Land Registration Cases_ltd 3rd Set

8/17/2019 Land Registration Cases_ltd 3rd Set

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LAND REGISTRATION CASE DIGESTTHIRD SET IN LTD

(EDITED BY: ALYSSA AFRICA)

SUBMITTED TO:ATTY. ERWIN TIAMSON

SUBMITTED BY:CANDELARIA, MICHELLE DULCE (CASES 1 AND 2)LAGUNILLA, KARL (CASES 3 AND 4)DAPITIN, JEN KCIN (CASES 5 AND 6)AFRICA, ALYSSA (CASES 7 AND 8)ARCE, AYA (CASES 9 AND 10)

RASING, PAUL MARVIN (CASES 11 AND 12)TOTANES, TANIA (CASES 13 AND 14)HERNANDEZ, CARMI (CASES 15 AND 16)ARCOL, EDMARK (CASES 17 AND 18)ELAURIA, CARLOTA (CASES 19)RUBA, ERICSON (CASE 20 and 21)ESPIRITUO, GLEN (CASE 22)PERLAS, VAN REGINE (CASES 23 and 24)VILLANUEVA, RIGEL (CASES 25 and 32)

CANUA, MA. ERLINORE (CASES 26)DELA CRUZ, ARIS (CASES 27, 28 AND 54)CO, PATRICK (CASES 29 AND 30)SARSOSA, ROCHELLE MARIE (CASES 35, 43 AND 34)AMBAS, KATRINA MARIE (CASES 33 AND 31)CORPUZ, IVY (CASES 36 AND 37)VILLENA, ROXANE MAE (CASES 38)QUE, JARRED (CASES 39)CAPPAL, JAISE DHANETTE (CASES 40 AND 41)AGTARAP, AXEL (CASE 42)

ROBLES, KENNETH (CASES 44 AND 45)MATEO, RAEMOND (CASES 46 and 47)CABBUAG, (CASES 48 AND 49)CAPINO, JAC (CASES 50 AND 51)RENOVALLES, MARA (CASE 52)VELASCO, MA. BLESILDA (CASE 53)


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1. Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

After his mother’s death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his

father (private respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents. The privaterespondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land registered in petitioner’s name are conjugal

properties. The Private Respondent contends that the lots were registered under Leoncio’sname only as a trustee because during the registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in thefamily. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of

the lots to its rightful owner – the conjugal regime. To protect the interest of the conjugal regimeduring the pendency of the case, the Private Respondent caused the annotation of a notice of

lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it wasdenied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or

harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending

litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the TCT named after the registrant is a conclusive proof of ownership

Held:No. Petitioner’s claim is not legally tenable. Placing a parcel of land under the Torrens

System does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different

from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.

Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title asevidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. Registering land under theTorrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring

ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over a particularproperty described therein.

While the Certificate of Title may be considered as a best proof of ownership, the mere

issuance thereof does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be under co-ownershipwith persons not named in the certificate or the registrant may only be a trustee or that the otherparties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance the Certificate of Title. In this

case, contrary to petitioner’s fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private

respondent. What the latter disputes is the former’s claim of sole ownership.Thus, although petitioner’s certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year

after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning

his ownership.

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it tosay that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect

partition of the property.For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which

requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him.Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis

pendens is proper. Hence, the petition is denied and SC affirmed the CAs decision.


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2. Baranda vs. Judge Gustillo

Facts:

A parcel of la nd designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastra l Survey of Sta.

Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the disputebetween petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez,

Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the saidland. However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held byrespondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to

be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Registerof Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled

the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of aseparate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the

new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of

lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register ofDeeds for the cancellation of the notice of l is pendens but the Acting Registerof Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

Issue: Whether or not the Register of Deeds may refuse to cancel or annul a notice of lispendens in a Torrens certificate of title.

Held:No. Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s

stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case

in the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registrationof deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register ofdeeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the Judge’s

Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens.

Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that:

“It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented forregistration dealing with real or

p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w h i c h c o m p l i e s w i t h a l l t h e r e q u i s i t e s f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n .

I f t h e instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform thepresentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising himof his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the

other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with

regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of anydeed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in

interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deed s wi th refe renceto any suc h ins trumen t, the que stio n sha ll be submitted to the Commission of Land

Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.


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3. Almirol vs. The Register of Deeds of Agusan

Facts:

On June 28, 1961, petitioner Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land

situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate

of title in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962,

Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deedof sale and to secure in his name a TCT. Registration was refused by the respondent.

Respondent contends that the property was registered as conjugal property and that since thewife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the

whole property without violating the existing law. Respondent further contends that to effect theregistration of the deed of absolute sale, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated andtransferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of

extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be

procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the CFI of Agusan on a petition for mandamus, tocompel the respodent to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding TCT.

Petitioner asserted that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts requiredof him, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law. In his answer, the respondent averred that the petitioner has other legal, plain, speedy and

adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the HonorableCommissioner of Land Registration, and prayed for dismissal of the petition. The lower courtruled in favor of respondent declaring that “the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of

Rep. Act 1151". Petitioner filed an appeal and hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus has merit to compel the respondent to registerthe deed of sale in question.

Held:

No. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine asthis function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, a register of deedsis entirely precluded by section 4 of RA 1151 from exercising his personal judgment anddiscretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the

ground that it is invalid. Under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be

taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he issupposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registrationwho shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the

doubtful question.

The court correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 of RA 1151 provides

that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question

shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter anorder prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive

and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the

petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.


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4. Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal

Facts:

On January 4, 1960, petitioner Gabriel filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila an

adverse claim against the properties registered in the name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R.Domingo, her sister. She alleges that the same properties have been included in the amended

inventory of the estate of the late Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, as they are in fact propertiesacquired by the deceased during her lifetime. Moreover, she claims that the registration of theseproperties should have been made in the name of the deceased, but through fraud and deceit,

by said Juanita R. Domingo, all the properties were registered instead in her name, thusdepriving the petitioner as an heir of the deceased of her lawful rights and interests over said

properties. On the same date, a similar notice of adverse claim was presented by petitioner withthe Register of Deeds of Rizal, on the said properties.

Domingo presented an opposition, claiming that the Adverse claim was instituted for

harassment; had no legal basis; and had done and will do irreparable loss her. The Register ofDeeds of Manila elevated the matter to the Land Registration Commission en Consulta.Domingo also asked that the adverse claim of Gabriel on her Rizal properties be denied. On

January 13, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse

Claim, asserting that the notice of adverse claim has been found to be legally defective orotherwise not sufficient in law. Gabriel appealed the denial to the Land RegistrationCommission. The LRC ruled that the notices of adverse claim are registrable.

Domingo moved for a reconsideration of the rulling, contending that a Register Deedsexercises some degree of judicial power to determine upon his own responsibility, the legality of

instruments brought before him for registration. In other words, Domingo submits that the duties

of the Register of Deeds are not wholly ministerial, for they can refuse, and/or suspend theregistration of documents when they think they are not valid or not registrable. LRC denied themotion. Domingo appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the duty of the Register of Deeds is purely ministerial.

Held:Yes. It should be observed that section 110 of Act No. 496, which is the legal provision

applicable to the case, is divided into two parts: the first part refers to the duty of the party who

claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, subsequent to the

date of the original registration; and the requirements to be complied with in order that suchstatement shall been titled to registration as an adverse claim , thus showing the ministerialfunction of the Register of Deeds, when no defect is found on the face of such instrument; and

the second applies only when, after registration of the adverse claim, a party files an appropriate

petition with a competent court which shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of thevalidity of such adverse claim, and to enter a decree, as justice and equity require; and in this

hearing, the competent court shall resolve whether the adverse claim is frivolous or vexatious,which shall serve as the basis in taxing the costs. In the instant case, the first part was already

acted upon by the L.P.C. which resolved in favor of the registrability of the two adverse claimsand this part should have been considered as closed. What is left, is the determination of the

validity of the adverse claims by competent court, after the filing of the corresponding petition forhearing, which the appellant had not done. The Land Registration Commission did not state that

it was mandatory for a Register of Deeds to register invalid or frivolous documents, or thoseintended to harass; it merely said that whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to

harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction,and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with

the formal and legal requirements for such documents.


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5. Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio

Facts:

On the 23rd day of December, 1905, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of

First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a certain mortgage, for the sum of P5,000. The

principal defense made by the defendants is that the plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions

of the Mortgage law relative to the registration of the said mortgage in the new registration. Themortgage was originally recorded in the Contaduria, Anotaduria, or Receptoria of mortgages in

accordance with the law in force before the Mortgage Law was put into operation in thePhilippine Islands. Paragraph 2 of article 397 of the new Mortgage Law requires in part that

"Records of annuities, mortgages, liens, or any other class of real rights, contained in saidbooks existing in the 'Contadurias,' 'Anotadurias,' or 'Receptorias' of mortgages must betransferred to the books of the new registry within a period of one year from the time of the

promulgation of this law. This transfer must be made at the request of an interest party.

In the present case the property covered by the said mortgage was transferred by

Antonio Enriquez and by his transferee several times, by deeds of transfer. Each deed oftransfer contained the statement that there existed against such property a mortgage in favor ofthe plaintiff. The deed of transfer of the present defendant also contains the statements which is

found in all the other transfer, which is "It appears to be encumbered with a mortgage for thesum of 5,000 pesos in favor of the funds of the Sagrada Mitra of this city, according to the

above-mentioned registration."

Issue: Whether or not plaintiff can foreclose the mortgage

Held:

Yes. The deed of transfer of the property in question to the defendant having containeda statement of the fact that there existed against the land a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff forthe sum of P5,000 and practically all of the facts relating to the said mortgage, defendants

certainly is not in a position to claim ignorance of the existence of said mortgage, even thoughthe same was not registered under the new registration in conformity with the Mortgage Law.

The purpose of registering an instrument relating to land, annuities, mortgages, liens, or anyother class of real rights is to give notice to persons interested of the existence of these variousliens against the property. If the parties interested have actual notice of the existence of suchliens, then the necessity for registration does not exist.

The defendant having had actual notice of the existence of the mortgage in question

against the property cannot take advantage of the failure of the plaintiff to have the sametransferred to the new registry under the Mortgage law. The effect of his actual notice isequivalent to the registration of said mortgage under the Mortgage law.


7/57

6. Egao vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and

ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the parcel ofland by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners

allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their land title by virtue of a free patent andtransferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale. However, theCertificate of Title was not transferred in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of the land from Marfori,

the respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid taxes for the property. However,the petitioners illegally occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true

owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant totheir Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the

decision of the lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly

sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CAholds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided byCommonwealth 141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru free

patent or homestead patent. They cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the

respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained the duplicate of the OCT still inthe name of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physicalpossession of the property. It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the absolute

owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer thereof to therespondents and to surrender peaceful possession of the land to the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve therights of the respondents over the land in dispute

Held:The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori

within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent based on the Deed of Sale

entered into by the parties. Although the petitioners denied the validity of the Deed of Sale thecourt held that it was notarized and a notarial document has in its favor the presumption ofregularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the OCT is still registered

under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as

contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiriesand closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to thepossibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there

was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making any further

investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value. A private individualcannot bring an action for reversion or any action which would have an effect of canceling a free

patent and the certificate of title issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form partagain of the public domain. Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds of sale of

patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void thus theEgaos have no title to pass to Marfori and nobody can dispose that which does not belong to

him. The respondents are not innocent purchasers for value with no standing to question therights of the petitioners over the land and to file an action to quiet the title. The petitioners

remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain in physical possession of thedisputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the OCT to the petitioners without

prejudice to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted by the Solicitor General for theState.


8/57

7. Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On September 22, 1983, spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin entered into acontract of sale over a residential land in Antipolo Rizal in favor of spouses Alfredo Sajonas andConchita Sajonas. The Sajonas spouses agreed to pay the same in installment basis under

their Contract to Sell. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas spouses caused the annotation of theiradverse claim based on the contract to sell. On September 4, 1984, the Uychocdes spousesexecuted a Deed of Sale after receiving the full payment of the purchase price from the Sajonas

spouses. It was registered on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, Domingo Pilares filed a Civil Case for the collection of sum of money against

Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980 they instead entered into a compromise agreement

wherein Uychocde is to pay him the amount of P27,800 within two years from June 25, 1980.When he failed to pay, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, and it was grantedon August 3, 1982. Pursuant to the issue, Sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented the

notice of levy on execution to the Register of Deeds of Marikina on February 12, 1985. The

same was annotated at the back of the TCT. On August 28, 1985, the TCT was cancelled and a

new TCT was issued to the Sajonas spouses but the notice of levy on execution was carriedover to the new title.

The Sajonas spouses filed a complaint and demanded that the notice of levy on

execution be cancelled on the ground that the property was already transferred, conveyed and

assigned to them, and that there are no more rights or interests to be levied upon. The trial courtrendered judgment in their favor on the ground that actual notice of an adverse claim isequivalent to registration, but it was reversed in the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the Sajonas spouses have a better right over the property.

Held:

Yes, the Sajonas spouses have a better right over the property. According to theSupreme Court, Section 70 of PD 1529 must not be construed to mean that the effectivity of a

statement of adverse claim is effective only for a period of 30 days. It must be understood that

what the law meant was that beyond the thirty day period, the annotation continues to be in

effect, otherwise the law would not have included that the claim may be cancelled after thelapse of the period upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest as such would be auseless provision. Furthermore, to render such application would not fulfill its purpose of

protecting the interest of a person over the real property and warning third parties of an existingclaim or interest similar or better than the right of the registered owner of the land.

Hence, it must be held that the annotation of an adverse claim still remains in effect onFebruary 12, 1985 when the Sheriff annotated notice of levy on execution. It therefore prevails

over the latter. Judgment is reversed.


9/57

8. Aznar Brothers Realty vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

A lot with an area of 34,325 square meters was located in Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu Citywas obtained by Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on through an Extrajudicial Partitionof Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale on March 3, 1964. It was registered on March 6,

1964 and was thereafter, declared by Aznar for purposes of taxation. The heirs, however, werestill occupying portions of the land by mere tolerance and under the condition that they wouldleave should Aznar use the property. Later on, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia

Realty Development Corporation for a housing subdivision and beach resort to be developedover the subject property. Aznar demanded them to vacate the property, but they refused. Aznarfiled a case against them for unlawful detainer with the MTC.

On the other hand, the heirs claimed that they had been occupying the property asowner since the time of their parents and grandparents. They claimed that the ExtrajudicialPartition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale must be rendered void ab initio for being

simulated and fraudulent. They likewise filed a case to declare the document null and void with

the RTC.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Aznar and was affirmed by the RTC. In theCourt of Appeals however, the decision was reversed on the ground that the heirs were inpeaceful, continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the property since time immemorial.

Issue: Whether or not the Aznar has a better right over the property.

Held:Yes, the Aznar has a better right over the property in question. Aznar’s claim is anchored

on the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale and in this case, the courtbelieves that such is valid. It must be noted that an Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute

Sale is a notarized document. Hence it is favored with the presumption of regularity and carries

evidentiary weight and it is up to the heirs to prove otherwise. In this case, the heirs over theproperty provided no proof to their allegations that the contract is fraudulent, nor that the parties

to the deed of sale were not legally capable of entering into a contract due to death and

minority.

In addition, the principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to thetransfer or creates a lien upon the land refers only to cases involving conflicting rights over

registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of theirproperties and has no bearing in this case as there was no proof that the heirs sold it to anyone

else other than Aznar. Hence, the Aznar must be deemed the lawful owner of the land. The judgment is reversed.


10/57

9. Estrellado vs. Martinez

Facts:

Proceso Martinez, the defendant, filed an application for the registration of property withthe Court of First Instance of Tayabas, wherein he alleged that he is the sole owner of the

property to be registered. The property in question was previously owned by the deceasedmother of the petitioner, Vivencia Estrellado, a minor. She was not named in the saidapplication, and her father, Eleuterio Estrellado, was not notified that there was an existing

action for registration. Thus, an order of general default was rendered for lack of opposition onthe part of the Estrellados, and upon finality of the order, the decree was issued to Martinez.

Vivencia, who later on found out about the order, then filed a motion praying for the review ofthe order, since she claimed that the decree was obtained by Martinez through the use of fraud.

The motion was denied, since the order already became final. She then sought relief by filing an

action for damages amounting to Php 2,000.00, which was granted by the judge but wasreduced to Php 600.00 only, corresponding to the value of the property in question.

Issue: Whether or not Estrellado is entitled to payment of damages for the deprivation of her

land by Martinez, even though the latter is in possession of a Torrens title

Held:

Yes. The Land Registration Law specifically provides that a person who has been

unlawfully deprived of his land, without his negligence, and despite of the fact the he may no

longer recover the land in question or the interests therein, may file an action for damages in acourt of competent jurisdiction, without prejudice to the action that he may bring against theperson who caused the said deprivation. The proceeding for the registration is in rem. It is an

assertion of legal title. The prime purpose of registration is certainty and incontestability in titlesto land. In a lesser degree, the purpose is the facilitation of the proof of titles and the transfer

thereof. This harshness of the law is tempered by the provisions (eg. Sections 38, 55, 101, and

102) which allow a deprived party to recover damages, not only from the party who registeredthe property, but also from the assurance fund created under the law, even though the title tothe land is already incontestable.

The deprived party must only show that: 1.) that the person is in reality wrongfullydeprived of his land by the registration in the name of another of the land by actual orconstructive fraud, 2.) that there was no negligence on his part, 3.) that he is not barred or in

any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of the land or interest therein, and

4.) that the action for compensation has not prescribed. In this case, the petitioner has satisfiedthe said requisites. It was proven that she was actually deprived of her land by way of

constructive fraud (since Martinez did not act with the intention to deceive and was notdishonest, but applicant Martinez did make a mistake of fact to the prejudice of another), and

she exercised diligence in prosecuting her action. Moreover, she exhausted all the remediesrequired prior to under the Land Registration Law, and her claim is not barred by the statute of

limitations.


11/57

10. Gatioan vs. Gafud

Facts:

Petitioner Encarnacion Gatioan bought a parcel of land originally registered in the name

of Rufino Permison, who acquired it on the basis of a free patent. Gatioan had the OriginalCertificate of Title of the land cancelled, in lieu of a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in his

name. The land in question was then mortgaged three times for three different loans acquiredby her from the Philippine National Bank. Upon the payment of her last loan, she did notexecute any instrument to discharge the encumbrance on her TCT. Meanwhile, the defendants,

Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan, also acquired a free patent over the same land as Gatioan,and an OCT was issued in their favor. They obtained two loans from PNB, and they used the

land as collateral.The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was able to compare the petitioner’s

TCT and the defendants’ OCT, and he found out that the titles cover only one and the same

parcel of land. He then ordered the cancellation of the second title. Gatioan filed a complaint forquieting of title, and a judgment was rendered in her favor. The defendant bank filed an appealquestioning the part of the judgment stating that the mortgage executed by Gaffud and Logan

was null and void and unenforceable, and claiming that the bank is a mortgagee in good faith

and for value. PNB sought to have the annotation of the mortgage on the OCT of Gaffud andLogan to be carried over to the TCT of Gatioan as an encumbrance.

Issue: Whether or not the bank may benefit from the provisions of Act No. 496 regarding theprotection for innocent purchasers of land

Held:No, it may not. Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act, provides in Sections 38, 56,

and 112 of Act No. 496 that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against the

defenses which the vendor would not. However, these provisions do not apply to the appellantPNB because it cannot claim that it is a bona fide purchaser/mortgagee who had no knowledge

of the existence of the flaws in the defendants’ title, as compared to the petitioner’s title. When a

conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of its contents andall interests, legal and equitable, included therein. The conveyance is recorded in the publicregistry, and it is never issued unless and until it is recorded. Thus, it serves as a notice to the

world that such land is registered, and it is presumed that a purchaser has examined every

instrument of record affecting the title of the land he purchased. This presumption is notrebuttable; otherwise, the very purpose of the system providing for records of conveyance willbe negated.

In this case, PNB failed to exercise a higher degree of diligence in granting the loans of

the parties, as well as in checking the mortgaged properties and the titles thereto. The petitioneralready mortgaged the property three times; it should have noticed that the defendants’

mortgaged property was exactly the same as that of the petitioner’s. Under the circumstances,appellant had absolutely no excuse for approving the application of the defendant spouses and

giving the loans in question.


12/57

11. Reyes vs. Noblejas

Facts:

An appeal by certiorari to review the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner

dated August 25, 1964 — ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny registration of theDeed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership presented to him by herein

petitioner.It appears from the facts of record that the spouses Leonardo Gamboa and Aurora L.Cariaga are the registered owners of the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of TitlesNos. 18230, 18231, 18232, 18233 and 18234, of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. These

properties were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and upon the failure of themortgagors to pay the amount of the indebtedness upon maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed

extrajudicially under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended.The mortgaged properties were sold at a public auction for the sum of P 6,100.00 in

favour of Arsenio Reyes. In said certificate, the period of redemption of the property shall be one

year after the sale.On February 10, 1964, there were presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of

Rizal, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed on February 8, 1964, by the auction-

vendee, Arsenio Reyes, and a Deed of Sale executed by the Philippine National Bank as

attorney-in-fact of the mortgagee (sic), in favor of the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes. It wassubsequently denied by the Register of deeds on the ground that the redemption period has notyet expired. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the period of redemption of properties sold at public auction is to be

counted from the date of the execution of the certificate of sale by the sheriff.

Held:No, it must not be counted from the date of execution of the certificate of sale. The

registration required by Section 50 of the Land Registration Law is intended primarily for theprotection of innocent third persons, i.e., persons who, without knowledge of the sale and in

good faith, have acquired lights to the property. The same protection to third parties is obviously

one of the objects of Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court in requiring that thecertificate of sale issued by the sheriff in an auction sale be registered in the office of theregister of deeds, for the purpose of the legislature in providing for our present system of

registration is to afford some means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may

reach the records and thereby acquire security against instruments the execution of which hasnot been revealed. Redemption is not the concern merely of the auction-vendee and themortgagor, but also of the latter's successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment

creditor of said mortgagor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the

mortgage under which the property has been sold. It is precisely for this reason that thecertificate of sale should be registered, for only upon such registration may it legally be said that

proper notice, though constructive, has been served unto possible redemptioners contemplatedin the law. We have to conclude, therefore, that the date of sale mentioned in Section 6 of Act

3135, as amended, should be construed to mean the date of registration of the, certificate ofsale in the office of the register of deeds concerned. Only after the lapse of the twelve-month

redemption period from the date of registration of the certificate of sale and in the absence ofany redemptioner within the said period, may the deed of final sale be executed in favor of the

purchaser who may then consolidate the title of the property in his favor. Consequently, Wehave to declare that the Land Registration Commissioner was right in ordering the Register of

Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation ofOwnership, the simultaneous registration of which documents was sought by herein petitioner

even before the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered.


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12. Agbulos vs. Alberto

Facts:

By virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on March

16, 1959 in Civil Case No. 18644 entitled Jose Agbulos, plaintiff, vs. Jose C. Alberto, defendant,the rights, interests and participation of the latter in a parcel of land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 24643 of the land records of Manila were levied upon. After dueproceedings the corresponding execution sale thereof was made on June 15, 1959, with hereinappellant Agbulos (judgment creditor in the case) as the highest bidder. The officer who made

the sale issued the certificate of sale on July 8, 1959 and the same provided that "Theredemption of the above described property from the purchaser may be made at any time within

twelve (12) months after the sale.On June 23,1960 appellee paid the sheriff of Manila with a sum of P 6,670.00 for the

redemption of the property and said officer executed in his favor on the same date the

responding certificate of redemption.It appears that on the same date (June 23, 1960) appellant filed with the Sheriff of Manila averified request for the execution and delivery to him of the final deed of sale upon the ground

that the judgment debtor not redeemed the property within the period of one year after the sale.

On June 29 of the same year the Sheriff replied that he could not accede to the request, givingthe following as his reasons for the denial: (a) that the certificate of sale in favor of appellantwas registered only on July 18, 1959, for which reason the period of redemption commenced to

run only from such date; and (b) that the judgment debtor had deposited on June 23, 1960, thatis, before the expiration of the one-year period of redemption the total sum of P6,670.00 in full

redemption of property.

In view of the action of the Sheriff, appellant filed a civil case praying for an order of annullingthe certificate of redemption, but was denied by the lower court, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred that the period of redemption commenced to runonly from the deed of the registration of the certificate of sale.

Held:Yes, the court erred. Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that "the

judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time

within twelve months after the sale" (Emphasis supplied) without specifying whether the period

should start from (1) the date when the execution sale was made, or (2) from the date when thecertificate of sale was executed by the sheriff who made the sale, or (3) from the date when saidcertificate of sale was registered in the office of the corresponding register of deeds.

Aside from what has been said heretofore, appellant now estopped from claiming that

the one-year period redemption started earlier than the date when the certificate of sale wasregistered, for the reason that he failed timely to question the entry or annotation made on the

back of the certificate of title of the property he had purchased, to the effect that the sale thereofin his favor was subject to redemption within one year from the registration of said certificate of

sale.


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13. Liong-Wong-Shih vs. Sunico and Peterson

Facts:

This was an action brought by the Liong-Wong-Shih against the defendant to have

declared null and void certain attachments issued in favor of the defendant by the Court of First

Instance of the city of Manila, and levied upon certain property alleged to belong to the Liong-

Wong-Shih. Two attachment orders were issued against 1⁄2 of a certain piece of propertysituated in the district of Binondo, City of Manila. As to the first attachment, the latter could not

be noted in the Registry of Deed for the reason that it was not then registered. On the secondorder of attachment, the property was then duly noted in the Registry of Deeds. Each of said

orders of attachment was levied by the sheriff of the city of Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the purchaser of a land, who fails to have his title deeds recorded in the

proper registry of property, can be relieved from attachment liens created or placed upon said

property subsequent to his purchase of such property.

Held:No. The record is incomplete — it does not show in which registry the title was

registered; whether under the registry provided for by the Mortgage Law or whether under thesystem of registration provided for by the Philippine Commission. The record brought does not

disclose in which record the title was recorded, whether in the view or the old, or whether the

sale of such land was made to the plaintiff herein before or after the application the former tohave his title recorded under the acts of the Commission. The case was remanded to the lowercourt for a new trial.


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14. Tabigue vs. Green

Facts:

Potenciana Tabigue sold the land in controversy to Frank Green by an absolute deed.

Frank Green wrote a letter in which he stated that the deed he already had from the plaintiffwould not be sufficient and that it would be necessary for Tabigue to sign another deed after the

registration had been made in her favor. After the land was registered to Tabigue, a newcertificate of ownership was executed and delivered to Frank Green, certifying that he was thesole owner of the property. However, the attorney for Potenciana Tabigue made a written offer

to Green to redeem the property but Green refused to permit the redemption, and he executed adeed of the land to the military government and sent the same to Manila to be forwarded to

Washington.

Issue: Whether or not Green’s subsequent execution of a deed of the land to a third party

denies Tabigue of redemption.

Held:

No. The Court ordered the defendant to transfer his title on the premises in controversy

to Tabigue, to register the land in the name of the plaintiff, and deliver the title of the same toher. It contemplated the surrender of the original certificate whenever the land is transferredfrom one person to another, and the Court believed that the judgment should specifically order

the defendant to deliver that certificate for cancellation.


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15. Buzon vs. Licauco

Facts:

This is an action filed enjoining defendants to proceed with an execution sale claiming

that the petitioner is the true owner of the land in question and was not informed of anyencumbrance. On 15 Dec 1904, a certificate of title to a parcel of land was issued pursuant to a

decree of the Court of Land Registration to Rafael Herrera. Thereafter, Maximo Licaucoinstituted an action against Herrera in the CFI obtaining an order of attachment against theproperty which was levied on 1 Oct 1907 by filing and registering a copy of the order in the

office of the Register of Deeds. Apparently, it appears that Herrera had executed a separatedeed of sale of the land in question to Lucio Buzon duly notarized on 6 Sept 1907 and was

presented to the register of deeds on 4 Oct 1907 or 4 days after the attachment proceedingswas filed by Licauco. The office of the register of deeds of Manila issued a certificate of transfer

of title to the land in question containing the annotation of the order of attachment filed by

Licauco in its memorandum of encumbrances.In view of this, Licauco insisted the alleged sale to Buzon was a simulated and not a genuinesale and that the right of ownership was not conveyed by Herrera as the certificate of title held

by Buzon was obtained by fraud. He claims that he had duly filed and recorded his order of

attachment four days prior to the issuance of Buzon's certificate of transfer and title hence thiscertificate should not be permitted to defeat his right to subject the property in question toexecution.

Issue: Whether or not an unrecorded deed of conveyance executed by the owner of the land

unregistered under the provisions of the Land Registration Act conveys title and ownership to

the Buzon?

Held:

No, the deed of sale of Herrera to Buzon did not take effect as conveyance or bind theland until 4 Oct 1907 or the date of registration to the Register of Deeds and that the levy of

Licauco’s attachment against the land effected on 1 Oct 1907 is valid and existing as of that

date.Section 50 of the Land Registration Act provides that no deed, mortgage, lease, or othervoluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take

effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the

parties, unless and until the act of registration is complete as provided by Section 51 of thesame act. Once registered, any conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree,instrument or entry, affecting registered land recorded, filed or entered in the office of the

register of deeds will then serve as a notice to all persons from the time of such registering,

filing or entering.Buzon in this case had both actual and constructive notice of the fact that the attachment had

been levied upon the land purchased by him before he became the owner, and clearly he notentitled to an injunction to restrain Licauco from subjecting this land to execution.


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16. Tuason vs. Raymundo

Facts:

On 3 Mar 1913, Vicenta Rodriguez and Gregorio Baroto Cruz owned parcels of land

subject to a loan from Alfonso Dubrunner and sold the land in question to Julia Tuazon whoimmediately possessed the property and leased it to Trinidad Maranga. Later, Maranga was

ousted by the sheriff of Manila under an action for execution procured by Faustino Raymundo.Raymundo argued that on 1 May 1911 he purchased the property in question under a pacto deretro with a one-year redemption period. Although no redemption was made, Raymundo

extended the redemption period without fixing a limit to the extension. The sale with the right torepurchase was not registered in the registry of property and no attempt was made to register it

until the 9 June 1913.It appears that Rodriguez and Cruz sold the same property to two different individuals being

with the right to repurchase and to the Tuazon on the 3 of Mar 1913. The sale to Raymundo

was not registered and no entry was made either upon the certificate of title held by the originalowners or in the registry of property while the sale to the Tuazon although made two years laterwas duly registered.

Issue: Whether or not an unregistered transfer of the property invalidates and provides a bettertitle over real property over a subsequent transfer registered under the Torrens system made forvalue and in good faith?

Held:

No. In accordance to Sec 50 of Act No 496, the act of registration shall be the operative

act to convey and affect the land and no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall effect as a conveyance or bindthe land or transfer title, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties.

In effect, the conveyance from Rodriguez and Cruz to the Raymundo in 1911 amounted simplyto a contract for a conveyance which would become a valid conveyance when it was registered

in accordance with the requirements of Act No. 496. Being nothing more than a contract for the

sale of land, it had no effect upon the purchase made by the Tuazon in 1913, she having boughtfor value and in good faith and her conveyance having duly registered as required by law.


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17. Sikatuna vs. Guevarra

Facts: A contract of lease of a portion of land in Calle Bilbao, Manila measuring about 100

square meters, was entered into between the partnership Jacinto, Palma y Hermanos, as

lessor, and Potenciana Guevara, as lessee, which land is a part of the land belonging to the

said partnership. The said contract contained an option in favor of the partnership Jacinto,Palma y Hermanos by which the latter, within one year from the date of the execution thereof,could purchase the house of Potenciana Guevara built on the land so leased. However, if withinsaid time the said partnership did not exercise such option, Guevara would have the right to

purchse the land leased to her.The time for the option having expired, without the partnership having exercised its right,

the defendant attempted to purchase the said land, to which the former objected whichprompted Guevara to bring an action against the said partnership to compel it to sell the land to

her.While the action was pending, the aforesaid partnership sold to the Sikatuna corporation

all the land including the portion leased to Guevara, which corporation recorded the transfer in

the registry under the provisions of Act No. 496. As a result, transfer certificate of title No. 8651

was issued to the said corporation.When judgment was rendered in the case filed by Guevara against the partnership, the

trial court ordered the latter to sell to the former the portion of land leased to her. The contractentered into between Sikatuna and Messrs. Jacinto Palma y Hermanos was thereby declared

rescinded.

Issue: Whether or not the rescission of the contract of sale between Sikatuna and thepartnership was valid.

Held: Yes. The rescission of the said sale does not lie because the property is now in the legal

possession of a third person who has not acted in bad faith. The second paragraph of article

1295 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the subject-matter of the

contract are lawfully in the possession of third persons who have not acted in bad faith.

There is no doubt but that in this case the plaintiff corporation has the character of a third

person, and it has not been shown that it had acted in bad faith. This case has a special

circumstance in that it deals with property registered under the Land Registration Act, No. 496,section 79 of which provides that actions concerning properties registered under the law shallaffect only the parties litigant, unless a notice of the commencement of the action is recorded,

which does not appear to have been done in the case before us. There was, therefore, no legal

obstacle to the transfer of the title of the said property, and for this special reason the said

transfer cannot be rescinded.


19/57

18. Worcester vs. Ocampo

Facts:

By virtue of an execution issued out of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated

January 26, 1910 in Case No. 6930, all the right, title and interest of the latter in two parcels ofland registered in his name were levied upon for the purpose of satisfying a judgment of

P60,000, a notice of the levy in said case having been entered upon the back of the certificatesof title on the same date, January 26, 1910. By a document dated January 11, 1909 or prior tosaid attachment, the two parcels mentioned were sold con pacto de retracto by Martin Ocampo

to Gervasio Ocampo, for the period of four years from said date, the vendor being allowed theright to continue occupying the said properties by paying an annual rental of P150. This

document was endorsed on the back of said certificates of title on February 1, 1910. By anotherwrit of execution, issued on March 26, 1910, in the same Case No. 6930, all the right, title and

interest of the defendant, Martin Ocampo, in the two properties which had been levied upon,

were sold at public auction and Dean C. Worcester, as the highest bidder, purchased the same,subject to the right of redemption which the law allows to judgment debtors; this sale was alsonoted on the back of said certificates of title on April 11, 1910. The period of redemption having

expired without the judgment debtor having exercised his right, the sheriff of Manila executed in

favor of the purchaser, Worcester, an absolute deed of sale of all the right, title and interest ofMartin Ocampo in the two parcels above mentioned, which had been sold at public auction.

Issue: Whether or not an absolute deed of sale executed by the sheriff of Manila to Dean C.Worcester should be registered in the latter's name.

Held: Yes. Treating of property registered under the Torrens system, as in the present case,

and under Act No. 496, the deed of sale con pacto de retracto produced no effect whatsoever

as a deed of such transfer, except from the moment of its filing or registration. From February,1910. As on a date prior to the first day of February, 1910 which is January 26 of said year, the

final levy on said properties in favor of Dean C. Worcester, had already been noted which notice

produced all the effects prescribed in section 51 of Act No. 496, it been the final levy, by virtueof which the public auction. It is evident that the said levy and sale made by the sheriff takesprecedence over the deed of sale con pacto de retracto. Said section 50 clearly provides that

when registered land is conveyed, mortgaged, leased, or otherwise dealth with, such

conveyance, mortgage, etc., shall not affect or convey the land until such conveyance,mortgage, etc., is recorded or filed or entered in the office of the register of deeds. From saidprovision it is clear then, that by reason of the fact that the said pacto de retracto was not

recorded, filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds until after the plaintiff had

secured his lien by attachment, that Gervasio Ocampo acquired his right subject to the rights ofthe plaintiff herein. His right being subject to the rights of the plaintiff, it cannot be enforced

against the land until after the rights of the plaintiff have been fully satisfied. No claim is madeby the appellant that there were any rights left in said parcel of land over and above the rights of

the plaintiff. Meanwhile, if every conveyance or attachment when recorded, filed, or entered inthe office of the register of deeds, shall be notice to all persons from the time of such

registering, filing or entering, then Gervasio Ocampo cannot plead ignorance of the existence ofthe rights acquired by Worcester under his attachment which was duly recorded in the office of

the register of deeds several days before there was any attempt to record or file or register thepacto de retracto. In other words, the only interest which he had remaining in the land was the

right to repurchase the same within the period mentioned in said contract and that therefore theonly interest which was sold by the sheriff was the right to repurchase, that being the only right

which Martin Ocampo had in the parcels of land in question at the time of the sheriff's sale.


20/57

19. Roxas vs Dinglasan

Facts:Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner with Certificate of Title over a lot with an area of

26,530 square meters, situated at Lipa City. She sold to Francisca Mojica by means of a public

instrument an undivided portion of 11,530 square meters of the lot. In the same month and year,she sold to Victoria Dinglasan by means of a private instrument the remaining portion of 15,000

square meters. Long before and at the time of the sales, Francisca Mojica and VictoriaDinglasan were in possession of the Lot. The vendor's Certificate of Title was not delivered tothe vendees because it was in the possession of another person to whom the lot had been

mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.

Pedro Dinglasan, by falsifying a public document of conveyance, succeeded in having

the title in the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title issued in hisname. The record does not show when and how he had obtained possession of the owner'sduplicate certificate of title.

Pedro Dinglasan mortgaged the lot to Leonora T. Roxas as security for a loan. Themortgagor's title having been delivered to the mortgagee, she caused the instrument to be

registered on the back of the said transfer certificate of title. Leonora T. Roxas then instituted

the instant foreclosure suit against the mortgagor, Pedro Dinglasan, the latter having failed orrefused to pay the obligation on its due date. Said defendant was declared in default.Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene. The complaint alleged that they

were the owners of the lot, having purchased the same from Felisa Kalaw, in June 1959; the

title to said land was fraudulently transferred by Pedro Dinglasan in his name; that PedroDinglasan mortgaged the land in favor of plaintiff Leonora T. Roxas; that said mortgagor hasbeen convicted of "Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual," and the document

used by him in transferring title in his name was the subject of the said felony.

Issue: Whether or not Mojica and Dinglasan are the rightful owners of the land

Held:

No. The complaint in intervention was to vindicate ownership of the land in theintervenors. The deeds of sale involving the parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title No.

9125 in the name of the vendor, Felisa Kalaw, not having been registered, the said intervenorsdid not acquire ownership of the land. It is well settled that in case of sale of a piece of landtitled under the Torrens System, it is the act of registration, and not tradition, that transfers the

ownership of the land sold. The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the

land, their action to vindicate ownership must fail because such action can prosper only uponproof by plaintiff that he is the owner. As pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership

of the land because their deeds of sale were not registered.


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20. NHA vs. Basa

FACTS:

On April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount

of P556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered byTransfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 287008 and 285413, located at No. 30 San

Antonio St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. 2 Spouses Basa did not pay theloan despite repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, on August 9, 1990, fileda verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriff’s Office inQuezon City, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. 3 After notice and publication, theproperties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder. 4 On

April 16, 1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on theowner’s duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles inthe custody of the Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a fire guttedthe City Hall of Quezon City on June 11, 1988. 5 On April 16, 1992, the redemption

period expired, 6 without respondents having redeemed the properties. Shortlythereafter.

on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership 7over the foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register of Deeds onthe certificates of title in the hand of NHA under Entry No. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207. 8On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. Thesaid petition was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an Order 9 dated August4, 1992. A Writ of Possession 10 was issued on March 9, 1993 by the RTC, orderingspouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots. The writ, however, remainedunserved. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ of possessionon April 28, 1993.

ISSUE:

whether or not the annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale in the primaryentry book of the register of deeds and on the owner’s duplicate title is sufficientcompliance with the requirement of law on registration.

RULING:

Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the Registerof Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of

possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a person inpossession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extra judiciallyforeclosed. 67 Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the issuance of the writof possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the[Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part thereof issituated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bondin an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to


22/57

indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating themortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall bemade under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration orcadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the caseof property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and

ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with amortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with anyexisting law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of suchpetition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred andfourteen of Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act NumberedTwenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond,order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in whichthe property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.


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21. DBP vs. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija

FACTS:

DBP presented for registration to the registry of deeds of nueva ecija cabanatuan city, a

sheriffs certificate of sale in its favor of two parcel of land covered by TCT both in thename of spouses andres bautista and marcelina calison. Which said institution acquiredas the highest bidder at an extra judicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was enteredinto the primary book of entry and the DBP paid the requisite registration fee on thesame day. No annotation made in the title because the original were missing from thefiles of Registry,

on the advice of the RD the DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of FirstInstance of nueva ecija the said court ordered the reconstitution. On june 25, 1984sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale subject of entry No.8191.

ISSUE:whether the certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No.8191made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the reconstitutedcertificates of title were issued only on June 19, 1984?

RULING:

The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No.8191 had been rendered"... ineffectivedue to the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document wasentered because of the non availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For saidcertificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be reenterednow that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," andbypassed the second query as having been rendered moot and academic by theanswer to the first.

Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration,whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as theregistrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry andannotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on theregister of deeds. 4/18/2015 UDK No. 7671http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jun1988/udk_7671_1988.html 4/5 Therefore,without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary entry on the original of thecertificate of title may be deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of saidentry, the Court rules that in the particular situation here obtaining, annotation of thedisputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it refers isentirely proper and justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealedresolution, amounts to declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant(DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or inderogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That,surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section


24/57

56 of PD 1529, be asserted as warranted by its termsThe qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present appellee)

register of deeds about making annotation of an entry effected before he assumed thatoffice are more imagined than real. He would only be making a memorandum of aninstrument and of its entry based on or reciting details which are already of indubitable

record and, pursuant to the express command of the law, giving said memorandum thesame date as the entry. No part of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of theoffice at the time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.


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22. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Aballe

Facts:

The provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros levied upon and sold to Levy Hermanos, Inc., allthe rights, interest and participation of Gervasio Ignalaga in lots Nos. 419, 762 and 763. On March 7, 1933, Levy Hermanos, Inc., filed a petition praying that:

a. the register of deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title to these lots in the nameof Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo

b. to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of Levy Hermanos, Inc.,

for the reason that the legal period for redemption has expired with nobody having exercisedthis right.

The petition was opposed by Antonio Alegato with respect to lots Nos. 762 and 419,

claiming to be the owner thereof for having bought them from their original owners, and by

Chiong Bonco, with respect to lot No. 763, claiming that he held a mortgage credit on this lot.The court overruled all these oppositions, ordered the register of deeds of the Province ofOccidental Negros to cancel the certificates of title covering lots Nos. 419, 762 and 763 of this

cadastral record and issue the transfer certificate of title, free from all aliens and encumbrance,

in favor of Levy Hermanos, Inc.

Issue: Whether or not the claimants, Antonio and Chiong can oppose the effects of noticeattachment to the instruments which was duly inscribed in the books of the registry of deeds.

Held:

No, he cannot now oppose the effects of said attachment. Neither his opposition withrespect to lot No. 762 founded, notwithstanding the fact that the notice of attachment had notbeen noted on the original certificate of title to this lot in the name of Gervasio Ignalaga and

Petra Maderazo or on the transfer certificate of title which was later issued in his name,

inasmuch as this notice of attachment was duly inscribed in the books of the registry of deeds. According to section 51 of Act No. 496, the registration of the instrument in the books of the

registry of deeds is notice to all as regards such document. It does not provide that it is the

notation thereof on the certificate of title. And section 56 of the same Act, in prescribing the formin which the registers of deeds should keep their entry books and directing the entry therein, in

the order of their reception, of all deeds and other voluntary instruments and all copies of writs

and other process filed with them relating to registered land, noting there in the year, month,

day, hour and minute when they received them, provides that inscription or registration shall beregarded as made from the time so noted. According to this, the notation of the attachment ofthis lot in the entry book of the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to

its registration or inscription.


26/57

23. Bass v. De la Rama

Facts:

Pedro Ferrer owned an undivided ! parcel of land with an area of 5,047,014 sq.m.

located in Escalante , Province of Occidental Negros under TCT 2112. He mortgaged the landfor P12,000.00 with an interest of 12 percent per annum, to Hijos dela Rama which is annotated

on the certificate of title on July 27, 1920. The same lot was levied on execution in favor ofJoaquin Bass which was recorded in the entry book but was not annotated in the title. De laRama caused the foreclosure of the land that cause the cancellation of TCT 2112 and issuance

of TCT 11411. Bass, on the otherhand, upon knowledge of such, instituted a case for thedelivery of the land and payment of damages for the value of the produce from the time it has

been in its possession. RTC ruled in favor of Dela Rama stating that the right acquired by Basswas lost due to failure to redeem Ferrer’s mortgage in favor of Dela Rama before it was

foreclosed.

Issue: Whether or not the recording in the entry book is sufficient to transfer title in cases of levyon execution without annotating the same in the title.

Held: No. Sec. 51, 52, 56 and 114 of the Land Registration Act should be read together in

order to satisfy the requirements of notice to the whole world. It is stated that under the equity of

rights, prior jurisprudence should be abandoned. Sec. 51 and 52 are complementary with eachother and should be interpreted together. Se. 52 states that every interest on the land should be

annotated in the CT. There are also separate fees required in registering into the entry book and

into the CT. Because of this, the Court concluded that the fees in registering in CT will be voidand nugatory if we will consider that the only requirement is the entry in the entry book. It is alsostated that 15 days after entry in the Entry Book without entry in the CT will render the former

nugatory.From the foregoing we can say that Bass never registered the land for the reason that

he is barred by prescription because Dela Rama occupied the lot since 1926, 10 years prior to

the levy in execution which is on 1936.


27/57

24. Fidelity & Surety Co. vs. Conegero

Facts:

Torrens Certificate of Title No. 147 was issued in favor of Pastora Conegero but by

virtue of Cadastral Survey, the same was cancelled and a new title in favor of Pastora wasissued, CT No. 194, and that of her children, CT 195. Pastora secured a debt to El Hogar

Filipino while she was still the holder of CT 147. A contract of sale in favor of Samuel Thomas was executed by Pastora to CT 147,

however, when Thomas’ lawyer cause the annotation of new title in favor of Thomas, they found

out that the same was cancelled. The inquiry is annotated in the entry book.Thomas filed a complaint against Pastora to produce CT 194 and cause its cancellation

in his favor. A notice of lis pendens was filed. Afterwards, Pastora executed a 3rd mortgage infavor of Southnorth and Goyena to secure a note worth P500.

Fidelity and Surety Company filed foreclosure of mortgage naming Thomas and

Southnorth as co-defendant with Pastora. Trial Court ruled in favor of Thomas.

Issue: Whether or not the entry in the entry book is sufficient to register the title?

Held: No. it is evident in Sec. 56 of Act 496 that the annotation and subsequent cancellation of

title is needed in order to suffice registration of title. Mere entry in the entry book without

registration and issuance of new certificate is without significance as to effect title. Also, when they registered it to the entry book, CT 147 was already cancelled. According

to Sec. 57, inorder to register a title, the original certificate should be presented, but the same

was complied with.From the foregoing, the title acquired by Fidelity as against Thomas and Southnorth is

superios and should be upheld.


28/57

25. Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondent Alimpoos filed for a petition of the recovery of a parcel of landalleging that they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro as a guaranty to a loan, who then,sold the land to the petitioner. They contended that Deguro prepared the deed of sale without

thir knowledge and consent. The deed of sale was annotated at the back of the certificate title.By virtue thereof, the Original Certificate Title was cancelled and a Transfer Certificate Title wasissued in favor of Deguro.

Issue: Whether or not the parcel of land can be reconveyed to owner Alimpoos.

Held:

No. Under Section 55 the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment ofa transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the

rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title. Petitioner is a purchaser in good

faith.

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to realestate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon theface of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, exceptwhen the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a

reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on

the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire, rights over the property, the courtcannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. Every persondealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued

therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the

condition of property.


29/57

26. Potenciano vs. Dineros

Facts:

Potenciano bought from Gregorio Alcabao a parcel of land and house, as evidenced by

a deed of sale. The following day, Potenciano presented the deed of sale and owner's certificateof title to the Register of Deeds for registration. The entry was made in the day book and

Potenciano paid the corresponding fees, evidenced by official receipt. However, in entering thetransaction in the entry book, the clerk who made the entry committed an error in copying thenumber of the certificate of title. Along with the confusion arising from the bombing of Manila,

the papers presented by Potenciano were either lost or destroyed and were not among thosesalvaged. Up to the time when this case was filed, no certificate of title has been issued to the

plaintiff.Sometime in April, 1946, Dineros sued Alcabao and his son for damages. A writ of

attachment was issued on the property that was sold to Potenciano, it appearing that the

property was still in the name of Alcabao. A third-party claim was filed by Potenciano and theerror in the numbers was explained. Dineros contends that entry of the deed in the day book isnot sufficient registration. Judgment was rendered in favor of the present defendant. The

plaintiff's claim was denied, and so was his claim during the execution sale.

Issue: Whether or not the registration made by Potenciano is valid?

Held:Yes, registration made by Potenciano is valid. Section 56 of the Land Registration Act

says that deeds relating to registered land shall, upon payment of the filing fee, be entered in

the entry book — also called day book in the same section — with notation of the year, month,day, hour, and minute of their reception and that "they shall be regarded as registered from themoment so noted." And applying this provision in the cases of Levin vs. Bass* etc., G. R. Nos.

L-4340 to 4346, decided on May 28, 1952, the SC held that "an innocent purchaser for value ofregistered land becomes the registered owner and in the contemplation of law the holder of a

certificate thereof the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and lawful deed of sale and

the same is entered on the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents theowner's duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registrationfees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform."

The judgment creditor may not, as purchaser at the auction sale, invoke the protection

accorded by law to purchasers in good faith, because at the time of the auction he already hadnotice, thru the third party claim filed by Potenciano, that the property had already beenacquired by the latter from the judgment debtor.

The Rules of Court provide that a purchaser of real property at an execution sale "shall

be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtorthereto." (Rule 39, section 24.) In other words, the purchaser acquires only such right or interest

as the judgment debtor had on the property at the time of the sale. (Cruz vs. Sandoval, 69 Phil.736; Barrido vs. Barreto, 72 Phil. 187.) It follows that it at that time the judgment debtor had no

more right to or interest in the property because he had already sold it to another than thepurchaser acquires nothing. Such appears to be the case here, for it is not disputed that years

before the execution sale — and even before the attachment — the judgment debtor hadalready deeded the property and delivered his certificate of title to another, who on the following

day presented the deed and certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. In other words, it wasregistered. And this act of registration operated to convey the property to the buyer.


30/57

27. Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses Tan, et al.

Facts:

The Spouses Tan, as private respondents, are registered owners of a certain parcel oflot located in Quezon City that they claimed to have purchased, in good faith, from a certainprivate respondent Ricardo Santos who, in turn, purchased said parcel of lot from Severa

GregorioThe Heirs of Severa Gregorio, as petitioners and represented by its administratrix

Buenconsejo de Vivar, challenged the authenticity of said sale between Spouses Tan and

Santos with claim that Severa Gregorio’s signature was forged at the instance of the salebetween the former and Ricardo Santos. This is despite the existence of a registered deed ofsale anent to said property

The Spouses Tan maintained their position that they acquired said property from Santos

free from any encumbrances

Issue: Whether or not said claim of the Heirs of Severa Gregorio will hold water.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Spouses Tan as it delved on the mattersconnected with the validity of the sale between the said spouses and Ricardo Santos. It ruledfavoring said authenticity on the following grounds:

When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and annotated

in the certificate of title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the owner of the soldportion as of the registration of the sale although the title to said property is still in the name ofthe vendor.

Per established facts connected with cleanliness of the title at the instance of the purchase ofthe Spouses Tan (as there was inquiry done with the Registry of Deeds), their good faith

concurs with the said registration of sale, enough to further establish the authenticity of their

claim as legitimate owners of said property


31/57

28. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:Spouses Magpayo, as private respodents, mortgaged their parcel of land to respondent

bank Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) that at the instance of their default wasextrajudicially forclosed by said bank. Subsequently, the same bank bought the same propertyvia public auction.

Jose Ma. T. Garcia, petitioner and brother of the Magpayos, who was in possession of

said property during the issuance of the writ of possession at the instance of PBCom refused tohonor said writ and questioned the authenticity of the claim of PBCom on the point of his claim

that he inherited said property from his mother Remedios T. Garcia, wife of Atty Pedro V. Garciawho earlier sold said property to the Magpayos. He further allege that during the execution of

said mortgage, the Magpayos were not the owners of said property as their title was issued afew days later than the resl estate mortgage

Respondent Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent PBCom on ground that theregistered deed of sale at the instance of said property provides for the authenticity of theownership at the instance of the Magpayos despite the fact that the title of the Magpayos to the

said property was issued a few days later than the deed of real estate mortgage.

Issue: Whether said ruling of respondent Court of Appeals holds water.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals upholding the right of theMagpayos as owners of said prooerty as it pointed out that: Registration does not confer

ownership; it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale

operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to usethe document as proof of ownership.


32/57

29. Gonzales vs. IAC

Facts:

The spouses Asuncion Sustiguer and Dioscoro Buensuceso were the original owners of

the property subject of this controversy.For delinquency in the payment of the real estate taxesdue thereon, the land was sold at public auction to the Province of Iloilo in 1955.

Hortencia Buensuceso, daughter of said spouses, discovered in the office of theRegister of Deeds of Iloilo that the Certificate of Title of subject land, OCT No. 3351, was still inthe name of her parents. Hortencia paid the back taxes on the land in behalf of her mother in

whose favor the Provincial Treasurer executed a deed of repurchase on April 10, 1969.On April 17, 1969, the spouses Gaudioso Panzo and Hortencia Buensuceso bought the

land from the latter's mother. On February 26,1971, a reconstituted original certificate of titlewas issued in the name of Asuncion Sustiguer alone. And by virtue of the sale of said property

by Sustiguer to the spouses Panzo, her title was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-64807

was issued by the RD of Iloilo in the spouses' name on March 3, 1971.The said spouses then mortgaged the property to respondent Rural Bank of Pavia

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