The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 6 | Number 2 | Article ID 3035 | Jan 29, 2009

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Demography, Migration and Multiculturalism in South Korea

Andrew Eungi Kim

Demography , Migrat ion andMulticulturalism in South Korea

Andrew Eungi Kim

More than a million foreigners reportedlyreside in South Korea now, with unskilledmigrant workers account ing for amajority. Although the country’s reliance onimported foreign labor is likely to continueunabated, the country prides itself as anethnically homogenous society and insists onalmost zero-immigration policy. However,this paper shows that Korean society israpidly becoming a multicultural society andthis process is inevitable and irreversible. Insupport of this argument, the paper examinesvarious social factors that are contributing tothe making of a multiethnic Korea, includingthe continuing influx of migrant workers,rapid aging of the population, low fertilityrate, and shortage of brides. The paper alsoassesses the applicability of various theoriesand trends of migration to the Koreancontext. The Korean case suggests a need fora paradigm shi f t in understandingmulticulturalism. This is because thedominant perspectives and theories onmulticulturalism have been western-centric,based on western experience and focusing onrac i a l d i f f e rences and t ens i ons . Multiculturalism in Korea as well as in itsneighboring countries like China, Japan, andTaiwan is fundamentally different, as itinvolves people of s imilar physicalappearances and historical cultural bonds,

and it entails ethnic rather than racialdifferences.

Key Words

Korea, multiculturalism, migrantw o r k e r s , i m m i g r a n t b r i d e s ,intermarriage, and aging

Introduction

A report by the U.N. (2006) shows thatthe number of people who live and workoutside their countries of birth hasdoubled over the last 35 years to 191million in 2005 (see InternationalOrganization for Migration 2005). Thetotal represents about three per cent ofthe world’s population or one in every 35persons. About 6 out of 10 internationalmigrants live in high-income economies,including 22 prosperous developingcountr ies such as South Korea,Singapore, Taiwan, Bahrain, SaudiArabia, Kuwait and Qatar (United Nations2006, p. 12). Other findings by thereport include the following: around 75per cent of international migrants lived injust 28 countries, with one in five livingin the United States; internationalmigrants comprise at least 20 per cent ofthe population in 41 countries; womencomprise nearly half of all internationalmigrants and they outnumber male

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migrants in developed countries; about athird of the 191 million internationalmigrants has moved from one developingcountry to another, while another thirdhas migrated from a developing countryto a developed country, indicating thatthe number of “South-to-South” migrantsapproximates that of “South-to-North”migrants (United Nations 2006, p. 12).

As i n o ther par t s o f the wor ld ,international migration in Asia is animportant social issue. Most countries inthe region are affected by temporarylabor migration as either labor-exportingor labor-importing countries. Only ahandful of Asian countries or territories,the richest ones, have a net import oflabor. These are Japan, South Korea,Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, andMalaysia. Since the 1980s Japan has beenimporting foreign workers to meet thedemand for cheap labor from small- tomid-sized firms. The country now hasabout two million registered foreigners(1.57 per cent of the population),including 600,000 Korean descendents ofcolonial immigrants,[1] and the issues ofcitizenship, nationhood, and nationalidentity have become important andcontroversial political issues (seeYamanaka 2000, 2004a and 2004b; Lie2000, 2001; Arudou and Higuchi 2008).

GDP of Asian countries (PPP) in globalperspective

South Korea (henceforth Korea) has beenimporting significant numbers of migrantworkers since the early 1990s. As of theend of 2007, registered foreigners totaled1,066,273, accounting for 2.2 per cent ofthe total population. The number offoreigners in Korea jumped 2.75 timessince 1997 from 386,972. If the currenttrend continues, the number of foreignersin Korea would reach 1.5 million in 2012,2.5 million in 2020, and 4.1 million by2050 or 9.2 per cent of the totalpopulation, which would be similar to theproportion of foreign-born residents inEngland (9.7 per cent) in 2005.

A large majority of foreigners in Koreahave entered the country with work visasand the number of foreigners with workvisas, as of May 2008, amounted to morethan 700,000. The 2008 total representsan annual increase of nearly 100,000 newarrivals since late 2004, when the figurewas 460,000. Most of those who enteredKorea with work visas, including morethan 200,000 overstaying migrantworkers, have been unskilled migrant

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workers.

The demand for foreign labor has largelycome about as better-educated andwealthier Koreans began to turn awayfrom certain occupation categories,especially the so-called 3-D (difficult,dirty, and dangerous) manual jobs,prompting the Korean government toutilize several labor-importing schemessince 1992 to both secure and controlforeign workers. The number offoreigners in Korea will increase furtheras the anticipated bride shortage bringsin more foreigners.

The presence of growing numbers ofunskilled migrant workers, along with asubstantial number of foreign brides andprofessional foreign workers, marks asignificant departure from the proverbialimage of Korea as an ethnical lyhomogenous society. Although foreignersconstituted only a little over one per centof the total population of 48 million as ofthe end of 2005, the country is on its wayto becoming a multiracial and multiethnicsociety. This paper examines the factorsthat will generate substantial inflow labormigrants and brides, notably rapid agingof the population and the resulting laborshortage, and son preferential practicesand shortage of brides. It also assessesthe applicability of existing migrationtheories to the Korean context andanalyzes international migration in Koreain light of general trends in globalmigration.

Unskilled Migration Workers: History ofLabor Importation Policies in Korea

Korea was a labor-exporting country fromthe early 1960s to the late 1980s.[2] Thousands of Korean workers emigratedannually in the 1960s and 1970s, notablyto Germany, when miners and nursesmade up the bulk of the outgoing migrantworkers. During the “construction boom”of the 1970s and early 1980s, tens ofthousands of Koreans were sent to theMiddle East to work as constructionworkers for Korean companies. In the1980s, more than 30,000 Koreansmigrated annually as laborers to othercountries. By 1993, the figure haddwindled to 18,000 (Ministry of Justice1982-1993).

Since the late 1980s, Korea changed froma labor-exporting nation to a labor-importing nation (Park 1994). Whenforeign migrant workers began arrivingin Korea in 1987, the shortage of manualworkers was estimated at 100,000,mainly in small- and medium-sizedmanufacturing firms (Kwon 2004, p. 1).Since the mid-1980s, Korea hasexperienced a deceleration in the growthof the domestic labor force as the rurallabor surplus was exhausted and theparticipation rate of youth (15-19 agegroup) in the labor force declinedsignificantly due to longer schooling. Thelabor shortage was also caused by thebooming construction industry, whichdrew Korean workers out of relativelylow-paying factory jobs into higher-paying construction work. Moreover,growing labor market segmentation sincethe early 1990s brought about unevenl a b o r s h o r t a g e s : l a r g e f i r m ssubcontracted some of their labor-

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intensive production lines to small firms(5-29 employees) to cope with growingnational and international competition,leading to an increase in the percentageof employees in small firms from 18.3 percent in 1980 to 27.6 per cent in1995. The labor shortages in Korea wereand are thus “more serious in smallerfirms than in larger firms, and inunskilled jobs than in highly skilled jobs”(Lee, H. 1997, p. 357). The laborshortage in manufacturing became veryserious in 1991 when unfilled productionjobs totaled 222,000.

Migrant workers in Korea organize

Perhaps more important than themigration transition and labor marketsegmentation in explaining laborimportation in Korea is a demand forcheap, unskilled labor to fill jobs shunnedby Koreans. In congruence with duallabor market theory, the demand forforeign labor in Korea came about asrelatively better-educated, more status-conscious, and wealthier Koreans beganto turn away from low-paying and lessprestigious manual jobs. To mitigate the

labor shortage in unskilled, manual jobs,since 1992 the Korean government hassought to bring in and control the inflowof unskilled migrant workers. [3] Thenumber of such workers entering Koreaincreased from 33,861 in 1994 to 49,345in 2000, and 106,688 in 2004. Koreaattracted workers from a dozen or soAsian countries, including China(predominantly ethnic Koreans), Vietnam,Indonesia, Bangladesh, and thePhilippines. Recently, however, unskilledmigrant workers have come from dozensof countries from throughout the world,including Russia, Pakistan, India,Uzbekistan, Brazil, and Nigeria. They areemployed in agriculture, fishery andservice industries as well as in 3D jobs inindustries including construction, metalwork, dyeing, auto-parts, tanning,textiles, furniture-manufacturing ando t h e r s m a l l - t o m e d i u m - s c a l emanufacturing industries (see Seol 1999,2000; Seol et al. 1999; Kim, W. 2004).

Four types of work permits regulate theinflux of foreign workers: ProfessionalWork Permit System (PWPS), IndustrialTraining System (ITS), EmploymentManagement System (EMS) for less-sk i l l ed overseas Koreans , andEmployment Permit System (EPS) forunskilled foreign workers. The workpermit system stipulates differentconditions and entitlements for skilledand less-skilled or unskilled workers. Skilled foreign workers are subject toless regulation than their less-skilledcounterparts. The Immigration Bureaudoes not limit the number of visas forskilled workers, while setting visa quotas

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for less-skilled foreign workers inspecified industrial sectors where theirlabor is needed.

The Industrial Training System (ITS) wasimplemented in January 1994. In theinaugural year, 31,830 Asian workersarrived. Since then, the number ofindustrial trainees fluctuated between25,000 and 52,000. The training programconsists of a one-year training and two-year work permit system: trainees areeligible to apply for a work permit aftercompletion of the training program. Ifthey are successful in obtaining a workpermit, they can work as regular workerswith the full range of labor rights. Fourmain sectors in which these traineeswork are manufacturing, construction,agricultural, and inland and coastalfisheries. However, the trainee programcreated many problems: trainees oftenbecame undocumented workers as theyran away from the trainee program forbetter pay elsewhere (trainees were paidbarely more than the minimum wage andwere often forced to work overtime withno overtime pay); there were manyreports of abuses as trainees were notprotected by the Labor Standard Law. The Industrial Training System wasdiscontinued in January 1, 2007.

The Employment Permit System (EPS) forless-skilled or unskilled foreign workerswas implemented on August 17, 2004 toultimately replace the problematicITS. Unlike the ITS, which was controlledand operated by business associations, allactivities of the EPS—registration ofpotential migrant workers, selection, pre-departure orientation, post-arrival

orientation, job placement, return andreintegration, and monitoring—arestrictly regulated by governmentagencies. The new system is aimed atproviding equal treatment to foreignworkers, including basic labor rights,employment insurance and legalminimum wages, while ensuring a stablesupply o f manpower for Koreanemployers. However, foreign workers arebanned from changing workplaces ontheir own and are allowed to work inKorea for a maximum of three years. Toestablish labor migration throughbilateral agreements between thesending and receiving countries, thegovernment entered a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU) with six Asiancountries—Thailand, Viet Nam, Mongolia,S r i L a n k a , I n d o n e s i a , a n d t h ePhilippines—from which about 25,000workers arrived in 2004. In 2006, threeother countries were added—Uzbekistan,Pakistan, and Cambodia—followed byMOU with China, Bangladesh, KyrgyzRepublic, Nepal, Myanmar and EastTimor in 2007. More than 100,000workers arrived from these countries in2007 alone. The Korean Ministry of Laborassigns annual quotas to all sendingcountries according to employerpreference, evaluation of sendingprocedures, and the number of illegalworkers. Consequently, sendingcountries compete for quotas, which isexpected to bring higher quality workersto Korea and guarantee fairness inr e c r u i t i n g i n t h e s e n d i n gcountries. Eligibility is restricted tomanufacturing companies with less than300 workers who can prove that they

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previously tried to employ Koreanworkers.

In addition, an Employment ManagementSystem (EMS) for overseas Koreans hasbeen implemented since December 2002for overseas Koreans who have foreignnationalities. To be eligible, they have tobe at least 30 years old and have arelative living in Korea (there are plans tobring down the age restriction to 25). Theoccupation categories for EMS areaccommodation and restaurant, cleaningservice, assistance with householdaffairs, and the like. EMS permit holderswere originally allowed to stay for up totwo years, but from August 2004permission was extended to three years.

Through these labor importationschemes, several hundred thousandforeign workers, skilled and unskilled,have been brought into Korea, usheringin the dawn of a multiethnic Korea.

Korea’s Aging Population and LaborShortage

Korea is one of the world’s most rapidlyaging societies and its fertility rate isfalling at a record pace to a level wellbelow the replacement rate of 2.1children per family. In 2000, Koreabecame an “aging society,” in which 7per cent of the population consists of theelderly (those 65 years or older). Ifcurrent population trends continue, thecountry will transition to an “agedsociety” in 2019, when 14 percent of thepopulation will be elderly. Korea willbecome a “superaged society” by 2026,when the elderly would make up 20 per

cent of the population.

Korea’s aging population

While economically advanced nationstook decades to transit from an agingsociety to an aged society, Korea will doso within a generation (roughly 19 years). It took France 115 years (1864-1979) tomake the transition, Sweden 85 years(1887-1972), and England 45 years(1930-1975) (see Table 1). Korea’s 19-year mark will break the world record of26 years set by Japan (1970-1996). Koreais expected to take just 7 years to passfrom an aged society to a super-agedsociety, again beating the Japaneserecord of 12 years. The United Nationsprojects Korea’s elderly population to riseto 24.1 per cent of the total in 2030 and

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37.3 per cent in 2050, the highest in theworld (Korea Times 2005a). The U.N.forecasts that Japan’s aged populationwill rise to the second highest level with36.5 per cent in 2050, followed by Spain(35 per cent), Italy (34.4 per cent) andthe Netherlands (33.2 per cent).Demographers have coined the term“agequake” to refer to the dire economicand social impact of Korean aging.

(https://apjjf.org/data/Table1.jpg)

Rapid aging is a product of Korea’sincreasing life expectancy and above allits low fertility rate. Due to significantimprovements in health care andnutrition, the average life expectancy ofKoreans rose by more than 10 years inthe two decades between 1983 when itwas 67.14 to 72.83 in 1993 and 77.46 in2003. A UN report projects South Korea’slife expectancy to increase to 81 years in2020 and 83.3 years in 2050 (KoreaTimes 2005b).

The most significant reason for this rapidaging is the falling fertility rate. Korea’stotal fertility rate was 1.08 in 2005, oneof the lowest, if not the lowest, in theworld (see Figure 1). [4] The decline from1.47 in 2000 to 1.17 in 2002 is the largesttwo-year drop on record, far below thereplacement level of 2.1 children. Koreatook just 16 years for its fertility rate todrop from the replacement level of 2.1 in

1983 to 1.42 in 1999 compared withJapan (30 years) and the Netherlands (29years). If the low birthrate persists, asdemographers anticipate, the NationalStatistical Office projects a totalpopulation of 42.35 million in 2050,falling from the current 48.29 million.

(https://apjjf.org/data/Figure 1.jpg)

As a consequence, the proportion of theeconomically active population (15-64year olds), which was 61.4 per cent in2003, will rise to 62.7 per cent in 2010and 64.0 per cent in 2020 before fallingto as low as 53.7 per cent by 2050(Donga ilbo 2005). This portends adeclining labor supply. According to areport by the Korea Labor Institute(2005), Korea will face a severe laborshortage beginning in 2010. Assumingthat Korea’s economic growth averages4.5 per cent and that there will be anannual 1.51 per cent increase in demandfor labor during the next 15 years, therewill be a shortage of 586,000 workers in2015 and 1.23 million in 2020. A Bank ofKorea estimate is even higher, projectinga shortage of up to 4.8 million workers in2020 (Bank of Korea 2006).

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In addition to acute labor shortage, thelow birthrate poses many economicproblems. Whether in the context of realestate or consumer spending, economicgrowth and population have always beenclose ly l inked. In fact , Korea ’sremarkable economic development of thelast forty years was in part fueled by alarge young cohort who provided asizeable labor pool (Lee, H. 1999, pp.82-85). Other problems associated withlow birthrate are declining tax revenuesfor (IMF estimates for every one per centincrease in the elderly population, therewill be .46% deterioration in fiscalbalance), declining savings rate,diminishing consumption, waninginvestment, and budget def icits(government expenditure on the elderlyin Korea is expected to soar from 2 percent of GDP in 2002 to 8.5 per cent in2050). Also, pension funds can dry up andfunding for health insurance can becomeinsufficient.

This leaves Korea with little choice but toimport increasing numbers of foreignlaborers. The Korean government may beforced to grant permanent resident statusto migrant workers in order to secure astable supply of labor. The availability ofa large pool of migrants, coupled with thegovernment’s wish to mobilize foreignlabor, will facilitate a flow of migrantsinto Korea.

The expected increase in laborimportation is not a welcome prospect forthe government, which remains fixatedon the ideology of an ethnical lyhomogenous nation. Consequently, therehave been active debates about extending

the retirement age of workers, althoughthe current global financial crisis and theconcomitant rise in the unemployment ofcollege graduates is putting a damper onthe issue. The government has alsoimplemented various policies to facilitatea higher fertility rate. These include: 1)an allowance to every pregnant motherfor med ica l check -ups ; 2 ) f reevaccinations to all newborns and freemedical and dental check-ups until theage of six; 3) childcare allowances forlow-income families; 4) expansion ofpublic childcare facilities; 5) for low-income families, waiving monthly healthinsurance fees for newborns until the ageof five; 6) subsidies for after-schoolprograms for the children of low-incomefamilies; and 6) incentives for companiesto extend, and offer more benefits for,maternity leave. Public advertisementson television and in newspapers promotehaving a larger number of children foreach family.

Many local governments have introducedincen t i ves t o encourage morebirths. Some provide chi ldbirthallowances, such as a one-time paymentof between one and three million won forevery second or third newborn, whilesome municipalities offer gift certificatesfor families to buy clothes, diapers, babyfood and other childcare supplies fornewborns. Some local governmentsprovide state-hired babysitters for up to30 days to families giving birth to a thirdchild. The babysitter service is alsoprovided to low-income families forchildren aged between three months to12 years. To date, however, these

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measures have failed to slow Korea’sdeclining fertility rate.

Immigrant Brides: Bride Shortageand Increasing Intermarriage

In addition to the continuing influx offoreign laborers, there is yet anotherfactor conducive to the emergence of amulticultural Korea: the influx of foreignbrides. As with migrant laborers, the vastmajority of foreign brides have comefrom Asian developing countries .

The proportion of intermarriages in totalmarriages in Korea has jumped morethan ten-fold since 1990, accounting fornearly 14 per cent in 2005. Thiscoincided with the growing number ofmigrant workers in Korea (see Table2). The soaring number of internationalmarriages is also due to a significantgrowth in the number of “picture brides”from abroad.

Korean men marry Vietnamese women inVietnam

Rapid urbanization has largely drainedthe countryside of young women insearch of better educational and jobopportunit ies . Many men in thecountryside, on the other hand, stayed

behind to carry on family farming. Thesemen have had great difficulty in findingmarriageable partners who were willingto give up the comfort of urban life tomarry farmers or fishermen. Unable tofind brides in Korea, many looked outsidethe country. In 2005, 35.9 per cent ofrural men who married wed foreignbrides from such countries as China(ethnic Koreans) , V ietnam, thePhilippines, and even Uzbekistan.[5] AsTable 3 shows, most foreign brides areAsians with more than three-fourthscoming from China and Vietnam in recentyears, attesting to increases in cross-border hypergamy.

(https://apjjf.org/data/Table%202.jpg)

(https://apjjf.org/data/Table%203.jpg)

The number of foreign brides will risesignificantly over the next decade, withKorean son preference, which has led toa serious imbalance in favor of males

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since the late 1980s, resulting in an acuteshortage of brides. Table 4 reveals theseriousness of sex imbalance in Korea:

(https://apjjf.org/data/Table%204.jpg)

The data are even more startling for thebirth-order-specific sex ratios: the sexratio at birth for the family’s third- andfourth-born children has hoveredbetween 130 and 140 in Korea (see Parkand Cho 1995). It goes without sayingthat such a skewed sex ratio at birth hasbeen obtained through sex-selectiveabortions. The proportion of marriedwomen aged 20-44 years old who havehad at least one induced abortion hasbeen high: 39 per cent in 1976; 48 per

cent in 1979; 52 per cent in 1988; 49 percent in 1994; 44 per cent in 1997; and 40per cent in 2003 (Korea Institute forHealth and Social Affairs 1976-2003).

The normal sex ratio at birth is around105, with extra males accruing rapidly,especially between 1988 and 1996. As aconsequence, Korea is facing a seriousshortage of brides. For example, the sexratio of men and women in their most“suitable” years for marriage—i.e., 26-30year old males and 24-28 year oldfemales—is expected to be 118.9 in 2010,112.0 in 2020 and 116 in 2030 (NationalStatistical Office 2001). This means thathundreds of thousands of males in theirteens and early 20s will be unable to findKorean wives.

The projected rise in intermarriage inKorea in the near future suggests thatthe nature of intermarriage will change.While intermarriage to date has beenlargely limited to farmers and blue-collarworkers, it is likely to increasinglyinvolve urbanites and even college-educated white-collar workers. What iscertain, consistent with internationalmarriage trends, is that Korean men withlow incomes are less likely to find Koreanwives.

Korea is not alone when it comes to brideshortages. Other Asian countries withstrong son preference, particularly Chinaand India, also face serious brideshortages. For example, China’s sex ratioat birth in 2005 was 118 and there are anestimated 30 million extra men in China.The number of extra males in India maybe within the same range (see Hudson

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and Den Boer 2005). As of 2002, othercountries with high sex ratios at birthwere Guam with 114, Taiwan 110, China109, and Singapore 108. What thisportends is increasing competition to lurebrides in countries suffering from brideshortages, particularly China, India,Korea, and Taiwan.

The Korean government has discouragedabortions in general and sex-selectiveabortions in particular. In fact, abortionhas been illegal in Korea, except in casesof pregnancies resulting from rape orincest, involving deformities of fetuses,and endangering the lives of pregnantwomen. And doctors are prohibited frominforming the mothers about the sex ofthe fetus. The harshest penalty forviolating this law for doctors is loss oftheir license to practice, but no doctorhas ever been “convicted” to that degreeof penalty. Thus far no country hassuccessfully prevented sex-selectabortions.

The issue of bride migration in Korea isfurther complicated by the growingnumber of bi-ethnic/bi-racial childrenfrom “international marriages.” Amongthe offspring of inter-racial and inter-ethnic unions, the most numerous areoffspring of Korean individuals andpersons of other Asian heritage. They arecalled Kosians, with the prefix “Ko”deriving from the term “Korean” and thes u f f i x “ s i a n s ” f r o m t h e t e r m“Asians.” Estimates vary, but theirnumber reportedly stood at around50,000 as of the end of 2006. Nearly athird of all children born in 2020 areexpected to be Kosians and their

accumulated total will soar to 1.67million or 3.3 per cent of the populationby that year (JoongAng Daily 2006). Inaddition, the number of bi-ethnic/bi-racialchildren in elementary and secondaryschool reached 13,445 in 2007, up 68.1per cent from the previous year(7,998). The proportion of bi-ethnic/bi-racial children in total enrollment isexpected to rise to 16 per cent in 2118and to more than 870,000 or 26 per centin 2050. Elementary textbooks will sooninclude a section on bi-ethnic/bi-racialchildren and multicultural families,highlighting the need to understand theircultural backgrounds and to developmore tolerant attitudes toward them. Thisis a major change from the emphasis onethnic homogeneity, which presentedKorea as a consanguineous communitycomprised of the descendants of onecommon ancestor. Major televisionnetworks have started to program showsfeaturing immigrant br ides andmulticultural families. Evidently, Koreansociety is starting to implement measuresto accept the multicultural reality, atleast for those who share “Korean blood.”

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Bi-ethnic and bi-racial children in Seoul

Multicultural Korea: Issues andImplications

This article sheds light on severalimportant issues in the study ofinternational migration, and revealsmany implications for broader theoreticaldebate in the field. First, in congruencewith neoclassical economics, those whocome to Korea as unskilled migrantworkers are from developing countries,prompted by differentials in wages andemployment conditions. Push-pull factorsa l s o p l a y a r o l e i n p r o m p t i n ginternational migration, including byforeign brides. Consonant with worldsystems theory, international migrationto Korea can be seen as an impact ofeconomic globalization in which an ever-increasing number of people areincorporated into the world economy,ultimately engendering migration flows. The historical-structural approach is alsoapplicable, since Korea, having achievedremarkable economic development in thelast four decades, is utilizing labor

importation/migration to mobilize labor. In addition, hypergamy, i.e., marryingsomeone of higher status, is evident formost of the foreign brides who marryKorean men, the vast majority comingfrom relatively poorer countries in Asia.

The Korean case points to a new trend:the regionalization of internationalmigration. The influx of foreign workersand brides illustrates the growingpredominance of intra-Asian migration asopposed to the early postwar decades inwhich the primary Korean migrant flowswere to North America. The region’spersisting economic disparities anddemographic differentials—i.e., thedeclining labor supply due to rapid agingin the more developed economies, andthe large pool of the economically activep o p u l a t i o n i n l e s s d e v e l o p e dcountries—suggest that internationalmigration will continue . What will bedifferent is that the destination willincreasingly be within the Asianregion. As Asia further transforms itselfas a region of growth and prosperity,intra-regional immigration is likely toincrease even more, given geographicalproximity and cultural similaritiesbetween the migrant-sending andmigrant-receiving countries. Theincreasing economic and culturalintegration of the Asian region willfacilitate this trend.

Conclusions

This paper has examined factors that aremaking Korea a multiethnic society, asthe inflow of migrant workers addresseslabor shortage resulting from rapid aging

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and low fertility. The rapid rise inintermarriage, initially limited to farmersand blue-collar workers, will proliferateinto wider social classes as the decades-long practice of son-preference results ina shortage of females. As a consequence,interracial and interethnic births are onthe rise. Taiwan, which seems to beahead of Korea by about ten years inexperiencing labor importation and brideimportation, provides a glimpse intochanges that are in store for Korea in thenear future: cross-border marriagesaccounted for 20.1 per cent of totalmarriages in Taiwan in 2005 (the figurereached its peak in 2003 when it was31.9 per cent), while births of bi-ethnicand bi-racial children accounted for 12.9per cent of total births (Kojima 2006).

These patterns generally correspond tothe five general trends in internationalmigration identified by Castles and Miller(2003, pp. 7-9): 1) the globalization ofmigration—more countries are affectedby migration and migrants come frommore diverse areas; 2) the acceleration ofmigration—international migration ofpeople is growing across the globe; 3) thedifferentiation of migration—mostcountries have a range of types ofimmigration, including labor migration,refugees and permanent settlement; 4)the feminization of migration—womenare playing a greater role in most typesof migration, in both labor and marriagemigrat ion . ; and 5) the growingpoliticization of migration—internationalmigration is having a greater impact ondomestic politics and national securitypolicies of states as well as bilateral

relationships among them. The growingmultiethnic character of Korea isconsistent with broad trends ofmigration; the growth in the number ofmigrant workers and foreign brides inKorea indicates the acceleration ofmigration; the influx of foreigners intoKorea began with migrant workers, butexpanded to include foreign brides,illustrating the differentiation ofmigration; in addition to the sizablenumber of female migrant workers, thegrowing number of foreign brides isemblematic of the feminization ofmigration; and the Korean government’smonitoring of labor-and bride-sendingcountries is indicative of the growingpoliticization of migration.

Despite all the indications that thecoun t ry i s r ap id l y becoming amulticultural society, the Koreangovernment still insists on almost zero-immigration. In contrast to such“immigration countries” as the UnitedStates, Canada, and Australia that haveextended citizenship to many newresidents and encouraged theirintegration and assimilation, Korearemains a “non-immigration” country,much like Japan and many WesternEuropean countries, its policy objectivescentering on controlling inflows,restricting long-term stays, discouragingpermanent residence and limitingcitizenship.

The current Lee Myung-bak governmentis continuing to promote the previousadministration’s goal of changing policytoward foreigners from “control andmanagement” to “understanding and

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respect.” But if changes in law are to beef fect ive , there wi l l have to beaccompanying changes in the mindsetand attitude of Koreans to embrace themultiethnic society that is emerging.

Andrew Kim is an Associate Professor inthe International Studies Division ofKorea University. He is the coauthor withJohn Lie of “South Korea in 2007:Scandals and Summits,” Asian Survey,Jan-Feb, 2008 pp. 116–123. This is arevised version of an article published inEthnic and Racial Studies Vol. 32, No. 1,pp. 70-92. Published at the Asia-PacificJournal on February 1, 2009.

Recommended citation: Andrew EungiKim, “Demography, Migration andMulticulturalism in South Korea” TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 6-2-09, February1, 2009.

Notes:

[1] Flows of immigration from Korea toJapan have been minimal in the post-WWII period. A part of the reason forthis is that Japan grants citizenship basedon jus sanguinis or the law of blood,meaning that it ascribes citizenship byblood, not by place of birth (jus soli). Thishas made it difficult for Koreans in Japanto become full-fledged citizens and thediscriminations against them has becomepopularly known in Korea.

[2] The focus of this article is ontemporary migrant workers in post-warKorea. The earliest labor migration inmodern Korean history actually tookplace at the turn of the twentiethcentury. Between 1903 and 1905, morethan 7,000 Koreans migrated to Hawaiit o w o r k a s l a b o r e r s f o r s u g a rplantations. The contact betweenKoreans and recruiters for Hawaiiansugar planters was largely provided byAmerican missionaries stationed in Koreaat the time. These migrant workers camef r o m a w i d e r a n g e o f s o c i a lclasses. Later, during the Japanesecolonial period (1910-1945), hundreds ofthousands of Korean “migrant” workerswere sent overseas by Japaneseauthorities to work in mines and factoriesand many others migrated to Manchukuo.

[3] It must be noted that even before thegovernment formally began implementinglabor-importing policies, a considerablenumber of transnational migrant workerswere in Korea. This was a result of thefact that the Korean government easedcond i t i ons f o r t our i s t v i sas inpreparations for the Asian Games in 1986and the Seoul Olympics in 1988.

[4] The reasons for the low fertility ratein Korea include the following: 1) peopleare marrying at older ages due to longerschooling and working; 2) more peopleare staying unmarried; 3) the stress ofraising children, particularly due toeducation frenzy; 4) high living costs; 5)high education costs (Korea’s per capitaprivate spending on education is thesecond highest in the world after theUnited States); and 6) high childcare

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costs. A noteworthy fact about therelationship between the low fertility rateand high living costs is that Koreanwomen with higher levels of educationalattainment, hence higher socio-economicclass, actually have higher fertility rates(around 1.5 for women with collegeeducation and less than 1 for those withelementary education). This is at oddswith a universal trend which shows thateducational attainment is negativelycorrelated with fertility rate, meaningthat the higher the educat ionalattainment, the lower the fertility rate.

[5] Both of the patterns, i.e., migration ofmainly unskilled Asian laborers andforeign brides, took place earlier inJapan.

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