Labrel Dgest Topic 9

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Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phil

GR 164302-03

Facts:

The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning

employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate

its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company

discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives

from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the

CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based

on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of

the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate ofemployees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus,

an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of

Strike with the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the

Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front

perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the

Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were

also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the

three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due

to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day

was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal

Issue:WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held:

Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the

concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v.

CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking

employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of

the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually

accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in

a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more

persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of

peaceable persuasion.


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The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the

companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity

which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a

strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor

Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended

date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority

of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a

meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least

seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a

union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally

ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.

Petition denied.


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CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CO. vs BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SACHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION Case DigestCHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR EDWIN CHUA v.BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION513 SCRA 621 (2007)

FACTS:A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and a worker whoknowingly participates in the commission of an illegal strike are deemed to have lost theiremployment status.

Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation (the union), a legitimatelabor organization, is the recognized bargaining agent of Chuayuco Steel ManufacturingCorporation (the corporation) of which its co-petitioner Edwin Chua is the President.

In the election of the union officers, Camilo Lenizo (Lenizo) emerged as President. Thecorporation however refused to recognize the newly elected officers for the reason that there isan intra-union conflict between the factions of Lenizo and Romeo Ibanez, the former acting unionpresident.

The union staged a strike which causes illegal acts that intimidated and harassed the corporationand non-striking employees. The strikers use physical violence and harass those employeeswho are not on their side by shouting and threatening them not to go to work anymore. TheLabor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and thus, some of the members who participated in themass action lost their employment status.

ISSUE:Whether or not some of the employees who participated in the strike should bereinstated without loss of seniority rights

HELD:Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly participatesin an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in the commission of

illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowinglyparticipates in an illegal strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the court becausethe means employed by the union are illegal.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160058 June 22, 2007

PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II,GEORGE L. DE LEON, LECEL M. FIDEL, AUGUSTO C. FRANCISCO, OLIVER B. ANTONIO,RONALDO B. CORONEL, CHRISTOPHER L. HERRERA and GEM TORRES,respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 160094 June 22, 2007

PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II,GEORGE L. DE LEON, and GEM TORRES, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PILIPINO TELEPHONECORPORATION,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

At bar are two consolidated petitions seeking review of the decision1and resolution2of the Court

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 which modified the decision3of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) by affirming the illegality of the strike conducted by PilipinoTelephone Employees Association (the Union) but reducing the penalty against union officersPelagio S. Briones II, George De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and Gem Torres from dismissal tosuspension for six (6) months.

First, we unfurl the facts.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union and Pilipino TelephoneCorporation (the Company) was due to expire on December 31, 1997. On October 30, 1997, theUnion submitted to the Company its proposals for the renegotiation of the non-representationaspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties submitted their

dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation.4Theconciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed.

On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike5with the NCMB for unfair labor practice dueto the alleged acts of "restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their rightto self-organization" committed by the Company's Revenue Assurance Department (RAD)Manager Rosales and its Call Center Department Manager, Manny Alegado, to wit:

1. Requiring employees to execute undated resignation letters prior to regularization as acondition for continued employment.

2. Preventing employees from displaying Union flags and CBA's slogans.
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3. Prohibiting employees from conducting and preventing employees from participating inUnion activities.

4. Requiring employees to render forced overtime to prevent them from attending Unionmeetings and activities after office hours.

5. Using vulgar and insulting language such as "Kahit sa puwet n'yo isaksak ang mgabanderang yan!"

6. Threatening employees who join concerted Union activities with disciplinary action.

7. Discouraging employees from participating in Union activities by branding the activitiesillegal and prohibited by law.

8. Abuse of Company Rules and Regulations to prevent the free exercise by the Unionand its members of their right to self organization and free expression (e.g. issuing showcause memos for refusal to render overtime and vandalism).

9. Utilizing security guards to harass employees who participate in Union activities byrequiring the guards to take down the names of employees who participate in the Unionactivities.6

The Company filed a petition for Consolidated Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of theSecretary of Labor. On August 14, 1998, then Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued anOrder, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction overthe entire labor disputeat Pilipino Telephone Corporation pursuant to Art. 263(g) of theLabor Code, as amended.

Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.

Furthermore, the parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committingany or all acts that might exacerbate the situation.

To expedite the resolution of the dispute, the parties are hereby directed to file theirrespective position papers and documentary evidence within TEN (10) days from receiptof this Order.

SO ORDERED.7(Emphases supplied.)

On September 4, 1998, the Union filed a second Notice of Strike8with the NCMB on the groundsof: a) union busting, for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds; and b) themass promotion of union members during the CBA negotiation, allegedly aimed at excludingthem from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. On the same day, the Union went onstrike.

On September 9, 1998, Secretary Laguesma directed the striking Union officers and members toreturn to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for the Company toaccept all strikers under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike. TheUnion and its members complied.

On December 7, 1998, the Company filed with the NLRC a petition9to declare the Union'sSeptember 4, 1998 strike illegal. On August 16, 1999, Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandogissued a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 4, 1998 strike conducted byPILTEA is declared illegal.

Accordingly, the following union officers of PILTEL/MKP, namely: George de Leon,Pelagio S. Briones, Nelson C. Pineda, Rolando U. Sta. Ana, Elna E. Escalante, Gem P.Torres, Ma. Rica D. Hilotin, Gerald Joseph P. Tayas, Lecel M. Fidel and Jose Rudylin R.Gamboa are declared to have lost their employment status.

While the following members, namely: Romeo Anonuevo, Jonathan Molaer, Cris Herrera,Edgar Alan Aquino, Aris Ablis, Dorothy Zulieta, Ronald Cornel, Arnel Garcia, RanelioMendoza, Oliver Antonio, Alvin Usman, Augusto Francisco, Celia Mogol and ErlindaMadrid are hereby suspended for six (6) months without pay.

SO ORDERED.10

The Labor Arbiter found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of SecretaryLaguesma's August 14, 1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural

requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor Code and its implementing rules. TheLabor Arbiter cited Scholastica's College v. Ruben Torres11which ruled that a strikeundertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or certification order by the Secretary ofLabor is a prohibited activity, hence, illegal under Article 264 of the Labor Code. He found thatthe grounds relied upon by the Union in its second notice of strike were substantially the sameas those set forth in its first notice of strike. Moreover, he held that the Company's allegedrefusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable issue as it was not a grossand blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA. He also held that the masspromotion of the Union's members was not tantamount to dismissal, hence, did not constituteunion busting. The staging of the strike was likewise found to suffer from fatal proceduraldefects, to wit: a) the notice of strike was filed on the same day that the strike was conducted; b)the fifteen (15)-day cooling-off period was not observed; c) the Union failed to conduct a strikevote within the time prescribed by law; and d) the result of the strike vote was not furnished to

the NCMB at least seven (7) days prior to the intended strike. Certain illegal acts were likewisefound to have been committed during the strike, among which were the following: 1) strikerManny Costales prevented the Company's Director, Lilibeth Pasa, from entering the BankersCentre Building; 2) union officers Judilyn Gamboa and Rolly Sta. Ana physically blocked the frontentrance of the same building; 3) striker Aris Ablis drove a company vehicle and used it to blockthe driveway of PILTEL Centre II, thus, the cars inside the building were prevented from goingout. The tires of said company vehicle were found deflated the following day; 4) strikers DorothyZulieta and Ronald Cornel prevented the Warehousing Manager assigned at the PILTELMetropolitan Warehouse from going out of his office; 5) the strikers, led by Nelson Pineda,blocked the Detachment Supervisor of Protection Specialists and the uniformed company guardsfrom delivering food to the non-striking employees trapped inside PILTEL Call Center at theManila Memorial Park Building; 6) in General Santos City, some union members tied the

entrance doors of the PILTEL Building and tied the company vehicles together; 7) FeCarandang, Estrella Anonical, Zaldy Logos and Jovencio Laderas blocked the main entrance ofthe Boac, Marinduque office of the Company; 8) strikers Edna Carrion, Celia Mogol, ErlindaMadrid, Raul Montalan, Rolly Miraflor, Zaldy de Chavez and Dina Madla of the Company's officein Boac, Marinduque were also heard telling the Company's clients not to transact business withthe company; and 9) strikers Zaldy Logos, Rizaldy de Chavez, Raul Montalan, Rolly Milaflor andJovencio Laderas were seen preventing the free ingress and egress of the Company's officepremises in Boac, Marinduque. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since the September 4, 1998 strikewas illegal, the Union officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. He furtherruled that the illegal acts committed during the strike were not serious enough to merit thedismissal of the erring Union members as they were merely acting at the order of their leaders.Hence, the erring union members were merely suspended for six (6) months.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.12The Union, itsdismissed officers and its suspended members filed a motion for reconsideration, to no avail.13
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The Union, its officers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres, and its members Francisco, Antonio,Coronel and Herrera filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with theCA, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of theNLRC.14On September 20, 2002, the CA modified the ruling of the NLRC as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 isMODIFIED. Petitioners Pelagio S. Briones, George L. De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and GemTorres shall be suspended for six (6) months without pay instead of being dismissed. Ifalready dismissed, petitioners shall be reinstated back to their former positions, or, ifalready filled, then to any other equal positions and shall be entitled to backwagescomputed from date of dismissal until date of actual reinstatement less the pay for the six(6) months suspension they were supposed to serve. The suspension of petitionersAugusto C. Francisco, Oliver B. Antonio, Ronaldo B. Coronel and Christopher L. Herrerafor six (6) months without pay and the finding of illegality of the September 4, 1998 strikeSTANDS.

SO ORDERED.15

Both parties filed their respective partial motions for reconsideration - the company assailed theCA decision decreasing the penalty of the union officers while the Union and its dismissedofficers assailed the decision declaring the strike illegal. Both motions were denied.16

Hence, the instant petitions.

In G.R. No. 160058, the Company raises the issue of:

[WHETHER] THE ASSAILED 20 SEPTEMBER 2002 DECISION AND 17 SEPTEMBER2003 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW ANDJURISPRUDENCE.17

It prays that the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003 Resolution of the CA bereversed in part and judgment be rendered affirming in toto the February 29, 2000 Decision ofthe NLRC.

In G.R. No. 160094, the Union and Union officers Briones, De Leon and Torres raise the issueof:

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLEERROR IN UPHOLDING NLRC'S FINDING THAT THE 4 SEPTEMBER 1998 STRIKEHELD BY PILTEA WAS ILLEGAL AS IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTINGLAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.18

They pray that this Court modify the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003Resolution of the CA and: a) declare the Union's September 4, 1998 strike as legal; b) nullify thesix-month suspension imposed on Briones, De Leon and Torres; and c) order the Company topay them backwages covering the period of their suspension.

The twin issues to be resolved are: a) the legality of the Union's strike and b) the penalty to beimposed on the Union officers, if any.

First, the legality of the strike.

The Union and its officers maintain that their September 4, 1998 strike was legal. They allege

that the Company was guilty of union busting in promoting a substantial number of Unionmembers and officers to positions outside the bargaining unit during the period of CBAnegotiations. Allegedly, said Union members and officers maintained the same jobs and duties
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despite their promotion. They also capitalize on the CA's finding that the company was guilty ofunfair labor practice in refusing to turn over the deducted contingency fees of the union membersto the union. Citing Bacus v. Ople,19Panay Electric Company v. NLRC20and PNOCDockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC,21they contend that this finding of unfairlabor practice precludes the CA from ruling that the strike was illegal and that the Union was inbad faith in conducting the strike.

These arguments do not sway.

Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715,22and Rule XXII,Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following proceduralrequirements for a valid strike:

1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE,specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;

2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual

execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15)days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where theunion's existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.

xxx xxx xxx

4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secretballoting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requiresthe secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unitconcerned.

5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days

before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.23

It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewithrenders the strike illegal.24

In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice ofstrike. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed to givethe Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projectedstrike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members.25

Moreover, we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the non-observance of the cooling-off period. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the Labor

Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected inaccordance with the union constitution and by-laws; and 2) the existence of the union must bethreatened by such dismissal. In the case at bar, the second notice of strike filed by the Unionmerely assailed the "mass promotion" of its officers and members during the CBA negotiations.Surely, promotion is different from dismissal. As observed by the Labor Arbiter:

x x x Neither does that (sic) PILTEL's promotion of some members of respondent unionconstitutes (sic) union busting which could be a valid subject of strike because they werenot being dismissed. In fact, these promoted employees did not personally come forwardto protest their promotion vis--vis their alleged option to remain in the union bargainingunit of the rank and filers.26

This is consistent with our ruling in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez27

that apromotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitousspeculation that it was made to deprive the union of the membership of the benefited employee.
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The contention of the Union and its officers that the finding of unfair labor practice by the CAprecludes the ruling that the strike was illegal is unmeritorious. The refusal of the Company toturn over the deducted contingency funds to the union does not justify the disregard of themandatory seven-day strike ban and the 15-day cooling-off period.

The Union's reliance on Bacus v. Ople,28Panay Electric Company v. NLRC29and PNOCDockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC30is likewise unavailing.

Nowhere in Panay Electric Companyand PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporationdidthe Court rule that the procedural requirements for a valid strike may be dispensed with if thestriking workers believed in good faith that the company was committing acts of unfair laborpractice. In both cases, the striking union members complied with the procedural requirementsfor a valid strike. It is correct that this Court, in Bacus, held that "a strike staged by the workersinspired by good faith does not automatically make the same illegal," but said case was decidedbefore the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 on March 21, 1989. We have ruled that with theenactment of R.A. No. 6715, the requirements as to the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, andnotice given to the DOLE are mandatory in nature.31

Moreover, we agree with the NLRC that the subject strike defied the assumption order of theSecretary of Labor. The NLRC correctly affirmed the Labor Arbiter that the second notice ofstrike was based on substantially the same grounds as the first notice of strike. The Union andits officers and members alleged that the mass promotion of the union officers and members andthe non-remittance of the deducted contingency fees were the reasons for their concertedactivities which annoyed the Company's RAD Manager and made him commit acts of unfairlabor practice, eventually leading to the Union's filing of the first notice of strike. Clearly then, theissues which were made as grounds for the second notice of strike, viz, the mass promotion ofthe union members and officers and the non-remittance of the deducted contingency fees, werealready existing when the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the entirelabor disputebetween the Company and the Union on August 14, 1998.

Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.x x x

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President orthe Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory orvoluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for thestrike or lockout.

Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, we shall now determine the proper penalty to beimposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC imposed the penalty of dismissal on the striking unionofficers after finding that: a) the strike was illegal for having been conducted in defiance ofSecretary Laguesma's August 14, 1998 Order of assumption of jurisdiction and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor Codeand its implementing rules; b) the grounds relied upon by the Union in its second notice of strikewere substantially the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike; c) the Company'salleged refusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable issue as it was not agross and blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA; d) the mass promotion of theUnion's members was also not tantamount to dismissal, hence, did not constitute union busting;and e) certain illegal acts were found to have been committed during the strike.

On the other hand, the CA reduced the penalty of the union officers from dismissal tosuspension for six months after finding that the "supreme penalty of dismissal" imposed on unionofficers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres was "so harsh" considering that the Union did not
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defy the Secretary of Labor's Assumption Order and that the Company did not have "cleanhands" when it filed the instant case for having committed an unfair labor practice by refusing toturn over the union dues to the Union.

We find that the CA committed a reversible error in modifying the rulings of the Labor Arbiter andthe NLRC.

For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the tribunal, board orofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be proven to have acted without or inexcess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction.32"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "a capricious and whimsicalexercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is notenough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic mannerby reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount toan evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law."33

We note that although the CA modified the ruling of the NLRC, nowhere in its decision did itattribute grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC. And rightly so.

Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.x x x

Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawfullockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer whoknowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer whoknowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike maybedeclared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a

worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination ofhis employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer duringsuch lawful strike. x x x

We have explained the meaning of this provision as follows:

The effects of illegal strikes, as outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make adistinction between ordinary workers and union officers who participate therein. Underestablished jurisprudence, a union officer may be terminated from employment forknowingly participating in an illegal strike. The fate of union members is different. Mereparticipation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services ofthe union members. The Labor Code protects ordinary, rank-and-file union members

who participated in such a strike from losing their jobs provided that they did not commitillegal acts during the strike.34

In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,35the Court held that "[t]he law, in using theword may,grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated inan illegal strike as having lost his employment." Thus, in a number of cases,36proof that anemployee who knowingly participated in an illegal strike is a union officer was enough to warranthis dismissal from employment.

This rule was relaxed in the case of PAL v. Brillantes37where the Court "invoke[d] its judicialprerogative to resolve disputes in a way to render to each interested party the most judicioussolution, and in the ultimate scheme, a resolution of a dispute tending to preserve the greater

order of society." In said case, the Court dismissed the petition of PAL seeking the terminationfrom employment of certain Union members and officers who staged a strike in violation of theSecretary of Labor's return-to-work order. The Court found that both parties contributed to the
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volatile atmosphere that emerged despite the Secretary of Labor's status quo order as PALterminated en massethe employment of 183 union officers and members. It noted the finding ofthe Acting Secretary of Labor that PAL "did not come to this office with 'clean hands' in seekingthe termination of the officers and members of PALEA who participated in the 16 June 1994strike."38

This Court exercised this judicial prerogative sparingly in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v.Secretary of Labor.39In said case, the Court also found Nissan equally guilty of exacerbatingthe situation after the assumption order of the Secretary for suspending a substantial number ofUnion officers and members with threat of eventual dismissal and perceived illegal lockout andunion busting. However, while it affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Labor suspending theunion members who participated in the illegal strike, the Court sustained the dismissal of theunion officers, viz:

While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegalstrike as having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to unionmembers or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction betweenunion officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union

member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; theremust be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike.40

The Court further explained the reason:

x x x Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,41we heldthat the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, isgreater than that of the membersand, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal onlyfor the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor, albeitformulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs.NLRC.42(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, we do not find any reason to deviate from our rulings in Gold City IntegratedPort Service, Inc. and Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. It bears emphasis that the strikestaged by the Union in the instant case was illegal for its procedural infirmities and for defianceof the Secretary's assumption order. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were unanimousin finding that bad faith existed in the conduct of the subject strike. The relevant portion of the CADecision states:

x x x We cannot go to the extent of ascribing good faith to the means taken inconducting the strike. The requirement of the law is simple, that is1. Give a Notice ofStrike; 2. Observe the cooling period; 3. Observe the mandatory seven day strike ban; 3.If the act is union busting, then the union may strike doing away with the cooling-offperiod, subject only to the seven-day strike ban. To be lawful, a strike must simply have

a lawful purpose and should be executed through lawful means. Here, the union cannotclaim good faith in the conduct of the strike because, as can be gleaned from thefindings of the Labor Arbiter, this was an extensively coordinated strike havingbeen conducted all through out the offices of PILTEL all over the country.Evidently, the strike was planned. Verily, they cannot now come to court hiding behindthe shield of "good faith." Be that as it may, petitioners claim good faith only in so far astheir grounds for the strike but not on the conduct of the strike. Consequently, they stillhad to comply with the procedural requirements for a strike, which, in this case, theyfailed to do so.43

Thus, in imposing the penalty of dismissal, the NLRC correctly held:

x x x the point We wish to stress is that the [open, blatant] and willful defiance by therespondents of the Order emanating from the Secretary of Labor and Employment in this
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labor dispute only goes to show that the respondents have little or no regard at all forlawful orders from duly constituted authorities. For what their officers and members havesuffered they have no one else to blame.44

It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent economic weapon of theworkers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor andcapital, exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor andmanagement, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic well-being ofthe State.45This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal onunion officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union members who commitunlawful acts during a strike. The responsibility of the union officers, as main players in an illegalstrike, is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to guide theirmembers to respect the law.46The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at thedestabilization of the social order, where the relationship between labor and management hasbeen endangered by abuse of one party's bargaining prerogative, to the extent of disregardingnot only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo, but the welfare of theentire workforce though they may not be involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of dismissalimposed on the guilty parties is a natural consequence, considering the interest of public

welfare.47

IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition in G.R. No. 160094is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No.160058 is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 datedSeptember 20, 2002 and September 17, 2003, respectively, are REVERSEDand the Decisionand Resolution of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 and April 28, 2000, respectively,are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ.,concur.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154591 March 5, 2007

MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and its members, Petitioners,

vs.

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the

Decision,1dated 31 October 2001, promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated 5 April 2000, declaring that the strike held

by the petitioner Manila Hotel Employees Association (MHEA), herein represented by Ferdinand

Barles, is illegal. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, modified the Decision rendered by the

NLRC and ruled that both incumbent officers and members of MHEA involved in the illegal strike lost

their employment status.

On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board (NCMB) in its National Capital Region office against Manila Hotel on the grounds of

unfair labor practices.2 Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the Secretary of Labor and Employment

(SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g)

of the Labor Code on 24 November 1999. Specifically, the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and

the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing any acts that may exacerbate the

situation.3 The parties and their counsels were served copies of the said Order.4 MHEA filed a

Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the validity of said Order.


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The case was set for mandatory conference on 8 February 2000 before Presiding Commissioner

Rogelio I. Rayala. During the conference, the parties were advised of the certification order, which

prohibited them from taking any action that would exacerbate the situation. At the instance of the

MHEA officers, the hearing of the case was reset to 29 February 2000 due to the absence of the

counsel for MHEA.5

On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by

the SOLE on 24 November 1999, and despite the repeated reminders thereof.6 On the same day,

Commissioner Rayala called for a mandatory conference.7 Thereafter, several conferences were

conducted by the NLRC, wherein both parties were warned against aggravating the already volatile

situation. During its hearing on 8 March 2000, the NLRC sought to have both parties identify the

issues and stipulate the facts, despite their reluctance. It also allowed the parties sufficient time to

file their position papers, with which both parties failed to comply.8

After the strike was conducted, both parties filed various motions and pleadings before the NLRC.

Manila Hotel filed a complaint with Prayer for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 11

February 2000, alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike, blocked all ingress and egress of the

hotel premises, harassed and intimidated company officers, non-striking employees, customers and

suppliers. In addition, it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that, consequently, the

striking employees lost their employment.9

The NLRC issued an Order dated 11 February 2000 directing the striking workers to return to work

immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of

employment. The NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant

order immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours.10 The parties, through their counsels,

received the said Order before 4:00 pm of the same day. In their Urgent Manifestation and Motion

to Set Aside Order dated 14 February 2000, and Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2000,

MHEA admitted that a copy of the order was served on the picket lines at 5:00 pm of 11 February

2000.11

The NLRC received a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila Hotel on 14 February 2000, manifesting

that only six striking employees complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The

other striking employees had openly defied the said Order.12

In response to the NLRCs return-to-work order, dated 11 February 2000, the MHEA filed an Urgent

Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order on 14 February 2000. It alleged that the Motion for

Reconsideration, dated 29 November 1999, questioning the validity of the Order of the SOLE, dated

24 November 1999, which certified the case to the NLCR, was still pending with the SOLE. The said


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motion had prevented the said Order of the SOLE from becoming final and executory. Thus, it

alleged that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute pending the resolution of

the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the SOLE.13 On 17 February 2000, the NLRC denied

MHEAs Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order.14

The NLRC also issued another Order on 17 February 2000, ordering MHEA to refrain from putting up

a blockade or barricade or any mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the hotel.

Parenthetically, it also ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking workers to peacefully

picket in a designated area outside the hotel. 15 Manila Hotel moved for the Reconsideration of the

said Order on the ground that the picket, which they were ordered to respect, was an unlawful

activity.16

Pending the resolution of its motion, MHEA filed a Motion to Inhibit, dated 10 March 2000, seeking

to inhibit Commissioner Rayala,17 who voluntarily inhibited himself.>18 Likewise, the MHEA,

through a Supplemental Motion, dated 22 March 2000, sought the inhibition of all the members of

the First Division of the NLRC.19 Commissioner Veloso also voluntarily inhibited himself. On 31

March 2000, the case was re-raffled to the members of the Second and Third Divisions. The

Commissioners thus convened and agreed to resolve the case per curiam. 20

In the Decision promulgated on 5 April 2000, the NLRC ruled that the 10 February 2000 strike held

by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. However, it determined that only

the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment. It ruled that there was no evidence

showing who among the striking employees were actually notified of the return-to-work order, and

therefore, such employees have not forfeited their employment. But in view of the antagonism on

both sides, the NLRC awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the returning

union members for every year of service, instead of ordering Manila Hotel to reinstate them.21 In

the dispositive part of the Decision,22 the NLRC decreed that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike is declared illegal. Accordingly, the incumbent officersof the union are declared to have forfeited their employment status. Further, no relief may be

granted the union with respect to their demands, in view of the absence of a decision thereon by a

Voluntary Arbitrator.

In lieu of an order for the Hotel and members of the union to maintain their respective status

previous to the strike, Manila Hotel, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay the returning union members, as

an alternative relief to continued employment, severance compensation in an amount equivalent to

one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction thereof, being considered as one whole

year. No entitlement to backwages is however decreed, pursuant to the no-work-no-pay principle in

strike cases.


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Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. Manila Hotel filed a Motion for

Partial Reconsideration which sought the deletion of the award of severance compensation to the

union members who participated in the illegal strike.23 MHEA, on the other hand, sought the

reversal of the Decision on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case and that they

were deprived of due process.24 The NLRC denied both motions in a Resolution dated 17 May

2000.25

On 6 July 2000, Manila Hotel filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals

to assail the Decision dated 5 April 2000, and the Resolution dated 17 May 2000, both issued by the

NLRC.26 In a Decision27 dated 31 October 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the same is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is MODIFIED

in that both the incumbent officers and members of the Union involved in the illegal strike are

declared to have lost their employment status. The award of severance compensation to the striking

members of the union is consequently DELETED.

On 26 November 2001, MHEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals

denied in a Resolution, dated 1 August 2002.28

MHEA filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals dated 31 October 2000. Thereafter, the Court ordered MHEA to submit proof

that the Chairman/President of MHEA, Fernando Barles, had been duly authorized to sign the

verification of the petition and certification of forum shopping.29 In compliance thereof, MHEA

submitted eight (8) special powers of attorney (SPAs) executed by 138 union members authorizing

Atty. Potenciano Flores and Ferdinand Barles to represent them in the case Manila Hotel Employees

Association v. NLRC, CA-G.R. S.P No. 59601.30 Manila Hotel sought the dismissal of the present

petition on the ground that petitioner Ferdinand Barles was not authorized to file it. Manila Hotel

alleged that Barles was no longer the Chairman of MHEA and attached a certification31 dated 5

March 2003 of the union Secretary General, stating that Eduardo M. Saplan was the Chairman of the

union, and that he succeeded Antonio Dumpit who held the position of Chairman from 5 July 2000

to 19 December 2002. It further alleged that the SPAs attached to the Compliance authorizing Barles

and Potenciano to represent the union pertained to a different case, and not the present case.32

MHEA, however, insisted that it was the same case since it involved the same parties, facts, and

issues.33

In the present petition, MHEA raises the following issues34:


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I

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION

HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND THEY HAD COMMITED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN

THEIR QUESTIONED DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, BY LAW AND SETTLED

JURISPRUDENCE, THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS, WHO ARE MERE ORDINARY MEMBERS OF THE

UNION, ARE ENTITLED TO BE REINSTATED BACK (sic) TO WORK WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY OR

OTHER EMPLOYEES RIGHTS AND BENEFITS AND WITH FULL BACKWAGES FROM DATE OF DISMISSAL

UNTIL ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT.

II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT BELOW AND THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAD COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONSHIP IN THE CASE AT BAR.

This petition is devoid of merit.

Before discussing the substantial issues of this case, this Court takes notice of a serious procedural

flaw. Ferdinand Barles is not authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum

shopping in the present case. The General Membership Resolution, dated 23 December 1998,

affirmed that he was appointed as the Chairman of MHEA, in place of Gonzalo Irabon.35

Nevertheless, Barles failed to refute the facts that were ascertained by the certification of the

secretary-general of MHEA: that at the time this petition was filedon 26 September 2002, and

even at the time the petition was filed before the Court of Appeals by Manila Hotel - on 10 July

2000, Ferdinand Barles was no longer the Chairman of MHEA. The certification clearly stated that

Antonio Dumpit was the union Chairman from 5 July 2000 to 19 December 2000, and that he wassucceeded by Eduardo Saplan. Moreover, the SPAs that were submitted to the Court in order to

prove that Barles was authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in

this case failed to establish that crucial fact. The SPAs had in fact authorized Barles to represent the

138 members who signed the SPA to represent them in a different case, Manila Hotel Employees

Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, CA-G.R. S.P No. 59601, which was raised on

appeal before the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 144879. The MHEAs assertion that there were the

same parties and issues involved in the two cases is self-defeating, not only because these are

clearly two distinct cases, but because such will likewise violate the rule against non-forum

shopping.


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The provisions of Supreme Court Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94 require a Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping in any initiatory pleading filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. In the

case of Teoville Homeowners Association v. Ferreira,36 the Court emphatically underscored the

need to show to the satisfaction of the Court that the person signing the verification and

certification against non-forum shopping had been specifically authorized to do so. In other similar

cases,37 it has been ruled that it is the party-pleader, and not the counsel, who must execute the

certificate against forum shopping. The rationale for the rule is that the counsel may be unaware of

any similar actions pending with other courts on the same matter. In this case, Ferdinand Barles was

no longer an officer of the union at the time this petition was filed, and therefore was no longer

privy to the cases that may have been filed by MHEA. Absent the specific authorization from the

MHEA members that he sought to represent, any statement he may make cannot bind the MHEA

herein named. For the foregoing reasons alone, this petition should be dismissed.

Aside from its procedural defects, the petition is also substantially infirm. MHEA members seek their

reinstatement after participating in an illegal strike, that is, a strike that was conducted after

receiving an Order of assumption38 by the SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory

arbitration. Worse still, the strikers failed to comply with the 11 February 2000 return-to-work

Order, issued by the NLRC, despite receipt thereof. The law explicitly prohibits such acts.

ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS

x x x x

(g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in

an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may

assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for

compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically

enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification

order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification, all striking orlocked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume

operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike

or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of

law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he

may issue to enforce the same.

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES


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(a) x x x x

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the

Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration orduring the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

More to the point, the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades

that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be

interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. Defiance of the

assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a

member, is an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.39

The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or

lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power

measure.40 In this case, the SOLE sufficiently justified the assumption order, thus:

The Hotel is engaged in the hotel and restaurant business and one of the de luxe hotels operating in

Metro Manila catering mostly to foreign tourist groups and businessmen. It serves as venue for local

and international conventions and conferences. The Hotel provides employment to more than 700

employees as well as conducts business with entities dependent on its continued operation. It also

provides substantial contribution to the government coffers in the form of foreign exchange

earnings and tax payments. Undoubtedly, a work stoppage thereat will adversely affect the Hotel,

its employees, the industry, and the economy as a whole.

At this critical time when efforts of the present administration are seriously focused on preserving

the economic gains achieved and ensuring that existing jobs are maintained, it is the utmost concern

of this Office to avoid work disruption that might result to the firms closure particularly so when an

alternative mechanism obtains to resolve the parties differences.41

The allegation42 that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999, entitled them to

participate in a strike, cannot be sustained. In the case of St. Scholasticas College v. Torres,43 the

Court reiterated the rule that a return-to-work order is immediately executory notwithstanding the

filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of

any petition questioning its validity. Citing the case Philippine Airlines Employees Association v.

Philippine Airlines, Inc.,44 it accounted for the rationale of this rule, as thus:


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The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other

construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry

indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the courts compulsory

power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its [return-to-work

order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it

but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the

ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time

element it concerned.

Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The

worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be

resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest.45 This extraordinary

authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to

labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of their motives, or the

validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend

to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification

order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices

on the part of the company, to justify their action.46

MHEA claims that the Court should consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact that they held the

strike three months after filing their notice of strike. Such detail is irrelevant. What is crucial is that

they were apprised of the assumption order of the SOLE wherein they were enjoined from carryingout a strike. They were again reminded to refrain from conducting a strike during the mandatory

conference on 8 February 2000. Pending the proceedings for compulsory arbitration and for no

apparent reason, they staged the strike two days later and refused to obey the return-to-work order

issued on 11 February 2000. In the case of Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization of

Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN),47 the Court cautioned against the

unreasonable and indiscriminate exercise of the right to strike:

[T]he decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from

emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the

legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In

every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are

involved. x x x.

MHEA alleges that the union members were not served a copy of the assumption order issued by

SOLE.48 Such allegation is absurd considering that MHEA repeatedly alluded in its Motion for

Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 to the assumption order, which they now deny having

received. The records also state that petitioners and their counsels received a copy of the order on

24 November 1999 and 26 November 1999, respectively. On 8 February 2000, two days before the


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strike was undertaken, MHEA officers had attended a mandatory conference before the NLRC

wherein they were advised not to take any action to exacerbate the situation. They had even moved

for the postponement of the hearing to 29 February 2000 due to the absence of their counsel. It is

only too obvious that MHEA conducted the 10 February 2000 strike knowing fully that an

assumption order had been issued.1awphi1.nt

They, likewise, imply that they were not served a copy of the return-to-work order.49 Such

allegation loses credence because MHEA, in its Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order

dated 14 February 2000, and Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2000, admitted that a copy

of the return-to-work order was served on the picket lines. Records show that their counsel was

likewise served a copy thereof during the 11 February 2000 conference and that he refused to

acknowledge receipt.50 During the 16 February 2000 conference, MHEAs counsel stated that the

reason that some of the strikers were unable to return to work was the fact that the picket lines

were violently dispersed a few hours after the twenty-four hour period expired.51 This implies that

during the twenty-four hour period that they were allowed to be fully reinstated, they failed to

report to work.

MHEA cannot lean on the doctrine in the case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v.

National Labor Relations Commission.52 The Court, in the aforecited case, ruled that there was no

valid service of the certification order which prohibited any strike or lockout since the said order was

served on the guard on duty instead of the president of the union who was authorized to receive

the same. As a result, the strike undertaken after the issuance of the said order was consideredlegal, hence cannot effectively terminate the employment of workers who joined the strike. In the

present case, not only were the union officers apprised of the order, a copy of the same was served

on the picket lines.

MHEA, likewise, assails the Decision of the NLRC for having been determined without conducting

any preliminary hearings nor requiring the submission of position papers.53 Again, the records belie

these statements. During the mandatory conference held on 8 March 2000, the parties had in fact

identified the issues and made stipulations of facts.54 During the same hearing, the Presiding

Commissioner required both parties to file their position papers.55 The parties, however, failed to

present evidence or file the position papers after they had been given ample opportunity to do so.

MHEA propounds the theory56 that both parties had acted in pari delicto and, therefore, the

dismissal of its members who participated in the illegal strike, was unwarranted, citing as its

precedents Philippine Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes57 and Philippines Interfashion Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Commission.58 In both cases, the undisputed finding that the employer was guilty of an

illegal lockout while the union conducted an illegal strike, caused the Court to order the

reinstatement of the employees who participated in the illegal strike. In Philippine Airlines Inc. v.

Brillantes,59 the Court emphasized the unequivocal rule that participating in a strike undertaken in


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defiance of the order of the SOLE results in the loss of employment status. It only made an

exception of the said case because the records clearly established that the employer, Philippine

Airlines, Inc., terminated the employment of 183 union officers and members, in violation of the

order issued by the SOLE.60 In Philippines Interfashion Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,

the return-to-work order was not issued pursuant to an assumption or certification order.61 More

importantly, the employees complied with the return-to-work order and reported back for work

within one day after receiving the same. Despite such compliance, the employer refused to reinstate

114 employees, and, thus, such refusal on the part of the employer amounted to an illegal

lockout.62

In the present case, nothing in the records shows that Manila Hotel was guilty of an illegal lockout. It

readmitted the six (6) employees who complied with the return-to-work order. MHEA made a vague

reference to striking employees who complied with the return-to-work order, but were nevertheless

refused re-admittance by Manila Hotel.63 However, they failed to even identify these employees.

There is no allegation that MHEA filed any case for illegal lock-out against Manila Hotel. What is

clearly shown by the records is that the strike or picketing was still being conducted on 28 February

2000, way after the 24-hour deadline set by the NLRC.64 Thus, it is obvious that applying the in pari

delicto doctrine pronounced in Philippine Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes65 and Philippines Interfashion

Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission66 to this case would be improper and without basis.

It would not be amiss to reiterate the Courts pronouncement in the case Reliance Surety &

Insurance Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission67:

As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because

the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and

capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the

results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. x x x.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailedDecision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 31 October 2001, declaring the strike conducted

by the MHEA on 10 February 1999 as illegal and, thus, resulting in the loss of employment status of

the union officers and members who participated in the said strike. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Labrel Dgest Topic 9

Documents

Transcript of Labrel Dgest Topic 9