal abuse because of your religion

Been stopped by the police while going about youreveryday business because you are a Muslims

Been subject to physical violence because of yourreligion

%

Figure 17: In the past year, have you yourself…?

AB respondents were more likely to say they had ‘Felt like an object of suspicion because of

their religion’ (40% compared to 24% of DE respondents). They were also more likely to say

they had felt some non-Muslims were more hostile to them because of their religion (35% com-

pared to 25% of D1 respondents).

increasingly ill at ease. Although youngerMuslims show much more confidence inwearing religious clothing and have bene-fited from the provision of special facilities,many of them regard society as hostile.

“…who gets targeted under the terrorism laws? Of

course it’s not fair!! I think there is a massive problem

of Islamaphobia, especially after the attacks, and I

think its more institutionalised too – I mean I think

we’ll start seeing it in employment and everything.”

Male, Muslim, 19, Oxford

“you know that it happens, you hear about it all

the time on the news and stuff, it’s not a secret.”,

Male, Muslim, 21, Birmingham

Sadly, racism and inequality are still fea-tures in our society and there are thingsthat Government and policy-makers coulddo to help address these problems.However, the preoccupation with Muslimvulnerability and Islamophobia has skew-ered our understanding of why such prob-lems exist, and in many ways, has madethings worse for Muslims.

The myth of Muslim victimisation (1) – IslamophobiaTo what extent do perceptions of victimisa-tion reflect the reality? Certainly, there havebeen a number of serious attacks on BritishMuslims in recent years. In the aftermath ofthe September 11th, the EU commissioned astudy into Islamophobia and found a dozenserious physical attacks on British Muslims.It is perfectly understandable that lobbyinggroups seek to raise awareness of such cases.Yet, we must remember that as tragic as eachattack is, these are relatively few, especiallycompared to the 1980s during the peak ofthe far-right’s influence in areas like EastLondon, Manchester and Birmingham. Inthat decade, there were forty-nine racist mur-ders and it was not uncommon to hear aboutviolent street attacks and arson attacks onfamily homes.108

The claims of Muslim lobby groups oftenpresent a misleading picture of the hostilityfaced by Muslims today. The IslamicHuman Rights Commission claimed therewas a massive rise in Islamophobic attacks,pointing to 344 recorded incidents in theyear following September 11th, but themajority of these were relatively low-level –verbal, or spitting and shoving. Distressingas these may be, they do not indicate a mas-sive backlash against a population of 1.6mMuslims. The majority of victims of report-ed crimes are aged between 10-24 years old.As a proportion of all race hate crimes, theproportion of victims from Pakistani andIndian backgrounds did not rise substantial-ly between 1998/9-2002/03.109

In light of concerns about Islamophobiaafter the London bombings, politicians andthe police warned about a potential backlashagainst Muslims. The police swiftly postedofficers outside mosques and a NationalCommunity Tensions Team was set up tomonitor hate incidents. Yet, in the words ofthe Director of Public Prosecutions, “thefears of a large rise in offences appear to beunfounded”. Figures published by theCrown Prosecution Service (CPS) for theyear 2005-2006 (which covers the period inthe aftermath of the London July 2005bombings) show that there were only forty-three prosecutions for religiously aggravatedcrime, and only eighteen of these related toMuslim victims. This figure actually repre-sented a fall from twenty-three cases ofMuslim victims in 2004-2005.110 One infour hundred Jews compared to one in1,700 Muslims are likely to be victims of“faith hate” attacks every year.

The gap between perception and reality isnot just a result of successful lobbying orskewered statistics, but a broader shift in theway the police understand and monitorracially-motivated crime. Following theMacpherson report into the StephenLawrence case in 1999, there has been awidening of the definition of race hate orfaith hate crime: “Any incident that is per-


66

108. MALIK, K. (2005b)

Islamophobia Myth. Prospect.

February 2005

109. METROPOLITAN POLICE

AUTHORITY (2003) Long term

trends in racist and homophobic

crime performance. London,

Metropolitan Police Authority..

110. O’NEILL, B. (2006) Time for

a backlash against the hate-

obsessed state? spiked-

online.11 December 2006

ceived to be motivated by faith or religioushatred by the victim or any other person”.111

This highly subjective criteria means that sta-tistics are a highly unreliable indicator ofprejudice in British society. Today, people areencouraged to report to the police relativelyminor incidents which they might haveignored previously, such as verbal abuse. Ithas been common practice for some policeforces to record attacks as race or faith hatecrimes if they perceive it to be as such, even ifthe victim does not report it as such themselves.Taking these factors into account, it is notsurprising that racially-motivated attacksseem to rise every year.112

While direct experience of prejudice isnot widespread, a number of high-profileincidents have certainly made Muslims feelafraid of the police. The shooting of theBrazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes on 22July 2005, and the anti-terror raid on ahome in Forest Gate on 2nd June 2006 havedone severe damage to the police’s reputa-tion and made some Muslims wary of coop-eration. The intrusion and violence involvedin these two incidents have quite rightlybeen subjected to public criticism and scruti-ny. However, the way in which our societyreacts to these incidents, and the overall cul-ture of victimhood have not allowed us todeal with Muslim fears. Rather, they haveexacerbated them.

In a number of articles, the writer andbroadcaster, Kenan Malik, has interrogatedthe claims made by Muslim lobby groupsabout police discrimination against Muslims.In one article, he discusses the impact of anti-terrorism laws on Muslims. In the summer of2004, the Home Office released figuresshowing that there had been a 300% rise inthe number of Asian men stopped andsearched by the police. Such a figure under-standably caused alarm in the media and sug-gested that the police were disproportionate-ly targeting young Asian men. However, oncloser inspection, Malik points out that only3,000 men were actually stopped under thenew Terrorism Act, and approximately half of

these were Muslim. This is 1,500 people in apopulation of 1.6m Muslims – just under0.01%. Malik goes on to say:

“A total of 21,577 people from all backgrounds were

stopped and searched under the terror laws. The

majority—14,429—were white. Yet when I inter-

viewed Iqbal Sacranie, General Secretary of the

Muslim Council of Britain, he insisted that, “95-

98% of those stopped and searched under the anti-

terror laws are Muslim.” The real figure is 14% (for

Asians). However many times I showed him the true

statistics, he refused to budge. His figures appear to

have been simply plucked out of the sky.” 113

There is certainly disproportionate treat-ment of Asians; they account for 5% of thepopulation, yet 14% of those stopped underthe new terrorism law were Asian. However,this is likely to be skewered by the fact thattwo thirds of anti-terror stop and searchesare carried out in London, where Asiansmake up 11% of the population. Asians arealso more likely to be targeted because theyhave a younger age profile compared to thewider population.114

As well as inflating fears, the accusation ofIslamophobia has now become a convenientway of closing down debate. The Muslim-led groups that monitor Islamophobia notonly record incidents of attacks on individu-als, but criticisms of Islam and Muslims ingeneral public discourse. The IHRC organ-izes an annual ‘Islamophobe of the Year’award, which it has given to BNP leaderNick Griffin, but also prominent main-stream commentators like Polly Toynbee.The criticism of Islam by even well-regardedjournalists is conflated with personal, violentattacks on Muslims. Valid criticism of Islamor Muslims is hindered by accusations ofIslamopbohia.

The myth of Muslim victimisation (2) –Discrimination and disadvantageIt is widely agreed that Muslims are a dis-advantaged community compared to other


Victimhood

111. METROPOLITAN POLICE

AUTHORITY (2003) Long term

trends in racist and homophobic

crime performance. London,

Metropolitan Police Authority..

112. Ibid. Paragraphs 17 and 18.

“The Racial and Violent Crime

Task Force was first established

in 1998. This and the publicity

surrounding the publication of

the Stephen Lawrence inquiry

report almost certainly led to the

increase of reporting seen in

1999/2000...The Task Force initi-

ated high profile internal and

external strategies that have con-

tinued over the five-year period

to encourage victims to report

crime and ensure better internal

recording, ” ‘Long term trends in

racist and homophobic crime

performance’

113. MALIK, K. (2005b)

Islamaphobia Myth, Prospect

February 2005

114. See Also, MVA and Miller, J.

(2000) Profiling Populations

Available for Stops and

Searches. London, Home Office

Policing and Reducing Crime

Unit.

groups in the UK. They tend to have poor-er employment rates, live in the poorestneighbourhoods with low quality housing,suffer worse ill health and have low educa-tional attainment. Half of Pakistanis andBangladeshi households live in the 10%most deprived wards in England.115

Numerous research studies and reportshave been produced to demonstrate thatMuslims suffer economic and educationalpenalties, and that specific policies areneeded to address their needs.116 However,it is far from clear why such problems areinterpreted through the framework of reli-gious difference. Policy-makers talk abouthelping “Muslims”, but levels of social dis-advantage actually relate more closely toethnicity than religious grouping, and evenmore importantly, to socio-economic class.We consider here two areas – employmentand education.

EEmmppllooyymmeennttAccording to data comparing religiousgroups, 30% of Muslim men are econom-ically inactive compared to 16% ofChristians. 40% of Muslim men and overa quarter of Muslim women in employ-ment work in the distribution, hotel andrestaurant industries (i.e. lower paid andmore part-time) compared with 17% ofChristian men and one fifth of Christianwomen. Muslim and Sikh men are theleast likely to be working in managerial orprofessional occupations (just under 30%)but this is not much less than the Christianpercentage of just over 30%. Jews (almost60%) and Buddhists (50%) are the mostlikely.117

However, the patterns of disadvantagedo not conform strictly to religious group-ings. The author of a major study, fundedby the Economic and Social ResearchCouncil, into employment rates for ethnicgroups notes, “while Muslims, as a group,do record the lowest percentage in full-time work (half that for Hindus), the expe-rience of the Indian Muslim

minority…challenges any notion of a sim-ple negative association between beingMuslim and the likelihood of holding afull-time job”.118 41% of Indian Muslimadults were in full-time work, compared to26% of Pakistanis, 23% of Bangladeshis,55% of Hindus and 43% of Sikhs.

These significant differences can beexplained by a number of factors. First,there is the relative youth of the Pakistani,Bangladeshi and Sikh populations;younger people are generally less likely tobe in full-time work. Also, the differencesin unemployment between all ethnicgroups narrow significantly for the 25-39age group. Second, the groups with partic-ularly high levels of unemployment(Pakistani, Bangladeshis and Sikhs) allshare concentration in those geographicalareas where unemployment levels are high-est or industries have waned (such as thetextile industries in the North). Third,there are the differences amongst the firstgeneration of immigrants who arrived inthe UK, in terms of where they came from,their educational attainment, cultural tra-ditions, skills, and financial capital. Thesevarying factors can exert a significant effecton the next generation.119

Therefore, there is little evidence to sug-gest a significant direct causal link betweenreligion and employment discrimination.Looking at the employment statistics of allgroups, it seems that socio-economic back-ground and educational achievement exerta primary effect. Undoubtedly, personalprejudices can operate against Muslims inthe workplace, but other groups also expe-rience this. Controlled tests conductedsince the 1960s, whereby white and ethnicminority applicants respond to jobs forwhich they are equally suitable, reproducethe same finding that at least one third ofprivate employers discriminate againstCaribbeans, Asians, or both.120 There arealso certain cultural factors that will disad-vantage particular groups, for instancepeople’s choice of clothing or adherence to


68

115. THE PERFORMANCE AND

INNOVATION UNIT (2001)

Report on Ethnic Minorities.

London, Cabinet Office. para 35,

p.12.

116. See for instance OPEN

SOCIETY INSTITUTE (2004)

Muslims in the UK: Policies for

Engaged Citizens. London, Open

Society Institute, GREATER

LONDON AUTHORITY (2006)

Muslims in London. London,

Greater London Authority,

CHOUDHURY, T. A. (2002)

Monitoring Minority Protection in

the EU. Open Society Institute.

117. Information drawn from data

collated by the National Office for

Statistics in 2003-2004 and the

2001 census.

118. BROWN, M. S. (2000)

Religion and economic activity in

the South Asian population.

Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23,

1035-1061. (accessed online

24.01.07)

119. Ibid. 1048. Also MODOOD,

T. (2005) Multicultural Politics.

Race, Ethnicity and Muslims in

Britain, Minnesota, University of

Minnesota Press. p. 78

120. MODOOD, T. (2005)

Multicultural Politics. Race,

Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain,

Minnesota, University of

Minnesota Press. p. 74

prayer times. It has been argued by somethat the importance of alcohol in the socialnetworking side of the workplace is indi-rectly discriminatory towards Muslims.However, if they choose not to enter socialspaces where alcohol is served, it could bereasonably argued this is their choice andnot a deliberate exclusion.

In September 2006, a new study by theEqual Opportunities Commission report-ed that 68% of Muslim women are eco-nomically inactive compared to no morethan a third of any other religious group(being “economically inactive” mayinclude being a student, being disabled orperforming a caring role such as staying athome and looking after children). TheGuardian reported the findings with theheadlines, “Muslim girls surge ahead atschool but held back at work”, and “Mymanager said I looked like a terrorist”,hinting that widespread discriminationand prejudice is to blame. Following thereport, Ruth Kelly, the Minister forWomen and Communities, said she wouldlike to see more Muslim women wearingthe hijab in the media to boost their pub-lic image.

However, the report itself showed thatthe picture of disadvantage is more com-plex. A large number of these womenchoose not to work because women withPakistani or Bangladeshi backgrounds tendon average to have their first child earlierthan women of other ethnic groups, andthey also tend to have more children.Figures from the Labour Force Survey,Spring 2005, show that only 23% or36,000 Pakistani and Bangladeshi womenaged 16–34 who are not in employmentactually want to be in work.121

For those who do work, they are rela-tively successful and do not seem put offby negative stereotypes. 25% of Muslimwomen in employment are working inmanagerial or professional occupations, ahigher proportion than Christian women(21%), though less than Hindu women

(27%), Buddhist women (27%) andJewish women (34%). 52% of youngPakistani and 47% of young Bangladeshiwomen employees aspire to be their ownboss, a senior professional or in seniormanagement, compared to only 4% oftheir white British counterparts.

Without doubt, some Muslim womenwill encounter prejudice and stereotypes inthe workplace, but hyping up these issueswill only increase the anxiety women mayhave about going to work. Furthermore,there are many positive things thatGovernment can do to help women of allbackgrounds enter the workplace, such asoffering education and career services,especially to those women returning towork after having a family. To diagnose thisas a “Muslim problem” will fail to respondto the widest need.

EEdduuccaattiioonnThe same process of mystification is oftenat work when people discuss inequality inthe area of education. It is undeniable thatunderachievement at primary and second-ary school is highest amongst Muslims.According to the census of 2001, fewerchildren of Bangladeshi and Pakistani par-ents obtained five A-C GCSE passes thanany community, except for children ofBlack British origin.122 But is this becausethey are Muslim? In education, there aremajor disparities between ethnic groups,but this is usually accounted for by pover-ty. The Economist, on 12th March 2005,reported that in a study of British educa-tional statistics that took into accountpupils who received free school meals (i.e.as an indication of family income) foundthat – contrary to expectations – of all eth-nic groups it was whites who were the mostunderachieving.

In 2003-2004 31% of Muslims of work-ing age had no qualifications – the highestproportion for any religious group (com-pared to the next group, Sikhs, at 23%,followed by Christians at 15%). Again,


Victimhood

121. The word ‘choose’ is used

with caution here, as any

woman’s decision to pursue a

career will be made in the con-

text of family pressures, as well

as wider cultural expectations.

122. MASOOD, E. (2006) British

Muslims Media Guide. London,

Counterpoint.

this figure is heavily skewered by the factthat a large number of older Muslims grewup abroad and had a limited education. Insome respects, the situation is also improv-ing. British-born Muslims between theages of 16 and 30 are twice as likely asMuslims born elsewhere to have a degreeor equivalent qualification. This suggeststhat there is a high degree of social mobili-ty between generations. Among Muslims,half of those aged 18-30 is in post-compul-sory education compared to 38% of thegeneral population. In 40% of localauthorities that monitor by ethnic origin,Pakistanis are more likely than whites toachieve five A*-C GCSEs. Tariq Modood,the leading authority on racial and ethnicdisadvantage in Britain, has noted thatdespite evidence to show that Asian groupsexperience higher levels of racism inschools than other groups, they go on tohave high staying-on rates and a strongeracademic orientation than other groups,especially compared to Caribbean maleswho may suffer similar disadvantages insocio-economic background.123

Regardless of the complexity of the evi-dence, some groups have campaigned vocif-erously for more religion in schools, arguingthat Muslims are disadvantaged by a failureto recognise their identity. In 2004, a groupof Muslim academics produced a positionpaper entitled Muslims on Education,launched by Muslim Labour peer, BaronessUddin and co-authored by the Associationof Muslim Social Scientists, the educationand development campaign FED, theMuslim College UK, and the Forum againstIslamophobia and Racism. The report stat-ed, “There are still major Muslim popula-tions within the UK that are not served byany suitable education service, state or pri-vately funded”. The authors called for specialclasses in Islamic subjects, more single-sexeducation and prayer rooms in secondaryschools. The report called for more Muslimfaith schools, and suggested “institutionalracism” was the major stumbling block. It

recommended compulsory religious educa-tion from ages 14 to 16, and a new ‘A’ levelin Islamic studies (although there is noequivalent in ‘Christian studies’). All schoolswith a majority of Muslim pupils, theyargued, should have one teacher of Islamavailable for collective worship and instruc-tion in Islamic subjects.124

It is not just Muslim groups who arecampaigning for more recognition of faithin schools. In October 2006, the GLA pro-duced a report entitled “Muslims inLondon”, which argued that, “Muslims inmainstream primary, secondary, furtherand higher education often experienceintolerance towards their faith and prac-tices and a lack of knowledge aboutMuslim culture.”125

But is the lack of provision of halal food,or the absence of a prayer room really themost pressing problem facing the majorityof Muslim children? Is the inclusion of reli-gion in the curriculum a way to deal withunderachievement in financially stretchedschools in deprived areas? Or, like non-Muslims, are Muslim parents more likelyto be worried about standards of teaching,discipline and values?

The exaggeration of Islamophobia anddiscrimination hides the real, complexcauses of disadvantage in schooling.Muslim parents are told that their childrenare failing at school because they are notgetting enough respect for their religiousidentity. The solution, we are told, is togive more attention to Islam in schools.Muslim journalist, Faisal Bodi, argues:

“In fact the solution lies in more, and better, reli-

gion. The resort to indiscriminate violence against

the homeland is often a reaction to a national dis-

connect, a lack of identification with a country

that is persecuting fellow Muslims abroad and

whose institutions remain pregnant with

Islamophobic attitudes cultivated by orientalists

over centuries…But it is also a function of poor

secular and religious education. Muslim pupils

underperform nationally, and their appreciation


70

123. MODOOD, T. (2005)

Multicultural Politics. Race,

Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain,

Minnesota, University of

Minnesota Press. p.82-100

124. ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (2004)

Muslims on Education.

Richmond, Association of Muslim

Social Scientists.

125. GREATER LONDON

AUTHORITY (2006) Muslims in

London. London, Greater London

Authority. p.41

of Islam is prejudiced by inadequate educational

provision in the state sector and the reluctance to

fund their schools in the private sector”.126

This argument rests on the notion thatMuslims need to have their identity andculture in schools respected. But byemphasising the different identities of chil-dren, are we reinforcing their sense of dif-ference to each other? Young Muslims mayfeel further alienated from society the morethey are made to feel that “their culture” isdifferent and must be taught separately. Itis plain sense to show children aspects oftheir heritage and enrich their understand-ing of other people’s cultural backgrounds,but focusing on ‘respect’ to the extent thatsome lobby groups and commentatorswish might end up limiting children’s hori-zons and curiosity about others. After all,Muslim children are part of “our culture”too.

The Qualification and CurriculumAuthority, regarded by its critics as march-ing in the vanguard of political correctness,has devoted a chunk of the history curricu-lum at Key Stage Three to a rather unsub-tle celebration of Islamic history and civil-isation (“What were the achievements ofthe Islamic states 600-1600?”) somethingnot done for any other minority religion.While many aspects of British history aresubjected to critical scrutiny, pupils are leftwith the impression that the Muslim worldat the height of its power had few flaws.

The obsession with identity could havea particularly corrosive effect in schools,the one place where young people shouldbe taught about the world beyond theirimmediate, familiar experience. Wheneducation becomes about promoting ‘dif-ference’ and validating separate identities,it is not surprising that schools in someparts of the UK are effectively segregatingalong ethnic and religious lines. Parents areencouraged to believe that their childrenwill not learn sufficiently about “their cul-ture” or be given adequate support if they

go to a school crowded by other ethnicgroups. Emphasising difference willincrease the sense of exclusion manyMuslims already feel towards the main-stream, and even encourage the kind ofself-referential identity politics that fuelsthe culture of victimhood.

The overwhelming focus on ‘Muslims’as a disadvantaged group confuses thelong-term, structural causes of inequalityand reduces problems down to a ‘lack ofrecognition’. It is not surprising thatMuslim lobby groups are keen to encour-age this as it gives weight to theirdemands for special religious and cultur-al provisions. It also reinforces theirimage as leaders of a victimised groupwho are marked off from society becauseof their religion – a claim which is high-ly dubious.

Victim mentalityThe cumulative effect of the public dis-course about Muslims has been the foster-ing of a victim mentality. Many of theMuslim respondents in the interviewsadmitted that there was a culture of victim-hood amongst some Muslims, and some-times too much sensitivity shown byMuslims.

“It’s the new ‘black gang culture’ of our genera-

tion, the new ‘alternative’ struggle/identity crisis,

it’s the new anti-establishment thing to be. And

yes, victimisation is a big thing here. Ali G’s ‘is it

because I is black, turns into, is it because I is a

Muslim’ … it’s the same king of thing.” Female,

non-religious (but of Muslim background), 21,

London

“Yeah I think it [culture of victimhood] does hap-

pen. I think it happens more than Islamaphobia

to be honest. Every time anybody is slightly

inquisitive about the way we address issues, but

because of our own insecurities we use that and

say ‘its only because I am Muslim’”. Female,

Muslim, 20, London


Victimhood

126. BODI, F. (2005) A dubious

leap of faith. The Guardian. 16th

November 2005

“You do see where some people are coming from.

But some people just take it overboard and exag-

gerate, so yeah there is a slight culture of victim-

hood…I think some people try to use it as some

kind of excuse – like ‘oh just because I am a

Muslim’” Female, Muslim, 21, London

As a number of respondents admitted,some Muslims probably do exaggeratetheir sense of victimisation in their day-to-day lives. On one level, this is fairly unsur-prising and hardly a matter for concern.Playing the ‘victim card’ is a pretty normalpart of contemporary personal politics.But what of those who genuinely feelafraid and anxious about their status insociety? Their sense of victimisation is notsimply paranoia or a personality defect.This victim mentality is given social cre-dence by institutions, politicians, themedia and lobby groups. It is unsurprisingthat young people believe they are beingdiscriminated against when everyone tellsthem so. When the police hang aroundoutside mosques, ostensibly to protectMuslims from attack, they are likely tomake them feel even more afraid.

One aspect of this victim mentality isthe tendency of the authorities to publiciseany isolated act of injustice against aMuslim as the ‘tip of the iceberg’ andsymptomatic of widespread Islamophobia.In June 2006, the term ‘institutional reli-gious intolerance’ was coined following theinquiry into the murder of Zahid Mubarek– a young Muslim male who was attackedin his cell at Feltham Young OffendersInstitution by his cell mate, RobertStewart. The term dominated news head-lines about the inquiry, and promptedwidespread concern about the treatment ofMuslims in British prisons. In its eighty-eight recommendations, the report sug-gested various provisions for Muslim pris-oners, including more imams in prisons.

However, the report refused to statewhether there actually was evidence of‘institutional religious intolerance’ in the

prison system. The authors admitted thatthey had not been able to investigate thetreatment of Muslims in the prison systemas this was beyond the scope of theirinquiry. They only urged the use of theterm as a “catalyst for concerns about thetreatment of Muslim prisoners”, as theyfelt that Macpherson’s term, ‘institutionalracism’, did not take religious prejudiceinto sufficient account. The report citedthe first special adviser on Muslim issues tothe prison service, Maqsood Ahmed, whosaid that if there had been any increasedlevel of Islamophobia in the recent periodit was “muted and low-key”.127

Mubarek’s tragic death did not provewidespread anti-Muslim discrimination assuggested in the media, but instead, multi-ple failures in the prison service, whichmight have affected any inmate. The mur-der itself was probably not even motivatedby Islamophobia. The inquiry heard twopsychologists give evidence that Stewart’smental state was so severe that he wouldprobably have killed anyone sharing a cellwith him that night, regardless of religionor ethnic background. The inquiry con-demned the mishandling of informationabout Stewart’s mental state, and also stat-ed that Mubarek was moved into Stewart’scell because it was the only one availabledue to severe overcrowded and financialshortages. The failure of the guards to pre-vent the murder was rightly condemned asa case of extreme negligence arising fromserious shortcomings in the prison service.

The prism of religion means that injus-tices in the system or cases of neglect arenow exploited as flashpoints for angeramongst some Muslim lobby groups. Atragic, isolated incident becomes used as ananchor around which to discuss the perse-cution of Muslims, even though there isoften little to prove that Muslims are beingdiscriminated against. The effect of suchstories in the media is to reinforce theMuslim population’s feeling that it is undersiege. If people who happen to be Muslims


72

127. THE ZAHID MUBAREK

INQUIRY (2006) The Zahid

Mubarek Inquiry Report. See

para 62.27.

are mistreated or suffer neglect at thehands of public institutions, we should becautious about allowing this to be co-optedinto the victimisation narrative.

A race apartThe impact of Islamist terrorism has beento shine a spotlight on Muslims, and makeother people afraid of them.Understandably, many Muslims feelunfairly tarnished by the actions of a smallminority and dislike the way some com-mentators have sought to demonise theirentire religion. To an extent, this feeling ofbeing misunderstood is probablyinevitable. In response, we should welcomeall attempts to demystify Islam as it is prac-ticed and understood by the majority ofMuslims, and remind ourselves of themany things Muslims and non-Muslimshave in common.

But instead of showing that Muslimsare like everyone else, the authorities havebeen treating Muslims as a distinct group,and as a result, our society has come to seethem as more alien than they actually are.Institutions like the police, the law courts,schools, local authorities and even hospi-tals, are now so conscious of Muslims’‘special needs’ that they have begun totreat them like different creatures alto-gether.

In January 2007, the Governmentannounced a £5m scheme implemented bylocal authorities to tackle Islamophobiaand run initiatives to “deter people whomight be attracted by Osama Bin Laden’sevil message”. But speaking in the localnewspaper in Bradford, Bary Malik, a localMuslim group leader feared that singlingout the Muslim community would onlyalienate other minorities.128 Although suchschemes are intended to improve commu-nity cohesion, they can inadvertentlywiden divisions between groups.

A particularly illuminating example ofthis approach at an everyday level can be

found in a set of Bedfordshire police forceguidelines, leaked in August 2005, onhow to deal with Muslim terror suspects.They recommended that “rapid entryneeds to be the last resort and raids intoMuslim houses are discouraged for anumber of religious dignity reasons”. Theguidelines also recommended that policeseek to avoid looking at “unclad Muslimwomen”, “entering occupied bedroomsand bathrooms even before dawn”, andstates that “the use of police dogs will beconsidered serious desecration of thepremises”.129

Police raids can be brutal and frighteningin any family’s home. It is, however, of someconcern that the Bedfordshire police shouldconsider Muslims to be more sensitive thanothers about being seen without appropriateclothing, and having their homesdisheveled. After all, it is not just Muslimhouseholds that object to dogs pouncingaround on furniture, or being spied on inthe bathroom. Bizarrely, the guidelines alsostate that ‘rapid entry’ into Muslim house-holds should always be the last resort, as ifthis were not always the case: “In the cur-rent climate the justification for pre-dawnraids on Muslim houses needs to be clearand transparent”. Considering how intru-sive house-raids are, one would have hopedthis was always done with clear and trans-parent justification, regardless of whetherthe household is Muslim or not.

The way the police, or any other author-ity, behaves should be judged according touniversal standards. Although public serv-ices should try to accommodate the differ-ent needs of users as much as possible, thisshould be within a framework of equalrights. It is playing into the hands ofextremists to act as if Muslims should betreated differently to everyone else, becausethis reinforces their feeling of being out-siders. At the same time, the over-attentionto Muslims can create resentment amongstother groups who feel they are not receiv-ing the same benefits.


Victimhood

128. BOURLEY, A. (2007) £5m

bid to turn young Muslims from

terror. Bradford Telegraph &

Argus, 10th January 2007

129. ‘No shoes allowed in terror-

ist captures’. WorldNetDaily. 2nd

August 2005. http://www.world-

netdaily.com/news/article.asp?A

RTICLE_ID=45571 (last

accessed 22.01.07)

Causing offenceOne of the most dramatic issues for BritishMuslims in recent years has been freedomof speech, which surfaced most recentlyduring the furore over the publication ofcontroversial cartoons by the Danish news-paper, Jyllands-Posten. The cartoons, con-sidered blasphemous by many Muslimsworldwide, raised debate about whethercausing offence to religious minorities isacceptable.

In the survey, there was no discernible dif-ference of opinion about freedom ofspeech between those who pray more oftenand those who do not (Fig 17). During theinterviews, most respondents we spoke tosaid they were less concerned about blas-phemy, and more about Muslims being

targeted unfairly and therefore needingspecial protection. The overwhelming con-cern from the wide range of respondentswas to be sensitive to people’s feelings.However, many respondents we spoke tofelt that although the cartoons were offen-sive, they should not have been banned.

“A lot of people got carried way in their reaction to

these cartoons. But should people be stopped from

drawing these cartoons? I don’t think they should be.

People had a right to be angry, but it’s not a good

idea to express their anger they way they did. It only

served to stoke up this idea of fundamentalism tak-

ing over the young British Muslim community…In

a way I would have liked the papers to publish these

cartoons – its news, and people want to see news.”

Male, Muslim, 21, Manchester

They added that some of the Muslim pro-testers shown in the media had been tooextreme:

“I find [the Danish cartoons] quite offensive.

Although I thought Muslims reacted quite badly.”

Female, Muslim, 21, Manchester

Interestingly, our research suggests there iseven less appetite for free speech amongstthe wider population (Fig 18).

In our interviews with non-religious,non-Muslim respondents, they alsoshowed concerned about sensitivity. Whenasked about mocking other people’s reli-gious beliefs, a number of them werestrongly negative:

“No, I don’t think that it’s right to mock or

ridicule… I think criticism and open debate is

fine, so all the opinions are out there, but mock-

ery to no end, is just destructive…But the thing is,

I don’t agree with the Muslim reaction either. It’s

not a reason to provoke them and it’s not a reason

to not uphold freedom of speech, it’s about sensi-

tivity.” Female, non-religious, 22, London

“No. I really don’t think that’s freedom of speech.

It’s disrespectful and ignorant. I can only really


74

37%

57%

5%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 17: “One of the benefits of modern society isthe freedom to criticise other people’s religious or polit-ical views, even when it causes offence” (Muslim pop-ulation)

29%

43%

28%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 18: “One of the benefits of modern society isthe freedom to criticise other people’s religious or polit-ical views, even when it causes offence” (General pop-ulation)

relate to this as my experience as a vegetarian, pos-

sibly the closest thing I have to a religious belief.

When people try and get me to eat meat or say

things about veggies being this, that and the other,

it’s just offensive and rude…It’s the same for reli-

gion and political beliefs, you shouldn’t mock

what you’re not or try to convert those who aren’t

what you are.” Female, non-religious, 23,

London

The survey by the Pew Global AttitudesProject, conducted in 13 countries, foundthat the majority (52%) of the British gen-eral public sympathised with Muslims overthe Danish cartoons affair.130

Muslim lobby groups have lobbied hardsince the late 1990s to bring in legislationoutlawing incitement to religious hatredon the grounds that certain types of speechcan offend people, create tension and beunnecessarily harmful to community rela-tions. They have privileged the ‘right’ ofvulnerable groups not to be harmed abovethe ‘right’ to debate ideas and beliefs totheir full.

Some have suggested that the demandsof Muslim groups have gone too far andthat we need to re-assert the tradition offree speech in Britain. But in reality,Muslim groups’ demands are not the firstto undermine the principle of free speechin western countries; rather, they follow atrend that has been institutionalised sincethe 1980s through speech codes on univer-sity campuses, diversity etiquette guide-lines in the workplace, and politically cor-rect jargon in local councils and publicservices. As the Canadian philosopher,Michael Neumann, points out it isWestern culture’s own exaggerated anxietyabout giving offence that has created someof the current dilemmas regardingMuslims.

“Many graduates of the kiddie left that imploded

in the early 1970s gave up on eliminating pover-

ty and inequality. They devoted themselves to

carping about hypocrisy and political incorrect-

ness; this apparently innocuous pursuit quickly

gained mainstream acceptance. Today we live

with the consequences; a culture of respect incred-

ibly sensitive to what doesn’t matter, and incredi-

bly insensitive to what does”.131

Ironically, it was feminist and gay rightslobby groups in the 1970s and 1980s whofirst demanded curbs on “hate speech” toprotect their particular identities. They arenow seeing the way such laws can be usedagainst them by religious groups. Themodern day commandment, “Thou shaltnot offend” has given rise to ever-morerestrictive demands by identity groups andhelped foster a victim culture. Althoughthe demand for respect is framed in termsof tolerance, it has produced a climate ofintolerance.

The see�saw effect The overreaction of institutions towardsMuslims has become highly counterpro-ductive, creating a climate of sensitivityand tension between groups. In recentyears, the media has picked up on numer-ous examples of measures taken by author-ities not to upset Muslims (usually withoutchecking first), which have helped foster abelief that Muslims are unduly sensitive.

In 2003 the local council in HighWycombe, Buckinghamshire banned anadvertisement for a Christmas carol servicearguing that religious issues could inflametensions in the multi-ethnic community.In 2005 Dudley Council banned allimages of pigs in its offices (including oncalendars, cuddly toys, etc) because oneMuslim complained about a consignmentof pig-shaped stress toys. The Tate Moderncontroversially withdrew an art work byJohn Latham which featured a copy of theQu’ran, although no Muslim had actuallycomplained. The London Undergroundbanned a poster for an American televisionseries, which pointed out that the centralhero fighting terrorism was a Muslim. The


Victimhood







Pew Research Center. p.22

131. NEUMANN, M. (2006)

Maximum Respect. Catalyst.

May 2006

MCB was baffled with the decision, sayingit made a nice change to see a Muslim in a

positive light. In 2003, a prison officer inSuffolk was dismissed from his post aftermaking a joke about Osama Bin Laden inthe presence of Asian visitors, even thoughthe tribunal could not establish whetherthey had even overheard the remark.132

No wonder people are left to concludethat Muslims are oversensitive. Theremight be some individual Muslims whooverreact and complain, but this is proba-bly the case with all religious and culturalgroups. The decision to ban images orwords is often done without any sense ofperspective. Undeniably, anti-Muslim prej-udice exists. But the cultivation of the vic-tim mentality means that this is takenwildly out of proportion. At the same time,the perception that Muslims are “gettingspecial treatment” fuels even more resent-ment – a kind of see-saw effect.

“Yes I think there is, there is no doubting it. There

are two sides to it, there is an Islamophobic senti-

ment and victim hood, they play off each other.”


“I think that the government needs to leave the

Muslim community alone… It’s always Islam this

or Islam that, a Muslim did this or a Muslim did

that, or we are doing this for Muslims. That’s just

not right. It put across the wrong image. I would-

n’t call it special treatment, I’d call it rubbish

treatment, we get stopped and searched on the

streets, people look at us like we are terrorists, and

to top it off, they do things like cancel Christmas

celebrations and they think they are doing us a

favour.” Male, Muslim, 22, Leeds

The attempt to be sensitive to Muslims’feelings can therefore backfire and makeMuslims feel even more self-conscious.Our survey shows that many Muslims feelthe response of the authorities often goestoo far (Fig 19).

A slightly higher proportion of peoplebelieved that authorities go “over the top”(28%) than “do not make enough effort”(20%).


76

132. For further details of these

examples, see ‘Officer’s Bin

Laden Comment ‘a joke’, BBC

Online 3rd December 2003

17%

76%

7%

Right thing to do

Wrong thing to do

Don’t know/Refused

28%

64%

8%

Right thing to do

Wrong thing to do

Don’t know/Refused

20%

39%

28%

13%

Do not make enough effort

Get the balance about right

Go over the top

Don't know/Refused

Figure 19: I am going to summarise actions taken bytwo local councils in Britain. Please say in each caseif you think the council’s decision was the right thingor the wrong thing to do.

“In 2003, a local council banned an advertisement for a Christmas

carol service for fear that it might cause tensions between religious

groups”.

In 2005, a local council banned all images of pigs from its offices

(on calendars, toys, etc) telling workers they might offend Muslims’

feelings

In general, do you think the authorities in Britain sometimes go over

the top in trying not to offend Muslims, or do you think they tend

not to make enough of an effort, or do you think they get the bal-

ance about right?

The perceived oversensitivity ofMuslims – amplified through sensational-ist media stories – does little to create asense of harmony. Parts of the wider popu-lation believe that Muslims exaggeratetheir problems:

“I think there is a culture of victimhood, yeah. I

think that Muslims are over sensitive and so every

little thing is seen as an attack on them or their

religion.” Female, Hindu, 21, Birmingham

“Speaking to friends that I have who are young

Muslims, that’s not something that many would

share and they may not like that culture, its more

an impression that the community leadership is

creating or selective people who are putting for-

ward that point of view in the media.” Male,

non-religious, 24, Oxford

The apparent favourable treatment givento Muslims may mean that other groupscan also become resentful.

“I don’t think Christians are treated fairly,

because there is a tendency to think that if some-

one insults Muslims or Sikhs or Hindus, that’s

bad, that’s wrong, their opinions should be

respected… Some groups are privileged, and I’m

not one of those groups.” Male, Christian, 24,

London

“…[three or four years ago] in my college…there

was a Muslim prayer room and in the halls there

wasn’t a Christian prayer room and the

Christians were not allowed to use the Muslim

prayer room for meetings…and I’m sorry but I

don’t see how that’s OK and it actually really

caused problems” Female, non-religious, 23,

London

The rules of the “victim game” mean thatis not only Muslim groups now whodemand recognition and respect for theiridentity. In 2005, the campaigning groupChristian Voice organized 1,500 protestersoutside BBC venues over the decision toscreen the controversial musical, “Jerry

Springer: the Opera”, which it described asblasphemous. The protest was inspired byan incident one week previously, whenfour hundred Sikh protesters successfullystormed a performance of the play ‘Behzti’at the Birmingham Repertory Theatre,closing it down. In May 2006, the groupHindu Human Rights campaigned againstan exhibition by the Indian artist, M FHusain, at a London venue, Asia House,because it deemed the paintings to be “anabuse of Hindus and Hinduism”. Theexhibition closed after acts of vandalismand harassment by members of the public.

The politics of multiculturalism has cre-ated a curious dynamic; some groupsdemand special protections for their par-ticular identity, which in turn encouragesother groups to make their own demands.Muslim groups have operated along theselines for some time, but they did not startthis framework. Rather, it was the broaderpolitics of multiculturalism, which assertsthat controversial opinions must besilenced in the name of protecting vulner-able minorities.

Feeling defensiveUnderstandably, Muslims have been feel-ing defensive about how wider societyviews them and their religion. One of theresponses of the Government has been totry to present a more positive image ofIslam. In 2006, the publicly-fundedFestival of Muslim Cultures worked topromote Muslim achievements in science,technology, art and music. In the sameyear, the Mayor of London’s Office sup-ported IslamExpo, a major conference toshowcase the diversity of Muslim life.

Initiatives like these may well help topromote a richer knowledge of Islam andgreater awareness of Muslim issues, butthey can also reinforce a feeling thatMuslims need to be understood becausethey are so different. The impetus behindpromoting a more positive image of Islam


Victimhood

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/eng-

land/suffolk/3288257.stm (last

accessed, 12.12.06) and THE

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY

OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

(2005) The British Muslim

Community in 2005, Wiltshire,

The Institute for the Study of

Islam and Christianity.

is the fear that Muslims are so unruly andangry that they need to be appeased andgiven special treatment. For all theseefforts, the more attention we give toMuslims, the more they feel scrutinised,and in turn, the more defensive they willfeel. By focusing on cultural identities, wereinforce the feeling that Muslims are alienand need to be treated differently.

“Emphasise individuality and stop boxing peo-

ple.” Female, Muslim, 22, Leeds

Numerous respondents complained aboutbeing labeled as ‘terrorists’. In fact, it isvery rare in the mainstream media to hearsuch blanket condemnations of Muslimsor Islam. In light of warnings aboutIslamophobia after September 11th, theGovernment spin machine even encour-aged The Sun to print a headline on itscentre page on 13th September 2001 –‘Islam is not an evil religion’.133 Exasperatedpolicy-makers might well wonder what elsethey have to do to prove they are notdemonising Muslims.

In reality, what many Muslims arereacting to is the feeling of being treateddifferently and placed under severe scruti-ny. We are constantly told about howimportant it is to listen to Muslims’ needsand understand “their culture”, whichonly reinforces this idea that they are notlike everyone else. Sadly it is true thatmany Muslims feel under the spotlightand very uncomfortable with the assump-tions often made about their lives.Although claims about Islamophobia arecertainly exaggerated, non-Muslims have

inevitably begun to look at Muslims asdifferent.

Policy-makers maybe fixated on identity,but many younger Muslims want to choosefor themselves and not be categorized.

“I think it’s good that they are teaching people

about Islam, but I don’t think they should keep

emphasizing the difference between people. We

need to somehow make communities work togeth-

er.” Female, Hindu, 21, Oxford

“I mean in a group of friends at school, with

mixed backgrounds, there is no PC approach, you

just gel together because …you know each other

before identities are strongly formed … there

needs to be emphasis on the unifying force and less

on the divisions.” Female, non-religious, 22,

Birmingham

“I just want people to experience new things, peo-

ple need to look outside the box they live in and

not be so suffocated by what they know, and open

the doors to what they don’t know because there

are some really amazing people out there”.


“I was with a couple of friends of mine… we

were talking about how we keep having to label

ourselves, and I said something about sticking

something up where the sun doesn’t shine... and

my friend said that was so British to say that. No

one had to tell me you have to be British, it’s a

part of who I am, it’s where I grew up. So this cat-

egorisation is very unfortunate. Even when they

have this ethnicity form to fill in… I don’t see the

point of it, but apparently its important… I get

confused; British Asian, British Indian, Indian,

British… other…” Male, Muslim, 22, London


78

133. BIRT, J. (2005) Lobbying

and Marching: British Muslims

and the State. IN ABBAS, T. (Ed.)

Muslims in Britain. Communities

Under Pressure. London/New

York, Zed Books/Room 400.

p.94.

7Who speaks for Muslims?

A strong Muslim identity has emerged inthe UK over the past two decades, andyounger Muslims are more likely to identi-fy with their religious community thanprevious generations. The growth ofMuslim organisations has meant more vis-ibility of faith-based issues and a confi-dence to seek accommodations withinBritish society. Since the late 1980s theGovernment has consulted with Muslimgroups in order to gauge Muslim opinionon a range of issues. This has been encour-aged by the broader political framework ofmulticulturalism, which categorizes citi-zens into religious, ethnic and culturalgroups. The Muslim Council of Britain(MCB) was set up in 1997 at the request ofthe then Conservative Home Secretary,Michael Howard, to act as the coherentand unified voice of Muslims to theGovernment.

However, in the past two years, there hasbeen much debate about the value of ‘com-munity leaders’ and their ability to trulyrepresent the views of their communities.As discussed in previous sections, theMuslim population is often regarded ashomogenous but contains considerabledivision and disagreement.

A number of newer organisations havespoken out against unaccountable commu-nity leaders whom they claim are driven bynarrow political agendas. In November2005, Progressive British Muslims waslaunched with the aim to give a platformto those Muslims who “feel under-repre-sented by the existing faith basedgroups”.134 Muslims for Secular

Democracy, launched in June 2006, hasargued for the need to stop stereotypingMuslims as “dysfunctional people withburning resentments”.135 In July 2006, theSufi Muslim Council was set up with theaim of representing the “silent majority” ofSufi Muslims who constitute 80% of theMuslim population. Its leader, Haris Rafiq,argued that existing organisations “lackedthe courage to stand up and speak forth-rightly about terrorism”.136 In November2006, the newly formed, cross-ethnicgroup, New Generation Network, criti-cized existing policies towards ethnicgroups. The founder, Sunny Hundal,argued that the Government is failing toengage with ethnic groups properly and“want so-called community leaders to dothe job for them”.137

What these new organisations share is afeeling that existing Muslim representativeorganisations fail to adequately representthe majority views of Muslims, or evenworse, misrepresent their views.

A major contention has been the MCB’sdecision not to attend the annual HolocaustMemorial Day (HMD) since its inaugura-tion in 2001. Although the MCB stronglydenounces the Holocaust, it maintains thatit was not historically unique and that thescope of the day should be widened toinclude other genocides, citing Rwanda,Vietnam, Cambodia, Bosnia and Chechnya.Some critics have interpreted this decision asplaying to anti-Semitic elements, and a com-petitive desire to promote the victimisationof Muslims around the world. The formerleader of the MCB, Sir Iqbal Sacranie, also


134. See Progressive British

Muslims web page:

http://www.pbm.org.uk/ (last

accessed, 09.01.07)

135. ‘Muslims launch new organi-

sation to challenge perceptions’

Asians in the Media. 12th June

2006. http://www.asiansin-

media.org/news/article.php/cur-

rent_affairs/1354 (last accessed

09.01.07)

136. KING, O. (2006) Criticism

for new Muslim organisation. The

Guardian. July 19th 2006

137. HUNDAL, S. (2006) This

system of self-appointed commu-

nity leaders can hurt those it

should be protecting. 20th

November 2006

provoked ire by saying in a radio interviewthat homosexuality was ‘unacceptable’ andthat same-sex civil partnerships were ‘harm-ful’. The MCB was also the subject of aPanorama documentary in August 2005,which suggested that the organisation wasdominated by ideologues with extremistviews. The sometimes strident and con-tentious comments expressed by the MCBhave caused concern that the diversity ofMuslim opinion is not being heard.Although the MCB has stated that it onlyrepresents its affiliate organisations anddenies ever having claimed to represent allMuslims, there is considerable annoyanceamongst many that it is used as a proxy bythe authorities for Muslim opinion.

More generally, there is a feeling that‘community leaders’ are unable to relate tothe feelings, aspirations and needs ofyounger Muslims living in Britain. Theattempt to represent Muslim opinion as ifit were all the same ignores the divisionsand disagreements amongst Muslims, par-ticularly between generations. As we havedescribed in this report, the Muslim iden-tity may be stronger, but it is also diverse.The tendency to consult with the ‘Muslimcommunity’ ends up ignoring many differ-ences of opinion on a range of political andreligious issues.

Feeling under�representedOne of the most striking findings of theresearch was how respondents did not feelrepresented by current representativeMuslim bodies.

Only 6% named the MCB as an organ-isation that represents their views (Fig 20).There is a feeling, particularly amongstyounger people, that the MCB is dominat-ed by older men, with insufficient repre-sentation of young people or women ontheir board. For many, this makes theMCB seem like an irrelevant institutionand not suited to representing the views ofthe wider British Muslim population.

“…many of the leaders of such organisations are

part of the first or second generation and probably

represent those groups better, but the youth of

today are third or fourth generation and there

seems to be a large gap of thought in between the

two.” Female, Muslim, 24, Manchester

“Who elected them? Who put them there? I don’t

know, I don’t even know who they are.” Male,

Muslim, 24, London

As we have described in the previous sec-tions, there is a growing generational gapover how Muslims relate to their religion.Younger Muslims see the establishedmosque structures and institutions set upby their parents’ generation as out of touchwith their needs, either because they aretoo religiously oriented or because they arenot religiously oriented enough. At oneend of the spectrum, there is concern thatthe MCB is too close to the Governmentand lacks independence or a “radical edge”to criticise its policies. These Muslims pri-oritise religious concerns and want a groupthat will campaign more effectively for theummah. At the other end, there is concernthat the MCB is too extreme and religious-ly-oriented, meaning that it alienates ordi-nary Muslims who care less about faith-issues and more about issues like tax,employment and education. These


80

Muslim Council of Britain

Muslim Association of Britain

The mosque that you attend

Islamic Society of Britain

Other

None

Don't know/Refused

6% 1% 1%1%

14%

51%

26%

Figure 20: Many organisations seek to represent aMuslim viewpoint on issues. Please name one or twoorganisations that you think of as best representingyour views as a Muslim, or if there is no organisationthat really reflects your views please say so.

Muslims have secular concerns and there-fore want their representative groups tofocus on more “bread and butter” issues.Both camps express the contradictions ofMuslim identity today. It would be impos-sible for the MCB or any other representa-tive group to represent Muslim opinion asit if it was held together by a consensus.

New Muslim organisations seeking torepresent the ‘moderate majority’ cantherefore play an important role in high-lighting the diverse opinions of Muslimsand challenging lazy stereotypes. However,it is important not to make the same mis-takes again, and to assume that becauseMuslims are not sufficiently represented byexisting community leaders, what theyneed is simply more and better communi-ty leaders. The problem is the notion of the‘community leader’ itself, and the idea thatyou can work out what Muslims think byconsulting certain prominent individuals.With the exception of perhaps a few verynarrow religious issues, Muslim opinionson politics, the economy, law, culture, theenvironment, and so on will be as diverseas those of the wider population.

“…it means that Muslims are all lumped togeth-

er and treated as if they have one voice. That’s

simply not true.” Female, Muslim, 22, Leeds

While there is a clear attachment to theummah, most Muslims feel uncomfortableabout generalizing about Muslims as agroup in Britain (Fig 21).

Confusingly, although Muslims fre-quently say that they want more engage-ment and consultation with their commu-nity, at the same time, they are also wary ofany attempt to represent “Muslim opin-ion”.

In this sense, we need to draw a distinc-tion between community engagement andpolitical engagement. Community engage-ment starts from the premise that peoplewho belong to a cultural or religious com-munity share the same political opinions

and interests, and are therefore best repre-sented by people from that community.Political engagement starts from the prem-ise that people’s political opinions andinterests are not tied to a cultural or reli-gious identity (although there may well besome overlap), and that they should berepresented by people who share the sameviews as them, regardless of their culturalor religious background. Therefore, there isno reason why an Asian woman MP can-not be just as good at representing herwhite constituents as any white MP. Peoplevote for ideas and beliefs, not skin colouror ethnicity. Similarly, Muslim voters canbe just as disillusioned with the policiesand ideas of a Muslim politician, even if heshares their religion. The process of politi-cal engagement should allow people totranscend the cultural or ethnic back-ground they inherit and think for them-selves about which political ideas and poli-cies are relevant to them. If Governmentengages with ‘community leaders’ becausethey have the right religious or culturalidentity, it ends up denying this very realfreedom that all citizens should have.

One of the dangers of communityengagement is the way it breeds cynicismabout the Government’s failure to engagewith Muslims directly. Many feel that theGovernment is using its financial andpolitical clout to ‘buy off ’ Muslim groups


Who speaks to Muslims?

74%

19%

7%

Agree

Disagree

Don't know/Refused

Figure 21: “Many people think the Muslim communityall believes the same thing. But there is more diversi-ty and disagreement than they realise”

and quieten dissent. At the same time,there is a feeling that the attempt to engagewith Muslims is a sign of weakness and adesire to appease critical voices rather thanchallenge them. On both counts, the strat-egy of engagement with Muslims is viewedas a cynical gesture.

“I think things like the ‘roadshow’ were gimmicks.

When you have a government-sponsored road-

show it has probably been organised by some third

rate civil servant from Manchester. Tony Blair set

up these Muslim NGO’s like the MCB just so he

could have an official representative body. They

are trying to bring Islam into the fold. But the

fact that Tony Blair had to do that is pathetic”.


Ironically, talking to Muslim groups is seenas a ploy by Government to avoid reallydealing with Muslim concerns. This showsthe irony of identity politics. Because com-munity groups are ultimately unrepresen-tative, people are cynical about why theGovernment engages with them in the firstplace. More and better community groupswill fall into the same trap, as long as theyare used as a substitute for real politicalengagement with Muslims as citizens.

The paradox of ‘listening’

“I have forsaken everything for what I believe in.

Your democratically elected governments continue

to perpetuate atrocities against my people all over

the world.”

So spoke Mohammad Sidique Khan, thethirty-year old ringleader of the Londonbombings, in a video message he recordedbefore his death. Responsible for the deathsof fifty-six people and the injury of hun-dreds more, the audacity of Khan’s home-made video diary is breathtaking. What wesee in his video is not a soldier at war, but aself-righteous young man who believed thathis own moral certainty absolved him of the

need to explain himself properly. Nobodyelected Khan. As far as we know, he did nothave relations with anyone in Palestine,Bosnia or Chechnya. Indeed, he did noteven bother to ask his family, friends orneighbours what they thought. At the localmosque near where three of the bombersgrew up, one of the committee members,Muhboob Hussein, reacted with anger to7/7: “This is not Islam, this is not jihad,these people are not Muslim. This man[Khan] never came to our mosque....”.138 Asone Muslim respondent told us:

“I thought that they were just selfish and just

scum.” Male, Muslim, 23, London

Khan’s claim to represent all Muslims wasa truly bizarre one. He had not shownmuch interest in trying to win people overto their worldview, he thought that “dem-ocratically elected governments” had lessclaim to act on behalf of people than hedid. In a strange way, one could argue thatKhan had taken the same liberties to speakon behalf of the Muslim community asother Muslim community leaders havedone since the 1980s. With impeccablelogic, Khan deduced that anyone whoshouts loud enough and claims to speak onbehalf of a community can win the ear ofgovernment.

Instead of challenging Khan’s pomposi-ty, many commentators have instead urgedthe Government to see Khan as a voice ofthe angry Muslim world, or to at leastrecognise the legitimacy of his demands.Of course, we would never apply this logicto right wing terrorists. Nobody listened tothe revolting ideas of David Copeland, theneo-Nazi London “nail-bomber” who rana violent campaign against black, Asianand gay communities in 1999. Nobodyseriously believes that a far-right group likethe Ku Klux Klan represents the views ofthe Christian majority in the USA. Even arespectable figure like the Archbishop ofCanterbury, who has a legitimate claim to


82

138. AKBAR, A. (2005)

Community haunted by a neigh-

bour it tried hard to forget. The

Independent. 3rd September

2005

speak on behalf of the Church of Englandcongregation, is not expected to deliver thepolitical views of the 37.3m people whostated their religion as “Christian” on the2001 census. Yet, when it comes toMuslims, by listening to the extreme viewsof the minority, we have ignored thediverse views of the majority.

No wonder Muslims feel that nobody islistening to them. In fact, all along, wehave been listening to them in the wrongway. The more we ‘listen’ to Muslims as adistinct community, the more we turnthem into alien creatures whom we strug-gle to understand. Listening to terrorists’demands might appease a handful of indi-viduals, but in the long-term, it will rein-force the alienation of Muslims who feelthey have been exploited to fight some-body else’s war.

“These bombers had as much in common with me

as they did with other British people, or other reli-

gious people, i.e. not much. I hated them for

claiming to represent Islam, you just can’t do that.

We didn’t choose them and the responses to their

actions will be mixed because Muslims are a

mixed group. The sooner people start understand-

ing that, the better!” Female, Muslim, 22, Leeds

“On TV generally… you see Al Mujahiroun. A

couple of individuals from that have been invited

onto the show, and nobody in the Muslim com-

munity gives them the time of day. We’re looking

at membership numbers of ten or twenty people.

They’re brought onto TV and broadcast as signif-

icant elements within the Muslim community….

it sends out completely the wrong message to non-

Muslims who are watching it, who must think ‘oh

my gosh these people are recruiting a Muslim com-

munity, this is what a significant minority

Muslim community thinks’.” Male, Muslim, 22,

London

Having been represented – and misrepre-sented – by community leaders, extremistsand policy-makers, many Muslims havebecome cynical about whether anyone real-ly cares about what they think. This prob-lem cannot be resolved overnight by moreconsultation exercises and focus groups.Instead, there needs to be a serious effort tore-engage with Muslims through their iden-tity as citizens. In the longer-term, this alsomeans reviving the broader political cultureto engage with other minority groups too.An important aspect of this will be the free-dom to say uncomfortable things andexpress challenging views.

More generally, it is important toremind ourselves that it is not onlyMuslims who feel disengaged from poli-tics. The constant focus on listening toyoung Muslims can make politicians forgetthat there is a wider population out therethat is feeling disengaged too. Young peo-ple generally are less likely to vote, andmany regard the political process as irrele-vant to their lives.

“I know the name of my MP, but that’s about the

biggest impact he has on my life.” Female, non-

religious, 21, London

“I tend to agree with the view that very little can

be done in regards to influencing long term policy

and I think it works the other way round as well.

I don’t personally see the direct hand of the gov-

ernment in my everyday life.” Male, Muslim, 22,

London

When the Government consults withMuslims, the answers it hears are probablynot so different to people their age.Engaging with them on the basis of theirreligious identity will not overcome thisbigger problem.


Who speaks to Muslims?

Part 3

8Reflections on policy

Changing attitudes to religionDespite the claims of extremists, mostMuslims do feel a sense of belonging toBritain and live comfortably with others insociety. The majority want to send theirchildren to mixed state schools, and feel asmuch, if not more, in common with non-Muslims in Britain as with Muslimsabroad. They reject the implementation ofsharia and agree that immigrants shouldlearn English. There are also signs thatmany Muslims are becoming secularisedand wish to modify their religious views toadapt to the mainstream culture.

However, our research also shows a def-inite shift amongst some younger Muslims,who are much more likely to identify withtheir religious community and be assertiveabout expressing their cultural differencein public. A growing number express sup-port for faith schools and say they wouldprefer to live under sharia law. Some havebecome involved in Islamist politics and atiny minority say they admire groups likeAl-Qaeda. While many religious Muslimssay they would like to see a reform ofsharia, there is evidence to suggest that cul-tural attitudes more generally have becomestricter in some regards, especially on therole of women, homosexuality and conver-sion to other religions.

Of course, young people have alwaysrebelled against the norm. The turntowards religiosity for young Muslimstoday might be seen as a kick against themainstream, almost in the way that icono-clastic punk culture appealed to bored sub-urban teenagers in the 1970s. Ironically,the retreat to a socially conservative

lifestyle could be the height of adolescentrevolt. But it must also be rememberedthat in the research we conducted, thedegree of religiosity also remained relative-ly high for people aged between 24-34.Therefore, rising religiosity is not just ateenage phenomenon, and something peo-ple are just going to “grow out of”. It rep-resents a very definite shift in attitudes toidentity and religion.

One thing is clear; Muslim parents arejust as bewildered by this development aseveryone else. Their children are pursuingreligion with a fervour that is unrecognis-able to them. Many of the older generationwould have practised their religion as anaspect of belonging to their local commu-nity. Their religion was one factor in beingpart of a network of people with sharedexperiences and memories of “back home”.Religion was a kind of social glue. For theirchildren, however, religion takes on moreindividually oriented, spiritual and politi-cal dimension. It is not just something youdo routinely, as part of an established com-munal tradition. It is the backbone of astrong personal identity. Many parents willno doubt be relieved that their sons anddaughters want to be good Muslims butothers may worry about how they will fitinto the mainstream if they choose to wearstrict religious clothing and spend all theirtime reading the Qu’ran. Like most par-ents, they have very little say over the kindsof religious or political views their childrenare drawn to.

The turn to religion needs to be under-stood in relation to a broader search formeaning and identity which exists


throughout British life. Young people areturning to religion by themselves as oneway to make sense of the world and iden-tify with a community of belonging. Manyyoung Muslims have turned to religion inthe hope that it will offer a narrative totheir lives and a connection with some-thing beyond themselves. They may returnto the theological texts in order to workout how to live the good life. Others maysee it as a badge of identity that marksthem out to others. They might identifywith other Muslims but not necessarily bemuch more religious. In this sense, Muslimidentity is also politicised, and a statementof belonging. It can express a feeling ofdetachment from the mainstream, not justa positive identification with a set of reli-gious values.

The precise relation each person has totheir religion is unique and it would be amistake to over-generalise. In the largemajority of cases, the turn to religion is apeaceful one that is managed while livingin mainstream society; holding a job,raising a family, meeting non-Muslimfriends and supporting the national foot-ball team. In some cases, the individualswe interviewed are wrestling with thisdivision within themselves; between theirreligious identity and the seduction ofmainstream culture. There is certainlyrecognition amongst Muslims that theyare a more diverse population than othersrealise.

Equality and identityMulticulturalists have long argued that lib-eral policies are ‘difference-blind’ and thatthis disadvantages minority groups because

it forces them to hide a key aspect of theiridentity. If people are encouraged to assim-ilate into Britain, they are being ‘oppressed’and made to feel culturally excluded.

In fact, it is the multicultural approachthat pigeon-holes people and pressuresthem to keep separate from the main-stream. The balkanisation of communitiesthrough diversity funding and schemes hashelped erode a sense of commonality.While today’s generation of young adultshas grown up in British society and is fullyimmersed in its culture, it has also beentaught that its identity is different to themainstream. Some Muslims do not feelthey have a stake in British society.

We advocate an egalitarian liberalapproach in policy-making. People should beentitled to equal treatment as citizens in thepublic sphere, with the freedom to also enjoyand pursue their identities in the privatesphere. This approach is not inimical to dif-ference; rather it ensures the freedom of peo-ple to preserve and cherish the aspects of theirculture as they choose, without coercion bythe state.139 Nobody, except perhaps the BNP,truly aspires to an unchanging British mono-culture where we all look and sound thesame. Cultural differences, left alone by thestate, should be allowed to flourish andenrich our society. Immigrants, like everyoneelse, should be able to speak different lan-guages in their home, practice their religionand eat whatever food they like.

At the same time, it is perfectly reason-able to expect people from immigrantcommunities to acculturate to certain basiccultural and legal norms, such as learningthe English language, sending their chil-dren to school, and complying with thelaw. If an employer believes that the wear-ing of the niqab will hinder the properteaching of children, then they should beallowed to enforce clothing restrictions, aslong as they are applied equally to all. Thegood news is that immigrants to Britainhave been more than willing to do acceptthese conditions, as long as multicultural


88

139. BARRY, B. (2001) Culture

and Equality, Cambridge &

Oxford, Polity Press in associa-

tion with Blackwell Publishers Ltd

“ Cultural differences, left alone by the state, should be

allowed to flourish and enrich our society”

policies do not hinder that process. Manyof them have adjusted their clothing, reli-gious habits and traditions to fit in withthe wider culture. Where possible, Britishsociety has been reasonably successful ataccommodating pragmatically to differentcultural needs and has accepted differencesin a fairly relaxed way.

Is asking an immigrant to acculturate aform of oppression? Not at all. Identity isnot a zero-sum game, where assimilatinginto one culture means abandoning everyvestige of one’s cultural or ethnic back-ground. Rather, humans have a uniquecapacity to add to their stock of rich cul-tural experiences by learning new lan-guages and changing their values. To sug-gest otherwise is to have a highly racialisedview of people, as if they are entirely deter-mined by their ethnic or cultural origin.Having the freedom to pursue one’s culturealso means the possibility of changing it,and developing without restraints posed bycommunity or religious leaders. Muslimsare a particularly good example of a groupthat is not homogenous and therefore, itsmembers should be free to practice andbelieve as they choose without stereotypingby the authorities.

An integral aspect of this liberal model isthe right to cause offence and criticise otherpeople’s cultures. Today, with increased sen-sitivities about Islamophobia, manyMuslims feel entitled to have their religiousviews and identity protected. Their attitudestowards women, homosexuality, or politicsare seen to be so inalienable that they areout of bounds for criticism. But treatingpeople equally as citizens does not mean weshould treat all cultures equally. It is precise-ly because we believe that all humans havethe capacity for reason and to question theirown cultures that we are able to criticiseother value systems. People can change theirculture consciously if they dislike aspects ofit, and healthy disagreement is a necessarypart of this. If we respect all cultures equal-ly, we are in fact, closing down our engage-

ment with minority groups. We end uptreating them as a race apart, incapable ofsharing similar views about issues of religionand politics, because “that’s their culture”.

Here is the double bind of identity pol-itics. On the one hand, Muslims areencouraged to expect to be treated differ-ently and have their culture respected. Yet,the more they are treated differently, themore they feel set apart from the main-stream. The increased attention to theirdifference makes Muslims more consciousof being ‘outsiders’ and makes them feelvulnerable. In order to feel even moreincluded, they demand even more recogni-tion and respect, which in turn increasedtheir feeling of being different. It is avicious circle. Their aspiration to be part ofthe mainstream is undermined when theydemand the right to be different.

Just as we should not stereotype Muslimsas vulnerable victims in need of special treat-ment, we should also challenge lazy stereo-types and sensationalist headlines which sug-gest that British Muslims per se are a threat to“our way of life”. The intense media scrutinyinevitably makes some Muslims feel like out-siders, rather than as members of the samesociety as everyone else.

Some British multiculturalists have triedto affirm the validity of their approach bypointing to the failures of the Frenchmodel and the riots in 2006 in the suburbsof Paris, in which large numbers of immi-grant youths took violently to the streets.They argued that France’s denial of differ-ence in the public space had bred resent-ment. Certainly, the liberal model can onlywork if there is a genuine commitment topolitical and material equality – somethingthat France has been widely criticised forlacking. Nevertheless, the ideal still offerssome hope. The Pew Center study onMuslim and non-Muslim attitudes world-wide found that despite the disturbances:

“In France, the scene of recent riots in heavily

Muslim areas, large percentages of both the gener-


Reflrections on policy

al public and the Muslim minority population

feel there is no conflict in being a devout Muslim

and living in a modern society”.

If we can learn a lesson from France, it isnot that we should elevate differences butthat we should prioritise the importance ofpolitical equality and ensure a commit-ment to improving living standards for all.

A sense of ‘us’Perhaps the most difficult fact to confrontafter the London bombings was that theseBritish-born terrorists had been willing toinflict suffering on people of their owncountry. They sensed no connection to orfelt no common cause with other Britishpeople. Instead, they considered them-selves to be soldiers, fighting for a fantasy,global community of Muslims.

One of the drivers behind the growth ofIslamism is a desire to find belonging in awider community. Young people, chargedwith energy and idealism, will always seekout a connection to a cause worth fightingfor. But as society has become more frag-mented, and older collective identitieshave weakened, the positive impulse tobelong has been forced into narrower andmore atomised types of political struggle.In a different period, these individuals mayhave gone to war for their country, ormarched on political demonstrationsagainst their government, or even becomepoliticians, but today – with no sense ofconnection to a real, living community –some of them are seeking out abstractcommunities to die for.

The inability to feel a connection withother people is a damning indictment ofthe multicultural approach in Britain. Forover twenty years, successive governmentshave uncritically followed the intellectualfashion that emerged in the late 70s andearly 80s. They have pushed an agendawhich has effectively undermined the pos-sibility of shared communal experience.

Stressing difference has pushed some peo-ple apart to the degree that they feel noempathy for the suffering of others who are‘not their own’. In the name of multicul-turalism, immigrants have been taughtthat belonging to Britain is something tobe ashamed of, and that, as ‘outsiders’, theyhave a special, superior status as a result ofbeing untainted. Instead of helping immi-grants to learn English and acculturate tothe mainstream, the multiculturalapproach has aimed to preserve distinctethnic identities and groups. Of course, inmany cases this was part of a genuine andadmirable attempt to make migrants feelwelcome. But the institutionalisation ofdifference over the common good has cre-ated tense lines of separation betweengroups. This was one of the main factorsbehind the inter-ethnic rioting in Lozellsin Birmingham in 2005.

To address this sense of disconnection,numerous politicians have called for newpolicies to promote ‘Britishness’. In recentyears, the Government has initiated formalcitizenship ceremonies and a citizenshiptest for new migrants. Think tanks havecalled for a ‘rebranding’ of British symbols,suggesting new faces on banknotes or anew design for the British flag. GordonBrown has taken the lead in arguing forBritishness. Speaking to the left-wingFabian Society in January 2006, he madethe rather curious suggestion thatRemembrance Sunday should be renamed‘British Day’, in order to celebrate Britishhistory, achievements and culture.

The attempt to renew our sense ofshared values may be well intentioned, butpromoting Britishness like this ends uptreating an organic identity as if it weresimply a public relations invention or amarketing ploy. You cannot re-name sig-nificant days in the calendar according tothe whims of the latest focus group.Symbols of national identity are meaning-ful precisely because they relate to veryreal, common experiences that have


90

brought people together historically. Thefeelings of national pride aroused byRemembrance Sunday or working classunity on May Day come from sharedmemories based on a sense of solidarity;not simply a photo opportunity for theGovernment.

The British nation state has a solid basisin reality, not just the imagination.Throughout its history, the nation coheredpeople together and was seen by many asthe best way to improve their circum-stances. Of course, there have always beenlimits to the way in which any state canrealise the aspirations of its citizens, andpolitical life has been divided. But histori-cally speaking, the nation has been thepolity through which people have foughtto realise their ideals. People may have dis-agreed passionately on these ideals, but thearguments have been fierce preciselybecause they have been about shaping thedirection of a common society. People seekto persuade others and win them overwhen they believe they belong to the sameproject. A sense of belonging to a countrydoes not preclude a strong commitment touniversal humanity, or solidarity with peo-ple abroad. Indeed, it has been the firststep in transcending immediate local inter-ests and participating in a polity whichpeople feel they can influence and shape.

Very few people would argue today thatBritishness is defined by ethnicity. Thedevelopment of Britain out of the oldkingdoms of the British Isles involved thegradual absorption of diverse peoples.Britain has been adept at absorbing andadding to its national identity through thearrival of ethnic, religious and cultural dif-ferences from within its different regions.Hugenots and Jews added to the mix andthis is just as true of immigrants from theold colonies. In the 1960s new arrivalsfrom the Indian sub-continent and theWest Indies faced serious racism and far-right extremists tried to raise the UnionJack as a symbol of exclusion. But these

immigrants also saw Britain as a place thatcould provide wealth, education andopportunity for their children. Many ofthem worked in the post-war welfare stateand felt pride in the liberties and achieve-ments of their new home. Some joinedanti-racism groups that cut across ethnici-ty and fought to improve the way theirlocal communities were treated by theauthorities. Crucial to this sense of thecommon good was the institutions of civilsociety: trades unions, political move-ments, and voluntary organisations, whichbrought people together on a regular basisand bred feelings of mutual interdepend-ence.

It would be fair to say that post-warBritain, battered by the Second World Warbut proud of its role in defeating fascism,was a place with a very secure sense ofnational identity, with deep historical,institutional and cultural roots. Yet overtime, and particularly since the 1990s, aprocess of weakening national and politicalidentities – on both the political left andright – has led to a vacuum in which a nar-rower brand of identity politics has flour-ished.

Ironically, one of the saddest aspects ofthe war against British identity that hasbeen waged in recent decades has been thebewilderment of many immigrants them-selves. Far from viewing Britain as bad orfatally compromised, many of them wereproud to have been accepted by a nationregarded as one of the most civilized in theworld and grateful for the opportunitiesthat living in the UK provided. Whatcould be more dispiriting than to gain aprize only to be told it was worthless?



“ One of the saddest aspects of the war against British

identity that has been waged in recent decades has been

the bewilderment of many immigrants themselves”

However unpopular individual govern-ments or their policies may be the fact isthat most Brits, native and immigrantalike, retain an uncomplicated andundemonstrative loyalty to Britain, despitethe apparent efforts of many of those incharge to persuade them that it is entirelypassé.

How can we begin to revive our sense ofcollectivity? First, rather than trying topromote Britishness in an artificial way, wewould do better to relax a bit more andallow people to express their identities bythemselves. People should feel able toexpress affection for their country, theirregion, or the town in which they live –flying their flag or supporting their foot-ball team – without accusations of racism.Just as importantly, they should also be freeto march against governments and organ-ise together in political protest. We shouldargue, debate and disagree over the idealswe should live by, and seek to persuadeothers to join us.

Another task is to challenge the longmarch of anti-Britishness through institu-tional and cultural life. Numerous criticshave pointed out that history lessons, forinstance, are taught in a one-sided,moralised way, focusing attention on theracism and violence of the Empire, and theoppression of ethnic minority groups andwomen, but with little sense of the positivecontributions of the industrial revolutionand the Empire, the emergence of parlia-mentary democracy, the literary and cul-tural heritage of the language.

The constant focus on the negative isnot motivated by a genuine desire to showthe complexity of the historical past, butrather to remind us of the inherent racismof British society and to supposedly makeethnic minorities feel welcome. Britishnesshas become a stick to beat people with,rather than something to be proud of. Thisis all the more ironic, when we considerhow many Asians and Blacks were flyingthe England flag at the last World Cup.

The sense of self-loathing is much strongerat the top than at the bottom. But anti-Britishness has not fostered a more hos-pitable atmosphere or tolerance towardsdifferent groups, it has simply demoralisedour view of the past. A society that feelsweighed down by shame cannot confident-ly face its future. The anti-Britishnessagenda has also bolstered the confidence ofaggressive Islamists who see a society that isashamed to defend its ideals.

By bringing to an end the institutionalattacks on Britain and its culture – thecounterproductive cancellation ofChristmas festivities, the neurotic bans ondisplays of national symbols, the facilerebranding of everything from Londonbuses to BA tailfins, the relentless rewritingof British history in schools – we can beginto recover the habit of solidarity that cur-rently only appears at moments of gravecrisis. 7/7 was a black day but the silverlining was provided by the inspiring waythat ordinary people from all kinds ofbackgrounds helped each other, calmly,bravely and without rancour. That senseof “us” is surely something worth fightingfor.

Of course, the tide of anti-Britishness isjust one symptom of wider self-loathing inwestern societies. The ‘West’ has become adirty word, and it is fashionable to inter-pret all its achievements as nothing morethan racist, imperialist oppression. But the‘West’ is worthy of our support because itis more than a geographical space, it is a setof ideas associated with the Enlightenment– a period of intellectual inquiry thatenriched our understanding of humanityand enshrined the principles of liberty,human reason and social progress.

As critics point out, human progress isnot inevitable and the West has often failedto live up to these ideals, as evidenced bythe modern history of warfare, genocide,and slavery. But overall, it has achievedmuch – improved living standards throughscientific and technological advance, polit-


92

ical rights and freedoms, the enhancementand spread of knowledge. What is more,these ideas may have originated in Europeand America, but their universal appeal hasmeant they have spread further afield.Non-western countries and political move-ments have borrowed ideas which westernintellectuals today deride. When someyoung Muslims bemoan the lack of valuesin the West, they express our own failure asa society to defend these ideals and asserttheir relevance for the current age.

The final step is to recognise that the‘common values’ that might bring ustogether are still up for debate. We do havebasic tenets of fairness, individual liberty,democracy, tolerance, justice and the ruleof law, but beyond that, there is no ready-made political consensus. The rise ofIslamic fundamentalism is a reflection of abroader crisis of political identity, not justcultural identity, and this affects all mem-bers of society, not just Muslims. Weshould be concerned about what sort ofsociety we want people to belong to andwhat ideas we want to sign up to. Youngpeople – not only Muslims – are askingquestions that concern us all. What is themeaning of freedom today? What shouldbe the role of the state? What is the pur-pose of education and how should weimpart knowledge to the next generation?How should we approach scientificendeavour and consider new technologies?Unlike simple requirements like learningEnglish, or acquiring a passport, theanswers to these questions require publiclyengaged debate and discussion.

A vital ingredient of this public discus-sion is the confidence to say the unthink-able and argue passionately over ideas,even if at times this causes offence. Inrecent years, authorities have used legisla-tion to ‘protect’ the feelings of designatedvulnerable groups. But this kind of saniti-sation of debate prevents people from dis-cussing things openly, for fear of saying thewrong thing. It can actually close down

debate and foster a climate of indifferencebetween different groups. In the case ofMuslims, the support for diversity hasclosed down much needed discussionwithin communities about cultural valuesand practices.

Who is qualified to challenge the extremists? When it comes to tackling radical Islamand winning the so-called ‘battle for heartsand minds’, it is agreed by many that reli-gion must be part of the solution.140

Encouraging Muslims to discuss their reli-gion and challenge extremist interpreta-tions is no doubt a worthwhile task. Thereare numerous scholars and organisationstrying hard to fight extremist ideas andpresent a more sophisticated interpretationof their religion to the younger generation.Such individuals and organisations canalso assist public authorities in thinkingabout who they give money to and theideas they espouse.

But why leave the political task of chal-lenging extremist ideas to Muslims? Surelycombating the political challenge ofIslamism is something non-Muslims canalso contribute to? The assumption is thatonly Muslims can fully relate to each other,and that those at risk need to be engagedwith through ‘their’ culture. This essential-ist notion leaves Muslims isolated as agroup and consigned to an intellectual andcultural ghetto. Even worse, it sends thesignal that non-Muslim, ‘Western’ ideasare not really for them. Of course, onecould probably find some useful rebuttalsto Islamism within Muslim scholarship,



140. In 2006, a report from a

conference organised in partner-

ship between Wilton Park and

Demos, stated, “Whilst there is

no consensus about the nature

of the links between religion and

extremism there is agreement

that religion is an important part

of the solution”. The report then

goes on to say, “Youth workers,

especially Muslim youth workers,

can play a particularly important

role, engaging with youngsters

about their ‘Muslimness’, chal-

lenging them to think about

Islam, and dealing with more

practice economic and social

issues…” WILTON PARK (2006)

Report on Wilton Park

Conference WPSO6/5 Towards a

Community Based Approach to

Counter-Terrorism. p.10

“ The assumption is that only Muslims can fully relate to

each other, and that those at risk need to be engaged

with through ‘their’ culture”

but there is no need to stop there. Insteadof organising a Muslim scholars roadshow,we should widen our ambitions and recruitscholars from other political and intellec-tual traditions, to debate values, ethics andpolitical ideas. Whether this might reducethe terrorist threat is almost a side issue, assuch a project would have merit in itself.

The refusal to challenge Islamism withnon-Islamic ideas betrays a lack of confi-dence about our ability to win the argu-ment rationally. It is almost as if we havegiven up trying to tell young people whatis wrong with Islamism, and we are insteadtrying to convince them that such ideas aresimply ‘un-Islamic’.

But it is crucial that all younger people– Muslim and non-Muslim – are taughtthat ideas do not belong to any single cul-tural or ethnic group, and therefore can beshared and argued about by others. This iswhat universalism means – that humanknowledge is not confined to cultural orethnic groups and we can share and learnmore widely from others. Through our rea-son, we are able to understand differentlanguages and ideas and consider them ontheir own merit, rather than by how cul-turally authentic they are. We should havegreater confidence in teaching youngerMuslims about a range of unfamiliar val-ues, political traditions and ideas – J SMill, as well as the Qu’ran.

Some have argued that teaching a ‘truer’version of Islam (whatever that mightmean) to younger people will give them asense of belonging and turn them awayfrom radicalisation. This might well betrue, but what might be the other conse-quences of this approach? If we constantly

stress religion in our engagement withyoung people and constantly talk to themthrough the prism of ‘their values’ or ‘theirtraditions’, we only reinforce their sense ofdifference even more. They are likely tothink of themselves as part of a group thathas special needs and concerns apart fromwider society. True, they may not becometerrorists, but they may not feel particular-ly British either.

Conclusion This report has tried to offer some explana-tions for the rise of Islamic fundamental-ism, but it has not presented a straightfor-ward solution to ‘the problem of terror-ism’. This is not because there are not spe-cific things the Government can do toreduce the potential terrorist threat – thereare very many measures that will improvethe security services, such as enhancedintelligence gathering and limiting theroom for extremists to manoeuvre in theUK. However, there is no quick-fix policythat one can implement tomorrow thatwill deal with the broader cultural factorsthat this report has tried to explore. Wemay be able to dismantle some existingpolicies and soften the edges of failingstrategies, but many of the cultural trendswe have identified need to be challengedthrough intellectual debate and persuasion.In short, one cannot throw money or ‘task-forces’ at what is, in part, a political andcultural problem. The findings of theopinion survey in this report confirm thata growing number of young Muslims arebecoming radicalised and are growingapart from the mainstream. Reversing thisprocess will take time to overcome.

Islamist terrorism is a threat to nation-al security, but it also represents a set ofideas and attitudes that we need to con-front. As we have tried to argue, theseideas are not entirely alien to us but insome respects have grown up in our veryown culture. When Islamists express


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“ There is no quick�fix policy that one can implement

tomorrow that will deal with the broader cultural factors

that this report has tried to explore”

ambivalence to modernity, hostility tofreedom of speech, a heightened sense ofvictimisation, and a demand for culturalrecognition, they are speaking in a lan-guage that has already been established inadvanced, Western multicultural societiesand, in fact, present serious problems oftheir own. It is not Islamism that posesthe greatest threat to Western values orBritish identity but the mixture of self-loathing and confusion that reigns in oursociety more generally.

More importantly, we should guardagainst the logic that any policy is good aslong as it will reduce the terrorist threat.There are valid arguments for improvingthe living standards of disadvantaged

groups in the UK, or to change foreignpolicy in the Middle East, or to teach bet-ter values in school, but these should beargued for in their own terms, not becausethey will stop young Muslims from gettingangry. There are over 60 million people inBritain, and politics should be about them,not just a group of young men who wantto join the jihad. Some have described thewar in Iraq as “the elephant in the room”and argued that we should change foreignpolicy if we want to end terrorism. Notonly is this a simplistic analysis of why ter-rorism has emerged, but it is a patheticapproach to politics. A society that priori-tises its safety above all else will soon haveno values left to lose.



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Transcript of Living apart together. British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. Policy Exchange