Land Property Rights and International Migration:

Evidence from Mexico

Michele Valsecchi�

University of Gothenburg

First version: April 2010This version: 13 December 2010

Abstract

In this paper we ask whether there is a relationship between land property rights

and international migration. In order to identify the impact of property rights,

we consider a country-wide land certi�cation program, which took place in Mexico

throughout the 1990s. Our identi�cation strategy exploits the timing of the program

and the heterogeneity in farmers� eligibility into the program. We �nd that the

change in de facto property rights is associated with a 13 percent increase in the

likelihood of having a member abroad. The program explains a relevant share of

the increase in US-Mexican migration between 1994 and 1997. In this respect, we

contribute to the current debate on the determinants of Mexican emigration (Hanson

2006, Hanson and McIntosh 2009, Hanson and McIntosh forthcoming).

Key words: International migration, property rights, land titling, land reform.

JEL Classi�cation codes: F22, D23, Q15.

�I am grateful to Jean-Marie Baland, Gordon Hanson, Karen Macours, Mariapia Mendola, Ola Olsson,Måns Soderbom, Yanos Zylberberg and seminar participants at the University of Gothenburg, EUDN2010 Workshop in Clermont-Ferrand, NCDE 2010 Conference in Helsinki, 3rd International Conferenceon Migration and Development at Paris School of Economics, LACEA 2010 Annual Meeting in Medellin.This paper started from an early project with Mariapia Mendola. I wish to thank Elisabeth Sadouletand Alain de Janvry for providing access to the data. Research funding was provided by AdlerbertskaStudentbostadsstiftelsen. Previous versions of this paper circulated with the title "Land Certi�cation andInternational Migration: Evidence from Mexico". Email address: michele.valsecchi@economics.gu.se. Allerrors are my own.

1

1 Introduction

Between 1990 and 2005 the share of Mexican population in the United States passed

from 5,2% to 10,2% (Hanson and McIntosh 2010). During the same period remittances

from the US to Mexico rose from US$2,5 to US$21,7 billions, with an average of US$7,5,

or 59% of net FDI (World Bank 2010). Mexico is the major sending country to the US

both in terms of legal and illegal migrants: 56% of the 10,3 million Mexicans in the US

in 2004 were illegal (Passel 2004). In turn, illegal immigration causes a huge pressure on

the US Government to limit border-crossing (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), drives the

political fortunes of US Governors (Hanson 2005) and stands high in the agenda of every

US Presidential candidate. Understanding what drives this migration �ow is critical for

any assessment of its future pattern and the design of any policy (Hanson 2006).

Although recent contributions attribute a large share of this rise to demographic

reasons (Hanson and McIntosh 2009, 2010), much remains to be understood. The Mex-

ican Government implemented various policies in the 1990s which may have a¤ected

migration and about which we lack rigorous econometric evidence (Hanson 2006). We

contribute to this literature by showing that changes in land property rights in the 1990s

did a¤ect migration to the US.

The research questions are: is there a relationship between land property rights and

US-Mexican migration? If there is any, do better de�ned property rights slow down or

speed up migration �ows?

In order to identify the impact of property rights on migration behavior, we make use

of a land certi�cation program, called Procede, which took place in Mexico throughout

the 1990s and targeted all ejido land in the country. Ejidos are areas of land allocated in

usufruct to groups of farmers, called ejidatarios, which include about 60% of agricultural

land in the country (Velez 1995). Procede provided households with certi�cates over their

housing plot, their individuals plots and their right to use the common land. By providing

certainty over their rights, these certi�cates may have led households to relocate their

labor supply in favor of o¤-farm activities, like migration. In order to count for potential

omitted variable bias, we exploit program timing and households�s eligibility into the

program. We �nd that the program is associated with a 13 percent increase in the

probability of having a member currently abroad or having been abroad recently. The

impact explains almost one third of the dramatic increase in migration rates between

1994 and 1997 that we register in our data1.

1Migrant households increase from 15% in 1994 to 29% in 1997. Since our treatment group constitutes

2

The paper also contribute to the literature on land property rights and titling pro-

grams, and to the literature on international migration. First, we contribute to the

literature on international migration. In a recent survey on this vast literature, Hanson

(2010) argues that, notwithstanding recent rise in global migration, it is very challeng-

ing to reconcile the level of global migrants (about 3% of global population) with large

and persistent wage di¤erentials across countries. This is even more puzzling in case

of Mexico, where borders are porous and illegal migration widespread. Hanson (2006)

calculates than at the existing wage rates (con�rmed by Rosenzweig 2007), it would take

less than two months for a migrant with 5-8 years of education to recoup the costs of

crossing the border.

There are two sets of explanations. First, if migrants self-selection is positive, then

the real wage di¤erential is lower than average earning di¤erences. This may not apply

as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) �nd that migrant�s selection in Mexico is intermediate2.

Second, there must be large unobserved costs preventing potential migrants from leaving

(psychic costs, credit constraints, uncertainty at destination). However, rather than

identifying these costs, the literature has focussed on the role of networks at destination

in mitigating them (see Munshi 2003, McKenzie and Rapoport 2007 and references

therein). This paper contributes to this literature by identifying a strong yet neglected

determinants of migration: tenure (in)security. Tenure insecurity may have reduced the

expected value of land assets in case of departure. Moreover, it may have kept low the

incentive to use migration as a self-funding strategy to invest back home (Woudru¤ and

Zenteno 2007, Yang 2008, Mendola 2008).

Second, we contribute to the literature on land titling programs. In the last decade

research mainly aimed at estimating the impact on investments (see Pande and Udry

2006, Deininger and Feder 2009, and Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010a for excellent re-

views). Results have con�rmed the prediction in many countries under study, although

evidence on the channels through which it takes place is more mixed. On the other

hand, "the relationship between land tenure and o¤-farm labor market participation is

under-researched, especially in rural areas of developing countries" (Deininger and Feder

2009:256). For urban areas, the evidence is con�icting: Field (2007) �nd a positive im-

pact on labor supply outside home among urban squatters in Peru, while Galiani and

Schargrodsky (2010b) �nd no impact among urban squatters in Buenos Aires. Whether

about 32% of the sample, the impact associated with the land certi�cates explains about 30% of theaggregate increase in migration.

2Evidence is not conclusive though. See Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), Cuecuecha (2005), Mishra(2007), Ibarran and Lubotsky (2007), Fernandez-Huertas (2010), Caponi (2010) and McKenzie andRapoport (forthcoming) for other contributions.

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urban property rights have an impact on labor supply outside home may depend on

whether labor supply was constrained before the change in property rights took place

(Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010a). For rural areas, Do and Iyer (2008) �nd a posi-

tive impact on o¤-farm labor supply among rural households in Vietnam, but ten times

smaller than Field (2007)3. To out knowledge, there is no evidence on the impact of

land certi�cation on migration, which is the natural extension of the study of non-farm

labor participation. As household members can now leave (and even rent out) their land

without fear of being expropriated or fear of losing their inheritance, they may be able

to migrate to work where earnings are highest, which may be in urban areas or, in our

case, in the United States.

Although results are speci�c to Mexico, whose proximity to the US makes migration

�ows very sensitive to changed in economic conditions, it would not be surprising to �nd

similar e¤ects for other countries as well, eventually limited to internal migration. In

2009 the World Bank was �nancing 46 Land Administration Projects all over the world

for about 1.5 billion dollars. Among them, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyz

Republic, Macedonia, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and Ukraine have stocks of emigrants on

total population even higher than Mexico, which is already above 10% (World Bank

Migration and Remittances Factobook 2011). Understanding whether land property

rights are related international migration seems worth further research.

The major added value of the paper is the identi�cation strategy. Property rights

are typically endogenous to household behavior (Besley and Ghatak 2010). In order to

tackle the corresponding identi�cation challenge, we take the following steps. First, we

consider a land certi�cation program, which provides a neat source of discontinuity in

(de facto) property rights between certi�ed and non-certi�ed communities. Second, we

also use survey data on the same households before the program took place to control

for all unobserved time-invariant di¤erences between program and non-program areas

which may be correlated with migration behavior.

Still, there could be some unobserved time-varying di¤erence across program and

non-program areas, correlated with migration behavior but di¤erent from the program,

which could bias our estimation. Therefore, the third crucial aspect of the paper is the

use of an additional control group, which is constituted by non-eligible households in

program areas, which at least partially attenuate the potential bias provided by time-

varying di¤erence between program and non-program areas. Such identi�cation strategy

3Field (2007) �nds an increase equal to 3.04 working hours outside home per week per workingmember, while Do and Iyer (2008) �nd an increase equal to 0.36, almost ten times smaller. In the latterpaper there is no descriptive statistic on labor supply before (and after) the program took place, so wecannot speculate on the extent to which labor supply was constrained.

4

is also what distinguishes this paper from Mullan et al. (2008), who look at rural-urban

migration in China, and de Braw and Mueller (2009), who look at internal migration

in Ethiopia. Di¤erently from them, we use a land certi�cation program (and a DDD

strategy) to identify the causal impact of land property rights on migration, rather than

self-reported of tenure security or land transferability4.

The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the theory linking land prop-

erty rights to household migration behavior; section 3 provides a background description

of the certi�cation program and land property rights in Mexico; section 4 presents the

data, the identi�cation strategy and the regression speci�cation; section 5 presents the

results; section 6 concludes.

4Another paper focussing on the same topics is Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008), who consider the impactof institutions on international migration in a cros-section of countries. Crucially though, they considerinstitutions in the destination countries, rather than sending countries.

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2 Theoretical framework

How should we expect better land property rights to a¤ect migration? Notwithstanding

the scarcity of research on the speci�c relationship, the literature on property rights

suggests several mechanisms.

One way to frame the decision problem is to consider the household as the decision-

making unit (Stark and Bloom 1985) and property rights as limiting expropriation

(Besley and Ghatak 2010). Assume that rural households allocate their labor supply

between in-farm (agriculture) and o¤-farm (migration) activities.

First, better property rights increase the incentives to invest. If the only factor of

production (other than land) is labor, then better property rights will unambiguously

increase in-farm labor and decrease migration (Besley and Ghatak 2010).

On the other hand, if the factors of production are labor and capital, and households

have better access to migration than to credit markets, then the impact will depend on

the capital-intensity of the investments. In case they are labor-intensive (manure, land

clearing, adoption of labor-intensive crops), in-farm labor increases (and so decreases mi-

gration)5. In case they are capital-intensive (machinery, fertilizer, cattle), in-farm labor

decreases (and migration increases)6. Thus, the average impact is a priori ambiguous

and may vary across households.

Second, better property rights change the need for in-farm guard labor (if there is

any)7. In this case the prediction on o¤-farm labor is ambiguous even without considering

the capital inputs, because guard and productive in-farm labor may be complements or

substitutes (Besley and Ghatak 2010).

Another way to frame the decision problem is to consider each household members

as a decision-making unit. First, better land property rights reduce the landowner�s

incentive to keep his extended family and his children home as insurance (Galiani and

Schargrodsky 2010a). It is well-known that, when credit and formal savings mechanisms

are incomplete, productive assets like land constitutes not only an income source, but

5This would be consistent with the general result from the land titling literature, which �nds that thecredit supply is at best weakly responsive to land titling or land certi�cation, and additional investmentsare essentially self-funded (Pande and Udry 2006, Deininger and Feder 2009, Galiani and Schargrodsky2010a).

6This channels refers to migration as a self-funding strategy, which is supported by evidence onmigration (or remittances) on agricultural technology (Mendola 2008), household investments (Yang2008), entrepeneurship (Woudru¤ and Zenteno 2007). See also de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet (1997)for a description of the migration-subsistence strategy of Mexican farmers.

7The distinction between productive and guard labor in the agricultural activity becomes salient inperiods when agricultural production requires limited or no labor, like, for instance, during fallowing.

6

also a savings mechanism (Rosensweig and Wolpin 1993). However, landowners may not

regard them as such if land is not transferable.

Second, better property rights reduce the cost of migration of landless household

members in terms of lost inheritance. Without a well-de�ned inheritance rule, land

will be subject to dispute among heirs. The weaker the property rights on such land,

the greater will be the amount of in-farm labor supply heirs devote to capture the

inheritance8.

3 Context: Procede in Mexican ejidos

Following the 1911 revolution, the Mexican government established that groups of farm-

ers could have received free of charge non-transferable land in usufruct (ejido)9. Farmers

(ejidatarios) may have decided whether to divide part or all the land into individual

plots10. Each farmer would have received one individual plot and access to the com-

mon land. Throughout the decades ejidos arrived to include an estimated 3.2 million

ejidatarios in about 30000 ejidos and to constitute 56% of the national land usable for

agriculture (World Bank 1999). Ejidos became characterized by levels of capital en-

dowment signi�cantly lower than the private sector (World Bank 2001) and by extreme

poverty (Velez 1995).

Among other policies aiming to improve the productivity of ejido land, at the end

of 1993 the Government launched a massive certi�cation program, called PROCEDE

(Programa de Certi�cacion de Derechos Ejidales y Titulacion de Solares). The program

would have documented ejidatarios� rights over land with certi�cates emitted by the

National Agrarian Registry (art.56 of the 1992 Agrarian Law). The program provided

titles over housing plots, certi�cates over individual plots and certi�cates over the right to

use the common land. Certi�cates over individual plots (certi�cado parcelarios) included

name of the ejidatario, size and position of the plot, and the list of bordering neighbors.

They would have substituted the old certi�cates (certi�cado de derechos agrarios), which

included only name, ejido a¢ liation and way of acquisition of the plot. Certi�cates of

right to common land use reported the ejidatario�s name and the proportion of common

land he/she had the right to exploit.

8Baker and Miceli (2005) provide a model where only one relative can inherit land (best-queli�edrule), which has a similar prediction: heirs over-invest in land-speci�c human capital, which can beinterpreted as staying home.

9Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution.10Details can be foudn in the 1971 Federal Law of the Agrarian Reform. See articles 130, 134 and 135.

7

Rather than imposing the program to the communities, o¢ cials visited them and

informed them. In particular, adoption required the consent of the large majority of

ejidatarios11. The issuance of certi�cates was relatively successful: Procede resulted in

the issuance of "certi�cates to more than 3 million households" (World Bank 2001).

The certi�cation constituted a de facto change in land property rights (as opposed

to a de jure change), because, rather than providing rights, it improved then ejidatarios�

ability to take advantage of their formal property rights. Thus, an assessment of the

impact of the certi�cation program requires a description of ejidatarios�formal property

rights.

3.1 Formal property rights before and after the 1992 Agrarian Law

The 1992 Agrarian Law grants ejidatarios with the following rights: full property rights

on their urban plots; right to sell (exclusively to members of the same ejido) and right

to rent on their individual plots12; right to use the common land, but not to transfer

it13. Since the right to sell their individuals plots was limited, ejidatarios would not have

been able to use them as collateral to obtain credit14.

Ejidatarios transmit their rights over land through inheritance. The heir must be

unique, but the ejidatario can choose him/her by stating an order of preference. If he

does not do so, the law gives priority to the wife/husband and then to the children, where

the order among the latter is left unspeci�ed. if the inheritance goes to the children,

they have three months to �nd an agreement or the Agrarian Tribunal will proceed to

11The 1992 Agrarian Law describes the adoption procedure in detail. The beginning of the certi�cationprogram required the head of the village (Comisario Ejidal) to call for the "Information and ConsentAssembly". This assembly required the presence of the simple majority of ejidatarios (�rst call), orany number of them (successive calls), to be valid (art.26). It also required the approval of the simplemajority of them to allow o¢ cials to map the ejido (art.27). After the measurement took place, the headof the village had to call for the "Delimitation, Assignment and Entitlement Assembly". This assemblyrequierd the three fourth of ejidatarios (�rst call), or its simple majority (successive calls), to be valid(art.26). It also required the approval of two thirds of them (art.27) for the map to be sent to thecadastre (RAN) to be registered. The program terminated when the ejidatarios received the certi�catesfrom the cadastre.12See articles 68, 79 and 80 of the 1992 Agrarian Law.13Only the ejido Assembly, in case of majority of votes, has the right to transfer the common land.

Such right is limited to the common land as a whole and to companies external to the ejido (art.75) anddoes not seem to have been used in practice.14The plot could have been used as collateral only with credit institutions which already had commer-

cial relationships with the ejido, and, in case of default, the latter could have taken the plot only for theamount of time necessary to get the money (art. 46). So, we do not expect certi�cates to have increasedaccess to credit. Acquisition of full property rights (dominio pleno) required an additional deliberationof the Assembly and an individual application of the ejidatario to the RAN (art.81-82). In practice veryfew Assemblies seem to have done so. Only 6/248 ejidos in our sample have adopted dominio pleno.

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the sale of the land within the ejido and the assignment of revenue to the children in

equal shares15.

The 1992 Agrarian Law constituted a de jure change in property rights which applied

to all ejidatarios, independently from the possession of the certi�cates discussed above16.

Up to 1992, ejidatarios had the following rights: right to receive an urban plot, but no

right to leave it for more than two years; right to use their individual plots, but no right

to rent it out, sell it or leave it fallow for more than two years, and no right to hire

wage labor; right to use the common land17. The inheritance rule was the same, but

one clause: if the ejidatario did not leave a will and the land inheritance went to the

children, the choice of heir would have been made by a governmental institution (Mixed

Agrarian Commission) on the Assembly�s recommendation18.

3.2 Non-ejidatarios: avecindados and posesionarios

As we said, Procede aimed to certi�cate all ejidatarios. All of them were eligible for the

program. However, ejidatarios were not the only landowners inhabiting the ejido com-

munities by the time the Government launched the program. The pre-reform restriction

over the right to bequeath and the restriction to ejido membership led to the multipli-

cation of households with no right to land (henceforth, non-ejidatarios). Typically they

were descendants of ejidatarios who did not inherit the land and immigrants and arrived

to constitute 37,2% of agrarian subjects (World Bank 2001:13-14). By occupation of

empty plots or acquisition through black markets, non-ejidatarios came to possess land

(INEGI). The 1992 Agrarian Law does not provide them with any right.

Before 1992, the law granted them the following rights: right to buy an urban plot;

no right to an individual plot; no right to use the common land19. The 1992 Agrarian

did not provide them with any additional right. Since they have the right to buy an

urban plot, non-ejidatarios are eligible for the certi�cate on it. On the other hand, they

are non-eligible for the certi�cate on the plots they possess.

15See articles 17 and 18 of the 1992 Agrarian Law.16 In fact, article 4 Transitorios states that ejidatarios in non-program areas maintain their status and

can formally take advantage of the provisions of the 1992 Agrarian Law.17Details of ejidatarios�rights can be found in the 1971 Federal Law of the Agrarian Reform. For rights

on urban plots, see article 93. For rights on individual plots, see articles 52, 55, 77 and 85. Possibleexceptions are listed in article 76. For rights on common land, see article 67.18See articles 81 and 82 of the 1971 Federal Law of the Agrarian Reform.19Details on the rights of settlers (avecindados) are in the 1971 Regulation. See articles 93 and 100.

Ejidatarios have the right to sell their urban plot once. If they do, they lose their right to receive anotherplot. In the same way, settlers have the right to buy one plot, but cannot trade it further.

9

They received the certi�cates on their individual plots if the ejido Assembly recog-

nized them in their status of possessors. In this case, they acquired the same rights

as ejidatarios on their individual plots20. Indeed, the program resulted in the "for-

mal recognition of occupancy rights for more than 1 million households" (World Bank

2001:vii).

Even in this case, non-ejidatarios remained non-eligible for the certi�cates on the

common land21. They received these latter certi�cates only if the ejido Assembly up-

graded them to ejidatario status22.

4 Data and estimation method

4.1 Data

We consider the 1994 and 1997 ejido surveys. The 1994 ejido survey was realized by

the Mexican Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Segreteria de Reforma Agraria, SRA) in

collaboration with University of California Berkeley, and was based on a two-step design:

�rst, the random draw of 275 ejidos out of the 1988 ejido census, then the strati�cation

of these ejidos with respect to average area of agricultural land per household (above

or below 5 ha), and the random draw of 1543 households23. The 1997 ejido survey

was realized by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform with the World Bank on 286 ejidos,

following the same survey design as in 1994. The total number of households interviewed

is 1665, while the number of panel households is 128624. In the rest of the paper we will

20 Indeed, the 1992 Agrarian Law provides the ejido Assembly with the power to recognize non-ejidatarios (art. 23.VIII). The 1993 Reglamento de la Ley Agraria en materia de Certi�cacion deDerechos Ejidales y Titulacion de Solares (henceforth, the 1993 Regulation) speci�es that the ejidoAssembly may create a list of recognized non-ejidatarios and to provide them with certi�cates over theirindividual plots. See articles 17 and 36. Their certi�cates are the same as ejidatarios�ones but for thespeci�cation "posesionario" on the back (PA 2009, 2010), where posesionarios stand for non-ejidatarioswith land (INEGI).21See articles 37 and 40 of the 1993 Regulation. Although non-ejidatarios have no right to vote in the

ejido Assembly (articles 34, 38 and 40 of the 1993 Regulation) the 1992 Agrarian Law promotes theirparticipation in the mapping process (art27.I).22See article 23.II of the 1992 Agrarian Law.23The survey is representative at the state level. Ejidos were selected from each state but Chiapas,

were con�ict prevented the beginning of the �eldwork. Details can be found in de Janvry, Gordillo andSadoulet (1997).24The total number of households is higher than in 1994 because of the intention to interview a

minimum of 5 households for ejido. It is not clear whether enumerators tried to re-interview all 15481994 households and reached only 1287 (attrition around 16%) or tried to re-interview only a subset ofthem. Cord et al. (1999), which is the reference paper for the survey design, states that the baseline(1994) sample was just 1342 households, and so attrition is very low (55 households, around 3.5%).

10

focus on the sample of panel households25.

The survey provides detailed information on members�demographic characteristics,

past migration experiences, current migration experiences on children of the household

head living outside the house, use of land, equipment, ejido characteristics26.

4.2 Identi�cation strategy

In this paper we exploit both the timing of the certi�cation program and heterogeneity

in farmers�status within ejidos to identify the impact of the program on household mi-

gration behavior. The 1997 ejido survey contains detailed information on the implemen-

tation of the program. Ejidos which report to have terminated the program before the

1997 survey are termed "program areas", whereas those which did not are termed "non-

program areas". Households in non-program areas constitute our �rst control group.

Ejidatarios in program areas bene�t from the program as they receive the certi�cate

over their houses, their individual plots and over their access to common land.

Not all ejidatarios in program areas report to have to received their certi�cates (87%

declare at least one plot being certi�ed; 78% declare all plots being certi�ed)27. Thus,

what we aim to identify is the Intent-To-Treat (ITT) rather than the Average Treatment

E¤ect (ATE) of the certi�cates.

Since the target of the program was the totality of ejidos in Mexico and the totality

of ejidatarios within them, there is no program placement nor household self-selection

at work. However, there could still be a program timing bias. Indeed, there is some

evidence suggesting that program timing has been far from random (Cord et al. 1999,

Deininger and Bresciani 2001). This may have been driven both by supply and demand

factors. First, the Government made an e¤ort to implement the program as quickly as25The program started between 1993 and 1994, that is, only few months before the 1994 survey, which

took place during the summer. We exclude 14 hh as they belong to ejidos with missing information onthe program, 108 households as they belong to ejidos which terminated the program before the 1994survey, 15 households because they are private landowners, 113 households because they had unclearstatus (to be speci�ed later) and 110 households because they belong to communities instead of ejidos.The �nal sample has 926 households in 221 ejidos.26These data have been used by several other authors for a variety of purposes: ejido reforms (World

Bank 1999 and 2001; Munoz-Pina, de Janvry and Sadoulet 2003), migration (Winters, de Janvry andSadoulet 2001; Winters and Davis 2001), o¤-farm activities (Sadoulet and de Janvry 2001) and cash-transfer programs (Sadoulet, de Janvry and Davis 2001).27This could be due to di¤erent reasons. First, households may own land in ejidos di¤erent from the

one they live in. Therefore they will not receive certi�cates on those plots until the other ejido is certi�edas well. Second, households may have declared as individual plot land that is actually common land. Inthis case the household will not receive any certi�cate, but may continue to consider it as own land. SeeField (2007) for a similar case concerning a certi�cation program.

11

possible. This may have led o¢ cials to favor implementation (program o¤er) according

to ease of entry. Second, the decision to implement the program was left to the ejido

Assembly. According to Bailon (1995), by November 1995 more than 95% of Mexi-

can ejidos had been contacted for the implementation of Procede, so awareness of the

program should not be a concern. However, participation to the Assembly and achieve-

ment of an agreement may have su¤ered from collective action problems. In addition,

the implementation of the program required the substantial resolution of internal land

con�icts28.

In table 1 we compare some observable ejido characteristics across program and non-

program areas before the program took place (columns 1-3). Program areas have a

higher percentage of parcelled land relative to common land, less ejidatarios, a more

equal distribution of parcelled land, better infrastructures (access to a paved road, elec-

tricity, drinking water and drainage; existence of an assembly hall) and less boundary

problems. Thus, there seems to have been selection into the program. The comparison

of observable characteristics after the program took place (columns 4-6) con�rms this

observation: program areas are closer to urban centers and have better irrigation facil-

ities. Notice that, consistent with section 3, adoption of the program seem to have led

to partial upgrading of non-ejidatarios to ejidatario status: the number of ejidatarios is

now higher, while the number of posesionarios is signi�cantly smaller in program relative

to non-program areas29. The di¤erences suggest that program placement may have been

directed to smaller and wealthier ejidos �rst, which is consistent with both supply and

demand determinants.

Non-random program timing may be problematic if the determinants of program

implementation are correlated with household migration behavior. In order to correct

for this bias, we could control for ejido characteristics that we found to be correlated

with program implementation (selection-in-observables). However, there would be no

way for us to be sure to have included all relevant determinants. For instance, de Janvry

and Sadoulet (2001) and Sadoulet et al. (2001) argue that the removal of subsidies to

agriculture coinciding with the entry of Mexico into the NAFTA agreements reduced

dramatically the return to agriculture and so have presumably increased migration out

of rural areas. This is consistent with the strong increase in migration rates between

28 Indeed, this is con�rmed by the path of implementation of the program (after 1997). It turns outthat Procede was closed in december 2006 notwithstanding the fact that program implementation wasnot complete (another program opened up: programa de Fondo de Apoyo para los Nucleos Agrarios sinRegularizar, FANAR).29Unfortunately the 1994 questionnaire does not ask about the number of posesionarios before the

program took place. In addition, since land inequality is measured with respect to entitled individuals,the increase that we observe in program areas is likely to re�ect the inclusion of new ejidatarios.

12

1994 and 1997 (table 2, columns 1 and 2). The intensity of pre-NAFTA subsidies to

agriculture could act as a confounding factor in our analysis if it di¤ered across program

and non-program areas. In addition, Winters et al (2001) provide evidence on the

positive role of community migration networks in Mexican rural migration. Since we do

not observe the strength of these networks, we can not make sure that they do not di¤er

systematically across program and non-program areas and so confound our analysis.

In order to improve our identi�cation strategy, we make use of non-eligible households

as additional control group. If non-eligible households are present both in program and

non-program areas, then we can compare the di¤erence in migration behavior between

eligible and non-eligible households in program areas to the di¤erence between eligible

and non-eligible households in non-program areas. This would allow us to control for all

time-invariant di¤erences across program and non-program areas. In order to identify

eligible and non-eligible households, we make use of pre-program (1994) data on posses-

sion of an ejido certi�cate. Households with a pre-program ejido certi�cate are termed

"eligible", whereas those without are termed "non-eligible"30.

An informal check of the quasi-random assignment of the program across ejidatarios

and non-ejidatarios is to compare pre-program (1994) observable characteristics of eji-

datarios and non-ejidatarios across program and non-program areas. Results (table 2)

show lack of signi�cant di¤erences across groups (column 7) in migration rates, household

demographics, dwelling characteristics, assets and land transactions. Besides, even the

comparison of each group of households across program and non-program areas (columns

1-3, 4-6) show very little di¤erence31. This supports the view that the di¤erential timing

of the program was due to community characteristics rather than household ones32.

It would be desirable to compare households�pre-program tenure security. Although

we can not observe it, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect tenure security to

be correlated with the intensity of land transactions (Besley 1995, Besley and Ghatak

2010)33. Table 2 shows that land transactions were relatively widespread before the

30According to the 1971 Federal Law of Agrarian Reform (art. 69), ejidatarios�rights are acknowledgedby certi�cation (certi�cado de derechos agrarios). Indeed, these certi�cates constitute the basis for thedelivery of the new certi�cates (art.4 Transitorios, Agrarian Law). Households without a certi�cate maystill be ejidatarios if they have an appropriate sentence of an Agrarian Court (art.16, Agrarian Law).We abstract from this possibility.31Table A1 (1997 data) con�rms the comparability of the two groups across program and non-program

areas.32Eligible and non-eligible households in program areas seem to have lower migration rates than those

in non-program areas in 1994, although such di¤erences are not signi�cant. Importantly, this di¤erenceis symmetric across groups and could capture, for instance, the fact that the wealthier areas relied lesson subsidies to agriculture, and so su¤ered relatively less from their removal.33See Deininger and Feder (2009) for a review of the corresponding evidence.

13

program took place, and that their intensity does not di¤er across groups. This is

consistent with case studies (Nuijten 2003) suggesting that informal tenure security was

relatively strong and supported widespread black markets34.

We know that, although non-eligible, many non-ejidatarios may have been recognized

and so received the certi�cates on their individual plots. Indeed, our data suggest that

77% of non-ejidatarios in program areas have at least one plot certi�ed (as opposed

to 87% of ejidatarios), while 66% have all their plots certi�ed (as opposed to 78% of

ejidatarios). Importantly, this does not constitute a threat to our identi�cation strategy.

For it to be valid, we only need non-eligible households to bene�t from the program

on average less than eligible ones. The di¤erence in certi�cation rates across the two

groups con�rms that non-eligible households were less likely to access the program than

eligible ones35. In addition, those non-eligible households who received the certi�cates

are unlikely to have bene�ted from it as much as eligible ones. Provision of certi�cates to

non-eligible households followed recognition of non-ejidatario status and not necessarily

upgrading to ejidatario one (World Bank 2001, Procuradoria Agraria 2009, 2010). This

means that these non-ejidatarios received the certi�cates over their houses and individual

plots, but not over the access to common land (art. 37 and 40 of 1993 Reglamento de

la Ley Agraria).

The 1997 ejido survey also includes information on the date of termination of the

program. This will let us distinguish program areas in early (1994-1995) and late (1996-

1997) program areas. This di¤erentiation captures the fact that households in early

program areas had more time to adjust their migration behavior. Therefore, it may

also be appropriate to compare eligible households and non-eligible ones across early

and late program areas (table A2). Notwithstanding the limited sample size36, there are

remarkably few di¤erences between eligible and non-eligible households across early and

late program areas (column 8). Even the comparison of each group across early and late

program areas (columns 2-4, 5-7) show limited di¤erences.

By using non-eligible households as additional control group, we control for all time-

invariant di¤erences across program and non-program areas. Still, it could be that

34 In fact, pre-1992 land transactions were illegal but widely accepted within ejidos (Yates 1981:181,and NACLA 1976:18, cited in Heath 1990:34).35The certi�cation of many non-eligible households is consistent with some of the articles in the 1992

Agrarian Law, which provided ejido Assemblies with the power to divide the commons and incorporatenew members, if a large majority agreed to do so. However, land certi�cation was not a requirement forsuch division and incorporation to take place. In fact, Munoz-Pina et al (2003) �nd that Procede doesnot explain neither the decision to divide the commons nor the decision to incorporate new ejidatarios.36The sample in table 4 reduces to 414 households because some ejidos report having been certi�ed,

but not the when they received the certi�cates,

14

the di¤erence between eligible and non-eligible households in migration behavior varies

across program and non-program areas due to factors other than the certi�cation pro-

gram. One way to relax this identi�cation assumption is to control for household-level

characteristics. In order to select them, we rely on the literature on migration.

Household-level descriptive statistics relative to migration status (not reported) show

that household heads belonging to migrant households are older and less educated (but

equally literated). Migrant households� average schooling is similar to non-migrants�

one37. Migrant households are bigger, are associated with a greater number of siblings

of the household head abroad38, are less likely to be indigenous39, and are also associated

with greater land assets40 and dwelling characteristics (drinkable water in the house, ex-

istence toilette and spare room), which may suggest positive self-selection of households

into migration status.

Still, there could be important time-varying unobserved di¤erences across program

and non-program areas. For example, there is some evidence that the strength of com-

munity migration networks varies over time (Munshi 2003). Another way to relax our

identi�cation assumption is to exploit the time-series dimension of our dataset. By

doing so, the identi�cation assumption is that the di¤erence in migration behavior be-

tween ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios across program and non-program areas does not

vary over time due to factors other than the certi�cation program. Therefore, we allow

for a di¤erence in migration behavior, but that must be constant over time.

4.3 Regression speci�cation37The absence of selection in terms of education is surprising with respect to the literature on Mexican

migration. However, notice that average education is very low in our sample (3-4 years of schooling). Onthe contrary, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show that in 1990 73,9% Mexican residents had more than 4years of education.38The number of siblings of the household head abroad is a proxy for the strength of the household

migration networks (Winters et al. 2001).39This is not surprising: indigenous households are mostly located in the Gulf and Sout-Eastern region.

Thus, physical distance adds to cultural distance to typical migration destinations.40Land assets are computed in National Rainfed Equivalent hectares, as suggested by de Janvry et

al. (1997). The idea is to compute a weighted average of irrigated and rainfed land, as well as naturalpasture and forest land with weights varying across agro-ecological regions, so to count for humidity.Such weights are computed with respect to the following question: how much land is needed to producea ton of corn?

15

We estimate 1997 household migration status41 with the following Linear Probability

Model:

yik = �1 + �1wi + �1(wi � eik) + 1eik + �011Zik + �012 (Zik � eik) + �013Xi + "1ik; (1)

where yik 2 f0; 1g is the migration status of household k in ejido i; wi 2 f0; 1gindicates whether ejido i has terminated the program before the 1997 survey, eik 2 f0; 1gindicates whether household k in ejido i is eligible, Xi is the vector of ejido-level controls,

Zik is the vector of household-level controls, and "1ik is the error term. We will also

estimate 1997 household migration status using a Logit model. In that case, equation

(1) corresponds to the latent variable speci�cation. The hh-level controls (Zik) are

the following: household composition (age of the household head, # adult members,

fraction of females among adult members, average literacy42, average schooling of adult

members43); migration assets (# HH siblings abroad)44; land assets (land used in 1994).

The ejido-level controls (Xi) are the following: land (ejido area in logarithm, share

common land with respect to common and parcelled land); population composition

(dummy for indigenous ejidos, membership to ejido union); infrastructure (access to

paved road).

The identi�cation of the impact of Procede on eligible households (�1) in (1) requires

that there is no di¤erence in migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible house-

holds across program and non-program areas driven by factors other than the program

or the set of controls we include, and correlated with migration behavior. This speci�ca-

tion let us control for all unobserved di¤erences across program and non-program areas

common to both eligible and non-eligible households (�1) ; like: distance from the border

(which a¤ects the cost of migration); historical community networks (which a¤ects both

the cost of migration and its expected return, to the extent they are constant over time);

di¤erent implementation of the program (due for example to administrative capacity of

the Procuradoria Agraria across areas).

To address the possibility that the identi�cation assumption does not hold, we exploit

41Household migration status is a dummy taking value one if the household has current one householdmember abroad, or if it has had a member abroad within the previous three years. This de�nition issimilar to Winters et al. (2001) and seems appropriate for the valuation of a recent policy change.42This information is available for members currently living at home only.43Adult household members are at least 15 years old.44Notice that the siblings of the hosuehold head may have been part of the household before migrating.

Therefore, our measure of household migration assets in 1997 may be partly endogenous to the program.In order to avoid this possibility, we consider its pre-program (1994) value.

16

the time dimension of our dataset and estimate household migration status according to

the following Pooled Linear Probability Model45:

yikt = �21wi+�22 (wi�1997) + 21eik + 22 (eik � 1997) + 231997 + (2)

+�21 (wi � eik) + �22 (wi � 1997 � eik) + �021Zik + �022 (Zikt � eik)+"2ikt;

where yikt is the migration status of household k in ejido i at time t; wi is the dummy

for ejidos which received certi�cates in 1997, and eik is the dummy for eligible households.

The identi�cation of the impact of Procede on eligible households (�22) requires that

the di¤erence in migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible households across

program and non-program areas, due to factors other than the program and the controls

we include, is constant over time. This assumption is weaker than the previous one,

because now we control also for time-varying unobserved di¤erences across program and

non-program areas (�22).

5 Results

5.1 Impact of Procede on migration

Table 3 shows the results associated with the cross-section speci�cation (1). As a starting

point we compare average outcomes for treated and control units (column 1). The

average impact of the program on eligible households is positive and large (0,115), but

not signi�cant. We then control for background characteristics (column 2). The average

impact of Procede on eligible households is now larger (0,127) and marginally signi�cant.

The marginal e¤ect associated with a Logit model (column 4) has similar magnitude

(0,130) and is also marginally signi�cant. The result is robust to the use of alternative

dependent variables, like the number of migrants (column 5) and the ratio of migrants

to adult household members (column 6).

45Again, we will also estimate household migration status using a Probit model. Nonetheless, ourreference model is the Linear Probability Model because it allows us to exploit the panel nature ofour dataset by including household �xed e¤ects. This is not possible with the Probit model. It wouldbe possible with the Logit model, but then we would not be able to compute the marginal e¤ects.Alternative non-linear models, like the Chamberlain�s Random E¤ects Logit model, are feasible, buthave rather restrictive assumptions.

17

The direction, magnitude and signi�cance of the coe¢ cients associated with the

control variables is quite consistent with the theory. The coe¢ cient associated with

household size is positive and signi�cant across all speci�cations. Its magnitude is about

0.03 (3% increase in probability for each additional adult). This is consistent with the

fact that the opportunity-cost of migration decreases with household size for any given

level of land if agricultural activity is characterized by decreasing marginal returns of

labor. The coe¢ cient associated with the indicator for indigenous ejidos is negative

throughout all speci�cations. This is consistent with the cultural barriers and their

geographical distance from the border with the United States.

Table 4 shows the results associated with the panel speci�cation (2). The average

impact of Procede on eligible households without controlling for any additional char-

acteristics (column 1) is positive, large (0,115) and marginally signi�cant. When we

control for additional household characteristics (column 2), the coe¢ cient estimate be-

comes slightly larger (0,123) and signi�cant at conventional levels. The magnitude of

the impact is robust to the inclusion of ejido �xed e¤ects (column 3), household �xed

e¤ects (column 4), as well as to the use of a non-linear model (column 5-6). The result is

also robust to the use of alternative dependent variables (columns 7-8). Notice that the

coe¢ cient estimates are remarkably similar to the ones associated with the cross-section

speci�cation, which suggest the absence of any unobserved time-invariant di¤erence in

migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible households across program and

non-program areas.

Since households in early program areas (1994-1995) had more time to adjust their

migration behavior than households in late program areas (1996-1997), we re-estimate

some of the speci�cations with program timing (columns 10-12). The coe¢ cient esti-

mate of interest is positive, signi�cant and its magnitude is consistent with the baseline

estimates.

The coe¢ cient estimate associated with the time trend is also large (0,113-0,170)

and consistent with the descriptive statistics (from 15% in 1994 to 29% in 1997). With

such a time trend it does not seem unreasonable to have a coe¢ cient estimate associated

with eligible households in program areas so large. This magnitude can be explained in

terms of great initial tenure insecurity. However, it is also consistent with the coe¢ cient

capturing part of the legal changes introduced with the 1992 Agrarian Law (see section

3). This would be the case if, for example, eligible households in non-program areas

were not aware of such legal changes or presumed that they were conditional on the

certi�cation. In this case the impact of the program would capture not just a de facto

change in property rights, but also a de jure one.

18

5.2 IV estimates

The inclusion of partially and non-certi�ed eligible households (9% and 13% respectively)

in our treatment group works as a downward bias on our estimates. In order to get more

precise estimates of the impact of the certi�cates on migration behavior, we use the

program as an instrument, rather than the explanatory variable of interest. Table 5

shows the results. The average impact of the program on eligible households is positive

and large (0,166 and 0,173 with and without control variables) and marginally signi�cant.

The increase in magnitude con�rms that the reduced form su¤ers from a downward bias.

5.3 Channel of transmission: land assets as children�s future inheri-tance

In section 2 we suggested four mechanisms through which land property rights may

a¤ect international migration: incentives to invest, need to guard the land, use of land

as insurance and savings, expected value of land inheritance in case of departure. In this

sub-section we present evidence supporting the latter aspect: uncertain property rights

keep landless family members home as they fear to lose their land inheritance in case of

departure.

In order to test this mechanism, we make use of a speci�c feature of Mexican land

law. The 1992 Agrarian Law establishes that, in case ejidatarios have not speci�ed their

will and the wife/husband cannot receive the inheritance, the land inheritance will go to

the children. It also speci�ed that, if they do not �nd an agreement on who inherits the

land within three months, the Agrarian Tribunal will sell the land and split the revenues

in equal shares among them.

If the inheritance mechanism is at work, we expect the certi�cates to have a strong

impact on households with no will, since the clause regarding the Agrarian Tribunal is

salient, and a small impact on households with the will, since the known identity of the

designated heir provides smaller room for a dispute.

In table 6 we show the regression results associated re-estimation of speci�cation

(2) for the sample of households with a will (column 1-5) and the sample of households

without (column 6-10)46. The impact of land certi�cation is positive, large and signi�cant

among households without a will (column 6: 0.160), while it is small and insigni�cant

among households with a will (column 1: 0.012). The comparison is robust to the

use of alternative models (column 2-3,6-7) and alternative dependent variables (column

46The 1997 household questionnaire asks households whether they have an inheritance list. About30% of the households declare to have such a list.

19

4-5,9-10)47. We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the inheritance mechanism.

It is important to recognize that such evidence is not conclusive. We do not know

why some households have a will and some others do not, so one may raise identi�cation

issues for this result. For example, we cannot exclude that possession of a will is not

correlated with one of the other channels. Therefore, we interpret it as an interesting

correlation.

5.4 Do non-ejidatarios bene�t from the program?

One potential concern relates to the use of non-eligible households as control group. As

we discussed in section 3 and 4, part of non-eligible households in program areas received

the certi�cates as well and so are likely to have experienced an increase in tenure security.

This constituted an attenuation bias on our results and so does not constitute a threat

to our identi�cation strategy.

On the other hand, one may wonder whether the program damaged non-eligible

households, rather than bene�ting them or leaving them una¤ected. For example, the

tenure security of non-certi�ed households may have decreased exactly because the tenure

security of all the households around them had increased, as it may have exposed them to

invasions more than before. Among non-eligible households, the tenure security of those

who did not receive any certi�cate may have decreased so much that the average impact

of the program on non-eligible households may have been negative. If this was the case,

then we would have an upward bias on our results. This would be consistent with the

negative (although relatively small and insigni�cant) coe¢ cient estimate associated with

non-eligible households in program areas in some of the speci�cations (about -0.05). In

order to rule out this possibility, we estimate speci�cation (2) excluding all households

whose individual plots were not certi�ed. The idea is that potential negative general

equilibrium e¤ects on non-eligible households are unlikely to apply if they received the

certi�cates.

Table 7 shows the results. The average impact of Procede on eligible households

without controlling for any additional characteristics (column 1) is positive and large

(0,132) and marginally signi�cant. The magnitude of the impact remains essentially the

same when we control for additional household characteristics (column 2: 0,128), when

we include ejido �xed e¤ects (column 3: 0,125), when we include household �xed e¤ects

(column 4: 0,125), when we use Logit model (column 4-5: 0,139). The result is also

robust to the use of alternative dependent variables (columns 7-8). Thus, it seems that47But notice that when using the number of migrants as dependent variables (column 4,9), the coe¢ -

cients are positive, large and insigni�cant for both sub-samples.

20

it is not the migration behavior of non-certi�ed households in program areas to drive

the baseline estimates of table 6.

5.5 Do di¤erences in migration behavior re�ect anticipatory responsesto the program?

A di¤erent point concerns the interpretation of the coe¢ cient estimates rather than

the validity of the identi�cation strategy. One may wonder whether the certi�cation

process may have led households to postpone their migration decision rather than having

increased the incentive to send one or more household members abroad. For example,

it could be that household members feared been left out from the certi�cation process

and so waited for the certi�cate to reach the household before taking that decision to

migrate that they would have taken anyway. It could also be that household members

abroad came back home just before the program took place to make sure not to lose

future assets, and then went abroad again.

If this was the case, then we would be confounding a short-term behavioral response

to the program for a structural change in the households�migration strategy. In terms

of tenure security, we would mistake short-tenure insecurity generated by the program

itself for a permanent increase in tenure security.

In order to rule out this possibility, we make use of future timing in speci�cations (1)

and (2). First, we estimate speci�cation (1) using the 1994 household survey. If there

is anticipatory behavior, then households in (early) program areas should migrate less

than households in late program areas. Table A3 shows that the coe¢ cient estimates

associated with this exercise are insigni�cant and very close to zeros, no matter whether

we consider program relative to non-program areas (columns 1-6) or distinguish early

relative to late program areas (columns 7-12), whether we add controls, use a non-linear

model or alternative dependent variables.

Second, we relax the assumption of no time-invariant unobserved di¤erence in mi-

gration behavior between eligible and non-eligible households across program and non-

program areas embedded in the cross-section speci�cation (1) by estimating the panel

speci�cation (2). We distinguish non-program areas in areas in process of being certi�ed

and areas where the process has not even started. The ejidos in process of being cer-

ti�ed are those where the process has started but neither the households have received

the certi�cates nor the map of the ejido has been registered at the cadastre. If there

is anticipatory behavior, then households in the former ejidos should migrate less than

households in the latter.

21

Figure 1 shows the coe¢ cient estimates, where we have also distinguished program

areas in early and late. The �gure suggests that eligible households in non-program areas

"in process" do migrate less than average, but the decrease is relatively small and not

signi�cant. Overall, it corresponds to the increase in migration behavior in late program

areas and cannot account for the increase in migration behavior in early program areas.

5.6 Heterogeneous impact of the program

So far we have implicitly assumed that the increase in de facto property rights cor-

responding to land certi�cation was homogeneous across households. An alternative

assumption is that the improvement in property rights is increasing in the amount of

certi�ed land. In our empirical framework, this corresponds to assuming that the inten-

sity of treatment is increasing in land assets.

In order to test this assumption, we split the sample in terms of size of household

land used before the program took place: 0-3 hectares, 3-12 hectares, more than 12

hectares. Table 8 shows that Procede has a strong impact on the second (3-12 ha) and

third (12< ha) categories (columns 3-4, 7-8), but not on the �rst one (0-3 ha, columns

2,6).

However, two alternative rationales are consistent with these results. First, in the

theoretical framework we considered the optimal choice of households "who can cover

the �xed costs of migration". This may not be the case: credit constraints may have

prevented poorer households from sending a migrant abroad. Second, the capital-labor

intensity of future investments may be increasing with land size. For example, large

landowners may want to buy heavy machinery for their plots, while small landowners

may want to increase manure.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we asked whether there is a relationship between land property rights and

international migration. We identify the impact of land property rights by making use

of a country-wide certi�cation program in Mexico ejido sector. Speci�cally, we exploit

both the gradual introduction of the program and household�s eligibility status. We �nd

that the increase in land de facto property rights is associated with a 13 percent increase

in the probability of sending a household member in the US. The result is robust to the

use of alternative econometric models and dependent variables.

22

Since the ejido sector arrived to constitute even 60% of agricultural land in Mexico,

this �nding may help explain the rise in US-Mexican migration in the 1990s and the

beginning of the 21st century.

Evidence of a relationship between land property rights and international migration

is interesting also for other reasons. Nothwistanding its recent increase, the level of

global migration is rather low (3% of world population). This is at odds with high cross-

country wage di¤erential and the cost of crossing borders illegally, which for at least

some countries is non-prohibitive. Weak land property rights may be a non-negligible

non-monetary cost of migration helping reconciling the puzzle.

Finally,we believe that the relationship between international migration and land

property rights, as captured by land certi�cation programs, is a �nding worth further

investigation. The �rst thing to investigate would be whether the relationship holds also

for other countries. There is a plethora of land titling and land certi�cation programs

which are ongoing or have just terminated. Although Mexico is the �rst labor-exporting

country in the world in absolute levels, many others have a higher share of emigrant

population on total population (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyz Republic,

Macedonia, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and Ukraine) or about as high as Mexico (Philip-

pines). International migration is often a sensitive issue in international migration and

so governments and international organizations promoting these programs may want to

be aware of the consequences.

In addition, there many details of the relationship that are missing. Future research

could test whether the impact concern more temporary or permanent migration. Above

all, research on the pattern of remittances may reveal whether this additional migration

translates into additional investments in the �eld (self-funding strategy) or a permanent

shift out of farm self-employment (decreased need for protection), eventually related to

a change in intra-household bargaining power as suggested by Galiani and Schargrodsky

(2010a).

23

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