Libya and the Responsibility to Protect

Editorial matter and selection, Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray © 2013Individual chapters © contributors, 2013

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vii

Tables and Figures viii

Acknowledgements ix

Notes on Contributors x

1 Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect 1 Aidan Hehir

2 Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as State Strategy 15

Robert W. Murray

3 The Responsibility to Protect as the Apotheosis of Liberal Teleology 34

Aidan Hehir

4 ‘My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded’: Africa’s Responses to the Libya Conflict 58

Alex de Waal

5 Africa’s Emerging Regional Security Culture and the Intervention in Libya 83

Theresa Reinold

6 The Use – and Misuse – of R2P: The Case of Canada 110 Kim Richard Nossal

7 The (D)evolution of a Norm: R2P, the Bosnia Generation and Humanitarian Intervention in Libya 130

Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele

8 The UN Security Council on Libya: Legitimation or Dissimulation? 162

Tom Keating

9 NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success? 191

Alan J. Kuperman

10 Conclusion: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya 222 Robert W. Murray

Index 229

Contents



1

1Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to ProtectAidan Hehir

Introduction

Resolution 1973 authorising the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya was passed – on 17 March 2011 – on the third day of the International Studies Association’s (ISA) Annual Convention. The crisis in Libya erupted after the call for papers had closed and thus it was not the subject of any conference papers. Prior to the Resolution being passed, however, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) did feature prominently in many of the panel discussions. Prior to 17 March, no-one, at least to my knowledge, predicted that the UN Security Council would sanction measures as robust as those contained in Resolution 1973. At the 2012 ISA convention there was a proliferation of papers, panels and roundtables discussing the significance of the intervention; the only thing academics seemed to agree on was that Resolution 1973 was a surprise.

International Relations (IR) academics were certainly not alone in fail-ing to anticipate the dramatic convulsions of February and March 2011, and the intervention in Libya joins a long list of ‘unforeseen events’. In defence of the utility of IR, this oft-proven inability to accurately anticipate events is arguably mitigated by a capacity to retrospectively analyse motivations and catalysts and, most importantly, situate superficially unique case studies in a broader narrative and identify their likely future implications. Yet events such as the intervention in Libya, while mobilizing sudden collective interest, invariably spark divi-sion and heated debate. Of course, the contestation that characterizes academia, particularly within IR, is arguably one of its strengths. This book seeks to engage with the ongoing debate and aims to temper the more effusive exhortations that greeted Resolution 1973. We do not



2 Libya, the Responsibility to Protect

purport to offer ‘the definitive’ explanation as to why events in Libya unfolded as they did, but rather to analyse this case study’s significance for R2P and the future of humanitarian intervention more generally. One prediction which is surely incontrovertible is that Libya will join the long list of ‘seminal’ post-Cold War case studies – Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Iraq, Darfur and others – and thus continue to be the subject of debate for many years.

This introductory chapter initially provides a brief overview of events in Libya from February to October 2011 to serve as a basic contextual foundation. I then discuss R2P with a view to identifying its status – legal and political – prior to events in Libya so as to facilitate comparative analysis. In the final section I discuss the structure of the book.

The Arab Spring and Libya

During the 1980s, Colonel Gaddafi’s support for various international terrorist organizations, his direct involvement in murderous attacks against the US, the UK, France and Germany, and his ill-fated attempts to unite the Arab world in a coalition hostile to Western interests, led him to become arguably the most reviled international figure in the West (see Chapter 4). All this changed, however, in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq; evidently fearing a similar fate, Gaddafi disbanded his chemical weapons programme and began a rapid process of reintegrat-ing with the West and the international community more generally (Vandewalle 2006, p. 177). The new strategy produced immediate results and Gaddafi’s ‘rehabilitation’ was regularly cited by proponents of the ‘war on terror’ as evidence of the efficacy of ‘the Bush Doctrine’ (Frum and Pearle 2004: 260). In late 2009 The Guardian published a review of Colonel Gaddafi’s 40-year reign, which concluded:

. . . many things are going his way; Western oil companies and inves-tors are flocking to Tripoli, domestic repression has eased somewhat, and even tourism is developing . . . Gaddafi stills turns heads every-where he goes, even sharing a photo call with Barack Obama at the G8 Summit in Italy. Shortly after the 40th anniversary celebrations he will address the United Nations in New York as Chair of the African Union. The handsome young Colonel has come a long way. (Black 2009)

At the time the idea that two years later Gaddafi would be deposed, and brutally murdered, during a NATO-led military intervention would have seemed absurd. Indeed, the idea of a region-wide eruption of popular



Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect 3

resistance was arguably inconceivable until it actually began. Certain observers were aware of the existence of societal discontent in the Arab World but the scale, duration and consequences of the Arab Spring was not predicted, even by Middle East specialists (Gause 2011).

Prior to the Arab Spring, civil society in the Arab World had often been depicted as undeveloped and incapable of generating momentum for democratic change (Yom 2005; Stephan and Robertson 2003). The ‘Orientalist’ notion that Arabs were pre-disposed to authoritarianism certainly facilitated this conception (Santini 2011). As is now clear, however, underneath the facade of order, tensions were mounting. In Libya, Gaddafi’s failure to create a strong sense of national citizen-ship amongst the population, coupled with his oppressive policies and remoteness, had created a dangerous disjuncture between the people and the regime. Indeed, with almost unique foresight, in 2006 Dirk Vandewalle warned that, while Gaddafi’s aberrant rule had demon-strated remarkable continuity, his system ‘. . . will face considerable challenges in the future’ (2006: 1). While Libya displayed few overt signs of looming rebellion, people in the Eastern province of Cyrenaica had traditionally been hostile to Gaddafi’s rule and were becoming more publicly vocal; from 2007 protests had been regularly taking place in Benghazi over the massacre at the Abu Salim prison in 1996, albeit without generating much international attention (Becker 2011).

In pursuing the ‘war on terror’ the West supported a number of undem-ocratic regimes, overlooking their repressive domestic policies to secure their support against al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism more gener-ally (Hollis 2012: 93). Libya served as a site for ‘extraordinary rendition’; thus Gaddafi’s new international utility facilitated his domestic repres-sion (Amnesty International 2012; Cobain 2012). His international reha-bilitation had diminished his perceived threat to international security, while his new role as international statesman cemented his self-image as the archetypal ‘strongman’ crucial to the maintenance of domestic order. According to a 2010 report by Amnesty International,

Libya’s reintegration into the international community has not been accompanied by significant reforms or long-lasting improvements in the domestic human rights situation . . . members of the EU and the USA . . . are turning a blind eye to the human rights situation in order to further national interests. (2010: 9)

The combination of Gaddafi’s hostile intransigence and the lack of external support led the disaffected within Libya to conclude that they




would have to act unilaterally to initiate democratic reform (Hollis 2012: 85–6). As a result, by the end of 2010 Libya was, according to the International Crisis Group, ‘a large pressure cooker ready to explode’ (2011: 2). The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, driven by the cries Ash-sha‘b yurıd isqat. an-niz. am (the people want to bring down the regime), served as the direct catalyst and on 15 February mass demonstrations held in Benghazi soon spread throughout the rest of the country.

From the perspective of international observers the sudden eruption of unrest in Libya was certainly a surprise; as Bellamy notes,

None of the world’s various risk-assessment frameworks viewed the country as posing any sort of threat of mass atrocities. Neither was a conflict widely anticipated. For example, CrisisWatch, the early-warning arm of the International Crisis Group, did not even mention Libya in its report of February 2011, and did not issue a ‘conflict risk alert’ until after the conflict had actually erupted. (2011: 4)

A report by UNICEF in 2010 noted that Libya had experienced a ‘buoyant’ growth rate, high per capita income, high literacy rates and high life expectancy and ranked the country 55th out of 182 states (International Crisis Group 2011: 2). The Minorities at Risk Coalition’s list of 68 states ‘at risk’ did not include Libya (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 838). Internationally Libya was elected uncontested to the UN Human Rights Council in May 2010 and in October the EU and Libya agreed a deal on migration cooperation, to the dismay of many human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 2011: 567).

Libya’s decent into violence provoked an unusually rapid and robust response from both regional organizations and the UN. On 22 February the Organisation of Islamic Conference criticized Gaddafi’s tactics as having caused, ‘a humanitarian disaster incompatible with Islamic and human values’ (2011) while, more significantly, the Arab League sus-pended Libya. The following day the African Union’s Peace and Security Council declared it ‘. . . strongly condemns the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protestors’. Condemnatory statements were issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy 2011: 2). On 25 February the UN Human Rights Council convened a special session during which they condemned the violence and called for Libya to be suspended. The formal suspension, the first of its kind, was unani-mously endorsed by the General Assembly on 1 March.




On 26 February the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII pow-ers and passed Resolution 1970. The Resolution referred the situation to the ICC and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze against the Libyan authorities. Given that significant protests had begun only eleven days earlier, and China and Russia’s historically conservative approach to external involvement in intra-state conflicts, Resolution 1970 was in itself an unusually unified and rapid response (Weiss 2011). Despite this pressure, and appeals from regional organiza-tions, the violence continued. On 17 March the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 which sanctioned the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. The Resolution condemned ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights . . . committed by the Libyan authorities’ and warned that these acts may ‘amount to crimes against humanity’. The Security Council sanctioned ‘a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ and, most significantly, authorized states to ‘take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’. The Resolution was passed with ten states voting affirmatively while China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India abstained.

Military action began on 19 March and was initially led by the US, France and the UK. Despite the concerns of prominent members such as Germany and Poland, NATO agreed to lead the operation on 24 March and on 4 April the US withdrew its forces from direct combat though it continued to play a central role in coordinating the mission (Barry 2011: 5; Daalder and Stavridis 2012). A number of non-NATO members – Sweden, Jordan, Qatar, Morocco and the UAE – also took part in the operation.

NATO had three official aims; police the arms embargo, patrol the no-fly zone and protect civilians (Daalder and Stavridis 2012). The third aim proved by far the most difficult to achieve and it was this which ultimately led to the major controversy surrounding NATO’s prosecu-tion of the campaign. The rebels proved to be unable to defend many of their positions and without NATO support there is little doubt that they would have been overrun (Barry 2011: 9). To prevent this, and the slaughter of civilians that would allegedly follow, NATO’s strategy changed from the initial focus on debilitating the regime’s military bases and heavy weapons to a more expansive set of targets, including, most controversially, regime change (International Crisis Group 2011: i). China, Russia and South Africa publicly criticized what they saw as NATO’s illegitimate interpretation of Resolution 1973 (Barry 2011: 6).

By the end of May, the mission was faltering as the rebel-held cities Misrata and Jebel Nafusa seemed about to fall, prompting France to uni-laterally (and illegally) air-drop weapons to the rebels (Barry 2011: 7).




On 26 April the African Union called for an end to NATO’s campaign and rejected calls for Gaddafi to step down warning, ‘. . . it should be left to Libyans to choose their leaders and international actors should refrain from taking positions or making pronouncements that can only compli-cate the search for a solution’ (African Union 2011: 12). To ensure success, NATO stretched the terms of Resolution 1973 beyond breaking point and by August this, combined with defections from Gaddafi’s regime, arms illegally smuggled to rebels from the UAE, Qatar and France, and military support from Sudan (see Chapters 4 and 9) turned the tide (Smith 2011: 75). Operation Unified Protector officially ended on 31 October, 222 days after it had started; Colonel Gaddafi was dead and a National Transitional Council was in power.

The responsibility to protect (R2P)

As detailed in many of the subsequent chapters, Resolution 1973, the intervention itself and the outcome, were greeted with jubilation by many of R2P’s more vocal proponents and championed as evidence of a new disposition amongst the Security Council and the interna-tional community more generally. Prior to the intervention R2P had a mixed record, characterized by the widespread recognition of the term but modest actual impact. The concept had undoubtedly made rapid progress in terms of achieving global publicity and a place in the international political lexicon. Two paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document referred directly to R2P constituting sig-nificant official, if not quite legal, recognition (Stahn 2007). In 2009 the General Assembly held a special three-day debate on R2P and the overwhelming majority of states spoke in favour of the basic principles at the core of R2P (Hehir 2011). The new office of the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect was established in 2008 and by the end of the decade R2P was officially referred to in a number of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Additionally, a number of NGOs, think tanks and research centres were established to specifically focus on promoting R2P, while within academia the concept was the subject of myriad books and articles – including a journal established in 2009 to focus solely on R2P – on a remarkably diverse range of subjects from climate change to women’s rights.

Yet, despite these achievements, the real-world impact of R2P was modest. Various crises within R2P’s purview raged unabated; where, many asked, was R2P during the conflagrations in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and, most notably, Darfur? If




R2P was championed by its many proponents as ‘revolutionary’, how could it be that in the first ten months of 2008 alone some 290,000 people were displaced from Darfur while four million required humani-tarian assistance (Coalition of NGOs on Darfur 2008: 7–8). At the time the UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan stated that ‘violence and sexual abuse of women and children . . . continue almost unabated throughout Darfur’ (UN General Assembly 2008: 12). Kofi Annan, indeed, stated that the reaction to Darfur showed, ‘. . . we had learnt nothing from Rwanda’ (Fisher 2007: 103).

Yet in his report to the General Assembly prior to the 2009 debate on R2P, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon defended R2P’s record. While accepting that the international response to the crises in Darfur, the DRC and elsewhere were lamentable, he claimed: ‘Nonetheless, when confronted with crimes or violations relating to the responsi-bility to protect or their incitement, today the world is less likely to look the other way than in the last century’ (Ban Ki-Moon 2009: 24). The evidence he advanced in defence of this appraisal was the role of Juan Méndez, then Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, in defusing the crisis in the Ivory Coast in November 2004 when he (suc-cessfully) warned the Ivorian government to cease the proliferation of hate speech. His second example was the international response to the crisis in Kenya following the presidential election in December 2007. Following 1,000 fatalities and over 250,000 displaced persons, Francis Deng, the new Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, invoked R2P in calling for an end to the violence, a call which was ultimately heeded.

Of course, while no-one can deny that in both crises R2P was employed as a rhetorical tool by external actors appealing for calm, whether this was a causal factor in the eventual cessation of the vio-lence in an altogether different matter. It is certainly not the case that prior to the advent of R2P external actors lacked the means to condemn violence or that successful external mediation is a post-R2P phenom-enon (Hehir 2012: 132). Additionally, despite the near ubiquity of the term, questions began to be raised as to its actual meaning and, cru-cially, whether states shared an understanding of its remit. While the 2009 General Assembly debate had demonstrated almost universal sup-port for R2P, the precise nature of the R2P recognized varied consider-ably; one of the more effusive endorsements came from the government of Sudan which obviously held a markedly different interpretation of host-state responsibility to that of Western states (Hehir 2011: 7). The absence of thresholds determining precisely when an issue moved from




the host state’s jurisdiction to the international community’s concern was an additional and obviously troubling ambiguity (Focarelli 2008; Reinold 2010). The proliferation of literature on R2P and its association with a wide variety of only tangentially related issues meant that its very meaning had been – paradoxically – irrevocably diluted by virtue of its ubiquity. As a result there was a growing consensus that R2P was little more than a political slogan destined to suffer the same sorry fate as ‘make poverty history’ and ‘sustainable development’.

This ambiguity related also to R2P’s legal status; while the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document certainly provided the concept with a more definite legal character than the original report by the ICISS, para-graphs 138 and 139, which recognized R2P, simply reiterated existing international law (Hakimi 2010: 343; Hehir 2010; Peters 2009: 538). As Simon Chesterman wrote, the Outcome Document ‘. . . essentially pro-vided that the Security Council could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had been authorizing for more than a decade’ (2011: 2). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) had been set up to establish ‘clearer rules, procedures and cri-teria for determining whether, when and how to intervene’ (2001: 11) and thus the fact that R2P has evolved to the point where it merely reconfirmed the existing discretionary powers of the Security Council naturally led many to wonder how it could possibly be effective given the system was exactly the same (Meyer 2009: 45; Berman 2007: 157).

Thus, by the end of 2010 R2P faced three key criticisms; first, that evidence of its efficacy was lacking; second, that states held widely divergent understandings of its remit and this ambiguity diminished its putative status as a norm; and third, that it had catalyzed no actual legal reform and thus the very system it was established to change remained intact.

Resolution 1973 and the subsequent intervention in Libya provided R2P’s supporters with a much-needed boost; this was, Gareth Evans declared, ‘. . . a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to’ (Evans 2011) and Ban Ki-Moon (2011) declared trium-phantly: ‘By now it should be clear to all that the Responsibility to Protect has arrived.’ This book seeks to assess the validity of these claims; though not all chapters focus specifically on R2P the analysis in each should help us to formulate a more accurate understanding of the unique con-stellation of factors which aligned to facilitate the decision to intervene. The book is not an attempt to uncover nefarious agendas or determine the ‘real’ reasons for the intervention; the analyses here individually and collectively highlight those particular aspects of the intervention which




challenge the sweeping, and often grandiose, claims made in its wake which, in our view, overlooked many troubling nuances in favour of unsubstantiated generalizations. The book is heavily orientated towards R2P but the analyses can also, of course, be situated within the more traditional – and ostensibly old-fashioned – ‘ humanitarian intervention’ debate and the Libyan intervention must surely be seen as a modern example of this debate/trend which predates R2P.

The structure of this book

In Chapter 2, Robert Murray deals with the contestation surrounding the impetus for the intervention in Libya. He summarizes the humani-tarian argument – that the intervention was impelled by concerns for the suffering demonstrators and thus ‘R2P in action’ – and the strategic-necessity argument, namely that the intervention was motivated by a desire to prevent further destabilization in this geo-strategically impor-tant region. Linking his analysis to historical patterns, Murray argues that the intervention is best explained as primarily driven by the logic of the latter; this has obvious implications for assessments of the inter-vention in Libya but, more broadly, suggests the strategic calculations states make remain largely unaltered by the rise of ‘human security’ and its most prominent manifestation, R2P.

In Chapter 3 I seek to explain the logic underpinning the strategy adopted by R2P’s proponents and in particular the emphasis on ‘mobi-lizing political will’ through the proliferation of ‘moral norms’ over legal reform. This strategy, I argue, derives from the teleology inherent in the liberal ‘end of history’ thesis which considers progress – in the form of the spread of capitalism and liberal democracy – inevitable and irresistible. Concurrent with this vision of the future is the conviction that democracies are responsive to popular advocacy, hence the prefer-ence for normative pressure rather than legal reform. This is a strategy, I argue, which is at variance with the record of normative advocacy in the post-Cold War era and one which ultimately overlooks the implica-tions of the looming structural change represented by the rise of China and Russia.

In Chapter 4 Alex de Waal provides a detailed overview of both Gaddafi’s relationship with the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States prior to the 2011 uprisings, and insights into the diplomatic machina-tions which took place after the rebellion began. This sheds light both on the divisions within the AU and the potentially viable diplomatic options rejected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) and ultimately ‘killed




by France, Britain and the United States’ (p. 78). The manner in which Gaddafi’s regime – odious as it was – fell has had, de Waal notes, serious negative implications for the future stability of Libya and the region. Of arguably greatest interest and indeed concern is de Waal’s revela-tions regarding the role played by Sudan in supporting the overthrow of Gaddafi. Given the Sudanese government’s record in Darfur, the fact that NATO worked closely with the Sudanese military – to the extent that the Sudanese at times directed NATO air strikes – obviously calls into question the ethical claims made about the intervention in Libya.

In Chapter 5 Theresa Reinold interrogates the notion of an ‘African’ security culture. While the AU has often been presented as adhering to the logic of R2P – in particular by virtue of article 4(h) of its constitutive act – the intervention in Libya highlighted the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality and the fissures within the AU. Reinold argues that the AU’s often tepid and ambivalent attitude towards the crisis in Libya can be explained by factors from different levels of analysis – the soci-etal, national, (sub-)regional and global. R2P’s absorption into the AU has, naturally she suggests, been influenced and altered by these various levels throughout the member states, to the point that the concept is very obviously contested and thus its efficacy tempered.

Richard Nossal argues in Chapter 6 that the debate within Canada regarding the justifications for the intervention in Libya provides a qualitative insight into a general disposition amongst the Western states during the intervention, namely ‘don’t mention R2P’. Nossal provides a detailed analysis of the Canadian government’s rhetorical creativity and contrasts this with others more eager to champion the intervention as ‘R2P in action’. While, Nossal argues, the determination within Canada – and indeed the US, France and the UK – to refrain from mentioning R2P was intended as a rhetorical ploy, ultimately the intervention – and the mission creep which characterized it – has nonetheless been identified as indicative of the inevitable outcome of R2P-type action by states such as Russia and China, not least because of the celebratory rhetoric employed by R2P’s more vocal champions. The fact that these states, cautious about R2P prior to the intervention in Libya, are now openly hostile to the idea, Nossal argues, greatly diminishes the prospect that Libya will herald a new precipitous era for R2P as many of its supporters claim.

In Chapter 7 Eric Heinze and Brent Steele argue that the intervention in Libya, though certainly unexpected, can be explained through the use of a generational analysis. Specifically, they argue that the post-2005 World Summit manifestation of R2P is a reflection of the ‘lessons learned’ by contemporary politicians whose formative experiences were




the events of the 1990s. There remains since the 1990s, they suggest, a permissive normative environment for humanitarian intervention but actual intervention remains contingent on a confluence of cir-cumstances which rarely occurs. Thus, rather than Libya constituting a ‘new’ type of intervention, it is consistent with the selective interven-tionism that characterized the 1990s and thus is an aberration rather than a harbinger.

Tom Keating, in Chapter 8, begins by providing an overview of the UN Security Council’s approach to the use of force in the post-Cold War era. This has been, he notes, obviously characterized by a new willing-ness to creatively interpret Chapter VII of the UN Charter to facilitate ‘humanitarian intervention’. Keating cautions, however, that this has been driven essentially exclusively by Western states who have not always applied a consistent approach to humanitarian crises, nor indeed to the need for Security Council authorization. He then analyses the debate at the Security Council on Libya and in particular the positions of those five states which abstained. While the passing of Resolution 1973 was widely heralded as a demonstration of a new resolve, Keating argues that the five abstentions must be recognized as being important barometers of the global disposition towards R2P given the status of the five states. The manner in which the provisions of the Resolution were stretched, Keating warns, has diminished the prospects of future unanimity around R2P.

While several of the preceding chapters challenge the manner in which the intervention was conducted, the nature of the support it was afforded and its broader implications, in Chapter 9 Alan Kuperman questions the veracity of the rationale advanced by the intervening coa-lition and its supporters and the efficacy of the action itself. Kuperman’s analysis of the situation on the ground prior to the NATO interven-tion contradicts the conventional narrative, particularly with respect to the ‘genocide’ ostensibly looming in Benghazi. Kuperman advances a counter-factual analysis to argue that non-intervention would have resulted in fewer deaths and ultimately less disorder in Libya and the surrounding region. In terms of the ‘lessons’ of Libya, Kuperman warns in particular against calling for regime change, foreclosing as it does potentially viable diplomatic options.

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Human Rights Watch (2011) World Report 2011. Available online at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2011.pdf [Accessed August 4 2012].

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International Crisis Group (2011) ‘Popular Protests in the Middle East and North Africa: Making Sense of Libya’, Middle East/North Africa Report 107, 6 June.

Meyer, S. (2009) ‘In Our Interest: The Responsibility to Protect’, in R. H. Cooper and J. V. Kohler (eds), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

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229

Index

Page numbers in bold refer to figures, page numbers in italic refer to tables.

Abi-Saab, G. M. 98Abu Salim prison massacre 3Achen, Christopher 23Acuff, J. M. 134, 154n2Adams, Simon 39Afewerki, Issayas 64Afghanistan 31, 122, 131, 142, 223Africa: blowback of Libyan

uprising 58; continental security architecture 93–5, 97; implications of Libyan crisis 78–9; mistrust of UN Security Council 97; and R2P 224; responses to the Libya conflict 58–79; security challenges 98–9; view of Gaddafi in 59

African mercenaries 63African National Congress 60African personality, the 96–7African Standby Force (ASF) 94African Union (AU) 6; Ad Hoc High

Level Committee 67, 67–8, 70, 71, 77–8, 100, 102, 104; application of R2P 93–9; blowback 77–8; ceasefire proposals 59, 69, 71, 198; Constitutive Act 94–5, 97, 98; continental security architecture 93–5, 97; critique of 104–5; Extraordinary Summit meeting 70; formation 61, 93; Gaddafi strategy 64; Gaddafi’s relationship with 9, 61; guiding principles 65; and ICC arrest warrant 71–2, 95, 98; leadership challenge 78; Libya initiative 59–60; loss of credibility 78; and Madagascar 79n2; Malabo summit 71–2; mandate 93; marginalization 100–1; Mauritania sanctions 64; Pan-Africanism 96–7; Peace and Security Council

(PSC) 4, 65–6, 68, 70, 72, 77, 93–4, 100, 103, 174, 176; peacekeeping operations 165; principles 61, 94; Proposals on a Framework Agreement for a Political Solution to the crisis in Libya 71; PSC meeting, 10 March 2011 65–6; PSC meeting, 23 February 2011 65; and R2P 10, 99–105, 105; response to Libyan crisis 65–72, 84, 99–105, 105, 174, 225; roadmap 66–7, 68–70, 78; security challenges 98–9; security culture 101; and sovereignty 99; threat of regional destabilization 58–9; and the TNC 72; and UN Security Council Resolution 1973 67, 70–1

Ajdabiya 196, 198, 202, 203Al Bayda 193, 198, 203Al Khums 203Alexander, Chris 121Algeria 79n4al-Qaeda 3, 134–5al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb

(AQIM) 76, 210–11Amnesty International 3, 45, 193,

209, 211, 212, 213An Agenda for Peace (UN) 25Annan, Kofi 7, 39, 46, 121, 141Ansar al-Dine 76Ansar al-Sharia militia 209–10Arab League 4, 9, 50, 103, 110, 152,

174, 176, 185Arab Spring 1, 3, 4, 15, 45, 52–3, 65,

66, 135, 152, 178, 192, 227Arab World, civil society 3arms embargo 5, 79n3, 112, 174,

175Ashdown, Lord 150Australia 125, 165



230 Index

authoritarianism 3Axworthy, Lloyd 39, 122, 123, 224Aziz, Mohamed Ould Abdel 64, 66,

71

Bachand, Claude 118Bahrain 15, 40, 44–5, 103, 177Baird, John 116, 116–17, 120Baker, James 151balance of power 21–2Bani Walid 196Baodong, Li 185Barfi, Barak 59Barnett, Michael 40, 41Bashir, Omar al 62, 63, 74, 94–5, 98BBC 193Beauchamp, Zack 153–4Beinart, Peter 135, 149–50Belhaj, Abdel Hakim 73Bella, Ahmed Ben 60Bellamy, A. 4, 26, 28, 32, 38–9, 39,

50, 52, 110, 147, 148, 152, 182–3Benghazi 3, 4, 11, 191, 193,

196, 198, 200, 209–10, 213; casualties 194, 195, 202, 203, 204, 204

Berdal, Mats 41bipolar system 21–2, 24, 41Black Hawk Down incident 138Blackburn, Jean-Pierre 120Bloc Québécois 111, 113, 118, 119blowback of Libyan uprising 58,

75–8, 78Boko Haram 76, 211Bosnia 135, 137, 138, 138–9, 148,

149–50, 151–2, 153, 154, 217n7Bosnia generation, the 132, 135,

140, 149–53Bosnian consensus, the 143Bouchard, Lt. Gen. Charles 112Bouchuiguir, Soliman 214Boumédiènne, Houari 60Bourantonis, D. 51Brams, Steven 19Brazil 5, 145, 163, 170, 172, 180,

182–3Brega 196, 203BRIC nations 183–5Buchanan, Alan 51

Burkina Faso 63–4, 213Bush, George H. W. 151Bush, George W. 142, 143Bush Doctrine 2, 223

Cameron, David 45, 124, 149Canada 169; avoids mentioning

R2P 120–1; characterization of the mission 114–16; commitment to R2P 121; foreign policy 122, 124, 224–5; general election, 2011 113, 119; intervention debate 10, 110–26; Libyan mission 111–12, 125; Libyan mission justifications 112–21; Parliamentary debate, 14 June 2011 113, 114, 116–17, 119, 120; Parliamentary debate, 21 March 2011 113, 117, 121; Parliamentary debate, 26 September 2011 113, 119, 121; position hardens 114; and R2P 114–21, 121–5, 224–5; and regime change 116; and Resolution 1973 117–18; role 122; use of language 121–5; use of R2P 111

Canadian Armed Forces 112Cannon, Lawrence 114, 116, 120,

124capitalism, end of history thesis 9Carlson, Allen 180casualties 195, 203, 216n3;

Benghazi 194, 195, 202, 203, 204; Misurata 195, 202, 203, 204, 206–7, 206; NATO intervention 205, 206–7, 206, 212; reprisal killings 208–9; Syria 216n6; Tripoli 195–6, 202–3, 203, 204, 205, 206–7, 206; without NATO intervention 202–4, 203, 204

ceasefire proposals: African Union (AU) 59, 69, 71, 198; NATO rejection of 198

Chad 61–2, 73, 77, 78Charlottetown, HMCS 112, 123–4chemical weapons 2Chesterman, Simon 8, 36, 47China 5; and the Darfur crisis 145;

and human rights 180; and



Index 231

intervention 28; peacekeeping operations 172–3, 179; and R2P 172, 175, 176, 179–82, 187; Resolution 1973 abstention 49–50, 110, 125, 163, 176, 179–82; Resolution 1973 criticism 185; rise of 9, 35, 44, 51; and sovereignty 180; and Syria 31, 48, 50, 52; UN position 180

Chrétien, Jean 122CIA 62civil society: Arab World 3;

global 42, 44, 49; and regional security cultures 88

Claude, Inis 170Clinton, Bill 139–40, 144Clinton, Hillary Rodham 114, 149,

151Clough, Michael 145Cold War 137, 155n5; end of 21–2,

25, 41–2, 165, 171; peacekeeping operations 165; prisoner’s dilemma 20–2, 21; security dilemmas 17–22, 19, 21

Comartin, Joe 119Combined Joint Task Force 112Commission on Global

Governance 26Common African Defense and

Security Policy (CADSP) 93Compaoré, Blaise 64compliance 45conditional sovereignty 141Conference of Defence Associations,

2011 114Congo, Democratic Republic of

the 6, 39, 44, 227Considine, Sapna Chhatpar 38Continental Early Warning System

(CEWS) 94Convention on the Elimination of

Mercenarism in Africa 66Cook, Robin 155n6Côte d’Ivoire 7, 66, 215Cotler, Irwin 118, 120, 123counter-terrorism operations 91Cox, R. 22–3crimes against humanity 36, 172CrisisWatch 4

Cuellar, Perez de 41Cyrenaica 3

Daalder, I. H. 193Dallaire, Roméo A. 44, 123D’Almeida, K. 102Darfur crisis 6–7, 27, 39, 44, 48,

62–3, 131, 132, 144–5, 148–9Darna 198Davis, Jonathan 180, 180–1Day of Rage 193Déby, Idriss 58, 59, 62, 63, 66, 76,

77, 79democracy, spread of 42, 49democratic peace 21demonization 110, 217n7Deng, Francis 7, 37, 89, 222deterrence theory 18Dion, Stéphane 122Duceppe, Gilles 113Dunne, T. 32, 110, 175, 184

East Timor 42, 137, 139Eastern Libya, rebellion: 15–19

February 2011 198, 199, 200Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) 165Economist 150, 178ECOWAS 137Egypt 177; aid to rebels 197;

Arab Spring 4, 15, 65, 178, 192election, July 2012 208Embassy Magazine 123Emerson, R. 96–7end of history thesis 9, 34, 40Eritrean Liberation Front 60, 63Ethio-Eritrean war, 1998 63ethnic cleansing 209Europe-Africa conference, Tripoli,

2010 61European Union: French power 178;

intervention 16; migration cooperation 4; opposition to the roadmap 70; peacekeeping operations 165

Evans, Gareth 8, 39, 50, 102–3, 125, 142, 146, 156n14

extraordinary rendition 3Ezulwini Consensus 94



232 Index

Fahim, K. 197Foot, R. 179–80Fortin, Jean-François 119Framework Agreement for Political

Solution 70France: and the AU 67; foreign

policy 178; military action 5; Operation Épervier 61–2; peacekeeping operations 165; recognition of rebels 207; and Resolution 1973 177–8; support for rebels 5

Franck, Thomas 169

G8 179Gabon 100, 165Gaddafi, Khamis 195Gaddafi, Muammar: accepts AU

roadmap in principle 68–9; adversaries 60; African access to 69; African handling of 64; African leaders view of 59, 69–70, 101–2; atrocities 3; attack on own people 16, 152, 192, 193–6, 202, 203–4, 213; AU response to crisis 66, 67, 68; AU strategy 64; Canadian characterization of 116; change in policies 212; characterization of opponents 110; counter-offensive 200; and Darfur 62–3; death of 6, 191, 205; demonization 110; fall of 2–6, 9–10; human-rights performance 209; ICC arrest warrant issued 71–2, 95, 98, 203–4; international utility 3; involvement in African politics 60–1; legacy 227; military adventurism 61–3; misinformation 213–14; nostalgia for 210; opposition to former colonial powers 60–1; patronage 63–4; refusal to negotiate 71; regime 3; rehabilitation 2; relations with AU 61; relations with Western governments 177; repression of uprisaing 100; retreat 205; revenge killings 196; rhetoric 196;

threat 103; uprising against 192, 198, 199, 200, 201; use of indiscriminate force 195; and Venezuela mediation offer 198

Gaddafi, Saadi al 77Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam 196, 200game theory 18–19; the prisoner’s

dilemma 19–22, 19, 21Gates, Robert 151Gathi, J. T. 97Gaza Strip 211Gbagbo, Laurent 66generational analysis 10–11;

humanitarian intervention 132, 133–6; policy elites 133–6, 149–53; R2P 133–5, 225–6

genocide 11, 144, 172; Darfur crisis 144–5; Rwanada 25, 37, 44, 98, 144, 214, 215

Genocide Convention, 1948 45–6Georgia 139Germany 5, 163Gifkins, Jess 110, 175, 184Global Centre for R2P 38, 39global civil society 42, 44, 49global normative order 86–7Goldberg, M. L. 184Green, Donald 22Green Party, Canada 111, 113Grotius, Hugo 137growth rate 4Guardian, The 2, 185–6Gulf Cooperation Council 44–5, 152

Habré, Hissène 62Hague, William 150Haile Selassie 96Haiti 137, 139, 148, 167–8Harper, Stephen 112, 114, 115–16,

117, 121, 123, 125Harris, Jack 118–19, 120Hawn, Laurie 120–1Heinbecker, Paul 39Helic, Armika 136, 150Hengari, A. T. 104Hensel, H. 42Herborth, B. 133Herz, John 17Hull, Cordell 155n4



Index 233

human rights 24, 25, 27–8, 36, 37, 41, 46, 92, 180, 209

Human Rights Watch 42–3, 195, 208–9, 212

human security 9, 24, 24–8, 31, 40, 83–4, 88, 89, 95, 98, 99–105, 104, 172, 223, 224

humanitarian intervention 2, 9, 11, 15–16, 40, 42–3; Darfur 132; discretion 140; evolution 137–40; feedback loops 172–3; generational analysis 132, 133–6; Haiti 139; impact 212–13; inconsistent 132, 141; international normative environment 130–54; just cause threshold 147; Kosovo 132, 139–40; legitimacy 140; lessons of NATO intervention 213–15; and Libyan mission 132–3; Operation Odyssey Dawn 149–53; permissive nature of 141–2; policy formulation 149–53; political circumstances and 131; protection norm 136; and R2P 132, 135–6, 140–2, 153; R2P as argument against 148–9; reluctance to act 138–9; responsibility discourse 24–8; and sovereignty 140–1; and UN Security Council 141, 147–8; UN Security Council authorization 137–8, 140; US abuse of 142–5

humanitarian intervention law 35–8; UN Charter 97; UN Charter, Chapter VII 35–6, 37

Hurd, Ian 48Hurrell, A. 87, 136

Ibrahim, Khalil 62–3, 75Ignatieff, Michael 117, 119, 122,

143‘Implementing the Responsibility to

Protect’ (Ki-Moon) 37India 5, 163, 170, 172, 182, 185indiscriminate force, use of 195Internal Security Agency (ISA) 209international coalition 112, 126n1

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 28–31, 38, 39

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 8, 26–7, 35, 36, 37, 38, 38–9, 46, 89–91, 97, 116, 122, 169, 222–3, 226; The Responsibility to Protect 89–92, 141–2

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 51

International Criminal Court 26, 71–2, 94–5, 98, 100, 203–4, 216n4

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 51

International Crisis Group (ICG) 4, 45

International Relations (IR) 1international society,

rehierarchisation 43International Studies Association’s

(ISA) Annual Convention, 2011 1intervention: Canadian debate 10;

humanitarian argument 9, 15–16; just authority 91–2; justifications 166, 224; legitimacy 27–8, 90–2, 164, 168–73, 224; principle of proportionality 91, 103; right intention 90–1, 103; state strategy 28–31; strategic-necessity argument 9; UN Security Council and 163–4, 164–8

Iraq 31, 35, 137Iraq, invasion of, 2003 2, 44, 143–4,

148, 155n9, 167Islamic fundamentalism 3Islamic Legion 63Islamist National Front 62Italy 165

Jackman, D. 184Jalil, Mustafa Abdel 68–9, 71, 74,

207Jammeh, Yahya 64Jebel Nafusa 5Jervis, Robert 20Jeune Afrique 58Jibril, Mahmoud 69, 207



234 Index

Jones, B. D. 176, 178–9, 184, 185Juppé, Alain 80n8just authority 91–2just war theory 90Justice and Equality Movement

( JEM) 62–3, 73, 75–6, 78

Kagame, Paul 104Kaldor, M. 42Kaplan, Lawrence 154Kaplan, Morton 18Karadzic, Radovan 217n7Karygiannis, Jim 118Katzenstein, Peter, The Culture of

National Security 85–6Kenya, presidential election, 2007 7Keohane, Robet 50–1Khong, Y. F. 134Ki-Moon, Ban 7, 8, 37, 39Kirkpatrick, D. D. 197Kituyi, M. 104–5Korean War 165Kosovo 131, 132, 137, 139–40, 141,

225–6; NATO intervention 36, 42–3, 167, 169

Krisch, Nico 187Kufra, occupation of 73–4Kuhn, Thomas 133Kurds 35

Laverdière, Hélène 119legitimacy: intervention 27–8,

90–2, 164, 168–73, 224; Libyan mission 113; and R2P 48–9; UN Security Council 168–73, 170–1, 187–8; UN Security Council Resolution 1973 48–9, 122

Levy, Bernard-Henri 150liberal anti-pluralism 42–3liberal democracy, end of history

thesis 9Liberal Party, Canada 111, 113,

117–18, 119, 122liberalism 40–2liberation movements, Gaddafi’s

support for 60Liberia 64, 137Libya Contact Group 68Libyan army, 32nd Brigade 195

Libyan mission 111; Canada’s 111–12, 125; Canadian characterization of the mission 114–16; Canadian debate 110–26; conditions allowing 110; generational analysis 149–53, 225–6; and humanitarian intervention 132–3; international coalition 112; justifications 112–21; legitimacy 113; mission creep 119; new regime 228; normative environment 130; policy elites and 132–3; and R2P 111, 136, 227; scholarly debate 111

Llewellyn, Edward 136, 150Lomé Declaration on

Unconstitutional Changes in Government 65

Luck, Edward 176Lunney, James 120–1

McKay, John 119MacKay, Peter 114, 116, 123–4Madagascar 79n2al Mahdi, Sadiq 62Malabo, Equatorial Guinea 71–2Mali, Tuareg insurgency 58, 63, 76,

78, 210–11, 213Malone, David 167–8, 170MANPADs 211, 213Martin, Paul 27, 118, 122Mauritania 64May, Elizabeth 113, 119–20Mbeki, Thabo 61Mearsheimer, John 21Medvedev, Dimitri 179Méndez, Juan 7mercenaries 63, 70migrants and migrant workers 45,

70Military Staff Committee 94militias 78, 209–10, 212Milne, Seumas 207Milosevic, Slobodan 217n7Ministry for Martyrs and the

Missing 206Minorities at Risk Coalition 4



Index 235

misinformation, danger of 213–14Misrata 5mission creep 119Misurata 194, 195, 196, 200, 202,

203, 204, 205, 206–7, 206, 208–9Mogadishu 138moral advocacy 42moral hazard 192, 207moral norms 9moral responsibility 46–7Morgenstern, Oskar 21Moussa, Amr 67Mugabe, Robert 61, 69, 80n7, 101multipolarity 22, 24, 34–5, 49–50,

226Museveni, Yoweri 61, 67–8, 69, 101Mutual Assured Destruction 18

Nasser, Gamal Abdel 60National Intelligence and Security

Service (NISS), Sudan 73, 74National Movement for the Liberation

of Azawad (NMLA) 76National Resistance Movement

(NRM) 60national security cultures 85–6National Transitional Council 6NATO 191–215; aid to rebels

197–8, 204–7, 205, 207–8; bombing campaign 197, 204–5; bombing of Sirte 197; Bosnia campaign 138–9; double standards 103; humanitarian impact of intervention 212–13; impact of intervention 208–10, 210–12, 212–13; intervention 204–7, 205, 206, 225; intervention aims 196–8; intervention and casualties 206–7, 206; intervention legitimacy 174; justification of intervention 79, 91; Kosovo intervention 36, 42–3, 139–40, 167, 169; lessons of intervention 213–15; leverage over TNC 69; military action 5–6, 16, 44, 60, 75, 83–4, 100–1, 102, 103, 112; opposition to the roadmap 70; peacekeeping operations 165,

167; rationality 30–1; and regime change 197, 198, 214–15; regional spillover from intervention 210–12, 213; rejection of ceasefire offers 198; responsibility to protect 84; role 178; situation without intervention 198–204, 199, 201, 203, 204; special forces 74; strategy 5; success 192–3; and Sudan 10; support for rebels 5; and Syria 211–12

Negritude 96–7neo-colonialism, fear of 98neo-liberalism 43neorealist theory 22–3Neumann, John von 21never again slogan 125–6New America Foundation 59New Democratic Party (NDP),

Canada 111, 113, 118–19, 120New York Times, The 123, 197, 210Nguema, Teodoro Obiang 72Nguesso, Denis Sassou 67–8Niebuhr, Reinhold 51–2Niger 76–7, 78, 211, 213Niger Patriotic Front (NPF) 77Nigeria 64, 79n5, 100Nigerian Movement for Justice

(MNJ) 77Nimeiri, Nimeiri 629/11 terrorist attacks 131, 142, 223no-fly zone 1, 5, 100, 103, 115, 150,

162, 174, 185, 191, 192, 197, 207non-governmental organizations 39,

41norm localization 84, 85, 87normative power 34, 38–40, 44norms: internalization of 47–8, 132;

protection 136Norton-Taylor, R. 197nuclear weapons 21

Obama, Barack 124, 150, 177, 178–9, 197, 227

Obasanjo, Olusegun 61oil 45, 74, 103, 209Operation Allied Force 43Operation Enduring Freedom 142



236 Index

Operation Épervier 61–2Operation MOBILE 112Operation ODYSSEY DAWN 112,

149–53Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

5–6, 112, 113, 125Organization of African Unity

(OAU) 61, 93Organization of the Islamic

Conference 4, 152, 176Orientalism 3othering 97Ouadi Doum, battle of 62Oxford Research International 210

Packer, George 132, 135, 143, 155n5Pakistan 145Pan-Africanism 96–7Panel of the Wise 94Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism

Initiative 77Peace and Security Council (PSC),

African Union (AU) 4, 59, 65–6, 68, 70, 72, 77, 93–4, 100, 103, 174, 176

peacekeeping 25, 164–8, 172–3, 179Pelham, N. 209people power 40Ping, Jean 61, 65, 67, 78, 80n6Plous, Scott 20–1Poland 5policy elites: emergence of Bosnia

generation 140; formative experiences 135–6; generational analysis 133–6, 149–53; Libyan mission and 132–3

policy formulation, humanitarian intervention 149–53

POLISARIO 60political will, mobilization 9, 38–9,

44post-Cold War era, generational

analysis 133–6Powell, Colin 151power: distribution of 35;

normative 34Power, Samantha 136, 147, 150,

150–1; A Problem from Hell 151preemptive war 143

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (USA) 138

prisoner’s dilemma 19–22, 19, 21progress 34, 40proportionality 91, 103Proposals on a Framework Agreement

for a Political Solution to the crisis in Libya (African Union) 71

Puri, Manjeev Singh 185Putin, Vladamir 179

Qatar 63, 73, 74, 197–8

racial violence 208–9radical Islamist groups 209–10Rae, Bob 117, 119, 120, 121Ras Lanuf 196, 203Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 174rational choice theory 16–24, 19, 21rationality 30–1; and mental

calculation 23–4; state 16, 16–24, 19, 21, 31

Rationality to Protect 31, 226realism 16–17; structural 21–3rebel forces 191; advance 192;

arms 193, 197; arms supplies 5, 6; British aid 207–8; counter-offensive against 200; first strike 194; French recognition 207; Gaddafi attacks on 193–6; NATO aid 5, 197–8, 204–7, 205, 207–8; Qatari forces 197–8; reprisal killings 208–9; retreat 200, 201; situation without NATO intervention 198–204, 199, 201, 203, 204; uprising 198, 199, 200, 201; victory 205; violence 193–4

rebellion, escalation 214regime change 11, 79, 84, 116, 119,

125, 186, 197, 198, 214–15regime security 84, 88, 98, 101, 104regional destabilization 75–8; threat

of 58–9regional organizations 87regional security cultures 83–106,

225; AU application of R2P 93–9; and civil society 88; definition 86; diversity 85; formulation of 85–8;



Index 237

and global normative order 86–7; and historical experiences 88; and human security 88; and the Libyan crisis 83–4, 99–105; literature 85–6; and R2P 89–93; and regime security 88; and regional norms 87; state level factors 88; and world political culture 86, 95, 105

regional spillover 210–12, 213regionalization 87regions 83Reinold, Theresa 47reprisal killings 208–9responsibility, definition 222–3responsibility discourse 24–8Responsibility to Protect (R2P):

2005 version 27–8; adopted by the UN 27–8, 131, 145–8, 171–2; African approach 96–7; AU and 10, 99–105, 105; AU application of 93–9; and AU response to Libyan crisis 99–105; and the BRIC nations 184–5; Canada and 114–21, 121–5; Canada avoids mentioning 120–1; Canadian debate 111; Canadian use of language 121–5; China and 172, 175, 176, 179–82, 187; criticisms 8; and the Darfur crisis 145; definition 92–3; double standards 103; enforcement 37; faith in 34–5; formulation 47; future outlook 226–8; generational analysis 135–6, 225–6; and human security 99–105; and humanitarian intervention 132, 135–6, 140–2, 148–9, 153; impact 6–8; implementation 224, 226, 228; interpretation 222–3; ISA and 1; jurisdiction 7–8; just authority 91–2; justification of intervention 90–1, 224; lack of consensus over 83; language of 142; and the law on humanitarian intervention 35–8; legal status 8; and legitimacy 48–9; legitimation 163; lessons 223–6; and the Libyan crisis 83–4,

136; Libyan mission discussed as 111, 227; literature 8; military dimension 95–6; and mission creep 119; and multipolarity 49–50; never again slogan 125–6; and norm internalisation 47; normative environment 130–1; normative power 34, 38–40; proportionality 91, 103; rationale 40; and regional security cultures 89–93; and Resolution 1973 8, 28–31, 117–19, 120; responsibilities 92; right intention 90–1, 103; Russia and 172, 175, 187; as speech act 141–2; and the state 227–8; and Syria 31–2; UN Security Council and 6, 8, 39, 95, 162, 169, 171–3, 186–8, 222, 224, 226; and UN Security Council Resolution 1973 175–85; UNGA debate, 2011 180–1; and Western interests 44–5

‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (Brazil) 183

responsible sovereignty 89–90revenge killings 196Rhodesia 165Rice, Susan 29, 136, 143, 147, 149,

151, 155n9, 156n13, 174right intention 90–1, 103roadmap, the 66–7, 78; Gaddafi

accepts in principle 68–9; NATO opposition to 70; problems 69–70; unacceptable to TNC 68–9

Roberts, Adam 168, 173, 187Robertson, Geoffrey 43Rock, Alan 122Rome Statute, the 26Roskin, Michael 133–4, 154, 155n4Ross, Will 59Royal Canadian Air Force 112Royal Canadian Navy 112Russia 5; and the Darfur crisis 145;

and human rights 46; and intervention 28; and R2P 172, 175, 187; Resolution 1973 abstention 49–50, 110, 125, 163, 176, 179; rise of 9, 35, 44, 51; and Syria 31, 48, 50, 52



238 Index

Rwanada 24, 131, 135, 137, 138, 141, 151–2, 153, 154, 156n13; genocide 25, 37, 44, 98, 144, 214, 215

Sabha 209Saddam Hussein 143safe havens 154Sankara, Thomas 63–4Sankoh, Foday 64Sarkozy, Nicolas 67, 124, 149, 178,

207Scarpaleggia, Francis 119Scheffer, David 39Scowcroft, Brent 151security: changing nature of 25–7;

reinterpretation 83; and sovereignty 89

security challenges, Africa 98–9security culture, African 10security dilemmas 17–22, 19, 21security interests, definition 85self-interest 51–2, 228shaming 34Shapiro, Ian 22Shaw, M. 41, 42Siebert, J. 175Sierra Leone 64, 137Silva, Lula da 182Silva, Mario 118, 121, 123Simms, Scott 119Sirte 197Siskind, Jill 123Slaughter, Ann-Marie 43, 136, 143,

146–7, 150, 154, 155n8, 177Snidal, Duncan 23soft balancing 87Somalia 24, 25, 46, 131, 135, 137,

138, 148South Africa 67, 78, 100, 170, 172,

183South Sudan 74, 75sovereign equality 43sovereignty 36, 85, 95; AU

and 99; China and 180; conditional 141; and humanitarian intervention 140–1; legitimate 89; and R2P 8; responsible 89–90

Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect 4, 6

speech acts 141–2Srebrenica massacre 138–9, 141, 149,

154Sri Lanka 6, 39, 44state, the: intervention strategy

28–31; as moral agent 16; and R2P 227–8; rationality 16, 16–24, 19, 21, 31; responsibility 24–8; self-interest 228; sovereign equality 43; strategic preferences 16

Stavridis, J. G. 193Steele, B. J. 135Stevens, Christopher 209–10strategic calculation 9strategic preferences 16Sudan 6, 24, 145, 227;

blowback 75–6, 78; destabilization fears 73; Libyan involvement 62; military support to the TNC 73–5; National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) 73, 74; and NATO 10; occupation of Kufra 73–4; role in overthrow of Gaddafi 10

Sudan People’s Liberation Army 74Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

(SPLM) 60Sudan-Chad Accord 63surface-to-air missiles 211, 213Syria 31–2, 40, 48, 50, 52, 131, 152,

153–4, 163, 176, 187, 188, 211–12, 213, 215, 216n6, 225, 226–7

Taliban, the 142Tarhuna 203Taylor, Charles 64Taylor, Guy 31territorial occupation 90–1terrorism: rational choice

models and 23; 9/11 terrorist attacks 131, 142, 223

Thakur, Ramesh 39, 110, 122–3, 145Theory of Games and Economic

Behaviour (Neumann and Morgenstern) 21

Tieya, Wang 180



Index 239

Tisdall, Simon 185–6Toronto Star 123Touré, Amadou Toumani 67–8Transitional National Council

(TNC) 9–10, 59; arms supplies 74; and the AU 72; control of militias 78; fighters 73; NATO leverage 69; recognition 68, 72; roadmap unacceptable to 68–9; Sudanese military support to 73–5; and Venezuela mediation offer 198

Tripoli 193–4, 195–6, 200, 202–3, 203, 204, 205, 205, 206–7, 206, 216n4

Tripoli Post 206Tripoli Spring 65Truman, Harry 17Tuareg insurgency: Mali 58, 63, 76,

78, 210–11, 213; Niger 76–7Tubu, the 77Tunisia 4, 15, 65, 178, 192

UN High Commissioner for Human Right 4

UN Human Rights Council 4UN International Commission of

Inquiry on Darfur 144UN Security Council 162–88;

Africa’s mistrust of 97; in the bipolar system 41; Chapter VII mandate 29–30, 37, 50–1; Chapter VII powers 35–6, 50; Chinese position 181; composition 170; credibility 167; and the Darfur crisis 145; delegated authority 165–7, 168; double standards 103; and Haiti 167–8; and humanitarian intervention 137–8, 140, 141, 147–8; influence of regional organisations 176; and intervention 163–4, 164–8; justification of intervention 166; legitimacy 170–1; legitimation role 168–73, 187–8; Libya debate 173–85; mandate 164; moral authority 170–1; need for reform 50–2; obligation

to act 46; paralysis 92; peacekeeping operations 164–8; permanent members 35, 50–1, 170, 172; power 49, 50–1; primary responsibility 91–2; and R2P 6, 8, 39, 95, 146–8, 162, 169, 171–3, 224, 226; rationality 30–1; Resolution 688 35, 137; Resolution 794 46; Resolution 940 139; Resolution 1244 180; Resolution 1265 46–7; Resolution 1393 47; Resolution 1970 5, 79n3, 100, 112, 115, 117, 162, 174; responsibility 29; role 37–8, 170, 187–8; South Africa’s presence on 67; speed of reaction 46–7; and Syria 52; USA and 155n8, 168; and the use of force 11; veto 50–1, 170, 188

UN Security Council Resolution 1973 47; abstentions 5, 49–50, 163, 176, 179–85, 186; adoption 174–5; African support for 50; all necessary measures permission 162, 163; and the AU 67, 70–1; and the BRIC nations 183–5; Canada and 117–18; compromise 162–3; critique 185–8; European initiative 177–8; implementation 173, 185; implementation concerns 163; imposition of no-fly zone 1, 5; influence of regional organisations 176; interpretation 102–3, 185; intervention 196–7; ISA reaction to 1–2; justifications 15; legitimacy 48–9, 122; legitimation of R2P 163; NATO interpretation of 5–6; negotiations 173–85; passage 5, 103, 110, 125, 162, 173, 174; provisions 29–31; and R2P 8, 28–31, 117–19, 120, 175–85, 186–8, 222; second 174; US support for 178–9; and Western Gaddafi policy 177

UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 4

UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan 7



240 Index

unforeseen events 1UNICEF 4United Kingdom: aid to rebels

207–8; and Darfur 48; invasion of Iraq 167; military action 5; and Resolution 1973 177–8; Select Committee on Foreign Affairs 44

United Nations: An Agenda for Peace 25; Charter 11, 37, 97, 98, 168–9, 180; Charter, Chapter V 38; Charter, Chapter VII 29–30, 35–6, 37, 49, 165, 174; Chinese position 180; and the end of the Cold War 41–2; General Assembly debate on R2P, 2009 36–7, 37; lack of resources 166; loss of credibility 164; peacekeeping 164–8, 172–3, 179; and R2P 6, 27–8, 131, 145–8, 171–2, 180–1; reform proposals 26–7; responsibilities 27; suspension of Libya 4

United States of America: abuse of humanitarian intervention 142–5; and Bahrain 45; Black Hawk Down incident 138; casualty estimate 206, 206; CIA covert operations 62; Cold War security dilemma 17–22; and Darfur 48, 144–5; Gaddafi policy 177; hegemony 42; intervention in Vietnam 23; invasion of Afghanistan 142; invasion of Iraq 143–4, 148, 155n9, 167; Libyan mission 112; military action 5; national interests 168; and Operation Odyssey Dawn 150–1; Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism Initiative 77; peacekeeping operations 165; Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 138; and Resolution 1973 178–9; role 155n5; and the UN Security Council 155n8

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 147

unrest, outbreak of 4

US consulate, Benghazi, attack on, Sept 2012 209–10

USSR: Cold War security dilemma 17–22; fall of 18, 21, 24

utility theory 23

value communities 87Vancouver, HMCS 112Vandewalle, Dirk 3Venezuela, mediation offer 198Vietnam War 23Voeten, Erik 170–1

Wagner, D. 184Walker, A. 179–80Walt, Stephen 21Waltz, K. 18war on terror, the 3, 131, 142Washington Post 209, 211weapons leakage 211, 213weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) 143Weiss, Thomas 110Welsh, Jennifer 47, 125, 166, 188Western interests, and R2P 44–5Wheeler, N. 46, 142Williams, Paul 39, 110Wintour, P. 197world political culture 86, 95, 105World Summit 131World Summit Outcome Document,

2005 6, 8, 27, 30, 36, 92, 116, 122, 145–7, 223

worldview, generational analysis 133–6

Wrzesnewskyj, Borys 118, 120

Yemen 103Youde, J. 134

Zagare, Frank 19–20, 21, 23Zaum, Dominik 168, 173, 187Zawiya 195, 196, 198, 200, 203,

204Zenawi, Meles 69–70, 80n8Zuma, Jacob 61, 67–8, 69Zuwara 200, 203



Libya and the Responsibility to Protect

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