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GOVERNMENT e5V SUDAN

Emergency Flood Reconstruction Program

MULTI -DONOR MISSION

October 17,1988

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LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS

ABS Agricultural Bank of SudanA£DB African Development BankBBI British Electricity InternationalBNAC Blue Nile Agricultural CorporationBNG Blue Nile GridBRRI Building and Roads Research InstituteCPSRB Central Public Service Recruitment BoardDANIDA Danish International Development AgencyDEC European Economic Comlss ionEFRP Emergency Flood Reconstruction ProgramPAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFED Fonds Europeon de DeveloppementFRG Federal Republic of GermanyGOS Government of SudanGTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusa_mmnarbeitIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentITA Italian Technical AssistanceLw International Labor OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundRPSRP Khartoum-Port Sudan Reconstruction Projectxf[ RKreditanstalt fur WiederaufbauMCHPU Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public UtilitiesNO& Ministry of AgricultureNoE Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific

ResearchMOFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic PlanningNOR Ministry of HealthMNorm Ministry of Irrigation and Water ResourcesMOL Ministry of LabormOSW Ministry of Social WelfareNOY8 Ministry of Youth and SportsMPC Ministry of Public CommuicationalaWH Ministry of Public Works and HouaingNua National Energy AdministrationNEC National Electric CorporationKGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNHRC National Human Resource CouncilNIRP National Irrigation Rehabilitation ProjectNWCRO National Water Corporation for Rural DevelopmentODA (British) Overseas Development AdministrationPIU Project Implementation UnitQS Quantity SurveyingRBPC Roads and Bridges Public CorporationREPR Railway Emergency Recovery ProgramSADB Sudan Agricultural Development BankSRC Sudan Railway CorporationSTPC Sudan Telecommunication Public CorporationSvC Sudan Water CorporationSWEC Sudan Water and Electricity CorporationTRP Telecommunication Rehabilitation ProgramMDOP United Nations Development ProgramUNDRO United Nations Disaster Relief OrganizationUNESCO United Nations Educational Secentific and Cultural

OrganizationUNFPA United Nations Fund for Population ActivititesUNHCR United Nations' High Commissioner's Office for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children's FundUNIDO United Nations Industry Development OrganizationUuRWA United Nations Relief and Works AgencyUPE Universal Primary EducationUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentWlO World Health Organization

MISSION MEMBERSHIP

This report is based on the findings oL a multi-donor mission which visitedSudan from October 4 - 20, 1988. The mission consisted of Messrs./MesdamesJonathan Brown (Mission Chief, World Bank), Abdi Jarik, Bashir Gardaad andMakase Nerumo (African Development Bank), Joe Bloemarts (EEC), Yves Beigheder(France), Hans-Henning Andresen, Thomas Labahn (Germany), Henning Pedersen(IFAD), Milan Zavadjil (IMF), Dr. Alberto Raggi (Italy), Dr. Mohammed Smadi(Jordan), Joha Hansell, Eric Hawthorn and Peter Roberts (Overseas DevelopmentAdministration, U.K.), T. Ekvall and F. M. Mburu (UNICEF), Jette Jensen(UNIDO), Richard Beardmore, Hans Gruss, Alberto Harth, Roy Hewson, Jane Holt,Eduard Irgens, Rogati Kayani, Aizad Khan, Karl Kleiner, Mohamed Muhsin, andAnthony Sparkes (World Bank), Mohamed Ibrahim, Aftab Raza, Osman Shamat,Yagoub Abu Shore and Jasdip Singh (World Bank Resident Mission), Dr. A. Deria(WHO), Fareed Atabani, Balghis Badri, Mohindra Bery, John Clarke, David Cook,Paul Doornbos, Poul Dueholm, Ismail Emtairah, Rod Hewett, Phillip Kirpich,Robert Nooter, Joe Scearce, Yagoub Shora, John Sutcliffe, Ole Sylte, M.Tayback and David Williams (Consultants). The United Nations DevelopmentProgram and the Overseas Development Administration gave financial support tomount the mission. Mrs. Loan Dommen and Miss Caroline Milad providedsecretarial support.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

The official currency unit in the Sudan is the Sudanese Pound.

Official Rate US$ 1.00 - LSd 4.5

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 Meter - 3.28 feet (ft)1 kilometer (kX) - 0.62 miles (ml)1 square kilometer (Kg) - 0.386 square miles (sq ml)1 kilogram (kg) . 2.2 pounds (lbs)1 metric ton (ton) 2,205 pounds (lbs)1 Feddan (fd) = 0.42 Hectare (ha)

FISCAL YEAR

Government July 1 - June 30

SUDAr - EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.Executive Su"ary . . . . . . . . . . .

I. INTRODUCTION .................... 1

A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. Chronology of the Recent Events. .......... ... 1C. Prospects for Reconstruction . .9.9...... 5

II. THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND THE ECONOMY . . . ... . . . . . 7

A. Macro-Economic Developments and Policies . . . . . . . . . . 7B. Longer-Term Development Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

III. AN ASSESSMENT F THE DAMAGE ................. 11

A. Overview . * * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11B. Estimate of the Damages by Sector . ..... ..... . 13

1.00 Agriculture/Rural Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . 132.00 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193.00 Health . . . . * . * . . .. * a a * * . . 254.00 Industry/Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335.00 Power . . . . . . . . . .* .* * . .* * . . . .. . 356.00 Telecommnications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397.00 Transport . . . . . . . . . .* * . .* .9 9 * * * 43

Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

8.00 Urban . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * . 51

IV. RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. ........... 9999999999 59

A. An Approach to the Reconstruction Program . . . . . . . . . 59B. Reconstruction Program Summary . . ............ 59C. Reconstruction by Sector ..... 161

1.00 Agriculture/Rural Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . 612.00 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 753.00 Health . . . . . * * * * . . * .. . . . . . . . . . 794.00 Industry/Construction . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 835.00 Power . * * . . . . . * * * . * . * .. . . ... 896.00 Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . * 937.00 Transport . * 9 9 9 * * * . a * 9 * * 9 9 9 * 99

Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

8.00 Urban . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . 109

D. Prevention of Future Flood Emergencies . . . . . . . . . 132

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . 134

A. Coordination and Execution . . . . . .*. . . .. .. . . . 134B. Implementation Capacity and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . 135C. Employment Generation . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . 136D. Aid Requirements and Donor Coordination . . . . . . . . . . 137

Annexes

Annex 1 Agriculture ...................... 138Annex 6 Telecommunications - Areas of Works . . . . . . . . . . 172Annex 7a National Reconstruction Implementation Unit . . . . . . 179Annex 7b Prevention of Future Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Tables

Table B-RW-1 Rural Water Supply Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . 17Table B-2-1 Structure of Education . ..... .. ...... . 21Table B-2-2 Education Sector Reconstruction Program . . . . . . . 22Table B-2-3 V * * * * * * . .. .. .. .. . ... 23Table B-3-1 Estimated of Health Facilities Damaged . . . . . . . 27Table B-3-2 Health Sector Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Table B-5-1 Generation Facilities of Blue Nile Grid . . . . . . . 37Table B-7-1 Highway Sector Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . . . 45Table B-7-2 Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . 46Table B-8-1 Population Distribution in Khartoum . . . . . . . . . 51Table B-8-2 Flood Damage Assessment to Khartoum . . . . . . . . . 52Table B-8-3 Estimated Damages to Urban Housing . . . . . . . . . 53Table B-8-4 Streets and Drains Inventory .. . . . . . . . . 54Table B-8-5 Estimated Damages to Khartoum S,%:eets and Drains . . 55Table B-8-6 Urban Water Supply Damage Asses&"$nt . . . . . . . . 57Table C-RW-1 Rural Water Supply ReconstructionlCosts . . . . . . . 72Table C-2-1 Education Reconstruction Program Costs . . . . . . . 78Table C-3-1 Health Sector Reconstruction Program Costs . . . . . 82Table C-4-1 Industry/Construction Cement Sub-Sector Costs . . . . 86Table C-5-1 NEC Reconstruction Program Costs . . . . . . . . . . 92Table C-6-1 Telecommunications Rehabilitation Costs . . . . . . . 94Table C-6-2 Telecommunications EFRP Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Table C-7-1 Higway EFRP Costs ...................... .101Table C-7-2 Highway Proposed Funding Arrangements . . . . . . . . 102Table C-7-3 Highway Implementation Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . 103Table C-7-5 Railways EFRP Cost ......... .... . 106Table C-7-6 Railways Implementation Schedule . . . . . . . . . . 108Table C-8-1 Urban Recovery Program Cost Estimate . . . . . . . 109Table C-8-2 Urban Replanning Costs . . . .. . ... . . . .. 113Table C-8-3 Housing Reconstruction Programs Costs . .. . . . . 115Table C-8-4 Streets and Drains Reconstruction Costs . . . . . . . 117Table C-8-5 Streets and Drains Disbursement Schedule . . . . . . 119Table C-8-6 Urban Water Supply Reconstruction Costs . . . . . . . 121Table C-8-7 Sewerage Reconstruction Program Costs . . . . . . . . 124Table C-8-8 Sanitation and Solid Waste Program Costs . . . . . . 126Table C-8-9 Strategic Metropolitan Planning Costs . . . . . . . . 129

Map of Sudan

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recent Events

(i) In August/September 1988 Sudan experienced two separate but relatedevents: first, three weeks of unprecedented high levels of rainfall includinga 200 mm rainstorm August 415 in the Khartoum region, more than the annualrainfall average in one day; and second, high levels of flooding of the Nileand other rivers, including sheet flooding down wadis which have not seenwater in living memory. These events caused devastation for a large portion ofthe population, particularly in the Khartoum and Northern Regions where therewas damage on a massive scale to agriculture, property and infrastructure.Some 200,000 homes were extensively damaged or completely destroyed by theflood/rains which took days to dissipate in flat areas with imper'eable claysoils. Some two milllon people have been left homeless, agricultural areasalong the Nile Rivaz around Khartoum and to the north have been devastated,and essential services such as health, education, and communications havesuffered. For example, in the Khartoum area, some 89X of schools have beendestroyed or damaged. In the Northern Region, the fruit trees of small farmerswere swept away by the flood and will take five years to replace as productiveassets.

(ii) The Khartoum rainfall was an exceptional event for a non-mountainousarea. The statistical probability of it reoccurring, based on historical data,is one in 500 years. The Nile flooding from the accumulated rains in the BlueNile catchment area have a probability of reoccurrence at Atbara and Dongolaof 50-150 years but at Khartoum, Sennar and Tamaniat of one in ten years; itappears that the same rainfall and river flows produce a higher flood level inthe Khartoum/Sennar/Tamaniat areas than 40 years ago, probably because ofaccumulated siltation. This phenomenon will be studied so that futureeconomic and social activities along the Nile can be planned in this newcontext.

(iii) Despite the floods, 1988/89 could potentially be a favorable year forthe economy. While production was halted in some sectors in August and earlySeptember, notably industry, energy and transport, the overall impact onoutput in 1988/89 should not prove severe. Despite some losses in theirrigated areas, agricultural production could rise sharply from the droughtdepressed levels of 1987/88, due to larger areas of planting and higher yieldsin the rainfed and recession cultivation areas if the threat from locusts canbe controlled. The industry and transport sectors could benefit from the riaein agricultural output as well as from reconstruction activity. GDP couldgrow 71 in 1988189 from the depressed level of the year before. However,economic performance will also depend on the economic policies pursued by theGovernment. The Government's four-year Salvation, Recovery and DevelopmentProgram outlined the broad objectives and the thrust of policies to bepursued. However, implementation in some areas has been slow, and demandpressures in the economy are rising. The Government has stated itsdetermination to continue with the reforms despite the flood and to takemeasures to dampen inflationary pressures.

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(iv) Regardless of the macro-economic impact, it will take years for thepopulation in the Khartoum area and in the Northern Region, in addition tosome parts of the Western and Eastern Provinces, to recover their already lowstandard of living and productive capacity. Emergency relief efforts beganalmost Immediately after the heavy rains with the assistance of UNDROQUNDP andwith the support of the international community and local and internationalNO0s. The provision of food, medicines and temporary shelter seem to havebeen successful in avoiding widespread disease, but restoring the affectedpopulation to its productive capacity before the floods will require a majorreconstruction effort. In late August, the Prime Minister of Sudan requestedthe World Bank to lead a multi-donor, multi-sector effort to assess thereconstruction needs and to outline an Emergency Flood Reconstruction Program(EFRP) which could be supported by the donors. This document is the productof that Mission which visited Sudan in the first half of October.

Obiectives of the Reconstruction Program

(v) The approach of the EFRP is to:

(a) assess the damage to Sudan's productive capacity and design areconstruction program to restore it to its pre-flood levels;

(b) in those sectors affected by the flood where the level of servicesbefore the flood was unacceptably low, the EFRP in some casesincludes recovery to a higher standard to provide at leastminimally acceptable levels of service; and

(e) establish an EFRP to accomplish (a) and (b) above with the donorsrequested to conside- financing the first two years of the Programto concentrate efforts of both Government and the internationalcommunity on the highest priority items in order to assist theaffected people as soon as possible. Essential but less urgentcomponents, as well as programs in areas where there areimplementation constraints, have been left to the third year ofthe program and beyond, except in cases, especially civil works,where efforts begun in the first year will take more than twoyears to complete.

Assessment of the Damage

(v) The damage caused by the rains and flooding was of several differentkinds - loss of production, loss of and damage to Sudan's productive capacityand plant and to stocks and Inventories, damage to critical infrastructureIncluding social services such as schools and health facilities, and personallosses of housing and personal effects. The total of all these various lossesis enormous as described in general terms in the Mission's report and asoutlined in a report prepared by the Government.

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The Emergency Flood Reconstruction Program

(vi) The two year time slice of the EFRP established by the Mission amountsto US$407.5 with a foreign exchange component of US$285.4 (701) and a localcomponent of US$122.2 equivalent (301) as outlined in the table belows

Emergency Flood Reconstruction Program

Sector Local Cost Foreign Cost Total Cost

Agriculture 33.8 63.6 97.4

Rural Water 6.6 17.4 24.0

Education 11.9 24.3 36.2

Health 5.9 32.7 38.6

Industry/Construction 15.0 35.3 50.3

Power 5.9 29.0 34.9

Telecommunications 3.3 31.1 34.4

Transportation 7.9 25.6 33.5

Urban 31.3 25.0 56.3

Program Coordination and 0.6 1.4 2.0Flood Prevention

Total 122.2 285.4 407.5

(vii) Agriculture. The main damage in agriculture's productive capacity wa inthe Northern Region where irrigation schemes were damaged, including loss ordamage to some 17,000 pumps, perennial crops, and agricultural inputs. TheEFRP includes $97.4 million for agriculture to rehabilitate infrastructure,provide credit and essential inputs, reestablish nurseries to stock perenmilalsand to expand the locust and pest control program.

(viii) Rural Water. Flood damage to rural water systems amounted to about$9.7 million mostly in the Central, Kordofan, Northern and Darfur Regions.The program contains $24 million for replacement of the damaged rural waterfacilities and for new water systems in new settlements in the Northern Regionfor rural areas where rising river levels make historical villages dangerousto maintain and villagers voluntarily decide to resettle in nearby areas.

(ix) Education. 240,000 students, 11% of the total enrollment in primary,inteomediate and academic secondary education, were affected by the flood with

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201 of schools damaged and large amounts of teachingllearning materials lost.The $36.2 million education component of the program incluies 100 new primaryschools, $10.0 million for imported materials for self-help reconstruction fordamaged Bthools and $2.0 million to assist Higher Education.

(x) Health. Damage to health facilities includes 45 hospitals, 117 medicalfacilities, 223 dispensaries and 81 primary health care units. While therehas been no widespread health outbreaks, it is believed that the flood willresult in an exceptionally high incidence of malaria in 1989190 unlesseffective mosquito control programs are launched by May 1989. The EFRPincludes $38.6 million for control of malaria and diarrheal diseases,restoration of an adequate supply of drugs, and two years of a four yearprogram to reconstruct physical facilities and equipment for health units.

(xi) Industry/Construction. The flood disrupted industrial operations inmost enterprises in Khartoum and key Industrial areas but production hasresumed with private companies importing necessary equipment and materialsunder the 'own resources" program. The EFRP contains $5.3 million to increaseproduction in the cement industry which was unable to meet domestic demandeven before the flood because of lack of spares and equipment. The Programalso contains $45.0 million for a building materials import program to meetthe requirements of the reconstruction effort.

(xii) Power. The damage to the country's generating and distribution plantwas relatively small as a direct effect of the flooding, but investment isneeded to replace essential stocks of equipment used to make emergency repairsimmediately after the flood, to replace some temporary repairs with morepermanent installations, and to help reduce the probability that future floodswill not disrupt electricity supply and thus general economic activity. A$34.9 million program has been established for power reconstruction andrehabilitation.

(xiii) Telecommunications. The flood severely damaged the telecommunicationsnetwork which was already in a deplorable state and had become a real barrierto economic development. The Miasion outlined a $115 million five yearreconstruction and rehabilitation p:ogram to provide Khartoum, secondary townsand some rural areas with minimum operational telecommunications service. Thetwo year t1me slice in the EFRP amounts to $34.4 million and would concentrateon the Khartoum and Northern Regions which are essential for the moderneconomic sectors and for administrative improvements.

(xiv) Transportation. There was only minor damage to paved highways in theNorthern and Eastern Regions with the main damage confined to the Khartoum -Port Sudan Road for which detailed engineering is being completed for aproject being supported by Norway, ODA and the World Bank. The cost estimatefor the highway part of the program is $23.0 million of which $16.4 for theKhartoum-Port Sudan Road.

(xv) Urban. Khartoum has grown from a population of 640,000 in 1970 to morethan 3.5 million today due to natural rural-urban migration, drought and civil

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strife. Before the flood, urban residents in Khartoum were provided with onlyminimal services and there were large unplanned areas. The city'sInfrastructure and services needed rehabilitation as well as a strategicvision of the future. The flood caused havoc in Khartoum, destroying 158,000bomes, large numbers of sanitation facilities, roads, drains and water supply.The EFRP includes assistance for Khartoum to prepare an urban strategy andsubsector action programs for its medium and long term future. In the shortterm, the EFRP will attempt to alleviate the plight of the urban poor throughthe provision of housing materials, an urban road program, and reconstructionof waterlseweragelsolid waste management. In addition, about 1,000 familiesliving in low-lying areas at risk from flood would be resettled on anexperimental basis. While Government undertakes planning on the future of theunplanned areas, people living in these areas would be supported by theprovision of water and health facilities and building materialslor cash grantsfor housing reconstruction. Repairs and rehabilitation of water supplysystems will be provided to some of the secondary centers. The urban componentof the EFRP will be $56.3 million.

(xvi) Flood Prevention Meas.es. A better forecasting system is needed toprovide advance warning of future floods on the Nile which should be possibleusing modern forecasting techniques and improved data collection. A studycosting US$500,000 has been included in the EFRP to outline the requirementsfor setting up such a system.

Imolementation of the Protram

(xvii) Coordination and Execution. Existing agencies and institutions of theGovernment will be used to carry out the Program. However, the overallcoordination of this complex, multi-sector effort will require theestablishment of a National Reconstruction Task Force. The Task Force willhave representation from all implementing agencies of Government and a small,highly professional National Reconstruction Implementation Unit reporting tothe Prime Minister as Chairman of the High Ministerial Committee forRehabilitation through the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning(Secretary of that committee). The cost of the unit, including necessarytechnical assistance, office equipment and specialized studies, is $1.5million.

(xviii) Implementation Constraints. The Government will need to take immediateaction to improve its ability to execute procurement contracts, to speed theprocessing of donor aid agreements, and to break the bottlenecks at the Portof Sudan and customs for the importation of essential goods and equipment.

(xix) Employment Generation. Labor intensive construction methods should beused whenever possible, especially in the street repairs and cleanup of theCity of Khartoum, in order to provide employment through the private sectorfor low income families which in turn will assist them in building their homesand replacing their lost possessions. The EFRP skould directly generate about10,000 new jobs through labor intensive methods.

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(xx) Aid Reuirements and Donor Coordination. Due to Sudan's difficulteconomic situation It to proposed that donors fund 901 of the EFRP's $407.5million cost or $366.75 million and that Government provide $40.75 millionequivalent over the two year time slice of the Program. Donors are urged toprovide Immediate asxsistance through (a) transfer of funds from existingcommitments where possible to meet urgent requirements; (b) advancing projectsalready under preparation; and (c) providing new aid on an emergency basis.Coordination will be achieved by Government and local donor coordination andthrough a meeting of the Consultative Group for Sudan to considerreconstruction needs tentatively scheduled for November 29, 1988.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Backaround

1.01 Sudan, with an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, has a popul4tionof about 23 million and a per capita GNP of US$ 330. Much of the country issparsely populated. About one-third of the land area is desert or semi-desert, while the other two-thirds is suitable for crop or pastoralproduction. The economy Is heavily dependent on exports of cotton,- lvestock,groundnuts, sesame and gum arabic. The manufacturing sector is relativelysmall, and the country's infrastructure is weak. The country has accumlatedan external debt In excess of US$ 10 billion, about half of which is currentlyin arrears. In 1983, differences between the semi-autonomous southern regionand the central Government led to re-emergence of civil unrest In the South.Peace negotiations and military efforts by successive governments have so farbeen unsuccessful. The unrest has hampered economic development, and has ledto the migration of large numbers of people from the South to the Northseeking refuge from the fighting. In 1984, a severe drought damaged crops andreduced livestock herds. By May 1986 when the present Government assumedpower in democratic elections, GDP had grown by only one percent per annumover the previous decade, and per capita income and consumption had fallen tolevels well below those prevailing in the 1970s.

B. Chronology of Recent Events and Probability of Reoccurrence

1.02 Durig August/September 1988 Sudan experienced two separate but relatedeventss (i) three weeks of unprecedented high levels of rainfall culminatingIn a 200 mm rainstorm August 415, and (i1) high levels of flooding of the Nileand other rivers. These events caused deprivation, destitution and sufferingfor a large portion of the population, particularly in the Khartoum andNorthern Regions, as well as damage to agriculture, property andinfrastructure on a massive scale.

the Rainfall

1.03 In late July (21-31 July) an unusual northward penetration of moist airand rain occurred over the Red Sea zad Arabia and a very large area of coldcloud and rainfall covered the Ethiopian highlandj, including the Blue Nilebasin and the upper Atbara, where heavy rainfall occurred on 26-29 July.After small storms at the end of July a massive storm occurred over Khartoumon 415 August, with an associated storm to the North. By midday GMT (1400local time) on 4 August the Meteosat satellite imagery data showed severallarge cloud masses to the north of Khartoum and widespread storms over theEthiopian highlands. At 1500 GMT a cloud mass extended from KaMrtoum some 200km north and 500 km east of the city, and over the next three hours driftedwestward and south, developing a new cold core some 80 km across directly overKhartoum between 1800 and 2000 CtT. Between 2000 GMT and midnight Khartoumremained under a massive cloud (some 7 x 3 degrees in extent) and the cityremained on the southern fringe until 0400 when a new cell was over Khartoum.This event was exceptional, with daily rainfall recorded for the Khartoum areaas follows:

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Khartoum Airport 200.5 =uKhartoum Central 210 mmTuti Island 175.5 mmGereif West 129.5 mmKober 170.0 mmShambat 147.5 mm

Such rainfall constitutes a record not only for Khartoum where the averageannual rainfall has been 170 mm but for most of Sudan. The severity ofdamage, especially to infrastructure and housing, was due to floods from therainfall on the mostly flat area, most of which has P heavy clay soil withpoor drainage.

1.04 The Meteosat lmagery shows that a large area between Khartoum and Atbaraon both the east and west of the Nile received heavy rainfall during thisperiod. Although rainfall measurements are not available over this area,heavy rainfall was measured at Atbara, totalling 154 mm over 1-10 August; thisis nearly three times the annual average.

1.05 Further storms occurred during August in the area but rainfall recordssuggest that nothing comparable to the August 415 storm occurred. Rainfallover the Blue Nile catcbment to the far South in July and August does notappear to have been much above average, including areas south of Khartoum.

Return Period of the Khartoum Storm

1.06 It is difficult to estimate the frequency (return period) of anexceptional rainfall event, as this involves extrapolation from existingrecords and is heavily dependent on the statistical distribution assumed. Itis possible to reduce the uncertainty by comparing the storm event not solelywith records at the single site, but with the combined records of a number ofcomparable but independent rainfall stations in the region. On this basis areasonable estimate is that the 200 mm recorded in Khartoum has a returnperiod of about 500 years. The return period is the average interval betweenoccurrences, and takes no account of possible climate change between thehistorical period and the future. There is a probability of about 1/500 thatthe storm would recur in any one year.

Rainfall and Runoff

1.07 The recorded river flows of July - September 1988 reflect the availableinformation on rainfall, deduced from satellite imagery.

1.08 The heavy storms of 26 - 29 July over the Atbara basin resulted inextremely high flows down this river, reaching a record flow at Khashm ElGirba on 31 July. High floods also occurred on the Gash to the east of theAtbara.

1.09 The storm of August 415 caused damage and inundation in the Khartoumarea, and to the north appears to have resulted in high flows in the normally

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dry watercourses (or wadis) which lead into the Nile north of Khartoum. Flowsin these wadis are a rare event and no measurements are available.

1.10 The flows of the Blue Nile reflect the rainfall over the Ethiopiancatchment. Because the rainfall in the Blue Nile basin was not exceptional,the peak flows were not extreme, but the river levels at Khartoum were secondonly to the record level of 1946.

1.11 River levels and flows on the main Nile below the Atbara mouth reachedpeak levels on 3 September 1988 which were higher than 1946, the previousrecord.

Flood Frequency Curves at Gautinft Stations

1.12 To put the recent floods into perspective, estimates were made of thefrequencies or return periods of the peak flows in 1988 at each site whereinformation is available. Based on probability analysis and historicalinformation, the probability of recurrent flood levels at various points onthe rivers is as follows:

Site 1988 Peak Flow Estimated Return Period(=3Is) (years)

Blue Nile at Roseires 9280 10 - 20(1988 el Diem)

Blue Nile at Sennar 8400 10

Blue Nile at Khartoum 8530 10

Nile at Tamaniat 9066 10

Atbara at mouth 6130 100 - 150(1988 Khashm el Girba)

Nile at Dongola 13200 50 - 100

The results for the Blue Nile are consistent. The 1988 flows at el Diemcorrespond to a 10 - 20 year return period, but this is based on flow seriesat Roseires/Wad el Aies. The flows at Sennar, Khartoum and Tamaniatcorrespond to a 10-year return period. The 1988 flows on the Atbara are moreextreme; the flows correspond to a 100 - 150 year return period. Below theconfluence of the Nile and Atbara there is only one station at Dongola; herethe leak flow was higher than 1946 and the return period is estimated at about50 - 100 years.

Comparison of Levels and Flows at Khartoum

1.13 Becas e the peak level in 1988 was little below that of 1946, a similaranalysis was carried out for annual maximum levels. This suggests that the

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1988 peak level correspond to a return period of about 50 years, which exceedsthe estimate of 10 years for the flows. This difference warranted a study ofannual maximum flows and corresponding levels at Khartoum for the period 1902-82. These suggest that the flood level at Khartoum has been rising for agiven flow over this period by about half a meter caused, inter alia, byaccumulated siltation. A similar trend was found at Tamania. The implicationis that if the 1946 river flows were to recur, the river levels in theKhartoum area would be higher than occurred in that year, and the extent offlooding In Khartoum would be much greater.

1.14 The implications for the future of the possible reoccurrence of theKhartoum rainfall and the flooding are considered in Section IV of the report.

Extent of the Damaze

1.15 The most extensive damage has been to the Northern Region and to theKhartoum area, with lesser damage in the East, West and South. Khartoum'spopulation was the most seriously affected by the heavy rains, which damagedor destroyed over 200,000 bouses and left approximately 1.5 million peoplehouseless. Especially hard hit were the low income groups living in mud brickhouses which could not withstand the rains. In the Northern region, the highflood level and the heavy runoff of rains caused severe damage to the privateirrigation systems along the Nile, date and other tree crops, and to housing.

1.16. Also, damage to infrastructure facilities has been widespread, with roadand rail links disrupted. Electrical generation facilities and distributionsystems were crippled, and the telecomuunications network suffered severedeterioration which is hindering efforts to restore normal economic operationsthroughout the country. A large number of schools and health facilities weredamaged or desv;-oyed, particularly in Khartoum and in the North.

1.17 Agriculturo losses also occurred in the major irrigation systems, andreplanting will. be required for crops washed out from the floods. Industrialproduction was brought to a standstill because of the loss of power anddisruption to the transport system, but permanent damage to industry appearsto be minimal.

1.18 The Government and private sector response to the flood has greatlymitigated the effects of the damage. Particularly noteworthy have been theefforts of the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation, supported by short termtecbnical assistance, and the Sudan Railways Corporation to restore thehighways and railways to operating condition and the National ElectricalCorporation to get the power system back in operation. Other Governmentagencies have also risen to the occasion, often with emergency help from thedonor community.

1.19 Emergency relief efforts began almost [mmediately after the heavy rains,with the assistance of UNDRO/UNDP and with the support of the internationalcommunity and local and international NGO's. This assistance has beendirected towards the [mediate relief needs of the flood victims through the

provision of food, medicines, and temporary shelter as well as emergencymedical relief to prevent epidemics. These efforts sppear to have beensuccessful, and no widespread diseases have been reported. Excludingassistance received but not yet reported, the total amount of reliefassistance received as of September 1, 1988 was approximately US$18.5 million.

1.20 In late August, the Governmeat of Sudan requested that the World Bankundertake an assessment of the reconstruction requirements resulting from thefloods, and to coordinate donor reconstruction efforts. The World Bank, inresponse to this request snd with financial support from the UNDP and ODA,undertook a mission to Sudan to survey the reconstruction needs and to outlinea Reconstruction Program Which could be supported by donors. The World Bankinvited other donors to join in the mission, and a number of them did so. Thisdocument is the product of that mission.

C. Prosnects for Reconstruction

1.21 The economy has already made remarkable progress towards recovery fromthe disaster. Road, rail and power facilities which were out of service havein may cases been restored, at least on a temporary basis. In agriculturereplanting will be possible if seeds and fertilizer can be made availablequickly. Rebuilding of houses, schools and health care facilities will takeconsiderably longer, but the rapid provision of building materials and keyoquipment and supplies will assist in these efforts.

1.22 The heavy rainfall is expected to have some positive benefits to theeconomy through the extra moisture which will stimulate rainfed cropproduction and through the renewal of aquafers and water holding points. TheGovornment is anticipating a bumper dura crop, and wheat production shouldalso be helped. To realize this potential benefit, however, will depend onrestoring essential infrastructure services and replacing losses of seeds andfertilizers as quickly as possible.

1.23 Sudan is doing what It can to rebuild and restore its economy given itslimited financial and institutional capacity. A rapid infusion of donorassistance is now crucial to sustain and carry forward the efforts which areunder way. This assistance will be especially necessary to mitigate thesuffering of the lowest income level of the population, whi* was mostadversely affected by the flood.

1.24 The reconstruction program which has been prepared by the Mission setsforth the most urgent requirements, to emphasizes work which can beaccomplished within the next two years. Given the time constraints underwhich the program has been prepared, there will necessarily need to beadjustments as more detailed engineering is carried out and as additionalneeds are identified. Therefore, some contingencies have been provided toaccommodate unforseen requirements. Also, assistance which can be providedquickly through reallocation of existing funds, by grant funding which can beobligated rapidly, or by advancing projects already under preparation will beespecially useful in restoring the economy to its normal operating level.

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II. THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND THE ECONOMY

A. Macro-Economic Developments and Policies

1.01 After years of inadequate economic, policy, the Government adopted aProgram of Action in August 1987 which included measures to strengthenproduction incentives through increases in procurement prices and an exchangerate adjustment, as well as measures to strengthen the fiscal position throughboth raising revenues and containing expenditures. The Government alsoplanned to implement some structural reforms, while at the same timeformulating a comprehensive medium term strategy. 'While the bulk of themeasures envisaged under the Program cf Action were implemented, budgetaryperformance deteriorated sharply in the second part of the year, reflectingexpenditure overruns. In addition, little progress was made in theImplementation of the structural reforms.

1.02 In early 1988, the Government prepared a four year Salvation, Recoveryand Development Program, the main objectives of which are (i) sustainingeconomic growth of 5 percent per annum; (ii) redressing external and internalImbalances; (iii) providing food security and basic needs for the population;(iv) rehabilitating existing infrastructure and productive capacity and; (v)revitalizing the private sector. These objectives were to be achieved throughmobilizing domestic resources by reforming the tax system and improving costrecovery; stimulating the private sector by deregulating prices, profits andthe export trade and providing a more conducive climate for investment byImproving the investment laws; reforming the public enterprises; maintainingthe own resource import system, while using tariffs and the exchange rate torationalize imports, rather than relying on administrative mechanisms. Anumber of important measures were announced in the 1988189 budget speechincluding: (i) removal of price and profit controls, except for a limitednumber of essential commodities; (4i) elimination of minimum prices forexports and export licensing procedures as well as the removal of the exportmonopoly of the Oilseeds Corporation; (iii) reform of the parastatal sector bydivesting non strategic enterprises and removing any preferential treatment ofstrategic commercial enterprises; (iv) privatising the public commercialbanks; (v) strengthening the supervisory role of the Bank of Sudan; (vi)containing current expenditures; and (vii) taking a number of measures toraise revenues, most importantly by raising excise taxes and import duties.

1.03 In disceussions held in Khartoum in June 1988 and in Washington in July1988, IHF and World Bank staff were in broad agreement with the authorities onthe objectives of the program and the thrust of the structural policies.However, agreement was not reached on elements of a one-year macroeconomicprogram, mainly due to differences over the exchange rate and associated priceincreases.

Impact of Floods

1.04 In agriculture, the economic impact of the floods was felt almostentirely in the irrigated sector. About 38,000 feddans under cotton

cultivation were lost, as were smaller areas under sorghum and groundauts.The heaviest damage, however, vas to fruit and vegetable production which isconcentrated In the heavily affected Northern Region where about one half ofannual production was lost (A detailed description of the losses incurred inthe agricultural sector is given in Chapter III, Section B-1.00.) Despite thelosses suffered in the irrigated areas, 1988189 could potentially be afavorable year for the agricultural sector, especially in comparison with therelatively poor outcome In the preceding year. However, such an Improvementwill only be possible if the Government can control the threat from locustsand pests. Cotton output could rise by over 10 percent in 1988189, reflectinga substantial rise In yields from the depressed levels of the preceding year,while the area under cultivation will be unchanged despite losses from thefloods. Output of the two main staples, wheat and sorghum, could increase by55 percent and 150 percent, respectively. A major increase in the area underwheat cultivation is expected to take place due to the increased availabilityof water. Concerning sorghum, both areas under cultivation and yields areexpected to rise sharply from the drought depressed level of 1987188.Similarly, production of groundnuts in the rainfed area could increasesubstantially. Overall, agricultural GDP could rise by 15 percent compared to1987/88 to a level 2 percent higher than in 1986187.

1.05 Production in many of the other sectors -- including energy, industryand transport -- almost came to a halt during August and early September.However, production has largely recovered and could, moreover, be stimulatedby both the reconstruction activity (construction, transport) and theincreased level of agricultural output (transport, food processing). Overall,GDP could rise by 7 percent compared to 1987/88, providing that sufficientintermediate inputs are available and that appropriate price policies arepursued.

1.06 On the demand side, the fiscal position weakened considerably In thelast quarter of 1987188 due, as noted earlier, to larger than expectedexpenditures. This deterioration continued in the first quarter of 1988/89,with bank financing reaching LSd. 550 million, about twice as much as In thefirst quarter of the preceding year. The increased bank financing reflectedboth lower revenues and higher expenditures. The former was partly due todifficulties caused by tho floods, notably the disruption of industrialproduction and the priority given to relief supplies in the ports. Whilethere should be some catchup in revenues in the coming months, expendituresappear to be running at a level that is not compatible with reducinginflationary pressures.

1.07 Inflation rose to over 50 percent per annum in the last quarter of the1987188 reflecting growing demand pressures. These pressures were exacerbatedby shortages of goods caused by the floods, with the prices of foodstuffs andcement rising particularly sharply. The prices of these goods fell somewhatin October, but underlying inflationary pressures remain strong.

1.08 The balance of payments outcome in 1988/89 will largely depend on thepolicies pursued by the Government, while the floods will have only a moderateImpact. The Government has projected import requirements to rise to US$1,610

million as a result of floods. However, as In previous years, imports willfall short if adequate financing is not available.

1.09 Exports will not be particularly affected by the floods and have apotential to rise to US$600 million, from US$495 million in 1987188. Cottonexports are expected to rise by 3SOZ compared to 1987188 to US$230 million,reflecting higher prices of long staple cotton and a moderate increase inexport volume based on accelerated sales of the 1987188 crop. However, at thecurrent exchange rate, exports of groundnuts, dura, gum arabic and certainmarginal exports would not be profitable and would require subsidies. Exportsof fruits and vegetables, a relatively minor item, will decline substanetially,reflecting the drop in production.

1.10 A rise in private transfers is projected for 1988189 reflectingIncreased remittances by migrants to deal with the consequences of the floods.These inflows have moderated the depreciation of the parallel market exchangerate which currently fluctuates in the LSd. 11-12 - US$l range.

1.11 While project aid fell to a minimum during the first quarter of 1988189,disbursements of commodity aid rose to US$105 million, compared to US$70million in the preceding quarter. A further US$250 million of commodity aidis in the pipeline. Inputs financed in the context of the ReconstructionProgram would increase currently projected aid levels by a yet to bedetermined amount.

1.12 Despite the relatively favorable outlook for exports, private transfers,and external assistance, Sudan faces a difficult external situation. Scheduleddebt service for 1988189 is US$ 1280 million while external arrears at endJune 1988 amounted to USS 5017 million, so that a large financing gap willr_main.

1*13 The Government has recently taken some measures to strengthen thebudgetary situation. In particular, the defence tax on imports has beenraised from 5 percent to 10 percent. On the expenditure side, demands forwage increases are being resisted, allocations to various governmentdepartments are being kept to only 1/15 of the allocated annual amountsinstead of 1112, and transfers to regions are being limited to last year'sallocation. Such measures, while in the right direction, will not besufficient to curb inflationary pressures.

1.14 Partly as a result of involvement with alleviating the effects of thefloods, there has been little progress on the implementation of structuralmeasures announced in the June 1988 budget. There has been no administrativeandlor legislative action to remove price and profit controls and thederegulation of the export trade is still not completed. There have been fewconcrete steps with regard to the parastatal reforms and the compensatory ratescheme has not been applied. However, in discussions with the ReconstructionMission, the authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to economic reformand in this context, discussions with the DMP are scheduled to resume inNovember.

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B. Longer Term Development Issues

1.15 In the longer term, it is imperative for Sudan to embark on asignificant economic adjustment program which will reverse the long termeconomic decline of the past fifteen years and will provide the basis forsustained growth and development in the future. An effective program wouldlead to increased levels of savings and investment, improved infrastructureand a less rigidly regulated economy which would lead to increased efficiencyfor productive operations and an improved public service providing effectiveadministration of a limited number of essential functions which can only becarried out by the Government. The program would also begin to address thebroader issues of human resource development, prevention of the environmentaldegradation which is already underway in the desert and semi-desert areas ofthe country, and programs for addressing the specific problem of the poorestsegments of the population.

1.16 The Salvation, Recovery and Development Program referred to earlier wouldrepresent a good beginning for starting the lengthy and arduous adjustmentprocess. While the flood has understandably delayed the implementation ofthat Program, the Government should resume the process as soon as possible,since future growth and development will depend upon getting the processunderway.

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III. AN A SSMENT OF THE DAMAGE

A. Overview

1.00 The damage caused by the recent rains and flooding was of severaldifferent kinds - loss of production, loss of and damage to Sudan's productiveplant *nd equipment and to stocks and inventories, damage to criticalinfrastructur including social services such as schools and healthfacilities, and personal losses of housing and personal e£fects. The total ofall of these various losses is enormous, as described in general terms in theforegoing sections and as outlined in a report prepared by the Government.

1.01 The Reconstruction Mission's approach to the assessment of the damagesas to identify and quantify the damage which was most relevant to preparing areconstruction program and for estimating the impact on the economy over thenext several years. Given the shortage of time and the lack of precise datain some areats no attempt mae made to put a value on all aspects of thedamage, or to accumulate a total figure for the losses sustained by thecountry as a whole. Instead, relevant damage assessments were prepared on asector basis and are contained in each sector damage assessment which follows.

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B. Estimate of Damase by Sector

1.00 Atriculture

1.01 Agriculture provides the livelihood of 7O0 of the population,contributes about 35Z of GDP, and almost all inputs f*r the industrial sector.Some 321 of agricultural GDP arises from livestock output; rainfed traditionalfarming and irrigated agriculture each account for about 251; mechanizedfarming for 121; and forestry and fisheries contrihute the other 61.

1.02 Sudan relies heavily upon agricultural output (especially cotton, sugar,ground nuts and wheat) from irrigated land along the Nile. There are fivemajor parastatal irrigation schemes: Gezira-Nanagil (2 million feddans) NowHalfa (0.4 million feddans), Rahad (0.3 million feddans) and the Blue andWhite Nile pump schemes (0.7 million feddans). The Northern AgriculturalProduction Corporation fNAPC) operates 14 pump schemes serving 0.08 millionfeddans along the Nile between Shendi and Atbara and between Merowe andDongola. There are, in the same region, some 160 registered cooperativeswhich irrigate about 0.07 million feddans, and around 27,000 privately ownedpump irrigation systems crop about 0.3 million feddans. There are also twolarge spate irrigation schemes (0.2 million feddans) in the Gash and Tokardeltas of Eastern Province. Finally, along the Nile rivers, after seasonallyflooded areas dry out, many farmers cultivate small farms on river terracesand islands for vegetable production (especially around Khartoum and in thenorth) and fruits (especially citrus, dates, bananas and mangoes).

1.03 Drought regularly affects rainfed farming, and the extent and success ofcultivation depends heavily upon yearly rainfall. The main rainfed crops aresorghum which fluctuates between 8 million - 12 million feddans, and sesamebetween 2 million and 2.5 million feddans. Millet, grown in the driest cropareas, varies between 2 million and 3 million feddans. Livestock (56 millionhead) graze natural pastures, frequently under nomadic management,supplemented by crop residues. Offtake is often seriously affected bydrought. There are locally important dairy, poultry, sheep and goatenterprises depending on Irrigated forage along the Nile, especially nearKhartoum.

Impact of the Flood on Agriculture

1.04 Damage was caused by two different phenomena. Localized exceptionallyheavy rainfall and runoff damaged some agricultural infrastructure andproduced flooding which caused crop losses, mostly in irrigation schemes.Poor maintenance standards of drains contributed heavily to such floods.Secondly, the Nile river system overflowed its usual peak boundaries causingdestructicn along its banks and carrying higher than usual sediment loads intothe irrigation systems. Thus flood/rainfall damage is concentrated onagriculture along the Nile system including crop losses, destruction ofirrigation infrastructure, and losses and damage to pumps and machinery. Thecrop losses for annual crops will not be as long lasting as the losses ofperennials, especially dates, citrus and mangoes which take from 5 - 8 yearsto come into bearing. Dairy and poultry farms near Khartoum suffered heavily,and much alfalfa feed was lost. There was also damage to rural water suppliesfor domestic settlements, irrigation and livestock in Kordofan and Darfur.Emergency relief efforts consumed fuel and jute sacks required for the normal

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annual crop, which must be replaced, and there is likely to be greater lossfrom pests and diseases on both crops and livestock in flood affected areas.Finally, the unusually heavy rainfall is creating favorable breedingconditions for locusts, which already seriously threaten Sudan's agriculture.

1.05 There are also positive effects of higher rainfall in rainfed farmingareas. Many parts of western Sudan (Kordofan and Darfur), which have sufferedbelow average rainfall (and severe drought) for the last 15 years, are nowwell soaked. Areas and yields of rainfed crops will increase and livestockoutput will be greater. Similarly, many of the dry waterways (Wadis) in theNorthern Region, which recorded no rainfall in recent years, were flooded.This, together with increased flooding of the flood irrigation systems in theGash and Tokar deltas, will result especially in much higher than usualsorghum output. Although some areas of standing crops in the irrigationsystems were lost and will not be replanted, the greater availability ofirrigation water will permit an expanded winter crop area, especially of wheatand vegetables/fodder. Finally, along the Nile particularly, the heavy siltload deposited on farm lands will enhance soil fertility and crop productionfor some years.

Estimated Imoact on Agricultural Output

1.06 Losses in agricultural output assessed by the mission were primarily incotton production and in fruits and vegetables in both the Northern andCentral Regions. The cotton loss of 38,400 feddans is expected to result in acrop loss for the 1988189 season of about US$15 Million. The loss for the1988189 crop year for fruits and vegetables is estimated at US$80 million. Inaddition, for the perennial fruit crops which take approximately five years toreplace, additional annual output losses of US$160 million will occur. overthe following four years. Therefore, total output losses over the next fiveyears resulting from the flood are estimated at about US$255 Million. Abreakdown of the losses are summarized in Annex 1, Table 10, and are describedbelow. The additional rainfed crop areas planted as a result of the heavyrains and the improved yields expected are estimated to result in increases inoutput for sorghum, groundnuts, wheat, sesame and millet of about $130-150million for this crop year.

1.07 In Northern Region, where crops are produced only along the banks of theNile and on islands, very serious damage occurred to about 24,000 feddans offruit trees and about 20,000 feddans of date palms as a result of inundation.It is difficult to estimate the value of such perennial tree losses sincetress are still dying and flood impact will be felt for some months. Almost501 of the current harvest of these cash crops, which is a major source ofincome in the Region, has been lost. About 901 of the whole cultivated areawas flooded and 202 was still flooded a month afterwards. There were heavylosses to alfalfa (10,000 feddans), bananas (4,000 feddans) and vegetables(2,500 feddans) and there were heavy livestock losses totalling some 150,000head of cattle, sheep, goats and camels, and about 200,000 head of poultry.

1.08 In Central Region some crop damage occurred in the Northern part of theGesira irrigation scheme, including about 9,500 feddans of sorghum, 1,700feddans of vegetables almost 8,000 feddans of the main cash crop, cotton, and1,400 feddans of ground nuts. Along the Nile, it is estimated that about150,000 feddans of horticulture, including a large area of fruit trees and

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10,000 feddans of bananas, has been destroyed by the high flood level.Poultry suffered the heaviest losses, but substantial numbers of cattloe shBepand goats were also lost.

1.09 In Eastern Region both the Rahad and New Halfa irrigation schemes wereaffected. The Rahad lost 11,000 feddans of sorghum and 11,000 feddans ofgroundnuts, in addition to 20,000 feddans of cotton. The main part of the120,000 feddan cotton crop was planted late, though this will be offset byincreased water availability for irrigation. New Halfa lost 20,000 feddans ofsorghum and 10,000 feddans of groundauts. Some 11,000 feddans of cotton werealso lost. The Gash flood destroyed around 7,000 feddans of fruits andvegetables near Kassala and an additional 7,100 feddans was lost mainly alongthe Atbara and Rahad rivers, and 1,400 feddans at Gedaref.

1.10 In Kordofan Region. some difficulties were experienced by mechanizedsorghum producers in transporting seeds and fuel, and vegetable crops sufferedfrom localized torrential rains. In Khartoum Province, it is estimated that23,000 feddans were flooded, destroying low-lying riverside areas ofhorticulture and fruit trees, especially bananas. In Khartoum, around 2.5million poultry out of 4 million were lost, together with most fodder forlivestock.

Impact on Agricultural Infrantructure

1.11 The Northern Region experienced the most serious damage. Around half ofthe 34,000 pumn and engine sets were either lost or damaged as a result of theflooding of the File. All but 320 of these are small pumps (30 - 6') servingprivate farmers. Around 202 (over 60) of the large pumps (8n - 12") operatedby cooperatives of the smallest farmers were also damaged. The Northern APCschemes also suffered loss and damage to their equipment. Throughout, theinundation and local runoff has silted up canals and shallow wells, andresulted in uneven deposition of sediment in fields which must be levelledb:ifore irrigated cropping can continue.

1.12 In Central Region, the Gezira scheme experienced localized heavyrainfall which damaged the Gezira light railway, destroyed houses and damagedsome minor canals. A more widespread effect resultad from the extremely heavysilt load ii irrigation water which was then deposited in the canals, reducingflow and allowing heavy weed infestation which were already major problamsfacing these schemes. The pump schemes along the Blue Nile also suffered, andit is estimated that around 600 pump sets were lost or damaged.

1.13 In Eastern Regtion, the Rahad scheme suffered damage to the irrigationand drainage network. In New Halfa, around 30 km of the main drain wasdamaged and 20 minor canals and structures. In both areas, the heavyinfestation of weeds in the canals is a continuing serious problem made worse

' by the flood. In the Gash and Tokar deltas, substantial damage occurred tothe embankments and canals, including two newly constructed offtakes. InKassala and along the Atbara and Rahad rivers, over 500 pump sets were lost inthe flood.

1.14 In Kordofan and Darfur Regions, some wells and pumps were damaged aswell as nurseries, and at least seven small earth dams were breached and manyhafirs (water holes) destroyed. These are locally important for domestic

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water and for crops and livestock grown by the communities which settledaround them. In Khartoum Province, there was extensive damago to pumps,motors and canals serving small-scale horticulture mainly on the eastern bankof the Blue Nile. Some 70 dairy and poultry farms were completely flooded.

Rurgl Water Suvglv

1.15 Sector Description. The Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources isresponsible for both the rural and urban water/supply through the NationalCorporation for Development of Rural Water Resources (NCDRWR) and the NationalUrban Water Corporation (NUWC). NCDRWR is responsible for all rural watersupply functions and also for those urban areas that have not yet beentransferred to NUWC. Its organization is decentralized as follow:s

- National level: Headquarters (Khartoum)- Regional level: Regional offices in 9 Regions- Provincial levels Provincial offices in 19 Provinces- Village level: Operational tears where needed.

ND.CRWR operates at present about 3,600 water yards, 1,100 hafirs, 170 surfacewater schemes and approxlmately 4,700 wells equipped with hand pumps.Detailed information about the sector is available in the UNDP/World Bank-financed "Water Supply and Sanitatlon Sector Review Report' which will beIssued towards the end of 1988.

Assessment of Flood Damated to Rural Water Supplv Installations.

1.16 Flood damages have been reported from six regions. The Central,Kordofan and Northern Regions have been affected most. In water yards, mainlythe pumping installations and diesel engines have been affected. In surfacewater schemes, damages have been reported on the centrifugal pumpinginstallations and slow sandfilter beds. Some hafirs and dams have beendestroyed, others badly eroded. The total damage is estimated to be US$9.7million (see Table B-RW-1). It should be noted, however, that most of theaffected systems were already under consideration for rehabilitation beforethe flood damage occurred. The estlmated damage of US$10.7 million representsthe repair or replacement value.

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TABLE B-RW-1

Rural Water SupilvSumSar of Flood Damage Assessment

-----------No. Of Affected System ---------Affected R~egions

Water Yards Surface Water Rafire & DameSchemes

Northern Region 80 20

Darfur Region 61 2 10

Kordofan Region 81 1 2

Central Region 165 2 10

Eastern Region 3 5 6

Khartoum Region 10 4 _

TOTAL 400 34 28

--------------------------------------------------------------------

Description of Items Est$mated Total Damage *In USS Million

Water yards 6.90Surface water schemes 1.50Hafirs and Dame 1.30

Total 9.70

* Repair or replacement value.

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2.00 Education

Introduction/Description

2.01 The Khalwas or Koranic Schools are the traditional religious schoolsthat predate the western pattern of f.rmal education in Sudan. With theadvent of a modern system of education, introduced into the country bymissionaries during the colonial era, the Khalwas, although still important,gradually gave way to a conventional primary school system. Reform programshave been introduced by the Government which linked the four year Khalwaprogram to the fifth and sixth grades of primary schools. The system hasevolved over time and Table B-2-1 indicates the present structure of theedueation system.

2.02 The Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research(MOE) is responsible for the formal education system (certain specializedtraining centers are administrated by the Ministry of Labor -MOL and others).Table B-2-2 contains basic educational data.

2.03 The Government has increasingly realized that an educated population isan essential element in the social and economic growth of a nation. With anoverall literacy rate of only 20Z, with 102 estimated in the rural areas andfor females about 7Z, the Government's expressed education policy has as itscenterpiece two fundamental objectives; first to achieve universal primaryeducation (UPE) by the year 2000, and second to introduce into the curriculumof academic secondary schools skill-oriented subjects for improved employmentopportunities and ability to be trained. Although some progress in thoseobjectives has been made, achievement of UPE by the year 2000 is unlikely andother tmprovements are delayed due basically to financial constraints.

Assessment of Damage

2.04 The Government's assessment of physical damage to the education systemis contained in Table B-2-3. These assessments were carried out by thetechnical staff of the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public Utilities(MCHPU). District education officers also assisted in this work. Due to thevast geographic spread of the immense number of facilities (1665 primary,intermediate and academic secondary schools in five regions), a dettiledreview of damage by the mission was not possible. It is however the view ofthe mission that the number of schools reported destroyed (217) is valid,whereas the listed damaged schools would require an exhaustive review todetermine precise flood damage since many schools suffered from long neglectedmaintenance (UNESCO, in a May 1988 report, estimated that an average of US$15,000 was needed for each of the about 6600 schools in the primary,intermediate and academic secondary level). This indicates the difficultyfaced by both the Government and the mission to accurately assess the damage.The need to restore the education infrastructure is however valid.

2.05 About 240,000 school children have been affected by the rains/flood (11Xof total enrolled students in primary, intermediate and academic secondary)with about 202 of the total number of schools with reported damage. Losses

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also include large amounts teaching/learning materials such as text books,exerciso books, ete.

2.06 Primary Education (Grades 1-6) was particularly hard hit by the floodsad this has exacerbated an already critical situation in the provision ofbasic education perhaps to the poorest and most deprived population group. In1984185, primary sebool enrollments represented only about 491 of the schoolage population of which female enrollment was about 402. As a direct resultof the flood, as noted above, many children are now deprived of educationalopportunities.

2.07 Damage was less extensive in Intermediate (grades 7-9) and Secondary(Grades 10-13 Education) schools as noted in Table B-2-3.

2.08 Damage to the Hither Education System, particularly In the Khartoumarea, is reported heavy. Again, to distinguish between rain damage and lackof maintenance is purely subjective. However, the need to rehabilitate highereducation facilities (i.e. to stop further erosion and to protect theGovernment's heavy Investment in Higher Education due to both the excessiverains and lack of maintenance) is valid.

Relief Efforts to Date

2.09 NO0 has reported that limited mobilization of local communities hasoccurred particularly at the primary school level to reconstruct damagedfscilities. However, due to the lack of financial assistance, the high costof construction materials, and the concentration of villagers on their ownlamediate survival concerns, self-help assistance will be somewhat delayed andless assistance than normal can be expected.

2.10 The MOE has established two main objectives: a) to secure schooling forthe 240,000 affected students; and b) to maintain the continuation of the1988/89 academic year which was planned to start In September, 1988. To carryout its plan, the strategy is to start the academic year as soon as possibleusing temporary facilities, including tents and double shifting of classeswhere practical (this has occurred In most regions to the extent possible);and reconstructing the schools destroyed by the rain and floods as soon aspossible. The problem is, of course, aggravated by the critical countryeconomic situation and unless assistance Is forthcoming In the near future, areduction in the number of students attending primary education, inparticular, is likely to result. It should be noted that the most likelyscenario for muediate relief in the provision of education opportunities isthat the already overcrowded classes (many primary and intermediate classeshave 60 - 75 students versus 50 as planned) will continue to increase innumber and education will likely suffer.

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TABLE B-2-1

SUDAN - smerlencv Flood Reconstruction Progra

Education Sector

Structure of Education

. 4

;f * wr lE 1-~~~~~10 w

0i

MS

- 22 -

TABLE B-2-2

SUDAN - Emegenev Flood Reconstruction ProgramEducation Sector

BASIC DATA 1/

A. Education Enrollment (1984/85)

Total % %Enrollment Respective Females

Age GroupsPrimary Education(Grades 1-6) 1,653,491 48.7 40.9Intermediate Education(Grades 7 - 9) 341,283 27.1 24.2Academic Secondary Ed.(Grades 10 - 12) 149,300)Technical Secondary Ed. 23,568) 16.1 40.0Higher Education (excludingstudents abroad) 36,439 2.3 38.0

3. Government Expenditure 1986/87 (in LSd Million)

Recurrent Expenditure on Education and Training

LSd Million

MOE (HQ) Approved Estimate 52.7Regional Education Expenditure 238.3Higher Education Approved Estimates 157.2

Total 448.2C. Share of Capital Allocation on Education and Trainina of Total National

Expenditure in LSd Million (1986/87)Educ. Expend.

Local Foreign Total as 2 ofNational Total

Expenditure

Higher Education 13.9 3.3 17.2 1.2Ministry of Educ. 9.6 1.8 11.4 0.8'Third Educ. Project 7.2 14.4 21.6 1.6(IDA financed)Regional Government 21.4 - 21.4 1.5

Total 52.1 19.5 71.6 5.1

D. Recurrent Expenditure on Education as Percentage ofTotal Recurrent Exvenditure (1986187) 8.2

1/ne__reor_o____198_ndMO_dtal/Unesco report of May,, 1988 and MOE data.

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TABLE B-2-3

SIDAN - EHGEMCY FL RFog PROL

EDUCAT1Q SECTO

Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kordofan Total Total

P T P T P T P T P T PT S S$(H)

Partly effected 484 - 444 - 42 - 19 - 25 - 1014 -Total deatroyed - 61 - 105 - 11- - - - - 177

Partly effected 225 - 126 - - - 22 - 2 - 375 -Totl destroyed - 12 - 26 - - - - - 38

SECONDARYPartly effected 30 - 20 - - - 5- 4 - 59 -Total destroyed - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2

739 73 590 133 42 11 46 - 31 - 1448 217

Total Schools 812 725 53 46 31 1665

Total costLSd (H) 173.0 170.0 22.0 14.0 12.5 391.5 $ 87.0

HIGEREDUCKhartoum Univ 27.0 - - - 27.0 $ 6.0Polytech 9.0 - - - 9.0 $ 2.0

1.0 - - - 1.0 $ 0.2

Sub Total CLSd) 36.0 1.0 - - - 37.0 8.2

Total (LSd) 209.0 171.0 22.0 14.0 12.5 428.5 $ 95.2_nm - -

-25-

3.00 Lealth

Introduction

3.01 A draft four year National Health Plan was prepared by GOS withassistance of consultants in November, 1987. The findings at that timeIndicated that the Sudan population was characterized by a relatively fragilehealth status, major characteristics of which weres infant mortality, 140 per1000; child mortality, 20 per 1000 per year; maternal mortality, 600 per100,000 live births; crude mortality rate, 17 per 1000 per year; highproportional morbidity ratios and high incidence rates due to environmentallydetermined disease, namely, malaria and diarrheal diseases. The existence ofmalnutrition among children, to the extent of 141, was a noteworthycontributing factor and the widespread agricultural use of Irrigationcontributed to high levels of schistosomiasis. Relatively poor hygienicconditions are major determinants of a high incidence of viral hepatitis.

3.02 Unlike some African nations, Sudan is not seriously deficient in medicaland para medical manpower Trained midwives and health visitors, a corps ofmedical assistants and professional as well as technically trained sanitaryofficers provide a firm manpower base for a modern health service.

3.03 The Inventory of health facilities includes 190 hospitals with a bedcapacity of 18,594. The peripheral delivery system consists of 288 healthcenters, 977 dispensaries, and 4016 primary health units (including dressingstations). Among the 190 hospitals, are 23 central. provincial and teachinghospitals. The health services system consists of: Government and privatesectors. It is estimated that 852 of total services is rendered by theMinistry of Health (NOH) and by its closely associated regional healthdirectorates.

Asessment of Flood Damate

3.04 The database for assessment of consequences of the heavy rains andfloods for the health sector consists of: (i) epidemiologic intelligencegenerated by the MOH assisted by experts of the US Public Health Service andby a teem assigned by the WHO regional office; (ii) field observations by theDirector Generals of the Regional Health Directorates; (iii) Regional engineerestimates of the cost of repair or of replacement of damaged facilities,Identified by regional staff; and (iv) field validation of selectetd facilitiesconducted by the Mission and by the WHO regional representative.

3.05 The major consequences of the flood and heavy rains are classified intothree categories: (i) complete or partial destruction of health facilities;($1) further deterioration of environmental health conditions which wereinadequate before the flood; and (iII) exceptional requirements for drugsresulting in substantial disruption of the national drug supply.

3.06 Damage to health facilities, see Table B-3-1 and B-3-2 includes 45hospitals, 117 health centers, 223 dispensaries, and 81 primary health careunits. A wide spectrum of Intensity of damage is involved from totaldestruction to minor damage. The areas most impacted by facility damage are

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the Northern Region, Capital District, and the Eastern Region. In addition todamage to structures, equipment and supplies were also lost.

3.07 Massive destruction of pit latrines has deprived approximately 500,000households of basic sanitary disposal of excreta contributing to widespreadtransmission of diarrheal diseases. Superimposed on an environment whichalready resulted in high levels of malaria, the 1988 flood has caused asignificant increase in the geographic areas impacted by malaria and has beenaccompanied by extremely high prevalence of the parasite of malaria in theSudan population exposed to the flood waters and to heavy rains. It Iscommonly believed by experts that the 1988 flood will result in exceptionallyhiah incidence of malaria with accompanyine illness and death in 1989 and 1990unless effective mosauito control Programs are launched by May 1989.

3.08 The densely housed displaced populations in the Khartoum district havebeen particularly affected by the 1988 flood incident in respect to sanitaryenvironmental and availability of adequate nutrition. High rates of diarrhealdisease have been found among the children who also appear to have high levelsof serious malnutrition. These conditions will continue unless consistent andmid term health programs emphasizing environmental hygiene (water and sewago),nutritional supplementation, and basic child survival interventions areintroduced on a continuing schedule.

Immediate Post Flood Response

3.09 Immediately following the heavy rains, significant health facilitydamage was apparent. Equally significant was the destruction of sanitaryfacilities (pit latrines), interference with accessibility to potable watersupply, and interruption of food supply, particularly among the urban poor.Assistance froms (i) Arab and western donors including food and drugs; (ii)USAID in epidemic control; (III) many private voluntary organizations: and(iv) international health organizations (WHO, UNICEF), was available withintwo weeks following the onset of the emergency. No major epidemic outbreak ofdisease was experienced. However, a significant increase was noted in theincidence of diarrheal disease and typhoid fever. Although the presence ofcholera was expected, no laboratory isolation of the organism has beenreported. Extensive draw down of the drug inventory of the MOH was necessaryand widespread shortage of essential drugs in damaged facilities as well as insample stations was documented. Excess mortality was identified within thesample areas. As of August 30, 1988, the WHO malariologist reported that themalaria situation was grave based upon evidence from lhospitals and samplesurveys of the general population indicating an 11X maslaria parasitemia rate(malaria parasite in blood).

3.10 The flood damage, noted above, was reviewed in detail, Oct 10 - Oct 24,by an ad hoc committee on the subject appointed by the Under secretary ofHealth, and by the Mission and by representatives of WHO, UNICEF and theItalian Government. With due regard for the requirements in other sectors, anurgent recovery program involving US$49.5 million expenditures was identified.

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TABLE B-3-1

SUDAN EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PRO6RAMESTIMATE OF FACILITIES OAMA6ED

BY EXTENT OF DAMAGE, TYPE FACILITY AND REGION

KHARTOUM NORTHERN EASTERN CENTRAL KORDOFAN DARFUR TOTAL---------------------------------------------------------------

P T P T P T P T P T P T P T

HOSPITfTLSPartly effected 21 2 4 7 9 - 43Totally destroyed - 2 - - - - 2

HEALTH CENTERSPartly effected 65 36 8 - - 2 111Totally destroyed 2 4 - - - 6

DIjSPESARIESPartly effected 85 68 47 - 3 - 204Totally destroyed 9 10 - - - - 19

PRIMARY HEALTHCARE UNITSPartly effected Z6 I8 4 - - 6 53Totally destroyed 11 10 5 - - 1 27

-------------------------------------------------------- _-

TOTAL 197 22 124 26 63 5 7 0 12 0 8 1 411 54

HOUSINGPartly effected 30 65 20 - 1 1 117Totally destroyed 4 20 2 - - - 26

-------------------------------------------------------- __

TOTAL 30 4 65 20 20 2 - - 1 - 1 - 117 26

TOTAL $ M (EST) $3.2 $6.2 $0.9 $0.2 $0.1 $0.1 $10.7

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TABLE B-3-2 page 1 of 4Health Sector Cost Estimates for Flood Recovery

By Goal

Goal Number of Units Cost per Item

IA Structural Replacement orRepair (Civil Works) $ 10,650,000 1/

.1 National Capital 3,115,000.1 Hospitals 21 1,050,000.2 Health Centers 67 564,000.3 Dispensaries 95 653,000.4 PHCU'S 37 361,000.5 Residences 34 486,000

.2 Northern Region $ 6,217,000.1 Hospitals 4 2,178,000.2 Health Centers 40 723,000.3 Dispensaries 78 1,533,000.4 PUCUs 28 421,000.5 Residences 85 1,372,000

.3 Eastern Region $ 931,000.1 Hospitals 4 220,000.2 Health Centers 8 102,000.3 Dispensaries 47 217,000.4 PHCUs 9 161,000.5 Residences 22 231,000

.4 Central Region $ 221,000.1 Hospitals 7 221,000.2 Health Centers

.5 Kordofan Region $ 112,000.1 Hospitals 9 41,000.3 Dispensaries 3 38,000.5 Residences 1 33,000

.6 Darfur Region $ 101,000.2 Health Centers 2 9,000.4 PHCUs 7 88,000.5 Residences 1 4,000

1/ Excludes professional services fee at 15% of $1.6 million

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TABLE B-3-2 page 2 of 4

18 Medical Supplies & Equipment* $ 9,404,230

Nuiber Unit Cost

1. Hospitals 45 162,000 $ 7,290,0001. Med Supplies/Equip 40,0002. Surg Supplies/Equip 60.0003. Lab Equip./Reagents 20,0004. Dental Equip. 2,0005. X-Ray Equip. 40,000

2. Health Centers 117 9,900 $ 1,158,0001. Water Tank 4002. Generator 40 KVA 6,0003. Lab Equip/Reagents 2,5004. Med/Surg. S/ E 1,000

3. Dispensaries 223 4,150 925,4501. Water Tank 3502. Lab.Equip/Reagents 2,5003. Medical Equip. 1,300

4. PHC Units 81 380 $ 30,7801. Water Tank 2502. Med. Equip 130

* Components of each set, as recommended and costed by UNIPA[.

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TABLE B-3-2 page 3 of 4

2. Environtmental Control $ 21,610,0001. Insecticides* 9,000,000

.1 DDT (75%) ( 2,500 tons)

.2 Malathion (500,000 litres)

.3 Abate ( 60,000 litres)

.4 Diazinon

2. -ransport No. $ Unit Cost*-t $ 12,010,000.1 Tractors 100 x 34,000 3,400,000.2 Trailers 400 x 7,800 3,120,000.3 Exhausters 3000 gal. 30 x 67,000 2,680,000.4 Trucks 40 x 67,000 2,680,000.5 Cars, Inspection 100 x 8,000 800,000

3. Portable Machinery $ 600,000.1 Sprayers x 1,000.2 Foggers x

* two year supply** Exclusive of customs

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TABLE B-3-2 page 4 of 4

Units Unit Cost Total $

3. Drug Replacement - $ 6,202,400

.1 Hospitals Basic Supply* 45 x $50,000 2,250,000

.2 Health Centers 117 x 500 58,500

.3 Dispensaries 223 x 500 111,500

.4 Primary Health CareUnits 81 x 400 32,400

.5 Restore StrategicDrug Reserve**(Central Supply) 3,750,000

* Basic Supply as recommended by WHO for 1 year supplya* To provide for 1 month reserve

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4.00 Industra/Constructlon

4.01 Sudan.s industrial sector contributes less than eight per cent of GDP.The sector comprises enterprises, both Government and private-owned, engagedprimarily in food processing and in the production of textiles, cement,leather and consumor goods and a range of light industrial products. Due tolack of foreign echbange for imported inputs and spares the sector hasoperated, on average, at lses than 35 percent of capacity for a number ofyears and public sector enterprises, in particular, have experienced seriousfinancial and managerial problems. The introduction of the 'own resources'Import arrangements last year has relieved the shortage of Imported raw andsemi-finished goods to some extent.

4.02 The construction industry compriseos a number of local and foreigncontractors capable of undertaking contracts of varying magnitude andcomplexity. However, due to the depressed state of the economy and, morespecifically, due to the shortage of foreign exchange for importation ofbuilding materials and equipment there has been for many years a slump in thesector. Given the availability of building materials, spares and equipmentthe construction industry has the capacity to mobilize rapidly.

Assessment of Plood Damaoe

4.03 The floods seriously disrupted industrial operations and produetion Inmost enterprises in Khartoum and key 4ndustr,al areas. 30-60 days ofproduction and provision of services were lost in the affected industrialaross as a result of loss of power supply, flooding of factories and accessroads and delays In supply of essential inputs including fuel. Workerabsenteeism was exceptionally high and protracted due to damage to housing andlack of public transportation. As a result of the loss of production andsales, enterprises experienced considerable financial strain compounded by asharp increase in prices of essential inputs due to scarcity.

4.04 Despite these constraints the business community responded withadmirable spontaneity to assist affected workers finaclally, especially inrelation to procurement of food and rebuilding of houses. Early measures werealso taken to resume production and at the time of this mission, enterpriseswere generally oporating nearly at levels achieved prior to the floods.Fortunately thero was no permanent damage to industrial plant and machinery ofany significance. Some inventories, especially oil seeds and packingmaterials, were damaged In a few instances.

4.05 Imports under the own-resources scheme which were hold up at Port Sudanhave begun to flow and thore sho-t 1 be a noticeable improvement in the supplysituation shortly. However, the -as of production during the floods will,for the current fiscal year, depress annual capacity utilization and affectthe profitability of most enterprises. With the economy adjusting to therecovery effort, demand for certain products and services, especially relatedto construction activity, will be on the increase. While it is conceivablethat the business community would increase Imports through the own-resources

- 34 -

sche_ , the situation would be improved by an increase in the availability ofessential 4nputs. Of particular Importance Is the availability of buildingmaterials, an aspect which Is delt with in the Reconstruction Program forthis sector. There is also the urgent need to rehabilitate and improveInfrastructure and sexvices damaged by the flood In and around the industrialarea, especially access roads, power supply, telecommunication facilities andsewage and Industrial waste disposal systems. These aspects are covered undervarious sector-l programs elseAwhere in this report.

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S.00 Power

The Power Subsector

5.01 The National Electricity Corporation (NEC) is responsible for theconstruction, operation and maintenance of Sudan's public electricity system.Power is generated at hydroelectric and oil and diesel fired power stations,details of which are contained in Table B-5-1, which also includes details ofplant under construction. The Blue Nile Grid (BNG) Interconnects the stationsvia about 500 km of 220 kV and 600 km of 110 kV transmission lines. Themaximum demand on the system in 1987 was 223 MW, and generation in 1987totalled 1,317 million kWh. NEC is also responsible for the Eastern Grid (EG)with an installed capacity of 27 MW of which 13 MS is hydro. A 110 kV line iscurrently under construction to interconnect the two grids. NEC alsomaintains and operates several isolated regional diesel stations.

5.02 NEC's generating plant, and 33 and 11 kV and 415 volt systems and itsequipment and vehicles are inadequately maintained due mainly to a shortage ofspare parts, compounded by deficiencies in technical ixpertise (para. 5.07),poor organization and inadequate staff discipline. The lack of spare parts ismainly brought about by NEC's inability to obtain the foreign currencyrequired for its procurement transactions. As a result of the lack of spareparts, NEC often has major items of equipment which are out of service becauseof the shortage of a minor replaceable part. Examples of system weaknessescaused by these shortcomings can be found in the Roseires intake desiltationequipment, at Burrn power station, in many parts of the distribution systemand in much of NEC's mobile plant and vehicles. Little progress seem to bebeing made to correct these deficiencies in NEC's methods of operation --deficiencies which were highlighted in the Bank's Appraisal Report for theongoing Power IV Project. The rains and flood highlighted these vulnerableareas and rendered Sudan's electricity system inoperative even though thecauses in many instances could have been prevented by routine maintenancemethods.

An Account of the Damaae Caused to the Power System Generation

5.03 At the Roseires and Sennar hydropower stations, during the flood period,intakes and cooling system were blocked by silt and debris, and output duringthe months of July, August and September was lower by about 50X compared tothe same period in 1987. This shortfall of 104 million kWh was made up, whenpossible, by generation at the oil and diesel-fired thenmal stations, at acost to Sudan's economy of about US$3.0 million equivalent of residual, heavyand light fuel oils.

5.04 Roseires power station intakes were damaged by heavy debris, and severalof the trash rack panels were bent or weakened and need replacing.

5.05 Khartoum North power station is being provided with technical assistanceby ODA (UK) in the form of seven engineering and technical advisers from thestaff of British Electricity International (BEI) consultants, and the stationwas soon back to full output, despite the effects on the station of system

- 36 -

disturbances caused by transmission and distribution faults, and despitedifflcult access over flooded roads which were inpassible even to four-wheeldrive vehicles.

5.06 The Burr4 power station basement was flooded during the stonm andseveral motors, contactors, and cables have been repaired on a temporary basispending supplies of replacement parts.

Transmission and Distribution

5.07 ODA employed British Electricity International to carry out a survey offlood damage to the Khartoum area systems. Their report, dated September1988, concluded that little damage had occurred in the 220 kV and 110 kVtransmission systems and on the 33 kV and 11 kV overhead lines, but that manyfaults had been experienced on the 33 kV and 11 kV underground systems. Thesefaults occurred mainly at terminations and joints, vhich, if the correctmaterials had been used could normally be expected to withstand temporarysubmersion in water. The report states that the large number of faults --over 100 11 kV and about ten 33 kV faults -- resulted from substandardmaterials and workmanship. By mid-September NEC's crews, working round-the-clock, had managed to repair more than eighty of these faults, a remarkableperformance under such difficult conditions and with so little materialresources. Unfortunately, many of these repairs were of a temporary nature,due to lack of materials and stores, and as a result about 50 joints will needto be remade. NEC staff will also need training in the jointing of the modernZIPS cables they have received under USAID assistance and which were used Inmany of the above repairs. It is confirmed that the materials and equipmentlisted In Annexes 3 and 4 of the BEI report are still urgently needed, and arenot interchangeable with those materials recently supplied by USAID.

5.08 The BEI report also indicates that some 3,000 consumer servicesIncluding meters, service boards and domestic fuseways, which are the propertyof NEC, were damaged, and these will require replacement when homes arerebuilt.

5.09 The damage to NEC equipment is estimated to total about US$1.7 millionequivalent, but the effect on the economy was many times this amount, and thefloods and storms have identified several weaknesses in NEC's equipment andsystems, which need to be corrected by components of the proposed program inorder to ensure that the system can weather similar conditions without theserious adverse effects on consumers that occurred this year.

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TABLE B-5-1

Generation Facilities of Blue Nile Grid

---Capacity (MW)---Power Plant Typos al Year kb No. Inst. 1988

Ratng. Ratng. Total

___________________________________________________________

Roselres h 71,72 3 30 30 90 ILRoseires h 79-84 3 40 40 120 8/Roselres h 89 1 40 0 0Sonner h 62 2 7.5 7.5 15Xhartoum North gt 89 2 1S 0 0Khartoum North s 85 2 33 33 66Khartoum North a 90,91 2 60 0 0Kuku 8t 85 1 15 12 12 f/Kukw gt 85 1 10 9 9 f/Kilo X gt 69 1 15 12 12 f/Burrn 56 2 5 3.5 7 elBurri 58,61 2 10 7 14 c/Burrl d 81 3 5 4 4d/Burrl d 84 4 10 8 24 eBurri gt 85 1 15 15 15.1/Burrn d 89 2 10 0 0W. Nedani d 67 2 3 1 2

Total available capacity (1988) 390 MW

a/ h - hydro, s - steam turbines, residual oil-fired,gt - gas turbine, distillate fueled, d - diesel, mostly run on heavyfuel oil.

hi Year of commissioning.

SI De-rated because of age or because of component restrictions.

A1 Two sets unavailable, due to lack of spares.

el Two sets unavailable, due to lack of spares.

fl Not always available due to frequent stoppage for emergencymaintenance and lack of spares.

&I Seasonal (unavailability in dry and flood season April-September).

- 39 -

6.00 Teleccggun$cations

Sector Descriution

6.01 Public telecoaumunications in Sudan are provided by the government-ownedSudan Telecommunication Public Corporation (STPC) founded in 1978 andoporating under the Ministry of Public Commmnications. Sudan has about 70,000direct excharge lines (DEL.) of which about 70S are in Khartoum and the restare in 10 main provincial towns. Khartoum and the main towns are connected bya network of terrestrial microwave radio, a domestic satellite system andoverhead trunk lines. International service is provided through a STDIA earthsatellite station located at Um Hersa in Rhartoum.

6.02 Sudan has one of the lowest telephone and telex facilities in Africa.Its telophone density of 0.3 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants is far belowthe density of 0.6 in Sub Saharan Africa. The facilities fall far short ofthe minimum required for S4dan's level of economic development, as reflectedIn the long lists of applicants most of whom have been waiting for over tenyears.

6.03 In addition to the inadequacy in facilities, the quality of service isunacceptably low. On the average, more than 601 of the telephones are faultyat any given time. The poor state of the network is accentuated during thenormal rainy season when more than half of the outside plant breaks down, atwiUch time it is estimated that less than 20S of all local calls, less than101 of STD calls and less than 4S of Incoming international calls aresuccessful, resulting in substantial economic and financial losses to thecountry and STPC. This fact was demonstrated by a recent survey conducted bythe National Energy Administration (NEA). Drivers were interviewed at randomin Khartoum between 9 - 12 in the morning. They were asked whether they wouldhave been on the road if they had a working telephone. 63Z said that theywould not have been on the road If they had access to a working telephone.Out of these 63Z, 751 of them had telephones but not in working order whilethe rest did not have telephone service. Considering that the petrol bill forSudan in 1986 was US$ 300 million equivalent, even saving 102 of this wouldmean an estimated saving of $30 million in fuel costs. When the savings inspare parts, maintenance and wasted manpower time spent driving through thecongested streets of Khartoum are added up, this figure of US$ 30 millioncould be doubled.

6.04 The inferior quality of service is mainly due to old and obsolete cablesand switching equipment. More than 501 of the switching equipment wasinstalled over 20 years ago (normal lifetime is about 15 years) and the cableis more than 30 years old (normal lifetime is about 20 years).Notwithstanding the age of the plant, the quality of service would be betterif it had been well maintained. The plant has been operating for decadeswithout proper maintenance, due mainly to the lack of spare parts, which hadto be procured with scarce foreign currency, and the lack of propermaintenance systems and operating procedures.

- 40 -

6.05 STPC's technical problem are compounded by the lack of a soundinstitutional framework at sector and entity levels. Although STPC has been acorporation since 1978, it has remained for all practical purposes aGovernment department which must follow all the policies and procedures of thecivil servic, with respect to planning, finance, purchasing and personnel.STPC has therefore little or no autonomy; this remains the single mostimportant issue In the sector. In addition, STPC9"s overall organization andmanagement are inadequate to operate the network efficiently and plan for itsrational development. The lack of adequate organization and management iscompounded by a shortage of trained manpower and lack of motivation.

6.06 Even before the floods, the World Bank had proposed to extend assistanceto Sudan towards the improvement of the sector, and a rehabilitation projectis under preparation. This assistance was to be extended in two stages. Inthe first Stage, the Bank would finace urgently required equipment and spareparts, estimated to cost US$ 7.2 million. In the second stage, the Bank wouldfinance part of a medium term (1988-1991) emergency rehabilitation programestimated to cost US$ 84 million. During the second stage, the framework forthe long term viability of the sector would be laid down through appropriateinstitutional reforms including: establishment of an organization structureresponiave to commercial operations including granting of adequate financialand administrativo autonomy to the Board of Directors and to the management ofthe operating entity (STPC); establishment of a framework for andimplemntation of integrated technical, financial and economic management andcontrol systems; preparation and execution of a manpower development andtrainin program; and establishment and implementation of a comprehensivenetwork operations and maintenance system.

State of the Network after the Floods

6.07 Given the fact that even during normal rains more than half of theoutside plant is rendered unusable,the effects of the August 1988 torrentialrains that flooded a large part of the telecomlmmications system weredevastating to the network. On August 5, 1988, immediately after the heaviestrains, there was a total telephone blackout in Khartoum. Under normal rainsmost service is usually restored within a month, but three months after thebeginning of the rains, more than 801 of the subscribers are still withoutservice. A detailed record of faults in the best areas of Khartoum (KhartoumCentral and South) is shown in Annex 6 Table 1. The other areas of Khartoumare much worse especially Khartoum North and Omdurman where more than 95Z ofthe telephones are faulty and will remain so for a long time. Many otherareas of Sudan were also affected especially the Northern part where 1500 kmof open wire routes have been washed away and switching equipment have beenbadly damaged. Standby power equipment was also severely damaged in manyparts of Sudan due to power cuts which necessitated continuous running of thestandby power supply. The estimated loss in revenue to STPC so far is LS 20.0million (US$ 4.4 million) equivalent.

6.08 STPC has been working hard to restore service but it has been severelyhampered by lack of materials, tools, test equipment and transportation. Even

- 41 -

with the meagre available resources, STPC has managed to restore partialservice in the Khartoum Central and South exchanges but a much remains to bedone. As stated in paras 6.03 - 6.04 most of the plant was in such bad shapethat any repairs that have been done are only temporary and the only long termsolution is complete replacement. This fact was proven during the rais whenthe same cables developed new faults at different points after repair.

Assessment of the Damage

6.09 The mission reviewed tho list of damaged plant and equipment prepared bySTPC. The list included 170,000 pair - km of cable in Khartoum and 19provincial eentres; 1500 pair km of OR routes in 8 rural towns; 8200 lines ofmanual exchanges in 35 rural areas, spare parts and replacement eauipment forswitching, transmission, power and airconditioning equipment; tools and testequipment and transport facilities. The total estimated cost of all theseitems is US$ 21.8 million for the foreign exchange component and LS 38.0 forthe local component or a total of US$ 30.2 million. The main areas affectedare shown in the map at annex 6.

6.10 Since practically all the items listed above (para 6.09) were already ina very poor state of disrepair, it is difficult to determine precisely thedamage actually caused by the floods. Except the rural components (OH linesand umnual switching) all of the listed items had already been included In themedium term rehabilitation program that is currently under preparation (para6.06). The flood disaster gave rise to the followings (a) the urgent need forthe US$ 7.2 million equipment and spare parts has now been accentuated. (b)the scope of urgent equipment and spare parts required is now much larger; and(c) most of the equipment and plant planned for replacement as part of themedium term investment program has suffered further severe deterioration andthe urgent need to implement this program has been accelerated.

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7. 00 The Transiort Sector

Hiiawavs

IntroductionLDescrivtion

7.01 Suden's paved road network totals about 2,300 Km. This does not includeabout 150 Km of paved roads in the Rahad Irrigation scheme generally regardedas private, although maintained by RBPC on en agency basis. The paved roadswest of the White Nile (about 600 Km in total) were not inspected by themission, but the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC), the responsibleagency for all paved roads in the country, reports that there is no flooddamage of any magnitude on these roads. The maintenance of the unpaved roadsis the responsibility of the local authorities, but in reality very littlework is carried out on these roads. When these tracks are damaged by floodand traffic, the vehicles move to another alignment until it becomes necessaryto make still another move. The flood-damage assessment and the recommendedhighway component in the proposed Reconstruction Program is therefore limitedto the 945 Km. inspected during the mission and the 762 Km included In theKh&rtoum - Port Sudan Reconstruction Project (KPSRP), which is underpreparation. In terms of cost, the most severe effect of the flood is relatedto the additional cost to repair the Khartoua - Port Sudan road. ThisProject, originally estimated to cost US$92 million, will be funded by ODA,Norway and IDA, with a US$10 million gap beforo the flood uncovered. Therewas also lesser damage on the roads In Central Sudan as detailed in Table B-7-1.

7.02 Some of the damage to the highways in Sudan came as a result of localresidents either cutting through the embankment to reduce the flood levels intheir residential area or blocking culvert Inlets to try to lead the floodwater away from their houses. As soon as the water subsided, RBPC was able toprovide temporary crossings, and the traffic was generally back to normalwithin a short time although a more permanent repair will be needed at a laterdate.

Assessment of Flood Damage

7.03 RBPC's capacity is limited by institutional as well as technical andfinancial shortcomings. It is therefore quite remarkable to observe thevolume and quality of work that the maintenance branch has been able toperform since the rains ended and it became possible to start work.Consequently, the need for assistance in the highway sector is less thanoriginally anticipated when the first damage reports were received.

7.04 It is estimated that the direct cost to Government to restore the 945 Kmof paved roads inspected during the mission to pre-flood condition isequivalent to US$1.9 million (not counting depreciation on equipment). Adetailed breakdown of the estimated cost of this flood damage for the 945 Kminspected is given in Table B-7-1. It can be seen that the damage is limitedin scope and severity. In addition, the Bank mission determined that there is

- 44 -

a substantial cost increase on the Khartoum - Port Sudan RehabilitationProject (KPSRP), on the order of US$16.4 million (see Table B-7-2), due toflood and rain damage. These estimates are based upon the best informationavailable at the tlme of the mission. It should, however, be pointed outthat, in addition, it is possible that the pavements have suffered damage thatwill only show up over time. This is due to the fact that in many places, theroad has been completely submerged over long sections and over a fairly longperiod of time and as a result, the bond between the various pavement layers,especially between the base and the asphalt, has been affected. On the PortSudan road the combiaation of the heavy rains and an already weakened roadstructure has resulted in the need to extend the length of the sections to berehabilitated. In general, it Is very difficult to draw the line betweendamage due to the recent flood and damage due to overloading over a longperiod of time, combined with insufficient maintenance.

RBPC'S Crash Proaram for Maintenance and Reconstruction

7 05 The various maintenance crews in RBPC's outstations are in the processof repairing the damage to the shoulders, embankments and the pavement itself.Lack of transport, spares and materials reduces the efficiency of theirefforts The repair work is also taking scarce resources away from theregular maintenance operations. It is anticipated that the rehabilitationoperation (apart from the KPSRP) will take about two years to complete,assuming that all necessary resources are provided in a timely manner.

7.06 On the main road to Port Sudan, espe Lally on the sections betweenGedaref and Haiya, there is a need for se a urgent repairs to keep the trafficgoing until the KPSRP gets underway. The Program is designed to increaseRBPC's capacity to carry out such repairs.

7.07 Under the World BSank Third Highway Project, presently in theimplementation stage, some urgently needed heavy equipment and transport isbeing provided. Procurement has been extremely slow, but the first deliveriesare expected in November, 1988. This will alleviate some of the capacityproblem in RBPC, but there is still an urgent need for assistance to replaceworn out vehicles and equipment, provide spare parts end to purchaseadditional materials for road construction and repair. Some tasks are vellsuited for small local contractors.

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TABLE 8-7-1SUOAN EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

HIGHWAY SECTORSUMMARY OF DAMA6E ASSESSMENT

SECTION VOLUME UNIT COST F.e.c. FOREIGN LOCAL IMPL.WORK REQUIRED RATE US$ US$ S COST COST STATUS

T.KHARTOUM-WAD MEDANI 187 KmRaise embankment cbm 1365 13 17745 56 8873 8873 Not yetOverlay tons 3500 SO 176000 80 146800 35000Culverts 8606m m 52 200 10400 SO 5200 6200 aConcrete cbm 40 180 720 18 720 6480Shoulder repair cb 26600 15 388000 16 3600 276000 80X complPatching tons 1060 70 78009 80 66600 14000 OngoingRip rap cbh 60 75 4500 18 450 4050 Not yet

SUBTOTAL 584845 241243 343603

2.WAD MEDANI-GEDAREF 227 KmRaise embankment cbm 2400 13 31208 50 15668 15566 No' yetShoulder material cb 7906 18 142260 10 14220 127986 OngoingOverlay tons 950 50 47508 88 38000 9SOO Not yetCulvert an 91 200 18208 SO 9100 9188Rip Rap cbr 1800 75 75006 18 7560 67500 a

SUBTOTAL 314100 84426 229680

3. WAD MEOANI-SENNAR 118 KmShoulder material cbi 1808 15 15600 SO 7580 7600 OngoingPatching tons 758 70 52586 98 42808 10500

SUBTOTAL 67508 49580 18800

4.SENNAR-KOSTI 107KMShoulder material cbm 2080 18 36800 SO 18608 19800 OngoingPatching tons 1560 70 105008 88 84000 21000

SUBTOTAL 141000 182080 39000

5. RABAK-ED DUEIM 96KM Under reconstruction6.E0 DUEIM-JEBEL AULIAlS6KmFerry ramp protection 4000 75 300000 80 240000 60000 New Contr

7. OHURMAN-WADI SAYDf4AZk1tRecostr.Sha4bat bridge 150800 60 90888 60000 New contrCulvert " 221 200 44200 50 22100 22100 PertlyShoulder m*terial cbn 10000 is 158808 50 75000 75000 CompletedRip Rap cbm 108 7S 7588 18 7S0 6750 Not yetPatching tons 180 70 7000 88 5600 1400

SUBTOTAL 358700 193450 165250

8.KHARTOUM N.-EL GEILI42KmCulverts n 195 200 39000 SO 19588 19508 Not yetShoulder material cbm 5800 15 75800 SO 37588 37580 PartlyRip Rap cbm 1088 75 75080 18 7500 67500 Not yetPatching tons SO 70 3500 80 2800 700

SUBTOTAL 192588 67300 1252809.KHARTOUN-P.SUDAN RD.(ADD) 702 Km 16380800 82 13431600 2948408------------------------------------------------------------ __---------------__-

GRAND TOTAL 1647 Km 18271145 79 14360813 3911133------------------------------------------------------------ __---------------__-

ROADS NOT INCLUDED: Rahad Scheme 156 Km AgricultureSennar-Singa 85 Km No damage reportedWestern Sudan 458 Km

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TABLE B-7-2

PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATIONCOST ESTIMATE (Irt US$. 1988 Price Level)

Link RehabilItation Distance USS/km CostMeasure (kin) (1000) (Mill. USS)

1. Gedaref - Kassala Reconstructlon 31 318 9.9(208 km) Overlay 80 mn 176 0.0

Overlay 70 mn 34 152 5.2Overlay 60 mn 65 141 9.2Overlay 50 mn 123 0.0Overlay 40 n 78 105 8.2

Subtotal 208 32.4

2. Kassala - Halya Reconstruction 10 340 3.4(south, km 0-120) Overlay 80 nmn 179 0.0

Overlay 70 mn 15 159 2.4Overlay 60 nun 140 0.0Overlay 50 mn 120 0.0Overlay 40 mn 50 101 5.1

Subtotal 75 10.8

3. Kassala - Halya Reconstruction 290 0.0(north,an 344-351) Overlay 80 mn 156 0.0

Overlay 70 mn 138 0.0Overlay 60 mn 5 121 0.6Overlay 50 nun 103 0.0Overlay 40 - 1s 86 1.3

Subtotal 20 1.9

4. Halya - Port Sudan Reconstruction 2 290 0.6(204 kIn) Overlay 80 mn 12 156 1.9

Overlay 70 m 138 0.0Overlay 60 m S6 121 6.8Overlay 50 mm 48 103 4.9Overlay 40 mn 86 86 7.4

Subtotal 204 21.6

Road Furniture 1.3

Total 507Flood Estimate 387 68.0Dlfference 120 55.0

13.0Contingencies (physical

+ price) 3.4

Grand Total 16.4

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7.00 Railways

Introduction/Description

7.08 Sudan's 4800 km railway system is the largest in Africa. Started in1897, most of the track was constructed before 1930 under the Anglo-Egyptiancondominium. Sudan Railway Corporation's (SRC) main route extends from PortSudan via Atbara to Khartoum, with an alternate link between the port andSennar via Kassala; there are branch lines north to Karim and Wadi Halfa onthe border with Egypt; west to El Obeid and Nyala and south to Wau. Althoughthe rail system ia extensive and has a significant advantage in distance overroad transport, the quality of rail service is poor. Railway facilities areold; much of the track Is in poor condition and needs renewal; and lack ofspare parts affects virtually every facet of rail operations. Night timesignalling is almost non-existent due to lack of bulbs and batteries and thetelecommunications system is subject to frequent breakdowns.

7.09 By far the greatest problem, however, has been and is especially so atthe moment, the low availability of locomotives, largely due to lack ofpreventive maintenance, delayed main overhaul and a chronic shortage of spareparts. As of October 1988 only 39 out of 136 main line locomotives wereoperative.

7.10 Aggravating the lack of spare parts and availability of equipment havebeen problems of management. Top management turnover has been high due to lowsalaries and the lure of some managers to higher paying jobs in the Gulfstates, but also to the en masse resignation, in protest over 60verrment'sdecentralization directives, of eight managers in 1982. All these problemsresulted in a decline in traffic from over 3.0 million tons in the early 1970sto about 600,000 tons in 1987.

7.11 As SRC's deterioration continued and bankruptcy became more imminent,Government's perception of SRC changed. Renewed focus was placed on the linkbetween the revival of efficient, reliable train service and the recovery ofSudan's economy. Government began to realize that SRC's immediate survivalwas at stake. To arrest further deterioration in SRC's financial andoperating performance and to Improve utilization of existing capacity,Government in 1987 requested the Bank to put together a multi-donor RailwayEmergency Recovery Program (RERP). At the same time, Government took boldsteps to strengthen SRC's management and organization structure, includingappointing a highly experienced general manager. While SRC has yet to see thebenefits of the RERP - the Project is only just getting underway, the changeswithin SRC's management clearly have been beneficial. The average number oftrains per day between Port Sudan and Khartoum have increased from about 0.7to 1.7 in the past year and SRC is increasingly concentrating its locomotiveresources on the most lucrative traffic, carrying block trains of bulk freightbetween Khartoum and Port Sudan.

7.12 The RERP (US$99.5 million), for which an IDA Credit of US$35 million was

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approved (Cr. 1894-SU, signed June 10, 1988) and for which other donors (AfDB,the EEC, the Government of the Netherlands, KfW and ODA) have approvedfinancing totalling US$64.4 million, includes technical assistance andtraining, locomotive running spares and the rehabilitation of 75 main linelocomotives and 43 shunting locomotives, emergency track materials and otheressential investments for a three year period. The institutional andmanagerial aspects that might require attention within the context of a floodrelief program, and other long term measures related to the repercussions ofthe flood and heavy rains, are bein8 catered for within the context of theRERP. The recommended flood recovery program outlined below, therefore, islimited to short term measures that can be carried out within a two yearperiod.

Assessment of Flood Damage and Temporary Restoration Measures

7.13 Of SRC's single line network of 4764 km, the stretch most severelyaffected by the August/September 1988 rainfall and the concurrent flooding ofthe Nile River and its tributaries, the Atbara and Gash, was the 787 km mainline from Khartoum to Port Sudan. The embankment was washed away at numerouslocations (12 between Khartoum and Atbara and 13 between Atbara and PortSudan) totalling 6 km in length, with the longest breach of 800 meters, theshortest of 20 meters and an average of 240 meters. One bridge of two 15 footspans near Khartoum North was washed out because of an Inadequate dischargecapacity. The first washouts occurred on August 4 and the last on September13, 1988. The main Khartoum-Port Sudan line was without service for 42 days,from August 4 until September 15. Restoration work commenced immediately oncethe flood water started receding and was organized in an exemplary, efficientmanner. Earthmoving equipment was borrowed from the Sea Pores C-<poration,the Atbara cement factory, and the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation asSRC's own machinery was inadequate to cope with the task in all sectors of therailway. The smaller breached sections were restored within three to sevendays but access to many of the longer breached sections was delayed bystanding water. Four sections were each breached three times after completionof the restored embankment. The restoration required movement of nearly onemillion cubic meters of earth at a cost of approximately LSd 12 million. Theformation was also superficially damaged by the torrential raiDs over a routelength of approximately 50 km. throwing the track out of line and level,resulting In further speed restrictions. A drive has been initiated by thetrack maintenance gangs to rectify these superficial defects and restorenormal speed within the next three months.

7.14 The Wadi-Halfa branch line with the Karima spur (total 816 km.), takingoff at Atbara to the Northern Region was the next worst affected sections 27locations were breached, heavy scouring under the sleepers occurred at another15 sites and the washaways totalled 2.6 km. The maximum breach length was 800meters, the minimum 22 meters, and the average was 97 meters. About 60,000cubic meters of earth were moved to restore communications at a cost of LSd2.0 million and traffic dislocation lasted 45 days. The SRC is the only modeof transportation in this region and although the line is lightly usednormally, the dislocation delayed relief access to severely flooded areas ofKarima.

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7.15 The Khartoum-Babanousa (988 km) and the Kassala loop (882 km) were alsoaffected. An aggregate of 2.2 km vere breached in sections ranging from 65 to198 meters, requiring about 80,000 cubic meters of earthwork, and costing anestimated LSd 3.0 million.

7.16 Damages to SRC's workshops and other fixed assets bave been limited.

7.17 In addition to the direct costs lncurred by SRC to repair damages to thepermanent way (LSd 17.0 million), the loss of revenue due to interruption ofoperations for 42 days is estimated at LSd 14.9 million.

Proaram for Permanent Restoration. Flood Damaze Containment Measures andImproved Restoration Capacity

7.18 SRC's response and effort to cope with the flood damage were admirable.On its own, with borrowed equipment and determination, SRC rebuilt embankmentsIn flooded areas scattered over 2000 km of its network well before the waterssubsided, repairlng nearly 11 km of washouts in total along its lines, andrestoring rail service within a reaarkably brief perlod given the constraintsof lack of adequate equlpment and communications.

7.19 Permanent Way. The breached embankments have been restored sufficientlyto allow the circulation of traffic at restricted speeds. Before normal speedcan be allowed, the top width and side slopes of the rail embankments willhave to be improved and the track level and alignment rectified. Moreover, tocontain future damage, it will be necessary to repair and supplement existingprotection works by laying gabions and filter cloth on the flood side slope ofthe embankments of the SRC main lines, especially from Khartoum to Port Sudan.Also, the bridge washed away near Khartoum will need to be rebuilt quicklywith an enlarged span of 20 meters. To execute the necessary repair work,earth moving equipment, gabions, steel culvert pipes, and motorized railtransport for the gangs and transport of materials are to be acquired by SRC.These measures will enable SRC to reduce the post-flood journey time forfreight trains between Port Sudan and Khartoum from 63.5 hours to the pre-flood average of 51 hours. A heavy duty rail breakdown crane is necessary togive SRC the capacity to rerail and retrieve accident wagons and locomotivesand clear accident sites more quickly than is possible now. During therepairs to the washaways, the restoration trains carrylig men and materialsincurred considerable risks of derailment or capslzing on the newly builtsodden embankments as the work advanced at each breach site. Fortunately noaccident occurred; otherwise recovery and restoration would have beenseriously setback.

7.20 Telecommunications. The weaknesses of the telecommunications systemwithin SRC were most graphically revealed during the flood emergency. Railheadquarters in Khartoum remained virtually cut-off from Atbara's railoperations center for several days. Damage to the land lines, paucity of railtrolleys, both personnel carriers and inspection vehicles, delayedtransmission of vital information of flood damage to the railways to SRC'sheadquarters and to Atbara. Lack of telecommunications equipment and trolleys

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*Is* hampered assembly and distribution of initial material help as well astho subsequent organization of the large scale efforts in movement of men andmaterials In trains. To execute the necessary repair work to thetelecommunications system, provUde improved - e communication to meetemergencies, and to facilitate deployment of repair and maintenance staff, itLa essential that telecommunications spares, radio equipment, cross countryvehicles and motor trolleys are acquired.

7.21 A program designed to meot these needs has been put together by SRC withtheassistance of a multi-donor flood recovery and railways supervisionmission. Once having acquired the equipment and materials outlined above, inconjunction with the improvements to its general management and operationsforeseen in the 1989-1991 RERP, SRC will have adequate capacity and skills toexecute the required repair works and will be in a better position to meetfuture similar emergencies.

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8.00 Urban

8.01 The major focus of the Mission's urban damage assessment exercise was onthe national capital area of Khartoum, by far the largest single urban centeraffected by the flood. The capital is made up of three towns, Khartoum,Khartoum North and Omdurman, situated at the confluence of the White and BluoNile rivers. The capital regional city is administered by a Com$issioneratowhich oversees the activities of three Area Councils which further subdividein 37 town councils. Over the past five years, the population of metropolitanKhartoum has grown from one million to its present size of over 3 millionpeople. This growth has occurred as a result of the national populationincrease at the rate of nearly 32 per annum and massive and ongoing rural-urban migration triggered by a serious drought in 1984 and a five-year oldcivil war in the South. The rapid rise in Khartoum's population has put urbanservices under severe and mounting pressure. Many thousands of peopledisplaced from the West and South of the country by drought and war or throughnatural rural-urban migration have squatted in unplanned and unserviced areasaround the fringe of the planned urban center. Unplanned areas are alsooccupied by thousands of long-term settled residents of the city who cannotfind accommodation in the planned areas. Table B-8-1 gives an estimate of thedistribution of both the settled and displaced population by planned andunplanned areas. Urban institutions have not been able to cope withmaintaining adequate levels of services, much less providing additionalservices to match the growing demand. Existing infrastructure had alreadydeteriorated before the on-set of the recent floods. There is effectively noform of urban planning to manage short-term or long-term urban growth.

TABLE B-8-1

Population Distribution in Khartoum (1988)

(In Thousands)

Population Group Area---------------------------------

Planned Unplanned Total---------------------------------------------------------

Settled Population 1,600 400 2,000

Displaced Population 151 839 1,000

Total 1,751 1,239 3,000

Source:-----Census-----and---Mission---------------------

Sources Census and Mission estimates.

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8.02 Assessments were made for damage to housing, roads and drains, watersupply, sewerage systems and solid waste in both planned and unplanned areas.Table B-8-2 summarizes the total est$mated loss of housing and infrastructureto Khartoum as a result of the flood amounting to US$125 million. Damageassessments concerning agriculture, schools, and health facilities In Khartoumare treated elsewhere in the report.

TABLE B-8-2

Summarv Flood Damate Assessment to Khartoum

Sub-sector US$ Million

A. Housing 104.0B. Streets and Drains 12.8C. Water 1/ 7.2D. Sewerage 1.0E. Solid Waste 2/ Nil

Total 125.0

1/ Includes $6.0 million of damage to Port Sudan, Thorak andE1 Gedaref water supplies.

21 Damage to access roads to refuse tips included in roads anddrains.

Urban Housing

8.03 It is conservatively esti$ated that Suxdan suffered the total or partialloss of about 180,000 dwellings during the flood, with a combined replacementcost of over $116 million. Much of this loss was experienced in urban area ofthe national capital, Khartoum.

8.04 The vast majority of Sudan's urban dwelling units are constructed ofmolded bricks or monolithic earth walls (jalous). The most common roofsinclude those made of mud supported on timber beams and joints (m$rigs &shazis)and matting (birisch) and those made out of corrugated cement asbestosor steel roofing sheets. A small proportion of urban housing is made of kiln-fired bricks under flat concrete roofs. The majority of houses depend on aform of mud and straw plaster for waterproofing. A few houses that haveoverhanging roofs and flat roofs are normally drained by a series of spoutsprojecting through the parapet wall just above the roof line. The main causesof damage included water penetration as result of wind driven rain, thescouring action of sand-laden water rushing down walls, the capillary effectof standing pools of water moving up the interior of walls causing thestructure to 'melt' and the undercutting of the base of houses by watercurrents circulating in the residential areas. In many cases plots were leftwithout any trace of earlier occupation except for the outline of a mudfoundation.

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8.05 The urban area of the national capital region of Khartoum, the locationof the largest concentration of urban dwellers, suffered the greatest housingdamage measured in number of units. It Is estimated that percentages ofhousing affected in planned and unplanned areas was 12 and 60 percent,respectively. This involved a total of approximately 158,000 units. Thetraditional sundried mud construction of dwellings, often located in naturaldraliage channels, accounts for the higher figure in the unplanned ares.Estimates of total housing damage In other parts of Sudan and an assumptionabout the rate of urbanisation along the Nile river led to the conclusion thatthere are approximately 21,000 damaged dwellings in other urban areas.Efforts at relief so far are confined to the distribution of several thousandtents through Government and NGO channels. Few families have startetdreconstruction of their dwellings owing principally to lack of funds. Thehigh post-flood prices for water and food have reduced the propensity to spendon shelter. Lack of secure tenure In many areas of Khartoum has alsocontributed to the delay in rebuilding.

TABLE B-8-3

Estimated Damates to Urban HousingHouses Damaged or Destroyed

No. of EstimatedRetions Location Units Replacement Costs

(US$ Million)

National Capital Three Areas 158,000 104.0Councils

Northern Southern 3,000 1.8MerowelKarlma 6,000 3.6Other Centers 5,400 3.2

Other Regions Eastern 2,000 1.2Kordofan 800 0.5Other 4,000 2.4

GRAND TOTAL 179,200 116.7

Assumptions:

1. Average cost of repairingireplacing urban dwelling outsideRhartoum is $600.2. Average cost of rehabilitating housing in planned and

unplanned areas is $1200 and $500 respectively.3. Percentage of housing affected in planned and unplanned

areas is 12 and 60 percent, respectively.

Sourcet Ministry of Planning and Mission estimates.

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Urban Streets and Drains

8.06 The length of all streets in Greater Khartoum, including Rhartoum,Omdurman and Khartoum North, totals about 3000 km. Of this about 400 km arepaved and engineered streets. The rest are unengineered earth tracks, rangingfrom small lanes on the outer areas that are not trafficked by cars to earthtracks in residential areas receiving traffic in excess of 250 vehicles perday. Major through routes are dual-carriage ways with four to six lanes, inall about 38 km. The draineOe system consists of minor drains, mostly alongboth sides of the paved streets, and major collector drains taking water tothe Nile. Drains are either built drains of concrete or bricks or open earthchannels. Table B-8-4 shows an approximate inventory of streets and drains inGreater Khartoum.

TABLE B-8-4

Streets and Drains Inventory (Approximate)(Lengths in KM)

Khartoum Omdurman Khartoum NorthDual Carriage Ways 14 12 2Paved streets 215 115 55Earth gravel 1071 973 533Total 1300 1100 600Major built drains 37 22 14Major earth drains 29 41 naMinor built drains 300 250 150Minor earth drains 100 100 100

8.07 Many of the streets have deteriorated badly over the last decade, mostlydue to neglect of preventive maintenance. A large percentage of the pavedstreet network is in such poor condition that normal maintenance is no longereffective. The streets require rehabilitation or reconstruction to becomemaintainable. Of particular concern is the poor condition of the majorthrough streets. Nearly half of the length of the dual carriageway system isin very poor condition, and about 25Z, or 8 km, requires reconstruction. Theexisting drainage system is inadequate. Drains are filled with sand andgarbage and are frequently clogged at crossing accesses. After heavy rains,ponds of water stand for a long time and create a health hazard. The waterbecomes contaminated, a breeding ground for waterborne diseases.

8.08 The responsibility for maintenance of streets and drains in Khartoumrests with the Commissionerate of Engineering Affairs and Health. The RoadsDepartment of the Director General of Engineering Affairs is directly chargedwith the responsibility for maintenance of paved streets. The Area Councilsand the Town Councils are directly responsible for maintenance of major drainsand minor drains respectively.

8.09 The overall picture of the streets and drains is not different from pre-flood conditions. Some structural damage to streets and drains has been

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observed, which can bo directly related to the effects of the flood,especially paved streets which have deteriorated more rapidly than wouldotherwise have been the case. The flood may also have negative long-termeffects on the pavement strength, the effects of which cannot yet be observed.In general, it Is not possible to distinguish precisely between damages due toflood on the one side and damages due to backlog of preventive maintenance onthe other. The institutions charged with the maintenance responsibility havelimited capacity both In terms of funds and equipment. So far no majorrehabilitation activity has been started.

8.10 The condition of the streets and drains has been assessed from visualinspection of the most of the network. There appears to be a closerelationship between the age-profile of the network and the seriousness of thedamage; the older the construction or rehabilitation, the more completefailures are observed. Only a few failures which could be due to interiorstructural pavement strength could be observed. Damages on five bridges onthe El Afun Road in the East of the Nile area, and 30 km of newly constructedembankment, were reported by the DG of COEA. These damages were not inspectedby the Mission,.

8.11 A sumary of the flood damage assessment is given In Table B-8-5. Thestandard used to arrive at this assessment was that of a fully restored roadnetwork, considerably higher than that of the system imnediately before theflood. Flood related damage is estimated to be 15 percent of this total or $12.8 million.

TABLE B-8-5

Estimated Damages to Khartoum Streets and Drains

Item US$ (Million)

a. Dual carriage ways 9.4b. Two-lane streets 57.1c. Major structures 0.5d. Major collector drains 4.7e. Minor drains 11.6f. Blockage to paved streets 2.6g. Other minor drainage 1.0

Total 86.9------------------------------------------------------------------ __-----

15X flood related 12.8Source----Co----is-ioner--te-of--------------and--ank--staff----t_-------

Source: Cominlssionerste of Khartoum, and Bank staff estimates.

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Urban Water SuiilX

8.12 The Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources is responsible for bothurban and rural water supply through the National Urban Water Corporation(NUIC) and the National Corporation for Development of Rural Water Resources(NCDRWR). NUWC is responsible for all urban water supply functions includingoperation and ma"ntenance except for some urban systems that are still underNCDRWR. NUWC Is decentralized as follows:

- National level 2 Headquarters in Khartoum- Regional level s Regional offices in 7 Regions- Town level * 65 urban offices.

NUMC operates at present 65 urban water supply systems. Detailed Informationabout the urban water sector Is available in the UNDP/World Bank financed"Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Review Report* which will be issuedtovards the end of 1988.

8.13 Flood damages have been reported from the following towns: Khartoum,Port Sudan, Tokar, El Gedaref/Showak, most of the towns in the Northern Regionand some other towns.

- KhArtoum's water supply system (5 treatment plants and approx. 110boreholes) did not receive major damage but some facilities havebeen affected. Operational problems did occur due to the heavysilt load of the raw water and the frequent power failures. Thepower fluctuations caused additional damage to electricalinstallations.

- Port Sudan has reported that the transmission main to the town hasbeen damaged. Also boreholes, pump-sets and sand filter beds havebeen affected.

- Tokar reports heavy damage to boreholes, equipment, generators,submersible pumps and transmission mains. Complete new water-works facilities would be required.

- El Gedaref/Showak. These two towns have been visited by aconsultant financed by KfW and a detailed damage report andproject proposal is available. It is reported that all productionwells have been flooded and the treatment plant itself was forsome time 5 meters under water. All electrical equipment is outof order including two emergency generators of 700 and 1000 kVA.

- Towns in the Northern Region. Most of the towns were affected.In some towns the water-works were completely out of order.Boreholes, pump-sets, generators and the distribution system areaffected.

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Except for Gedaref/Sbowak detailed flood damage reports are not available.However, it is estimated that the total damage to urban water supply$nstsllations amounts to approximately USs 7.20 million. For details seeTable B-8-6

TABLE B-8-6

Urban Watet SupplySummary of Flood DsmaRe Assessment

Description of Items Quantities Estimated DamageUS$ Million

Affected pipelines fittings andvalves of uIs 50-500 =n, mainlyAC pipes 100 km 2.90

Submersible pump-setsQ - 40 - 75 m3/h 70 No 0.50

Horisontal centrifugal pump-setsfor treatment plantsQ - 250 - 500 m31h 20 No 0.70

Air compressors for filter-bedwVshing 10 No 0.10

Standby generators from 30 to1000 RVA 42 No 2.00

Sundries -- 1.00

Total 7.20

…-----------------------------------------------------------------__----

Sources National Urban Water Corporation and Mission estimates----------------------------------------------------------- __-----------

Urban SeveraRe

8.14 Khartoum is the only urban area in Sudan with a sewerage system. TheSanitary Engineering Department, vithin the Khartoum Commissionerate, isresponsible for planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance ofthe sewerage system. The department has approximately 1000 employees, ofwhich 25 are engineers and 35 technicians. More information about the sewerage

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and sanitation sector in general is available in the UNDPIWorld Bank-financed"Water and Sanitation Sector Review Report- which will be issued towards theend of 1988.

8.15 The piped sanitati6n systems cover part of old Khartoum and theindustrial area of Khartoum North. Omdurman has no sewerage system. It isestimated that about 300,000 inhabitants are connected to the systems. Thereare three treatment plants, 16 sewerage pumping stations and a seweragenetwork of about 145 km. Flood damages have occurred mainly in the seweragenetwork. People removed/broke manhole covers in order to get rid of the stormwater which flooded their houses. Thus mud, sand and debris entered thesewerage system and caused blockages. In some roads settlement over the sewerlines occurred. It has yet to be investigated to what extent the seweragepipelines have been damaged in these roads. Storm water also flooded somepumping station and caused damage to the electrical installations. Thevisible damage to the sewerage systew is relatively small. The costs forcleaning of the sewerage system are difficult to estimates. In total, theflood damage may be in the order of US$1 million.

Solid Waste Management

8.16 Khartoum's capacity to manage its solid waste has been deteriorating forseveral years. Cultural attitudes towards waste, the declining economicsituation and the growing population have combined to reduce refuse collectionand disposal to a minimal level despite the acquisition of additionalequipment in recent years. One or two attempts to involve the private sectorin garbage collection have not proved entirely successful owing to weakCouncil supervision, price controls on service charges, and tardy paymentprocedures on the part of the Area Councils.

8.17 The on-set of the flood further reduced the level of service by cutting*off the road access to at least one major tipping area. It also caused thewidespread dispersion of the non-soluble waste products (largely plastic)which has resulted in the almost uniform distribution of refuse throughout thecity. On the positive side, the flood waters appear to have swept away muchvegetable matter. On balance, the flood had no net effect on the state ofsolid waste in the city nor on the levei of service associated with itsmanagement. This is confirmed by the absence of any reference to the issue inall official damage assessment reports.

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IV. RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

A. An Approach to the Reconstruction Program

1.01 The Government's objective is to bring back to normal all affected areasand districts as quickly as possible. The Mission agrees with the need to getthe Program off to the fastest possible start as the best way to minimizeeconomic losses and to reduce human suffering.

1.02 The Program has been designed to both (i) restore productive capacityand essential economic infrastructure, and (14) reduce human suffering throughthe restoration of social services and shelter. Emphasis will be on self-helpand the private sector since there are limits, 1cth financial andinstitutional, on what the Government will be able to do.

1.03 The Mission identified the most obvious needs based on the dataavailable at the time. No doubt additional requirements will emerge which canbe assessed at a later date. The Mission also limited the financing in mostcases to work that can be accomplished during the next two years in order toexpedite start-up and funding decisions.

B. Reconstruction Proaram Summary

1.01 The total Reconstruction Program is estimated to cost US$407.5 millionand would be Implemented over the next two to three years. Components includethe following:

US $ (MILLION)

SECT Cq LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL

Agriculture 33.8 63.6 97.4Rural Water 6.6 17.4 24.0Education 11.9 24.3 36.2Health 5.9 32.7 38.6Industry/Construction materials 15.0 35.3 50.3Power 5.9 29.0 34.9Telecommunications 3.3 31.1 34.4Transportation 7.9 25.6 33.5Urban 31.3 25.0 56.3Flood Prevention andProgram coordination 0.6 1.4 2.0

------------------------------------

Total 122.2 285.4 407.5

Detailed descriptions of each sector program are included in the sectionswhich follow.

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C. Reconstruction b_ Sector

1.00 Aftriculture

1.01 The flood and heavy rains are likely to have littlo Impact on overallagricultural exports or imports, but to have major Impact on smallholderfarmers, particularly in the Northern Region, whose livelihoods and incomeshave been seriously affected. Many have lost their homes, their annual crops,small pumps and irrigation facilities, seeds, and their fields are heavilysilted up. They have lost perennial tree crops and livestock. As the floodrecedes, they need credit and other assistance to reestablish their farmswhich contribute significantly to the economy. They should be the primetarget of recovery assistance. In addition, many facilities have been damagedsuch as irrigation infrastructure operated by public corporations servingprivate farmers, and nurseries which supply farmers with perennial cropplanting material. The flood emergency has also caused shortages of seeds,fertilizers and pesticides for replanting crop areas and additional veterinarysupplies are needed to combat the threat of increased livestock disease. Inaddition, Government agricultural services will need increased vehicles, fuelsand lubricants to accelerate the recovery effort.

1.02 There are several ongoing programs with external assistance to improveirrigated agriculture. Most focus on the long-term improvement of publicirrigation facilities and the viability of parastatal agriculturalcorporations. They are the appropriate vehicle for measures such asstrengthening the capacity for operation and maintenance of canals and drainsand making available normal foreign exchange needs for fuel, spare parts andother agricultural inputs. The flood emergency has highlighted the need forbetter maintenance of canals, drains and other Irrigation and agriculturalinfrastructure. However, the emergency recovery program would defer such

longer-term actions to a National Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (NIRP)proposed for IDA support, now under preparation. The emergency recoveryactivities proposed herein can be completed within two years.

1.03 The proposed Program would include:

(a) Supply of food assistance to the most seriously flood-affectedfarmers in the Northern Region to support them whilerehabilitating their farms and replanting their crops;

(b) Expansion of nurseries by MOA in the Northern and Central Regionsto supply date and fruit trees for sale to farmers to replanttheir perennial crops, and strengthening of MOA's horticulturalservices;

(c) Incremental credit required by farmers and cooperatives in theNorthern Region for tractor rental, pump repairs, purchase ofpumps, agricultural and cash inputs for seasonal crops and farmmachirryttools;

(d) Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure serving publiccorporations, cooperatives and private farmers in the NorthernRegion;

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(e) Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure serving theagricultural corporations and private farmers In Central andEastern Regions, Including Khartoum Province;

(f) Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure in Kordofan, Darfurand In the Gash and Tokar delta;

(g) Strengthening of livestock health services to combat the threat ofincreased livestock diseases;

(h) Incremental requirements of jute sacks, seeds, fertilizers, fuel,lubricants and spare parts to replace stocks used for emergencyrelief operations and to replant the crop area after the floodrecedes. Incremental input requirements for expanding the wheatarea in the Northern ad Central Regions would be provided;

(i) Incremental activities of the existing MQA extension and seedservices available to flood victims through the provision of seed,packing facilities, vehicles and operating costs;

(j) Locust and other pest control activities to safeguard againstincreasing locust threat and pest/disease attacks in areas beingreplanted; and

(k) Tecbnical assistance.

Detailed Components (Costs include physical contingencies and expected priceincreases)

1.04 Food Suaport to Northern Retion Farmers ($9.0 million). Some 10,000 ofthe most destitute farm families in the Northern Region would be supportedvith minimm rations of 3 kgs/day per family for a period of six months, untilreestablished crops can be harvested. Families would be selected by localgovernment and community leaders, which would also handle distribution.

1.05 Date and Fruit Tree Nurseries and MOA Horticultural Services ($7.3million). Fourteen MOA nurseries in the Northern Region and six in theCentral Region would be expanded and equipped by the provision of 20 shallowwells, 16 3"-4a pumps and motors, 9 6" pumps and motors, approximately 2,000m2 of shade, 8 km of fencing, 1,000 m2 of storesloffices, 9 tractors withtrailers and equipment, -20 pickups, 4 trucks, 5 station wagons,miscellaneoussmall nursery equipment and annwal input and operating costs for fertilizers,plant materials, hormones, fuel, labor and poly bags.

1.06 Credit Program ($13.0 million). The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS)maintains seven branches serving farmers in the Northern Region, normallylending to some 3,800 farmers a year. Although many more farmers are likelyto seek credit for seasonal inputs following the flood, ABS capacity could notbe increased quickly enough to more than double the number of farmersborrowing. ABS will therefore service credit needs of about 8,000 affectedfarmers (or about 20S of flood-affected farmers), and has targeted LSd. 20

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million to the Region. The average credit size is expected to be LSd. 1,000per feddan of which LSd. 700 would be in cash and the remainder as in-kindinputs procured and supplied by ABS. Average seasonal credit size covers 10feddans. Incremental credit requirements of LSd. 36 million could be providedto ABS for on lending to flood-affected farmers. Credits will cover 1002 ofseasonal crop budgets, and will be repaid within 12 months at the currentinterest rate of 191 p.a. ABS expects to handle incremental creditrequirements of other flood-affected regions, including the Khartoum Region,with its own resources, hence the Program's credit component will be confinedto the hardest hit Northern Region.

1.07 Rehabilitation of Atricultural Infrastructure in the Northern Region($23.0 million). The Recovery Program includes the following subcomponentss

A. Private and Cooperative Schemes

(1) Immediate supply of about 3,500 (3-4u) size and about 400 (6-12')size pumps and engine sets through ABS to restore water supply forthe winter crops. Additional supply of about 6,000 (3-4") sizepumps and spare parts for about 10,000 smaller pumps and enginesdamased during flood for spring/summer crops;

(2) About 100,000 labor/day of manual work to restore about 8,000 kmlength of smaller canal during next 3 to 4 months;

(3) Supply of about 170 farm tractors (70-80 H.P.) through ABS withdisc ploughs, ridgers, scraping bladders and spare parts for about50 existing tractors to assist in the land levelling and landpreparation of heavily silted land;

(4) Replacement of tradition agricultural Implements lost or damagedduring flood; and

(5) Provision for the Regional Ministry of Agriculture (RMOA) toassist farmers through provision of vehicles for intensifiedextensioniplant protection activities and construction of newoffices, workshop/store and staff housing in Merove district.

B. NAPC Schemes

(1) Rental or purchase of about 100 (3-41 size) pumps for draining offlooded areas;

(2) Supply of about 30 (10-12" size) portable pumps and engines torestore irrigation for 6 badly affected schemes in both Provinces;

(3) Rehabilitation of 4 discharge basins, 30 damaged bridges and about20 major structures along the main canals of affected schemes;

(4) Spare parts of engines still under water in 4 pump schemes in theNorthern Province;

(5) Rental of construction equipment (dozers, dragging, excavators andmotor graders) for desilting work and supply of a minimum fleet of

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O & M equipment for construction of drains and future maintenanceof schemes; and

(6) Construction of new office, workshop and staff housing totallylost in the two schemes of the Northern Province.

C. Coordination Unit. Strengthening of the existing NRARPINPIRPcoordination unit to assist in the Implementation and monitoring of the floodrecovery program in the Northern Region.

1.08 Rehabilitation of Agricultural Infrastructure in the Central and EasternRegions ($23.5 million). The Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources(MOIWR) managed to repair crucial breaches in canal system and get irrigationflowing after a disturbance of 4 to 6 weeks. The damaged canals andbottlenecks on the drainage system would be urgently repaired, while the mainworks of the New Halfsa protective drain will be deferred to a later stage.The machinery capacity of the Earthmoving Corporation (EMC), which ispresently highly constrained, would be strengthened as there are noalternative means to remove the flood induced siltation before the 1989190cropping season.

Gezira Scheme ($5.5 million). The reconstruction works at Gezira wouldconsist of about 2.1 million m3 of earthworks ($2.2 million) and repairsto minor irrigation structures ($0.2 million) and repairs andreconstruction of MOI buildings ($2.4 million).

Rahad Scheme ($4.5 million). The Program would provide $2.1 million forreconstruction and repairs to canals, drains and structures, and anotherUS$1.5 million for purchaso of the emergency irrigation 0 & M equipmentfor the scheme.

New Halfa Scheme ($2.4 million). The critical damages to the irrigationand drainage system ($1.5 million) would be remedied and emergencyIrrigation 0 & M equipment ($1.5 million) provided. The remaining work(tentatively estimated $3.2 million) on the reconstruction of theprotective drain (96 km) Is not urgent, and would be carried out underthe proposed National Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (NIRP) aftersufficient surveys and investigations.

Eartbmovina Plant for EMC ($5.6 million). Funds would be provided toDNC for purchase of 20 draglines and excavators, 6 Crawlerlbulldozers, 4fuel tankers, 2 mobile workshops and 6 pickups to enable EMC to removefrom canals and drains an additional 2.5 million m3 of silt per anmm.This would enable EMC to remove the flood induced silt (in 1988189) andstrengthen its capacity, already dilapidated, for carrying out thefuture annual canal clearance.

Private Farmers ($4.9 million). ABS would procure and make availablefor credit sale to private farmers some 3,000 3-4" pumps and motors, and500 5-6a pumps and motors.

1.09 Rehabilitation of Agricultural Infrastructure in Kordofan. Darfur. Gashand Tokar Areas ($3.0 million). MOIWR's National Water Corporation for RuralDevelopment (NWCRD) would be provided with 5 bulldozers, 5 transporters,

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ancillary spares, and operating expenses to reconstruct small dams and hafirsin Kordofan and Darfur. The Gash Delta Corporation would utilizo thefollowing for Its reconstruction works 3 bulldoserslloaders, 1 motor graderand 1 truck together with spares and operating costs. For the Tokar DeltaCorporation, 2 bulldozerslloaders and 1 truck would be provided, and some20,000 m of bank protection constructed.

1.10 Livestock Health Services ($1.5 million). MOL health services would bestrengthened by the provision of vaccines and medicines ($0.2 million),equipment ($0.1 million), 4 vehicles ($0.3 million), and incremental operatingcosts (US$0.4 million).

1.11 Incremental Reouirements of 4ricultural Inputs ($11.1 million). Thefollowing would be provided:

(a) Fuel ($0.5 million) to replace MOA stocks used on the floodemergency and planting of additional crops areas by thecorporations;

(b) Fertilizers ($4.5 million)s 20,000 tons urea ($2.0 million) and2,000 tons superphosphate ($0.6 million) for private farmersreplanting crops and for the additional crop areas planted bycorporations;

(c) 600 tons alfalfa seed, and 10 tons vegetable seed ($0.5 million)for distribution to private farmers;

(d) Spare parts for motors pumps and farm machinery ($2.6 million) tocover additional needs arising from the flood emergency,accelerated planting program and additional weeding operations;and

(e) Jute sacks ($3.0 million) to replace stocks used as send bagsduring the flood and for the crop additional wheat crop areaplanted by corporations.

1.12 Incremental Activities of MOA Extension and Seed Services ($0.9million). Vehicles repairs, fuel, field allowances and operating costs forthe intensified extension effort in flood-affected areas will be provided.The seed supply services would be strengthened by provision of a packingplant, operational costs and foundation seed stocks.

1.13 Locust and Pest Control ($3.4 million). Because of heavy rainfall andinaccessibility of locust breeding areas, large swarms of locusts now infestan area of some 3-5 million feddans in Sudan. The FAO Locust Control Unitalready mobilized considerable assistance to spray some affected areas.Additional funds for airplane charter ($1.0 million), pesticides ($0.5million), vehicles ($0.2 million) and operating costs ($0.5 million) arerequired to control the threat of crop destruction, which is likely to negatethe greater production anticipated from good rainfall on this year's annualcrops and will threaten crops replanted after the flood. The extendedbreeding areas are expected to threaten 1990 crops also. In addition, pestand disease problems are increasing in the flood zone, and control services

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must be increased by provision of pesticides ($0.2 million), 10 vehicles ($0.2Million) and incremental operating costs ($0.1 million).

1.14 Teehnical Assistance ($1.6 million) to assist in surveys and engineeringreviews, and procurement of services and inputs.

Cost Estimates

1.15 Major assistance is already being provided by many donors for Sudan'sagricultural development, 'which will continue, in addition to the proposedrlood Reconstruction Program. Total costs for the proposed ReconstructionProgram are $97.4 million, Including $63.6 million foreign exchange (641).Because of the uncertainties in estimating damage (some infrastructure isstill flooded), physical contingencies of 201 have been added on all items.Expected price increases of 41 p.a. on foreign costs and 30S p.a. on localcosts have been included. Detailed cost estimates are contained in Annex 1,and are summarized belows

11L Forelal H1n

1. Food aitlobance in Northaer

Region 4.8 1.3 6.0

2. tar.ei.and MA hoctigultur.

aevicee 8.4 1.6 S.0

6. Form credit in S,hmt Reion 7.7 0.0 6.S

4. fRehabiitation agric. inra-

structure_Nohthora Rel., 1.4 16.7 18.1

. Reb. egric. lndraetrucur.-

Contal I aster Assionat 3.4 14.6 16.0

. Rt. aric. Infrostructure-

Kwdofee Derfur 0.1 2.8 2.4

7. Aoricultural inuts 0.2 8.7 8.9

S. btuiion ew eed services 0.1 0.6 0.7

9. Livestock bealth service, 0.2 0.9 1.1

10. Loust and pest control 0.8 2.4 2.7

11. 7ro&nicol Asld 0.1 1.1 1.2

1e1 cast 21.7 81.0 72.7

PbyeiceS contintacl.. 4.3 10.2 14.5

Expetd price Incr_ea 7.8 2.4 10.2

TOTAL omlS MA NE

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Pronosed FInancing

1.16 Financing would cover foreign costs of all Items except food asistancecredit and nurseries which would be 100l funded. GOS would contribute theequivalent of $7.5 million, or 71 of total financing required. IDA wouldprovide $22.1 million from reallocating of ongoing Credits. Other hmnediatedonor reallocations are expected to total $5.0 million from ongoing loans.There Is therefore a financing gap of $62.8 million of new funding requiredfor the Program.

Possible Financint

GOS Donors Possible Financing

1. Food Assistance - 9.0 New funding required2. Nurseries & HOA hortic. - 7.3 0 a U

3. Credit - 13.0 New funding required4. Northern Region

NAPC 1.0 3.4 IDA Cr. 1118 realloc.PROA 0.5 0.7 U a aPrivate & Coops. - 5.6 IDA Cr. 1201 under

procurement- 2.0 IDA Cr. 1201 new proc.

5.0 Donor reallocation4.7 New funding required

MR RP - 0.1 IDA Cr. 1118 realloc.5. Central & Eastern Regions

Gezira 2.2 3.3 IDA Cr. 1388RAbad 0.9 3.6 IDA Cr. 1118 realloc.New Halfa 0.5 1.9 IDA Cr. 1022ml01 0.3 0.3 IDA Cr. 1118 realloc.INC 0.6 5.0 New funding requiredPrivate pumps - 4.9 a

6. Kordofan, Darfur 0.1 2.97. Agric. inputs 0.3 10.9 'a

8. Extension and seeds 0.2 0.7 a n9. Livestock health 0.4 1.1 ' n 10. Locust and pests 0.4 3.0 ' U '

11. Technical Assistance 0.1 1.5 IDA Cr. 1118 realloc.

Total 7.5 89.9Total financing required 97.4

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Procurement and Implementation Responsibilities

1.17 Procurement of Food Assistance would be performed by the Ministry ofAgriculture's VFP liaslon unit using its established procedures. Procurementof machlnery. vehicles and eauipment for MOA nurserles. extension and seedservices would bo undertaken by RPMU, the Project Unit which coordinatesprocurement for most IDA-financed -agricultural projects. There have been manyrecent ICZ contracts, from which the successful contractors would be asked tosupply additional quantities at the contract price with adjustment forInflation and shipping charges as necessary. RPMU would also procure vehiclesfor the veterinary services. Civil works (buildings, shade, fencing) would beprocured by LCB.

1.18 Procurement of works and eouipment for the rehabilitation ofagricultural infrastructure in the Northern Region would be undertaken asdescribed below.

Equipment procurement is proceeding using ICB procedures under ongoingCredits by ABS for a total amount of about US$12.6 million. Imediateprocurement of $2.1 million by ABS would be done by increasing thequantities of items under contracts (ICB) currently under process forIDA's ASP Credit. Procurement by NAPC, existing suppliers andcontractors who have been awarded contracts using ICB or LCB procedureswould be contacted and if they are willing to supply items with the sameunit rates adjusted for international inflation and shipment to theNorth, then the orders would be placed with such suppliers. In case ofno agreement, international shopping procedures (LICB) would be used byNAPC for the procurement of vehicles, 0 & N equipment and portablepUMps.

Civil Works Building facilities for the RHQA and NAPC would be carriedout using LCB procedures. The rehabilitation of structures, desiltingof canals and minor repairs to the pumping stations would be carried outby NAPC by force account.

1.19 Procurement of works and eouiament for the rehabilitation ofatricultural infrastructure in the Central and Eastern Regions would be theresponsibility of MOI. Machinery, vehicles and equipment for MOI and EMC willbe procured from suppliers recently contracted following ICB procedures,provided prices are not increased except for inflation. Civil works will beplaced as negotiated contracts with EMC at unit rates for work contractedduring 1988 adjusted for inflation. Buildings and structures will be procuredafter LCB procedures for contracts above $0.1 million equivalent. Scatteredworks of less than $0.1 million would be carried out by task force ornegotiated contract.

1.20 Agricultural Inputs for private farmers and cooperatives would beprocured by ABS (fertilizers, jute sacks and seeds) from suppliers contractedIn CY1988 following ICB procedures, except in the case of seed, smallcontracts (below $0.2 million each) would be placed by International Shopping

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procedures. Inputs for agricultural corporations would be processed by RWMUusing the same procedures. Fuel would be procured by the Sudan PetroleumCorporation, the sole Importer. Pesticides would be procured by MOA'spesticide committee, awarding contracts through RPMU to suppliers contractedfollowing ICB procedures awarded recently under IDA Credit ARP III at the sameunit prices adjusted for inflation.

1.21 The locust control center would procure pesticides for its activitiesthrough international shopping procedures or to sole supply contractorsrecently engaged in the locust program coordinated by FAO. Vehicles forlocust control would be procured by RPMU with other vehicle contracts.Aircraft charter would be by negotiated contracts with local and foreignspraying contractors participating in locust control contracted by the locustcontrol center.

1.22 Drugs. vaccines and veterinary supplie3 would be procured by RPHU forthe Ministry of Livestock from contractors recently supplying aftercompetitive bidding provided their unit prices are not increased beyondInflationary adjustment.

1.23 These procurement and implementation arrangements are In the hands ofproject agencies currently capably t-plementing donor-assisted agriculturalprojects. The procurement arrangements to be used are designed to ensureefficient economic procurement under emergency conditions, utilizing agenciesfamiliar with IDA procedures.

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Rural Water SuiPlV Reconstruction Proaram

1.24 Proaram Comxonents. NCDRWR has not only requested assistance forreplacement and repair of damaged facilities but also for construction of newwater supply facilities In the Northern Region along the Nile. The newfacilities would be located on land safer from floods and need to be precededby a study to dotermine these areas. These facilities would cater for farmerswho lived in the flood planes and for the great numbers of displaced peoplewho migrated into those areas.

1.25 The emergency program for replacement and repair of damaged facilitiesconsists of supply and installation of mechanicallelectrical equipment andcivil works spread over five regions sad consists of reconstruction andrehabilitation works. It would not mAke sense only to restore the facilitiesto the pre-flood condition and neglect urgent rehabilitation needs of otheressential facilities in the respective system.

1.26 New Water Systems for Resettlements in the Northern Region. NCDRWRestimates that about 200 new settlements will be required. The whole plan hasstill to be approved by the Ministry of Planning. Once approved, thelocations for the settlements will be determined by Joint Government/CommunityCoamittees.

1.27 Cost Estimates and Financing (see Table C-RW-1). The total programwhich would take five years to implement would cost US$48.80 million includingcontingencies. The two-year program costing US$24.0 million would consi!t of(i) replacement of flood-damaged water facilities; (it) provision of 50 newwater facilities for villages to be resettled following on overallresettlement program agreed with Government; and (iiI) institution buildingand implementation assistance for NCDRWR. Given the Governments constraintsin financing, donors are expected to finance 90S and the Government 10 of thetotal costs plus any taxes and duties levied on the import of goods. Manydonors are active in the rural water supply sector (Arab Fund, Denmark, EEC,Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, ODA, UNICEF, West Germany, World Bank andYugoslavia).

1.28 Prosram Priorities and Implementation. Both programs, the emergencyprogram for replacement and repair and the program for water systems in newsettlements have equal priority. If the latter program is not startedimmediately, people will reconstruct their houses where they have been beforeor construct near the river in order to have access to water. NCDRWR wouldnot have the capacity to implement this hugh program within 2 years. It istherefore proposed that the new water system program for the Northern Regionbe implemented by contractors and international competitive bidding would beapplied. The emergency program for replacement and repair of facilities in 6Regions would be implemented by NCDRWR with assistance of local contractorswhere required and with technical assistance.

Issues

1.29 The major issue is the lack of cost recovery for maintenance ndoperation. Damage due to neglect of maintenance seems to be equal or greaterthan the flood damage. A study on cost recovery and maintenance is a priorityand funding for this is included in the five-year program.

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TABLE C-RW-1Rural Water SuwI' Rosoentruction Prorm

Cost E.timte.

Deecriptlon quantity Total Coat (In USS Million)Foreign Local Total

1. Replacea nt, repair and rehabilitation of damaged watoer upplyf cilIties

Water yard.Pump sto 20 8.25 9.26 8.58Doiesel engine. 160 e.80 0.68 e.88Storage tanks (S98) s 1.00 0.11 1.11Pipe. & fitting. (ete) 10 1.90 0.84 1.84Spare part. - 0.25 - 0.2SCleaning, developingtooting of bore holes - 0.41 0.41

Replacement and addl-tional bore holes 10 2.20 0.70 2.ff

Taf ire and damDeillting and

rectification 28 - 1.2? 1.27Surface mter eystesRepair to *ndf iter. 84 - 9.77 0.77Centrifugal pump *ete a6 0.68 0.08 9.76

Subtotal 1 8.08 8.99 12.672. Ne water system for approximately 200 new settlemont. In the

Northern RegionWater yards

soreholeo 15O 8.40 1.10 4.59Pump s ts 16 2.50 0.20 2.70Storage tanks (5on8) 20 4.60 0.45 4.45ButIdings, reticulation,

fence 20 2.20 1.60 8.79Surface water cyste5x

Sandfiltere 7o 1.70 1.80 8.00Centrifugal pump soft 70 1.82 0.40 2.30

Subtot l 2 15.62 5.08 20.6e8. Implementation requirement.

Construction/service equipwent for NCDRRfour wheel drive trucks(20 t) 4 0.40 0.94 0.44

Wel service unite 2 8.40 0.04 9.44Technical assistance and consultant.to NCDRI for proj. prop. A Impl.Experts foreign A Local

men-months 1W 2.25 0.45 2.79Subtot l 8 8.5 9.58 8.58

4. Total 112.a 27.86 9.56 89.90Contingencle physical 15X 4.10 1.48 5.68

price 15X 4.72 1.65 6.87ORAND TOTAL 8417 12.68 48.0

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Two-Year Reconstruction Program - Cost Estimates

-Total Costs in USS Million-

Foreig Local Lot-S

1. Replacement, repair and rehabilitationof damaged water supply facilitiessee page 1, Item 1 8.68 3.99 12.67

2. New water system in new settlementsin the Northern Region.It is estimated that within atwo-year period about 50 newvater systems can be Implementedsee page 1, Item 2, 252.91 1.25 5.16

3. Implementation requirementssee page 1, Item 3construction service equipmentfor NCDRWR 0.80 0.08 0.88Technical assistance andconsulting services 5OZ1.12 0.23 1.35

Subtotal 3 1.92 0.31 2.23

4. Total 1+2+3 14.51 5.55 20.06

Contingenciesphysical 152 2.18 0.83 3.01price 4Z 0.67 0.25 0.92

GRAND TOTAL 17.36 6.63 23.99

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2.00 Education

The ProDosed Reconstruction ProMram

2.01 Comionents The MOE has placed it's highest reconstruction priority onprimary education and the mission is in full agreement. Taking intoconsideration the vast geographical spread of the primary schools and assumingthat replacement schools will be allocated to the regions proportional to thenumber destroyed versus the original total, it is recommended that the twoyear program include the following:

a) 100 new primary schools (Table C-2-1) $2V.2 N

b) Imported materials for self helpreconstruction $10.0 M

c) Higher Education reconstruction $ 2.0 M

Total $36.2 H

2.02 The primary school component (2.01 a) would include the equivalent of100 (six forms, type B) primary schools. (This number is based onImplementation capacity. The remaining 117 schools destroyed would bereconstructed through regular project lending following the completion of thefirst 100 schools, assuming donor funding is available). In addition, fullreplacement of all teaching/learning materials (textbooks, exercise books,chalk etc) is included. This would provide teachingilearning materials forthe 100 schools (30,000 student places) plus about 18,000 additional sets.

2.03 The supply of imported construction material (2.01 b) consisting ofgalvanized corrugated roofing sheets, timber for roof beams and cement, etc.could allow, on a self-help basis, the reconstruction of many of the partlydamaged primary, intermediate and academic secondary schools. Materials couldbe containerized and shipped CIF direct to the various districts as determinedby the MOE. A plan of action should be prepared by the MOE for theappropriate distribution and accountability for this material. By shippingCIF to destination the foreign exchange component would be 1002 ($10.0 m) withthe local districts providing the necessary transportation to the actualsites. This material could be provided 'in kind" by a donor(s) in lieu ofactual cash. This material vould however have to be procured/provided withinat least the first six months of the two year program.

2.04 An amount of US$ 2.0 million is included for Higher Education (pars 2.01c) to assist in the reconstruction of the most crucial areas to be identifiedby MOE in conjunction with Higher Education officials. Again the MOE shouldprovide to the donors(s) a specific action plan to carry out this vorkutilizing the technical staff of the Higher Education system. This againwould be expected to be completed within the two year program.

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2.05 The estimated cost of the two year program is US$ 36.2 millionequivalent with an estimated foreign exchange component of $ 24.3 million(672 of total project cost). Donor financing at 901 (net of taxes) wouldfinance 100X of the foreign exchange component, and US$ 7.7 million or 651 ofthe local cost. Governmont contribution would be US$ 4.2 million equivalentspread over a three year disbursement period.

Prolect Implementation

2.06 Technical Assistance requirements consisting of about 216 man months(one quantity surveyor, four building supervisors and one accountant) would berequired to impl_emnt the program and is included in the primary schoolcomponent (2.01 a). This technical assistance could be provided separately bydonor(s). In addition, procurement services should be provided byILO/Equipro, which would be a continuation of an ongoing contraat under theWorld Bank's Education III Project.

2.07 About 400 tons of paper would be required for textbooks (also includedin 2.01 a) and a contribution "in kind' could be considered as well as theconstruction materials (2.01 b).

Preparation and Implementation

2.08 To accomplish the construction of the 100 new primary schools and theprovision of related furniture and teachingilearning materials, it would benecessary to a) retain the present highly experienced local project director(Education Project III); b) recruit and/or obtain the QS (Deputy PIU Director)and two of the four building supervisors as soon as possible, in any event notlater than January 1, 1989 and c) extend the contract of Equipro immediatelyto prepare tender documents for materials to be imported for civil works andteachingilearning materials (item 2.01 a). Included would be recruitment ofthe technical assistance under b above unless provided by a donor agency.

2.09 It is envisaged that the QS with the assistance of the buildingsupervisor(s) would organize along with staff of the MCPU (professional feesare included in the program for MCPU) tender documents utilizing standardizedschool designs (construction would be phased) for local competitive bidding.Imported construction materials would be provided to the contraators by thePIU procured by Equipro. Imported materials would be containerized for directshipment to the regionsidistricts Involved. The building supervisor(s), aspart of their terms of reference, would monitor and ensure that such materialswould be timely provided to the contractors.

2.10 Textbooks would be printed by the Government's print shop with paper,Ink , etc. tendered by Equipro unless provided by a donor agency.Teachingilearning materials (textbooks, exercise books, chalk, etc.) would beexpected to be available for the school year beginning in late July 1989.

2.11 Funds could be included in a World Bank project preparation facility toextend the contract with Equipro fort a) services provided to prepare thetender documents for imported materials and teaching/learning materials; andb) to recruit the required technical assistance specialists.

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Risks

2.12 To eomplete this proposed program within the two year time frame wouldrequire ifediate efforts by the Government to confirm the continuation of themanagement of the PIU and the extension of the ILOlEquipro contract. If thisis not sareed to, it is unlikely that this program can be carried out withinthe two year time frame.

Procurement

2.13 Procurement would depend on the source of financing. If portions of theprogram are financed by the World Bank, its normal procurement regulationswould be followed. If Equipro is contracted as mentioned above, sufficienttime is available for ICB for Imported materials. As also noted above, civilworks for new primary schools (pars 2.09) would be through local eompetitivebidding. For item 2:01 b (imported construction materials, it Is suggestedthat donor(s) provide the material CIF local destination. For the HigherEducation (2.01 c), MOE would have to include in its action plan proposedmethod(s) of procurement.

Disbursements

2.14 Disbursements for the new primary schools (para 2:01 b) are estimatedas follows:

-_________ -US$m---------------FISCAL YEAR DONORS 0OS CUMULATIVE

DISBURSEMENT

1989 8.0 0.8 8.81990 8.5 0.9 18.21991 4.7 1.3 24.2

2.15 Disbursement timing for 2.01 (b) and 2.01 (c) would be dependent ondonors response and actions plans to be prepared by the MOE. As noted abovethe local cost component for 2.01 (b), construction materials, would be forlimited transport cost from the districts to the school sites and has not beenestimated in this report as well as disbursements for the Higher Educationcomponent (2.01 c).

- 78 -

Schedule

2. The lopkamnutlon schedule for the In primary schooln to m follo:

uartere 1 2 a 4 1 2 a 4 1 2 8 4

Phase I# of 'choole (89)

Phase 2# of school (69)

Ph a 8 in ssof choolo (19)

Total schools (1)

TABLE C-2-1

SWDAN - Emroencw Flood Reconstructlon ProporamEducatlon Sector

Cost Estimate for 100 r ' Prmlary Schools

COST F.E.C1. Civil Work s

(including site dwelopsnnt) 13.l6 0.89

2. Furniture 09.8 9.68

8. Prof Servics 0.91 9.18

4. TA/Equipro 2.55 2.66

S. Teaching/lerainog materials 0.60 0.57

6. Project adminietration 0.12 9.C2

Sub total (1-4) 20.88 11.94

7. Contingencies

(a) Physicsl 2.98

(b) Price 1.68

Sub total (7) 8.66 2.11

Total 24.19 18.15

- 79 -

3.00 Health

The Progosed Reconstruction Prosram

3.01 Three urgent goals are targeted: (1) replacement or repair of flooddestroyed or damaged health facilities including basic equipment and supplies;(ii) control of anticipated hyperendemic levels of malaria and diarrhealdiseases (including typhoid fever); (III) restoration of an adequate supply ofbasic drugs. Goals (ii) and (III) can be achieved within a two year recoveryperiod and, if achieved, will provide a base upon which OS can proceed withits four year health plan. Coal number (i) will require at least four yearsdue to implementation constraints.

3.02 Except as noted above, the capacity to Implement and absorb the recoveryprogram Is present within MOR with techbical assistance from donor agencies(example, the Shendi Program). The tasks involved, subsequent toidentification of the amount and source of funding, for each of the goals are:

1.1 Identification of KOR accountable officer for the facility constructionand equipment/supply program element (DG for rehabilitation);

1.2 Establishment of priority list of construction sites;

1.3 Assignment to appropriate DG Regional Health for operationalexecution;

1.4 Central procurement of medical supplies and equipment;

2.1 Identification of MOB accountable officer for the environmentalhygiene program element; (Under secretary of Health);

2.2 Designation of Chief Operating Officer (Director, EnvironmentalHealth) for this goal;

2.3 Formulation of strategic and tactical plan;

2.4 Procurement of insecticides;

2.5 Procurement of equipment;

2.6 Distribution to regions of insecticides and equipment;

2.7 Execution of spraying, larviciding operations prior to targetcompletion dates; repeat cycles in 1989 and 1990;

3.1 Identification of MOH accountable officer for the drug recoveryprogram element; (DG, Medical Supplies);

3.2 Review and standardization of drug kit for the health centers,dispensaries, and primary health units in the health facilitiesreplacementirepair program element;

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3.3 Inventory of the hospital drug requirements for those hospitals(45) in the recovery program;

3.4 Inventory of drug deficits in CMS directly attributable to theflood emergency;

3.5 Procurement of drug kits and other drugs by competitive bidding.

3.03 The total cost of the program is estimated at US$49.5 million equivalentwith an estimated foreign exchange component of US$39.5 million. The cost ofthe First Phase (2 year program) is US$38.6 million with a foreign exchange ofUS$32.7 million (80S of total project cost). Donor financing at 901 ofUS$34.7 million would finance 10OZ of the foreign exchange component andUS$0.34 million (342) of the local cost. The Governmvnt contribution would beUS$3.9 million equivalent spread over a three year disbursement period.

3.04 The ti$e frame, shown below, serves as a guide to Implementation of thehealth recovery program. In environmental control, a rigid adherence to timetargets must be met. otherwise large sums of money will be spent with littleor no effect. If the 1989 malaria levels of illness are to be attackedsuccessfully, spraying operations must be ready for field execution by May 1,1989 (see para.B-3.07). The health facility reconstruction program is tooextensive for a two year execution. Consequently, priorities must be set.

Tin frame for execution of health sector recovery _ro ram

1989 1990 1991Task Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan1.111.2

1.3

2.1

2.2 ---------

2.3 -mm

2.412.5

2.612.7 _ _ niniinininmmnininwm

3.1 -

3.213.4 -=------- 4

3.5

- 81 -

Lmglementation

3.05 Physical facilities. Due to the large number of small and videlydispersed facilities (411 damaged and about 54 destroyed in six regions)combined with a vest amount of reconstruction in other sectors, the repair andreplacement of facilities is expected to take four years or more. In theMhartoum orea alone, there were over 197 facilities reported damaged withabout 22 basic health facilities destroyed. Since a detailed review of damageby the Mission was not possible, a random chbck did confirm the validity ofthe damage, some of which probably would not have not occurred if sufficientmaintenance wmuld had been carried out on a regular basis. The need torestore this infrastructure and essential services provided is however veryvalid.

3.06 The size of much of the repair work is not conducive to competitivebidding and it is the Hission's opinion that it would be more economical andexpedient If force account mathods could be used In particular for damagedfacilities with an estimated cost of $50,000 or less. For such repair work,detailed drswings and tender documents would likely take an inordinate amountof tine to prepare, resulting probably not only in higher cost but furtherdelay. Estimates of damages appear to vary from a low of $5,000 to about$250,000. It is suggested that interested donor(s) should work directly withthe NOR to establish a method for reconstruction (utilizing its own staff andthat of regional MCBPU staff) and including methods of accountability of fundswhich could be channelled directly through MOF to the regions involvedfollowing regular budgetary proeedures. It is also suggested that fundscbannelled through an NGO would be an appropriate mechanism to carry out thiswork. Included in the estimates are funds for architectural/engineeringservices. This allocation could also be used for administrative cost to carryout this work.

3.07 As noted in table C-3-1, the reconstruction of physical facilities andreequipping has been phased and the MOR should prepare a plan of action whichwuld identify the priority of work. It is suggested that replacement ofdestroyed facilities should have first priority. The balance of the remainingfacilities wmuld be reconstructed through regular project lending aftercompletion of the first phase assuming donor funding is available.

Procurement

3.08 Regarding envirormental control items and drug replacement, lists arealready fairly well defined and procurement would depend on the source offinancing. Much of those items could be provided "in kind'. If portions ofthe program are financed by the World Bank, its normal procurement regulationswould be followed. As noted in para. 3.04, items under envirormental controlmust be in the country for use by not later than May 1, 1989.

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DisburseSmet

3.09 Disbursements are estimated as follows:

US $ (M)Fiscal Year Donors GOS Cumulative Disbursement

1989 21.0 2.0 23.01990 10.6 1.0 34.61991 3.1 0.9 38.6

TABLE C-3-1

SUDAN - EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

HEALTH SECTOR

Estimated Proarsm Cost let & 2nd Year 3rd & 4th YearUSS (M) USS (M)

Cost FEC Cost FEC

1. PhYsical Facilities

a) Civil Works 5.3 2.4 5.4 2.4b) Prof. Services 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2c) Supplies & Equip. 4.7 4.2 4.7 4.2

------------------------------------

Sub Total 1 10.8 6.8 10.9 6.8

2. Environment Control

a) Insecticides 9.0 8.1 -- -b) Transport 12.0 11.4 -- -

c) Equipment (Spray) 0.6 0.5 -- -_____________________________________

Sub Total 2 21.6 20.0 -- -

3. Drut Replacement 6.2 5.9

Total (1-3) 38.6 32.7 10.9 6.8

Contingencies included in lin> ites

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4.00 Industrv/Construction

The Proposed Reconstruction Proftram

4.01 The extent of demand for buildLng materials in the reconstruction effortrequires both an i$mprovement in the production of materials from localfactories and Imports on an emergency basis. Critical to this is the cementindustry which ass been unable to optimize capacity utilization. There aretwo cement factories in operation: The Atbara Cement Co. Ltd. (fullygovernaent-owned) producing presently around 90,000 tons per annum agaist adesign capacity of 200,000 tons, and The Nile Cement Co.Ltd at Rabak (56percent Goverrment owned) producing approximately 75,000 tons per year againsta design capacity of 100,000 tons. Together both factories are forecasting toproduce 175,000 tons during 1988189 subject to the availability of spareparts. Cement is also Imported by the private sector under the own-resourcesscheme and in the recent past imports have been of the order of 150,000 -200,000 tons per year. The quality of local cement is claimed by the industryto be superior to imports. Sudan's per capita consumption of cement at 20 kg.per capita is quite low in comparison to .ther countries, indicating a muchhigher absorptive capacity.

4.02 An additional line of production is under installation at Atbara withplanned capacity of 200,000 tons. Funded by the Government of Denmark throughDanida, the project has been only partly completed. Due to delays inimplementation the line is expected to be fully commissioned In late 1989provided satisfactory arrangements for additional funding and technicalassistance are put in place from various sources. An extension project toincrease capacity at The Nile Cement Co. at Rabsk by 300,000 tons is at theplanning stage. In the short to medium term, therefore, the cement needs ofthe country will have to be met through a combination of local production andsubstantial imports.

4.03 The price of locally produced cement was increased in September 1988 by50 percent to LS.750 per ton to enable the two factories to operate at aroundthe financial break-even point. Cement on the private market is sold atLS.1600-2000 per ton, largely due to scarcity. The official local price isstill below its international equivalent and would require a further increasein order to bring imported and locally produced cement to equivalent pricelevels. Taking the above factors into consideration and in view of theexpected heavy demand for cement under the Reconstruction Program, there is astrong case for providing support to the local cement industry, complementedby emrgency Imports.

4.04 There will also be additional demand for Imported building materialssuch as roofing sheets and timber as a result of the flood. On the otherhand, local brickmakers and the brick-making factory at Atbars can probablymeet the extra demand for bricks in view of larger quantities and betterquality of silt being available along the banks of the Nile following thefloods.

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Comaononts

4.05 The Reconstruction Program for this sector, therefore, has twocomponents:

(a) Support to local cement companies; and

(b) Building materials Import Program.

Suauort to Local Cement Companies

4.06 The Atbara Cement Company which is presently operating at 45 percentcapacity has the most potential to increase production. The main limitingfactors are (a) lack of adequate electrical power arising from the shorta3e ofspares to rehabilitate the power units; (b) lack of adequate preventivemaintenance due to shortages of spares and experienced manpower, (c) frequentshortages of packing materials and td) serious transportation bottle-necks.The rehabilitation of the power station involves the installation of a newelectric generator and repairs to three others along with the provision of amore efficient cooling system and associated technical assistance. Theprovision of critical spare parts is another pre-requisite to improvingproduction at Atbara. Similarly, at The Nile Cement Factory at Rabak there isneed for spares to carry out preventative maintenance both to maintain thepresent production level and to increase capacity utilisation. Spares requiredinclude fire bricks, grinding media, lining plates, compressor and conveyorparts and electrical gear. Packing materials are also needed. The setting upof efficient preventive maintenance programs at both factories is alsonecessary. Conservative estimates of expected improved production at bothfactories after the investment indicate attractive financial and economicreturns.

4.07 Following disruption caused by the flood to normal production, Danidahas extended technical assistance to the Atbara factory from September 30 1988to November 15, 1988 in order to assist in the completion and commissioning ofmost of the third production line. In order to ensure a more reliable supplyof power, the responsibility for management of the power plants at Atbara isintended to be transferred to the National Electrical Corporation (NEC). TheGOS would provide, on a regular basis, adequate foreign exchange forImportation of spares and packing material. The GOS has requested UNIDO'sassistance to carry out a cement sub-sector study to assess the futurerehabilitation needs of the two factories, to determine the financialrequirements of the two companies to support on-going operations and mediumterm rehabilitation, to examine the cost structure of the enterprises andrecommend cost saving measures as well as formulate a pricing policy forcement. Based on these findings, further investments may be required in thetwo companies. No estimate has been provided in this Program.

Cost Estimate

4.08 The total Program cost for this component to support the local cementcompanies, as shown in Table C-4-1, is US $ 5.3 million with a foreignexchange component (net of taxes and duties) of US$ 5.2 million.

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Possible Sources of Financinta

4.09 Subject to satisfactory agreement being reached with the GOS, Danida hasIndicated Interest in finaicing the rehabilitation of the power plants atAtbara amounting to US$2.5 million in foreign exchange. Funding for theimportation of spares and technical assistance for their installation will besought from donors while funding for setting-up preventive maintenanceprogram will be sought from UNIDO. In consultation with the respectivedonors, on-lending agreements will be entered into between the respectivecompanies and the GOS.

Prevsrattion and Implementation

4.10 For the component related to the rehabilitation of the power plants atAtbara, Danida will, pending a transfer of the management of the powar plantfor the cement factory to the NEC, commxssion consultants to provide detailedspecifications and arrange for contracts to be awarded with the approval ofthe GOS. A UNIDO cement consultant will review and agree on, by October 31,1988, the list of critical spares to be imported by the respectivecompanies. Terms of reference for the Cement Sub-Sector Study will also beagreed and finalised by the UNIDO Consultant with the Ministry of Industry byOctober 31, 1988. The program Is expected to be implemented within the1988189 fiscal year.

Procurement

4.11 Procurement will depend on the source of finance. For the component tobe financed by DanIda, procurement will be by direct contracting with originalsupplier. Limited International Bidding will apply for the procurement ofspares. The selection of consultants to carry out the study and the hiring ofan engineering and planning expert to be assigned to the Atbara CementCo. will be carried out by UNIDO with the approval of the Ministry ofIndustry.

Disbursement

4.12 The estimated schedule of disbursement is as follows:

USS Million

Fiscal Year Donor GOS

FY 1989 5.1 0.2

- 86 -

TABLE C-4-1

Industrv/Construction: Cement Sub-Sector Proxram

Cost Estimate

Category Total FEC ForeignIt US$S X Cost

1. Spare Parts:

(1) Power plant rehab.Atbara 2.600 96 2.500

(iL) General spares andpacking materials(Atbara) 1.500 100 1.500

(Ili) General spares andpacking materials(Nile Co.) .750 100 0.750

Subtotal 4.850 95 4.750

2. Technical Assistance & Studies

(i) Experts for repairs andmaintenance 0.390 90 0.350

(i1) Cement Sub-sector Study 0.085 90 0.076

Subtotal 0.475 90 0.426

GRAND TOTAL 5.325 97 5.176

- 87 -

Building Materials Imoort Program

4.13 As indicated earlier, there is a presaing need for importation ofessential building materials to meet the requirements of the reconstructioneffort. Under various sectoral programs construction and building materialwill be Imported on the basis of specific contracts. In the context of theurban sector, a plan to address the housing needs is being outlined. Withregard to sectors and groups not covered by specific programs such as trade,comaerce, industry, and individuals, these groups could be assisted indirectlythrough better availability of construction materials in the market place inorder to meet the extra demand for the rebuilding of structures which weredamaged or destroyed by the flood. The materials to be imported under thiscomponent would include cement, corrugated sheeting, timber and reinforcementrods. While the level of demand cannot be forecast with any precision, thecost estimates indicated in Table C-4-2 have been based on modest estimates ofpossible levels of donor support and on the implementation and handlingcapacity in the economy.

Cost Estimates

4.14 The total Program cost, as shown in Table C-4-2, is US$45 million ofwhich the foreign component (net of taxes and duties) is US$ 30 million. Ifdonor financing for US$ 30 million is made available, importers under theProgram would be expected to finance the local costs (transport, insurance andother port charges) plus local duties.

Possible Sources of Finance

4.15 No sources of funding have been identified as yet. There is need fordonor funding of US $ 30 million for this component.

Preparation and Implementation

4.16 Generally, the Imported construction materials would be made availablethrough regular commercial channels in order to increase the availability onthe local market. As such, it will be important for the Government to setcustoms duties and/or surtaxes at a level which will avoid windfall profits toimporters. An enlarged supply will reduce the scarcity pricing levels nowpertaining in the open market, to the benefit of end users. Counterpart fundsmade available through the importation of donor financed constructionmaterials could be paid into a special account which could be used to providehousing construction grants to low income families who lost their homes duringthe flood, as will be described more fully in the urban sector part of thisreport.

- 88 -

Procurmete

4.17 Proc=ement will depend on the source of finance.

Disbursement

US $ Million

Donor Local Cumulative Dist.at end of FY

nT 1989 15 10 25

NY 1990 1S 10 45

Table C-4-2

Industry/Constructiont Building Material Imports Program---------------------------------------------------------

(1988189 & 1988190)

Cost Estimtes

--- All Costs in US$ Million---

CATEGORY TOTAL FEC FOREIGNITEM 2 COST

1. IMATERIALS

(i) Cement 15 66.7 10

(it) Roofing shootitimber/Reinforcing rods 30 66.7 20

TOTAL 45 66.7 30______ ------ ------

- 89 -

5.00 Power

The Proiosed Reconstruction Program

5.01 Roselres Hvdronower Station. The siltation and debris problems atRoseires hydropower station have been tackled on an ad hoc basis several timessince the station wa commissioned. To help prevent hydropower stationoutages in the future, the proposed program includes a component consistingof the study and detailed design by consultants of:

(a) whether in the light of modern meteorological forecasting andsatellite Imagery, revisions are requlred to the mode of operationof the dam and power station;

(b) recommend actions, within a three-month period, which will includethe production of detailed designs and bidding documents for (i) amore efficient and effectiv method of desilting the intake thanis currently used, by utilizing large continuously operabledesilting equipment, (ii) a debris diversion boom, taking intoaccount international experience in its design, and (iii) a closedloop clean cooling water system for the generators and bearings.

Provisions have been made in the cost estimates so that these recommendationscan be carried out under the proposed program.

5.02 Thermal Power Stations. Recognizing that NEC used an unusual asmount ofits stock of spares during the crisis, and that NEC faces serious difficultiesin keeping stocks up to proper levels the proposed program includes fundingfor engine, awitchgear and, instrumentation spares for Khartoum North, Burri,Kuku and Kilo X power plants.

5.03 Trasnmission System. The proposed program includes the procurement of220 and 110 kV substation spares and tower strategic spare parts.

5.04 Regional Isolated Stations. NEC operates fourteen regional diesel powerstations, several of which sustained flooding and damage. The programincludes the procurement of needed spares and for some consumables for theseout-stations.

5.05 Distribution System. NEC suffered most damage In this area. This crisishas indicated that the existing distribution system needs substantialstr ngthening if similar or worse effects are to be avoided in the future.The program includes the procurement of overhead line equipment, transformers,cables and cable fittings In sufficient quantities to replace damaged and lostequipment and to provide for the services to reconstructed houses both in theKhartoum aroa and in the Regions.

5.06 Communications. Plant and Vehicles. The crisis not only drew attentionto but compounded NEC's deficieneies in its fleet of vehicles and in itscommunications capability. The program includes some increases to NEC's

- 90 -

vehicular capacity, but funds in this area vill concentrate on the procurementof spares for the many vehicles which are currently off-the-road because ofNEC's inability to raise foreign funds for spare parts.

5.07 Trainina and Technical Assistance. The program contains training forNEC's cable jointers who will receive on-the-job training in the laying andtaking of modern XLPE cable and termination joints. The program also includesfor Technical Assistance for on-the-job training for technicians intransformer, switchgear and protection maintenance and operations.

Cost Estimates

5.08 The estimated cost of the NEC flood recovery program which is shown inTable 5-2 is US$34.9 Million with a foreign component of US$26.4 Million. Thelocal cost consists mainly of NEC salaries and wages associated with therepair and installation of the imported equipment and spares. Donor financingof 901 of program costs would amount to US$31.0 Million.

5.09 Implementation. NEC would be responsible for the implementation of allthe power components of the program including the employment of consultants toadvise on and design the Roseires intake alterations and additions (para. B-5.08). Spare parts and materials lists have already been prepared by NEC andthese will shortly form the bills of quantities of enquiry documents, whichare under preparation. These will be based, where IDA funding is involved, onthe Bank's sample bidding documents.

5.10 Procurement. Procurement will depend on the source of financing. Manyof the procurement packages will consist of proprietary spares and these willbe obtain via negotiated direct contracting. The transmission anddistribution materials and the vehicles and workshop equipment, if financedfrom a Bank project, will be procured using international procurementprocedures in accordance with the IDA/IBRD guidelines.

5.11 Disbursements. The estimated schedule of disbursements is as follows:

---------------- US$ Million -----------------Cumulative Disb.

Donors NECIGOS at End of FY

PY1989 0.8 a/ 0.1 0.9

FY1990 16.4 3.3 20.6

FY1991 11.3 2.6 34.5

a InldsU03_ilofrRsieite_td

a/ Includes US$0.33 Million for Roseires intake study.

91 -

5.12 The schedule of Implementation of NEC's component of the Program ia asfollowas

J 89 D J 90 D J 91 D

Roseires Study

Roseires Procurementand Manufacture

Roseires Installation

Completion of BidDoes. for procurementof spare and materials

Manufacture & Delivery

Installation by NEC

- 92 -

TABLE C-5-1

NEC Flood Recovery and Flood Damage Prevention Program

Cost Estimate

--------------------------------------------------------------- __----

Local Foreign TotalBsse Cost ------------US$ Million-----------

…--------------------------------------------------------__----------Roseires flood effectprevention 0.5 5.0 5.5

Khartoum North sparesand installation 1.4 2.1 3.5

Burrn II spares andinstallation 0.1 0.5 0.6

Burd III spares andinstallation 0.2 1.2 1.4

Gas Turbines spares andinstallation 0.3 2.3 2.6

Transmission system spares 0.1 1.7 1.8Distribution materials and

execution 1.7 7.9 9.6Regional Station spares andinstallation 0.3 1.7 2.0

Vehicle spares andconsumables 0.1 1.0 1.1

Plant, workshop equipmentand vehicles 0.4 2.0 2.4

Communication equipmentand spares 0.1 0.3 0.4

Training 0.3 0.3Study of Roseires intake andflood damage prevention 0.1 0.3 0.4

Taxes and duties a/ - - -

Total base cost 5.3 26.4 31.7…-----------------------------------------___----------------------__

Physical and PriceContingencies 0.5 2.6 3.2

…__________________________________________________-________________

Total financing required 5.8 29.0 34.9

…-------------------------------------------------------------------_al NEC is exempt from taxes and duties.

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6.00 Telecommunications

Teleommiunications Rehabilitation Program (TRP)

6.01 Since most of the equipment damaged by the floods was already part ofthe medium-term rehabilitation program, the total requirements have beenincluded in what is now defined as the Telecommunications RehabilitationProgram (TIRP). This consists of the Items originally included In the mediumterm investment program plus the additional items (rural systems in the northof Sudan) which have been completely destroyed by the floods. Due to theincrease in the scope of the original program, the original inplementationperiod of four years has now been extended to five years. Thus instead of the1988-1991 time frame the implementation is now planned to be in the 1989-19S3time frame.

Total Rehabilitation Protram Cost

6.02 The total cost of the TIRP is estimated at USS 115.3 million with aforeign exchange component of US$93.5 million, 812 of total cost. The costestimates are based on current equipment prices and installation costs(October 1988). A suimmary of the components of the TRP including theirestimated costs is given in table C-6-1.

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Table C-6-1 1!1989-1993 Telecommunications Rehabilitation Program

Item Cast in USS Mill ForeiSnX of Total

Foreign Local Total

1. Rehabilitation of cables in 27.5 3.4 30.9 89Khartoum Central, South, North;Omdurman and 20 provincial centres

2. Replacement of Kht North and 9.0 1.0 10.0 90Omdurman Exchanges (20000 lines)

3. Replacement of exchanges at 2.5 0.5 3.0 83.3flive provincial centres

4. Replacement of manual exchanges 3.9 2.7 6.6 90.9in 28 rural centers

5. Replacement of overhead routes 6.5 0.5 7.0 92.8in 8 rural centers

6. Replacement of international 4.3 2.4 6.7 35.8satellite earth station

7. Rehabilitation of domestic 11.9 5.5 17.4 68.4earth station

8. Equipment and spare parts for 4.9 0.2 5.1 95.3rehabilitation of switching,transmission power and air-conditioning, tools & testequipment

9. Transport facilities 3.3 -- 3.3 100

10. Rehabilitation of the training 2.4 0.4 2.8 85.7school, training of instructorsand fellowships

11. Consultancy services 6.2 0.2 6.4 99.7

Base costs 82.4 16.8 99.2 82.3Physical contingencies 4.0 1.7 5.7 70.2Price contingencies 7.1 3.4 10.5 67.6

-----------------------------------

Total (net of taxes+duties) 93.5 21.9 115.4 81.1Customs Duties 20.7

11 This table includes the two-year program included in table C-6-2

- 95 -

6.03 The mission considers the above program realistic and manageable by STPCwith the institution building measures included. It does not include all thecomponents that have been approved under the four year Government SalvationProgram such as the microwave system between Khartoum - Wad Halfa, estimatedat US$ 25.0 million, and building of a new training school estimated at US$6.0 million. These should be reviewed in the context of future investmentprograms.

Emergency Flood Reconstruction Prosram

6.04 The Emergency Flood Reconstruction Program (EFRP) is a time slice of theTiP, covering its first two years. It consists of the most critical itemswhich can be implemented in the two year time frame. This short term programis justified even without the longer term TRP. The program is made up of theelements proposed by STPC with the following exceptions.

(a) Rural Systems: Given the extent of damage to the overhead line systems andmanual exchanges and considering that these are located in remote areas, onlya part of the systems proposed by STPC was included in the EFRP because theycannot all be installed in two years.

(b) The STPC list of requirements had one notable omission; the rehabilitationof the underground cable network in Khartoum Central and South. These areaswere severely affected by the floods and they are the main revenue generatingareas of the Khartoum network. There is an ongoing rehabilitation projectfinanced by the German Government in these two areas. However, the envisagedinvestments do not cover the entire area and leave pockets which were severelydamaged by the floods. The mission suggested that these areas could beincluded in the two year emergency program. The implementation can beachieved in two years only through an extension of the existing contract.

Program Description

6.05 The components of the two year program, which have been discussed andagreed with the Ministry of Public Communications (WPC) and the STPC, aredetailed in Annex 6 and include:

(a) Rehabilitation of 128,000 pair km of underground cables in KhartoumCentral, South, El Hasa Hisa, Sinar, Singhar, El Gadarif, Kassala, Kosti, ElObeid, Atbara and 11 other minor provincial centers;

(b) Equipment and spare parts to rehabilitate power and airconditioningequipment in Khartoum; and exchanges in Khartoum (South Exchange, El lmtidad,Shambat, International Telephone Exchange), Sennar, Nedani, Shambat, Fasher,Nyala, Kadogli, Malakal, Juba and Wau;

(c) Replacement of 620 pair km of overhead trunk lines and 100 pair km of dropwires in 8 dlstricts: Atbara, Shendi, Karima, Dongola, Karma El Nusul, Dueim,Abu Usher and Wad El Ghorash;

(d) Replacement of manual exchanges in 28 rural centers;

- 96 -

(o) Purchase of tools and test equipment for installation and maintenance;

(f) 90 motor vehicles for planning, Installation and maintenance; and

(g) 187 may moutbh of consultancy services for planning and supervision ofinstallation.

Costs

6.06 The total program cost is estimated at US$ 34 million witha foreign exchange component of US$ 31 million (911 of total cost). The basecost estimates are based on current equipment pr4t-es and Installation costs.The detailed program costs are given in Annex 6 and summarized below.

Table C-6-2Telecomm_unications

Emeraone- Flood Recovery Program

1989-90 Proaram Costs

Cost in USS x Mill fTortgM2 of Total

Item Foreign Local Total

1. Rehabilitation of underground cable 12.2 1.7 13.9 87.8in Xhartoum Central, South and 19 othercenters.

2. Equipment and spare parts to rehab. 4.9 0.2 5.1 95.3switching, transmission power andairconditioning

3. Replacement of OR routes in8 rural centers 2.9 0.2 3.1 93.2

4. Replacement of manual exchangesin 28 rural 1.7 0.4 2.1 82.9centers

5. Tools and test equipment 1.0 -- 1.0 100.0

6. Transportation facilities 1.8 -- 1.8 100.0

7. Consultancy services 2.8 -- 2.8 100.0----------------------------------

Base cost 27.3 2.5 29.8 91.6Physical contingency t1OZ) 248 0.3 3.1 91.8Price contingency 1.0 0.5 1.5 68.6Total 31.1 3.3 34.4 90.5

------------------------------------

Customs Duties 7.5 (33.9 millionSudanese Pounds)

- 97 -

ProIram Financin

6.07 The sources of foreign financing have not yet been conflmed. However,it should be mentioned that the program can only proceed in the proposed formif the wvrks for the re abilitation of Khsrtoum Central and South (..timmtedat US$ 7.0 million) can be incorporated in the ongoing contract for Whichfinancing was made available by the German Government. If this ti notpossible then the program would be proportionately reduced to Include itemscosti"n US$ 24.0 million only. The remaining US$ 24.0 million ha to beprovided by other donors. The local cost of US$ 3.0 million equivalent wouldbe financed by STPC.

Frotram Preiaration and Implementation

6.08 STPC's management, planning and inplementation capacity Is i$ndequatefor the proposed two year program, let alone the five year program.Str ngthening of STPC's managemont is a necessary condition for successfullmplementation of the program and the Minister of Conmmunications has begunthis task. Among the Laprovements will include full autonomy and an overhaulof existing management systems and procedures and designation of anexperienced successor to the retiring general manager. There has alreadybeen progress in updating STPC's accounts.

consultancy

6.09 Given STPC's low capacity in planning and implementation, consultantswill have to bo employed to assist in the verification of actual requirementsthrough detailed surveys; preparation of detailed plans; preparation oftechnical spocifications and procurement documents; and supervision ofImplementation. Consultants will specifically be required for all the cabletransmission and exchange rehabilitation works. To ensure proper managementof the program a Project Management Group consisting of consultants and STPCstaff, dedicated to the planning and Implementation of the program, will needto be constituted.

TUmint of Program Implementation

6.10 In order to ensure completion of the program in two years, planningshould comence immediately. Consultants will be required immediately to t

(a) assist in setting up the Project Management Group;

(b) undertake detailed site surveys of requirements and propose alternativesolutions where appropriate; and

(c) prepare technical specifications and bidding documents.

About 16 man months of consultancy services will be required, which could befinanced under a World Bank PPF. The 16 man months will consist of 4engineers (2 external line plant + 1 transmission + 1 switching) working for 4months starting in December 1988. The most expeditious way to ensure that the

- 98 -

consultants are on board in December 1988 is to negotiate directly with theconsultants who are now on site (Detecon of West Germany) to provide theseconsultancy services. The terms of reference for the consultants are attachedin Annex 6, Attachment 1.

6.11 The method of procurement will depend on the sources of financing. Ifthere is World Bank financing, the procurement would be as follows:

(a) new equipment - Limited International Bidding (LIB)(b) spare parts for existing equipment - direct negotiation with originalsuppliers of equipment

(c) consultancy - direct negotiation with the consultant who is already bnsite.

Disbursements

6.12 The estimated schedule of disbursements is as followst

USS MILLION

liscal Year Disbursement Durinft Semester Cumulative Disbursement(FY) Donors STPC at end of FY

FY89June 30, 1989 0.4 0.1 0.5

Py90December 31, 1989 5.8 0.4 6.7June 30, 1990 10.0 0.6 17.3

FY91December 31, 1990 11.8 1.0 30.1June 30, 1991 2.1 0.8 33.0

FY92December 31, 1991 1.0 0.4 34.4

Im,lementation Schedule

6.13 The implementation schedule of the program is included in Annex 6.

- 99 -

7. 00 Transport

The Prouosed Reconstruction Proaram

Hithwavs Components

7.01 The work detailed in Table B-7-1. can be caried out by RBPC, eitherdirectly or through contracts, provided the necessary funds are made availablefor the procurement of equipment, spares and materials, and for the award ofrepair and supply contracts. A detailed breakdown of these requirements isgiven in Table C-7-1. The foreign cost totals US$16.5 million or 812 of thetotal cost of US$20.3 million equivalent. The physical and pricecontingencies are included In the individual items. Price escalation iscalculated on the basis of 42 annually over the implementation period. Theprogram includes four contracts plus the additional cost to the RPSRP as aresult of the flood emrgency. Contract (1) Is for the scour protection ofthe outer portion of the embankment leading to tbe ferry ramp on the easternshore of the Nile at Ed Dueim. This embankmaent, constructed under a largerproject financed by IDA's Second Highway Project, was originally protected bygabions. These are now damaged, and floods and waves are causing damage tothe structure. It is proposed to include a contract for the supply andplacing of about 4,000 m3 of rock (min. size 40X30X30 cm) to cover the exposedslope. Contract (ii) is for the construction of a new two-lane bridge overthe Rhor Shambat River north of Omdurman. The approaches were severelydamaged during the flood, and it is considered necessary to provide a newbridgo with adequate capacity to replace the old one. The local government inOmdurman is responsible for maintaining the bridge, but the council has noresources to do so. It is recommended that RBPC be given the task of buildingthe bridge and for future mintenance. All traffic along the west bank of theNile north of Omdurman is dependent upon this bridge. Contract (iII) and (iv)are for supply of gravel and stone for repair of shoulders and embankments.

Cost Estimates

7.02 The total Program cost, as shown in Table C-7-1, is US$20.3 million witha foreign component (net of taxes and duties) of US$16.5 million. If donorsfinance 902 of program cost (US$18.3 million), the Government would beexpected to finance US$2.0 million equivalent, plus any taxes on duties leviedon the import of .sy goods.

Possible Sources of Fundina

7.03 The Program cost could be funded from the following sources:

(a) Government of Sudan (GOS);

(b) Reallocation from the Third Highway Project (Highway III) up toUS$2 Million;

(c) KPSRP, for which the total cost is now estimated to be in theorder of US$108 million. (There is a funding gap of about US$24million for which donor assistance is required); and

(d) Other donors.

- 100 -

Possible funding arrangements are shown in Table C-7-2. There is no need toamend the Development Credit Agreenont for the Third Higbway Project toreallocate funds.

Preuaration and Implementation

7.04 For the component related to the KPSRP, detailed engineering is underway. The contract with Norconsult (Norway), funded by a grant from theKIngdom of Norway, calls for the engineers estimsto by mid November 1988 andfinal tonder documents by January 15, 1989. The civil works contract(s) arescheduled to be awarded In July, 1989. The implementation period is 2 l12 - 3years (see Table C-7-3). Detailed engineering for the new Rhor Shambat bridgeIn Omdurman has not yet started. It is recommended that the design becontracted out to a local consultant acceptable to RBPC, unless a standarddesign is found suitable. None of the other components will require anylengthy preparation time. RBPC Ls familiar with donor procurementrequirements and with the process of preparing supply contracts.

7.05 As outlined above, the Program would be implemented by RUPC, which Is inthe process of strengthening its operations through training and technical aidunder the ongoing Third Highway Project. Based on progress made under thisProject to date and its performance recently in restoring the flood damage asnoted above, no additional technical assistance is considered necessary.

Procurement

7.06 Procurement will depend on the source of finance. For portions of theProgram financed by IDA, ICB will apply for the RPSRP component since thiswill fczm an integral part of a major contract. All other components will beprocured under local competitive bidding (LCB) or local shopping on the basisof at least 3 quotations.

Disbursement

7.07 The est4mated schedule of disbursement is as follows:

USS Million

Cumulative Disb.Fiscal Year Donors GOS At End of FY

FY1989 .9 .1 1.0

Fn1990 9.1 .9 10.0

FY1991 6.4 .7 17.1

FY1992 2.9 .3 20.3

- 101 -

TABLE C-7-1

SUDAN-EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMDETAILED HIGHWAY SECTOR COSTS(LCB or Local Shopping)

------------------------------------------------------------------ __--------

CATEGORY VOLUME UNIT TOTAL F.E.C. FOREIGNITEK RATE US $ 2 COST

1. MATERIALS(I) Bitumen tons 1,500 240 360,000 100 360,000(SI) Cement tons 1,000 100 100,000 100 100,000(IS.) Culvertst steel u 500 75 37,500 100 37,500

SUBTOTAL 497,500 497,500

2.EQUiPMENT(S) Compressor, * 2 40,000 80,000 100 80,000(IU) Pick-up trucks,# 10 10,000 100,000 100 100,000(iIi) Water pumps, J 6 500 3,000 100 3,000(lv) Rollers for patchlng 6 5,000 30,000 100 30,000(v) Generators, , 3 40,000 120,000 100 120,000

SUBTOTAL 333,000 333,000

3. SPARE PARTS & TOOLS(1) Tyres and tubes, t 750 130 112,500 100 112,500(ii) Batteries, # 300 60 18,000 100 18,000(11) Grader blades, # 250 300 75,000 100 75,000

SUBTOTAL 205,500 205,500

4. CONTRACTS(S) Protection Dueim ramp 300,000 90 270,000(ii) Khor Shambat bridge (new) 150,000 70 lOS,OOO(iii)Gravel supply cbm*km 7,000,000 0 1,400,000 75 1,050,000(iv) Stone supply, tons 5,000 200 1,000,000 60 600,000

SUBTOTAL 2,850,000 2,025,000

S.RHARTOUM-P.SUDAN Rd.(Add.) 16,380,000 82 13,431,600…--------------------------------------------------------------__-----------

GRAND TOTAL 20,266,000 81 16,492,600… a.________ ___---- ------------------- ------------------- ------------------

Item 5. does not include the US$ 10 million fundinggap be!ore the flood.

- 102 -

TABLE C-7-2

SUDAN - EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMPROPOSED FUNDING ARRANGEMENT

---------------------------------------------------------- __---------

ITEM COST ESTIMATE US$ MILLION

TOTAL GOS DONORS_____________________________________________________________________

A. CIVIL WORKS

(i) Add. works on PortSudan Rd 16.38 1.64 14.74

(LI) Ed Dueim Ferry Ramp 0.30 0.03 0.27

(iii) Khor Shambat Bridge(New) 0.15 0.02 0.14

(1v) Supply of Stone andGravel 2.40 0.24 2.16

SUBTOTAL 19.23 1.92 17.31

B. MATERIALS

(i) Bitumen, Cement andCulverts 0.50 0.50

C. EQUIPMENT AND SPARES 0.54 0.54

TOTAL 20.27 1.92 18.34

Sources of Funds

Reallocation of Highway III 2.00

Other Donors 16.34

---------------------------------------------------------------- __---

- 103 -

TAUE C-7-3

SUDAN EMERGENCY LOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Hiativav Implementation Schedule

89 90 91 92Jan Jan Jan Jan

Procurement of Equipment

Procurement of Materials muu.*

Dueim Ferry

Supply Contract

Port Sudan Road

Shambat Bridge

- 105 -

The Priogsed Rai1is8 Reconstruction Progrsm

Component!

7.08 The proposed Railways EmergenCy Recovery Program Is designed to enableSRC to repair and supple-met protection works to its main line trackembaniments (details are provided in Table C-7-4), to procure equipmentrelated to this repair; to reconstruct a washed out bridge, to repair endaugment Uxisting telecommunications equipment essential for com nications inemergencies of all types* and to procure radio communications for backup inthe event of telecomumnication failures. Individual components are detailedin Table C-7-5. Imported materials necessary to repair SRC's trackembankments consist of gabions and filter cloth and steel pipe culverts; atoneto fill the gabion mattresses will be acquired locally and the works will becarried out by SIC (force account). Earthmoving equipment, bulldozers,loaders and dumpers will initially be employed in completing the permanentrestoration of the damaged embankments, and subsequently to keep the drainagechannels clear and to serve as a washaway reserve. Floodlighting equipment isrequtred to continue work in shifts into the night. Operations during thepresent emergency was possible only during day-light hours. A 65 ton self-propelled rail breakdown crane has been provided to assist in rapid removaland recovery of derailed or capsized locomotives and rolling stock. Spareparts and equipment for strengthening the telecommunication system response aswell as the mobility of the telecoammnication and way and works staff throughthe purchase of motor trolleys are also included. Additionally, a study oflong term measures required to protect the railway line which runs parallel tothe Gash Rliver for about 80 km on either side of Kassala and which prone torepeated flooding Is included in this Program.

Cost Estlmates

7.09 The total cost of equipment and materials ib estimated at US$10.5million, of which the foreign exchange content, net of taxes and duties, isUS$7.6 million. Details are shown in Table C-7^5. The cost estlmates arebased on tenders issued and received in the years 1985-88, adjusted forInflation and estimated in end-1988 prices. The physical and pricecontingencies, together with running spares for each item totalling 152 of thebaso price, are included in the individual items.

Possible Sources of Financina

7.10 Because of SRC's current difficult cash generation position,particularly after the revenue loss during the flood, it Is proposed thatdonors fund 1002 of the US$10.5 million program including local costs ofUS$2.89 equivalent composed primarily of stone material and labor.

- 106 -TABLE C-7-5

RAILWAYS FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMPROJECT COMPONENTS AND COSTS - US$('008)

II COHPONENT 2 FOREI6N I LOCAL I TOTAL :1

It. PERMfANENT WAY EQUIPMENT & WORKS I I U H211.1 Equipment 300 1 I2It Trackdozers (4) 1 1,000 I IIt Leaders (2) 280 I :1Ut Tipper Lorries (6) 1 450 1 21Ut Motor Trolleys I :tSI Gang Trolleys (3) 1 250 : I:it Personnel Trolleys (8) 1 650 I tIt Flood Lighting Equipment 200 : 2 1It Spares. misc. Maintenance Equipmtu 358 2 ::1:1.2 Materials I I t:: C.M. Pipes, 1I diam.,500 lIn 50 I : ::'I 6abions/filter cloth. 30,000 r2 2 650 I 2 ::It 6abion Rock & Labor : 2 850 : 1:211.3 Bridge Works 2 2 1222 Superstructure, 2m span I 150 I 1 1:2: Works I : 6001 :1::1.4 Breakdown Crane, Rail : 1,000 : 100 1 1122 (Self-Propelled) : 1 1 1:2I SUBTOTAL 2 4,950 : 1,850 I 6,800 1:

:12. TELECOMMUNICATIONS & SI6NALLIN6 1 : 380 0 ::1: EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS 2 :::22.1 Radio Equipment 2 : :::: VHF sets (3 sets of 15 each) 1 50 2 : 1:11 HF radio sets (10) s8 I I ::If Solar Energy Generators (20) 1 80 2 I :1:1 Electrolyte Cells (3000) 1 150I H:2: Batteries (140) 2 70 1 1 2122 Photosensitive Cells (500) : so 2 : :1::2.2 Materials 1 450 1 1 °::1 Reinforced Copper Wire (50 tons) 1 : 2 11

:2 Insulators (4000) I 2 1 22:2 Spindles with Washers (4000) : :12 Stay and Jurper Wire (1008) : 1 1 :1112.3 Transport Equiprent a I : ::2t Mobile S & T Workshops (2) 1 680 I 500 I 11

I2 (Self-Propelled) I I H22 Lorries S tons (2) IS: I 1 I::: 4 wheel drive vehicle (3) 1 150 I

22 SUBTOTAL I 1,800 I 800 2 2,600 2:

113. CONSULTANT SERVICES I I 2 ::1 Study of Track Protection Works I 150 : 50 ' :1:: a near 6ash River 1 1 1 a:

::4. CONTIN6ENCIES 1 660 : 240 : 900 22

:: GRAND TOTAL I 7,560 : 2,940 10,500 H12 J_wg-muwaaw=G=t"=" sra$w-s=Caa"s"n"

- 107 -

Preparation and Implementation

7.11 Priced lists for materials and equipment and tender documents are uaderpreparation by SRC, utilizing prices and proiedures for similar purchases madeby SRC in the 1985-88 period. Most of the permanent way andtelecommunications repair work can be undertaken by SRC and will be executedover the next two years. The only major works which may require externalassistance are for the reconstruction of the bridge chich is approximately 40km north of Khartoum. In the event these bridge works are beyond SRC's directcapacity, the railway will consider extending a civil engineering contractcurrently under tender preparation (US$12.0 million with EEC financing) forthe construction of four bridges on the Kosti-Babanousa line. Protectionworks, given the materials, can be executed by SRC's civil engineeringdepartment within the next two years. An implementstion schedule Is providedIn Table C-7-6.

Procurement

7.12 Procurement procedures will be subject to the source of financing. Potthe portions of the Program funded by the World Bank, ICB procedures will befollowed for all but the proprietary items (mainly telecommunicatiocs sparesestimated at US$ 4.0 million). Materials procured locally are limited tothose for protection works (cement and gabion rocks) and these will beprocured under local competitive bidding under SRC's existing procedures.

Disbursements

7.13 The estimated disbursement schedule is shown below:

USS million

Time Period Foreian Cost Local Cost Cumulative DisbursementsForeiaa Local Total

Jan-June '89 1.0 - 1.0 - 1.0July-Dec.'89 5.0 1.0 6.0 1.0 7.0Jan.-June'90 0.6 1.3 6.6 2.3 8.3July-Dec.'90 1.0 0.4 7.6 2.7 10.3Jan.-June'91 - 0.2 7.6 2.9 10.5

-108

TABLE C-7-6

RAILWAYS FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMIMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

1989 1990 19911 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

I11.Procure Earth Moving Equiprentt--1--1--1 1 I t t I t t It

IIZ.Repair Embankment* 11 :--I--J--St--t--l--: tt S 1 1 I1If Remove Speed Restrictions II I t--.--l-:l- 1 : I I I tI

a: I5t I I It 1113.Protection Works 1 1 1 1i I I 1t It S I 1i-I Procure Materials If--I--I--i--I I 1 I 1 1 1 IIil Execute Works ttI l--S--II--t--l--t--l I I I 11II I I I I 1 1 I I ii 1 I I II114.eridge Reconstruction ti 1 1 11 1 I I U I I I 11Ii Complete design/Procure Mats. -^--1--It I 1 1 It I 1 1 U1tl Construct Diversion itI I I--, 11 I 1 t II 1 1 I 1111 Construct Bridge I I I t--t-- 1 1 I I I IIII It 1 I I : 1 I 1 I I I I itI15.Teleco'nunication/Sionalling it I 1 1 tl I I 1 It I I I ItIt Procure Material tI--I--111 I 1 I 1 1 1 1 III Install S 1 --1--11--t--t--1--tI 11111II1 1 1 I116.Breakdown Crane ti I I : 1I I I I tt I : t11 Invite bids/order 11 I--- II : 1 UsI t If:1 Deliver 1:I 1 i'si I. I I I I I 1:

117.Study 6ash River 1 1 1 1 It : 111 t IIt1invite bids/fix contract ii I--1 ! I I I U I IlComplete Study Report It I I :I I: t1 : t S 1 1Ii II I I: I : II: 1 1 I I I IItI I tXw""""""wtsw"t-e=-D-"e-w"-----Gg"

- 109 -

8.00 Urban

Tho Provoaed Reconstruction Prottam

8.01 A range of urban recovery coponents dealing with tho major areas ofhousing physical and infrastructure damage for Khartoum are proposed, usingwhere practicable, labor-intensiv, techniques. Becaues the flood especiallyImpacted low income families, It is Imperative that all individuals sufferinglosses from the flood be eligible to receive benefits from the Progrsm. Theinitial phase of the program, designed to be implemented over two years wouldrequire funds in the amount of US$56.3 million as shown in Table C-8-1.

TABLE C-8-1

Urban Recovery Proaram - Cost Estimates (USOOO)

Local Foreign Total

A. Housing reconstruction 521 21,387 21,908

B. Streets and drainrehabilitation 8,414 -.3,586 22,000

C. Water rehabilitation jJ 19,630 3,590 23,220

D. Sewerage rehabilitation 400 1,130 1,530

S. Sanitation reconstruction andsolid waste collection 1,724 3,715 5,439

F. Strategic urban planning 600 1,600 2,200

TOTAL 31.289 45.008 76.297

G. Less provision for materialsIn Industry sector 20,000 20,000

NET TOTAL 31.289 25.008 56.297

Notes

1. Includes works for Port Sudan, Tokar and E1 Gedaref and the towns In theNorthern Regions.

2. All figures include price and physical contingencies.

8.02 Malor Sector Issues. The recovery of the urban sector of Sudan,particularly Khartoum, will require a substantial investment in sholter and inphysical infrastructure. The size of the required investment is well beyondthe ability of the 00G to provide and donor assistance will be required.

- 110 -

Unlike many other sectors of the economy, the urban sector is one with whichthe donor community has had little experience. As such there is currently nopolicy dialogue on urban issues critical to the success of the reconstructionprogram in particular and to the management of urban growth more generally.While acknowledging that a reconstruction program is not the proper vehiclefor seeking "wjor policy reforms, there are a number of issues which impingeon the successful Implementation of the urban Reconstruction Program and whichmay require further policy dialogue. These issues are outlined below.

Institutional Complexity and Managevment Capacity

8.03 The main agencies involved in urban development include: MPMH, theUrban and Rural Water Corporations, the Khartoum Commissionerate (includingthree Area Councils in Greater Khartoum), the Department of Town Planning, andmany others. Their actions have taken place in the absence of an overallstrategy for growth and with weak institutional and financial capacity. Toaddress this in the shorter term, clearer responsibilities for implementationneed to be established for the EFRP. In the medium term, an urban growthstrategy needs to be developed for greater Khartoum, taking into account thisinstitutional complexity and shortage of human capital.

8.04 Building Materials Costs and SupP1l. As in most emergencies, basicbuilding materials costs have risen several fold: up to seven times forcement and three to four times for oven-fired bricks compared to prices beforethe floods. This has affected the commercial and industrial sectors and themiddle and high income housing market. The lower income group faces shortagesof wood for rood structures and zinc corrugated sheets in shelter andcommunity facilities built by self-help. Government is contemplating thefollowing policies to address the cost and supply of building materials: (1)price control (which may increase further the informal market); (2) emergencyImports of cement, timber and minc sheets; and (3) support to the localmaterials industry (particularly oven-fired and sun-dried bricks). TheIndustrial Association and several NGOs are also contemplating schemes to easethe situation, particularly for the lower income population.

8.05 Resettlement of Population In Unauthorized Areas and "Peace Villates".Government programs currently contemplate resettling in peripheral peacevillages those residents in " mnplanned" areas who came to Khartoum les_ thanten years ago in order to decrease densities and normalize plot and streetlayouts. Since the floods, several hundred families have been moved to threevillages at some distance from the city center. The issues that will need tobe addressed aret (1) the economic costs to Government and families involvingsuch resettlement; (2) lack of employment opportunities and basic services inthe new villages; and (3) the implications for the overall growth of Khartoumand the cost of extending transport services.

Housinz Recovery Component

8.06 The priority in the housing sector is to assist in the rehousing ofaffected households in Khartoum and other urban areas. The majority ofvictims are poor. Not only have their losses been considerable, but they have

- 1ll -

the least access to resources with which to rebuild their shelter, much lesstheir lives. To the extent that the victims are the displaced from otherregions of Sudan, the task is doubly difficult owing to their tenuous statusin urban areas.

8.07 For those whose dwellings were completely destroyed the emphasis shouldbe on the construction of a mlnimum core house in traditional materialsdesigned to allow for future extension. The majority of victims in unplannedareas fall into this category. The cost for a 20 m2 adobe ialous room isestimated to be US$500, excluding the perimeter wall bounding the plot. Thosewhose dwellings are salvageable will, in the first instance, require access toskills and a minimum of materials for repairs required to permit safe re-occupation of at least one room of the structure. It is suggested that thissecond category of household will also require resources amounting to aboutUS$500 to meet this minimum level of shelter.

Housing Reconstruction in Khartoum

8.08 The following program is recommended for reconstruction in the housingsector. It is based on the realization that the low-income groups most inneed will be the hardest to reach and will have the least access to the neededresources. In the absence of any existing form of low-income housing financemechanism in Sudan, It is proposed that GOS establish a program of grants ofcement, timber and roofing sheets to low-income households. A plot holder ina planned area wishing to participate in the program would approach his/herlocal authority who would certify that the applicant meets the needs testestablished for the program and that there is a need for a specific amount ofbuilding material. Upon presentation of the certificate to the relevant AreaCouncil, the materials would be disbursed to the plot holder who would arrangefor their transport to the site. The local authority would inspect the worksunder the prevailing local building code. No grant would exceed US$250 invalue. All materials would be procured by the Ministry of Housing and PublicWorks on a local or international tendering basis and be delivered to thethree Area Councils. All materials would be priced at cost plus handlingcharges. Funds In the amount of US$8.8 million would be required for theplanned areas of Khartoum in order to provide 35,000 householders withmaterials valued at US$250 each. And alternative approach to the distributionof materials could be the distribut.4sn of cash grants for housing constructionfrom counterpart funds generated by the sale of imported constructionmaterials. Additionally, some combination of cash grants and materialsdistribution could be considered. Implementation of the full program wouldtake four years, the first two of which are proposed for funding under theReconstruction Program.

8.09 Short-term technical assistance would be required to establish thematerial grant system. Area Councils staff would require training and acertain amount of equipment, including appropriate types of accountingmachines. It is estimated that funds in the amount of $291,000 would berequired for the establishment of the systems

- 112 -

Toebhical Assistance for Materials Grant Systems - Costs (US$)

Foreitn Loeal .Total

6 mm technical assistance 60,000 - 60,000

3 pick-up trucks 45,000 - 45,000

6 tractorsltrailers 180,000 - 180,000

3 accounting machines 6,000 - 6,000

TOTAL 291,000 - 291,000

Local running costs would be provided in kind by the Area Councils.

8.10 Housing assistance of a similar kind to Khartoum's unplanned areas willrequire an additional US$30.9 million over four years or US$15.5 million overthe first two years. Since local organizational arrangements are not as wellestablished in the unplanned as in the planned areas, alternative distributionarrangements will have to be worked out. This could be done with theinvolvement of NGOs and/or with the Ministry of Social Welfare, as anextension of the relief activity carried out in these areas earlier. Thesearrangements should be agreed upon on an urgent basis, without which the EFRPwill be necomplete.

Production of Local Buildina Materials

8.11 A program for the importation of building materials from abroad isoutlined in the section on Industry. To supplement this it is proposed thatlocal private sector production facilities for materials such as soilstabilized blocks and bricks be promoted. The Building and Roads ResearchInstitute of the University of Khartoum has carried out extensive researchwork in the area of cement stabilized soil bricks and it has been concludedthat a number of production methods are commercially feasible. It is proposedthat BRRI and the relevant Ministry prepare a proposal involving theidentification and training of existing and prospective brick manufacturers.Suitable brick making machines could be bulk purchased under internationalbidding procedures. Setting up 100 operations at US$8,500 could costUS$850,000 including provision for working capital. Up to 1,000 jobs could becreated by this program.

Technical Assistance to Builders

8.12 Support will be required for traditional builders and their role in thebuilding process. If this is overlooked, the normal consequence is thatbuilders miss out on an opportunity to learn and improve their skills. Aprogram should be established that will work through local builders by

- 113 -

improving their skills and bolstering their position in the community. Thisoften leads to technical lmprovemento as vell as organizational innovationwhich both improve the quality of building and reduce the families' costs.This program would require a campaign to make the public wnare of itsexistence and to develop an understanding of the need to make changes inbuilding process. Funds in the amount of $200,000 are required for thisduring the first two years to build prototype houses, prepare trainingmaterials and hold regular workshops. It is proposed that BnRl and theMinistry of Housing and Public Works develop details for this component.

Urban Area Replannina

8.13 Government has embarked upon a program of replanning settled residentialareas of Xhartoum with a view to developing rights of way, providing improvedaccess roads, demarcating individual plots, designating sites for communityfacilities, organizing environmental enhancement programs and issuingcertificates authorizing house construction. The occasion of the floods hashalted this program which was already operating at a low level of activityowing to lack of resources and community organization. Recent post-floodsurveys in Um Baddah, one of the areas being replanned, indicated thathouseholds attached a high priority to the resumption of this programpresumably because of the implied granting of security of tenure which in turnwould promote speedy house construction. Resources required to resume thidprogram, costing a total of US$132,000 for two years are identified in TableC-8-2.

TABLE C-8-2

Urban Replanning (USS)

Local Foreian Total

1. Technical assistancePlanneriengineer 48 mm 6,000 6,000Community development

(192 mm) 19,200 19,200

2. Vehicles6 pick-up trucks 90,000 90,000

3. EquipmentSurvey equipment 6,000 6,000

4. Materialspegs, etc. 1,000 1,000

5. Running costs 10,000 10,000

TOTAL 36,200 96.000 132.200

- 114 -

Resettlement of Flood Prone Areas

8.14 The floods accentuated the serious shelter sad services situation in theCapital and other urban areas along the Nile. Current Government policy aimsat the resettlement of designated "unplanned" areas in three "peace villages'beyond the periphery of existing urban areas. The medium-term strategy forgrowth of the unplanned settlements and for flood mitigation in GreaterKhartoum will be addressed through the strategic growth study for the CapitalCity. However, a pilot exercise in selective resettlement of an area subjectto severe flooding is proposed within the scope of a two-year recoveryprogram.

8.15 The project proposed would: (1) selectively resettle up to 1,000families from low-lying areas to an adjacent site or equivalent unoccupiedareag (2) upgrade both the host area, gradually introducing basic services andself-help housing; (3) demonstrate the feasibility, economic and socialbenefits of careful and selective resettlement; (4) prepare the basis for thelonger-term program of resettlement of families in flood-prone areas inGreater Khartoum. The criteria for selection of the pilot area would include:severe flooding conditions; low-income population; expansion in adjacent siteor equivalent; existing or potential community organization; and commitment toimplement the pilot project by the local area council.

8.16 The pilot project would be implemented jointly by the MPWH and the AreaCouncils. Assistance would be sought from HABITAT and local NGOs, ifappropriate. Sub-components would include: plot demarcation, water network,refuse collection, building materials credit for shelter and communitydevelopment, all funded under other components of the Reconstruction Program.The net cost of tbis component would be US$300,000 to provide for 8 kilometersof access roads not included in the road rehabilitation component and a smallproject management unit manned by representatives from the Area Council andthe 4inistry of Housing

8.17 The estimated total cost of the housing reconstruction program to belmplemented over two years is $21.9 million. This includes $20 million forconstruction materials already provided for in the Industry ReconstructionProgram, see Table C-8-3. Hence the net cost of the Housing ReconstructionProgram is approximately $1.9 million.

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TABLE C-8-3

Housint Reconstruction Program Costs(USS 0008)

Item/Program Local Foreian Total

1. Construct. materialgrants 1/ 20,000 20.000

Establishment of system 291 291

Running costs for 24 months(Khartoum area only) 35 35

2. Promotion of private sectorproduction of buildingmaterials 50 800 850

3. Technical assistance tobuilders (Khartoum) 100 100 200

4. Replanning urban areas 36 96 132

5. Pilot relocation scheme for flood-prone areas (1000 HH) 300 - 300

TOTAL 521 21,387 21.908

Less funds provided formaterials in Industry 20,000 20,000

NET TOTAL 521 1,387 1.908

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Streets and Drains Reconstruction Protram

8.18 The EPRP for streets and drains that is shown In Table C-8-4 representaa four-year effort to restore the services. In addition to items Identifiedin the assessment of damages, the Mission has decided to include a part of therequired clearing and levelling of major earth streets in residential areas.Theao streets are now nearly hupossable by any vehicle. The justification forincluding this activity lies in the resulting reduced vehicle operating cost,the Improved general convenience to the public, and the fact that theexecution of this item will create an opportunity for employment of the urbanpoor.

8.19 Reconstruction of the dual carriage ways will have first priority.These streets repressnt an investment of US$100 million, and there is a riskthat part of this will be lost if no corrective measures are taken to preventfurther rapid deterioration. Traffic is at present restricted at increasedcost to the users.

8.20 The Government is concerned about the poor condition of the street anddrains system in the National Capital of Khartoum, and a reconstruction effortIn this sub-sector is accorded high priority. A major reconstruction effortwill be justified from economic gains as well as from improved healthconditions. The poor drainage conditions add to the rapid deterioration ofthe streets, and represent a health risk. Benefits will result from generalimprovement of accessibility and from reduced vehicle operating costs andincreased speed. Benefits in the health sector will result from reducedhealth care cost and increased production. The streets to be included in theReconstruction Program shall be selected on the basis of established prioritycriteria. Approxmtately 5,000-10,000 jobs would be created.

Cost Estimates

8.21 The total program cost, as shown in Table C-8-4, is US$ 45.5 millionwith a foreign component (net of taxies and duties) of US$28,1 million. Thephysical and price contingencies are included in the individual items. Priceescalation is included at 42 annually over the implementation period.

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TABLE C-8-4

sU_AN aMENCY-FL6OD RECSTRUCTION PROGRAMDETAILED COST OF URBAN SECTOR (STREETS AND DRAINS)

…---…------------------------------------------------------------__--__

Category Volure Unit Rate Total F.E.C. ForeignItem us l (1000) USS (l000) X Cost USS(1000)-------------------------------------------------------------- __----------

1. …ivil Worksi. Dual carriage way

Reconstruction. Kr 8 720 5.760 80 4.608Overlay 70 mm AC, Km 9 400 3.600 80 2.880

ii. Streets StructuresReconstruction, km 50 310 15,500 80 12,40Overlay 50 "n AC, km 25 125 3.125 80 2.500El Afun Road, Kn 30 50 1,500 80 1,200* Bridges 5 50 250 80 200

iii. Major & MinorDrains, Clearingand levelling ofStreetsLabour Based Contracts 12,600 20 2,520

iv. Grading of EssentialAccess 40 90 36Roads to Low IncomeSuburban Areas

Sub Total 42,375 62 26,344---------------------------------------

2. Technical Assistanegi. Pavement Evaluation,

Design and TenderDocunents foritem 1(i) 150 86 120

it. Tender Documents foritem 1 (ii) 150 20 30

iii. Project ManagementOffice (P1O) 2.500 50 1,250

-----------------------------------------

Sub Total 2,800 50 1,400----------------------------------------

3. Enuiprent and Tools

1. Equipment for PMO 100 100 100

ii. Hand Tools for Labourbased Contracts 300 100 300

----------------------------------------

Subtotal 408 100 400Brand----Total-----5, --7---62-- 28,144--

6rand Total 45,S75 62 28,144

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F adin

8.22 USAID and Dutch Aid are currently involved in US$12 million worth ofongoing road reconstruction projects In Khartoum. Funding will be required tofinace the first two years of the program, i.e. $22 million.

Implementation

8.23 The Director General of the Khartoum Commissionerate of Engineering andBmath (DG of COECH) will be charged with the responsibility forlmplementation of the reconstruction force account and contract work. TheStms Intended for force account work are the reconstruction from flood damageof 31 Afum Road in the east of the Nile area, and the grading of essentialaccess roats to low income suburban areas. The DG will be "Engineer 1' for allcontracted civil works. He will be assisted by a Project Management Office(PfO) established by a consultant engineer that will take care of contract(s)for reconstructionlrehabilitation of dual carriage ways, which will be let forinternational competitive bidding (ICB). Contracts for

reconstructionlrehabilitation of paved streets, will be let as localcomWetitive bidding (LCB). The same applies for the labour based contracts,item 1(iii).

8.24 The scope of services for the PtO will include the followingt

- Commissioning of design for dual carriage way andstreet reconstruction;

- Design and commissioning of standard contracts forlabour based construction;

- Supervision of construction;

- Procurement of prefabricated materials;

- Advise eontractors in labour based construction.

Services for PMO will be contracted from a local consultant, strengthened witha foreign consultant or by well qualified personnel in key positions asrequired.

Risks

8.25 The risks facing the Implementation are mainly institutional. The kindof civil works to be performed are well known to all prequalified contractors.The size of the component should attract competition from among qualifiedcontractors for all work items. One immediate risk is that the PMO may failto meet the standard required for their vital function. This risk will bereduced by ensuring capability and experience of PMO key personnel.

Another risk is that the useful life of the investment may be reduced due tolack of preventive maintenance in the future. Improved drainage facilities

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will prevent premature failure of the pavement. The institutional risk as aresult of inadequate mintenance capability, will be sought minimized bytraining of the municipality's maintenamce persornel, through the TratinigDivision of RBPC, supported by the ongoing World lank financed 'Third HUigkyProject".

Disbursements

8.26 The estimated schedule of disbursements is as followss

TABLE C-8-5

US$ MILLION

FISCAL YEAR DONORS GOS CUNULATIVE DISBURSEMENTAT END OF FY

FY 1989 1.4 0.6 2.0FY 1990 6.2 3.8 12.0Fn 1991 6.2 3.8 22.0FY 1992 6.2 3.8 32.0FY 1993 6.2 3.8 42.0FT 1994 2.2 1.4 45.6

Technical Assistance

8.27 Technical Assistance will be required for:

(i) Pavement evaluation, pavement design and preparation of tenderdocuments for dual carriage way reconstructiong

(ii) Design and tender documents for reconstruction of paved strQts;

(iii) Services for PMO.

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Urban Water Raconstruction Progra

8.28 The objective of thid program is to rehabilitate water treatmentfacilitles, bordholes and distribution systems which have been affeeted bystorm mater and flood In order to secure the supply of potable wator andImprove the health situation. However, NUMC has not only requested assistancefor replacement and repair of damaged facilitie& in the affected towns butalso for construction of new wateryards for the urban poor in the fringo reaof Greater Xhartoum. In these areas hundred of thousands of low incomefamilies have suffored most from the flood disaster and have to pay dearly forwater which is transported into these areas by vendors (usually donkey carts).

8.29 Protram for Reolacement and Repair of Damated Facilities. This programconsists of supply and installation of mechanicallelectrical equipment andcivil works for vater supply facilities in the affected towns. Besidesreconstruction, the program licludes urgent rehabilitation works for otheressential facilities In the respective systems. It would not make sense toonly restoro the facilities to the pro-flood condition and neglect otherurgent robabilitation vorks which are essential for the proper functioning ofthe whole system. Such an approach has been taken Into consideration in thepreviously mentioned report on the water supply scheme for Showak/Gedarefwhere in addition to restoration, rehabilitation works and an extension of thesystem was also proposed In order to secure safe and adequate water supply tothe area. Total cost of the Showak/Gedaref proposal is estimated at US$1.6million. Details and cost of the entire program are outlined in Table C-8-6.

8.30 Construction of New Water Yards for the Urban Poor of Greater Khartoum.It has been proposed to construct in Phase I about 20 water yards in unplannedareas with no present convenient source of water with at least two boreholesIn each yard inclusive of pipelines to public standpipes. The program alsoincludes the supply of water tankers for distribution of water to unplannedareas. Details and cost of this program are outlined in Table C-8-6.

Cost Estimates and Financmna

8.31 The total program cost as shown in Table C-8-6 amounts to US$23.2million licluding contingencies. Given the Government's constraints infinancing, donors are expected to finance 902 and the Government 10 of thetotal costs plus any taxes and duties levied on the import of goods. Sincemany donors are active in the urban water supply sector (KfW, Arab Fund,Islamlc Bank, AfDB, Governments of Japan, Italy, Netherlands, Yugoslavia,Kuwait Fund, USAID), the financing of the program seem to be feasible.

Proaram Priorities sad Implementation

8.32 The highest priority would be the implementation of the program for theurban poor in Greater Khartoum. However, not much time should be lost torehabilitate the water supply systems in the affected other towns. In orderto implement the whole program in two years it is proposed to:

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- use contractors for the construction of the 20 water yards for theurban poor in Grester Rhartoum. Local or even internationalcompetitive bidding should be applied;

- use staff of NUWC for the rehabilitation works In the affectedtowns supplemented by local contractors where requiredg

- provide NUWC with technical assistance for project preparation andImplementation.

Issues

8.33 Cost recovery should be improved in order to have sufficient funds forproper operation and maintenance of the water supply systems and for the debtservice.

TABLE C-44

Uran Water Supply Reconstruction Proram

cost Estimate

Total Cost In US$ MliliIonDceription Quantity Foreign Local Total

1. Rople_mnt and repair of damage water supply faelIties andother urgent rbabi I itation works In urban water supply *ystes.

Supply and laying of water pipeileIncluding fttings and valves

Dt o _ 2S 3km 0.82 0.08 0.40Dia 166 20 km 0.82 0.68 0.40Die 150 - 15 km 0.86 06.0 0.45Da 28 _ 1S km 0.56 0.14 0.70DI& 250 _ 6 km 0.82 0.08 0.40Diea om 5 km 0.40 0.10 0.50Di 850 - 5 km 0.64 0.18 0.60Dia 460 _ 6 km 0.80 0.20 1.00Dtn So0m 5 km 1.00 0.25 1.25

Supply and metallation ofsubmerible pump set output from40 to 75 mS/h 70 0.40 0.10 0.50Supply and Ietal lation of horizontalcentrifual pump st output from250 to m0 *mS/h 20 0.82 0.08 0.40

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supply a"d Intllatlon of aircompresor sots for filterw"bbig 10 *.04 0." *.0

Supply and )nsal lat)on of ditslgenratorsSo kV* 11 0.28 0.U 0.2550 * 10 9.10 S."4 0.40

lC0 * 6 0.82 G." 6.85#10 ' 2 0.28 0.12 0.2661109 ' 9.68 9.07 0.70

* 2 0.9.0 .10 1.00

Subtotal 1 8.16 1.65 9.80

2. Contrution of new water yards for the urban poor of GreaterKhrtoum

Construction of water yard with2 ells In eah yard, nel.pump sts, power generator wherereqired, resrvoir andpipelinew to publicStand pipes 20 4.00 1.00 5.00

Supply of watr tankerscapacity 20 .8 each 20 1.99 0.29 2.00

Subtota1 2 5.60 1.19 7.69p. Imeetation roquirnts and sundriesConstruction *quIFmnt for MMSCTrnchaing machine forexcavatton 2 0.19 0.01 0.20Truk ountedra a 0.28 0.91 *.24

Tiruck 15 t 5 0.28 0.02 o.a0Pick ups 20 9.28 0.02 o.89

Laboratory quipment for waterquality control 10 9.49 9.01 0.60Technical assistance and consultancys*rvics for project preparationand implsmsntation, training In us oflaboratory qulpmentexert foreign A local oci. tranap.requirements 6 each 09.0 0.18 1.08

Subtotal 8 2.87 0.26 2.624. Total 1 * 2 * 8 16.42 8.00 19.42

ContingencisPhysical 15X 2.40 0.45 2.91Price 4X 0.75 0.14 9.89

GRAND TOTAL 19.68 8.69 28.22

Sourc: NIC and Mission sestimte

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Urban Severase Reconstruction Protram

8.34 In order to restore the sewerage facilities to a functional condition itwill be necessary to clean the sever system, replace manhole covers andrepair/replace damaged sewers. Since the Sanitary Engineering Department hasno sewer cleaning equipment, the supply of such equipment including technicalassistance in the use of it will be the major cost item in the program.Details and costs of the entire program are outlined in Table C-8-7.

Cost Estimates and Financina

8.35 The total program costs as shown in Table C-8-7 amount to US$1.52million including contingencies. Given the Government's constraints infinancing, donors are expected to finance 902 and the Government 102 of thetotal costs plus any taxes and duties levied on the import of goods. Itshould be noted that this program does not contribute much to the improvementof the entire sewerage system which is nearing the status of completecollapse. The three treatment plants ar- out of order and the pumpingstations are in urgent need of rehabilita.- ion. The Sanitary EngineeringDepartment expects that identified donors vill finance a program for therehabilitation of the pumping stations, pumping mains and treatment plantswhich is estimated at US$21 million. Since the involvement of another donorfor the relatively small flood reconstruction program would not make muchsense, it is recommended that the GOS asks the identified donors for theadditional funds.

Implementation

8.36 The repair or replacement of sewer lines could be carried out by theSanitary Engineering Department. Manhole covers can be manufactured locally.For the procurement of sewer cleaning equipment and training in the use of it,technical assistance will be required.

Issues

8.37 The desolate condition of the sewerage system is the result of neglectedmaintenance and lack of replacement of old equipment. The lack of funds as aresult of poor cost recovery seems to be the major reason.

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TABLE C-8-7

Sweraze Reconstruction ProgramCost Estimate

.__fif__ _- ------------------------------------------------

Description Quantity Total Costs in US$ MillionForeign Local Total

---------------------------------------------------------------- __--

Sewer cleaning equipmentmanually operated equipment - 0.10 0.00 0.10high pressure flusher 2 0.60 0.03 0.63mobile dewatering pumps 6 0.03 0.00 0.03

Supply of manhole coversReconstruction of seereg 1.5 km -- 0.30 0.30

Supply of pick-ups for improvingmaintenancelsewer cleaning 4 0.06 0.00 0.06

Technical assistance forprocurement of sewer equipmentand training In Its use,man months 10 0.15 -- 0.15

,__________________________

Subtotal 0.94 0.33 1.27ContingenciesPhysical 15S 0.14 0.05 0.19Price 42 0.04 0.02 0.06

___________________________

Grand Total 1.12 0.40 1.52

Sourcet Mission estimates

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Sanitation Reconstruction and Solid Waste Collection

8.38 It is esttnated that no more than 35 percent of all household inKhartoum rely on water-borne methods of sanitation. This means that at thetime of the floods upwards of 330,000 households were resorting to the use ofpit latrines or no facilities at all. During the flood thousands of pitlatrines were destroyed and have not yet been rebuilt. There is a thereforeneed to implement a program to promote the self-help construction of thesefacilities in areas not served by the piped sanitation system in the interestsof environmental hygiene.

8.39 The responsibility for regulating the construction of pit latrines inKhartoum lies with the three Area Councils. Under the by-laws a plot holderwishing to construct a pit latrine must obtain a permit from the Council whoensures that minimum standards for distance from the house and area areobserved. In practice it is doubtful if such permits are actually sought.The role of the Council should combine the regulatory function with that ofpublic education and technical assistance to promote proper environmentalsanitation. It is proposed that a program for on-site sanitation beestablished in each of the three Area Councils. Local authorities wouldundertake a program of public education explaining the benefits of proper on-site sanitation and other plot holders a range of alternative designs for pitlatrines. The key construction component of any pit latrines is the slabsupporting the superstructure. Cement for the on-site casting of thiscomponent would be issued to plot holders under the materials grant programoutlined in Section 8.08. Consideration should also be given to themanufacture of pre-cast concrete cover slabs. Area Councils assisted by theCommissionerate and the Ministry of Health should draw up details of thiscomponent.

8.4.'5 Area Councils should undertake a two year labor-intensive program ofcommuLal public latrine construction in areas presently underserved by thesefacilities. This component would receive management assistance from the PM0established for Khartoum's street rehabilitation component and be implementedthrough the private sector. Approximately 1,200 jobs would be created underthis program.

8.41 A final part of this component would provide for a labor-intensiveprogram for the collection of existing solid waste and laying the ground workfor future strengthening of refuse collection by constructing refusecollection points at the local area level. This 'aill require the procurementof 74 tractors and trailers and 888 handearts and manual tools for the 37 towncouncils. It would generate about 1,100 jobs.

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TABLE C-8-8

Sanitation and Solid Waste Prosram(US S OOO'S)

LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL

1. ManagementArea Council staff 2i 20Engineer 20 20

2. Self-help pit latrine constructionTechnical assistance 15 15Public education 15 15

3. Commuanl pit latrine constructionMaterials 1983 340 2323Labor (1200) 624 624Transport 100 100

4. Solid waste collectionMaterial 100 50 100Labor (1100) 572 572Equipment 266 1334 1600

---------------------------------

Total (icluding all contingencies) 3715 1724 5439

Source: Mission estimtes.

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Stratesic Urban Plannint

8.42 The capital city of greater Khartoum sits astride the Blue and WhiteNiles and the Nile proper. It has developed as three separate townss Omdunman(the oldest), Khartoum and Khartoum North.

8.43 The growth in population has been extreme, even by developing countrystandards. The population In 1960 was approximately 356,000, it almostdoubled in the next decade to 640,000 and since 1970 it has grown more thanfive fold not only from natural increase and typical rural "push' and urban"pull" factors, but from massive influxes of population fleeing from droughtprone areas, war zones and locusts.

8.44 In greater Khartoum today service deficiencies have reached intolerablyhigh levels for vast numbers of people, possibly in excess of 2 million.Large areas of unserviced squatters and unplanned settlements proliferatethroughout the national capital area. At the perimeter, the urban area isincreasingly absorbing villages and consuming the agricultural land whichsupports them. People are having to travel longer and longer distances oninadequate transportation systems to the three centers. The centersthemselves are deteriorating as the natural process of growth and change comeunder increasing demographic pressures and uncontrolled and uncoordinateddevelopment overloads services and erodes environmental standards. GreaterKhartoum Is not alone In experiencing rapid urban growth. The developingcountries are urbanizing at over 50 million persons per annum or approximatelyone million per week. Typically, cities of over 3 million in countries whichare manly rural are urbanizing at a rate exceeding 200,000 per annum. Halfof this reflects natural growth, (approximately three percent per annum) andthe balance of 100,000 results from rural urban migration. Such a city canexpect to have to receive another 1 million citizens every four years (thegrowth is compound) and in all probability will reach six million in thiscountry. Khartoum is unlikely to be an exception.

8.45 In situations like this, governments have frequently adopted policieswhich aim to stem the migratory flows and reduce the relative attractivenessof the primary cities. These policies have usually failed. They have provedto be double edged. Migration has not stopped and the private city (often thepower house of the nation) has stagnated.

8.46 A review of experiences In third world urbanization since the seventieshas concluded that the most efficient and equitable way forward is to adoptpolicies and programs which enhance development and employment opportunitiesin rural areas as well as recognize urban growth in both secondary towns andprimary cities. The programs would aim to harness the energy of both ruraland urban people and provide opportunities for all citizens, including theurban poor to live a more productive life. The standards to be adopted insuch programs would reflect the socio-economic realities facing a village,town or city and be set at levels which can be sustained and afforded by

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boenficiaries. In other words, it is necessary to develop the local tax baseand reduce the need for financial transfers to local government from thenational treasury.

8.47 In Sudan today the crisis facing urban mana8ement in the nationalcapital area is of such magnitude that it must be tackled as a matter ofurgency. In parallel with the two year flood reconstruction program it isnecessary to prepare plans, policies and programs which will:

(a) address growth in the greater Khartoum area;

(b) catch up with service deficiencies;

(c) Improve operation and maintenance; and

(d) develop financial and human resources.

This can only be accomplished by undertaking an urban development study withthoe following objectives:

The preparation of:

(a) a structure plan and written statement covering the development ofKhartoum 1990 - 2000;

(b) preparation of affordable action programs, including preliminaryengineering and cost estimates for all service sectors for theperiod 1990 - 1995;

(c) preparation of forecast capital and revenue financial statementsfor all agencies involved in the action programs. The financialstatements to include forecast balance sheets and proposedfinancing plans Indicating sources and applications of funds; and

(d) recommendations for financial and institutional reform includingthe establishment of planning, programming and budgeting systemfor the national capital area.

In meeting these objectives particular attention would be given to: (i)creating a climate of opportunities in which newcomers can be speedilyabsorbed into the urban system; (ii) government's interventions and actionswhich can promote productivity in the private sector, particularly theinfonual private sector; and (iii) operation and maintenance procedures andpractices. On completion a final report will be prepared in such a mannerthat It will support a request for financial assistance from an internationalbank or financing agency.

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8.48 The level of effort to undertake an urban development study of the typedescribed above to still under review. Preliminary estimates Indicate that Itwould cost approx US$ 1.5 - 2.0 million of which Is $ 0.5 million would bespent on local consultants and counterparts.

8.49 In addition, It will be necessary to undertake additional aerialphotography and mapping at a preliminary estimated cost of US$ 0.5 - 1million. Initial allocations for these costs are in the budgets for the EFRPand would be the subject of requests for UNDP and bilateral donor assistance.

Next Steos

(a) Prepare detailed terms of reference for the urban development study witha target date for comencement and consultant of June 1, 1989;

(b) Prepare a request for bilateral assistance in aerial photography andmapping with a target commencement date of January 1, 1989.

TABLE C-9-S

ftra1tec Metroaolltan Planningand Action Prora - Cost Estimates

Strateglc Planning

Ten Leader Secial anthropologist 4Economist 5Pinanctal anslyst 4Urban planner/architect 4Municipal engineer 5Watr/sanltary anginer 4Urban land specialist 2Transportation specialist 8Housing specialist 2Solid wastes specialist 1Rtver hydrologist 1

Expatriate person month 40 at 15,00U SNo,eLocal consultant so at 8,00 180,00Counterprt (incentives) 0,Office care logistics 146,0s0

ON,"

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Altion Prosn

Upgsdlns Water eupply/a"mltablon 4Reab/drainag9 4Ar dawlpamt aFinane and institoti.nal 4SolId Waste .nag.mant 4Economist

J1

Expatriates 31 x 1C,08 465,000Local 75 x SO0O 225,0OCounterprt I n.oti,Vn . 19,0Offtce cars uN logistice 185,60

Total strategic planning 960,0WAction prDogr 82S,00

1,785,0WContingenol. *5,0O

Total plnning and action progr 1,860,M0

mapping 0 pereon months 15O 90,00equlIpent 15,00wPrinting, pctograpiys, ec 85,0W

Total base prime 55,0WConting neie 50,M0

GRAlID TOTAL Planning and Mapping 2,200,0W

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Institutional Arranmements

8.51 Overall mpl_ menttion of the urban reconstruction program would be theresponsibility of main agencies (1) the National Urban Water Corporation(NUWC) would implement the piped water and, metered standpoints componentsI(ii) the Coumissionerate of Engineering Affairs (CEA) of the RhartoumCommission would implement the urban streots, drainage and seweragerehabilitation components with the assistance of a Project Management Officeestablished by a consultant engineering firm; (iii) the Department of Housingof the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (NPWH) would implement thereplanning and resettlement components; (iv) the refuse disposal andsanitation component would be implemented by the Area and District Councilswith assistance from the Coumissionerate; (v) the building materials grantcomponent would be implemented by Area Councils and the MPWN; (vi) the capitalcity strategic planning study would be implemented by a special unit to be -etup jointly under the Town Planning Department (TPD) of the HPW, the EmergencyRecovery Unit of the MOPEP, and the Commissioner of Khartoum. The strategicstudy results would be discussed by the Central Town Planning Committee whichhas a membership of 16, Including several HPWH department heads and, theElectricity and Water Corporation.

8.52 To facilitate coordination of the urban program, its is proposed that asmall unit be established in the office of the Commissioner General, Khartoum.This unit would have a direct link to the Project Implementation Unit to boestablished in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. It wouldoversee both the activities undertaken by the Commissionerate and activitiesundertaken on behalf of the Commissionerate by other agencies.

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D. Preventiom of Future Flood a"ergencies

1.01 The flood resulted from two distinct but related events, the storm overRhartoum which caused internal flooding sad flooding from the river followingheavy rainfall In the catcbment area. The storm of August 415 over Khartoumwas an exceptional event, with an estimated return period of 500 years for arecorded fall of 200 mm. It is not possible at present to estimate therainfall to the north, and its return period, but evidence from Meteosatimagery may be useful In further study. Urban drainage cannot normally bejustified to cater for such an extreme rainfall event, however, and Khartoumdrainage could not cope with the magnitude of the recent storm water.

1.02 The river flows were less rare events and must be taken into account forpreventing future emergencies. The peak flows on the Blue Nile are estimatedto have a return period of about 10 years, but peak flows on the Atbara and onthe main Nilo at Dongola appear to have longer return periods. The Atbaraflow has a return period of about 50 years based on historical records; theseestimates take no account of changes in land use over the upper Atbara basinin recent years.

1.03 The extent of river inundation in 1988, together with the estimatedreturn period of flooding, gives useful information for flood soning. It hasnot yet been possible to locate satellite Imagery showing the extent ofinundation, but it Is understood that SPOT Imagery exists for a number ofdates in the period August 13 - September 13 for the Khartoum and Blue Nileareas, together with Gedaref and Kasala areas It is also understood thatthe Sudan Survey Department carried out air photography in August 1988, whichculd provide an interesting comparison with air photography by the Royal AirForce photography in 1946 and the Egyptian Air Force in 1954, when anastimated 700 - 800 km2 and 500 km2 were inundated (The Nile Basin, Volumes

VII & IX).

1 04 Preventing a future emergency must take account of the apparent rise inriver levels near Khartoum for a given discharge. There is evidence from thehydrological records that the levels corresponding to peak flows have risenabout 60 cm at the Khartoum gauge over the past 80 years, and by a rathersmaller amount at Tamaniat. TkIs apparent change would seem most likely to bedue to local river aggradatior., and this must be investigated more fully,taking into account the detaltled hydrological evidence, evidence of bedlevels, the possible causes and the Implications of such a change on floodprotection for the urban area.

1.05 A better forecasting system is needed for river flows and levels on theNile system, based on a combination of hydrological forecasting of runoff fromrainfall and river routing from estimates of measured flows at upstream sites.Because of the problems associated with the rapid collection and transmissionof rainfall measurements and river levels in the upper Blue Nile and Atbarabasins, an improved forecasting system would need to be based not only ontransmission of river levels from as far upstream as possible, but could takeadvantage of recent developments in real time eastimation of rvaifall usingcloud cover monitoring from Meteosat imagery.

- 133 -

1.06 Rainfall estimates converted from cloud cover duratios could be fedInto * hydrological model which would in turn require calibration using riverflow records. Once established, such a system could give a longer lead timeby providing advanced warning of flows to be expected at el Diem, the presentgauge on the Blue Rile near the Ethiopian border. The response of the riverdownstream could be forecast by models of different complexity, ranging from aslmple routing model of the Muskingum type to more complex hydraulicmodelling.

1.07 A study would be made therefore of the problems of data collection,transmissio, and modelling of the Blue Nile and Atbara systems. It would alsoInclude prorision for successive surveys of the river maphology In theKhartoum area, and produce a water surface profile model. Linked withdetailed topographic mapping to be performed under the Urban RecoveryProgram, the model would predict which areas of Khsreoum are susceptible toflooding at various river peaks and frequencies, which will be used forprevention of emergencies by improved forecasting. The study would also leadto improvements in flood levels and timing, and through improvedcommunications, serve to warn people in flood prone areas throughout the Nilesytem of impending hazard. Given the two to three days warnaing this wouldprovide, many of the moveable assets lost in the current flood such asirrigation pumps, livestock, stored crops and household effects could betransported to higher grounds.

1.08 The proposed Recovery Program therefore includes a study on the above tobe carried out by international consultants contracted by the Ministry ofIrrigation and Water Resources which is responsible for this work. Some 36mlm of expert services primarily In the fields of reservoir operations, floodrouting, hydrology, computer programming, coammiuications and river morphologywould be required. Minor equipment for gauging, sediment sampling, and

modeling would be provided, together with vehicles and back up specialistservices at a total estfimated cost of $0.5 million. Outline terms ofreference are given In Annex 7b.

- 134 -

V. IIOLD4ENTATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (EFRP)

A. Coordination and Execution

1.01 Organization: Rapid Implementation of the EFRP is essential to restoreproductive capacity with a minimum of loss to the economy, and to providerelief to those who have suffered due to the floods. Also, the EFRP will becarried out with the involvement of many sectors and regions, and at manylyers of Government and the private sector. These requirements dictate thatexisting organizations be utilized for the preparation, procurement andexecution of the Program to the maxm4mm possible extent. At the same time,there will be a need for central coordination and assistance to theimplementing agencies in overcoming obstacles and delays which will inevitably

arise.

1.02 Therefore, the EFRP includes provision for the creation of a nationalmulti-sectoral Government task force and a small centrally located

implementation unit to handle coordination and expediting on a daily basis, asfollows:

(a) National Reconstruction Task Force (NRTF). The Task Force wouldbe established with representation from all of the involved sectorministries and implementing agencies of Government, under thechairmanship of a national Coordinator appointed by the Ministerof Finance. It would meet at regular intervals to review plans,resolve inter-sectoral issues, and find solutions toimplementation problems.

(b) National Reconstruction Implementation Unit (NRIU). This unitwould function under the direction of the coordinator and wouldconsist of a small group of Sudanese professionals supported bytechnical advisers to: (i) manage the implementation of the EFRPand monitor overall progress; (ii) liaise with and assist thesoctoral coordinators to overcome bottlenecks on a daily basis;(iii) coordinate donor assistance and assist in dealing with donorprocurement procedures; (iv) implement a system of monthly andquarterly reports for the Government and donor community on EFRP'sprogress; and (v) alert the Minister of Finance and/or the officeof the Prime Minister of major obstacles impeding the EFRP'stimely implementation. The unit would be headed by a senior levelcoordinator who would report to the Prime Minister in his functionof chairman of the High Ministerial Committee for Rehabilitationthrough the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, who is theSecretary of that Committee. It would be assisted by asecretariat headed by a Chief Executive Officer to oversee day-to-day operations. The unit would be staffed with three additionalprofessional positions covering the areas of: (a) sectoral liaisonand programming; (b) disbursements and procurement and; (c)reporting and public information. A more detailed outline of thefunctions of the unit are outlined in Annex 7. Cost to the

- 135 -

Program for support to the Unit will be US$ 1.5 million, with US$ 1.0million in foreign exchange and US$ 0.5 million In local costs.

B. Implementation CapacitX and Constraints

1.01 Donor-assisted programs in Sudan have in the past frequently beendelayed due to implementation constraints of various kinds. Since speed is ofprime importance in the EFRP, the Government will need to anticipate theseconstraints and take steps to overcome them even before the EFRP gets underway. Each sector program has been designed with implementation issues inmind, and implementing agencies and appropriate technical assistance have beenidentified to minimize potential problems.

1.02 In some cases the capacity of Sudan's construction industry as a wholecreates a constrain for rebuilding, such as for schools, health facilities,and road improvements, and the size of the Reconstruction Program reflectstI's limitation.

1.03 Procuremaent of donor financed goods and services has also been a problemin the past, leading to lengthy delays. The National ReconstructionImplementation Unit should be able to help overcome this bottleneck throughprovision of assistance to the Implementing agencies. Training of procurementofficers in donor procedures will also be necessary in cases where suchprocedures are new to them.

Port Sudan

1.04 Port Sudan is the front door to the country, and increasingly the frontdoor is shut.

1.05 Run by a parastatal, the Sea Ports Corporation (SPC) has eleven generalberths on its north side and four specialized berths on its south side forgrain, containers, roll on-roll off and petroleum. Total throughput hasranged from 4.2 to 4.6 million tons over the last three years, even though itsrated capacity Is far larger. The SPC is in serious trouble; overallproductivity is less than 200 tons per employee per year, a figure low by anystandard. Ships often have to wait at anchor, some more than 15 days, becauseof SPC's inefficiency and disorganization. Cargo can wait for two to threeweeks on the quay before it is "officially" received by the Port authorities.One batch of spare parts ordered by SPC itself reportedly arrived in May 1988but was cleared only in September due to the Port's failure to attend to itsown emorgency needs. During a mission in July it was noted that nearly alloperations were being carried out without forklift assistance, and the quayswere so congested from cargo that it wa difficult to service ships currentlyat the berths. The storage area behind the port's warehouses was congestedwith breakbulk cargo placed at random. Much cargo was seriously damaged andthe entire storage area was in disarray. Despite the need to use itsresources for spare parts and equipment to improve operational productivity,SPC has recently invested in port facilities nearby with no visible economicjustification. The Port has been run for the last year by acting officials Inits top two positions.

- 136 -

1.06 The Port of Sudan to clearly an impediment to the success of theEmrgecy Flood Reconstruction Program as well as to general economicdevelopment since Its tnefficiency makes imports more expensive and exportslese competitive. An emergency port rehabilitation program needs to beundertaken and a number of donors are prepared to assist in this effort.Before this, bowever, Government should itself take 4mmediate action in thefollowing areat

(a) Nominating an experienced general manager to run SPC with a parttime chairman who would not interfere in operational matters. Thefirst priority of the general manager would be to instill orderand motivation in the work force and in this he would need thestrong support of the central Government;

(b) Concentrating all resources on the key job of operating the port,including the purchase of essential spare parts and equipment;

(c) Employing consultants to begin reorganization of port operationsand procedures including the use of ship manifests to 'receive'shipments in the port and better cooperation among the Port,Customs and shipping agents; and

(d) If the information promised to the donor community by SPC forSeptember/October 1988 has not been prepared, technical assistanceshould be brought into the Port in both operational and advisorypositions.

C. EmPlo_ment Generation

1.01 Many of the losses from the flood have been personal losses toindividuals and families - loss of income from interrupted work environments,loss of crops, and loss of personal possessions and housing. Many of theselosses are beyond the means or ability of the Government to offset, and canonly be restored by Individuals themselves through their own offorts.However, the Government can facilitate these efforts not only by direct meansas outlined in the proposed EFRP, but by designing the Program so that itgenerates the maximum amount of employment for the affected areas andindividuals so that personal income will be available to purchase the suppliesand good needed for families to replace lost possessions.

1.02 An important method for creating additional employment opportunities atlittle or no financial cost to the Government is to carry out reconstructionprograms on a labor intensive basis wherever-possible. Street repairs and thecleanlng of debris and solid wastes in the Khartoum area can be done by manuallabor rather than machinery, thus providing employment and Incomes for largenumbers of people who in turn can utilize that Income to rebuild their housesand replace their possessions. Contracts for this type of work should specifythat labor intensive methods must be employed, except in cases where thiswould lead to significant cost incroases. Contractors who are accustomed tomachine operations may resist the change to labor intensive methods, butexperience elsewhere indicates that this method can be utilized for many of

- 137 -

the reconstruction tasks in a cost effective manner. The Program as designedhas been designed to generate 10,000 addit''ial jobs through labor Intensivecontracts.

1.03 A clear statement of Government policy regarding a preference for laborintensive programs, and the reasons for this approach, would be helpful inovercoming the resistance to change from more conventional methods.

D. Aid Reauirements and Donor Coordination

Financint the Protram

1.01 Due to Sudan's difficult financial situation, it Is proposed that 90percent of the EFRP be financed by donor assistance, for a total of USS 366.75million. Some donors have already made decisions regarding the transfer offunds from existing programs or for the provision of additional financing forreconstruction. Where known, these amounts have been indicated in the sectorreports. However, much of the Program is not yet funded. close coordinationwill now be imperative to assure that donor financing fits together withoutoverlapping or gaps. The Planning wing of the Ministry of Finance andEconomic Planning is responsible for this coordination, which can besupplemented by the National Reconstruction Implementation Unit when it isestablished. In some sectors or programs, one donor may be acting as a leadagency, helping to coordinate and integrate the assistance to the sector (asthe World Bank is doing with the railways).

1.02. Donor's Conference. The Government believes that it would be useful tohold a meeting of the Consultative Group for Sudan, chaired by the World Bank,in late November to seek financing for the Program and to assist In thecoordination of donor inputs. The Mission concurs in the need for such ameeting, which has been tentatively scheduled for November 29, 1988 in Paris.

1.03 Imediate Needs. The Mission urges donors, however, not to wait for theConsultative Group Meeting if funding is available now for urgentrequirements. We hope that this document will facilitate the taking of earlydecisions, and would be glad to provide any background information which wouldassist in achieving that result.

138

ANNEX - I

SUDANFLOOD RECOVERY PROSRAN

AGRICULTURETABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE CONTENTS1. NURSERIES AND HORTICULTURAL SERVICES Ministry of Agriculture2. LrYESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES3. RrHABIL.ITATION AF INfRASTRUCTURE Northern Region

- Table 3A For NAPC Scheme- Table 3i For Regional Hinistry of Agric.- Table 3C For Private & Coop. Scheme- Table 3D ror Coordination Unit

4. REHABILITATION OF PUBIIC IRRIGATION (NOI) Central/Eastern RegionINFRASTRUCTURE

- Table 4A For Gezira Sches- Table 48 For Rahad Scheme- Table 4C For New Halfa Scheme- rable 40 For Earth Moving Corporation (EfC)- rable 4F Technical Assistance to Oli

S. REHABILITATIIN OF INFRASTRUCTURE fkor'1ofan, Darfur, Gash/Tokar Deltas

6. LOCUST AND PEST/DISEASE CONTROL

7. EXTENSIoN AND SEED SERVICES

8. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

9. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

10. AGRICIILTURAL LOSSES

11. DETAIlED PROGRAM COSTS - Itemized (Base)

12. DETAILED PROGRAM COSTS - Itesized (including Contingencies)

139

&NNEX-1Table 1

SUDAN

FLOOD RECOVERY PROBRAKAGRICULTURE

NURSERIES AND NWA HORTICULTURAL SERVICES

Cost Estimates $ '000'Unit

Unit Cost 1989 1990 Total Foreign Local F.Exch.

S z

INFRASTRUCTURE &PUKPS

Shallow wells 20 1,000 20.0 - 20.0 4.0 16.0 203-4* pumps/motors 16 600 9.6 9.o 9.6 - tO0

5-60 pueps/motors 9 4,000 36.0 - 36.0 36.0 - 100Shade 2,000a2 50 50.0 50.0 100.0 20.0 80.0 20fencing 8 km 15,000 80.0 40.0 120.0 108.0 12.0 90

buildings 1,0002i 250 50.0 200.0 2*Q.Q-lQQ.4 ------ILQ.Q 40Sub total 535.6 277.6 258.0

Equipmenttractors & lapl. 9 14,000 126.0 - 126.0 126.0 - 100

Spare parts 20 2,000 40.0 - 40.0 40.0 - 100

trailers 9 2,000 18.0 18.0 10.0 - 100

pick ups 20 12,000 240.0 - 240.0 240.0 - 100

station wagons 5 27,000 135.0 - 135.0 135.0 - 100

motor cycles 20 1,500 30.0 - 30.0 30.0 - 100

trucks 4 35,000 120.0 - 120.0 120.0 - 100

small nursery 20 5,000 50.0 50.0 APPAQ-19.J - 100

Sub total 809.0 s09.0

Operating Costs

seeds/seedlings 550,000 0.1 55.0 55.0 110.0 - 110.0 0

date shoots 275,000 S 1375.0 1375.0 2750.0 - 2750.0 -fertilizers, LS. 20.0 20.0 40.0 36.0 4.0 90fuel,lubricants LS. 160.0 160.0 320.0 288.0 32.0 90repairs,Labor LS. 100.0 100.0 200.0 - 200.0 0

field allowance LS. 25.0 25.0 50.0 - 50.0 0

Polybags LS. 100.0 100.0 _QQ.Q ... 2..QOLQ .... _Sub total 3690.0 524.0 3146.0

Total Base Cost .5014.6 110.6 3404.0

140

Table 2SUDAN: FLOOD RECOVERT PROGRAN

AGRICULTURELIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES

COST ESTINATES

Cost Estimates 5 *000'No; Ulit Cost 1989 1990 Total LOCAL FOREIGN F. Efc

I[uglImr ..!accigSA L.S. 100.0 100.0 200.0 - 200.0 100

EghjegehI L.S. 50.0 50.0 100.0 - 100.0 100

Pickups 4 12,000 48.0 - 48.0 - 100.0 100Spare parts L.S. 2S.0 25.0 50.0 - 50.0 100Motorcycles 20 1,500 30.0 - 30.0 - 30.0 100Repairs existino L.S. 10.0 100.0 200.0 40.0 160.0 80vehicles

operating Costsvehicles L.S. 100.0 100I. 200.0 20.0 180.0 90Field allowances L.S. S0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 - 0Labor L.S. 36.0 36.0 72.0 72.0 - 0

Total Costs 1,000.0 232.0 768.0

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of 81bir Sriecb 0m1(a52g)3M. Clsam* mid dnsilta Ns i,M 0. 41 24 1 *

of eae dran (m3)14. ClOsrOstrmgtlsn 0 160l000 0.9 144 120 1 ^

of miner .mel.M1. bilde *erk for Ow 6 20 26.0 a 6s I *

(Sub-total) 2,10 2,022

ZUIGATtlU & OAU1M8 I1

IM. epair. to _ bridge NW 2 140,000 2Z0 140 1 * * vfore. Ii

MU. Repirs to Nicor Stntir $11 48 24 * *

a22 164

W81DJ141 IEAIS

M. _emWir1 wells and _w, Sao 120 s

privy

D_G~ 0O N P1*3. nt and oade 2 60,000 160 144 1 Telex Us blue oil, Credit

(11181S)

InIO Crawler/do 120/140 hp ' 3 160.000 460 432

NVII.Notor Grnder 'I 10,000 sI 7o

1112. dnlle eeeto (0.7 * 2 15,0t0 110 103 '

1312. 1i1e Wlrimp * 6 26,000 25 32 U

1114; tipr trks (A/ toe) * 6 00000 ISO 162

11N1. 4 x 4 ticwe ^ 4 1250Q0 s0 45

316. Spar. Poe (NWB to No16) SU 221 208

(S-total) 1266 1248

Total owe cost (1i/68) 564 440AN '4 Pysical cmtinet 6208 450

^wp 4t

AN2 -I* Ta-lXC Pago 2/2

SO""R FOR NiEM EALIA

Items Costs (US* 000)total 1

3arthWorkb 1810 3023I/S Strwutures 324 164Buildings 120 , 60OB I Plmt 1338 . 1248

B" Cost 4 441111/ C ettagotm so 450

Total M08 4945

9issacig Plan:Item of Work rimming Nod., (U3 000)

(1) (2) (3) (4)Or. l8SU D Plood Cr. i022-SW NIw

artwork (xcept MI) - - 1023* ( 1) - - - 2167

Irris6tlon Stractur/ - - 493buildinssrigneu 0 m O Plt 3525 - - -

Total 15i25 1516 316? (Total 6208)(R) (1372) (103) (2073)

ANU -II&lO 4-3

SUDNI - uwo uco0u u*u. (AoaCuzu

3ath ag Cwpoatieo (3 - Pimt

(Cost latilt)

Ite unit ott git ate Costs I3*000 o t nia _il(U$) Total Fs typ made

PiM-I Dreglise (3822 type) mI UO,OOO I'28m 112 IC2 2D3C-2 Uydrvuaaic Iaatig Mm 12 15,000 1,020 91830-3 Cruler/dosa 120/A P Kom 8 160,000 960 864 S

36C-4 Mobile orlsebp Im 2 O,000 100 90 *3C-6 Fuel takers (1500 a) N.s 4 35.000 140 126 uo6C0-6 Pick-up NM 12.5. 75 so 8

(S/totl) 3,m57 s21lIn -? Spars (202 total oant Si 15 624

ot ove) .(I) o"e Cost 4,290 3842(ii) Ph¢sical Co ointea (l04 of Ds¢i Coot) 429 384

Total 4,719 4226

total US$ 4.72 Hill (US 4.23 111 3)Dadw the Food sovety Prosn

AM 1

WaN - visa _aowuv wmoma CAOSICL1t3)

Nlnitmy of. Zrristtie - awl& SaIt ateal *ssisti

Oust bliuto

Item bit tm 1tt ste Cost On fri nt Viai _nw(90) Itl t Nb

1. 44 pickup v1biols Mm 10 33.50 IM 110 a 2 13

2. Su8eg 3q4pt (20 tX_m) Sm 1bot 23. Offic .IS g lbtwials M4 3" 0 24. total S PMe SOm 1a - I * 25. ?hI.sI Asist (ost) i 100 1" 144 ' A 2

Total Bose Ct (Jel.) i's 514

, .

11 P t of' lte , 3, , 4 to bseilid in *te m(Sw iwto NS 3.00o0)

6. IW

U...

157

ANEX ITable 5

SUDNIFLOOD RECOVERY PROSRAN

AGRICULTURRebabilitation of Agricultural Infrastructure in

Kordofan, Darfur and ftsb/Tokar deltas

Cost Estiaates S '000-..Unit

Unit Cost t 1989 190 Local Foreign Total F.Exth.

Bulldozer/Loaders 5 160.000 800.0 - - 000.0 800.0 100transporters 5 50,000 250.0 - - 250.0 250.0 100spare parts LS 30.0 SO.0 - 100.0 100.0 100Nobile workshop 1 35,000 35.0 - - 35.0 35.0 100Pickups 5 12,000 60.0 - - 60.0 60.0 100operating work LS __ -- q- _ 4Q,Q _ _ .Q 60Subtotal NOI 1225.0 80.0 24.0 1201.0 1305.0

Sash CorporationBulldozer/loader 3 160,000 48f.0 - - 480.0 480.0 100Notororader 1 80,000 00.0 - - 80.0 80.0 100Truck 1 30,000 30.0 - 30.0 30.0 100Pick up 1 12,000 12.0 - - 12.0 12.0 lOOSpare parts LS 25.0 25.0 - 50.0 50.0 100Operating costs LS -° Q Im --- Q----- 2J90 eOSubtotal GC 637.0 35.0 8.0 664.0 672.0

Tokar Corporationbulldorer/loaders 2 160,000 320.0 - - 320.0 320.0 100Truck 1 30,000 30.0 - - 30.0 30.0 tOOOperating costs a 15.0 15.0 6.0 24.0 30.0 80spares for BankProtection 20000K 1.0 0Q.Q...__-__.Q_-___Q. 0Subtotal IC 385.0 15.0 26.0 374.0 400.0

158

'mu-i-Table 6

SUDA"FLOOD kECOVERY PROGRAJ

AGRICULTURELOCUST AND PEST/DISEASE CONTROL

Cost Estimates $ '000'Unit -

Unit Cost 8 1989 1990 Local Foreign Total F.Exch

LOCUST CONTROL

Pestecides LS 500.0 - - 500.0 500.0 100Aircraft charter 1,000.0 - - 1,000.0 1,000.0 100Pickups 10 12000 120.0 - - 120.0 120.0 100Equipeent & vehicles LS So.0 - - SO.0 50.0 100Incremental Opera- LS 500.0 - 200.0 300.0 500.0 60ting costs ______- -___

S Subtotal -Locust Control 2,170.0 - 200.0 1,970.0 2,110.0

PEST CONTROL SERVICESPesticides LS 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100Vehicles Pickups 10 12000 120.0 - - 120.0 120.0 100Motor cycles 50 1500 75.0 - - 7S.0 75.0 100Incremental Opera- LS 50.0 50.0 60.0 40.0 100.0 40tion costs __ _________--_--____--_____-__-----____

Subtotal - Pest Control 345.0 150.0 60.0 335.0 395.0

1S9

NEX_1Table I

SUDANFLOOD RECOVERY PROSRAN

ARICULTUREExtension and Seed Services

Cost Estimates $ '00o'Unit

Ulit Cost S 198 19 Local Foreign Total F.Exct

Estension ServicsVehicle r-pairs LS 25.0 25.0 10.0 40.0 50.0 . soInc.Fie*1 allowances 100.0 100.0 200.0 - 200.0 -

Inc. Operating costs, * 100.0 100.0 40.0 160.0 200.0 80fuels etc. --- _____________________________Sub total 225.0 225.0 250.0 200.0 450.0

Se ServicesVehicles pickups 5 12,000 60.0 - - 60.0 60.0 10tPackaging Equipasn4i *100JQO 1QO.0 - - 100.0 100.0 tO0

water seed LS 20.0 20.0 - 40.0 40.0 100Inc. Operation costs LS SQ.3 - -QD- Q -QQ----Sub total 230.0 70.0 100.0 200.0 300.0

160

TAStES

SUDANFLWOD RECOVERY PROGRAN

AGRICULTUREAGRICULTURAL INPUTS

Cost Estiates S '000'Unit

Items ulit Cost 1989 1990 Local Foreign Total F.Exch.*$

FUELKOA Services 100,000 gI 1.0 100.0 - - 100.0 100.0 100

RPIU 200,000 gl 1.0 200.0 - - 200.0 200.0 tO0

Sub total iQa.2Q - - lQ.0 IOQQa.Q 100

Sub total 600.0 - - 600.0 600.0

SEEDSASs (lisc) 400.0 - 200.0 200.0 400.0 50

FERTILIZEnS 11Ass Urea 6,600t 170 1122.0 - - 1122.0 1122.0 100

Ass TSP 2,000t 230 460.0 - - 460.0 460.0 100IPHU (Vheat)SCS 8,OOOt 170 1360.0 - - 1360.0 1360.0 100

NAPC I,OOOt 170 272 - - 272 272 100

Others 4,OOOt 170 __4NQ_ - - __A.Q.. {{Q0-- 100

Subtotal 3094 3894 3894

SPARESASS (forsers) LS 500.0 500.0 - 1000.0 1000.0 100UPIU NOA/AUAC LS Q 99.0 J99DLL - 1999,Q 0 QQ^_.0 100

Sub total 1000 1000 10000 1000

JUTE SACKSAsS (farmers) * 2000.0 - - 2000.0 2000.0 100

RPHU - AUAC -,2919 _3ZP,Q _J2Q.. Q

Subtotal 2320.0 2320.0 2320.0

I Including losses during rain and needs for incresentalwinter crop area.

161

1RMUTable 9(Pag 112)

FLOG RECOVERtY PROGRAM

ASICULTUPETECHICAL ASSISTACE

A S E N C TI/ an - months1989 1MO Total

NAPCPerennial crops specialist 1 2 3Engineering 6 6 12Monitoring/studies _24 -fi

Sub total 9 11 20

RMOA (Northern)Plant protectien/extension Issues 1 2 3Nonitoring/studies J J

Sub total 1 5 6

lsplesentation review Northern Region 4 - 4Completion report Northern Region - -_.

4 4 8

Procurement engineer 12 6 la

Rpm"Procurement engineer 12 6 18

AVAC

Monitoring, Programming- Local Expert 12 12 24- Foreign Expert 12 12 24Nid Term Review 4 - 4

A Project Coopl. Report - 4 4

162

Table 9(Pa" 212)

SUDbFLOOD ECOVERT PIOGSN

AGRICULTURETECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

SUINAIT OF COST ESTIMATES

Unit Rate t llillion

NAPC 20 "/a 10.000 0.20 .

RHOA 6r/a 10,000 0.06

NttIP 8 o/r 10,000 0.16

RPNU 1i */n 10,000 0.16

AUAC 24 r/r 2,000 0.05

32 n/rn *-I0,00

_ 0.63 sillion

163

Table 10(Page 1/2)

SUDANFLOOD RECOVERY PROCRA

AGRICULTUREAgoricutural Loss*s

Northern RegionNature dote Palos 8,000 FeddansImmature date palms 12,000IM lost production from surviving 20,000

Nature orchards1 10,000Immature orchards 14,000

1988 lost production from surviving 56,000orchardssannas 4,000Alfalfa 10,000Fodder sorghum 10,000Vegetables2 2,500Henna 2,500stored onions 700,000 SacksStored beans 7,500 SacksNurseries for tree crops 7 InundatedCattle 67,500 HeadSheep 36,500Goats 35,500Camels 4,000Poultry 205,500

Central Region(a) Sezira Schee

Cotton 7,800 FeddansGroundnuts 1,400Sorshum 9,500Vegetables 1,700Treated cotton seed 1o000 sagsUrea 5500 (50 Kg)tailing hoops 2,300Cotton sacks 17 BalesFruit trees 450 TreesCattle 12,000 HeadGoats and sheep 66,000 ReadPoultry 360,000 Head

ncludes citrus, sangoes, other fruit trees.2 Includes wide mix of green leaf vegetables, beans, tomatoes etc.

164.. . F _~W Ll.

Table 10(page 212)

SUDAII FLOOD ECOVERY PEOSRAN

ASRICULtUREAgricultural Losses

(b) Other AreasBananas 10,000 FeddausVegetables 135,000Nature orchards N/AAlfala N/ALivestock N/A

Eastern Reaiso

(a) ahad ShemeCotton 19,600 FeddansGroundnuts 1,1o00

Sorghus 10l,80Vegetables 300

(b) Me Nalfa Schemecotton 11,000 FeddausGroundouts 10,000Sorgbum 20,000

(e) Other AreasVegetables 10,400Fruit orchards 5,100Nurseries 30Livestoc N/A

gordofa RegionN/A

Khartous edionN/A

1ogo 19W Leo.l foroeig, Total 21kM exiut IDA AtmiD KILO SOC Others Osuev-:t4SIito A emsrssy Lw 33st of

1. rood &ssstanoc Itrcltocets cJeit 1,isti Northrn Ro lon 400.0 6600.0 1200.0 4000.0t

2. Xarsesies and NM 2hort icltarl s*tYiOa I(a) Intrastecturlpuupo 241.6 290.0 256.0 277.6 131.6 Eb) Cqaipmat 759.0 50.0 609.0 609.02IcW Operating cont 16)S.0 163S.0 3146.0 524.0 3670.0 a

Sub-total 2. 2)9.06 2171.0 3404.0 1410.4 S014.6 a

3. TAreers incee_tal criLt: asols 6100.0 7650.0 1.0 *S00.0 a

2.4. fh"bilitstien of agriceltural t

lstrastr tftre isn ?orthuru Region 2 £

a) Drainage 140.0 - 16.0 64.0 140.0Ib) lrsigatloa A pumps 1777.0 - 303.) 1394.0 1777.0 $ac) suol ings 399.0 267.0 36.) 260.0 666.0 :It) Vbicles & £quipt 1202.0 - 1202.0 t202.0 sGe) Operating Cots 77.0 66.0 71.) 6S.0 1)6.0 a

Sub-total. OAP 3506.0 33l.0 "06.0 3013.0 3921.0 t

(al Drainage 90.0 - 17.0 73.0 90.0 :Gb) auildings 45s.5 364. 350.0 242.0 s92.0 2(co Vehicles S squipt 247.0 - 247.0 247.0 aldl Operating costs 24.0 20.8 34.0 1O.6 45.6 2

Sub-tot*l R'OA 017.) 151.3 401., 172.6 974.6 s

91IVAT? and O-O Sla) Pumpsltotors 10400.0 - 10400.0 10600.0 a(b) Lgrcsquipt_ast 2644.0 - 10.0 2630.0 2640.0 :Sub-t.tal PrIV & 8Cop6lS040.0 10.0 12030.0 13040.0 t

tlRIb~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

la) Vehicles S quipt 63.0 - 1.0 62.0 -630 tlbi Operating costs 46.3 47.7 73.2 20.6 94.08

Sub-total 3315P 109.3 41.7 74.2 02.6 157.0

Sub-total 4. 17554.6 150.0 1394.0 14690.6 18092. A

S. Rshabilitation of agricultwral I£ntrasttuetwr in Coatedtatd *srters inelos

UDI - GSI * tla) sarthver9s 2040.0 511.0 1S37.0 2040.0 2

Struturs 210.0 105.0 10S.0 210.0 sStindugs --rMieis 2000.0 1040.0 1040.0 2000.'

^ * ... .*... 1z 0 *6S6.0 2MM2.0 4336.

PDI - RJUIUD t

Sol Suwthuorhs 1S69.0 391.0 1178.0 1S69.0 t

lb) 8t*uture. 304.0 A52.0 152.0 304.0 t

IC) ftergency o08 plant 1386.0 136.0 1246.0 0 136.0 s

SBb-total Nab"l 3259.0 6:.0 2576.0 3259.0 t

(.1 Strmctures 328.0 164.0 164.0 326.0 4

lb) Smlldings - repirs 120.f 114.0 6.0 120.0 a

gea Moesgency OmU plant 1386.0 136.0 1246.0 1366.0 *

SWb-total New Ulto 1634.0 416.0 1416.0 1634.0 :

mItI- uIareys a . .8matmeting

J

ia) Vehicles S *qulpt 265.0 3S.0 230.0 2t6S.0

lb) surveys 150.0 50.0 200.0 200.0 s

Zub-t*tal Surveys 415.0 50.0 235.0 236.0. 465.0 a

13lC s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

la) Machlnery a oqulpt p360.0 336.0 3024.0 3360.0 s

lb) Spare parts 71S.0 91.0 624.0 71S.0 t

(ca YSbleles 21S.0 21.0 194.0 215.0 t

Sub-total EWC 4290.0 440.0 3042.0 4290.0 S

PkltArE ruX scem3os t.

#a) 3-40 pumps S motors 1200.0 600.0 1800.0 16.0 a 0

tb) 5-6 pumps S motors 2000.0 2000.0 2000.0 t

Sbttatal PrDv pumps 3200.0 600.0 3600.0 3600.0 t

Sub-total 5. 17334.0 650.0 3436.0 145S0.0 17986.0 t

S. Sebabilaeioe of agricultural t

Infrastructure In Khordofan, efar. A Cash/Tokar deltas t

a) Not-Itural watoc 122S.0 80.0 24.0 1261.0 130S.0 :

lb) Gash 63?.0 35.0 8.0 664.0 672.0 2

le) tokar 1 38S.0 1S.O 26.0 374.0 400.0 :

Sub-total 6. 2247.0 130.0 56.0 2319.0 2377.0 a

7. Agricultural inputs a

(a) Fuel 300.0 300.0 300.0 s

lb) fertllisers 3894.0 3694.0 3894.0 2

tca Seds 400.0 200.0 200.0 400.0 a

Idi Spare parts 1000.0 1000.0 2000.0 2000.0 t

1-e Jute o cks 2320.0 2320.0 2320.0 S

Sub-total 7. 7914.0 1000.0 200.0 6714.0 8914.0':

0. S neloo anu ndSeed sorelces

la) Vehicle repalrs 25.0 25.0 10.0 40.0 SO.0 a

(bS Field allowanco 100.0 100.0 200.0 200.0 S

(et Operating costs 100. 0 1000 40.0 160.0 200.0 t

Sub-total extanslon 22S.0 221.0 50.0 400.0 450.0 St

fA8eeiSt, 8ricest(al Vehicloa 60.0 60.0 600 0fb) Packaing j equipmoat 100.0 100.0 100.0 3

(c) ounAtaon a42.z s 20.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 s141 Operating costs 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 s

Sub-total NOASS 230.0 70.0 100.0 200.0 300.0 i

Sub-total 8. 45S.0 29S.0 150.0 600.0 750.0 At .8I

9. Livestock health t .

sXvlceto) Drugtvsaccines sl0.0 150.0 300.0 300.0Ib) Aquipment 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0(cl Vehicles 203 0 125.0 .40.0 286.0 328.0 3

Idl Operating costs 186.0 186.0 192.0 180.0 372.0 ISub-total 9. 589.0 511.0 232.0 560.0 1100.0 t

t0.oUmst and pent control serviasi

teCeS CONTROL ala Pesticides 500.1 500.0 50O.0

Ibl Aircraft charter 1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 3

lob Vehicles 8 equipt 170.0 170.0 170.0 0Id) Operating costs 500.0 200.0 300.0 500.0

Sub-total LC 2170.0 200.0 1970.0 2170.0 8

MOA PtSSTIODSWSB SURVKCBS t -

(la Pestlfungciqdes 100.0 100.0 200.0 200.0(bl Vehicles A equipt 195.0 195.0 195.0

Ic) operating costs 50.0 S0.0 60.0 40.0 100.0 aSub-total POO 345.0 1S0.0 60.0 435.0 495.e t

Sub-total 10. 251S.0 150.0 240.0 240$.0 2665.0 8

11 .echnical assistance la) NOD (surtiys) 130.0 50.0 36.0 144.0 180.0 Ilb) MOT Peocureant 120.0 60.0 180.0 180.0 3

Ic) RiOA UR 10.0 50.0 60.0 60.0 t

(d) NAPC 90.0 110.0 200.0 200.0 t(el NRIRP 40.0 40.0 s0o0 80.0 1

(eI RP.u 120.0 60.0 100.0 180.019g AUAC 184.0 184.0 45.0 320.0 368.0

Sub-total 11. 694.0 554.0 04.0 1164.0 1248.0. ~~~~8

TAOT ALL TSENS 66644.2 6003.0 21660.0 50979.2 72647.2 :

Physical contingencies a

(20'4 13320.8 1200.6 4333.6 10195.8 14529.4 a

_xpeated price ascalation t

toreign 49 Local 30% 9400.7 846.0 7800.5 2447.0 10247.5 S

@3a8D TOTALS 89373.7 8050.4 33002.1 63622.0 97424.1 s

Sable 12 (Po U114)

AgLcm Ptailal cost -timaneis

o---------- Costsi 0 -t-ou"ui_----s---s r1 .*tet g fn La thaoni" -.--------------

1909 1990 Local Foreign Total tZDA exist DA AiDS tWAD gm MA Others Gen-

sete aitl a mergeaw Am met ot

1. c assistaneo g'sloon owehit so"n

Au Uorthsrs Regiom 6000.0 4000.0 1200.0 6000.0 a

Physical contlgenaoos(309) 1200.0 960.0 240.0 1200.0 $

Ixpcted price escalation aoroeign 49 Local 309 1785.V 1716.0 57.6 170S.6 a

TOTALS 8905.6 7488.0 1497.6 0905.6 S

2. Uursetes and mmhorticultural service 2

(a1 Infreastucture/pumpe 245.6 290.0 350.0 277.6 5S35.6 s

lbi Uquipent 759.0 50.0 009.0 009.0 a

(co Operating costs 1835.0 1835.0 3146.0 524.0 3670.0 aSub-total 2. 2839.6 2175.0 3404.0 1610.6 5014.6 A

Physical contingencieas(209) S67.9 43S.0 660.6 322.1 1002.9 a

Eipected price escalation aForeign 49 Local 30l 737.7 565.0 1225.4 77.3 1302.7 s

TOALS 4145.2 3175.0 5310.2 2010.0 7320.3 a

3. Farmers lncemeta I&credit needs 6500.0 7650.0 650.0 0500.0 s

Physical contingencies . t

(20%) 1700.0 . 1530.0 170.0 1700.0 aExpected price escalatton s

Foreign 4% Local 301 2794.8 2754.0 40.0 2794.0 ATOrALS 12994.0 11934.0 1060.8 12994.8 a

4. RehbilitatIon of agricultural a

Infrastructure In northern Reion I

(a) Drainage 140.0 - 56.0 64.0 140.0 a(b) Itrriation a pumps 1777.0 - 363.0 1394.0 1777.0 s

gca Buildings 399.0 267.0 396.0 260.0 666.0

(di Vehicles A oquipt 1202.0 - 1202.0 1202.0 a

Eel Operating costa 70.0 66.0 71.0 65.0 1361 a

Bub-total NAC 358.0 333.0 900.0 3013.0 3921. :

8m a(a) DrOaiage 9010 - 17.0 73.0 90.0 t

(ib flildings 45S.5 136.5 350.0 242.0 592.0 a

(a) Vehicles A equipt 247.0 - 247.0 247.0 a

(dJ Operating costs 24.8 20.6 34.8 10.6 4S.6 aSub-total RN" 817.3 157.3 401.0 572.0 974.6 a

pRIVAU and CO-OPS s

(a) Pumps/motors 10400.0 _ 10400.0 10400.0 s

(i Agric eqnipment 2640.0 - 10.0 2630.0 2640.0 t

Sub-total Priv a Coops13O40.0 10.0 13030.0 13040.0

Tal 12 (Peg 214)

(a) Vehicles a qaitpS 63.0 - 1.0 62.0 43.0 tlb) Opecrting costs 46.3 47.7 73.a 20.8 94.0

Sub-total 'fhl" 109 .3 47.7 74.2 6.6 157.0 s

Sub-total 4. 17554.6 536.0 1394.0 16696.6 16092.4Physical contiat cils

(205) 3510.9 107.6 276.6 3339.7 3614.5 alhtpZtZ pries *roaltitl

MrsitW * local 305 1264.6 36.6 SOl.4 001.5 1303.4 tTOtALS 22330.1 664.4 2174.6 20839.9 23014.5 t

S. Rehabilitation of agricultural tintrastacturo In Central and astern Regions

tNt - GEtIRA I(a) Earthwork. 2048.0 511.0 1537.0 2048.0 2(ba Structurces 210.0 105.0 105.0 210.0 aIc) Buildings - r.pairs 2060.0 1040.0 1040.0 2060.0 a

Sub-total Geira 4338.0 1656.0 2682.0 4368.0 1NOt - ARD (a) larthworks 1569.0 391.0 1176.0 1S69.0(b) Structures 304.0 152.0 152.0 304.0 a(I) Emergency 084 plant 11B6.0 126.0 1248.0 1316.0

Sab-total RlWd 3259.0 681.0 2576.0 12S9.0 s

101 - NEW NALFAa (a1 trtu¢tdres 326.0 164.0 144.0 328.0 alb) SattULege - cepairs 120.0 114.0 6.0 120.0 tlo) Imrgancy oS plant 1366.0 136.0 1243.0 1386.0 *

Suab-2tal Nwe Halfe 1634.0 416.0 1418.2 1434.0 t

W2 - SIuVyS 6 IEaginering(a) Vehicles a * upt 265.0 3I.0 230.0 265.0(b) Survey* 150.0 50.0 200.0 200.0 a

Sub-total Survey 41S.0 50.0 23S.0 230.0 465.0 a

(a 4uchtinry A equipt 3360.0 336.0 1024.0 3360.0lb) space p4rts 715.0 91.0 624.0 715.0to) Vehitcles 215.0 21.0 194.0 21S.0

sub-t2tal Ea= 4290.0 440.0 3642.0 4290.0 i

PRIVATE PUMP SCmEomSla) 3.4f pumps S motors 1200.0 600.0 1600.0 3600.0 a(b) 5-64 pups 6 motors 2000.0 2000.0 2000.0 sSub-total Priv pumps 3200.0 600.0 3600.0 3600.0 a

Sub-total S. 17334.0 650.0 3436.0 145S0.0 17966.0Physical tontingencies

(206) 3447.2 130.0 467.2 2910.0 3597.2Inpoeted price esalation

Foreign 4t Local 30l 1645.4 49.9 1237.0 698.4 1931.4 sTOtALS 22666.4 $49.9 5360.2 18156.4 2351.86 t

6. Rhobabiltion of a*ticultural tinfrastructer# In Xbordotfan

able It (Pop 314)

Dafur. 8 Gaah/oar deltas S

la) 0ot-Rural water 1225.0 60.0 24.0 1281.0 1305.0 t

lb) Gash 437.0 3S.0 8.0 864.0 672.0 1

(a) Tekar 385.0 15.0 26.0 374.0 400.0 a

Sub-total 6. 2247.0 130.0 58.0 2319.0 2377.0 1

Physical eontingencies 4 1.(20%) 449.4 26.0 11.6 463.6 475.4 i

ESxpected pti¢o *selati¢nIForoign *4 Local 30t 125.0 7.2 20.9 111.3 132.2 3

SOT^LS 2831,4 163.2 ,90.5 2894.1 2984.6 tt

Aqricultural inuts(a) Ptal 300.0 300.0 300.0 S

lb) Fertilisers 3894.0 3894,0 3894.0 a

(l) "eds 400.0 200.0 200.0 400.0 a

(d) Spare patts 1000.0 1000.0 2000.0 2000.0 i

le) Jute sacks 2320.0 2320.0 2320.0 t

Sub-total 7. 7914.0 1000.0 200.0 6714.0 6914.0 :

Physical contingencies I

(208) 1582.8 200.0 40.0 1742.8 1782.6 8

Uxected price escalationForeign 4% Local 301 43S.3 55.0 72.0 418.3 490.3 s

TOTALS 9932.1 1255.0 312.0 10675.1 I117.1 a

Extnsion and saed services I

HUA Extensionla) Vehiele repairs 25.0 25.0 10.0 40.0 50.0 s

(hb field allowaYnce 100.0 100.0 200.0 200.0 t

la) Operating costs 100.0 100.0 40.0 160.0 200.0 a

Sub-total extension 225.0 225.0 S0.0 400.0 4<0.0 t

1OA Seed lvicos a

(a) VehiCles 60.0 60.0 60.0 t

(bi Packaging equipnt 100.0 100.0 100.0 I

gce Poundation snds 20.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 3

(d) Operating costs 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 I

Sub-total MSS 230.0 70.0 100 0. 200.0 300.0 t

Sub-total 8. 4SS5. 295.0 150.0 80.0 M050.0

Physical contingenies- a

(20%) 91.0 59.0 30.0 120.0 150.* W

Expected price escalation oroeign 4% local 30% 50.2 32.6 4.0 28.6 82.8 I

OTALS 596.2 3A6. 234.0 740.8 962.6

Livestock bhelth t

services (a) DU/vcinoe 150.0 150.0 300.0 300.0 a

lb) 1 et 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 I

lo) eiMcleS 203.0 125.0 40.0 268.0 328.0 I

(dJ Opeatiap costs 1660 166.0 192.0 100.0 372.0 a

Sub-total 9. 569.0 511.0 232.0 066.0 1100.0 a

Pysigcal oontingoeis a

120%) 117.6 103.2 46.4 173.6 220.0 t

IEpected price escalationforeign 4t Local 30% 67.0 56.2 83.5 41.7 125.2 a

"AfLS 771.t 471.4 361.9 1083.3 144S .

Table 12 (Page 4/4)

10.Locust and pent control services 3

LOWCS CONTROL I

(a) Pesticides SOO50 500.S 500.0:

(b) Aircraft cha4ter 1000. 1000.0 1000.0 .

(o) Vehicles 1 eqaipt 170.0 170.0 170.0 0(d) Operating costs 500.0 200.0 300.0 500.0 a

Sub-total LC 2170.0 200.0 1970.0 2170.0 t

nuOA flS?/DIS!R S3RVCS 3

(a) Post/fungicidos 100.0 100*0 200.0 200.0 a(b) Vehicles A equipt 195.0 195.0 195.0 t(c) Operating costs S0.0 50.0 60.0 40.0 100.0 3

Sub-total PO8 345.0 150.0 60.0 435.0 495.0 3

Sub-total 10. 2515.0 150.0 260.0 2405.0 2665.0 aPhysical contingenoles s

(20%1 S03.0 30.0 52.0 481.0 533.0 aExpected price escalation t

Foreign 4% Local 30% 197.3 11.8 93.6 115.4 209.0 V

TOTALS 321S.3 191.8 405.6 3001.4 3407.0 3

11.Technical assistance t

(a) NOI (surveys) 130.0 S0.0 36.0 144.0 160.0 t

(b) No? Procuresent 120.0 60.0 160.0 180.0 3

(c) RMOA UR 10.0 50.0 60.0 60.03(di NAPC 90.0 110.0 200.0 200.0 s

Ce) NRZRP 40.0 40.0 80.0 80.0 t(f) RPMU 120.0 60.0 180.0 100.0 a(g) AVAC 184.0 184.0 40.0 320.0 368.0 t

Sub-total 11. *694.0 554.0 84.0 1164.0 1248.0 t

Physical contingencles(20%) 138.8 110.6 16.6 232.8 249.6 s

Zxpected price escalation t

Foreign 4% Local 30% 47.9 38.2 30.2 S5.9 86.1 tTOTALS 860.7 703.0 131.0 1452.7 1503.7 t

TOTAL ALL TTV4S 66644.2 6003.0 21668.0 50979.2 72647. tt

Physical contingencie5 s(20%) 13328.6 1200.6 4333.6 10195.8 14529.4 3

Expected price escalation 3Foreign 4% Local 30% 9400.7 646.8 7800.5 2447.0 10247.5 t

GRAND TOTALS 89373.7 8050.4 33802.1 63622.0 97424.1 3

172

Annws6 Table I

Cable faulO:s fat KTh..CentrAl and MT Southdurina the Worgt Flood Peried

Sorc& LTP Statiateec

Faulty Subscrlber lis

s n~~~Jj=Stral KTe%t

10.07." 632 9113.07." 3327 1598 Rain03.08.88 50" so reort Rain on09.08.88 $524 04.08.810.08." 813811.08.88 7"7 01.006 a 054 5081

27.08.88 7411 495701.09." 7759 44703.09." 7199 477906.09.88 6525 47413.09.88 8248 5176 Rahn.on15.09.88 6483 5182 12.09.8810.09.8 6387 . 51191.09.88 5732 591522.09.88 5221 514124.09.88 484X 5126

Unoccupied cable pairs and spare parts are not considered

Existing subscriber KMl Central : 12000KTM South : 8000

Total subscribers faulty in KTW Central oad South: 16.000 (802)Total TM faulty subcriberW lines 40,000 out of 43,000 (931)

173

Annex 6 Table

R.ezenvFleaod Recover PRearas

FT "99 PT 90 F 1991FOR. LC. TOTAL FOR. LOC. TOTAL FOR. LOC. TOTAL

Q~S g US$

I.Rehabilitation of undrgroupd cable. in Kht Cet,South; medmi £1 Basa Htss.Senar, Sisbar, El Gaarif,Kassala. Kosti. El Obeid,Abara an 11 other minerinstallations - 10.98 1.53 12.52 1.22 0.17 1.39

2. Rthabilitation ofseneraters, aircoditlonrs,batteries, ad retiflers inKartoum International Rxch.;auto exc in harteoum. (SouthExchanse El Iutida, Shambatiter. TSleph. Rich). b1ddat.Shambat, Fasber and Mayala.Kadali, MalakaL, Juba,':o 0.2 0.01 0.26 4.17 0.17 4.34 0.49 0.22 0.51

3. Rehabilitation of over-head routes in 8 diet:Atbara, Shenl, Karima,Dongola, Karma, 11 Nuaul.Dulsi, Mm Ushbr a WadEl Chorat - - 2.61 0.18 2.79 0.29 0.02 0.31

4. Rehabilitation ofmual exchangs in28 cnterw - - 1.53 0.36 1.89 0.17 0.04 0.21

5. Tools & Test Riqupt - - - 1.00 - 1.00 - -

6. Traaasrtation f£ll. 0.5 - 0.50 1.30 - 1.30 -

7. Comltancy sevices 0.4 - 0.40 2.10 - 2.10 0.31 - 0.31

Base Cost 1.15 0.01 1.16 23.69 2.24 25.93 2." 0.25 2.73Physical contan. (101) 0.12 - 0.12 2.33 0.27 2.60 0.25 0.03 0.28Price contingacy 0.05 - O.0S 0.95 0.49 1.4 0.10 0.0S 0.15

Total 1.32 0.01 1.33 26.97 3.00 29.97 2.83 0.33 3.16_ _ _ _ - -

174

Annex 6Aettchment I

Terms of Referenceconsultants foRiPr9praram Apaugn

1. The Sudan Tlecoeumnications Public Corporatoon ( ITPCis executing atwo yar (1989-1990) Emersoncy Flood ieconstructiou Program to restore plantand equtpmnt damaged by the recent floods. The program is being financed bythe World Bank and other donors to be identtfied. The broad tasks for whichthe program planning, sngiering and management consultants are proposed tobe employed to assist the STPC in implementation of thl program ro asfollows:

(a) carry out detailed site surveys, dosign, dotalled engineering,procurement, supervision of installation. accptance testingand comiossioningofall equipmet item (switching and transmission equipment, outside plantnetwork *an subscriber facilities) and civil works; coordination ofimplemntation of different program components; and In genoral programmana8gemet includlng supervlslon of contractors; and

(b) transfer know-how to STPC staff a planning, design, engineering andproject managaemet for all program coaponents through on-the-job training.

-. . .J

ftwa of Work

3. The scope of services to be provided by the consultants are grouped asfollows:

(a) detailed site urveys to deterine actual requiremnats;(b) destan and detailed egimmring;(c) procurement;(4) supervision of installation, acceptance tests and commissioning;(e) transfor of know-how ond training; and(f) program managemnt

However, all the program components may not nceossarily require all the aboveservices or in the same degree.

Detailed Site Surveys

3. he consultants will visit each site included in the program to:

(a) verify the scope of requirements;(b) prepare alternative tochnical solutions

DeaI ie

4. The consultants shall prepare detailed equipment design and detailedengineering to achieve:

(a) the least-cost solution appropriate to the component;(b) effective tte uration with existang facwtties;

175

(c) "tisfactory grde of service; and(d) adhronce to appropriate CCITTICCIB recommendations.

S. The consultents shall prepare all the required tender docu ment(including comercial conditions, technical speclEficaltions, schedules ofrequirements and delivery, draft contract) for procureamt of all equipmetitems and for civil works.

6. The consultant's role in the procurement cycle shall Include; but not belimited to the following:

(a) proparation of tender docume. The documemts shall Include theprocedure for repeat orders, if the log:tera developmet prosram includessuch recommendation, and the formula for futur pricing of such repeat ordersthat takes into aaccut if flation. technology advances in manufacturing costsan the international market situation at the time of ordering;

(b) evaluation of bids, and preparation of technical and flinae.ilevaluatioa reports with recommendations on contract award.

(c) after S$PC man"gemnts decision on selection of the contractor,drafting contract and assisting in contract negotiations and award; and

(d) prepare dndmntsladdenda to contracts as my become necessary duringprogram implomentatlon.

Installati.n. AccnmetnmTmin n amuin

7. The consultts shall provide detailed support and actively assist STPCin adminsatratlon of STC*s contracts for equipment supplies and civil works,through;

(a) review and approval of all contractor's submissions in respect ofoninsering designs, plans an schedules; lists of main equipmet;Installation nd maintenan test equipm t; tools and spare parts;istallatlon and acceptance test procedures;

(b) monitortin of delivry and installationlcoAstruction she6dule-;

(o) ceckAing types ad quatites of equipment, matertals, documetatioa,software supplied by contractors to ensure conformation to contracts;

(8) cpordiantlon in toplemetation of different program componets;

(f) supervision of equipment installations and civil works construction bycontractors to ensure quality and completeness;

(g) preparation of schedules for and conductance of acceptance tests;

(h) commissioning of equlpment; and

(i) assist S=TC in resolution with the equlpment controctors of problemsthat arise In the comissioned equipment during the warranty period.

176

Transfer of Kngw-!io and joaining

*. An ssAntial item of the consultant s total assignmet. shall be heupgrading and developmen ot 0TPt's human resourcus through transtor at know-how and training ot STPi st.tf in all aspects ot *Ae work unden& ken by theconsultants in sudin. Tbe transter ot know-how and Lreaiing ot $1t`C stattshalh cover but not be limited to techniques and methods ot planning; design*Aa detailed anginaering; technical and economic evaluation of differentalternatives; preparation of techaical specifications; procurementdocumentation and procedures; installation, acceptance tests and comissioningof equipment; and general project maageAmet.

9. $TPC's shall ake available suitable counterparts to the consultants.

Pr2AM Ihnaem

10. The consultants shall provde the organization, staff and intrsstrgcturenecessary for management of the total scope of work as detailed above. Theyshall establish and maintain necessary project tiles and records *includingrecords of all expenditures) which shall be accessible to £TrPC duriang projectImplementation.

11. The consulants shall appoint a team leader who will assume overallresponsibility for the total assi metn and lisauon with other sections at

.. ~.. . _.:...:. .:*

12. The consultants shall prepare and submit to SVC within five dayu ot theend of each month, a composite and detailed report on each task preceded by anExecutive Summry for the information for the snior 3STP mangement.

13. It is estimated tht the following exports will be required during theisplementation of the project:

ta- two external plant engineers;ibs a switcing onginer;(c) a transmission engineer;

The duration for each engineer wiLl be d&ftfrent,ebt- the expertise-will bereuired for about two years, initially for a period ot 4 wnths. The initialcontract to be financed uader the World bank's Project Preparation Facilitywill be for 4 months beginning December 1, 198t. During the tour months theconsultants are expected to complete detailed site survey, detailedengineering and preparation of bicding documents.

Uualiticatlons ot Consutlants

1S. AcadOMjlh each consultant will tave a minimum ot.a tuchnical collegediploma or equivalent technical quaitltcatlon.

Field E.xo rlence: each consultant will have more than ten yearsexperience in his field of specialization, at least two or which must be in adeveloping country similar to budan.

LANGUAGE: a thorough knowledge of written and spoken English 1sessential.

SUDAN -ANNEX 6

EMERGENCY FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM TABLE 3

IMPLEMEATION SCHEDULE

CALENDER YEAR 1988 1- 1991

QUARTER 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

CONSULTANCY 0 - - a _ --

UNDERGROUND CABLE l l | -|

OH LINES

MANUAL EXCHANGES - -

SPARE PARTS,

TOOLS AND TEST

EQUIPMENT C v V _

TRANSPORT FACILITIES*T l l e 1

Legend: 0 Call for Tender

+ Contract Signareor ordering of Spare parts

X Delivery InSudan

Installation

O End of instaltation or assignment

- al,$ --~~~ANNEX-1

TELECQMUNIC ATIONS

APRINCIPAL AREAS Of WORK/ FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION

PROORAM

PASR E D K EL NZULDONGL A

3;A~RAi, _ SHENDI 4><3 { ~~KASALALEGEND

HEISA GEDAPJF

XPU~ENNARfRLA

n oi -AS EL

RUORES-t_ EWFSHE EQOBEID

+ M~ALA MALAKAL

< t~~~~~JUBA

>LEGEND-_K REaLTATE

OH O£0 REHABILITATE VG CABLESo REMAALIUTATE POWER SUPPUS

179

Rnnex ?A

Ni i ntgn Reco,nstructio Tfamnta I ion ilnt

1. lhe nagnitude of the eergency and the nulti-sectoral impacto? ts flood and rain dacag- require the creation of a temnararunfchan;sf to ensure the tinely Ihpleoentation, flow of funds andthe effectiwe coordinatior of the Reconstruction Progrwn. Thisnechaniun would be inplenented through a high-level NationalReconstruction Inplwnentation (MRI) Unit which would have athree-yeor life span. Uhile inplenentation responsibilitV wouldreot with sectoral agencies. each would also designate a specialSectoral Reconstruction Coordinator, to be a nweber of theNational Reconstruction Task rore* described below.

2. The Unit would be heeded by a high lewel ReconstructionCoordinator who would report directlv to the ninister ot rlnanceand Planning on progress of the Reconstruction Program. KeVresponsibilities would includes

Ca) Mana9e the inplenentation of the short:ternReconstruction Progran and nonitor overall progress

iu) Lialse with and advise the seotoral ReconstructionCoordinators Including* Rgrloulture, HighwaVs.Education. health, Uater. Urban. Industry, Power andTeleconmunioatione and orgnlize with these sectors aNational Reconstruction Taok roroen

(c) alert the Office of the Prine linister through theMinister of rinnane nd Planning c(rP) of mo.orbottlenecks inpeding the tinelV inplenentation of theprogrwnt and

Cd) tnplenent a streanlined unified reporting sVatew forthusMrP and the Donor Connunity.

Kau Oua 1itietaons

3. The noin qualificattons for the Reconstruction CoordinatorareS

C.) Significant senneso nonageent experience in publicandoer private sectors-

180

<h)b High personal and political prestige en.oved acrossdlfferent sectors of society;

(e) Good access to the Chief Executive, hinistors, UnderSearetaries and the Key (Khartoun>) Caemnsoioners; and

Cd) Experience with the international Donor Connunity.

4. Inplwnentation of the sectoral recouery conponents will bedone through the line agencies and coordinated through theNational Reconstruction Task force forned by the SectoralCoor 1 inotors. The Unit would be staffed with a sall executlegroup deputed fran the 11P or key ninistries to cover the areasoft

Ca) RectAral L1iAsan to ensure effective comnunicationand coordination with the sectoral agencies and toassist the seators with weaker lnpienentation capacitV:

(b) to and oeUren4n: to ensure streonlinedprocedures across sectors for effective use of fundsfron donor sources- and

(C) Re>artin and Pub<li Tnfornation: (1) to produce briefnonthlv telexed reports to donors: <1i) consolidatedquarterlv reports and the final recouery assesanentafter the conpletion of the two-vear program; and Cill)to disseninate the nore inportant actions to theReconstruction Progran.

Techniel Assistance

S. To assist the National Reconstruction inplenentation Unitin the nonagenent of the overall recovery progran. tec mnicalassistance would be provided to: (i) streanline procur,. ent anddisbursenent procedures; (ii) unify reporting requirenents; and(1ii) assist in the application of donor procedures.

0 .3i

6. In addition to the Coordinator and fo'ur nonagenentpositions (S 0.3 lillion), the unit would have-on earnarkedbudget In the mrp for equtpnent, transport and coununications (S0.2 Million>% for technical assistance (S 0.6 Million) and forspecialized studies and services (S 0.1 Million>, totalling S 1.Stillion.

181

flnnai.. 78

SUDOA - Flood Recovery Pr-oarn

Preuentiogn of Future Eneroencies

Terms of Rcfcrence for Rieur Studies bv Conmultants

1 R river systen nodel would be developed tor flood forecastingand water managenent. The model would concentrate on the Blue Mileand Rtbara basins and take account of contributions fron the UhiteNile to forecast flows down to Lake Nasser.

2. Thg Rainfall - Runoff Comoonent would provide the inputs to arluer routing nodel <uhich would start at the gauging stationfurthest upstrean on the main river), and would include najortributaries including the Rahad and Dinder Rivers. Because it isdifficult to obtain tinely rainfall measurements in the catchnents inEthiopia. the estination of rainfall using satellite inagery (eg.cold cloud nonitorlng) as an input to a rainfall-runoff nodel wouldbe deueloped and calibrated.

3. The riuer routing nodel would take the inputs fron thehvdrological nodel and route the flows through the riuer systen.including reservoirs. storage areas and confluences. This modelwould be capable of forecasting in real tine. river flows. and watersurface elevations in both tine and space. The type of modelnecessarV would be evaluated in terns of conplexity and requiredprecision. The nodel would be calibrated and tested using historicdata. Reconnendations would be made on the conputer facilitiesrequired, taking into account local conditions. Training of thelocal engineers in the use of the nodel would be provided: includingtraining documents and nanuals.

1. Recommendations for data transnission fron gauging stations.including equipnent. and satellite data collection and analysis wouldbe made. taking into account local conditions and the location of thecontrol center. Rdditional data requirenents for proper nodel usageshould be specified.

s.. ruil documentation of the developnent, techniques and operationof the nodels is required. uith examples. and the proposals would befully costed.

6. Studu of River MorDholopv in the Khartoun Are. There areindications of change it. the relationship between river discharge andwater surface elevation at gauges at Khartoun and Tamaniat, based onconparison of frequency analyses of flood flows and leuels. and onthe gaugings ouer the historic period. ror these apparent changes tobe taken into account for planning of flood protection neasures. astudV is required of the causes and consequences of these changes.

182

7. The study wuuld include:

(e) Study of the euidence prouided by hiatoric hydrologicalneasurenents, eg changes In routing curves, bed levels andfrequency analysess

(b) Assenblv and study of historical topographic andbothynetric surueys to indicate channel and bed levels;

(n) Study of the hydraulic charecteristics of the river courseand variations over tine of such phenonens as bed forn.flow resistance. uegetation, land encroachnent;

(d) Identify the relative Inportance of factors affecting theriuer regine and weter surface eleuationg and

(a) forecast the future trends of natural conditions andpossible alternattv,. conditions involving flood controlneasures.

8. Output fron the study would also include identification. on anap with suitable contour Intervals, of the areas of the KhartounRegion which would inundated by different flood frequency peaks, andareas in which flood nitigation works nay be indicated, suitable foruse of urban planners and flood warning systen.-

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ._.

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C, Ram /lFbd Aifbd AreEs THAIO P I A

PanZAL Al,d 1 .{\%O / A 5

4'- Peved Roads Under Coratruck >\Ot 1-.on_ - Second Reds, Unsrfced 1 5_S*_,-"~ ur 7'

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