Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 124711 November 3, 1998MARICALUM MINING CORP.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), SIPALAY MINE FREE LABOR UNION and CECILIO T. SALUDAR,respondents.PUNO,J.:Before us is a special civil action oncertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering Maricalum Mining Corporation1to reinstate Cecilio Saludar to his former job or substantially equivalent position with three (3) years backwages without qualification and deduction, or to pay the sum of P52,010.55.The records show that on August 17, 1984 a decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo Ovejera in RAB Case No. 06-0610-83 entitled Sipalay Mine Free Labor Union and Cecilio T. Saludar v. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation which ordered the reinstatement of illegally dismissed equipment operator Cecilio Saludar. The decision was not executed as all the assets of Marinduque had been foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). These assets were subsequently acquired by petitioner Maricalum while Marinduque had ceased its operations.Eight years later, Saludar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Maricalum. On April 14, 1993, Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy granted the motion. Maricalum appealed to the NLRC contending that it is a different entity from Marinduque which was the only party to the original action. In its May 19, 1994 decision, the NLRC ruled:(t)he records will show that Maricalum not only voluntarily recognized and absorbed the services rendered by the workers under the previous management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, but it also assumed the obligation of Marinduque to its employees.Besides, this issue was already settled in the earlier and similar case ofMaricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation v. Xerxes Mission, NLRC Case No. V-0233-91, where we stated:Likewise, we note from the records that in the Deed of Transfer from the PNB and DBP of the assets of Marinduque, Maricalum shall assume liabilities due or owing to any other person.Sec. 3, subsection 3.01 of the said deed states:1. From and after the effectivity date, Maricalum shall be solely liable (I) . . .; (II) for any other liability due or owing to any other person (natural or corporate).The Deed of Transfer was made retroactive to October 1984, when Maricalum was duly incorporated. Therefore, under the above general stipulation there can be no doubt that the awards adjudicated in favor of Leonardo Munion and Julian Montilla in the NLRC decision of January 29, 1987 come within the purview of the liabilities contemplated in the aforecited provision and is enforceable against Maricalum. We find no merit in its contention that it assumed only the assets, and not the liabilities of Marinduque specially in the light of its having voluntarily recognized and absorbed the services of the workers under the previous management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation. It undertook to rehire the workers of Marinduque or to pay those who cannot be rehired their corresponding benefits pursuant to the applicable law or CBA. It is clearly pointless for Maricalum to insist that it is not a successor-in-interest of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, at least in relation to the tenural rights of the latter's employees and the satisfaction of the judgment under execution.Nonetheless, the NLRC held that since more than five (5) years have elapsed the judgment could be enforced against Maricalum, not by mere motion but by an action for revival of judgment.On September 2, 1994, Saludar filed an Action for Revival of Judgment before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (Bacolod City).2Maricalum again moved to dismiss alleging that: (1) the complaint was not accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping; (2) that the action was cognizable only by regular courts; and (3) that it was not a party to the original case.On December 14, 1994, Saludar filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, attaching therewith an Affidavit of Compliance with Supreme Court Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping. On December 21, 1994, Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy denied Maricalum's Motion to Dismiss and directed the parties to submit their position papers. On April 18, 1995, Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy ruled3in favor of Saludar. He held that the certification of non-forum shopping does not apply to cases falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and labor arbiters because the NLRC is not a court but an agency performing quasi-judicial functions. He also sustained the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over action to revive judgment involving illegal dismissal. The dispositve portion of the Decision states:Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION to reinstate complainant CECILIO T. SALUDAR to his former job or substantially equivalent position with three (3) years backwages without qualification and deduction, or the sum of FIFTY TWO THOUSAND TEN and 55/100 PESOS (P52,010.55). (Emphasis supplied.)On May 25, 1995, Maricalum appealed the decision of Labor Arbiter Uy4. On October 27, 1995, the NLRC affirmed this decision. It held:Aside from the fact that its liability as a successor entity has already been settled in our decision on May 19, 1994, which is already final and executory, the necessity of a hearing to implead Maricalum Mining Corporation in order to enforce and satisfy an award decreed by the NLRC had already been ruled by the High Court in this wise:5Being an incident in the execution of the final judgment award, NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over the case and could issue such orders, as were necessary for the implementation of that award. It is true that DBP was not an original party and that it was ordered impleaded only after the Writs of Execution were not satisfied because the properties levied upon on execution had been foreclosed extrajudicially by it, DBP had to be impleaded, however, for the proper satisfaction of a final judgment. Being an incident in the execution of the final judgment award, NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over the case and could issue such orders as were necessary for the implementation of the award. Its inclusion as a party could not have been accomplished at the earlier stages of the proceedings because at the time of the filing of the complaint, private respondent's cause of action was only against Lirag.In the light of the foregoing, the assertion of respondent Maricalum Mining Corporation that impleading it at this stage of the proceedings infringes upon its constitutional right to due process loses its worth. Especially where as ruled earlier by this Commission, Maricalum Mining Corporation "not only voluntarily recognized and absorbed the service rendered by the workers under the previous management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, but it also assumed the obligations of Marinduque to its employees, Maricalum Mining Corporation did not even ask for a reconsideration of the above ruling.Lastly, we are not persuaded by respondent's version that the present action had already prescribed. It is undisputed that the original decision dated August 17, 1984 became final and executory on September 14, 1984 and when the complaint subject hereof was instituted on September 2, 1994, it has not yet prescribed.6Hence, this petition with the following issues for resolution:1. Whether or not Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory and should apply to NLRC.2. Whether or not Saludar's complaint for revival of judgment is fatally defective and null and void, hence did not stop the running of the prescriptive period.3. Whether or not complainant Saludar has cause of action against petitioner in an action for revival of judgment directed against another entity, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC).4. Whether or not the NLRC-Bacolod has jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment.7We now consider the issues.IThe certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Court Circular 04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further interpretation,viz:. . ., the following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and other existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to the sanctions provided hereunder:1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certificate annexed thereto and simultaneously therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.xxx xxx xxx2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)The NLRC is a quasi-judicial agency, hence, initiatory pleadings filed before it should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum-shopping.Nevertheless, inLoyola v. Court of Appeals8, we held that substantial compliance with the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient. We explained:(s)ubstantial compliance with the Circular is sufficient. This Circular expanded or broadened the applicability of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. InGabionza vs. Court of Appeals[G.R. No. 112547, Resolution of July 1994, 234 SCRA 192] this Court held that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient for:It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate an orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with absolute literalness as to subvert its ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.xxx xxx xxxThe fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent Saludar filed an affidavit of compliance with SC Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping albeit a little delayed. This little delay should not defeat the action for revival of judgment which undeniably was filed within the ten (10) year prescriptive period. Also, the circumstance that respondent had painstakingly tried to enforce the favorable judgment he obtained against petitioner for almost ten (10) years but to no avail, should deter us from strictly construing the provisions of the Circular. A liberal interpretation of the Circular would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to "secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."9IIWe do not agree with petitioner Maricalum's contention that Saludar has no cause of action against it since the judgment sought to be revived was obtained against Marinduque. The records show that Maricalum voluntarily absorbed Marinduque's obligations to its employees. The NLRC found that when the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) transferred Marinduque's assets to Maricalum, the Deed of Transfer contained the proviso that "(f)rom and after the effectivity date, Maricalum shall be solely liable for any liability due or owing to any other person (natural or corporate)."10Marinduque's liability to respondent Saludar for unpaid backwages adjudicated in RAB Case No. 06-0610-83 way back in 1984 became final when no appeal was interposed by it. This final judgment then formed part of the liabilities of Marinduque which Maricalum assumed in the Deed of Transfer. Thus, it is futile for Maricalum to deny liability it had voluntarily assumed.IIIFinally, we reject the contention of Maricalum that NLRC-Bacolod has no jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment. InAldeguer v. Gemelo11we held:The action in the present case is an original action, and not a mere incident of the primitive suit or a mere auxiliary and supplementary remedy. It is a new and independent action for the recovery of a debt evidenced by the original judgment. In other words, it is an action based on a judgment, or what is called in English anaction upon a judgment. The American doctrine is uniform in the sense that whereas the remedy ofscire facias, which is a mere incident of the original suit, must be instituted in the court where said suit was brought (34 C.J. 664-615; 23 Cyc., 1444-1445; 2 Freeman on Judgments, 2272-2273; 1 Black on Judgments, 578), an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.xxx xxx xxx. . . The owner of a judgment may . . . use his judgment as a cause of action, and bring suit thereon in the same court or any court of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute such suit to final judgment. (Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind., 443; Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind., 529; Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind., 577. (Becknellet al. v. Becknell, 110 Ind., 47).xxx xxx xxxAn action on a judgment may be brought in the court which rendered it, or in any other court having jurisdiction. Thus the action may be brought in an inferior court on a judgment obtained in a superior one; and, conversely, an action lies in a superior court upon a judgment rendered in an inferior one. It was formerly thought that such an action was a local one, and must be brought in the county where the records remained; but it is now held that the action may be brought in any county in which jurisdiction of defendant's person can be obtained. (Emphasis supplied).Prescinding from the above decision, private respondent Saludar properly instituted his action for revival in the NLRC which rendered the judgment sought to be revived. It is well established that regular courts are bereft of jurisdiction to entertain disputes involving employer-employee relationship.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the NLRC in RAB Case No. 06-08-10512-94 is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 124013 June 5, 1998ROSARIO MANEJA,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL,respondents.MARTINEZ,J.:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are the Resolution1dated June 3, 1994 of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR-00-10-05297-90, entitled "Rosario Maneja,Complainant,vs. Manila Midtown Hotel,Respondent," which dismissed the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner against private respondent company for lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case; and its Resolution2dated October 20, 1995 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private respondent Manila Midtown Hotel beginning January, 1985 as a telephone operator. She was a member of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with private respondent.In the afternoon of February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) form and a deposit of P500.00 from a page boy of the hotel for a call by a Japanese guest named Hirota Ieda. The call was unanswered. The P500.00 deposit was forwarded to the cashier. In the evening, Ieda again made an RLDC and the page boy collected another P500.00 which was also given to the operator Loleng. The second call was also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to petitioner for follow-up. Petitioner monitored the call.On February 15, 1990, a hotel cashier inquired about the P1,000.00 deposit made by Ieda. After a search, Loleng found the first deposit of P500.00 inserted in the guest folio while the second deposit was eventually discovered inside the folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official receipts.When petitioner saw that the second RLDC form was not time-stamped, she immediately placed it inside the machine which stamped the date "February 15, 1990." Realizing that the RLDC was filed 2 days earlier, she wrote and changed the date to February 13, 1990. Loleng then delivered the RLDC and the money to the cashier. The second deposit of P500.00 by Ieda was later returned to him.On March 7, 1990, the chief telephone operator issued a memorandum3to petitioner and Loleng directing the two to explain the February 15 incident. Petitioner and Loleng thereafter submitted their written explanation.4On March 20, 1990, a written report5was submitted by the chief telephone operator, with the recommendation that the offenses committed by the operatorsconcerned covered violations of the Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA): (1) OSDA 2.01: forging, falsifying official document(s), and (2) OSDA 1.11: culpable carelessness negligence or failure to follow specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s).On March 23, 1990, petitioner was served a notice of dismissal6effective April 1, 1990. Petitioner refused to sign the notice and wrote therein "under protest."Meanwhile, a criminal case7for Falsification of Private Documents and Qualified Theft was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila by private respondent againts Loleng and petitioner. However, the resolution recommending the filing of a case for estafa was reversed by 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Virgilio M. Patag.On October 2, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter. The complaint was later amended to include a claim for unpaid wages, unpaid vacation leave conversion and moral damages.Position papers were filed by the parties. Thereafter, the motion to set the case for hearing filed by private respondent was granted by the Labor Arbiter and trial on the merits ensued.In his decision8dated May 29, 1992, Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo found that the petitioner was illegally dismiised. However, in the decision, the Labor Arbiter stated that:Preliminary, we hereby state that on the face of the instant complaint, it is one that revolves on the matter of the implementation and interpretation of existing company policies, which per the last par. of Art. 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is one within the jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA and thereafter, if unresolved, one proper for voluntary arbitration. This observation is re-entrenched by the fact, that complainant claims she is a member of NUWRAIN with an existing CBA with respondent hotel.On this score alone, this case should have dismissed outright.9Despite the aforequoted preliminary statement, the Labor Arbiter still assumed jurisdiction "since Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the same Labor Code, are conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination case(sic.)." The dispositive portion of the decision states that:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby renrdered as follows:(1) Declaring complainant's dismissal by respondent hotel as illegally effected;(2) Ordering respondent to immediately reinstate complainant to her previous position without loss of seniority rights;(3) Ordering further respondent to pay complainant the full backwages due her, which is computed as follows:3/23/90 - 10/31/90 = 7.26/mos.P2.540 x 7.26/mos. P18,440.4011/1/90 - 1/7/91 = 2.23/mos.P3,224.16 x 2.23/mos. 7,189.871/8/91 - 4/29/92 = 15.7/mos.P3,589.16 x 15.7/mos. 56,349.89P81,980.08(4) Moreover, respondent is ordered to pay the 13th month pay due the complainant in the amount of P6,831.67 including moral and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 and P10,000.00 respectively, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10) percent of the total award herein in the amount of P11,381.17;(5) Finally, all other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Private respondent appealed the decision to the respondent commission on the groundinter aliathat the Laber Arbiter erred in "assuming jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case after finding that the case falls within the jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA, and if unresolved, proper for voluntary arbitration."10An Opposition11was filed by petitioner.In the assailed Resolution12dated June 3, 1994, respondent NLRC dismissed the illegal dismissal case for lack of Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because the same should have instead been subjected to voluntary arbitration.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration13was denied by respondent NLRC for lack of merit.In this petition forcertiorari, petitioner ascribes to respondent NLRC grave abuse of discretion in 1. Ruling that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case;2. Not ruling that private respondent is estopped by laches from questioning the jurisdiction of the illegal dismissal case;3. Reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter based on a technicality notwithstanding the merits of the case.Petitioner contents that Article 217(a)(2) and (c) relied upon by respondent NLRC in divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case, should be read in conjunction with Article 26114of the Labor Code. It is the view of petitioner that termination cases arising from the interpretation or enforcement policies pertaining to violations of Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA), are under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator only if these are unresolved in the plant-level grievance machinery. Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance as there has been no grievance meeting between the NUWHRAIN union and the management. The reason for this, petitioner adds, is that it has been a company practice that termination cases are not anymore referred to the grievance machinery but directly to the labor arbiter.In its comment, private respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed the illegal dismissal case outright after finding that it is within the jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure. Moreover, private respondent states that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal, and is not in estoppel by laches as contended by the petitioner.For its part, public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, cited the ruling of this Court in Sanyo Philippines Workers Union- PSSLU vs. Caizares15in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.The legal issue in this case is whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.The respondent Commission, in holding that the Labor Arbiter lacks jurisdiction to hear the illegal dismissal case, cited as basis therefor Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715. It said:White it is conceded that under Article 217(a), Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving "termination disputes," the Supreme Court, in a fairy recent case ruled:The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery, and when not settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBAs does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of company personnel policies. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. . . . (Sanyo vs. Caizares, 211 SCRA 361,372)16We Find that the respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted the aforequoted portion of our ruling in the case ofSanyo, as divesting the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction in a termination dispute.Art. 217 of the Labor Code gives us the clue as to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decided within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.As can be seen from the aforequoted Article, termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted, however, that in the opening there appears the phrase: "Except as otherwise provided under this Code . . . ." It is paragraph (c) of the same Article which respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted as giving the voluntary arbitrator jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.However, Article 217 (c) should be read in conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor Code which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide allunresolvedgrievancesarising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies. Note the phrase "unresolved grievances." In the case at bar, the termination of petitioner is not an unresolved grievance.The stance of the Solicitor General in theSanyocase is totally the reverse of its posture in the case at bar. InSanyo, the Solicitor General was of the view that a distinction should be made between a case involving "interpretation or implementation of Collective Bargaining Agreement" or interpretation or "enforcement" of company personel policies, on the one hand and a case involving termination, on the other hand. It argued that the dismissal of the private respondents does not involve an "interpretation or implementation" of a Collective Bargaining Agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company personel policies but involves "termination." The Solicitor General further said that where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up the Collective Bargaining Agreement or by voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual termination,i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.17We fully agree with the theory of the Solicitor General in theSanyocase, which is radically apposite to its position in this case.Moreover, the dismissal of petitioner does not fall within the phrase "grievance arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. It is to be stressed that under Article 260 of the Labor Code, which explains the function of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator. "(T)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies." Article 260 further provides that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representative to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be refered to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and the company. It can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.18In the case at bar, the union does not come into the picture, not having objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal of the herein petitioner. The reason for this, according to petitioner is that "the practice in said Hotel in cases of termination is that the latter cases are not referred anymore to the grievance committee;" and that "the terminated employee who wishes to question the legality of his termination usually goes to the Labor Arbiter for arbitration, whether the termination arose from the interpretation or enforcement of the company personnel policies or otherwise."19As we ruled inSanyo,"Since there has been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the labor Arbiter." The aforequoted doctrine is applicable foursquare in petitioner's case. The dismissal of the petitioner does not call for the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies but is a termination dispute which comes under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.It should be explained that "company personel policies" are guiding priciples stated in broad, long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization's top authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include, among others, the procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. The usual source of grievances, however, are the rules and regulations governing disciplinary actions.20The case of Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC21sheds further light on the issue of jurisdiction where the Court cited theSanyocase and quoted the decision of therein Labor Arbiter Olairez in this manner:In our honest opinion we have jurisdiction over the complaint on the following grounds:First, this is a complaint of illegal dismissal of which original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217 has been conferred to the labor Arbiters. The interpretation of the CBA or enforcement of the company policy is only corollary to the complaint of illegal dismissal. Otherwise, an employee who was on AWOL, or who committed offenses contrary to the personnel policies(sic) can no longer file a case of illegal discharge is premised on the interpretation or enforcement of the company policies(sic).Second. Respondent voluntarily submitted tha case to the jurisdiction of this labor tribunal. It adduced arguments to the legality of its act, whether such act may be retirement and/or dismissal, and prayed for reliefs on the merits of the case. A litigant cannot pray for reliefs on the merits and at the same time attacks(sic) the jurisdiction of the tribunal. A person cannot have one's cake and eat it too. . . . .As to the second ground, petitioner correctly points out that respondent NLRC should have ruled that private respondent is estopped by laches in questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.Clearly, estoppel lies. The issue of jurisdiction was mooted by herein private respondent's active participation in the proceedings below. In Marquez vs. Secretary of Labor,22the Court said:. . . . The active participation of the against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.In the assailed Resolution,23respondent NLRC citedLa Naval Drug Corporation vs.Court of Appeals24in holding that private respondent is not in estopel. Thus,The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863).However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,such,for instance,as that the court had no jurisdiction,the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.Here,the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. (Emphasis ours)Again, the respondent NLRC has erroneously interpreted our ruling in theLa Navalcase. Under the said ruling, estoppel lies in this case. Private respondent is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter before the respondent NLRC having actively participated in the proceedings before the former. At no time before or during the trial on the merits did private respondent assail the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Private respondent took the cue only from the preliminary statement in the decision of the Labor Arbiter, which was a mereobiter, and raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Commission. It was then too late. Estoppel had set in.Turning now to the merits of the case, We uphold the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was illegally dismissed.The requisites of a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in the Article 282 of the Labor Code,25and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.26The substantive and procedural laws must be strictly complied with before a worker can be dismissed from his employment because what is at stake is not only the employee's position but his livelihood.27Petitioner's dismissal was grounded on culpade carelessness, negligence and failure to follow specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s) under OSDA 1.11; and, having forged or falsified official document(s) under OSDA 2.01.Private respondent blames petitioner for failure to follow established procedure in the hotel on a guest's request for long distance calls. Petitioner, however, explained that the usual or established procedures are not followed by the operators and hotel employees when circumstances warrant. For instance, the RLDC forms and the deposits are brought by the page boy directly to the operators instead of the cashiers if the latter are busy and cannot attend to the same. Furthermore, she avers that the telephone operators are not concious of the serial numbers in the RLDCs and at times, the used RLDCs are recycled. Even the page boys do not actually check the serial numbers of all RLDCs in one batch, except for the first and the last.On the charge of taking of the money by petitioner, it is to be noted that the second P500.00 deposit made by the Japanese guest Ieda was later discovered to be inserted in the folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official receipts. Thus, there exists no basis for personal appropriation by the petitioner of the money involved. Another reason is the alleged tampering of RLDC No. 862406.28While petitioner and her co-operator Loleng admitted that they indeed altered the date appearing therein from February 15, 1990 to February 13, the same was purposely made to reflect the true date of the transaction without any malice whatsoever on their part.As pointed out by Labor Arbiter Oswald b. Lorenzo, thus:The specifics of the grounds relied by respondent hotel's dismissal of complainant are those stated in Annex "F" of the latter's POSITION PAPER, which is the Notice of Dismissal, notably:1. OSDA 2.01 Forging, falsifying official documents(s)2. OSDA 1.11 Culpable negligence or failure to follow specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s)On this score, we are persuated by the complainant's arguments that under OSDA 1.11, infractions of this sort is not without qualifications, which is, that the alleged culpable carelessness, negligence or failure to follow instruction(s) or established procedure(s), RESULTING IN LOSS OR DAMAGE TO COMPANY PROPERTY. From the facts obtaining in this case, there is no quantum of proof whatsoever, except the general allegations in respondent's POSITION PAPER and other pleadings that loss or damage to company property resulted from the charged infraction. To our mind, this is where labor tribunals should come in and help correct interpretation of company policies which in the enforcement thereof wreaks havoc to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Apparently, the exercise of little flexibility by complainant and co-employees which is predicated on good faith should not be taken against them and more particularly against the complainant herein. In this case, to sustain the generalized charge of respondent hotel under OSDA 1.11 would unduly be sanctioning the imposition of too harsh a penalty which is dismissal.In the same tenor, the respondent's charge under OSDA 1.11 on the alleged falsification of private document is also with a qualification, in that the alleged act of falsification must have been done "IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MISLEAD THE USER(S) THEREOF." Again, based on the facts of the complained act, there appeared no one to have been misled on the change of date from RLDC #862406 FROM 15 TO 13 February 1990.As a matter of fact, we are in agreement with the jurisprudence cited by VIRGILIO M. PATAG, the 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor of the City of Manila, who exculpated complainant MANEJA from the charges of falsification of private documents and qualified theft under IS No. 90-11083 and marked Annex. "H" of complainant's POSITION PAPER, when he ruled that an altercation which makes the document speak the truth cannot be the foundation of a criminal action. As to the charge of qualified theft, we too are of the finding, like the city prosecutor above-mentioned that there was no evidence on the part of MANEJA to have unlawfully taken the P500.00 either from the hotel or from guest IEDA on 13 February 1990 and moreover, we too, find no evidence that complainant MANEJA had intention to profit thereby nor had misappropriated the P500.00 in question.29Given the factual circumstances of the case, we cannot deduce dishonesty from the act and omission of petitioner. Our norms of social justice demand that we credit employees with the presumption of good faith in the performance of their duties,30especially petitioner who has served private respondent since 1985 up to 1990 without any tinge of dishonesty and was even named "Model Employee" for the month of April, 1989.31Petitioner has been charged with a very serious offense dishonesty. This can irreparably wreck her life as an employee for no employer will take to its bosom a dishonest employee. Dismissal is the supreme penalty that can be meted to an employee and its imposition cannot be justified where the evidence is ambivalent.32It must, therefore, be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. Any ambiguity or ambivalence on the ground relied upon by an employer in terminating the services of an employee denies the latter his full right to contest its legality. Fairness cannot countenance such ambiguity or ambivalence.33An employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause.34Failure to do so result in a finding that the dismissal wasunjustified.35Finding that there was no just cause for dismissal of petitioner, we now determine if the rudiments of due process have duly accorded to her.Well-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notice before the termination of employment can be effected: (a) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and, (b) the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunityto be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.36In the case at bar, petitioner and her co-operator Loleng were issued a memorandum on March 7, 1990. On March 11, 1990, they submitted their written explanation thereto. On March 20, 1990, a written report was made with a recommendation that the offences committed by them were covered by OSDA 1.11 and 2.01. Thereafter, on March 23, 1990, petitioner was served with a notice of dismissal for said violations effective April 1, 1990.An examination of the record reveals that no hearing was ever conducted by private respondent before petitioner was dismissed. While it may be true that petitioner submitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually conducted before her employment was terminated. She was not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself.Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for the actual holding of a hearing. Every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable hom to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation.37Considering that petitioner denied having allegedly taken the second P500.00 deposit of the Japanese guest which was eventually found; and, having made the alteration of the date on the second RLDC merely to reflect the true date of the transaction, these circumstances should have at least warranted a separate hearing to enable petitioner to fully ventilate her side. Absent such hearing, petitioner's right to due process was clearly violated.38It bears stressing that a worker's employment is properly in the constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived of his work without due process of law.Substantive due processmandates that an employee can only be dismissed based on just or authorized causes.Procedural due processrequires further that he can only be dismissed after he has been given an opportunity to be heard. The import of due process necessitates the compliance of these two aspects.Accordingly, we hold that the labor arbiter did not err in awarding full backwages in view of this finding that petitioner was dismissed without just cause and without due process.We ruled in the case ofBustamante vs.NLRC39that the amount of backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee must be computed from the time he was dismissed to the time he is actually reinstated, without deducting the earnings he derived elsewhere pending the resolution of the case.Petitioner is likewise entitled to the thirteenth-month pay. Presidential Decree No.851, as amended by Memorandum Order No. 28, provides that employees are entitled to the thirteenth-month pay benefit regardless of their designation and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.40The award of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner is also warranted where there is lack of due process in effecting the dismissal.Where the termination of the services of an employee is attended by fraud or bad faith on the part of the employer, as when the latter knowingly made false allegations of a supposed valid cause when none existed, moral and exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of the former.41The anti-social and oppressive abuse of its right to investigate and dismiss its employees constitute a violation of Article 1701 of the New Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article 21 on human relations. The grant of moral damages to the employees by reason of such conduct on the part of the company is sanctioned by Article 2219, No. 10 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions reffered to in Article 21.42The award of attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award by the labor arbiter is justified under Article 111 of the Labor Code.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated June 3, 1994 and October 20, 1995 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision dated May 29, 1992 of the Labor Arbiter is therefore REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU,respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be reinstated.On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826.On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioninginter aliathe assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00 o'clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the UNION presented a list of (6) demands to the COLLEGE in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were flatly rejected.Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his return-to-work order and sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12 November 1990, the UNION received the Order.Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3),viz.:that striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against them; and, that CBA negotiations be continued. However, these efforts proved futile as the COLLEGE remained steadfast in its position that any return-to-work offer should be unconditional.On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the UNION continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that "appropriate steps under the said circumstances" may be undertaken by him.1On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the striking employees, which were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the COLLEGE.On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers and several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order before respondent SECRETARY, citing "selective acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It also sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their respective position papers. The COLLEGE prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who defied his return-to-work order.On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which,inter alia,directed the reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its existence".2Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and, correspondingly, sustained their termination.Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking UNION members, and private respondent UNION, the dismissal of its officers.On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both motions. Hence, this Petition forCertiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his assailed Orders insofar as they directed the reinstatement of the striking workers previously terminated.Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes, maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thus Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: . . . 2. Termination disputes . . . 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs . . .In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling inPAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment3where We held:The labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary measures against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts.Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down inSarmiento v. Tuico4andUnion of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,5workers who refuse to obey a return-to-work order are not entitled to be paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned of their refusal to return thereto as ordered.Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed officers considering that the act of the UNION in continuing with its picket was never characterized as a "brazen disregard of successive legal orders", which was readily apparent inUnion Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra,nor was it a willful refusal to return to work, which was the basis of the ruling inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra.The failure of UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders was not because they wanted to defy said orders; rather, they held the view that academic institutions were not industries indispensable to the national interest. When respondent SECRETARY denied their motion for reconsideration, however, the UNION intimated that efforts were immediately initiated to fashion out a reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, if failed.The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, was already settled inInternational Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.6Therein, We ruled that:. . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is readily evident from its opening proviso reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . .Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the Secretary of Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving unfair labor practice.7At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to that ofPAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra,which was cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real.To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal strike.Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor disputed itself, or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case inPAL v. Secretary or Labor and Employment, supra,and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling inInternational Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra,will apply.The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990, asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise prayed in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the termination of its officers and members before respondent SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then that the issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For, labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of Labor).8After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.We now come to the more pivotal question of whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order, should be reinstated.We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order:1. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to workand the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied).2. Article 264, same Labor Code Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Ministeror after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. . . (emphasis supplied).Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike . . .(emphasis supplied).3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August 1990) Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the sameunder pain or loss of employment statusor entitlement to full employment benefits from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied).Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work.This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).9It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.The rationale for this rule is explained inUniversity of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citingPhilippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,10thus To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld inPhilippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel11where We ruled thus:There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and emotional well-being of the country's youth.Respondent UNION's failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal. act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status."Section 6 Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides the penalties for defying a certification order of the Secretary of Labor or a return-to-work order of the Commission, also reiterates the same penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance with the aforesaid orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under pain of loss of employment status." Under the Labor Code, assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.Thus, we held inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra,that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced.We recently reiterated this stance inFederation of Free Workers v. Inciong,12wherein we citedUnion of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra,thus A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended . . . The union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.Despite knowledge of the ruling inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra,records of the case reveal that private respondent UNION opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 but also that of 9 November 1990.While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9 November 1990 initiatives were immediately undertaken to fashion out a return-to-work agreement with management, still, the unrebutted evidence remains that the striking union officers and members tried to return to work only eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in failure, or twenty (20) days after they received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC),13cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and conditions or prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its students who form part of the youth of the land.Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the doctrine laid down inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra,andUnion of Filipro Employees v. Nestle, Philippines, Inc., supra,cannot be made applicable to them because in the latter two cases, workers defied the return-to-work orders for more than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said, did not last more than a month.Again, this line of argument must be rejected. It is clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra).Suffice it to say, inFederation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra,the workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they report back to work. This is absurd.In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement of striking union members who refused to report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. The Order in question is, certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the Petition forCertiorariis hereby GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and the Resolution 31 May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union members terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-26461November 27, 1968ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION,petitioner,vs.JUDGE JOSE C. BORROMEO and ANTONIO LUA doing business under the name CEBU HOME & INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY,respondents.Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz and Associates for petitioner.Diores and Escareal Law Office for respondents.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Original action forcertiorariand prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul writs of preliminary injunction issued in Case No. R-9414 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Cebu Home and Industrial Supply and Antonio Lua vs. Associated Labor Union", and to restrain the Honorable Jose C. Borromeo, as Judge of that Court, from hearing said case.Petitioner herein, Associated Labor Union hereinafter referred to as ALU is a duly registered labor organization. Among the members thereof are employees of Superior Gas and Equipment Company of Cebu, Inc. hereinafter referred to as SUGECO a domestic corporation with offices at Juan Luna Street, Cebu City and a factory plant in Basak, Mandaue, province of Cebu. On January 1, 1965, ALU and SUGECO entered into a collective bargaining contract, effective up to January 1, 1966. Negotiations for the renewal of the contract between ALU and SUGECO were begun prior to the date last mentioned. While said negotiations were going on, late in February, 1966, twelve (12) SUGECO employees resigned from ALU. Thereupon, the negotiations stopped. On March 1, 1966, ALU wrote SUGECO requesting that the twelve (12) resigned employees be not allowed to report for work unless they produced a clearance from ALU;1but this request was immediately rejected by SUGECO, upon the ground that it would cause irreparable injury, that the bargaining contract had lapsed already, and that SUGECO could no longer demand said clearance from its employees. SUGECO intimated, however, that, should the twelve (12) men rejoin ALU, negotiations "for the renewal of the collective bargaining contract" could be resumed.On the same date, ALU wrote SUGECO charging that the latter was bargaining in bad faith and that its supervisors had campaigned for the resignation of ALU members, as well as serving notice that, unless these unfair labor practice acts were stopped immediately and a collective bargaining contract between SUGECO and ALU forthwith entered into, the latter would declare a strike and establish the corresponding picket lines "in any place where your business may be found." Counsel for SUGECO replied to the ALU, on March 3, 1966, stating that, with the resignation of the aforementioned ALU members, ALU no longer represented the majority of the SUGECO employees for purposes of negotiation and recognition.On March 4, 1966, ALU struck and picketed the SUGECO plant in Mandaue. The next day, March 5, SUGECO commenced Civil Case No. R-9221 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against ALU, to restrain the same from picketing said plant and the SUGECO offices at Cebu City and elsewhere in the Philippines. Forthwith, the Honorable Amador E. Gomez, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, caused to be issued,ex parte, the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by SUGECO.On the same date,2ALU preferred, in the Court of Industrial Relations hereinafter referred to as CIR unfair labor practice charges against SUGECO, its general manager, Concepcion Y. Lua hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Lua and its two (2) supervisors, alleging,inter alia, that these respondents had coerced and exerted pressure upon the aforementioned ALU members to resign, as they did resign from ALU, and that their resignations were seized upon by SUGECO to refuse further negotiations with ALU. On April 29, 1966, an acting prosecutor of the CIR filed therein against SUGECO the corresponding complaint for unfair labor practice.3Meanwhile, ALU had moved for a reconsideration of the order of Judge Gomez, dated March 5, 1966, sanctioning the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against ALU. This motion was later denied by Judge Jose C. Borromeo, who presided Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.4Hence, on May 9, 1966, ALU instituted Case No. L-25999 of the Supreme Court, for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, against Judges Gomez and Borromeo and the SUGECO, and prayed therein that the CFI of Cebu be declared without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of said Case No. R-9221; that the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued be annulled; that Judges Gomez and Borromeo be directed to dismiss said case; and that, meanwhile, they be ordered to desist from further proceedings in said case, and from enforcing the writ aforementioned. On May 16, 1966, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by ALU in L-25999. Subsequently, or on February 9, 1967, we rendered judgment therein in favor of ALU, annulling the writ of preliminary injunction issued in said Case No. R-9221, on March 5, 1966, directing respondent Judges to dismiss the same, and declaring permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us on May 16, 1966.Soon after the issuance of the latter writ, ALU resumed the picketing of the SUGECO plant in Mandaue. Moreover, it began to picket the house of Mrs. Lua, SUGECO's general manager, and her husband Antonio Lua hereinafter referred to as Mr. Lua at Abellana Street, Cebu City, and the store of the Cebu Home and Industrial Supply hereinafter referred to as Cebu Home at Gonzalez Street, Cebu City. The Cebu Home, which belongs to and is managed by Mr. Lua, deals in general merchandise, among which are oxygen, acetylene and cooking gas produced by SUGECO. On June 21, 1966, Cebu Home and Mr. Lua hereinafter referred to as respondents filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Cebu, against ALU, to restrain the latter from picketing the store and residence aforementioned and to recover damages. Thereupon, Judge Borromeo issued an order requiring the ALU to show cause why the writ sought should not be issued. In a memorandum filed on June 25, 1966 and a motion to dismiss dated June 29, 1966, the ALU assailed the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case upon the ground that it had grown out of a labor dispute. This, notwithstanding, on June 30, 1966, Judge Borromeo issued an order the dispositive part of which reads:WHEREFORE, upon filing of a bond by the petitioners5in the amount of P3,000.00 to answer for damages which the respondent6may be entitled, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, restraining the respondent, its officers, employees, agents or persons acting in its behalf:1) From picketing the office of the Cebu Home and Industrial Supply in Gonzales Street, Cebu City and the residence of the petitioner Antonio Lua in Abellana Street, Cebu City;2) From preventing the employees of the petitioners from entering inside or going out the office of the Cebu Home and Industrial Supply and the residence of the petitioner Antonio Lua;3) From stopping the car, truck or other vehicles entering or going out the office of Cebu Home and Industrial Supply and the residence of Antonio Lua;4) From preventing the sale and distribution by the petitioners of its merchandise in connection with its business; and5) From performing acts which cause disturbance of the tranquility and privacy of the petitioner and his family.On July 4, 1966, respondents herein moved to amend the foregoing order so as to broaden its scope. Upon the other hand, on July 6, 1966, ALU sought a reconsideration of said order and the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 30, 1966. Acting upon a motion to amend of respondents herein, Judge Borromeo issued, on July 22, 1966, another order, from which we quote:Considering the evidence presented and the facts stated in the previous order of the Court, it is believed that the petition is justified and that the acts complained of, if not restrained, will render the writ of preliminary injunction ineffective.WHEREFORE, in connection with the writ of preliminary injunction which was previously issued, the respondent union, its members, agents or persons acting in its behalf are hereby restrained:a) From preventing the petitioners, their employees or representatives from unloading their merchandise and other supplies coming from Manila or other places and from hauling them from the waterfront for the purpose of delivering them to the place of the petitioners;b) From preventing the petitioners or their representatives from delivering and loading their empty tanks and other supplies to the boat or other means of transportation for Manila or other places; andc) From preventing, obstructing or molesting the petitioners, their employees or representatives from performing acts in connection with their business.On July 25, 1966, Judge Borromeo denied ALU's motion to dismiss Case No. R-9414 and to reconsider his order and dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction of June 30, 1966. Thereupon, or on August 26, 1966, ALU commenced the present action forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction, to annul the writs of preliminary injunction issued, on June 30 and July 22, 1966, in Case No. R-9414 and to restrain the lower court from hearing the same.ALU maintains that the lower Court has no jurisdiction over Case No. R-9414 because it had grown out of a labor dispute, is intimately connected with an unfair labor practice case pending before the CIR and involves a strike the injunction against which had already been lifted by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-25999.7Moreover, ALU claims that even if the lower court had jurisdiction over Case No. R-9414, the writs of preliminary injunction issued therein are null and void, not only because of said lack of jurisdiction, but, also, because it failed to observe the requirements of Sec. 9(f) of Republic Act No. 875, as well as the provisions of Sec. 9 (d) (5) of the same Act, requiring findings of facts on matters enumerated therein.Upon the other hand, respondents argue that the issue in the lower court does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CIR, there being no employer-employee relationship and "no labor dispute" between the ALU members and Cebu Home; and that, at any rate, the SUGECO products distributed and sold by Cebu Home, came, not from the SUGECO plant in Mandaue, but from other parts of the Philippines. Respondents further deny that the residence of Mr. Lua was being used as a place to store and refill SUGECO gas for resale.Respondents' pretense is untenable. To begin with, Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 8758vests in the Court of Industrial Relations exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of any unfair labor practice. Moreover, for an issue "concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment" to partake of the nature of a "labor dispute", it is not necessary that "the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."9Then, again, in order to apply the provisions of Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 875, governing the conditions under which "any restraining order" or "temporary or permanent injunction" may issue in any "case involving or growing out of a labor dispute", it is not indispensable that the persons involved in the case be "employees of the same employer", although this is the usual case. Sec. 9,10likewise, governs cases involving persons: 1) "whoare engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation"; or 2) "who ... havedirect or indirect interests therein", or 3) "who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees"; or 4) "when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as hereinbefore defined) or "persons participating or interested" therein (as hereinafter defined)". Furthermore, "a person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it" and "he or it isengaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has adirect or indirectinterest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employees or employers engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation."11Now, then, there is no dispute regarding the existence of a labor dispute between the ALU and SUGECO-Cebu; that SUGECO's general manager, Mrs. Lua, is the wife of the owner and manager of Cebu Home, Antonio Lua; and that Cebu Home is engaged in the marketing of SUGECO products. It is, likewise, clear that as managing member of the conjugal partnership between him and his wife, Mr. Lua has an interest in the management by Mrs. Lua of the business of SUGECO and in the success or failure of her controversy with the ALU, considering that the result thereof may affect the condition of said conjugal partnership. Similarly, as a distributor of SUGECO products, theCebu Home has, at least, an indirect interest in the labor dispute between SUGECO and the ALUand in Case No. R-9221. In other words, respondents herein have an indirect interest in said labor dispute, for which reason, we find that Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875 squarely applies to Case No. R-9414.Thus, in Goldfinger v. Feintuch,12it was held:Within the limits of peaceful picketing, however, picketing may be carried onnot only against the manufacturerbut against a non-union product sold by onein unity of interest with the manufacturerwho is in the same business for profit. Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages, both it and the retailers who sell its products are in a position to undersell competitors who pay the higher scale, and this may result in unfair reduction of the wages of union members. Concededly the defendant union would be entitled to picket peacefully the plant of the manufacturer. Where the manufacturer disposes of the product through retailers in unity of interest with it,13unless the union may follow the product to the place where it is sold and peacefully ask the public to refrain from purchasing it, the union would be deprived of afairandpropermeans of bringing its plea to the attention of the public.Besides, the ALU introduced evidence to the effect that the SUGECO products had been brought to Cebu Home and were being distributed in the latter, as a means to circumvent, defeat or minimize the adverse effects of the picketing conducted in the SUGECO plant and offices in Mandaue and Cebu City respectively by ALU. It is true that respondents averred that said products were purchased by Cebu Homebeforethe strike was declared against SUGECO and that some of said products were obtained from SUGECO in other parts of the country; but, even if true, these circumstances did not place the picketing of the Cebu Home beyond the pale of the aforesaid Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875 because, as distributor of SUGECO products, Cebu Homewas engagedin the same trade as SUGECO. Neither does the claim that some SUGECO products marketed by Cebu Home had come, not from the Mandaue plant, but from other parts of the Philippines, detract from the applicability of said provisions, considering that ALU had struck against SUGECO and had announced, as early as March 1, 1966 or three (3) days before it struck its intent to picket "any place where your business may be found" and that SUGECO in Cebu is a sister company of SUGECO elsewhere in the Philippines.For, a similar reason, in American Brake Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9 of International Association of Machinists,14the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled:Where corporate employer hadseparate plantsin Missouri and Pennsylvania, and labor dispute existed atMissouriplant, but not at thePennsylvaniaplant, peaceful picketing at Pennsylvania plant by members of union representing employees atMissouriplant wasnotan unfair labor practice as defined by Labor Management Relations Act....15In the language of the American Jurisprudence:16It seems nowgenerally agreedthat a state cannot either by its common law or by statute prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of business solely on the ground that the picketing is carried on by personsnot employed therein. The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional guaranty of free speech is infringed by the judicial policy of a state to forbid peaceful picketing on the ground that it is being conducted by strangers to the employer affected, that is, by persons not in the relation of employer and employee with him. Rules limiting picketing to the occasion of a labor dispute arenotoffended by the act of a union having a grievance against amanufacturerin picketing a retail establishment in which its products are soldwhen there is a unity of interestbetween the manufacturer and the retailer; this is true even when the shopkeeper is the sole person required to run his business. And the right of employees on strike at one plant of an employer to picket another plant of the same employer has been upheld even though some of the employees of the picketed plant as a result refused to work despite a no-strike agreement. Also, a union may picket a retail store selling goods made in anonunionfactory between which and the union there is an industrial dispute,provided there is a unity of interest between the retailer and the manufacturer.17Apart from the foregoing, it will be recalled that, prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining contract between ALU and SUGECO, on January 1, 1966, negotiations had started for the renewal of said contract; that during said negotiations, late in February 1966, twelve (12) SUGECO employees resigned from ALU, owing according to charges preferred by ALU and confirmed by a complaint filed by a CIR prosecutor to unfair labor practices allegedly committed by SUGECO and its supervisors who, it was also claimed, had induced and coerced said employees to quit the ALU, which they did; that, thereupon, SUGECO stopped negotiating with ALU alleging that, with the resignation of said