Land Registration With Jurisprudence

8/19/2019 Land Registration With Jurisprudence

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

I. Torrens System

A. Concept and Background

1. Purpose

Republic v. Umali

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it

was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee theintegrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once theclaim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person

purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s titlethereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that hisacuisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. !hat is worse is that if this were permitted, publicconfidence in the system would be eroded and land transactionswould have to be attended by complicated and not necessarilyconclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further conseuence would be that land conflicts could even be morenumerous and comple" than they are now and possibly moreabrasive if not even violent.

#ino v. $%

The main purpose of the Torrens &ystem is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactionsrelative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the faceof a Torrens $ertificate of Title and to dispense with the need of

inuiring further, e"cept when the party concerned had actualknowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a

reasonably cautious man to make such further inuiry.

Thus, where innocent third parties relying on thecorrectness of the certificate thus issued, acuire rights over the

property, the court cannot disregard such rights. 'e is protected.

2. Nature of Proceedngs

(aburada v. (R%

$ourt has no )urisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and asecond decree for the same land is void. This is so, because whenonce decreed by a court of competent )urisdiction, the title to theland thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the wholeworld, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in asubseuent proceeding *not based on fraud nor within the statutory

period+ to ad)udicate the same title in favor of another person.

urthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the first registered owner in the Registration -ook is a standingnotice to the world that said property is already registered in hisname. 'ence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that theland he applied for is already covered by a title so he has no rightwhatsoever.

In other words, the first proceedings are in rem which bindsthe second proceedings.

'eirs of #edro (opez v. e $astro% proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings,

reuires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,including the &tate, who have rights to or interests in the property.$onstructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through

publication of the application for registration and service of noticeto affected parties.

$onseuently, when respondents e $astro filed their own

application for registration of the same parcel of land in the



Tagaytay $I branch, strictly speaking, it could no longer entertainthe application for registration as the res involved had been

constructively seized by the $avite $I branch. -e that as it may,the $ourt is not persuaded that the registration proceedings

instituted by private respondents should be nullified by reason of

the fact that the $avite $ity branch of the same court was already proceeding with another registration case for the same piece of land.

In land registration proceedings, all interested parties areobliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their ob)ective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first

acuires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, wheremore than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person

holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a personwho relies on a subseuent certificate. It should be stressed that said

rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of

filing of the application for registration of title. 'ence, even thoughan applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have

priority of right to register title. %s such, while his application is

being processed, an applicant is duty/bound to observe vigilanceand to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.

*0ote1 e $astro application filed in 2345 but entry of

decree 1!"#, $I tagaytay6 !hile (opez application earlier filed in

2374 but entry of decree only on 2353, $I $avite.+

$. In %e&aton to t'e Pu(&c Land Act

Republic v. 'erbieto

The $% overlooked the difference between the #ropertyRegistration ecree and the #ublic (and %ct. Under the #R, therealready e"ists a title which is confirmed by the $ourt6 while under the #(%, the presumption always is that the land applied for

pertains to the &tate, and that the occupants and possessors only aclaim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continous, open and notorious possession 8since 9une 2:, 23;7 or

earlier<.

&ince the sub)ect lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the applicants may acuire title thereto only

under the #(%.

%pplicants could not acuire land through adverse

possession since the land was only classified as alienable in 234=%0 their possession only started in 237>.

*0ote1 Su(stanta& re)urements for pu(&c &ands are n

t'e PLA (ut t'e procedura& re)urements are n t'e P%D.+

$ivil $ode provisions on prescription, which is sub)ect toconfirmation under the #R, in general applies to all types of land.

'owever, e"cluded therefrom are lands of the public domain whichare covered by the #(% 8special law v. general law<

&ecretary of ?0R v. @ap

$% 2;2, #(%, remains as the e"isting general lawgoverning the classification and disposition of lands of the publicdomain other than timber and mineral lands, and privately ownedlands which reverted to the &tate.

# 27:3, #R, governs the registration of lands under the

Torrens &ystem as well as unregistered lands, including chattelmortgages.

-oracay Island is land of the public domain, considered asReserved orest (and. Anly part of it is alienable and disposable

agricultural land as recently reclassified as such by #resident BC%.There are two reuisites for )udicial confirmation of

imperfect title under #(%1 *2+ A$?0 possession and occupationunder a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from 9une 2:, 23;7 and *:+ $lassification of the land as alienableand disposable land of the public domain.

B. Certfcate of Tt&e



#.. 27:3. &?$TIA0 =3. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. D %fter the )udgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the

court shall, within fifteen days from entry of )udgment, issue an order directing the$ommissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of

title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of )udgment,

certified copies of the )udgment and of the order of the court directing the$ommissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the $ommissioner shall cause to be

prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of thecorresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be atrue copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed bythe $ommissioner, entered and filed in the (and Registration $ommission. Theoriginal of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the $ommissioner and shall be sent, together with the ownerEs duplicate certificate, to the Register of eeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his

registration book.

Reyes v. Raval Reyes

The registered owner of the land has a more preferentialright to the possession of the owner’s duplicate than one whosename does not appear in the certificate of title and yet has toestablish his right to the possession thereto.

0ational Brains v. I%$

#ersons dealing with property covered by a Torrenscertificate of title are not reuired to go beyond what appears on theface of the title. !hen there is nothing on the certificate of title toindiciate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or anyencumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not reuired to e"plorefurther than what the Torrens upon its face indicates in uest for anyhidden defect or inchoate right that may subseuently defeat hisright thereto.

$a)uyon v. -atuyong

#etitioners are not builders in good faith. Bood faithconsists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is

his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. In the instantcase, when the verification survey report came to petitioner’s

knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a

professional’s field confirmation of petitioner’s encroachment of respondent’s titled property.

It is doctrinal in land registration that the possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily taintedwith bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the

disputed lot despite knowledge of respondent’s ownership put petitioners in bad faith.

&pouses Falenzuela v. &pouses Cano

% person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or

oversight land owned by another, does not become owner of suchland by virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens &ystem isintended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of thecertificate of registration but it not intended to perpetrate fraudagainst the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot beused to protect a usurper from the true owner.

Title to the property merely confirms and registersownership.

2. Indefeas(&ty

%fter the lapse of one year from the entry of the decree of registration, said thedecree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.*&ec =:, #.. 27:3+

'eirs of Ca"imo (abanon v. 'eirs of $onstancio (abanon

The principle of indefeasibility does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently registeredin the name of another. &ection =:, #27:3 merely precludes thereopening of the registration proceedings for titles covered by the



Torrens &ystem, but does not foreclose other remedies for thereconveyance of the property to its rightful owner.

The remedy of the land owner whose property has beenwrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is, after one

year form the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but,respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open toreview, to bring an ordinary action for reconveyance or, if the

property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

%n unrepudiated e"press trust, as proved by the eed of %ssignment and the %ffidavit, does not prescribe.

e Buzman v. %gbagala

%n action is deemed an attack on a title when the ob)ect of

the action is to nullify the title and thus challenge the )udgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct whenthe ob)ect of the action is to annul or set aside such )udgment, or en)oin its enforcement. An the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack onthe )udgment is nevertheless made an incident thereof.

'ere, attack was indirect because the principal relief was todeclare the donation and transfers void.

'owever, the principle of indefeasibility does not apply

when the patent and title based thereon are void. %n action to

declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and issusceptible to direct, as well as collateral, attack.

'ere, the irector of (ands did not have the )urisdiction toissue the free patent since the land was private. 'ence, the patentand the title issued thereon are void.

(epanto $onsolidated v. umyung

% certificate of title is void when it covers property of the

public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. %ny

title issued on non/disposable lots even in the hands of allegedinnocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

$araan v. $%

% certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasibletitle to the property in favor of the registered owner.

In an action for recovery of possession, the defense of the

possessor that the plaintiff’s certificate of title is void is a collateralattack which is prohibited under # 27:3.

Thus, the defense of prescription of $araan cannot standagainst the $ertificate of Title of $osme because under section ;5,# 27:3, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of theregistered owner shall be acuired by prescription or adverse

possession.

Republic v. Buerrero

% petition for review of the decree of registration must befiled within one year from the date of entry of the decree. %nd in

case of public lands, the one/year period commences from the dateof issuance of the patent by the Bovernment.

'ere, the sales patent was issued on 23G: and this action toamend the certificate was filed only in 23G3. Coreover, anadministrative claim, although filed within the 2/year prescriptive

period, does not serve to toll the 2/year period.

% petition for review of the decree of registration refers to areview of the decree of registration in the Regular $ourts and not inthe -ureau of (ands.

$. Prescrpton

0o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall beacuired by prescription or adverse possession. *&ec. ;5, #.. 27:3+



9avier v. $oncepcion

The defense of prescription of the cause of action for recovery of possession by the registered owner is without merit. Theestablished rule is that one cannot acuire title to a registered land

by prescription or adverse possession.

(aches is likewise not available because there are nointervening rights of third persons which may be affected or

pre)udiced by a decision ordering the return of the lots. 'ence, theeuitable defense of laches will not apply against the registeredowners.

*. Co&&atera& Attack

% certificate of title shall not be sub)ect to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,modified, or cancelled e"cept in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. *&ec.

;G, #.. 27:3+

Cadrid v. -onifacio

Accion Publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion, is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to ane)ectment suit filed after the e"piry of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possessionof the realty.

The ob)ective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is torecover possession only, and not ownership. 'owever, where theuestion of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issueto determine who has the better right of possession. &uchdetermination is merely provisional and not conclusive on theuestion of ownership.

'ere, both parties claim ownership of the property.#etitioners through oral sale and respondents as represented by a

T$T in their names.

Core weight is given to the T$T because it is evidence of indefeasible title to property. The title holder is entitled to all the

attributes of ownership, including possession.

The petitioner/defendants attack on the validity of

respondent/plaintiffs title, by claiming that fraud attended itsacuisition, is a 8prohibited< collateral attack on the title. It is anattack incidental to the uest to defend their possession of the

properties in an accion publiciana not in a direct action whose mainob)ective is to impugn the validity of the )udgment granting the title.

'alili v. $IR

'ere, the union seeks to recover the property from the buyer of the land 8CC#$I<. The ob)ective of such claim is to

nullify the title of the buyer to the property, which therebychallenges the )udgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.

This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. % Torrens Titlecannot be collaterally attacked. 'ence, whether or not petitionershave the right to claim ownership of the property is beyond the

province of the instant proceeding.

'ere, the action came from the 0(R$.

*. %g't of Possesson Arsng +rom Tt&e

$arbonilla v. %biera

The registered owner is entitled to possession. 'owever, theowner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is inactual occupation of the property. To recover possession, theregistered owner must resort to the proper )udicial remedy.

'ere, the petitioner/registered owner opted to file ane)ectment case. ?)ectment cases 8forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer< are summary proceedings designed to provide e"peditiousmeans to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the

property involved. The only uestion that the courts resolve is who



is entitled to possession de facto and not to possession de )ure. Itdoes not even matter if a party has title to the property. %n

e)ectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one whohas presented proof of ownership of the sub)ect property. Hey

)urisdictional facts must be pleaded and proved.

'ere, petitioners failed to prove that the possession of respondents was by mere tolerance.

#etitioners must file either an action reivindicatoria, a suitto recover ownership to property or file an accion publiciana, a

plenary action to recover based on the better right to possess.

II. %ega&an Doctrne

A. Concept and Effects

%ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineraloils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora andfauna, and other natural resources are owned by the &tate. *&ec. :, %rticle II,

$onstitution+

%randa v. Republic *%ugust :;, :>22+

Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in &ection:, %rticle II of the 23G5 $onstitution, all lands of the public

domain belong to the &tate, which is the source of any asserted rightto ownership of land. %ll lands not appearing to be clearly within

private ownership are presumed to belong to the &tate. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the &tate, it remains part of the inalienable publicdomain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidencemust be established that the land sub)ect of the application isalienable or disposable.

To prove that the land sub)ect of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the e"istence of

a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation

or an e"ecutive order6 an administrative action6 investigation reportsof -ureau of (ands investigators6 and a legislative act or a statute.

The applicant may also secure a certification from the Bovernmentthat the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

$havez v. #?%

Under %rticle 7 of the &panish (aw of !aters of 2G44, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with Jproper permissionK from the &tate. #rivate parties could own the reclaimedland only if not Jotherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.K This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from thesea without permission from the &tate because the sea is property of

public dominion. It also meant that the &tate could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimedland, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the &tate.Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permissionfrom the &tate could not acuire ownership of the reclaimed landwhich would remain property of public dominion like the sea itreplaced. %rticle 7 of the &panish (aw of !aters of 2G44 adoptedthe time/honored principle of land ownership that Jall lands thatwere not acuired from the government, either by purchase or bygrant, belong to the public domain.K

%rticle 7 of the &panish (aw of !aters must be readtogether with laws subseuently enacted on the disposition of publiclands. In particular, $% 0o. 2;2 reuires that lands of the publicdomain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the

government can alienate them.

The %mended 9F% covers not only the reedom Islands, butalso an additional 73:.27 hectares which are still submerged andforming part of Canila -ay. There is no legislative or Presidential

act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable

lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submergedareas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can

be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the publicdomain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the



commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submergedareas are, under the $onstitution, Jwaters " " " owned by the &tate,K

forming part of the public domain and conseuently inalienable.Anly when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged

areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the

$onstitution are the only natural resources that the &tate mayalienate. Ance reclaimed and transformed into public agriculturallands, the government may then officially classify these lands asalienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, thegovernment may declare these lands no longer needed for publicservice. Anly then can these reclaimed lands be consideredalienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within thecommerce of man.

2. Nat,e Tt&e and Tme Immemora& Possesson

Native Title - refers to pre/conuest rights to lands and domains which, asfar back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of privateownership by I$$sLI#s, have never been public lands and are thusindisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the &panish$onuest6 *&ec. =*l+, I#R%+

Time Immemorial / refers to a period of time when as far back as memorycan go, certain I$$sLI#s are known to have occupied, possessed in theconcept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, byoperation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordancewith their customs and traditions. *&ec. =*p+, I#R%+

III. Ct-ens'p %e)urement

A. Ind,dua&s

1. +&pno Ct-ens

$itizens of the #hilippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, oracuire not more than twelve hectares of the alienable lands of the public domain,

by purchase, homestead, or grant. *&ec. =, %rticle II, $onstitution+

$itizens may acuire private lands. *%s much as they canM+

2. +ormer Natura&Born Ct-ens

% natural/born citizen of the #hilippines who has lost his #hilippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, sub)ect to limitations provided by law. *&ec. G,%rticle II, $onstitution+

%ny natural born citizen who has lost his #hilippine citizenship and who has thelegal capacity to enter into a contract under #hilippine laws may be a transferee of a

private land up to a ma"imum area of five thousand *7,>>>+ suare meters in thecase of urban land or three *=+ hectares in the case of rural land to be used by himfor business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them mayavail of the privilege herein granted1 #rovided, That if both shall avail of the same,the total area acuired shall not e"ceed the ma"imum herein fi"ed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other

purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural landfor business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him

shall not e"ceed the ma"imum areas herein authorized.

% transferee under this %ct may acuire not more than two *:+ lots which should besituated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the #hilippines1 #rovided,That the total land area thereof shall not e"ceed five thousand *7,>>>+ hectares in thecase of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. % transferee whohas already acuired urban land shall be disualified from acuiring rural land area

and vice versa. *&ection 2>, oreign Investments %ct+

$. A&ens

%lien Individuals may be transferees of private lands only in cases of hereditary

succession. *&ec. 5, %rticle II, $onstitution+

#-$om v. (ui &he

Taken singly, the lease contracts show nothing that is necessarilyillegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious patternto subvert by indirection the $onstitutional prohibition of %lienownership of land. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable

period is valid. &o is the option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted #hilippine citizenship.



-ut if an alien is given not only a lease, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the ilipino owner cannot sell or

otherwise dispose of his property, this is to last for 7> years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of

ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of

the right to en)oy the land but also of the right to dispose of it N rights the sum total of which make up ownership.

$ourt held all lease contracts void because of the intent surroundingthe e"ecution.

Ramirez v. Fda. de Ramirez

The device 8testamentary succession< of a usufruct to analien who is not a legal heir does not vest title to the land in the

usufructuary. It is not prohibited by the $onstitution because it isthe vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by

the $onstitution.

The $onstitutional provision which enables aliens toacuire private lands does not e"tend to testamentary successionotherwise any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by

paying money to a #hilippine landowner in e"change for a devise of a piece of land.

$heesman v. I%$

$onstitution prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.

$heesman was charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,

assuming that it was his intention that the lot in uestion be purchased by him and his wife, he acuired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase6 and in attempting to acuirea right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, heknowingly violated the $onstitution6 the sale as to him was void.

In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality touestion the subseuent sale of the same property by his wife on the

theory that in so doing he is merely e"ercising the prerogative of ahusband in respect of con)ugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the $onstitution. If the property were to be declared con)ugal, this

would accord to the alien husband a substantial interest and rightover the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its

transfer or disposition. This is a right which the $onstitution does

not permit him to have.

%s already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at thisstage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. -ut even if itwere a fact that said wife had used con)ugal funds to make the

acuisition, the considerations )ust set out militate, on highconstitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the

property so acuired or any part thereof. %nd whether in such anevent, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used

for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or

e"penditure of con)ugal funds is not now inuired into6 that would be, in the premises, a purely academic e"ercise

Culler v. Culler

*0ote1 academic in cheesman was realized here<

Cr. Culler was aware of the $onstitutional prohibition

when he purchased the property. 'e declared the property in thename of Crs. Culler because of said prohibition. 'is attempt at

subseuently asserting or claiming a right on the said propertycannot be sustained.

There was no implied trust created. &ave for hereditarysuccession, an aliens’ disualification is absolute. 0ot even anownership in trust is allowed. -esides, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allowa circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

'e who seeks euity must do euity, and he who comesinto euity must come with clean hands. Cr. Culler cannot seek reimbursement of the funds he used to purchase the property on the



ground of euity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Ting 'o v. Teng Bui

The sub)ect lot does not form part of the ?state of thedeceased alien who was absolutely prohibited from owning land. -yvirtue of the miscellaneous sales patent and the corresponding A$Tissued in his name Teng Bui is considered the owner of the land.

Coreover, the prohibition against an alien owning lands of

the public domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be permitted to arise on euity considerations.

'owever, the properties erected on the land owned by TengBui form part of the estate of respondents deceased father.

*0ote1 ownership over the land separated from the

buildingLimprovement.+

B. Corporatons

#rivate corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the publicdomain e"cept by lease, for a period not e"ceeding twenty/five years, renewable for

not more than twenty/five years, and not to e"ceed one thousand hectares in area.*&ec. =, %rticle II, $onstitution+

$orporations or associations D whether citizens or of citizens and aliens D may not

own, but may only hold by lease lands of the public domain. *A9 Apinion, 235=+

'owever, only corporations or associations at least 4>O of the capital stock of which is owned by ilipinos, and the remainder by foreigners, may own privatelands.

R v. Ung &iu Temple

The fact that the religious corporation has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the $onstitutional inhibition, since it isadmitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of

the 4>O reuirement is to ensure that corporations or associationsallowed to acuire agricultural land or to e"ploit natural resources

shall be controlled by ilipinos6 and the spirit of the $onstitutiondemands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling

membership should be composed of ilipino citizens.

Roman $atholic %postolic %dm. of avao v. (R$

-ishops or archbishops of corporation soles are merelyadministrators of the church properties that to their possession, andwhich they hold in trust for the church. Coreover, upon the death of the administrator, the properties pass on to his successor in officeand not to his legal heirs.

The framers of the $onstitution did not have in mind the

religious corporation when they provided for the 4>O capitalreuirement. Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended

for corporation sole, it is obvious that the corporation sole could not be regulated or restricted by said provision.

-eing mere administrator of the temporalities or propertiestitled in his name, the constitutional provision reuiring 4>Oilipino ownership is not applicable. The said constitutional

provision is limited by its terms to ownership alone and does not

e"tend to control unless the control over the property affected has been devised to circumvent the real purpose of the $onstitution.

?ven if the uestion of nationality be considered, the 4>Oconstitutional reuirement is fully met considering that the

constituents of the $orporation &ole is composed of anoverwhelming ma)ority of ilipinos. It is the nationality of theconstituents and not that of the administrator that should be takeninto consideration.

9.B. &ummit v. $%

% mutual agreement of right of first refusal between two

parties in 9F%, one party being the ilipino owning 4>O and theother the alien owning ;>O, does not constitute a violation of the



$onstitution limiting land ownership to ilipinos and ilipinocorporations.

It can be said that if the foreign shareholdings of alandholding corporation e"ceeds ;>O, it is not the foreign

stockholders’ ownership of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land N that is thecorporation becomes disualified to own land.

0o law disualifies a person from purchasing shares in alandholding corporation even if the latter will e"ceed the allowedforeign euity in the $onstitution. !hat the law disualifies is thecorporation owning land N this is the effect of more than ;>Oforeign euity.

The constitutional prohibition applies only to (%0. Itdoes not e"tend to real property as defined under %rticle ;27 of the

civil code.

Republic v. T.%.0. #roperties Inc.

The 23G5 $onstitution absolutely prohibits privatecorporations from acuiring any kind of alienable land of the publicdomain.

Under the 235= $onstitution, private corporations, even if

wholly owned by ilipino citizens, were no longer allowed toacuire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 23G5

$onstitution continues the prohibition and only allows private

corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain throughlease.

This case is different from irector of (ands v. I%$ 82;4&$R% 7>3 *23G4><, because the corporation in that case acuiredthe land when it was already private land. The A$?0 possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law ipso )uretransformed the land from public land to private land.

The irector of (ands doctrine is not applicable to this case because it has not been proven that when T%0 acuired the

property, its predecessors had already satisfied the #(% of A$?0and adverse possession of the land for => years since 9une 2:, 23;7

or earlier. Therefore, when T%0 acuired the property it was still

public land.

or irector of (ands to apply and enable a corporation tofile for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporationmust have acuired the land when its transferor had already a vestedright to a )udicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his

A$?0 and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for atleast => years since 9une 2:, 23;7 or earlier.

Coreover, the length of possession of the $orporationcannot be tacked on to complete the statutory => year acuisitive

prescriptive period.

R% 3254 e"tended the period for filing )udicial applicationsfor )udicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles toalienable and disposable lands of the public domain until ecember =2, :>:>.

C. Condomnums

1. Condomnum Corporaton /0ns t'e Land

Transfers to aliens of a condominium unit may be made only up to the point where

the concomitant transfer of membership or stockholding in the condominium

corporation would not cause the alien interest in such corporation to e"ceed ;>O of its entire capital stock. *&ec 7, $ondominium %ct+

2. Corporaton Leases t'e Land

%ny corporation which is owned 2>>O by a foreign firm may establish aPcondominium corporationP under R.%. 0o. ;5:4 and set up a condominium pro)ecton land leased for a period not to e"ceed *7>+ years. *A9 Apinion 235=+

oreign Investors may lease private lands for a period not e"ceeding fifty *7>+ years,

renewable once for a period of not more than twenty/ five *:7+ years, provided that



the the leased area shall be used solely for the purpose of the investment, and provided further that the leased premises shall comprise such area as may

reasonably be reuired for the purpose of the investment sub)ect however to the$omprehensive %grarian Reform (aw and the (ocal Bovernment $ode. *&ec. ;,

Investor’s (ease %ct+

$. Land s Coo0ned (y t'e nt /0ners

!here the common areas in the condominium pro)ect are owned by the owners of separate units as co/owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyedor transferred to persons other than ilipino citizens, or corporations at least 4>O of the capital stock of which belong to ilipino citizens, e"cept in cases of hereditarysuccession. *&ec. 7, $ondominium %ct+

Anly citizens of the #hilippines, as individuals, may acuire both private lands and

lands of the public domain. Therefore, there can be no )oint ownership of such lands between ilipinos and foreign investors as individuals.

I. /rgna& %egstraton

A. Possesson

%pplicants who by themselves or through their predecessors/in/interest have been inopen, continuous, e"clusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienableand disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownershipsince 9une 2:, 23;7, or earlier. These persons shall be conclusively presumed tohave performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment grant and shall be

entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. *&ec. 2;*2+, #..27:3 and &ec. ;G*b+, $.%. 2;2+

Republic v. 'anover

%n applicant for )udicial confirmation of imperfect title

under # 27:3, sec 2;*2+ in relation to $% 2;2, sec ;G*b+ must prove that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands

of the public domain %0 that they have been in A$?0 possessionand occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership

since 9une 2:, 23;7 or earlier.

'ere, the applicant is not entitled to registration because ithad not proven possession since 23;7, but had only proven such

since 2347.

Cartinez v. $%

!hen the conditions under ;G*b+ of $% 2;2 are compliedwith, the possessor is deemed to have acuired, by operation of law,a right to a grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title beingissued. The land, therefore ceases to be of the public domain, and

beyond the authority of the irector of (ands to dispose of. Theapplication for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of whichdoes not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would beevidenced by the patent and the Torrens Title.

%randa v. Republic *%ug :>22+

The #roperty Registration ecree *#.. 0o. 27:3+ providesfor original registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under &ection 2;*2+ thereof, a petition may be grantedupon compliance with the following reuisites1 *a+ that the propertyin uestion is alienable and disposable land of the public domain6*b+ that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors/in/interest have been in open, continuous, e"clusive and notorious

possession and occupation6 and *c+ that such possession is under abona fide claim of ownership since 9une 2:, 23;7 or earlier.

'eirs of Calabanan v. RepublicQQQ

%pplicants under 2;*2+ of # 27:3 in relation to sec ;G*b+of $% 2;2 acuire ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands

based on the length and uality of their possession. It is sufficientthat the land be declared alienable and disposable at the time of thefiling for the application for )udicial confirmation of imperfect titleand the land need not be alienable and disposable during the entire

period of possession.

B. Prescrpton



%pplicants who have acuired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of the $ivil $ode. *&ec. 2;*:+, #.. 27:3+ #ossession has to be in the

concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. *%rticle 222G, 0$$+.Awnership is acuired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years,

without need of title or of good faith. *%rticle 22=5, 0$$+

(ands of the #ublic omain are outside the commerce of man and conseuentlycannot be acuired through prescription.

'eirs of Calabanan v. RepublicQQQ

Under 2;*:+ of # 27:3, applicants acuire ownership of the lands through prescription in the $ivil $ode. 'owever, the

applicants may only acuire patrimonial lands of the public domain,which only become such after they have been declared alienable

and disposable and there must also be an e"press governmentmanifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer

retained for public service or the development of national wealthunder %rticle ;:: of the $ivil $ode. Anly when the land has

become patrimonial property can the prescriptive period for theacuisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

Ather 0otes1

2. !here the land is owned in common, all the co/owners shall file the application )ointly.

:. If the applicant is not a resident of the #hilippines, he shall file with his

application an instrument in due form appointing an agent upon whom service shall

be made.

=. %pplications for )udicial confirmation of imperfect through possession shall note"tend beyond ecember =2, :>:>.

C. Indgenous Cu&tura& Communtes or Indgenous Peop&es

Cembers of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their

predecessors/in/interest have been in open, continuous, e"clusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture

under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least => years prior to Actober :3, 2335

*approval of the I#R%+ shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all theconditions essential to a Bovernment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title *&ec. ;G*c+, $.%. 2;2 and &ec. 2:, I#R%+.

&aid individually/owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and

actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes,including those with a slope of eighteen percent *2GO+ or more, are herebyclassified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option to register granted under the I#R% must be e"ercised within twenty *:>+years from Actober :3, 2335. *&ec. 2:, I#R%+

D. %egstraton Process and %e)urements

1. 3ursdcton

The RT$ of the province or city where the land is situated shall have e"clusive )urisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands. %n

application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicantLs provided they are situated within the same province or city. *&ec. 25 and 2G, #..27:3+.

The CT$ e"ercises delegated )urisdiction only over original cadastral or landregistration cases where either the sub)ect matter is an uncontested lot or if contested

the value of the lot should not e"ceed #2>>,>>>.>>. *&ec. =;, -.#. 2:3+. Catterssubseuent to the original registration by the CT$ are to be determined by RT$.

*A$% $ircular 0o. =G/35+

2. E,dence

The applicant shall file together with the application all original munimentsof titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the (andRegistration %uthority. *&ec. 25, #.. 27:3+

Republic v. Buinto/%ldana

&ection 25 denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the applicant submit to the court, asidefrom the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, acopy of the duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be



registered. The survey plan is indispensible as it provides areference on the e"act identity of the land.

The submission of a duly e"ecuted blueprint of the survey plan and a duly e"ecuted technical description of the property,

operates as substantial compliance with the legal reuirement of ascertaining the identity of the lots.

&ubmission of the original tracing cloth plan is no longer mandatory in original registration of title.

irector of (ands v. Rivas

The &panish titles informacion possessoria andcomposicion gratuita can no longer be used as bases for applicationfor registration because # G3: discontinued their use as titles of ownership.

?vangelista v. &antiago

#etitioner’s failed to establish legal or euitable title to theland. &panish titles can no longer be presented as proof of

ownership whether in a land registration proceeding or in an actionto remove a cloud on or to uiet title.

Republic v. eliciano

There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion

possessoria held by respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. &uch title, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie

evidence of possession.

irector of (ands v. $%

The classifcation, delimitation and survey o lands o thepublic domain are vested in the President uponrecommendation o the Secretary o the DENR. (Sec. , !.".#$#% The assi&nment o orest land or a&ricultural purposesis vested in the Secretary o the DENR.

$ourt erred in disregarding the certification of the -ureauof oresty that the land became alienable and disposable only in

2342.

Tottoc v. I%$

The mere classification or certification made by the -ureauof orestry that a part of the public domain is timberland is notcontrolling in all cases especially when no actual verification wasmade prior to the issuance of the certification. %s opposed to on/the/spot relocation surveys.

e Fera/$ruz v. Ciguel

Ta" declarations are not proofs of ownership. It is merely anindicium of a claim of ownership or an indicium of possession inthe concept of ownership. 0either ta" receipts nor declarations of

ownership for ta"ation purposes are evidence of ownership or of theright to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.

Fda. e Raz v. $%

Ta" declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof.

% belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that theapplicant had no real claim of ownership of the sub)ect land prior tothe declaration and where there are serious discrepancies in the ta"declarations, as in this case, registration should be denied.

Republic v. Buinto/%ldana

In relation to # 27:3, &ection 2;*2+ / The law speaks of possession and occupation. #ossession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. !hen, therefore, the

law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all/encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with

the words A$?0, the word occupation serves to highlight the factthat for an applicant to ualify, his possession must not be a mere

fiction. %ctual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of



acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturallye"ercise over his own property.

Ta" declarations are a good indication of possession in theconcept of an owner. These documents at least constitute proof that

the holder has a claim of title over the property. %nd a ta"declaration also announces his adverse claim over the land

&outh $ity 'omes v. Republic

Tacking of possession is allowed only when there is privity

of contract or relationship between the previous and present possessor. In the absence of such privity, the possession of the new

occupant should be counted only from the time it actually beganand cannot be lengthened by tacking it to the possession of the

former possessors.

&outh $ity cannot and could not tack the possession of his predecessors to its own for the simple reason that the lands sold to itdid not include the unregistered land. 'ence there was no privitywith regard to the unregistered land.

The $ourt also mentioned that the manner of possession of the predecessors of &outh $ity was insufficient to claim title to theland because it was not e"clusive but shared by the neighbors.

#alali v. %wisan

% person occupying a parcel of land, by himself andthrough his predecessors, en)oys the presumption of ownership.

Respondent failed to prove possession of the property, her claim rests merely on her ta" declaration. -ut ta" declarations, bythemselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real

property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession,the declaration of the land for ta" purposes does not proveownership. Respondent’s ta" declaration, therefore, cannot serve as

basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession of the sub)ect property since before the war.

#ossession coupled with a ta" declaration is a weightyevidence of ownership and is certainly more weighty and

preponderant than a mere ta" declaration alone.

$. Pu(&caton4 5a&ng4 Postng

The notice of initial hearing shall be published once in the Afficial Bazette and oncein a newspaper of general circulation in the #hilippines1 #rovided, however, that the

publication in the Afficial Bazette shall be sufficient to confer )urisdiction upon thecourt.

The notice of initial hearing shall also be posted in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in the application and also in a conspicuous place on the

bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city. *&ec. :;+

Republic v. 'erbieto

The mis)oinder of causes of action and parties does not

affect the )urisdiction of the courts to hear and proceed with theapplication for registration of the two respondents who applied for registration on two separate lands.

The late publication of the 0otice of Initial 'earing in thenewspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at

all, having the same ultimate result. Awing to such defect, the CT$failed to constructively seize the lands and acuire )urisdiction over

the applications for registration. Therefore, the orders of the courtwere void for having been issued by the CT$ without )urisdiction.

*. /pposton and Defau&t

The opposition shall state all the ob)ections to the application and shall setforth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedydesired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some other duly authorized

person. *&ec. :7+

If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court shall,

upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and reuire the applicant to present evidence. !here an appearance has



been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered against personswho did not appear and answer. *&ec. :4+

'eirs of (opez v. ?nriuez

ailure to move to lift the default order does not give a party standing in the case. %s long as the court does not life the

order of general default, petitioners have no legal standing to filethe motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the

applicant.

Covants as mere interested parties, under sec :: of #27:3 are persons to whom the property sub)ect of registration had

been transferred to.

Covants as intervenors/oppositors who seek to uestion the

application for registration must move to lift the general order of default.

Fergel v. $%

In order to have the general order of default lifted, themovant as intervenor/oppositor must show that his failure to timelyfile an opposition is due to fraud, accident, mistake or e"cusableneglect.

There must be an e"press finding of fact of the %C? bythe trial court or court of appeals. ailure to read the publication in

the official gazette or in the newspaper may in itself not beconsidered as e"cusable neglect.

6. Decree and Tt&e

!ithin fifteen days from entry of )udgment, the court shall issue an order directingthe (R$ to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title.

Upon receipt of the order, the (R$ shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original

certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration.

The decree of registration shall be signed by the $ommissioner, entered and filed inthe (and Registration $ommission. The original of the original certificate of titleshall also be signed by the $ommissioner and shall be sent, together with theownerEs duplicate certificate, to the Register of eeds of the city or province wherethe property is situated for entry in his registration book. *&ec. =3, #.. 27:3+

E. %emedes

1. Ne0 Tra&7 %econsderaton

2. Petton for %e&ef from 3udgment

$. Appea&

*. Petton for %e,e0 of t'e Decree of %egstraton

Anly a person, including the government and its branches, deprived of land, anyestate or interest therein by such decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, mayfile in the proper RT$ a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of suchdecree of registration.

Upon the e"piration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the

certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. %ny person aggrieved bysuch decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages

against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

In no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acuired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be pre)udiced. !henever the phrase Pinnocent purchaser for valueP or an euivalent

phrase occurs in this ecree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. *&ec. =:, #.. 27:3+

-aldoz v. #apa



% final decree of registration issued pursuant to registration proceedings is reviewable only within one year from the entry of

the decree of registration and upon the ground of actual fraud.

urther, any petition to set aside the decree of registration

and reopen the registration proceedings must be filed in the form of a motion in the same registration proceeding where the decree wasissued, and not in the form of a separate action like the present.

$risolo v. $%

%n oppositor who abandoned his opposition during the landregistration proceedings is not entitled to a reopening of the

proceedings by virtue of a petition for review of the decree of registration. &uch remedy is available only to persons who were

fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard.

Coreover, there must be actual or e"trinsic fraud and notintrinsic fraud to entitle one to reopen the proceedings.

$al v. osa

raud may be actual or constructive. %ctual or positivefraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of

misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. $onstructivefraud is construed as fraud because of its detrimental effect upon

public interests and public confidence, even though the act is notdone with actual design to commit positive fraud or in)ury upon

other persons.

raud may also either be e"trinsic or intrinsic. raud isregarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issueinvolved in the original action, or where the acts constituting thefraud could have been litigated therein. raud is regarded ase"trinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from

presenting his entire case to the court or where it operates uponmatters pertaining not to the )udgment itself but to the manner in

which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the

controversy. ?"trinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to thetransaction.

or fraud to )ustify a petition for review, it must be e"trinsicor collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been

controverted or resolved in the case where the )udgment sought to be annulled was rendered.

The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent schemeof the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day incourt. The fraud is one that affects and goes into the )urisdiction of the court.

'owever, a petition for review cannot be based on allegedfraud that goes into the merits of the case and is intrinsic and not

collateral, and has been controverted and decided.

il/?state Canagement v. Trono%n application for registration of a parcel of land already

covered by a Torrens Title is actually a collateral attack against theTitle not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a TorrensTitle.

% Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked6 the issue onthe validity of title can only be raised in an action e"pressly

instituted for the purpose.

It is too late to uestion petitioner’s titles considering thatthe $ertificates of Title issued have become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration.

6. Acton for %econ,eyance

If property is acuired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force

of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person fromwhom the property comes. *%rticle 2;74, 0$$+

(opez v. $%



There are two kinds of implied trusts1 resulting trusts andconstructive trusts.

% resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated bythe parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of

their transaction but not e"pressed in the deed itself. Resulting trustsare based on the euitable doctrine that valuable consideration andnot legal title determines the euitable title or interest and are

presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.

% constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing adirect intention to create a trust, by operation of law in order tosatisfy the demands of )ustice and to prevent un)ust enrichment. It israised by euity in respect of property, which has been acuired byfraud or where although acuired without fraud, it is against euitythat it should be retained by the person holding it.

&alao v. &alao

Implied trusts are those which, without being e"pressed, arededucible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law asmatters of euity, independently of the particular intention of the

parties.

% resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raisedor created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restrictedsense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed alwaysto have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which

is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not e"pressed inthe deed or instrument of conveyance.

% constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of lawor by operation of law. In a more restricted sense, a constructivetrust is a trust not created by any words, either e"pressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by theconstruction of euity in order to satisfy the demands of )ustice. Itdoes not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law.

0o resulting trust was created in this case because there wasnever any intention to create one. 0either was there a constructive

trust because the registration of the land was not procured throughfraud or mistake.

Carcopper Cining v. BarciaThere is nothing to support Carcopper’s contention that an

implied or constructive trust was created in its favor. %n implied or constructive trust presupposes the e"istence of a defrauded partywho is the rightful owner of the disputed property. 'ere, aside fromthe fact that petitioner’s predecessor never applied for a free patent,it does not allege any relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, with therespondent to )ustify the creation of a trust.

Cunicipality of Fictorias v. $%

!hen respondent obtained a new T$T in her name, she hadno legal right to do so of the disputed portion of land because shedid not own such property since it had been previously sold by her grandmother to the Cunicipality.

Thus, where the land is decreed in the name of a personthrough fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of lawconsidered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the personsfrom whom the property comes. The beneficiary shall have the rightto enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of theTorrens Title and the trustee and his successors/in/interest are boundto e"ecute a deed of reconveyance.

?sconde v. -arlongay

%n action for reconveyance is a legal and euitable remedygranted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.



%n action for reconveyance does not seek to reopen the proceedings and set aside the decree of registration, but only to

show that the registered owner is not the real owner thereof.

Reconveyance here is not the proper remedy because there

was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of the title, nor in the proceedings. #etitioner was had knowledge of the proceedings butopted not to participate therein.

%lamarza v. %rguelles

The remedy of the landowner whose property has beenwrongfully or erroneously registered in the another’s name is, after

one year from the date of the decree, is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to

review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of )usticefor reconveyance of the property or if the property had passed into

the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

9oauin v. $o)uangco

It seems that the action is for reconveyance, on the theorythat the original registered owners were administrators of the landsand hence held them in a fiduciary capacity. %nd assuming this wasthe case, the disabilities imposed by such relationship did note"tend to the transferees of said administrators, who acuired theland for value and claimed adverse title in themselves.

The action for reconveyance on the theory of trust might

prosper against the trustees and provided they still hold the property, but not as against third persons who do not occupy thesame fiduciary position.

0aval v. $%

0otwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title, theregistered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered

property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is thatreconveyance does not set aside or re/sub)ect to review the findings

of fact of the -ureau of (ands. In an action for reconveyance, thedecree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. !hat is

sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name,

to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.

%n action for reconveyance does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.

Hhemani v. 'eirs of Trinidad

%ction for reconveyance applies to a patent issued by theirector of (ands, approved by &ecretary of 0atural Resources, and

signed by the #resident. The date of issuance of the patentcorresponds to the date of entry of the decree of registration in

ordinary cases.

-autista/-or)a v. -autista%n action for reconveyance based on a void contract does

not prescribe. 'owever, if the court finds that the contract is merelyvoidable, then the action is sub)ect to prescription.

(abiste v. (abiste

E'press trusts are created by direct and positive acts o theparties, by some ritin& or deed, or ill, or by ords eithere'pressly or impliedly evincin& an intention to create a trust.

#rescription will only run from the time the e"press trust is

repudiated. or acuisitive prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an e"press trust for the recovery of property held in trust it must be shown that1

2. The trustee has performed uneuivocal acts of repudiationamounting to an ouster of the cestui ue trust

:. &uch positive acts have been made known to the cesui uetrust

=. The evidence is clear and conclusive.



% trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held intrust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the

registration. The rule reuires a repudiation to be dulycommunicated to the beneficiary.

The only act that can be construed as repudiation is the petition for reconstitution of title.

&anto v. 'eirs of (ustre

The action for reconveyance on the ground that the

certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of saleis virtually an action for the declaration of its 8deed of sale< nullity,

which does not prescribe.

Coreover, a person acuiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the

benefit of the real owner of the property. %n action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. %ndin such case, the prescriptive period applies only when there is anactual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in

possession of the property.

Atherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when anaction for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in thenature of a suit for uieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

Rementizo v 'eirs of #elagia

The right to seek reconveyance of registered property is notabsolute because it is sub)ect to e"tinctive prescription of a periodof 2> years 8obligation created by law<. %nd the 2> year period isreckoned from the date of issuance of the $ertificate of Title.

The title to the land was registered in 23G5 and thecomplaint was filed only in 233G hence the action is barred by

prescription.

In some cases the $ourt had used as starting point the dateof the actual discovery of the fraud, instead of the date of issuance

of the certificate of title. In those cases, however, there were evident bad faith, misrepresentation, and fraudulent machinations employed

by the registered owners in securing titles over the disputed lots.

#rescription of %ction for Reconveyance1

2. our years from knowledge if registration through fraud.:. Ten years from issuance of title if registration through mistake.=. Imprescriptible if trustee is in possession *Suieting of Title+;. Imprescriptible if registration based on an e"press trust unless

repudiated.

". Acton for Damages

!hen the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become

incontrovertible, the person aggrieved by such decree of registration may pursue hisremedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsiblefor the fraud.

#ino v. $%

!here the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor

when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely onwhat appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to

e"cite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation tolook beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor

appearing on the face of said certificate.

If an action for reconveyance cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring anaction for damages against those who caused the fraud or wereinstrumental in depriving him of the property. %nd such action

prescribes in 2> years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.

8. Acton aganst t'e Assurance +und

#. 9uetng of Tt&e



Realty &ales v. I%$

The action filed by $arpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. -y assertingits own title to the property in uestion and asking that $arpo’s title

be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third/partycomplaint against S$$, Realty was similarly asking the court toremove clouds from its own title.

&uits to uiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor arethey, strictly, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The

)udgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

Camadsual v. Coson

%n action to uiet title is imprescriptible if plaintiffs are in possession of the property.

In an action to uiet title, the plaintiff must have legal or euitable title. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be the registeredowner of the property in uestion. Ane who has an euitable rightor interest in the property may also file an action to uiet title under the law. Thus JtitleK can connote acuisitive prescription by

possession in the concept of an owner.

#reviously, the $ourt considered the action to be one for

uieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual

possession since time immemorial of the property in uestion bythemselves and through their predecessors/in/interest, whiledefendants secured a certificate of title through fraud,misrepresentation, and deceit.

a)a v. $%

The counterclaim of a)a for reconveyance of the propertyhas not prescribed. %n action to uiet title to property in the

possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. 'ere, since a)a claims in

her answer with counterclaim that she with her predecessors had been in possession for more than => years, her action for

reconveyance in effects seeks to uiet her title to property, henceimprescriptible.

Ane who is in actual possession of a piece of land claimingto be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or histitle is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reasonfor the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him acontinuing right to seek the aid of a court of euity to ascertain anddetermine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its

effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one whois in possession.

$ourt held here that the right to uiet title, seek reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering the propertyaccrues only when the possessor is made aware of the adverse claim

and only then does the prescriptive period begin to run.

The e"istence of a $ertificate of title is not conclusive onthe uestion of ownership of the land in controversy, because thevalidity of such a certificate is put in issue by allegations of fraudand misrepresentation.

Rumarate v. 'ernandez

or an action to uiet title to prosper, two indispensiblereuisites must concur, namely1 2. The plaintiff has a legal or aneuitable title to or interest in the real property sub)ect of the action6

and :. The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to becasting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legalefficacy.

Title to property is that upon which ownership is based. It isthe evidence of the right of the owner or the e"tent of his interest,

by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a rightto e"clusive possession and en)oyment of the property.



$onsidering that Rumarate was in possession, the action touiet title cannot prescribe.

0otwithstanding that the land should be awarded toRumarate, their title is imperfect and is still sub)ect to the filing of

the proper application for confirmation of title. Its premature toissue a certificate of title in the name of Rumarate.

$aero v. U#

The petitioner’s action to uiet title had already prescribed because

he was never 8or was not able to show< in possession over thedisputed lot. An the other hand, U# was able to prove possession

through the buildings and structures which it controls andmaintains.

!. Cance&&aton n,o&,ng Dou(&e Tt&e

#a)omayo v. Canipon

It is the settled rule in this )urisdiction that where twocertificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same

parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration

where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the personholding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against

the person who relies on the second certificate.

'ere, #a)omayo A$T was issued in 23=2 and CaniponA$T only in 2375, hence #a)omayo A$T, and T$T thereafter

prevails.

1:. Acton for %e,erson

Republic v. $%

If a person is able to register land which cannot beregistered under the Torrens &ystem, or when the irector of (andsdid not have )urisdiction over the land because it is timber land, the

grantee does not, by virtue of the certificate of title alone, becomethe owner of the land illegally registered.

The patent or title issued is void since the officer whoissued it had no authority to do so.

Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may beordered cancelled and the cancellation may be pursued through anordinary action therefore. The action cannot be barred by prior

)udgment of the land registration court since the said court had no )urisdiction over the sub)ect matter.

?ven granting that the irector of (ands was negligent in

failing to oppose the registration, it is a well/settled rule that theRepublic is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of

its officials or agents.

$onseuently, the &tate may still seek cancellation of the title issuedas such has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot beinvoked against the &tate.

+. Cadastra& %egstraton

1. Nature and Purpose

Republic vs. Fera

% $adastral proceeding is in rem. #arties are precluded

from re/litigating the same issues already determined by final )udgment.

Ane of the main purposes of a cadastral proceeding is tosettle titles to lands. %nyone claiming ownership of any land soaffected should lay claim. ailure to do so authorizes the court todeclare the land public.

'eirs of (uzuriaga vs. Republic



#ublication is a condition sine qua non for the RT$ actingas a cadastral court to acuire )urisdiction. ue publication is

reuired to give notice to all interested parties of the claim andidentity of the property to be surveyed.

%nd any additional territory or change in the area cannot beincluded by amendment without new publication.

-ut where the identity of the land and area of the claimed property is not the sub)ect of the amendment but other collateralmatters, new publication is not needed.

Feranga vs. Republic

0o publication, then the decision is void for having beenrendered without )urisdiction.

2. 3ursdcton

uran vs. Alivia

% piece of land, registered through a homestead patentunder the land registration act cannot be the sub)ect matter of acadastral proceeding and any title issued thereon is null and void.

$adastral court has no )urisdiction over registered land.

Canotok Realty vs. $(T Realty

9urisdiction of $adastral $ourt is limited to1

2. Technical errors in the description of the lands provided they donot impair the substantial rights of the registered owner and

cannot operate to deprive the registered owner of his title.:. etermine between : parties who has a better right over the

property or which of the conflicting titles should prevail=. Upon reuest of the registered owner, the cadastral court can

issue new title.

!hat is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is theregistration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the

name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title alreadyissued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to

impair his substantial rights.

$. ;'en +&ed<

!hen in the opinion of the #resident of the #hilippines public interest so reuiresthat title to any unregistered lands be settled and ad)udicated, he may order theirector of (ands to cause to be made a cadastral survey of the lands. *&ec. =7*a+,#.. 27:3+

!hen the lands have been surveyed or plotted, the irector of (ands, represented bythe &olBen, shall institute original registration proceedings by filing the necessary

petition in the RT$ of the place where the land is situated against the holders,claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in

substance that public interest reuires that the title to such lands be settled andad)udicated and praying that such titles be so settled and ad)udicated. *&ec. =4, #..

27:3+

*. 3udgment and Decree

%ll conflicting interests shall be ad)udicated by the court and decrees awarded infavor of the persons entitled to the lands or to parts thereof and such decrees shall bethe basis for issuance of original certificates of title in favor of said persons andshall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under ordinary land registration proceedings. *&ec. =G, #..27:3+

. Su(se)uent %egstraton

A. Nature and Effects

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar

as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this ecree, the registrationshall be made in the office of the Register of eeds for the province or city where

the land lies. *&ec. 72+



?very conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, )udgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the

Register of eeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, beconstructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or

entering. *&ec. 7:+

#rimary ?ntry -ook. ?ach R shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, allinstruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating toregistered land. 'e shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they

were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and thememorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it

refers, shall bear the same date. *&ec. 74+

$arry/Aver. If, at the time of any transfer, subsisting encumbrances or annotationsappear in the registration book, they shall be carried over and stated in the new

certificate or certificates, e"cept so far as they may be simultaneously released or discharged. *&ec. 73+

$ampillo v. $%

% sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a privatetransaction or of a foreclosure or e"ecution sale, becomes legally

effective against third persons only from the date of its registration.Under the Torrens &ystem, registration is the operative act that gives

validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.

% bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an

auction sale acuires good title as against a prior transferee of same property if such prior transfer was unrecorded at the time of theauction sale.

'eirs of Carasigan v. I%$

% prior deed of sale registered only after the annotation of anotice of lis pendens will not defeat the right of the plaintiff, who

caused the annotation of the annotation of the notice, whosubseuently obtains a favorable )udgment.

The first buyer who is late in registering the sale is bound by the outcome of the litigation since registration is operative act

which creates constructive notice to the whole world. #rior to theregistration of the sale, it did not bind third persons.

Barcia v. $%The general rule is that in case of two certificates of title,

purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,whether the land comprised in the later certificate be wholly, or onlyin part, comprised in the earlier certificate. %nd in successiveregistration, the person claiming under the prior certificate isentitled to the estate or interest.

The ma"im prior est in tempore potior est in jure *he who

is first in time is preferred in rights+ is followed in land registrationmatters.

In cases of involuntary registration, an entry in the day book 8primary entry book< is a sufficient notice to all persons evenif the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is not presented.

In case of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and the holder of the certificate of title, the moment he presents anotarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day

book and at the same time the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented or surrendered, and pays the fees.

Cingoa v. (and Registration %dministrator

The date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp or registry receipt, of an instrument to the R for purposes of registration should be considered the date of filing and receiptthereof by the R. It is this date that should be entered in the

primary entry book of the R, which shall be regarded as the dateof its registration.

Rodriguez v. $%



The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage is avoluntary instrument and as such registration is the operative act to

convey and affect the land.

&ection 77 of # 27:3 reuires the presentation of the

owner’s duplicate certificate of title for the registration of any deedor voluntary instrument.

The reason for reuiring the production of the owner’sduplicate is that, being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to

be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument andwould willingly surrender his duplicate in order to accomplish suchregistration.

'owever, where the owner refuses to surrender the

duplicate, the grantee may file an adverse claim in the R.

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over real property where theregistration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for bythe law, and serves notice and warning to third parties.

'ere, no effort was made to secure the duplicate from themortgagee who was in possession of the T$T. %nd moreover sincethe instrument is a registerable instrument and no )ustifiable reasonwas shown why the deed could not be registered, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration.

B. o&untary Dea&ngs

0o voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of eeds, unless theownerEs duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, e"cept in casese"pressly provided for in this ecree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.*&ec. 7=+

C. In,o&untary Dea&ngs

1. Attac'ments

2. Suts4 3udgments4 Decrees

$. +orec&osure

*. Ad,erse C&am

!hoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registeredowner, arising subseuent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other

provision is made in this ecree for registering the same, make a statement under oath setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whomacuired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner,the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of

registration. -efore or after the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claimmay be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest1

#rovided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on thesame ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

-efore the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim byfiling with the Register of eeds a sworn petition to that effect. *&ec. 5>+

%rrazola v. -ernas

%n adverse claimant must be one who claims any right or

interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arisingsubseuent ot the original registration. That interest is registerable

as an adverse claim if no other provision is made for its registration.

The claim of a person that she has hereditary rights in theland fraudulently registered in her sister’s name because the land

belonged to their mother, whose estate is pending settlement in aspecial proceeding, is a registerable as an adverse claim. %nd eventhough the will is yet pending probate.

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title tothe disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is acontroversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and

protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the



controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transactionregarding the disputed land is sub)ect to the outcome of the dispute.

%lfredo v. -orras

!hen ownership or title passes to the buyer, the seller

ceases to have any title to transfer to any third person. If the seller sells the same land to another, the second buyer who has actual or constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot be a registrant inBood aith. &uch second buyer in - cannot defeat the first buyer’stitle. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer mayseek reconveyance of the property sub)ect of the sale.

'ere, the adverse claim on the land was registered on eb G.%nd the sale, as shown on the deeds of sale, was dated eb ::.

'ence the :nd buyers are charged with constructive notice of theadverse claim and the defect in the title of the sellers.

(eonardo v. Caravilla

%n adverse claim does toll the running of the prescriptive period to demand for specific performance based on a contract of sale.

The procedure for registration of voluntary instruments is provided for by law. -ut where the vendor refuses to deliver to the

vendee the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, which title must be presented in order that the deed of conveyance may be registered

and the corresponding T$T may be issued, the vendee may file an

adverse claim.

The adverse claim here was ineffective because for anadverse claim to be valid it must be shown that a demand was madeon the vendor and that he refused to surrender the owner’s duplicatecertificate of title.

&a)onas v. $%

The cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary torender it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain

annotated and continue as a lien on the property.

The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the

validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford theadverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venuewhere the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determine the e"istence of anyencumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is inline with the effect that no second adverse claim shall be registered

by the same claimant after cancellation.

$hing v. ?nrile

%n adverse claim remains effective even after the lapse of the =>/day period as long as it isn’t cancelled.

!here a party has knowledge of a prior e"isting interest,which is unregistered at the time he acuired a right to the sameland, his knowledge of that prior interest has the effect of registration as to him.

'ere, petitioner’s adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled with the fact that they are in possession of thedisputed property. These circumstances should have put ?nrile onguard and reuired him to ascertain the property being offered tohem has already been sold to another to prevent in)ury to prior innocent buyers.

% purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should puta reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted ingood faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of thevendor.

Coreover, regardless of the non/registration of the deed of sale and the =>/day effectivity of the adverse claim, ?nrile was

constructively notified of the prior sale because the adverse claim



was readily perceivable as an annotation on the dorsal part onCemorandum of ?ncumbrances.

6. Ls Pendens

I. Non%egstra(&e Propertes

A. Ina&ena(&e Lands of t'e Pu(&c Doman

B. Lands a&ready regstered under t'e Torrens System.

II. Innocent Purc'aser +or a&ue

The RT$ shall not entertain a petition for review of the decree of registration wherean innocent purchaser for value has acuired the land or an interest therein, whoserights may be pre)udiced. !henever the phrase Pinnocent purchaser for valueP or aneuivalent phrase occurs in this ecree, it shall be deemed to include an innocentlessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. *&ec. =:, #.. 27:3+

Buaranteed 'omes v. 'eirs of Faldez 8755 &$R% ;;2<

It is basic that a person dealing with registered property

need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor/in/interest. &ince Pthe act of registration is the

operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third personsare concerned,K it follows that where there is nothing in the

certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not

reuired to e"plore farther than what the Torrens title upon its faceindicates in uest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may

subseuently defeat his right thereto.

It is enough that petitioner had e"amined the latestcertificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of theimmediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not

bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the property.

?ven assuming arguendo that the e"tra)udicial settlementwas a forgery, the $ourt still has to uphold the title of petitioner.

The case law is that although generally a forged or fraudulent deedis a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when such a

fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. %nd onesuch instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred

from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained

that way, the land was subseuently sold to an innocent purchaser.or then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in thecertificate.

$lemente v. Razo 8;7: &$R% 543<

%ny buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrenscertificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligatedto look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. %nd, he is charged withnotice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.

'owever when the party has actual knowledge of facts andcircumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to makesuch inuiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or thelack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce areasonably prudent man to inuire into the status of the title of the

property in litigation. The presence of anything which e"cites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond thecertificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on theface of said certificate. Ane who falls within the e"ception canneither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a

purchaser in good faith6 and hence does not merit the protection of

the law.

$abuhat v. $% 8=44 &$R% 254<

9ust as an innocent purchaser for value, a mortgagee mayrely on what appears on the face of the Torrens title. %nd when aninnocent mortgagee acuires rights over the mortgaged property, thecourt cannot disregard such rights which must be respected and

protected.



% mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on thecertificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as security

and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has noobligation to undertake further investigation. 'ence, even if the

mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title

to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith isnonetheless entitled to protection.

&an Roue v. Republic 87=: &$R% ;3=<

The adverse claim of the Republic by virtue of thee"propriation proceedings will not defeat the rights of &an Rouewhich acuired the sub)ect lot for value and free from any lien andwithout knowledge of the Republic’s adverse claim.

The Republic’s claim may have given &an Roue’s predecessors/in/interest, the sellers, voidable title to the sub)ect

properties. 'owever, prior to the acuisition by &an Roue, the lothad been subdivided and covered by separate titles of thesubseuent transferees. These titles, which includes the sub)ect

properties, have not been voided at the time of the sale to &anRoue. %s such &an Roue acuired good title, having purchasedthem in good faith and for value and without notice of the seller’sdefect of title, if any.

?state of @u)uico v. Republic 87=5 &$R% 72=<

?uitable estoppel may be invoked against publicauthorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to

innocent purchasers for value and the government did not undertakeany act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.

!here the title of an innocent purchaser for value whorelied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be cancelledand the e"cess land to be reverted to the Bovernment, we ruled thatit is only fair and reasonable to apply the euitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an in)ustice toinnocent purchasers for value.

!hile the general rule is that an action to recover lands of the public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by

laches or estoppel. &ection =:, # 27:3 recognizes rights of innocent purchasers over and above the interests of the government.

?state of Alaguer v. Ang)oco 874= &$R% =5=<

%ccording to the provisions of %rt. 2G5; of the civil code,when the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is madethrough an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing.%bsent this reuirement, the sale shall be void. %lso under %rt 2G5G,a &#% is necessary in order for an agent to enter into a contract bywhich ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acuired, either gratuitously or for value.

'ere, the good faith of Ang)oco hinges on the e"istence of the written power of attorney.

!hile the law reuires a &#%, the B#% was sufficient as theagent was e"pressly empowered to sell any of the principal’s

properties. ?ven if a document is designated as B#%, thereuirement of &#% is met if there is a clear mandate from the

principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act. The&#% can be included in the general power when the act or

transaction for which the special power is reuired is specifiedtherein.

E=ceptons to t'e IP>

&anchez v. Suinio 8;4= &$R% ;52<It is a settled rule that when two certificates of title are

issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successiveregistrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land,the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as againsta person who relies on a subseuent certificate.



%s between two persons both of whom are in good faithand both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and

prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of avendor bereft of any transmissible rights.

Torres v. $%

Coreover, even if we grant Cota the status of an innocentmortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that aforged instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot beapplied where the owner still holds a valid and e"isting certificateof title covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine wouldapply rather when the forger thru insidious means obtains theownerEs duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, andsubseuently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon theowner *&ec. 77, %ct ;346 &ec. 7=, #.. 0o. 27:3+. -ut if the owner

holds a valid and e"isting certificate of title, his would beindefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocentholderEs. !Prior tempore potior jure"

&pouses %brigo v. e Fera

-etween two buyers of the same immovable property

registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to *2+ the first registrant in good faith6 *:+ then, the first

possessor in good faith6 and *=+ finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if

the property is not registered under the Torrens system.

&ince the land was already registered under the Torrens&ystem, the registration of the sale to %brigo under %ct ==;; wasnot effective to bind the land for purposes of ouble &ales.Registration must be done in the proper registry to bing the land.

An the other hand, the registration of e Fera under theTorrens system should prevail over that of %brigo considering theregistration was done in good faith.

ouble &ales reuires the second buyer to acuired theimmovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.

$onstructive notice to the second buyer through registrationunder %ct ==;; 8which governs the registration of all instruments of land neither covered by the &panish Cortgage (aw nor the Torrens&ystem< does not apply if the property is registered under theTorrens.

$oronel v. I%$ 8277 &$R% :5>

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under theTorrens &ystem, does not necessarily make the possessor a true

owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains atitle, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or

oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrenssystems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the

owner of the lands illegally included.

The buyer does not own the land mistakenly included in theT$T issued to him.

#rivate evelopment v. $% 8;57 &$R% 732<

$oncededly, a person, be he a buyer or mortgagee, dealingwith a titled property, as the e"terior lot is, is not reuired to go

beyond what appears on the face of the covering title itself.Unfortunately for petitioner #$#, however, the aforementioned

rule does not apply to banks.

-anks, indeed, should e"ercise more care and prudence indealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for their

business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, %ct ;34, e"tended only to purchasers for

value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the samecharacter and description.



Tio v. %bayata 8774 &$R% 257<

The rule has always been that every person dealing withregistered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificateof title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go

beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

'owever, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond thecertificate of title and make inuiries concerning the actual

possessor. % buyer of real property which is in possession of another must be wary and investigate the rights of the latter.Atherwise, without such inuiry, the buyer cannot be said to be ingood faith and cannot have any right over the property.

Tio were without actual knowledge of the claim of %bayata,which was not discoverable by them, after e"amining the title, its

annotations and after an inspection of the property. The -ank ledthem to believe that the possessors were mere suatters on the land.Tio is entitled to the status as innocent purchasers for value.

?"presscredit inancing v. Felasco 8;5= &$R% 75><

To fulfill the reuirement of good faith, it is imperative for a mortgagee of the land, in the possession of persons not themortgagor, to inuire and investigate into the rights or title of thosein possession. It is true that a person dealing with the owner of registered land is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title. 'emay rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property

annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation.'owever, we note that the Barcia spouses are unlike other mortgagors. They are in the business of constructing and sellingtownhouses and are past masters in real estate transactions. urther,

petitioner is in the business of e"tending credit to the public,including real estate loans. In both these businesses, it devolvesupon both, greater charge than ordinary buyers or encumbrancersfor value, who are not in such venture. It is standard in their

business, as a matter of due diligence reuired of banks and

financing companies, to ascertain whether the property beingoffered as security for the debt has already been sold to another to

prevent in)ury to prior innocent buyers. They also have theresources to ascertain any encumbrances over the properties they

are dealing with.

'ere, ?$ through its agents who made an ocular inspection were already informed of the previous sale of the land toFelasco’s but despite knowledge of the unregistered sale stillaccepted the mortgage. ?$ was a mortgagee and purchaser in badfaith.

rancisco v. $% 827= &$R% ==><

There were in a word sufficiently strong indications to

impel a closer inuiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two *:+ smaller lots embraced in the purchase on the part of

$asimiro ?spiritu and his co/vendees. That inuiry is in truthdictated by common sense, e"pected of a man of ordinary prudence.PThe earth,P it has been said, is Pthat universal manuscript open tothe eyes of all. !hen a man proposes to buy or deal with realty hisfirst duty is to read this public manuscript, that is, to look and seewho is there upon it, and what are his rights.

'ad that inuiry been made, the adverse claim of $andidorancisco over the two *:+ small lots would have immediately come

to light, and the controversy would have died a/borning The?spiritus failure to undertake such an inuiry precludes their

successful invocation of the character of purchasers in good faith.P% want to caution and diligence which an honest man of ordinary

prudence is accustomed to e"ercise in making purchases is, incontemplation of law, a want of good faith.P The buyer who couldnot have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was inthe adverse possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith, suchknowledge being euivalent to registration.

&armiento v. $% 8;5> &$R% 33<



Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser may be considereda purchaser in good faith when he has e"amined the latest certificate

of title. %n e"ception to this rule is when there e"ist important factsthat would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go

beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it.

Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately ignores asignificant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwisereasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.

!here, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is reuired to go beyond

the certificate of title to make inuiries concerning the rights of theactual possessor. ailure to do so would make him a purchaser in

bad faith.

(epanto $onsolidated v. umyung 8G3 &$R% 7=:<

% certificate of title is void when covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. %ndany title issued on non/disposable lots even in the hands of allegedinnocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

% transferee can set up the defense of I#F but the applicanthimself cannot.

%bad v. Buimba 8;47 &$R% =74<

The law reuires a higher degree of prudence from one who

buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the

land ob)ect of the transaction is registered. !hile one who buysfrom the registered owner does not need to look behind thecertificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registeredowner is e"pected to e"amine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for one to determine if there areany flaws in the title of the transferor, or in the capacity to transfer the land. The same rule applies to mortgagees.

'ere, %bad the mortgagee failed to inuire into theauthority of dela $ruz to mortgage the property. %nd even if dela

$ruz pretended to be Buimba, %bad failed to inuire into theidentity of the person he was dealing with. %bad is in -ad aith.

*0ote1 To be considered as an I#F, the seller must be theregistered owner himself.+

Arduna v. uentebella 89une :3, :>2><

-asic is the rule that a buyer of a piece of land which is in

the actual possession of persons other than the seller must be waryand should investigate the rights of those in possession. Atherwise,

without such inuiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer ingood faith. !hen a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty

is to read the public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is thereupon it and what his rights are. % want of caution and diligence

which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed toe"ercise in making purchases is, in contemplation of law, a want of

good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that theland sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in

bad faith.

'ere, the subseuent purchasers failed to make anyinuiries into the possession of Arduna, which if they did theywould have discovered the adverse claim of Arduna. They cannot

be considered purchasers in good faith.

?rena v. Suerrer/Hauffman 8;3: &$R% :3G<

Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the

certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as securityand in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has noobligation to undertake further investigation. 'ence, even if themortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid titleto, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith isnonetheless entitled to protection.

This doctrine presupposes, however, that the mortgagor,

who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeededin obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his name and that,



after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the propertyto another who relies on what appears on the said title. The innocent

purchaser *mortgagee in this case+ for value protected by law is onewho purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed e#ecuted b$ the

registered o%ner himself not by a forged deed, as the law e"pressly

states.

&uch is not the situation of petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors pretending to be the registered owners but who are not

said owners. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith does not applyto a situation where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner

and the mortgagor is a different person pretending to be the owner.In such a case, the mortgagee is not an innocent mortgagee for

value and the registered owner will generally not lose his title.

Land Registration With Jurisprudence

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