Land Title and Deeds Atene de Davao 1st Exam

Land Title and Deeds Ateneo de Davao University Based on the Lectures of Atty. Ma. Theresa D. Yu-Panes, MD and the Book of Agcaoili

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Notes by Shelumiel Abapo, CPA Cases by Christine Bonifacio and Astrid Gopo

Presidential Decree No. 1529

Section 1. Title of Decree. – This Decree shall be known as the Property Registration Decree.

Section 2. Nature of Registration Proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. – Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens System. Regional Trial Courts (Courts of First Instance) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Authority (Land Registration Commission) with two (2) certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five (5) days from the filing or issuance thereof.

The Regalian Doctrine

All lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to the State.

The State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. (Secretary of DENR vs. Yap)

Presumption: Lands not shown to have been reclassified or

released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain.

The burden to overturn the presumption by incontrovertible evidence that the land subject to an application is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. There is a need to establish the positive act classifying the land as alienable and disposable.

o Presidential Proclamation o Executive Order o Administrative Action o Investigative Reports of the Bureau of Lands o Legislative Act or statute

Concept of Jura Regalia

Private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic.

Under Spanish Law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property. These were the rights enjoyed during feudal times by the King as the sovereign.

By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.

Dominium – The capacity of the State to own or acquire property.

This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia.

By virtue of discovery and conquest, all lands became the


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exclusive patrimony and dominion of Spanish Crown.

The Spanish government took charged of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards.

Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.

History Tree of the land law in the Philippines: 1. Roots of Regalian Doctrine, that upon the Spanish

conquest, the ownership of all lands, territories, and

possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown

2. Regalian Doctrine was first introduced in the Phils. Through

the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas

3. This was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Spanish

Mortgage Law of 1983

a. This provided for the systematic registration of titles

and deeds as well as possessory claims

4. Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law amended the

Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies

a. This established the possessory information as

method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown

lands, under certain conditions set forth

b. Here, possessory information title, when duly

inscribed in the Registry of Property is converted

into a title of ownership only after the lapse of 20

years of uninterrupted actual, public, and adverse

possession from the date of inscription

c. But possessory title had to be perfected one year

after the promulgation of the Maura Law.

Otherwise, lands would revert to the State.

In sum, under the Spanish, private ownership could only be founded on royal concessions in the forms of:

a) Titulo real or royal grant

b) Concession especial or special grant

c) Composicion con el estado or adjustment title

d) Titulo de compra or title by purchase

e) Informacion posesoria or possessory information title

5. Under the American regime, the first law governing the

disposition of lands is the Philippine Bill of 1902

a. By this law, lands of the public domain in the

Philippine Islands were classified into three:

i. Agricultutal

ii. Mineral

iii. Timber or Forest Lands

b. The act provided for means of disposal

i. Absolute grabt (freehold system)

ii. Lease (leasehold system)

6. Philippine Legislature passes Act 496 or the Land

Registration Act

a. This established a system of registration by which

recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and

imprescriptible known as the Torrens System

7. Act No. 2874 or the 2nd Public Land Act superseded Act 926

a. This is a more comprehensive law which limited the

exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and

Americans and citizens of other countries which

gave Filipinos same privileges


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b. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and

occupation en concepto dueno since time

immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required

8. CA 141 amended Act 2874, and has ever since remained as

the existing general law governing the classification and

disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber

and mineral lands, and privately-owned lands which

reverted to the State

a. CA 141 retained the requirement of Act 2874 as

mentioned in 7(b) but was superseded by RA 1942

which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive

period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title

b. This was last amended by PD 1073 which now

provides for possession and occupation of the land

applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier

9. PD No. 892 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as

evidence in land registration proceedings

a. Under this decree, all holders of Spanish titles or

grants should apply for registration of their lands

under Act 496 within 6 months from the effectivity

of the decree on February 16, 1976

b. Thereafter, the recording of unregistered lands shall

be governed by Section 194 of the Revised

Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344

10. PD No. 1529 of the Property Registration Decree amended

Act. 496

a. It codified the various laws relative to registration of

property

b. It governs the registration of lands under the Torrens

System as well as unregistered lands, including

chattel mortgages

Secretary of DENR vs. Yap Facts: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in pen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was


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classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land

(protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable). On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions Issue: WON private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. Held: Petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all


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unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay

occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

Classification of Lands in the Constitution 1935 Constitution classified lands of public domain into:

a. Agricultural

b. Forest

c. Timber

1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: a. Agricultural

b. Industrial or Commercial

c. Residential

d. Resettlement

e. Mineral

f. Timber or Forest and grazing lands

g. Other classes as may be provided by law

1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 classification plus one additional”

a. Agricultural

b. Forest/Timber


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c. Mineral

d. National Parks

Republic vs. Naguiat Facts: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to 4 parcels of land in Botolan, Zambales with the RTC of Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the parcels of land having acquired them from a corporation which likewise acquired the same from Calderon, et al and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession for more than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest (PII) have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation (OCENPO) of the lands in question since June 12, 1945 or prior. RTC Decision: Adjudicated unto Celestina the parcels of land and decreeing the registration thereof in her name. CA Decision: Affirmed the RTC Decision Issue: WON the private claimant was able to defeat the presumption of State ownership of the lands in question. WON the lands in question ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

Held: Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private ownership. As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Under Section2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion are presumed to belong to the State. According, the public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain belongs to the Executive Branch of the Government and not the court. Needless to stress, the onus (burden) probandi (proof) to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The private-claimant has not presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable or disposable. Matters of land classification and reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.

The Regalian Doctrine as Enshrined in the Fundamental Law


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The 1987 Constitution embodies the principle of State ownership of lands and all other natural resources in Section 2 of Article XII on “National Economy and Patrimony”:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The abovementioned provision provides that except for agricultural lands for public domain in which alone may be alienated.

Forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain with the State, the exploration, development, and utilization (EDU) of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision, albeit allowing it to enter to:

o Co-production, o Joint venture, and

o Production-sharing agreements

Or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale EDU

The 1987 provision had its roots in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces or potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian Doctrine in Section 8, Artcile XIV:

Section 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or


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commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the.public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The Regalian Doctrine does not negate “native title”

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought the suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371 also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its IRR. Supporters: Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and the Government agency created under the IPRA The Secretary of the DENR and DBM filed through the OSG a consolidated comment, and the OSG is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that its grants ownership over natural resources to IPs and prays that the petition be granted in part. Grounds of constitutionality:

Amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine By providing an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, violative of the rights of private landowners. The powers vested by the IPRA Law to NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands to be violative of the due process clause of the Constitution After due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme Court voted as follows: Seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7) other voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. After the re-deliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the ROC, the petition was dismissed and the validity of the law was deemed upheld.

Separate Opinions of the Justices Constitutionality of the IPRA Law

Justice Kapunan stated that the Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of Carino vs. Insular Government

The Carino ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by


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Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Justice Puno stated that Carino firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that:

o “No law shall be enacted in the said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCS)/Indigenous People (IP) as a distinct sector in the society. It grants this people ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands and defines the extent of these lands and domains.

Justice Vitug opposed the IPRA saying that the Carino ruling cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from them all government authority emanates.

o It is not for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must stand inviolate.

Justice Panganiban stated that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution, and that no one is exempt from its all encompassing provisions.

Background of the Torrens System of Registration

In this system, title by registration takes the place of “title

by deeds” of the system under the general law.

A sale of land is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued.

o The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein.

Under the old system, the sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaw, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc.

Object: To do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system.

Generally a system of registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared object is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer.

Act 496 or Land Registration Act of 1903, enacted by the Philippine Commission, placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.

o It requires the government to issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves

The certificate of title (COT) is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.


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G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. Facts: • Plaintiffs Legarda and Prieto occupy as owners a lot in Ermita. There exist a stonewall on said property. • On March 2, 1906, plaintiffs presented a petition in the court of land registration for the registration of their lot. • They were issued OCT under the Torrens system on October 25, 1906. • Later, the predecessor in interest of Saleeby sought to register his property and was issued an original certificate of title on March 25, 1912 with include the stonewall already registered under the title of the plaintiffs. • When plaintiffs discovered that the stone wall was also included in the title of defendant, they presented a petition in court for adjustment and correction of title. • The lower court denied the said petition contending that they did not raise the same during the pendency of the defendant’s registration. The decision f the lower court was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear or oppose it. Issue: Who’s title should prevail in case of duplicate or double registration of the same property under the Torrens system? In this case Legarda (earlier date) Ruling:

The general rule is in case of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier date prevails unless it can be clearly ascertained by ordinary rules of or statutory construction that there was mistake in the inclusion in the certificate of title with an earlier date. The primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in his registered title, then the purpose of the law is defeated. Section 38 of Act 496 provides that a decree of registration shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the government. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereof nor by any proceeding in court reversing judgment or decree subject only to the right of any person deprived of the land by decree of registration obtained by fraud to be filed in court of land registration for review within one year. In the case at bar, Legarda was first to register the property under the torrens title in 1906, therefore such registration is constructive notice to the whole world. The second registrant cannot claim good faith for there is already constructive notice through the first registration. It only follows that the registration by Saleeby in 1912 in null and void.

Purpose of the Torrens System (Legarda vs. Saleeby)

1. To quiet the title to land, 2. To put a stop forever to any question of legality of the title,

except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto

G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991 SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and THE


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INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S. VIRATA and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Facts: • On September 28, 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation filed an action for quieting of title against the estate of Virata. • The disputed property here was a friar land. • Plaintiff alleges that it is the registered owner of the parcel of land located in Imus Cavite containing about 48,182 sq. m. issued on February 24, 1976. • It further alleged, that Virata during his lifetime through fraud caused the issuance of another certificate of title on September 1, 1959 which creates a cloud to petitioner’s title. • Solid State bought the disputed property in 1976 from one Julian Penaranda. • Julian Penaranda acquired the same by application to purchase the land which was a friar land. The sale to Penaranda was with the approval of the Secretary of Interior later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. He went through the process as provided by Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act. • On the other hand, Virata alleges that he acquired the disputed property December 6, 1957 from Mabini Legaspi. The latter acquired the same in a public auction on May 5, 1943. • Mabini testified that she sold the property to Virata. • TC ruled in favor of Virata and dismissed the complaint. • CA affirmed the TC Issue: WON the TC erred in considering Virata the owner of the disputed property? YES

Ruling: It is undisputed that the property in the case at bar is a friar land. Therefore, the law applicable is Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act. It provides that sale or lease of said properties shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior. Clearly, the purchase of Penaranda was in compliance with law. The execution of the sale vested title to Penaranda as the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce approved it. Hence, the sale from Penaranda to Solid State validly transferred ownership. On the other hand, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier but nowhere in the records show that a certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of Lands in her favor. The official receipt of sale presented does not prove that the property was conveyed to her by the government. The sale to Mabini was highly irregular, void and not in compliance with law. Registration does not vest title. It merely evidences such title. Title does not become incontrovertible since it is void ab initio.

Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court to avoid the possibility of losing his land

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action, and all the world are parties, including the government.

After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest.

The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.

Aims to decree land titles shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable, and to relieve the land of the burden of


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known as well as unknown claims.

The registration compels the claimants to come to court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to establish evidence of title over realty.

It is means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large

A certificate of title is not a source of right, but merely confirms or records a title already existing and vested

Distinction between Title and Certificate of Title Title – a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property Certificate of Title – a mere evidence of ownership, it is not the title to the land itself 2 Types

1. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) – a true copy of the decree of registration

2. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) – issued subsequent to the original registration

Advantages of the Torrens System (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz)

1. Substituted security for insecurity 2. Reduced the cost of conveyances from pounds to shillings,

and the time occupied from months to days; 3. Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage

4. Simplified ordinary dealings that he has mastered the 3 R’s (Reading, wRiting, aRithmetic) can transact his own conveyancing

5. Affords protection against fraud 6. Restored to their just value many estates held under good

holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults

A View of Past and Present Legislation on Land Registration

The State has the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate

State has control over the real property within the limits

State posses not only the right to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative capacity to establish the method of procedure

1. The Public Land Act (CA No. 141)

a. Act No. 926 or the first Public Land Act, passed through the Philippine Commission in pursuance of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

i. It governed the disposition of lands of public domain ii. It prescribed terms and conditions to enable persons

to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands iii. It provided for the issuance of patents to certain

native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands

iv. It operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government


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v. Public Land – referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands

b. Act No. 2874 or the second Public Land Act superseded Act No. 926, passed under the Jones Law

i. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges

c. CA No. 141, the present Public Land Act, amended Act No. 2874 after the passage of the 1935 Constitution

i. The difference between Act No.2874 to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations

ii. This applies to lands of the public domain which have been declared open to disposition or concession and officially delimited and classified

iii. It contains provisions on the different modes of government grant, i.e. homestead, sale, free patent (administrative legalization), and reservations for public and semi-public purpose

iv. The certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent has the same validity and efficacy as a certificate of title issued through ordinary registration proceedings

Section48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act , to wit: XXX XXX XXX (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

Section 51 provides that applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles shall be subject to the same procedure as that established under the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), except that notice of all such applications, together with the plan of the land claimed, shall be immediately forwarded to the Director of Lands who may appear as a party in such cases.


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2. The Land Registration Act (Act No, 496) i. Approved on November 6, 1902 but became effective on

January 1, 1903 ii. Established the Torrens system of registration

iii. Created the Court of Land Registration which had exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for registration with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such application

a. Before the creation of the Court of Land Registration (CLR), the jurisdiction to determine the nature, quality, and extent of land titles, the rival claims of contending parties, and the legality and effect thereof was vested in the Courts of First Instance (RTC now)

b. After land has been finally registered, the CLR ceased to have jurisdiction

c. The only authority remaining in CLR was conferred by Section 112

d. The final decrees are regarded as indefeasible and could not be reopened, EXCEPT:

i. That any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein through fraud, may file in the CFI (RTC now) a petition for review within 1 year after entry of the decree, PROVIDED that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value

iv. Registration under the system did not create a title. It simply confirmed a title already created and vested

v. This Act provided for an Assurance Fund to pay for the loss or damage sustained by any person who, without negligence on his part, is wrongfully deprived of any land or interest therein on account of the bringing of the land under

Torrens system of registration 3. The Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259)

i. Took effect on February 11, 1913 ii. When in the opinion of the President, the public interest

requires that title to any lands be settled and adjudicated; he shall order the Director of Lands (DOL) to make a survey thereof, with notice to all persons claiming an interest therein.

iii. The DOL, represented by the OSG, shall institute registration proceedings by filing a petition in the proper court against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands, stating that the public interest requires that the titles to such lands be settled and adjudicated.

iv. Notice of the filing of the petition is published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette

v. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decree awarded to the person entitled to the lands or parts thereof

a. The decree shall be the basis for the issuance of the certificate of title which shall have the same effect as a certificate of title granted under PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree)

b. Cadastral Proceeding – is in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties thereof, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action

c. The provisions of this act have been substantially incorporated in PD 1529, particularly in Sections 35 to 38 thereof, under the title Cadastral Registration Proceedings.

4. The Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)


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i. Approved on June 11, 1978 ii. Issued to update the Land Registration Act and to codify the

various laws relative to registration of property and to facilitate effective implementation of said laws

iii. This decree supersedes all other laws relative to the registration of property

a. RTCs of the city or province where the land lies, serve as first level courts, exercise jurisdiction over applications for registration and all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, subject to judicial review

iv. Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA No. 41 are virtually the same

a. Section 14(1) of PD 1529 – specifically operationalizing the registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the registration of property

v. The act has substantially incorporated the substantive and procedural requirements of the Land Registration Act of 1902

a. But has expanded its coverage to include: i. judicial confirmation of imperfect or

incomplete title in its Section 14(1); ii. cadastral registration proceedings in

Sections 35 to 38; iii. Voluntary proceedings in Sections 51 to 68; iv. Involuntary proceedings in Sections 69 to 77 v. Certificates of land transfer and

emancipation patents issued pursuant to PD No. 27 in Sections 104 to 106; and

vi. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original titles in Section 110

b. Judicial proceedings are in rem

c. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by giving the public notice of initial hearing by means of:

i. Publication; ii. Mailing; and

iii. Notice d. The decree renamed the Land Registration

Commission (LRC) as Land Registration Authority (LRA) – the central repository of records relative to original registration, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands

vi. Section 14 paragraph 1 to 4 of PD 1529 enumerates the persons WHO may apply for registration, and the conditions necessary

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.


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(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

The application for registration shall be filed with the RTC of the province or city where the land is situated

The court shall issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing, and the public shall be given notice thereof by means of:

o Publication, o Mailing, and o Posting

Any person claiming an interest in the land may appear and file an opposition, stating all his objections to the application

Once the judgment becomes final, the court shall issue an order for the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the adjudicate

Thereupon, the LRA shall prepare the corresponding decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate certificates of title which shall be sent to the ROD of the city or province where the land lies for registration

Decree of Registration – binds the land and quiets title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law

Certificate of Title – shall not be subject to collateral attack, nor shall it be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law

Assurance Fund – is provided for the loss, damage, or deprivation of any interest sustained by any person, without negligence on his part, as a consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system.

Registration under Torrens System is a Proceeding in rem

Section 2 of PD 1529 expressly states that judicial proceedings for the registration of land shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system

Proceeding in rem – when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established

Proceeding in personam – the technical object of the suit is establish claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense

Being in rem, upon the presentation in court of an application for registration of the title to lands, all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to such application

G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910

MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.

Facts:

• The petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan and Francisco are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was


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accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners. • On June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.) • He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. • From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed. • The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.

Issue: 1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year? NO 2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud? NO Ruling: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908. 1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. 2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known. The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts) The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and while he petitioners were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to


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include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants. Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication “to all whom it may concern.” Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.” As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide. NOTES: • The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. • The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential characteristics of actual – as distinguished from legal-fraud • Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction

between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.) • action in rem vs. action in personam: If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. • Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud.

RTC have plenary jurisdiction over land registration cases

The jurisdiction of the RTC over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of PD 1529, while jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title is provided for by Section 108


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[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]

Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds Paranaque

Facts:

• Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Ruldolf Lietz Incorporated. It changed its name to Ruldolf Lietz Holdings Incorporated. For this reason, petitioner sought to amend the certificates of title of real properties it owned which was still under their old name. • On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC of Paranaque. • Petitioner impleaded the Registry of Deeds of Pasay and alleged that the properties were all located in Pasay. (This was due to the mistaken impression that the ROD of Pasay was still in custody of the certificates of title of properties in Paranaque) • Subsequently, when petitioner learned that the titles were in Paranaque, it filed an ex parte motion to amend its petition and impleaded the ROD Paranaque. • However, the RTC of Paranaque already dismissed motu proprio Ruldolf Lietz petition due to improper venue. • Petitioner filed a MR but was denied. • The Solicitor General on his comment contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because the allegations in the original petition states that the properties were in Pasig, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Paranaque court. Therefore, the court cannot act upon the motion to amend its petition.

Issue: W/N the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition? YES

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition. It held that the Solicitor General has confused jurisdiction with venue. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action is conferred by law and may not be conferred by consent or waiver. On the other hand, venue as fixed by statute may be changed by consent of parties and may be waived.Jurisdiction is based on substantive law while venue is based on procedural law.

In the case at bar, petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC in seeking amendment of its certificates of title. It is conferred by law as provided in PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.


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More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:

Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx.

Therefore, since the court has jurisdiction, RTC erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio since motu proprio dismissal

can only be resorted when there is lack of jurisdiction, litispendencia, res judicata or prescription.

Section 2 provides that the RTCs shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interests therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions

Before the enactment of PD 1529, summary reliefs, such as action to compel the surrender of owner’s duplicate COT to the ROD, could only be filed with the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes contentious and controversial and should therefore be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident property belonged

Delegated Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts Section 34 of BP 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691 grants first level courts delegated jurisdiction to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases. The Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC) shall have jurisdiction in the following instances:

a. Where the lot sought to be registered is not subject of controversy or opposition; OR

b. Where the lot is contested but the value thereof does not exceed P100, 000


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The value shall be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by the agreement of the respective claimants, if there be more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Decisions of the First Level Courts Appealable to the CA Delegated Jurisdiction is limited to what is expressly mentioned in the delegation --- to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases. Hence, matters subsequent to the original registration determined by Second Level courts, including petitions for reconstitution of lost titles, may not be unloaded to First Level courts. SC Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A November 15, 1995, SC issued this circular which provides:

1. Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this Administrative Circular but where the hearing has not yet commenced shall be transferred by the Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the cases to the Executive Judge of the appropriate MeTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC for the required raffle among the branches of the court under his administrative supervision; and

2. Cadastral or land registration cases pending in the RTC where the trail had already been commenced as of the date of effectivity of the Administrative Circular shall remain with said courts. However, by agreement of the parties, these cases may be transferred to the appropriate MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs.

Distinction between the court’s general and limited jurisdiction ELIMINATED

Section 2 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a land registration or cadastral court

Purpose: To avoid multiplicity of suits and expediency

The change resulted to a. Simplified registration proceedings by conferring

upon RTCs the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions

G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO,

petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.

Facts:

• Spouses Abdon Arceo & Escolastica Geronimo were owners of 4 parcels of land in Bulacan. (actually 6 but only 4 were in dispute) • Escolastica died on 1942; Abdon died on 1953 while their son Esteban died of 1941. • Esteban had 5 children- Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio & Sotera. • Jose is married to Virginia Franco and together they had 6 children.


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• Virginia together with her children are the petitioners in this case while the siblings of Jose are the respondents in this case. • On 1972, Virginia and children filed with the cadastral court and application for registration of the 4 disputed parcels of land, which was opposed by Jose’s siblings. • Petitioner’s are contending that on September/October 27, 1941 Abdon and Escolastica executed a deed of donation inter vivos marked as exhibit J in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. That since 1942 Jose has been paying the taxes. • Another deed of donation inter vivos was also executed by the spouses marked as exhibit T, which further disposed the properties to Jose. • On the other hand, respondents rely on a deed of donation mortis causa executed by the spouses on October 3, 1941 marked as exhibit 1 which disposed all their properties to all their grandchildren including Jose. They contend that said deed revoked the earlier donation made by the spouses. (pertaining to exhibit J) • The cadastral court rejected the 3 documents and distributed the properties according to the law of intestate succession • CA affirmed • Petitioners contend that the cadastral court does not have the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership and that its authority was merely to confirm an existing title.

Issue: W/N the RTC acting as cadastral court has the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership? YES

Ruling:

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

The Decree has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.

Registration court is not divested of its jurisdiction by administrative act for the issuance of patent

It has been held that a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of title cannot be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the


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issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.

The Director of Land’s jurisdiction, administrative supervision and executive control extend only to lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner. (De los Angeles vs. Santos)

Proceedings for land registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent are not.

o Therefore, a homestead patent does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as far as courts acting upon proceedings in rem are concerned.

Jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to property Pursuant to Section 19(2) of BP 129, as amended, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property

a. Exceeds P20,000 outside Metro Manila; b. Exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila

EXCEPT: actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction is conferred upon the MTCs

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for determines the jurisdiction

An action for reconveyance or for the annulment of a deed of sale and partition is one involving title to or interest in property. Thus, the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property to determine what court has jurisdiction

Venue Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the

proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, or in case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the ELECTION of the PLAINTIFF.

Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands. Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought under the operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.

Registration under Spanish Mortgage law discontinued

On February 16, 1976 PD 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System and the use of Spanish titles in Land Registration Proceedings Act) was issued decreeing the discontinuance of the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. It provides:


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Section 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344;

Section 2. All laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the foregoing provisions are hereby repealed or accordingly modified.

Section 3 of PD 1073 provides:

Section 3. The judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish grants such as application for the purchase, composition or other forms of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees in force prior to the transfer or sovereignty from Spain to the United States shall no longer be allowed. However, this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any person claiming the same land from acting under Section 48(b) and Section 48(c) if he meets the conditions prescribed for judicial confirmation of his incomplete title thereunder.

Spanish titles no longer used as evidence of land ownership

During Spanish time, all lands of any kind were under the exclusive dominion of the Spanish crown.

The Spanish government distributed lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to settlers and other people in various forms, such as (RSAPPG)

a. Titulo real or royal grant; b. Concession especial or special grant; c. Composicion con el estado or adjustment title; d. Titulo de compra or title by purchase; e. Informacion possessoria or possessory information

title; and f. Titulo gratuito or gratuitous title

Spanish titles a. Although evidence of ownership, they may be lost

through prescription b. Not indubitable evidence of ownership, and neither

indefeasible nor imprescriptible

Courts are now prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them

Reasons for Discontinuance of use of Spanish Titles 1. Proliferation of dubious Spanish titles which have raised

conflicting claims of ownership; and 2. They tend to destabilize the Torrens system of registration

Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals Facts: The case is about the fantastic claim of the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro to a vast tract of land with a total land area of 173,000 hectares on the basis of a Spanish title --- Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894.


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Issue: WON the Heirs can validly claim ownership and register the lands based on their Spanish title. Held: It is settled that by virtue of PD 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants would cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from the date of effectivity of the said decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs as their privies as evidence of ownership.

Registration of instruments under Act. No. 3344 ineffective against 3rd persons

Registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land

Prior to PD 1529 (PRD), Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act governed the recording of transactions involving registered land, i.e. land with a Torrens titles.

Act No. 3344, provided for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a 3rd party with a better right.

Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but such sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered

registered and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.

The registration should be made in the property registry to be binding upon 3rd persons.

Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient execution of the laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land reform and social justice program of the government, there is created a commission to be known as the Land Registration Commission under the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.

Renamed Land Registration Authority or Pangasiwaan sa Patalaan ng Lupain pursuant to Section 28, Chapter 9, Title III, of EO No. 292, known as the Administrative Code of 1987.

Exercises supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds, as well as the clerical and archival system of the courts of first instance throughout the Philippines with reference to the registration of lands

Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land Registration Commission shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known, respectively, as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land Registration who shall be appointed by the President. The Commissioner shall be duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Deputy Commissioner, who shall possess the same qualifications as those required of the Commissioner, shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos (P3,000) per annum less than that of the Commissioner. He shall act as Commissioner of Land


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Registration during the absence or disability of the Commissioner and when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall have been designated or appointed in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other functions as the Commissioner may assign to him. They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in the interest of the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each receive compensation at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos (P3,400) per annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner. All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission including those of the Registries of Deeds whose salaries are not herein provided, shall receive salaries corresponding to the minimum of their respective upgraded ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of Budget Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum thereof across the board, notwithstanding the maximum salary allowed for their respective civil service eligibilities. The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without prejudice to such benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted by the President or by the legislature to government employees. All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Headed by an Administrator who is assisted by 2 Deputy Administrators, all of whom appointed by the President

All other officials of the LRA, EXCEPT Registers of Deeds,

are appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Administrator

Land Registration Authority – is the central repository of the records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands. Specifically, it is responsible for the issuance of decrees of registration and certificates of title (original and duplicate) where land is brought for the first time under the Torrens system.

Section 6. General Functions. (1) The Commissioner of Land Registration (now the Land Registration Administrator) shall have the following functions: (a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title; (b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission; (c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds; (d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Courts of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands; (e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and


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regulations therefor; (f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.

(2) The Land Registration Commission (now the Land Registration Authority/LRA) shall have the following functions: (a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of the government; (b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings; (c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands.

LRA Administrator

Functions are plainly executive and subject to the President’s power of supervision and control

He can be investigated and removed only by the President and not by the SC which is not charged with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials

The LRA is not a judge or a member of the judiciary, otherwise if the legislative intent would place him within the right to be investigated by the SC and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant or privilege would be unconstitutional since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of

powers by charging the Court with administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials

Duty of LRA to issue decree ministerial

It is ministerial only in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, as to which they have no discretion on the matter.

However, if LRA officials are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court.

o In this respect, they act as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court.

Duty of LRA officials not ministerial

In cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land.

o In the same vein, the ROD cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the order of the court for the issuance of new certificate of titles where there are existing TCT covering the subject parcels of land and there are reasons to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the new titles.

o When the court ordered to issue a decree on a lot already decreed and titled in the name of another, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court’s order for the issuance of the decree. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not compellable by mandamus because it involves exercise of discretion.


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The duty of LRA officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court’s decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but NOT beyond the lapse of 1 year from the entry of the decree.

Section 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for each province and one for each city. Every Registry with a yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos during the last three years shall have one Deputy Register of Deeds, and every Registry with a yearly average collection of more than three hundred thousand pesos during the last three years, shall have one Deputy Register of Deeds and one second Deputy Register of Deeds. The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction of each Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration, with the end in view of making every registry easily accessible to the people of the neighboring municipalities. The province or city shall furnish a suitable space or building for the office of the Register of Deeds until such time as the same could be furnished out of national funds.

Registry of Property

Sec. 51 of PD 1529 provides that no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument --- except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its REGISTRATION

o If the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer BUT it DOES NOT affect innocent 3rd persons.

Art. 708 of the Civil Code provides for the establishment of a Registry of Property which has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property.

The original copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) shall be filed in the Registry of Deeds.

o It shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar COT and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.

Each ROD shall keep a primary entry book where all instruments including copies of writs and processes relating to registered land shall be entered in the order of their filing. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted.

Registration – the entry of instruments or deeds in a book or pubic registry

To register means to enter in a register, to record formally and distinctly, to enroll, to enter in a list

It includes both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes.

In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the Registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.

Effects of Registration

Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world.

The act of registration shall be operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as 3rd persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the ROD for the province or city where the


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land lies. Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to:

1. The first registrant in good faith; 2. The first possessor in good faith; and 3. The buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title

Section 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other subordinate personnel; salaries. Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Deputy Registers of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the Registries of Deeds shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration. The salaries of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shall be at the following rates: (1) First Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner. (2) Second Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in second class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries. (3) Third Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in third class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in second class Registries. (4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and Second Deputy Registers of Deeds shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than those of their corresponding Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds, respectively.

The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration, shall cause the reclassification of Registries based either on work load or the class of province/city, whichever will result in a higher classification, for purposes of salary adjustments in accordance with the rates hereinabove provided. Section 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds. No person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been actually engaged in such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a like period in any branch of government the functions of which include the registration of property. The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided, however, that no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for cause and upon compliance with due process as provided for by law. Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated. It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly


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canceled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.

Office of the Register of Deeds

It constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated

The existence of a COT in the Registry of Deeds supports and strengthens the authenticity of the title

There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for each province and one for each city

o The DOJ Secretary shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction of each Registry upon the recommendation of the LRA Administrator

o The purpose is to make every Registry easily accessible to the people of the neighboring municipalities

Register of Deeds

To be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the DOC Secretary

Deputy Register of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the ROD shall be appointed by the DOJ Secretary upon the recommendation of the LRA Administrator

Both must of the ROD and Deputy ROD must be members of the Bar

Duties of Register of Deeds

It perform both functions of an administrative character

and functions which are at least of quasi-judicial nature

The function of the ROD with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature

o Whether a document is valid or not is NOT for the ROD to determine as this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction

o If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided AFTER, not before the registration

Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.

Instances where the ROD may deny registration

1. Where there are several copies of the title (co-owner’s duplicate) but only one is presented with the instrument to be registered

The law requires that every copy authorized to be issued as duplicate of the original must contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered by the title.

If different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens would cease to be reliable.

2. Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of conveyance bears the signature of only one spouse

In donation of conjugal property is signed by only of the spouses, such bears on its face an infirmity


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which justifies denial of its registration. 3. Where there is a pending case in court where the character

of the land and validity of the conveyance are in issue

In such case, the matter of registration may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notice of lis pendens.

4. Where required certificates or documents are not submitted

It is important to submit required certificates or documents such as DAR clearance, copy of latest tax declaration, HLURB registration papers etc. to facilitate registration

The refusal by the ROD to register an instrument affecting registered land by reason of non-compliance with certain requirements does not bar registration if thereafter the defects are cured.

Doubtful questions submitted to LRA Administrator for resolution

Sec. 10 states that it shall be the duty of the ROD to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

He shall see to it that the said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled.

If the instrument is NOT registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason thereof, and advising him of his right to appeal by CONSULTA in accordance with Sec. 117

A ROD is precluded from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the proble whether

to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.

Registration does not validate an Invalid Instrument

While registration operates as notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor converts and invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties, nor amounts to a declaration that the instrument recognizes a valid and subsisting interest in the land.

G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998] SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent. Facts: • Petitioners, Spouses Laburada were applicants for registration of Lot 3A which is a portion of Lot 3 Block 159 located in Mandaluyong City. • On January 8, 1991 the trial court acting as land registration court confirmed and ordered the registration of their title. • After the finality of the decision, TC upon motion of petitioners issued an order on March 15, 1991 requiring the Land Registration Authority to issue corresponding decree of registration. • LRA refused the issuance. Thereafter petitioners filed for mandamus contending that there was unlawful neglect in the performance of LRA’ duty. • Silverio Perez, Director of LRA explained that after plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932. The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued


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Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively; (take note of the dates) • After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are incomplete. • For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same. Issue: W/N mandamus is the proper remedy? NO Ruling: LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as

officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234 Note: During the discussion, Ma’am said that the spouses Laburada should have exhausted all administrative remedies before filing for mandamus.

[G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004] Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent. Facts: • On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees. • The parties thereafter, entered into a compromise agreement which provides that Gloria has a period of one year to buy back the house and lot. However, Gloria failed to do so.


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• Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996. • On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo]. • On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name. • On November 12, 1997 De Vera filed an action for forcible entry against Abrigo spouses but was dismissed. • On November 21, 1997, petitioners filed the instant case with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against respondent and Gloria Villafania. • TC awarded the property to Abrigo. • CA on its amended decision, found respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected. Issue: Who between de Vera and Spouses Abrigo has the better right? Romana De Vera Held: This case involves a double sale by Gloria to : May 27, 1993 – Rosenda and Rosita October 23, 1997- Romana Rivera Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who

may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344. For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property


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Soriano v. Heirs of Magali, held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Therefore, 1544 does not apply to Spouses Abrigo. De Vera under 1544 is considered to have registered the property in good faith first which is under the torrens system. De Vera is in good faith since she had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation.

Section 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc. (1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a province or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion of the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to discharge his duties, said duties shall be performed by the following officials, in the order in which they are mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates another official to act temporarily in his place: (a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second Deputy Register of Deeds, should there be one; (b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal;

(2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds without pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice may, in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional compensation to the official acting as Register of Deeds, such additional compensation together with his actual salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus filled by him. (3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of a Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for the new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province or city shall be the ex-officio Register of Deeds for said new province or city. Section 12. Owner's Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every Registry an index system which shall contain the names of all registered owners alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall be prepared in the name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all lands registered in his name. The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within ten days after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on collections and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his Registry. Section 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic Engineer in the Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical adviser of the Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall be responsible to him for all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said office. He shall perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned to him by the Commissioner.


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Importance of a Survey Plan

A survey plan serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land

In pursuant to PD 239 dated July 9, 1973, the authority of the LRA to approve survey plans for original registration purposes has been withdrawn.

o The authority is now exercised by the Lands Management Bureau (LMB), the function of verifying and approving original survey plans for all purposes in order to assure compliance with established standards and minimize irregularities in the execution of land surveys.

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other

manner provided for by law. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly. Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for tthe original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings. A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration The primary purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and undisputable. As expressed in Section 31 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), the decree of registration shall bind the land and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all the branches thereof. Further, as stated in Section 32, the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in court for reversing judgments. EXCEPTION: If there is right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by ACTUAL FRAUD to file in the proper Regional


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Trial Court (RTC) a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than 1 year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration.

A certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of land.

The title, once registered, is notice to the world.

No one can plead ignorance of the registration. Registration only confirms ownership

A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Registration does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of 3rd parties.

The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land.

It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, EXCEPT those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.

o If there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, EXCEPT in the simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title.

Effects of Registration a. Relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims;

or b. it compels the claimants to come into court and to make

there a record, so that thereafter there may be no

uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims

Placing a parcel of land under the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. While certificate of title may be considered the best proof of ownership, the mere issuance thereof does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that the other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title (COT). System of Registration Registration – an entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. In its strict sense, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 2 Systems of Registration

1. One for registered lands under PD 1529/Property Registration Decree

2. For unregistered lands under Act 3344

Registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land.

o Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Property Registration Decree, the sale is not considered registered and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.


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Act No. 3344, on the other hand, provided for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better right.

o There can be no constructive notice through registration under Act No. 3344 if the property is registered under the Torrens system, nor can the registration be effective for the purpose of Article 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale.

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

The recording of instruments relation to unregistered lands is governed by Section 113 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, EXCEPT as between the parties thereto, UNLESS such instrument shall have been recorded in the office of the ROD.

Laws governing land registration

The State possesses not only the right to determine how

title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative capacity to establish the method of procedure.

Primary Source of Legislation on Registration of Private Lands and Lands of Public Domain

a. CA 141 or the Public Land Act, approved Nov. 7, 1936, effective on Dec. 1, 1936

Governs the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles on the basis of possession and occupation of alienable portions of the public domain in the manner and for the length of time required by law

Relevant provisions: Sec. 47-57, Chapter VIII of the Act

b. PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, issued on June 11, 1978

A codification of all laws relative to the registration of property, and supersedes all other laws relative to registration of property.

It has substantially incorporated the provisions of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act, Sec. 14, Par. 1 to 4, enumerating the persons who may apply for registration and the conditions therefor

c. Act No. 2259 or the Cadastral Act, enacted on Feb. 11, 1913 An offspring of the system of registration under the

Land Registration Act It aims to serve public interests by requiring that the

title to any lands be titles and adjudicated The salient provisions in the Cadastral Act have now

been carried over in the present Property Registration Decree Sec. 35-38.

d. RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),


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approved on Oct. 29, 1997 Recognizes the rights of ownership and possession

of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title, and defines the extent of these lands and domains.

IPRA expressly converts ancestral lands into public agricultural lands, and individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands, shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of the PUBLIC LAND ACT or the PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.

i. The option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.

Registration Proceedings are judicial and in rem Distinguish in rem proceedings vs. in personam and quasi in rem

In rem In personam Quasi in rem

Binds the whole world

to enforce personal rights and obligations against a person although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property

Deals with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights and interests of all

possible claimants

Registration is voluntary under the following:

a. Public Land Act; b. Property Registration Decree; and c. IPRA

Registration is compulsory under the Cadastral Act c. It is the government itself which initiates the petition

A. Registration under the Property Registration Decree 1. Who may apply? (Sec. 14 of PD 1529

1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

3. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

4. Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Under Art. 493 of the CC, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefor alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, EXCEPT when personal rights are involved.

The effect of alienation/mortage with respect to the


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co-owners shall be limited to the portion may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership

Since a co-owner cannot be considered a true owner of a specific portion until division or partition is effected, he cannot file an application for registration for the whole area without joining the co-owners as applicants.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the vendee (buyer) and the vendee is subrogated to all the rights and actions of the vendor, subject to the latter’s right of redemption.

Having legal title to the land, the vendee a retro (buyer) has a registerable title which may be the subject of initial registration.

The right to redeem retained by the vendor a retro should only be noted in the decree and COT that may be issued

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him

1. Trustor – a person who establishes a trust 2. Trustee – one in whom confidence is

reposes as regards property for the benefit of another

3. Cestui que trust – the person for whose benefit the trust has been created

Whoever claims an interest in registered land by reason of any implied or constructive trust shall file with the ROD for registration a sworn statement containing a

1. description of the land; 2. the name of the registered owner; and 3. a reference to the number of the certificate

of title A corporation sole or ordinary is NOT the owner of

the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in TRUST for the faithful member of the society or church for which the corporation is organized.

Properties acquired by the incumbent pass, by operation of law, upon his death not to his personal heirs but to this successor in office.

Section 14 (1)

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Pertain to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings

Right to file the application for registration is derived from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious possession in the Concept of an


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Owner (OCENCO) of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

Requisites for Registration under Sec. 14(1) 1. That the land applied for is an agricultural public land

classified as ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE land at the time; 2. The application for registration is filed with the proper

court; 3. That the applicant, by himself or though his

predecessors-in-interest, has been in Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious possession in the Concept of an Owner (OCENCO); and

4. That such possession and occupation has been effected since June 12, 1945 or earlier

(1) Land must already be A and D at the time of the filing of the application In Republic vs. Naguit, the issue is whether it is necessary under Sec. 14(1) of the PRD that the subject land be first classified as A and D before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents. Facts: • Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. • It was allegedthat Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the

governmentuntil she filed her application for registration. • The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition. • The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bonafide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposableonly on October 15, 1980. • The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start? NO Ruling: Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered asalready alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title isfiled. There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject propertyis alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as


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alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government fromenforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable anddisposable. The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms itscertification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

The SC answered in the negative, holding that Sec. 14(1)

MERELY requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is FILED.

The court, however, stressed that the rule is different with respect to non-agricultural lands, like forest lands. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the

public domain. Forest lands cannot be alienated in favour of private persons or entities. (Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc.)

Forest land is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

This was reiterated in the case of Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic:

G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Facts: • On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. • Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. • Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. • But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the


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administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. • Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. • The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. Issues: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier? NO, it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration

provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? NO Ruling: The Pertition is denied. (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.


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Amendments to Section 48b of CA 141: Originally- OCENPO since July 26, 1894 or earlier June 22, 1957 (RA 1942)- OCENPO for 30 years January 25, 1977 (PD1073)- OCENPO since June 12, 1945 or earlier (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish

that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. G.R. No. 176885 July 5, 2010 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent. Facts: • On March 2, 1999. Espinosa filed with the MTC of Cebu an application for land registration. • He alleged that : o the land is alienable and disposable o he purchased the said property from his mother Isabela on July 4, 1970 o that he has been in OCENPO in the concept of an owner over


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the said property for more than 30 years • Proof presented: o Tax Declaration o Survey plan describing land as alienable and disposable (June 25, 1963) • Republic contends that Espinosa did not comply with Section 48b of CA 141 which requires OCENPO in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier. • MTC granted the application for registration • CA dismissed Republic’s appeal and based the grant on the 30 year OCENPO Issue: WON Espinosa’s confirmation of imperfect title should be granted? NO Ruling: Espinosa’s claim is based on Section 14 (2) of PD 1529 Property Registration Decree and not on Section 14(1). He does not allege that he or his predecessors in interest have been in OCENPO of the property in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier. His main allegation was the possession of the property for more than 30 years. Amendments to Section 48b of CA 141: Originally- OCENPO since July 26, 1894 or earlier June 22, 1957 (RA 1942)- OCENPO for 30 years January 25, 1977 (PD1073)- OCENPO since June 12, 1945 or earlier Even assuming that his ground was Section 14(1), his possession should have begun on January 24, 1947 or prior to January 25, 1977 (effectivity of amendment to 48b of CA 141. In the case at bar, he never alleged to have possessed the property on

such date. The earliest tax declaration was in 1965. On the ground und Section 14(2) which provides that those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. What is applicable here is the New Civil Code. Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Only private properties are susceptible to prescription. As long as the property belongs to the state though alienable and disposable still remains property of public dominion unless classified by the government as patrimonial and no longer needed for public use, public service and development of the national wealth. Such act must be a positive act from the government. In the case at bar, the property was never declared patrimonial and no longer needed for public use, public service and development of the national wealth. Such act must be a positive act from the government. Hence cannot be acquired through prescription.


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Section 14(2)

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

Properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. EXCEPT: Where the law itself so provides.

Thus, patrimonial property of the State may be subject of acquisition through prescription as Section 14(2) specifically allows qualified individuals to apply for registration of property, ownership of which he has acquired by prescription under existing laws.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides for the legal foundation for the application of Section 14(2):

Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

Under the Civil Code, it is clear that where lands of the

public domain are patrimonial and, hence, private in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.

Public domain lands that are NOT susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands as the Constitution proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

What is referred to by the phrase “by prescription under the provision of existing laws” unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands.

When shall land of public dominion shall form part of the

patrimonial property of the State? – When there is a declaration by the government that these are alienable or disposable and are no longer intended for public use or public service.

Only when such lands have become patrimonial can the prescription period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

THUS, where land is already a private land, the applicant has the right to register the same under Section 14(2) even if the possession thereof for the required prescriptive period commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945.

Prescription – one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the action laid down by law. 2 Kinds of Prescription 1. Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription – acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title 2. Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription – a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title

Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, which does not hold true with respect Section 14(1)

In order for Section 14(2) to apply, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

o Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, and thus


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incapable of acquisition by prescription. o Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly

enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. (Malabanan vs. Republic)

Where prescription applies?

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.

Where prescription DOES not apply?

Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be object of prescription

What is good faith of the possessor? The good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the

person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

When is there just title?

There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

Concept of possession for purposes of prescription

To consolidate prescription, the possession must be that of owner, and it must be public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.

Acts of a possessory character done by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient.

Computation of prescription In the computation of time necessary for prescription, the

present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-interest.

It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary.

Distinguish Prescription from Laches

Prescription Laches

Concerned with the fact of delay Concerned with the effect of delay

Is a matter of time Is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced This inequity is being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties

Is statutory Not statutory

Applies in equity Applies at law

Based on a fixed time Is not based on a fixed time

Section 14(3)

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(1) Ownership of abandoned river beds by accession


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Refers to acquisition of ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under existing laws

Under Art. 461 of the Civil Code, river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

Requisites for the application of Art. 461: (SPNAC) 1. The change must be sudden in order that the old river may

be identified; 2. The changing of the course must be more or less

permanent, and not temporary overflooding of another’s land;

3. The change of the river must be a natural one; a. Caused by natural forces and not by artificial means

4. There must be definite abandonment by the government a. If the government shortly after the change decides

and actually takes steps to bring the river to its old bed, Art. 462 will not apply for it cannot be said that there was abandonment.

5. The river must continue to exist a. The river must not completely dry up or disappear

(2) Ownership by right of accretion along river banks

Art. 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters

Requisites for the application of Art. 457: (GEA)

1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the

water; and 3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the

banks of rivers.

In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the PRESUMPTION is that the change was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion.

The right of the owner of the land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and herd to their natural increase.

(3) Accretion along the banks of creeks, streams, and lakes Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 remains to be in effect, reads:

Article 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Alluvial deposits along the banks of creeks, streams, and lakes do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.

But the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd persons

Alluvion must be due to the effects of the current and the


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exclusive work of nature. Accretion does not automatically become registered land

Accretion does not become automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible

Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another.

Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.

To bring an area formed by accretion under the Torrens system, there must be an application for registration filed for the purpose.

In order that the accretion may be protected by the rule on imprescriptibility, it is necessary that the same be brought under the operation of the Torrens system. Where the adjoining land owner does not cause the registration of the increment to his property, the same may be acquired by 3rd persons. This is illustrated in the case of Grande vs. CA

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents. Facts: • The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela with an area of 3.5032 hectares, by inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents.

In the early 1930’s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title. • By 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area. • The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until September 1948, when the Calalungs entered upon the land under claim of ownership. • Respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present and claims that they have acquired the property through prescription.

• The CFI ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for damages. (Based its decision on Art. 457 of the NCC-The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs) • Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed. Held that an accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. Issue: Whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription? YES Ruling:


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Art. 457 provides that “to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. SC agrees with the CA that it does not automatically become registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. In the case at bar, petitioners never sought registration of the disputed alluvial property. Therefore, it never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1933 or 1934 via two credible witnesses (Pedro Laman and Vicente Bacan), as opposed to the Grande’s single

witness (Laureana Rodriguez) who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.

Similarly, in Cureg vs. IAC, it was held that the accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens system.

(4) Alluvial formation along the seashore forms part of the public domain

In CONTRAST to the rule on accretion, alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the PUBLIC DOMAIN and, therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.

It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government.

Since the land is foreshore land or property of public dominion, its disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau)

Until a formal declaration on the part of the government, through executive department or the legislature, to the effect that the land is no longer needed for

a. Coast guard service; b. for public use; or c. for special industries

they continue to be part of the public domain, not available


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for private appropriation or ownership.

The adjoining registered owner of foreshore land cannot claim ownership thereof by right of accretion. Unless he has filed the appropriate application, like a revocable permit application with the Lands Mgt. Bureau, he has not right whatsoever in the foreshore land as to be entitled to protection in the courts of justice.

Revocable permit application – temporary authority to occupy a foreshore land, upon payment of permit fees, and cannot be used to acquire the land in full ownership. Section 14(4) (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. Reservation for a specific purpose by President Proclamation

The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to preserve them for public use, PRIOR to the divesting by the government of title thereof, stands even though this may defeat the imperfect title of a settler.

Lands covered by reservation are NOT subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.

This was reiterated in…

G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO

MEDICAL CENTER, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.

Note: what was really awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him. Facts: • On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. • Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao. • On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares. • On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. • On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as


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the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. • On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital.(Proc 350) • Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. • Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration on the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. • TC granted the application for registration of Mindanao

Medical Center • CA decreed in the name of appellants(De Jesus) an area of 12.8081 square meters, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the appellee(MCC) that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances • Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center contends that it has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances Issue:WON MMC has registrable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350 serving area for medical site purposes? YES Ruling: 1. By virtue of Proclamation 350, such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. 1. Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes


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imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him. 2. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 3. Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law."

Land Acquisition by private Corporations

1935 Constitution expressly allowed private juridical entities (corporations) to acquire alienable lands of the public domain NOT exceeding 1,024 hectares

1973 Constitution, Sec. 11, Art. XIV provides that NO private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the

public domain except by lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares

1987 Constitution, Sec. 3, Art. XII provides that private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain EXCEPT by lease, for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and NOT to exceed 1,000 hectares in area

The Susi Doctrine

In Susi vs. Razon, the SC held a doctrinal precept, that where AT THE TIME the corporation acquired the land, its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation thereof in the manner and for the period prescribed by law as to entitle him to registration in his name, then the proscription against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease does NOT apply for the land was no longer public land but private property.

Purpose of Prohibition

To transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain (public lands) to a qualified individual

Prohibiting corporations is virtually removing the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent

Without the constitutional prohibition, individuals who already acquired maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.


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Facts: • Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired on October 29, 1962, from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land which has been in possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan (time immemorial) • Court of First Instance of Isabela ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less. TC finding were: o That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962; o That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela • IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of Acme • The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding

alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141 Issues: 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO Ruling: 1. SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.


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continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the provisions of law are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands 2. NO 1935 Constitution is applicable. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. There also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or

acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The Acme case is now the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.

When natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Public Land Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title to the land, which are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription and which could be validly transferred or sold to private corporations.

Corporation Sole Qualified to apply for registration

It was held in Republic vs. IAC and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lucena that a corporation sole is qualified to own and register private agricultural land

A corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property

It is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy

It consists of one person only, and his successors are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal


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capacities and advantages particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.

In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao vs. Land Registration Commission, the SC held that “bishops or archbishops, as sole corporations are merely administrators of the church properties that come to their possession, and which they hold in trust for the church. Thus, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death, not to his heirs but to his successor in office.

Vested Rights not impaired by subsequent law

A right is vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest.

Vested right is some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.

In Acme, the SC declared that the purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of a subsequent law which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper.

The Constitution or subsequent law cannot impair vested rights.

G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982 LAUSAN AYOG, et al,

petitioners, vs.JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and

BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors. Facts: • On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares. • Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. • The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director characterized them as squatters. • He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land. • Since the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana with 40 defendants). • The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, that the land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution and the Secretary of Natural resources approved the patent. • Before the patent was issued (Aug. 14, 1975), there was a trial, and 15 of the defendants testified that they entered the disputed


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land long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. • However the court did not give credence to their testimonies. They found out that the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales award was made. • Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to the corporation. CA affirmed. • After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants, some of whom are now petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. (supervening fact) • They invoked the constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area." The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of the manifestation of the defendants that they would file a petition for prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant prohibition action was filed. Issue: WON the 1973 Constitutional prohibition on private corporations from purchasing public lands apply to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands considering the sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975? NO Ruling:

Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case. The Court held that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. SC cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, they cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or free patent applications. Their jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed.

In Republic vs. CA and Baloy, the SC held that private land could be deemed to have become public land only bi vurtue of a juridical declaration after due notice and hearing. Without a judgment or order declaring the land to be


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public, its private character and the possessory information title over it must be respected.

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles

Governing provision is Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 (Public Land Act) approved on November 7, 1936

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)

hereof.

Subsection (b) was later amended by RA 1942 dated June 22, 1957

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."

Subsection (b) and (c) were later amended by PD 1073 dated January 25, 1977

“agricultural lands” was changed to “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain”

Possession must be since “June 12, 1945 “Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.”

As amended, Sec. 48(b) and (c) of CA 141, as amended, reads:


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(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

Period of Possession (Historical Background)

Act No. 926 or the 1st Public Land Act passed on October 7, 1903 provides for the OCENPO of agricultural public lands for a period of 10 years

Act No. 2874 of the 2nd Public Land Act approved on November 29, 1919, applied to lands of the public domain except timber and mineral lands, the OCENPO of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894

CA 141 or the Public Land Act approved on November 7, 1936, but took effect December 1, 1936, retained the requirement under Act. No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894 but the application was limited only to Filipino citizens

RA 1942 dated June 22, 1957 amended CA 141 Sec. 48(b) by requiring possession and occupation for at least 30 years

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title

PD 1073 dated January 25, 1977 further amended CA 141 by providing that it shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and reverted the required possession and occupation to June 12, 1945

CA 141 remains to this day the special law governing the

classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral alnds

As presently phrased, Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act requires possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title

Sec. 48(b) has a counterpart provision in PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which is Section 14(1)

There are no material difference between Sec. 14(1) of the PRD and Sec. 48(b0 of the PLA

PLA refers to agricultural lands of public domain whereas PRD uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

But the Constitution declares that “alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands”

The subject lands under Sec. 48(b) of the PLA and Sec. 14(1) of the PRD are virtually the same, with the latter operationalizing the registration of lands of public domain and codifying the various law relative to the registration of property

Rights of Cultural Minorities to their lands

RA 3872 dated June 18, 1964 amended Sec. 48 adding subsection (c)


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The amendment is founded on the right of the national cultural communities to avail of the benefits of registration over lands occupied and settled by them to enhance their social and economic status as a distinct sector of society

To address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples, Congress passed and approved bRA 8371, known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) on October 29, 1997

It granted these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which in turn traces its origin to native title

Extension of Period to file application RA 9176 dated November 13, 2002 was enacted

a. Extending the period to file an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 2020

b. Further limiting the area applied for to 12 hectares c. Providing that all pending applications filed before

the effectivity of the amendatory Act shall be treated as having been fixed in accordance with the provisions thereof

The extension of the period fixed by law for the filing of the application for registration is not jurisdictional but is more of a time limitation

Registration Proceedings presupposes that land is a public agricultural land

Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA (CA 141) presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but because adverse possession since June 12, 1945, the land has become private.

The ownership is based on adverse possession and the

right of acquisition is governed by Chapter VII on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles

Requisites for Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA and Sec. 14(1) of PRD

a. The land is alienable public land b. His possession and occupation has been open, continuous,

exclusive, notorious, and in the concept of owner (OCENCO)

c. Since June 12, 1945

A certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands

Even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, such title shall be cancelled

In Rep. vs. CA and Naguit, the phrase “since June 12, 1945” qualifies its antecedent phrase “under bona fide claim of ownership”

Hence, what the law merely requires is that the property sough to be registered is already alienable and disposable AT THE TIME of application for registration of title is filed.

It is not necessary that the land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could start.

The rule on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land is classified as alienable and disposable. The reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable lands is the prerogative of the executive department.

o The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as

a. presidential proclamation or an executive order;


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b. an administrative action; c. reports of investigators from the Bureau of

Lands (now Lands Mgt. Bureau); and d. a legislative act or statute

In Bracewell vs. CA, there can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.

When the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the PLA are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, without the necessity of a COT being issued.

o The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidence by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

o This doctrinal principle has been enunciated in Susi vs. Razon

In Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, the SC recognized an EXCEPTION to the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.

o Any land that should have been in possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

o This principle is rooted in Carino vs. Insular Govt., institutionalizing the concept of native title

Hearing

Applications for registration shall be heard in the RTC or in proper cases in a first level court, in the same manner and shall be subject to the same procedure as established in the PRD

1. Notice of all such applications, together with a plan of the lands claimed, shall immediately forwarded to the Director of Lands

2. Prior to the publication for hearing, all of the papers in said case shall be transmitted by the clerk to the SolGen or officer acting in his stead

The burden is on applicant to prove his positive averments and not for the govt. or the private oppositors to establish a negative proposition insofar as the applicants’ specific lots are concerned

1. Applicant must submit convincing proof of his and his PII’s actual, peaceful, and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the lots during the period required by law

Whenever any judgment of confirmation or other decree of the court under Chapter VIII of the PLA shall become final, the clerk of court shall certify the fact to the Director of Lands, with a cert. copy of the decree of confirmation or judgment of the court and the plan and technical description of the land

1. The final decree of the court shall be the basis for the OCT in favor of the persons entitled to the property

Lands declared public land in previous registration may be subject of judicial confirmation

G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; et al, applicants-appellants, vs.


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DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government

oppositor-appellees. VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees. Facts: • On August 4, 1960 appellants (Heirs of Zara) filed an application for registration of the land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application. • They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. • Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. • Villa’s contend that that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was

open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership. • The said proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in another case. • On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case. • The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961 Issue: WON the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141? NO Ruling: Section 48(b) of CA 141 provides “Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a


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certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968. (at present extended to December 31, 2020) It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. Case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.

Note, however, that in Diaz vs, Republic, the Court ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of PLA for judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against ALL persons.

Registration under IPA Law

RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, dated Oct. 29, 1997

It deals with Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs)

The law allows IPs to obtain recognition of their right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title

The 1987 Constitution carries provisions which guarantee the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and their right to live in a culture distinctly their own

Constitutionality of the IPRA Law

Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 Facts: • Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). • Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution • The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous


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peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. • In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional? NO Ruling: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – an exception to the Regalian Doctrine.

The Concept of Native Title

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909) Facts: • The applicant and plaintiff Mateo Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings

go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. • His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. • His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. • No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it • In 1901 a petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only established possessory title • The lower court granted the application for registration on March 4, 1904. • An appeal was filed in behalf of the Government of the Philippines and as US having taken possession of the property for military and public purposes. The application for registration was dismissed. • Respondent’s argue that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff’s land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect. • Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered,


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because the Philippine Commission’s Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Issue: Whether the plaintiff owns the land? YES, he owns the land. Ruling: The grant to the plaintiff was a result of prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.” Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be deemed owners; if cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years. When this decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law. The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the

government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act. Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof. Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. (Native title)

Justice Puno is his separate opinion said that the IPA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land and are private.

The Court laid down the presumption of a native title: a. As far back as testimony or memory went, and b. Under a claim of private ownership

Justice Puno stressed that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not parts of the public domain.

Justice Kapunan explained that the doctrine in Carino applies only to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise.

Distinction between ownership by native titles and acquisitive prescription

Ownership by Native Title Ownership by Acquisitive


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Prescription

Presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial

Involves conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the state to a private person

The land is not acquired from the State or its successors-in-interest, the US, and the Philippine Government

The classification of lands of public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks is irrelevant to the application of the Carino Doctrine because the Regalian Doctrine which vest in the State ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.

IPRA Law/Definition of Terms Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs)

Group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community or communally bounded and defined territory

They have claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed, and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits

Or those who have, though resistance to political, social, and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos

Ancestral Domains

ALL areas belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied, or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present

Shall include ancestral lands and lands no longer exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities

Ancestral Lands

Land occupied, possessed, and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their PII, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of govt. projects and other voluntary dealings

Native Title

Pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputable presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish conquest

Time Immemorial

The period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.

Indigenous Concept of Ownership


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Under IPRA, the ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity.

The concept holds that ancestral domains are ICCs/IPs private but community property, which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed, or destroyed.

Prior to the enactment of IPRA, PD 410 dated march 11, 1974 governed the distribution of ancestral lands

o The Decree defined ancestral lands as part of the public domain which have been in OCENO and cultivation by members of the national cultural communities by themselves or through their ancestors, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership according to their customs and traditions for a period of at least 30 years before the approval of the Decree

o All unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain occupied and cultivated by members of the NCCs were declared part of the ancestral lands and are further declared alienable and disposable to be distributed EXCLUSIVELY among the members of the NCC concerned.

o The lands shall be identified, surveyed, and subdivided into family-sized farm lots not exceeding 5 hectares each and allocated to qualified members of the cultural groups by the issuance of land occupancy certificates

The indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership

By virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common is meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member

It is private simply because it is not part of public domain but it is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person.

The domain cannot be transferred, sold, or conveyed to other persons by any one person.

Ownership over Natural Resources in Ancestral Domains/Lands belong to the State

While ancestral domains and ancestral lands are considered private in character, it does not necessarily mean that natural resources found therein belong to the ICCs/IPs as private property

Justice Kapunan opined in Cruz vs. DENR Secretary that the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples.

The recognition of ancestral domains as “private but community property” of the IP cannot be construed as to mean that the natural resources are their private property as well. The phrase used is merely descriptive of the IPs concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in our Civil Code.

Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, states that ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to “manage and conserve” them for future generations, “benefit and share” the profits from their allocation and utilization, and “negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration” for the purpose of ensuring ecological


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and environmental protection and conservation measures.

The rights of ICCs/IPs over the natural resources take the form of management and stewardship.

The law only grants priority rights in the development or exploitation of natural resources. This implies that there is a superior entity that owns these natural resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

o A non-member of the ICCs/IPs may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years.

o A formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned, or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation.

o The Natl. Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.

Ancestral domains remain as such even when possession or occupation of the area have been interrupted by caused provided under law such as voluntary dealing entered into by the govt. and private individuals/corporations.

o Hence, the issuance of Timber License Agreements (TLA) to a corporation did not cause the ICCs/IPs to lose their possession or occupation over the area covered by the TLA.

Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains

Prior to IPRA Law, ancestral domains and lands were delineated under the DENR and governed by DENR AO No. 2 series of 1993

Presently, the process of delineation and recognition of

ancestral domains and lands is guided by the principle of self-delineation and is set forth under Sec. 52 and 53 Chapter VIII of RA 8371, and in Part 1 Rule VII of the NICP AO No. 01-98 (IRR of RA 8371)

Under self-delineation principle, the sworn statements of the elders as to the scope of territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs will be essential to the determination of these traditional territories.

The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned

Proof of ancestral domain claims shall include the following:

Testimony of elders or community under oath; Other documents directly or indirectly attesting to

the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners

On the basis of investigation and the findings of facts based thereon, the ADO shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions and description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein

The approved and validated survey plan of the ancestral domain claim and the petition for delineation shall constitute the basic documents of the delineation process.

A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs shall be posted in a prominent place for at least 15 days

A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be


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published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for 2 consecutive weeks to allow claimants to file opposition thereto within 15 days from the date of such publication

In areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio stations shall be a valid substitute. If both newspaper and radio station are not available, then mere posting shall be deemed sufficient.

Within 15 days from publication, and of the inspection process, the ADO shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.

However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the ADO shall require submission of additional evidence.

The ADO shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification.

In case of rejection, the Ado shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial.

The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of conflicting claims among the ICCs/IPs on

boundaries of the ancestral domain claims, the ADO shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, WITHOUT prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of the IPRA

ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially delineated and determined by the NCIP shall be issued a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community, containing a list of all those identified in

the census

In all proceedings for identification or delineation of the ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall represent the interest of the RP

The NCIP is the agency authorized to issue a certification precondition in favor of any entity which desires to undertake operations within the ancestral domains of the IPs or whose proposed projects will affect the ancestral domains

The law does not grant the executive department of the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain by mere agreement or compromise.

Identification, delineation, and certification of ancestral lands

The allocation of lands WITHIN any ancestral domain to individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants shall be left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions

Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands which are NOT within ancestral domains may have their claims officially established by filing applications for the identification and delineations of their claims with the ADO

o An individual or recognized head of a family or clan may file such application in his behalf or in behalf of his family or clan, respectively

o Proofs of such claim shall accompany the application form which may include:

Testimony of elders or community under oath;

Other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners


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Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the ADO shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place for at least 15 days

A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for 2 consecutive weeks to allow claimants to file opposition thereto within 15 days from the date of such publication

o In areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio stations shall be a valid substitute. If both newspaper and radio station are not available, then mere posting shall be deemed sufficient.

Within 15 days after such publication, the ADO shall investigate and inspect each publication, and if found meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed.

The ADO shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification.

o IN case of rejection, the ADO shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial.

o The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP

The ADO shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP, which shall evaluate the report submitted.

If NCIP finds such claim meritorious, it shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT

), declaring and certifying the claim of each individual or

corporate claimant over ancestral land.

The ADO, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, may review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community.

o Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired, title issued may be cancelled by NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Registration of CADTs and CALTs

NCIP through ADO shall register all CADTs and CALTs with the ROD of the place where the properties are located

The recording of the CADT/CALT in the Office of the ROD does NOT result in the issuance of a Torrens COT like that issued through a regular registration proceedings.

The purpose of registration is to apprise the public of the fact of recognition by the NCIP of specific claims to portions of ancestral domains or ancestral lands

No part of the ANCESTRAL DOMAIN may be subject of alienation or disposition because they are communally owned although private in nature.

But ANCESTRAL LANDS may be the subject of registration under the PLA or PRD

o If successful, a decree of registration will be issued by the LRA as basis of the COT to be issued to the applicant who is a member of the cultural community

o In any subsequent dealings, like sale, mortgage, or lease, the instrument embodying the transaction, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate shall be presented to the ROD for him to annotate the encumbrance created by the instrument on said title or to issue a new title to the person to whom the land has been conveyed.

o The surrender of the owner’s copy of the title shall


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be the authority for the Register of Deeds to enter registration

2 Modes of Acquisition of Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands a. By native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or b. By Torrens title under Public Land Act or Property

Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands ONLY IPRA converts Ancestral Land as Public Agricultural Land for registration purposes

For registration purposes, the IPRA expressly converts ANCESTRAL LAND into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State

Hence, there is no need to secure a separate certification that the ancestral land is ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE in character, it being sufficient to show that the land is duly identified, delineated, and certified as ancestral land.

Individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, are considered as alienable and disposable agricultural lands under IPRA.

o Since ancestral domains and ancestral lands are private, IPRA itself converts ancestral land, regardless whether the land has a slope of 18% or over, from private to public agricultural land proper for disposition

The requirements for registration of AL are different from that under regular registration proceedings

Requirements for Registration of Ancestral Lands

a. The applicant is a member of an indigenous cultural group; b. He must have been in possession of an individually-owned

ancestral land for not less than 30 years; and c. By operation of law (IPRA), the land is already classified as

alienable and disposable land, and there is no need to submit separate certification that the land has been classified as A and D land.

Effects of Registration

A duly issued Torrens certificate of title covering ancestral land has the same efficacy, validity, and indefeasibility as any title issued through regular registration proceedings

The title shall not be subject to collateral attack nor can it be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law

Transfer of Land or Property Rights

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands may be transferred subject to the following limitations:

Only to members of the SAME ICCs/IPs; In accord with customary laws and traditions; and Subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for

a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs

Ancestral Domain Ancestral Land

It is private but communal ownership which belong to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed, or destroyed

Ownership allows the transfer of ancestral land or property rights thereto to members of the same group

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Sec. 16, states that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned

Sec. 17 provides that in event of an agreement for mining operations, the royalty payment, upon utilization of the


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minerals, shall be agreed upon by the parties, and shall form part of a trust fund for the socio-economic well-being of the ICC.

RA 7076 or the People’s Small Scale Mining Act of 1991, Sec. 7, states that no ancestral land may be declared as people’s small-scale mining area without the prior consent of the ICCs concerned

If ancestral lands are declared as people’s small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts

Authority of PEZA to issue building permits

By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Authority (PEZA) which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands.

o PEZA may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures.

A Certified of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) is merely a registered claim and not a proof of ownership.

Ancestral land claimants cannot build structures within the economic zone on the basis of their CALC without the building and fencing permits issued by PEZA.

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

An independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from different ethnographic areas who are appointed by the President

Specific Powers and Functions

1. Formulation of policies, issuance of rules and regulations

2. Resolution of conflicts 3. Issuances of CADT/CALT 4. Cancellation of ancestral domain and ancestral land titles 5. Issuance of certification as a precondition to the grant of

permit 6. Power to cite contempt, issue restraining order

1. Formulation of policies, issuance of rules and regulations

NCIP is granted with administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers to carry out its mandate

Primary agency charged with the formulation and implementation of policies, plans, programs, and projects for the economic, social, and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs, and to monitor implementation thereof

It is also mandated to issue rules and regulations for the implementation of the Act

2. Resolution of Conflicts

NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs

Before NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes, it is a condition that the parties shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.

It has also the authority to decide ALL appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the Commission

It shall issue rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions

Any decision, order, award, or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute, or any matter pertaining to the


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application, implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the Act may be brought by a petition for review to the Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof

3. Issuance of CADT/CALT 4. Cancellation of CADT and CALT

NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over petitions for the cancellation of CADTs/CALTs alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community provided that such action is filed within 1 year from the date of registration

However, the jurisdiction over actions or incidents affecting a certificate of title issued through registration proceedings is vested in the courts of justice (RTC or MTC)

5. Issuance of certification as precondition to the grant of permit

Has the authority to issue the appropriate certification as pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease, grant, or any other authority for disposition, utilization, and management of portions of the ancestral domain with the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned

The issuance of CADT/CALT is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated in accordance with the IPRA but cannot be considered as a condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification

o Citing the opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz vs. DENR Secretary, the SC held:

It is required as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain.

The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained.

6. Power to cite for contempt, issue restraining order a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing

and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act;

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted under the IPRA;

c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage, to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity

In order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.


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Regional Hearing Offices

NCIP, through its Regional Hearing Offices, shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of RA 8371 (IPRA)

Has original and exclusive jurisdiction over: a. all disputes and controversies involving ancestral

lands/domains, violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of the ICCs/IPs;

b. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

c. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Sec. 8(b) of RA 8371; and

d. Cases analogous to the foregoing

Has original jurisdiction over cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and DAMAGES arising out of any violation of the IPRA

Ancestral Domain Office (ADO)

Under the NCIP, shall be responsible for the identification, delineation, and recognition of ancestral land/domains

It shall also be responsible for the management of ancestral lands/domains in accordance with a master plan as well as the implementation of the ancestral domain rights of the ICCs/IPs as provided in Chapter III of the IPRA

It shall issue, upon the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned, certification prior to the grant of any license, lease, or permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the interests of ICCs/IPs or their ancestral domains and to assist to the ICCs/IPs in protecting

the territorial integrity of all ancestral domains

Sec. 15 Form and Contents (see PD 1529 for the form) Requisite steps in bringing land under the Torrens System

a. Survey of land by the Lands Management Bureau or a duly license private surveyor;

b. Filing of application for registration by the applicant; c. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application

by the court; d. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing

together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Authority

e. Publication of the notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation;

f. Service by mailing of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property;

g. Posting by the sheriff of the notice in a conspicuous place on the land and in the bulletin board of the municipal building or city where the land is situated;

h. Filing an answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;

i. Hearing of the case by the court; j. Promulgation of judgment by the court; k. Issuance of an order for the issuance of a decree declaring

the decision final and instructing the LRA to issue the decree of confirmation and registration;

l. Entry of the decree of registration in the LRA; m. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the

corresponding ROD; and


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n. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owner’s duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the ROD, upon payment of the prescribed fees

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements will justify the court to deny the application for registration. Forms and contents of the application for registration Section 15 requires that the application for land registration shall be:

a. Writing; b. Signed by the applicant or the person duly authorized in his

behalf; and c. Sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths

for the province or city where the application was actually signed

If there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. The application shall provide information on the following (contents):

a. Full description of the land as evidence by a survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands, surveyor’s certificate, and technical description;

b. Citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether single or married, and, if married, the name of the wife or husband, and if the marriage has been legally dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated;

c. Full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them;

d. Assessed value of the land and the buildings and improvements thereon;

e. Whether or not there are mortgages or encumbrances of

any kind whatsoever affecting the land, or any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or in possession, thereof;

f. The manner by which the applicant has acquired the land (refer to Sec. 14);

g. Whether or not the property is conjugal, paraphernal or exclusive property of the applicant;

h. Names of all occupants of the land, if any; i. Original muniments of title and other related documents

supporting applicant’s claim of ownership; and j. If the land is bounded by a public or private way or road,

whether or not the applicant claims any and what portion of the land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or road determined

Pursuant to the Manual Instructions to be observed by the Clerks of Court of the RTC in Ordinary and Cadastral Land registration cases issued by the LRA on February 20, 1991, the application for registration shall be filed in the following form:

a. That the application shall be in accordance with the form prescribed in Sec. 15 and should state the full name of the applicant, his civil status, citizenship, residence and postal address, and if a minor, his age.

If the applicant is married, the application should state the name of his spouse and whether the property applied for registration is conjugal or exclusive property of the applicant.

If the marriage has been legally dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated.

The application should also state the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known and if not known, it


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shall state the extent of the search made to find them.

b. That the application to be subscribed by the applicant or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths for the province or city where the application was actually signed.

Should there be more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each.

c. That the application and its accompanying papers be filed in triplicate which shall be distributed as follows:

ORIGINAL for the Clerk of Court

DUPLICATE for the LRA

TRIPLICATE for the Solicitor General d. That prior to the filing of the application, the applicant has

furnished the Director of Lands (now, Regional Executive Director of the DENR) with a copy of the application and its annexes.

The application shall be accompanied by the following documents:

a. The original plan in tracing cloth or Diazo Polyester film duly approved by the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Service of the DENR, a certified copy of the same by Clerk of Court shall be attached to the duplicate records and forwarded to the LRA.

Where in lieu thereof, a true copy of the original plain in tracing cloth or Diazo Polyester film is submitted, the Clerk of Court shall see to it that the same is properly attested and duly certified correct by the Regional Technical Director concerned or the official authorized should sign the plan for the RTD.

All bearings, distances, and the technical descriptions of the land appearing on the plan must

be legible.

Such true copy shall be retained by the court concerned and a copy thereof duly certified as a faithful reproduction by the Clerk of Court shall be forwarded to the LRA.

b. The white or blue print copies of the plan. c. The original and two copies of the technical descriptions

certified by the RTD of the official so authorized and not merely signed by the Geodetic Engineer who prepared the plan.

d. The original and two copies of the Geodetic Engineer’s certificate, or in lieu thereof, a certification from the RTD as to its availability

e. A certificate in triplicate of the Provincial, City, or Municipal Assessor of the assessed value of the land at its last assessment for taxation or, in the absence thereof, that of the next preceding year.

In case the land has not been assessed, an affidavit in triplicate (Judicial Form No. 81) of the market value of the land signed by 3 disinterested witnesses.

f. All original muniments of title of the applicant which prove his ownership of the land.

This requirement is NOT mandatory as long as the documents can be produced before the court during the hearing whenever required or necessary.

NOTE: Under LRA Circ. 05-2000, the original tracing cloth plan is no longer forwarded to the LRA; only a certified copy thereof need be forwarded. Reason: To obviate problems of applicants for registration in remote provinces or cities where they would still go to the LRA to retrieve the tracing cloth for submission as evidence during trial or to cause the production thereof by said office via a subpoena


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duces tecum issued by the court for the same purpose.

Section 16. Non-resident applicant. If the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, he shall file with his application an instrument in due form appointing an agent or representative residing in the Philippines, giving his full name and postal address, and shall therein agree that the service of any legal process in the proceedings under or growing out of the application made upon his agent or representative shall be of the same legal effect as if made upon the applicant within the Philippines. If the agent or representative dies, or leaves the Philippines, the applicant shall forthwith make another appointment for the substitute, and, if he fails to do so the court may dismiss the application.

Non-resident of the Philippines shall file his application through a duly authorized representative or attorney-in-fact.

Service of all papers and other legal processes shall be made upon said representative or attorney-in-fact with the same effect as if made upon the applicant himself.

A special power of attorney executed in a foreign country CANNOT be admitted in evidence unless it is duly certified by the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court)

Section 17. What and where to file. The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file

together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands. The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.

Application for Land Registration

As provided in Sec. 2, the Regional Trial Courts shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for ORIGINAL registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed AFTER original registration of title, with power to HEAR and DETERMINE all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.

First Level Courts (MeTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC) may also be assigned to handle ORIGINAL registration cases in the following instances (provided by RA 7691 amending Sec. 34 of BP 129):

a. Where the lot is NOT subject of controversy or opposition; or

b. Where the lot is contested but the value thereof DOES NOT exceed P100, 000

Appeals from decision of inferior courts in land registration cases are taken to the Court of Appeals.

The application for registration must be accompanied by a

survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands, together with the claimant’s muniments of title to prove ownership.

In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, the SC declared that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. The plan and the


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technical description of the land must be duly approved by the Director of Lands, otherwise the same have no probative value.

o Purpose of the Original Tracing Cloth – To fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions.

The LRA has NO authority to approve original survey plans nor to check the correctness thereof.

o Under PD 239, only the Lands Management Bureau may not verify and approve survey plans for original registration purposes.

The clerk of court shall NOT accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.

Section 18. Application covering two or more parcels. An application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided they are situated within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a severance of the application.

Where during the pendency of an application for registration, the applicant sold the property to another under pacto de retro, but owing to the lapse of the redemption period, ownership became consolidated in the vendee, the latter as the new and lawful owner is entitled to be subrogated in place of the applicant and may continue the proceedings in the case and finally obtain title as owner.

Section 19. Amendments. Amendments to the application including

joinder, substitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms. Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and notice as in an original application.

Where the amendments consists in a substantial change in the boundaries or increase in area of the land or involve the inclusion of additional area, the amendment shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and notice as in the case of an original application.

An order of the court, in a land registration proceeding, amending an official plan so as to include land not previously included therein, is a nullity as against a person who is not a party and who has NO notice of the proceeding, unless publication is effected anew.

Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication.

Thus, if it shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land over which the registration court has NOT acquired jurisdiction.

Conversely, if the amendment does NOT involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.


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Section 20. When land applied for borders on road. If the application describes the land as bounded by a public or private way or road, it shall state whether or not the applicant claims any and what portion of the land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or road determined.

Pursuant to Sec. 44 of the PRD (PD 1529), every registered owner receiving a COT issued pursuant to a decree of registration and ever subsequent purchaser of the registered land for value and in good faith shall hold the same FREE from all encumbrances. EXCEPT:

a. Those which are noted in the certificate of title; or b. Those encumbrances enumerated in the law such as

public highways or private ways, government irrigation canals or lateral thereof

Under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, lands intended for public use, such roads, canals, rivers, ports and bridges, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character are OUTSIDE the COMMERCE OF MEN and may not be subject of private appropriation.

Section 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine the propriety of the application for registration and to ensure that the issuance

of a new certificate of title will not conflict with a valid and existing certificate of title.

For this purpose, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid it in its determination and resolution of the case and also order the conduct of an ocular inspection in the presence of the interested parties if deemed necessary.

The land registration court may also require the DENR, LRA, and other government agency to submit a report on whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by the certificates of title to avoid overlapping of claims and duplication of titles. This is in line with the Purpose of Land Registration Law:

a. Ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property;

b. To make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title;

c. To quiet title to the land and to put stop forever to any question of legality to a title; and

d. To decree that land title to be final, irrevocable, and undisputable.

Section 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with a subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to


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whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.

Dealings with the land while registration is pending

The land subject of registration is allowed to be dealt with after the filing of the application and before the issuance of decree.

The land may be sold or otherwise encumbered, but whatever may be the nature of the transaction, the interested party SHOULD submit to the court the pertinent instruments evidencing the transaction to be considered in the final adjudication of the case.

In case of transfer of a portion of the land, the corresponding subdivision plan should also be presented.

Upon notice to the parties, the court shall: Order the land registered subject to the conveyance

or encumbrance created by such instruments; Order that the decree of registration be issued in the

name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed.

The adjudication of land in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does NOT become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after one year from the entry of the final decree prepared by the LRA.

As long as the final decree has not been entered, and the one year period has not elapsed from such entry, the title is not deemed finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control of the court.

Dealings/transactions entered into pending registration do not require amendment of application

In Sec. 22, it refers to amendments to the application by

joinder, substitution, or discontinuance of the parties

In Sec. 108, it involves amendments after entry of the certificate of title

In Sec. 22, amendment of the application is NOT required, it being sufficient that the court, by motion of other appropriate pleading, be presented with the instruments evidencing the transaction, and the approved subdivision plan where a portion of the land is conveyed to another.

The application of Sec. 22 is illustrated in the case of Mendoza vs. CA: G.R. No.

G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978 GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix

DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA, respondents. Facts: • On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. • A notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting the date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published, posted and served but nobody appeared nor filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for that purpose. Consequently, the registration court entered on July 6, 1965, an


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order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte. • During pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights. • The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 21, 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza. • The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz. Issue: Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”. Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for

registration and the issuance of the decree of title. “SEC. 29.(Section 22 of Property Registration Decree) After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.

The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” for the applicant. Neither does it require that the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The ONLY requirements of the law are:

a. That the instrument be presented to the court by


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the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and

b. That prior notice be given to the parties to the case.

Section 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern". Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

2. By mailing.

(a) Mailing of notice to persons named in the application. The

Commissioner of Land Registration shall also, within seven days after publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as hereinbefore provided, cause a copy of the notice of initial hearing to be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is known.

(b) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Public Highways, the Provincial Governor and the Mayor. If the applicant requests to have the line of a public way or road determined, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a copy of said notice of initial hearing to be mailed to the Secretary of Public Highways, to the Provincial Governor, and to the Mayor of the municipality or city, as the case may be, in which the land lies.

(c) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Forest Development, the Director of Mines and the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. If the land borders on a river, navigable stream or shore, or on an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the application or the proceedings that a tenant-farmer or the national government may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice of the initial hearing shall be given in the same manner to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Mines and/or the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, as may be appropriate.

3. By posting.

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be posted by the sheriff of the province or city, as the case may be, or by his deputy,


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in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in the application and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion thereof is situated, fourteen days at least before the date of initial hearing.

The court may also cause notice to be served to such other persons and in such manner as it may deem proper.

The notice of initial hearing shall, in form, be substantially as follows:

(Caption and Title)

NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING

To (here insert the names of all persons appearing to have an interest and the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern):

An application (or petition) having been filed in the above-entitled case by (full name and address) praying for the registration and confirmation (or for the settlement and adjudication, in case of petition in cadastral proceedings) of title to the following described lands:

(Insert description)

You are hereby served this notice to appear before this Court at its session to be held at _________________ on the ______________ day of _______________, 19 ______, at _____________ o'clock in the _________ then and there to present such claims as you may

have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claim; and unless you appear at said Court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter you will forever be barred from contesting said application (or petition) or any decree entered thereon.

Witness, the Hon. ________________________ Judge of the Court of First Instance of _______ this _______ day of _________________, in the year 19______.

Attest:

Commissioner of Land Registration

Notice of Initial Hearing

Within 5 days from the filing of the application, the court shall issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the order.

3 Means of Notice of the Initial Hearing 1. Publication; 2. Mailing; and 3. Posting

The requirement of giving notice by all 3 modes is MANDATORY

The notice of hearing is signed by the judge and copy of notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA


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(1) Publication

The procedure prescribed by the PRD in land registration is denominated as in rem, or one against all persons who may allege any right to the land sought to be registered, and the decree of the court granting registration is valid and effective against all who may have an interest in the land.

The publicity which permeates the whole system established for the registration of real property requires that the application for registration accompanied by a plan of the land, together with its description, and all the owners of the adjacent properties and all other persons who may have an interest in the realty shall be notified, which notifications with a description in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation

Purpose of Publication 1. To confer jurisdiction upon the court over the res, and 2. To apprise the whole world of the pending registration case

so that they may assert their rights or interests in the land, if any, and oppose the application, if so minded.

A land registration is a proceeding in rem, and the proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the State, who have rights to or interests in the property.

An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must be strictly be complied with.

A party seeking registration has to prove his title against the whole world. This can be achieved when all persons concerned who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and who cause why the application should not be

granted.

Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the application for registration and posting and service of notice to affected parties.

Publication of notice of initial hearing

Sec. 23(1) provides that upon receipt of the order of the court setting the case for initial hearing, the Land Registration Administrator shall cause the notice to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation; however, the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court

The notice shall require all persons concerned to appear in court on the date and time indicated and to show cause why the application shall not be granted.

Publication in a newspaper is NECESSARY to accord DUE PROCESS

In Roxas vs.CA, it was held that while publication of the notice in the OG is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement.

It is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving “as wide publicity as possible” so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof.

Although it will not affect jurisdiction, the fact that publication was NOT made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant’s right or title to the land. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Director of Lands vs. CA and Abistado:


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[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997] THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents. Facts: • On December 8, 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. • However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants. • The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.(notice of initial hearing was only published in the Official Gazette) The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: o It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. • The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration

of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. • The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory? YES Ruling: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. 1. By publication. -- Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.


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The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Publication in the OG does not dispense with the requirement of notice by MAILING and POSTING

The proviso in Sec. 23 that “the publication in the Official Gazette shall

be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court” was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting.

Lack of Personal Notice does NOT vitiate the proceedings

The requirement that personal notice SHALL be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to unknown claimants.

Clearly, lack of personal notice will NOT vitiate the proceedings. Sec. 23 states that “the court may also cause notice to be served to such persons and in such manner as it may deem proper”. Evidently, personal notice is NOT necessary unless required by the court.

In Adez Realty, Inc. vs. CA, SC held that notice of hearing by proper publication in the OG is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is NOT sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

The proviso requires that applications for registration should contain a notification to all the occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. Interpreting this provision, the SC held that lack of notice is denial of due process and constitutes EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

Purpose of Notice by ALL 3 Modes

The purpose of the requirement of giving notice by all 3 modes is to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.

Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the OG, which comes out in few copies only per issue.

In Director of Lands vs, CA and Abistado, the SC ruled that while Sec. 23 of the Decree indeed provides that publication in the OG suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, there is still need of publication in a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the requirements of due process.


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New Publication necessary to include additional area

If the amendment of the application for registration consists of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.

Without a new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to that covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.

But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.

In De Luzurriaga vs. Republic, the SC clarified that were the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subject of amendment but merely other collateral matters, a new publication is NOT needed.

(2) Mailing

This requirement is mandatory

Within 7 days after publication in the OG of the notice of initial hearing, the LRA Administrator shall cause a copy of the notice to be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is known.

Mailing to the Secretary of DPWH etc., Governor, and Mayor

If the applicant requests to have the line of a public way or road determined, the notice shall also be mailed to the DPWH Secretary, Provincial Governor and Mayor of the municipality or city in which the land is situated.

If the land borders on a river, navigable stream or shore, an

arm of the sea, or lake, or if it otherwise appears that a tenant-farmer or the national govt. may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, the notice shall be mailed to the DAR Secretary, the Solicitor General, Director of Lands, Director of Public Works and Communications, Director of Forest Development, Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences and Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources as may be appropriate.

Role of the Solicitor General

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor General is bound to “represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings”.

No other officer can exercise such function.

It is also the practice in the OSG to deputize lawyers in government offices involved in land matters or provincial or city prosecutors to represent the government in the handling of such proceedings.

But as a rule, only notices of court proceedings and related processes actually served upon the SG are binding on his office.

PD 478, the Magna Carta of the OSG, which took effect June 4, 1974 provides: Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, government-owned or controlled corporations, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. XXX XXX (e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related


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proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. (g) Deputize, whenever in the opinion of the Solicitor General the public interest requires, any provincial or city fiscal to assist him in the performance of any function or discharge of any duty incumbent upon him, within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid provincial or city fiscal. The Solicitor General has CONTROL and SUPERVISION over the special attorney or prosecutor who has been deputized to appear for him. The special attorney or prosecutor is no more than the surrogate of the SG in any particular proceeding. As the principal, the SG is entitle to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions.

The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. As consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on deputized counsel, acting as agent or representative of the SG are not binding until they are actually received by the latter.

(3) Posting

Within 14 days before the initial hearing, the LRA Administrator shall cause a duly attested copy of the notice be posted by the sheriff in a conspicuous place on the land applied for and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipality or city in which land is situated.

The requirement is also mandatory.

Section 24. Proof of publication and notice. The certification of the Commissioner of Land Registration and of the sheriff concerned to the effect that the notice of initial hearing, as required by law, has been complied with shall be filed in the case before the date of initial hearing, and shall be conclusive proof of such fact.

The certification by the LRA Administrator as to the fact of publication and mailing, and that of the sheriff as to posting, as required by law, are conclusive.

Section 25. Opposition to application in ordinary proceedings. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an opposition on or before the date of initial hearing, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The opposition shall state all the objections to the application and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some other duly authorized person. If the opposition or the adverse claim of any person covers only a portion of the lot and said portion is not properly delimited on the plan attached to the application, or in case of undivided co-ownership, conflicting claims of ownership or possession, or overlapping of boundaries, the court may require the parties to submit a subdivision plan duly approved by the Director of Lands.

Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an opposition on or before the date of initial hearing, or within such time as may be allowed by the court, provided he has an interest in the property applied for.


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The opposition shall: a. State his objections to the application; b. Set forth the nature of his interest; and c. Indicate the relief desired

The opposition shall be signed and sworn to by him or by his duly authorized representative

Requisites for the Consideration of an Opposition

1. The oppositor must have an interest in the land applied for; 2. He should state the grounds for his objection as well as the

nature of his claimed interest; 3. He should indicate the desired relief; and 4. The opposition should be signed and sworn to by him or by

his duly authorized representative.

It has been held, however, that unverified oppositions in land registration proceedings are nevertheless sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors who may be allowed to verify their oppositions later on, especially where said defect is demmed waived by the applicant’s failure to invoke said requirement seasonably.

Nature of interest to support opposition

Opposition to an application for registration of the title must be based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the applicant, whether it be limited or absolute.

To give a person a legal standing to object to the application for registration, “he must make some claim to the property”.

o The circumstance that an opponent in a land registration proceeding cannot show title in himself

does not incapacitate him from opposing registration of the property in the name of the applicant.

o Nor is it even material for the opponent to have the legal character necessary to enable him to maintain a registration proceeding in his own name and behalf.

All that is necessary to enable on to exert the faculty of opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in the property. It is immaterial whether this interest is in character of legal owner or is purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust.

All claims of 3rd persons to the property must be asserted in the registration proceedings.

If any claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from the property applied for, and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate of title subsequently issued to the applicant.

If it is included, the claim is deemed adversely resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree within one year from its issuance on the ground of fraud.

A mere claim cannot defeat a registered title. A claim is merely noted on the survey plan cannot prevail over the actual decree of registration as reproduced in the certificate.

The phrase “claim of ownership” means the possession of piece of property with the intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner.

The phrase is also defined as “a party’s manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or right”.

Effect of failure to file opposition


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A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land.

A claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within the period of 1 years after the COT had been issued, is deemed to have forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right thereon.

Persons having legal standing to file opposition The following are deemed to have an interest or equitable title necessary to give them legal standing as oppositors:

1. A homesteader who has not yet been issued his title but has fulfilled all the conditions required by law for the issuance of patent;

2. A purchaser of friar land who is deemed to have an equitable title to the land even before the issuance of the patent;

3. An awardee in a sales application who, by virtue of the award, is authorized to take possession of the land to enable him to comply with the requirements for the issuance of patent;

4. A person claiming to be in possession of the land and has applied with the Lands Management Bureau for its purchase.

A mere public land applicant under any mode of disposition under the PLA cannot be a proper party to oppose an application for registration under the Torrens System since

by filing his application with the LMB, he recognizes the character of the land as public land and not as private property. In such case, only the Government though the SG may properly interpose its opposition following the principle that all lands and other natural resources are owned by the State.

The burden of overthrowing the presumption of State ownership belongs to the registration applicant by “well-nigh incontrovertible proof” and that he is entitled to registration under the law.

A private person may not oppose an application for registration on behalf of the government on the ground that the land belongs to the government.

Opposition by the government

The government acting through the OSG is invariably represented by the Director of Lands or Director of Forestry as public oppositor in all land registration and related proceedings.

Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies, if not initiated by the SG, will be summarily dismissed.

Notwithstanding the absence of opposition from the government, the applicant in land registration cases is NOT relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed.

The applicant must show that even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.

Even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the land registration


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court if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition.

Hearing is necessary to determine validity of ownership claim

Under Sec. 1 of Rule 131 of the ROC, each party whether applicant or oppositor, must prove his own affirmative allegations by the amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment.

The court, if it deems necessary, may refer the case or any part thereof to a referee who shall hear the parties and their evidence, and the referee shall submit his report thereon to the court within 15 days after the termination of such hearing.

The failure of the Director of Lands, in representation of the government, to oppose the application for registration for which he was declared in default will NOT justify the court in adjudicating the land applied for as private property.

The court has to receive evidence to determine whether or not the applicant, or private oppositor if claiming affirmative relief, has discharged the burden of establishing ownership.

In Director of Lands vs. Santiago, it was held that where an opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, has been formally filed, it is improper for the court to declare the opposition in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing.

In Republic vs. CA and Arquillo, it was held that the failure of the government agency concerned to file an opposition to the application for registration or to appeal from the adverse decision of the registration court is NOT fatal. The reason for this is that the government is usually NOT estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents.

o The belated filing of an appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to appeal from a judgment of the court.

Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata proper in registration proceeding

The PRD does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. However, Sec. 34 of the PRD provides that the Rules of Court which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Decree shall be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

Sec. 47 of Rule 39 of the ROC sets forth the doctrine of res judicata.

2 Concepts of res judicata

1. Bar by former judgment; and 2. Conclusiveness of judgment

The rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of action.

Requisites as to the first concept

a. the former judgment or order was final; b. it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; c. it was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties; and d. between the first and the second actions, there was

identity of parties, subject matter, and of causes of action


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If there is no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues, res judicata comes under the second concept --- conclusiveness of judgment.

In Valisno vs. Plan, the SC applying the principle of res judicata, sustained the applicant’s motion to dismiss the opposition ruling that the two courts’ having equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.

G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986 FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents. Facts: • On August 21, 1964 petitioners Spouses Valisno purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker (Fermin Lozano) over the property who built his house thereon. • On August 12, 1968 respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor on June 30, 1967 from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. • Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. • The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the

CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. • Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on the property in dispute. • Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. • Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. • The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition. Issue:


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Whether or not the grant of the motion to dismiss the opposition is proper? YES Ruling: The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the defendant becomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. Although the first action was captioned for the recovery of possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria. The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based on one’s ownership over the property. The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from ownership over the property in the first action while

it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition.

In a registration case, it was held that the defense of res judicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in answer is deemed waived.

Res judicata cannot be pleased for the first time on appeal. Submission of subdivision plan The court may require the submission by the parties of a subdivision plan duly approved by the Director of Lands, in the following instances:

a. If the opposition or adverse claim covers only a portion of the lot applied for which is not delimited on the plan accompanying the application;

b. In case of undivided co-ownership, conflicting claims of ownership or possession, or overlapping of boundaries

Section 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the notice "To all Whom It May Concern", all the


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world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order. Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.

When Order of Default be entered Order of General Default

Addressed to the whole world

If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, order a default to be entered and require the applicant to present evidence.

All the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order.

Order of Special Default

When an appearance has been entered and answer filed, a default order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.

When no answer in writing or any opposition is made to an application for the registration of property, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence thereof.

But a declaration of default is not a guarantee that the application for registration will be granted.

It is still the burden of the applicant to prove that he is entitled to registration by “well-nigh incontrovertible proof”.

Motion to lift order of general default

An order of general default is interlocutory in character, subject to the control of the court, and may be modified or amended as the court may deem proper at any time prior to the rendition of judgment.

But the motion to lift the order of general default should be filed before the entry of final judgment.

A motion to set aside the order of default filed prior to the rendition of the judgment on the merits should be considered with liberality.

However, where the court revoked the order of default 5 years after the said order had been entered, and permitted private claimant to file his answer and later ordered the registration of the lots in his name, it was held that the order setting aside the order of default, and the proceedings adjudicating the lots as private property, are null and void and should be set aside.

Party in Default can appeal judgment

In Martinez vs. Republic, the Court held that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that:

a. The plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or

b. That the decision is contrary to law, even without the need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default

Section 27. Speedy hearing; reference to a referee. The trial court shall see to it that all registration-proceedings are disposed or within ninety days from the date the case is submitted for decision.


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The Court, if it deems necessary, may refer the case or any part thereof to a referee who shall hear the parties and their evidence, and the referee shall submit his report thereon to the Court within fifteen days after the termination of such hearing. Hearing before a referee may be held at any convenient place within the province or city as may be fixed by him and after reasonable notice thereof shall have been served the parties concerned. The court may render judgment in accordance with the report as though the facts have been found by the judge himself: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion accept the report, or set it aside in whole or in part, or order the case to be recommitted for further proceedings

Hearing

Sec. 27 aims to dispose of registration cases as expeditiously as possible and hence the court is required to decide the case within 90 days from the time it is submitted for decision.

It may be necessary for the court to refer the case to a referee, usually the branch clerk of court, for hearing and reception of evidence to enable the judge to devote his time to other important businesses of the court.

In such event, the referee shall receive the evidence and submit his report to the court within 15 days from the termination of the hearing.

The court shall render judgment on the basis of the report. Proof required in registration proceedings

The burden is on applicant to prove his positive averments.

He must submit convincing proof of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s actual, peaceful, and adverse

possession in the concept of owner of the lots during the period required by law

Citizenship Requirement

The Krivenko Doctrine: Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands In the landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, the SC settled the issue as to who are qualified and disqualified to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines.

KRIVENKO v REGISTER OF DEEDS G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee. FACTS • Alexander A. Kriventor, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. • In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration. ROD Manila denied on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. • Krivenko then brought the case to the CFI Manila by means of a consulta. The previous judgment was sustained. This is Krivenko’s appeal Notes on Motion to withdraw the appeal:


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• there has been a motion to withdraw appeal but the court has nevertheless resolved the case on the merits, as not only had the brief been presented, but the case has already been voted upon • While the motion was pending, DOJ issued a new circular came instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. ROD Manila naturally obeyed the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and defended by the SolGen here. • Reason for not granting the withdrawal: Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the DOJ circular, issued while this case was pending before this Court. The possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. ISSUE WON an ALIEN under our Constitution may acquire residential land. NO. RULING Under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. The phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in Sec 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Article XIII, section 1, Constitution Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources. SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public

domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. SCOPE: embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain PURPOSE: to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. RULE: "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. When Art 13, Sec 1 makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups. This classification is corroborated by existing public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the


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members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession. "AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS" The definition provided for by Mapa vs. Insular Government (1908), as provided for in Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, has been followed in a long line of decisions of this Court. - "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." “RESIDENTIAL LANDS” it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION THAT THE TERM "PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND" INCLUDES LAND FOR RESIDENCE PURPOSES In relation to rules of construction, it may be safely presumed that the ConCon referred to the technical description then prevailing because at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. Revision of the Public Land Law, Passage of the CA 141 (after the Constitution was adopted)

Residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. This can be gleaned from the fact that SEC 58, 59 and 60, CA 141 permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens.

The term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a

particular meaning. BROAD OR GENERAL MEANING: as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. PARTICULAR MEANING: Sec 9, CA 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into a. lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; b. ands that are residential; c. commercial; d. industrial; e. or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. OBSERVE THAT: Prior to the Constitution

Aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes (Sec 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874)

Land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens (Sec 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874) After the Constitution

the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. (Sec 23, CA 141)


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Land of public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. (Sec 60, CA 141) The three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Executive Department of the Government: 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos: “At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. *Mapa vs. Insular Government definition was cited* Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Test in determining whether lands are agricultural or not: Character of the land is the test. In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods. Director of Lands: no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.”

Importance of his opinion: not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations. SECTION 5 DISCUSSION: The constitutional purpose of section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation


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of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens. Sec 1 “agricultural land” – public Sec 5 "agricultural land" – private under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural; RESULT the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Fundamental principal underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution

"that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

The 1935 Constitution (Sec. 1 of Art. XIII) reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individual or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. (Sec. 5, Art. XIII) Save in cases of legal succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to


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individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The constitutional intent of the 1935 Constitution is strongly reflected in CA 141, known as the Public Land Act.

In Borromeo vs. Descallar, the SC held that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private lands. This is embodied in Sec. 7 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

o Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizens.

A natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost his citizen-ship may be a transferee of private land Sec. 8 of Art. XII of the Constitution provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. Pursuant to Sec. 10 of RA 7042, as amended by RA 8179 dated March 28, 1996, provided that any natural-born citizen who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum of 5,000 sq. meters in case of urban

land, or 3,000 hectares in the case of rural land.

In case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted. But if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

If the transferee has already acquired urban land, he shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land area and vice versa.

Under the Citizenship Rerention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) provided that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippines citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking oath of allegiance to the Republic, and shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines.

The area limitation under RA 7042 does not apply to those who has re-acquired lost citizenship under RA 9225 since they are granted the right to “enjoy full civil and political rights” upon the re-acquisition of his Filipino citizenship.

Capacity to own land is determined as of the time of its acquisition and not registration

The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership.


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Thus, a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a Filipino citizen acquired land from a vendor who had already complied with the requirements of registration prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land.

This was the ruling of the SC in the case of Republic vs. Director of Lands and Lapina:

REPUBLIC v CA and LAPIÑA G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents. FACTS:

June 17, 1978 - Sps Lapiña bought 2 Lots (347 and 348), as their residence situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.

February 5, 1987 - spouses filed an application for registration of title of the 2 parcels of land (RTC). This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.Republic opposed. RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

The court confirmed their title to the lots in question. (Noting in the dispositive portion that they were Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and their residence in both the PH and Canada). RULING OF THE CA: AFFIRMED.

Found that the land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development

that “both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply.

Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have.

That title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question REPUBLIC

That the sps have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.

that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever


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classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

That it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

ANCILLARY ISSUE: Republic does not deny that the sps’ PII have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. ISSUE MAIN ISSUE: Can a FOREIGN NATIONAL apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? YES RULING ANCILLARY ISSUE: Tacking of possession: Following the logic of the Republic, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not,

however, what the law provides. With respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141): (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest….. shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. As amended by PD 1073: Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an


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imperfect title. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .( Director of Lands v IAC) When the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. MAIN ISSUE: CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT Compared to Buyco case:

the private respondents became American citizens before

filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land. In the case at bar

Sps were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.

In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother. But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows the sps to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.


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Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides: Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1000sqm, in the case of urban land, or 1 hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized. BP 185 governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. (since from the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject)

Even if sps were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved. RE: dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by spouses. Specifically, it refers to Section 6. The requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.


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Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.

Contra-distinguish this case with Director of Lands vs. Buyco, where the applicants were like-wise natural-born Filipino citizens who later became naturalized American citizens. But their application was denied registration, not simply because they were already American citizens at the time they filed the application, but because they failed to prove that their predecessor-in-interest had possessed the property in such manner as to segregate or remove the same from the mass of the public domain. Unlike in the case of Lapina, they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. In fact, the entire property is a pasture land which is not alienable under the Constitution.

Aliens may lease private lands

Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution.

A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. But if an alien is given a lease to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages the sum of rights (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jud fruendi, and jus abutendi) which make up ownership.

Foreigners allowed to purchase condominium units

Under RA 4726, foreign nationals can own Philippine real estate through the purchase of condominium units or townhouses pursuant to Sec. 5

The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares, or other interests in the condominium management body, the condominium corporation.

No one can buy shares in a condominium corporation without at the same time buying a condominium unit.

It expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.

o Under this set-up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself.

o The land is owned by the condominium corporation and the unit owner is simply a member in this condominium corporation. As long as 60% of the members of this condominium corporation are Filipinos, the remaining members can be foreigners. Hence, the constitutional proscription against aliens


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owning real property does not apply. Donation in favor of Religious Corporation controlled by non-Filipinos not registrable

The 1987 Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious landholdings in the country.

As to the contention that the disqualification is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court stated that land ownership is NOT dispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship.

In Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, the SC held that the fact that the religious organization has not capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

Distinguish the Ung Siu Si case from the case of Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission where the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao is a corporation sole whereas the former is a corporation aggregate, an unregistered organization operating through three trustees, all of Chinese nationality. Land acquired by an American citizen in 1945 can be registered under the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution

While aliens are disqualified to acquire lands under the 1935 Constitution, the Ordinance appended thereto on

November 10, 1939 provided that until the final withdrawal of the United States sovereignty over the Philippines, citizens and corporations of the United States could enjoy all the same civil rights as Philippine citizens. The Ordinance was made part of the 1935 Constitution as directed in Sec. 2 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law or the Independence Law.

The proclamation of the Philippine Independence on July 4, 1946 did not impair Moss’ proprietary rights over the said land because the 1935 Constitution provides that upon the proclamation of Philippine Independence, “all existing property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States shall be acknowledged, respected, and safeguarded to the same extent as property rights of citizens of the Philippines. This Constitutional provision is implemented in Art. VI of the Treaty of General Relations entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States on July 4, 1946.

Corporation sole may acquire and register private agricultural land

It was held in Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission that a corporation sole, which consists of one person only, is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and to register the same in trust for the faithful or members of the religious society or church for which the corporation was organized.

It is not treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated, the Constitutional proscription against private corporations acquiring public agricultural lands will not apply.

The reason for this is that a corporation sole has “no nationality” and the framers of the Constitution did not


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have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided that 60% of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.

A corporation sole or “ordinary” is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof. The properties pass, upon his death, not to his personal heirs but to his successor in office.

Can a Filipino vendor recover land sold to an alien?

In Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, the SC ruled in the negative because the Filipino vendor was in pari delicto with the alien vendee.

In Cabanatuan vs. Uy Hoo, the SC made the pronouncement the Filipino vendor is prevented from invoking the doctrine in the Krivenko case if their purpose is to recover the lands thay they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As this Court well-said, a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects be carried out. The law will not aide either party to an illegal agreement, it leaves the parties where it finds them.

However, Rellosa was reversed by Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She:

G.R. No. L-17587 September 12, 1967 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate

estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-appellant. FACTS • Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. • The sisters lived in one of the two houses in it, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620. • Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. • Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping. Wong also paid her expenses. • "In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. • Ten days later the contract was amended so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of the rental due from


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him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. • she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within 10 years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. • The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. • Justina filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. • Subsequently, she executed two other contracts, extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. • In two wills executed subsequently, Justina bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

• PRESENT ACTION: seeking cancellation of the registration of the contracts + collection of sum of money; alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong through fraud, etc. and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." • The CFI declared the documents null and void + ordered to pay the lease, among others. Both parties appealed. After the case was submitted for decision, both parties died, substituted. ISSUE As regards the validity of the lease contracts in favor of Wong Cheng RULING Aliens may use lands by lease A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. (Krivenko v. RoD) Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. Justina’s intentions – The ambition of the old woman, before her death, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doña Justina did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her


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grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog. She was very emphatic in the care of the (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she wanted that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties (reason for the 99-year lease). Contracts VOID; the contracts were a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition – For the testimony just quoted, while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void. Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this

can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril. It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. 1. the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. 2. ART 1416 of the Civil Code provides, EXCEPTION to the pari delicto rule: "When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko: ….Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . . . . Aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed.


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That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified. ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

In the Lui She case, the SC declared that the pari delicto may not be applied in said case since:

1. The original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt; and

2. As an exception to the rule on pari delicto, when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.

Evidently, the Court was referring to the public policy of preserving lands for Filipinos. Hence, in the case of sale to aliens, Lui She bars recovery by the Filipino vendor where the buyer has acquired Philippine citizenship or where the land has come to the hands of a qualified transferee in good faith.

In Borromeo vs. Descallar, if the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is

rendered valid.

The rationale behind the rule is that as the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Rule restated On the basis of their capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the following may acquire private lands:

a. Filipino citizens; b. Filipino corporations and associations as defined in Sec. 2,

Art. XII of the Constitution; and by exception c. Aliens but only by hereditary (legal) succession; and d. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his

citizenship under the terms of Sec. 8. Filipinos can both acquire or otherwise hold lands of the public domain Filipino corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain but they can hold such lands by modes other than acquisition, such as lease.

A foreign corporation is disqualified to own lands in the Philippines. It is also disqualified to own rights to ownership to such lands.

Land Title and Deeds Atene de Davao 1st Exam

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