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SMCEU v. Judge Bersamira (Review, Art. 212)

G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990

J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for

merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are

independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE. In said contracts, it was

expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the

contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to bedeemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-

employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one

hand, and SanMig on the other.Petitioner is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-

and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a C ollectiveBargaining Agreement effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1989. Section 1 of

their CBA specifically provides that "temporary, probationary, or contractemployees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and,

therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement."

In a letter dated 20 November 1988, the Union advised SanMig that someLipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and

sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. The Union allegedthat this group of employees, while appearing to be contractual workers

supposedly independent contractors, have been continuously working for

SanMig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that their work isneither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities

necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it wascontended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It was then

demanded that the employment status of these workers be regularized.On 12 January 1989 and 30 January 1989, the Union filed two notices ofstrike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting.

Conciliatory meetings were then held before the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board of DOLE (NCMB-DOLE).

Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were

staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices.On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and

Damages before respondent Court enjoining petitioner from representing

and/or acting in behalf of the employees of Lipercon and DRite, and of

calling a strike among others.

Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance and

issued a Temporary Restraining Order, and subsequently, an Order granting

the complaint of SanMig.

Issue: Whether or not there exists a l abor dispute such that the RTC may not

validly assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NCMB-DOLE.

Held: A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Codeincludes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of

employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,

fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of

employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate

relation of employer and employee."While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship

exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers ofLipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist

"regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of

employer and employee" provided the controversy concerns, among others,the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement"

thereof. Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor

dispute is not determined by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants donot stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist here is evident. Whatthe Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by

Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of

SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship betweensaid employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their

employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringingthe matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also

seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union

membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part,

resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-

employee relationship between it and those workers and because thedemand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation

and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of

employment are also involved. Neither can it be denied that the controversy

below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance

of by the NCMB-DOLE.

As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to

the labor tribunals.

Okol v. Slimmers World International (Art. 217)G.R. No. 160146 December 11, 2009

J. Carpio

Facts: Respondent employed petitioner Leslie Okol as a management

trainee on 15 June 1992. She rose up the ranks to become Head OfficeManager and then Director and V ice President from 1996 until her dismissal

on 22 September 1999.On 28 July 1999, prior to Okols dismissal, Slimmers World preventively

suspended Okol. The suspension arose from the seizure by the Bureau of

Customs of seven Precor elliptical machines and seven Precor treadmillsbelonging to or consigned to Slimmers World. The shipment of the

equipment was placed under the names of Okol and two customs brokersfor a value less than US$500. For being undervalued, the equipments were

seized.

On 19 September 1999, Okol filed her written explanation for the incident.However, Slimmers World found Okols explanation to be unsatisfactory.

Through a letter dated 22 September 1999 signed by its president, SlimmersWorld terminated Okols employment.

Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC againstrespondents for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions,damages and attorneys fees, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of

backwages.

On 22 February 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the case with a

reservation of their right to file a Position Paper at the proper time.

Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the complaint.

In an Order, dated 20 March 2000, the labor arbiter granted the motion to

dismiss. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the vice-president of Slimmers

World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the

dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of

the Arbitration branch.

Okol filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a Resolutiondated 29 May 2001, the

NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiters order. Respondents filed a

Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC but were denied.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction

Held: The issue revolves mainly on whether petitioner was an employee or a

corporate officer of Slimmers World. In Tabang v. NLRC, it was held that an

"office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected

by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually

occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors ostockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also

determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.In the present case, the respondents, in their motion to dismiss filed before

the labor arbiter, questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRC in taking

cognizance of petitioners complaint. Respondents presented the GeneralInformation Sheet, Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors and

Secretarys Certificate,and the Amended By-Laws of Slimmers World as

submitted to the SEC to show that petitioner was a corporate officer whoserights do not fall within the NLRCs jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the

meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was a member ofthe board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital stock, and

an elected corporate officer.

Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was adirector and officer of Slimmers World. In a number of cases, it was held that

a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporatcontroversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation.

Thus, under the law, it is the regular courts which has jurisdiction over the

present case.

DFA v. NLRC (Art. 217)G.R. No. 113191 September 18, 1996

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J. Vitug

Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent filed a complaint for his

alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"

contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB

and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs, both with a copy

of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent

Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered

by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or thesale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement

Establishing the Asian Development Bank in relation to Section 5 andSection 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of

The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters. The Labor Arbiter took

cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived itsdiplomatic immunity from suit.

The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, theDFA referred the matter to the National Labor Relations Commission. In its

referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." The

NLRC, in its reply to the letter, said that it is not competent to review adecision of the Labor Arbiter as it only exercises administrative supervision

over the Arbiter. Dissatisfied, the DFA lodged the instant petitionfor certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the AsianDevelopment Bank

Held: Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:

The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except incases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers toborrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the

sale of securities.

Under Article 55 thereof

All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank,

including experts performing missions for the Bank:(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts p erformed by

them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.

The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement

should be able, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing

and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of

securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The

Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed

by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters

Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants

and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippines government whichmust be respected.

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not beenintended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a

waiver of immunity would not attack.

PAL v. NLRC (Art. 218)G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998

J. Martinez

Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were

dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by the dismissal, private

respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction which was granted.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC may validly acquire jurisdiction despite the

fact that there is no complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the laborarbiter in this complaint for injunction

Held: In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all

prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particularact in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may

cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any

decision in favor of such party;

It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute

between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case,there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as

there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor

arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.

The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC i s in reality an

action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition

which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full

backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the

petition should have been filed with the labor arb iter who has the original

and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all

workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:(1) Unfair labor practice;

(2) Termination disputes;(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers

may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and

conditions of employment;(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising

from the employer-employee relations;(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including

questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare andmaternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer- employee

relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos, whether or not

accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the laborarbiter is both original and exclusive. The only exceptions are where the

Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power ofcompulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to

voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction overall cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor

Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is

appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private

respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of

petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanketauthority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction,

considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the

NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes."

Ong v. Court of Appeals (Art. 223)

G.R. No. 152494 September 22, 2004

J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts: Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing,which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels, belts, and umbrellas.

Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered very low sales and productivitybecause of the economic crisis in the country. Hence, it adopted a rotation

scheme by reducing the workdays of its employees to three days a week or

less for an indefinite period.

On separate dates, the 15 respondents filed before the NLRC complaints for

illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay,holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and

attorneys fees against petitioner.Petitioner claimed that 9 of the 15 respondents were not employees of

Milestone but of Protone Industrial Corporation which, however, stopped its

operation due to business losses. Further, he claims that respondentsManuel Abuela, Lolita Abelong, Ronnie Herrero, Carlos Tabbal, Conrado

Dabac, and Lodualdo Faa were not dismissed from employment; rather,

they refused to work after the rotation scheme was adopted. Anent theirmonetary claims, petitioner presented documents showing that he paid

respondents minimum wage, 13th month pay, holiday pay, andcontributions to the SSS, Medicare, and Pag-Ibig Funds.

The Labor Arbiter, however, sided with the private respondents. The NLRC

likewise dismissed the appeal on the ground of failure to pay the requireddocket fees.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper appeal to the NLRC

Held: Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, sets forth the rules on

appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award:

ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter arefinal and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both

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parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards,

or orders. ()

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety

bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the

Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the

judgment appealed from.

The pertinent provisions of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the

NLRC, which were in effect when petitioner filed his appeal, provide:Section 1. Periods of Appeal. Decisions, awards or orders of the

Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final andexecutory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both

parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such

decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter ()Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal

shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided inSection 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment

of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety

bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompaniedby a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied

upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;and a statement of the date when the appellant received the

appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the

other party of such appeal.A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other

requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period forperfecting an appeal.

Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, theRegional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involvesa monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be

perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which

shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a

reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission

or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetaryaward, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees.

The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall

submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety

bond posted is genuine.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the

Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the

motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to

perfect appeal.

In the case at bar, petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on

January 6, 2000. He filed his notice of appeal with memorandum of appealand paid the corresponding appeal fees on January 17, 2000, the last day of

filing the appeal. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond, hefiled a motion to reduce bond alleging that the amount of P1,427,802,04 as

bond is "unjustified and prohibitive" and prayed that the same be reduced to

a "reasonable level." The NLRC denied the motion and consequently

dismissed the appeal for non-perfection. Petitioner now contends that he

was deprived of the chance to post bond because the NLRC took 102 days todecide his motion.

While, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure allows theCommission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority

is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the sound

discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds.In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected

only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a

cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing ofa memorandum of appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with

the other requisites mentioned shall not stop the running of the period forperfection of appeal. The posting of cash or surety bond is not only

mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is fatal

and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Thisrequirement is intended to discourage employers from using the appeal to

delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees just andlawful claims.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite

for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the

provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the

posting of a cash or surety bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly clearthat the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the

employer to be the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be

perfected.

The fact that the NLRC took 102 days to resolve the motion will not help

petitioners case. The NLRC Rules clearly provide that "the filing of the

motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect

appeal."Petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the

ten-day reglementary period following the receipt of the order, resolution or

decision of the NLRC to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or

decision. In the alternative, he should have paid only a moderate andreasonable sum for the premium

While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has beenrelaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial

compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited

willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.

Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. (Art. 223,

Reinstatement of LAs Decision)

G.R. No. 177026 January 30, 2009J. Carpio-Morales

Facts: An anonymous e-mail was sent to the General Manager of Amkor

Technology Philippines detailing allegations of malfeasance on the part of

its supervisory employees Lunesa Lansangan and Rosita Cendaa(petitioners) for "stealing company time." Respondent thus investigated the

matter, requiring petitioners to submit their written explanation. Inhandwritten letters, petitioners admitted their wrongdoing. Respondent

thereupon terminated petitioners for "extremely serious offenses" asdefined in its Code of Discipline,

prompting petitioners to file a complaint fo

illegal dismissal against it.

The labor arbiter Arthur L. Amansecdismissed petitioners complaint, he

having found them guilty of

"[s]wiping another employees [sic] I.D. card or requesting another

employee to swipe ones I.D. card to gain personal advantageand/or in theinterest of cheating", an offense of dishonesty punishable as a serious form

of misconduct and fraud or breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor

Code: () which allows the dismissal of an employee for a valid cause.

The Arbiter, however, ordered the reinstatement of petitioners to their

former positions without backwages "as a measure of equitable and

compassionate relief" owing mainly to petitioners prior unblemished

employment records, show of remorse, harshness of the penalty and

defective attendance monitoring system of respondent.

Respondent assailed the reinstatement aspect of the Arbiters order before

the NLRC.In the meantime, petitioners, without appealing the Arbiters finding them

guilty of "dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud or breach oftrust," moved for the issuance of a "writ of reinstatement."

After consolidating respondents appeal from the Labor Arbiters order of

reinstatement and subsequent appeal/order denying the quashal of the alias

writ of execution and lifting of the notice of garnishment, the NLRC granted

respondents appeals bydeleting the reinstatement aspect of the Arbitersdecision and setting aside the Arbiters Alias Writ of Execution and Notice of

Garnishment.Petitioners motionfor reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution having been

denied, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which

while affirming the finding that petitioners were guilty of misconduct andthe like, ordered respondent to "pay petitioners their corresponding

backwages without qualification and deduction for the period covering

October 20, 2004 (date of the Arbiters decision) up to June 30, 2005 (date ofthe NLRC Decision)," citing Article 223 of the Labor Code and Roquero v.

Philippine Airlines.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 223 is applicable in the present case

Held: It is not applicable. The decision of the Arbiter finding that petitioners

committed "dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud, or breachof trust" had become final, petitioners not having appealed the same before

the NLRC as in fact they even moved for the execution of the reinstatement

aspect of the decision. It bears recalling that it was only respondent which

assailed the Arbiters decision to the NLRC to solely question the propriety

of the order for reinstatement, and it succeeded. Article 223 concerns itselfwith an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while

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the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in

Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of i llegal dismissal.

Thus, petitioners are entitled neither to full backwages nor to reinstatement

as they are not unjustly dismissed.

Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (Art. 224)

G.R. No. 126322 January 16, 2002

J. Pardo

Facts: It appears from the records that petitioner is alleging ownership overa number of properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex

Development Corporation, which were erroneously levied upon by the

sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the decision rendered by the saidCommission in a labor case. As a consequence of the erroneous and unlawful

levy of the properties, the petitioner filed a Notice of Third Party Claim withthe Labor Arbiter, an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the NLRC, a petition

for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Manila all of which were

dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners subsequent appeal to the NLRC fromthe decision of the Labor Arbiter was likewise dismissed. Its appeal to the

Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. Its motion for reconsideration waslikewise dismissed despite petitioners protestations that the filing of a

complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a

remedy specifically granted to an owner whose properties were subjected toa writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which

it was not a party.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there wasforum shopping and on dismissing the petitioners accion reinvindicatoria onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court

Held: Anent the first issue, there is no forum shopping. In the case at bar,

there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs

sought.The case before the NLRC where the labor arbiter issued a labor dispute was

between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The

only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of

execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property

of petitioner, not a party to the labor case.

On the second issue, a third party whose property has been levied upon by a

sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with

several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may

avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude

the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in theevent he failed in the remedy first availed of.

Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and

b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to

the NLRC.

Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper

action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegallyseized by the sheriff.

The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did notpreclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of

property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of

such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping.The power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to properties

unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.

"The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction withthe judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate

jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies onlywhen no third-party claimant is involved. When a third-party, or a stranger

to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant

may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil courtwhich may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to

the judgment debtor."In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that:

"The well-settled doctrine is that a 'proper levy' is indispensable to a valid

sale on execution. A sale unless preceded by a valid levy is void. Therefore,

since there was no sufficient levy on the execution in question, the private

respondent did not take any title to the properties sold thereunder ().

"A person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right

over the levied properties is not precluded, however, from taking other legal

remedies."

A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property would not

constitute interference with the powers or processes of the Arbiter and the

NLRC which rendered the judgment to enforce and execute upon the levied

properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not subject

to levy. Thus, a separate action for recovery, upon a claim andprima-

facieshowing of ownership by the petitioner, cannot be considered asinterference.

CITIBANK vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 108961., November 27, 1998

FACTSCitibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. entered into a contract for the

latter to provide security to the bank's premises. On April 22, 1990, thecontract between Citibank and El Toro expired. On June 10, 1990, petitione

Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the bank would not renew

anymore the service agreement with the latter. Citibank hired anothe

security agency, the Golden Pyramid Security Agency, to render security

services at Citibank's premises. CIGLA filed a notice of strike directed at thepremises of the Citibank main office. Faced with the prospect of disruption

of its business operations, Citibank filed with the RTC Makati, a complaint

for injunction and damages. CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion todismiss the complaint which was denied. CIGLA filed with the Court o

Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction assailing the

validity of the proceedings had before the regional trial court. The Court ofAppeals promulgated its decision in CIGLA's favor. Citibank filed a motion

for reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied themotion. Citibank contends that there is no employer-employee relationship

between Citibank and the security guards represented by respondent CIGLA

and that there is no "labor dispute" in the subject controversy. The security

guards were employees of El Toro security agency, not of Citibank. Its

service contract with Citibank had expired and not renewed.

ISSUE: WON it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial court that has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Citibank with

the trial court.

HELD:

NO.In determining the existence of an employer -employee relationship

the following elements are generally considered:

1.the selection and engagement of the employee;

2.the payment of wages;

3.the power of dismissal; and

4.the employer's power to control the employee with respect tothe means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished

It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a

claim filed where no employer-employee relationship existed between a

company and the security guards assigned to it by a security servicecontractor. In this case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited

hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work. It was the securityagency that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards.

The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank and thesecurity guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of whethe

they stand in the relation of employer and employees? Article 212paragraph l of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It

"includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of

employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiatingfixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of

employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximaterelation of employer and employee."

If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is oneregarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is

a civil dispute. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer

employee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard

members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure

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the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no

right to strike against the bank.

RURAL BANK OF CORON vs. CORTES

G.R. No. 164888 December 6, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent was the Financial Assistant, Personnel Officer and CorporateSecretary of The Rural Bank of Coron. On examination of the financial books

of the corporations it was found out that respondent was involved in severalanomalies, drawing petitioners to terminate respondents services.

Respondents counsel conveyed respondents willingness to abide by the

decision to terminate her but reminded them that she was entitled toseparation pay as well as to the other benefits provided by law in her favor.

However, this demand remained unheeded, so respondent filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction, contending that the case was an intra-corporate controversyinvolving the removal of a corporate officer, hence, cognizable by the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Section 5 of PD 902-A. It was denied and eventually, the Labor Arbiter found for respondent,

computing the monetary award due her. The Labor Arbiter disposed his

decision.

On last day of the period of appeal, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal andMotion for Reduction of Bond to which they attached a Memorandum on

Appeal. In their Motion for Reduction of Bond, petitioners alleged that thecorporations were under financial distress and the Rural Bank of Coron wasunder receivership. They thus prayed that the amount of bond be

substantially reduced, preferably to one half thereof or even lower.

The NLRC, while noting that petitioners timely filed the appeal, held that the

same was not accompanied by an appeal bond, a mandatory requirementunder Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New

Rules of Procedure. It accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which

dismissed it. Hence this petition faulting the appellate court for dismissing

their petition, saying that they did such based on mere technicality and

failure to decide based on merit.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Labor Arbiter has thus jurisdiction over respondentscomplaint.

2. WON the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition "on amere technicality."

HELD:

1. YES. While, indeed, respondent was the Corporate Secretary ofthe Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial Assistant and

the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations.Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla23 instructs that a

corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform servicesunder a circumstance which would make them employees.

2. NOThe non-posting of an appeal bond within the reglementary period diveststhe NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The requirement for

posting the surety bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional and

cannot be trifled with. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fataland has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The

petitioners cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of rulesfor their act of negligence.

In the case at bar, petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond withinthe prescribed period, thus, no appeal was perfected from the decision of

the Labor Arbiter. For this reason, the decision sought to be appealed to theNLRC had become final and executory and therefore immutable. Clearly

then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to

reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CABANSAGG.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005

FACTS

Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist and applied fo

employment with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank, a

private banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the

Philippines. PNB found her eminently qualified and offered her a position as

Branch Credit Officer. She then filed an Application, with the Ministry of

Manpower of the Government of Singapore, for the issuance of an

Employment Pass. Her application was approved for a period of two (2)years. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the

meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employmencontract Cabansag and she was issued by the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment Certificate,

certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.

On April 16, 1999 PNB demanded that she submit her letter of resignationwith the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to

penetrate the local market. Cabansag asked that she be given sufficient time

to look for another job. She was told that she should be out of heremployment by May 15, 1999. She was again summoned and adamantly

ordered to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999she received a letter terminating her employment with the Bank. |The Labo

Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Cabansag. PNB appealed the

labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. The Commission affirmed thaDecision. In disposing of the Petition for Certiorari, the CA noted that

petitioner bank had failed to adduce in evidence the Singaporean lawsupposedly governing the latters employment Contract with respondent

The appellate court found that the Contract had actually been processed bythe Philippine Embassy in Singapore and approved by the PhilippineOverseas Employment Administration (POEA), which then used that

Contract as a basis for issuing an Overseas Employment Certificate in favo

of respondent.

ISSUES

1. WON the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National CapitaRegion has jurisdiction over the instant controversy;

2. WON the arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Regionis the most convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the

instant controversy

HELD:

1. YES. Based on Art 217 of the Labor Code and Section 10 of RA 8042, laboarbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising

from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involvingall workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).

Respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the

PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had

to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of

Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to theimmigration regulations of that country.

Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the

country to first obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed

here. That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the noncitizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does

not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that itsholder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country.

Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured anOverseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine

Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared

her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, thisdocument authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled

her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assumingarguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a

direct hire governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and

customs prevailing in Singapore, she subsequently became a contract

worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies

upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegallyterminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.

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Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing business

through a branch office in Singapore. Significantly, respondents

employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by the

president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila. This

circumstance militates against petitioners contention that respondent was

locally hired; and totally governed by and subject to the laws, common

practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with

more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent fallsunder the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in

Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippinelaws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.

2. YES. Based on Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedurereads:

Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hearand decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having

jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided,

however that cases of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed beforethe Regional Arbitration Branch where the complainant resides or where the

principal office of the respondent/employer is situated, at the option of thecomplainant.

For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place orlocality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action

arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to reportback after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field

employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace iswhere they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularlyreceive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results

of their assignment to their employers.

Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042),

a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or hasbeen engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a

legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino

worker.[21]Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its

branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal

resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of migrant worker

or overseas Filipino worker.

As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against

petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the

Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where

the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal bypetitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her

residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint beforethe RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 120077, October 13, 2000

FACTSMarcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer at the

Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently, in June 1988, he

was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, People's Republic of Chinaand later terminated due to retrenchment. Santos filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, which

decided in his favor, Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that thePOEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC declared the

decision null for want of jurisdiction and enjoined the complainant to file hiscomplaint with the POEA. Santos moved for reconsideration arguing that

the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an "overseas

contract worker. NLRC granted the moti on and reversed itself. LaborArbiter found that respondent Santos was illegally dismissed from

employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalentto his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. Petitioners filed a

motion for reconsideration arguing that Labor Arbiter de Vera's

recommendation had no basis in law and in fact.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

YES. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and

the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines

has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace

Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving ou

citizens can be tried here.

The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the

Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the

Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was

hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitmentagency of the government.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may

assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the

Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to

the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to havepower to enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at

bar.

Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given

that all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, toemployment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The

inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the

Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither arethey "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr

Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decisionbe made as to the law governing the employment contract as such wasperfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of

lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made).

The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Responden

Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the

Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People'sRepublic of China.

No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the

facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took

place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position

to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely

affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos

retrenchment.

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assumingthat a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have

any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hoteis a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even

served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve

controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we donot have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country

If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specificallthe POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an "overseas contrac

worker" a fact which he admits with conviction.

Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits, the

NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LISTANAG.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003

FACTSSeverino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land in Sorsogon. He voluntarily

offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department oAgrarian Reform (DAR),3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the

property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent

Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of

Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determinethe just compensation of the land. On October 14, 1998, the DARAB

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rendered a Decision, valuing the land as P10,956,963.25 for the acquired

area of 240.9066 hectares. A Writ of Execution was issued by the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) directing the manager of Land Bank

to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the

manner provided by law. Listana filed a Motion for Contempt with the

PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of

Execution. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the

writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB. PARAD issued an

Order granting the Motion for Contempt. Land Bank filed a Motion forReconsideration of the aforequoted Order, which was however denied by

the PARAD. Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD,manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central.

PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and

ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of theadjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. On a separate date,

he also directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A.Lorayes.

ISSUE:WON the order for the arrest of petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by

the PARAD, was valid or not.

HELD:

NO. There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirectcontempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal

charge initiated by the court motu proprio. In the case at bar, neither ofthese modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.

More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:

Sec. 12.Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise

provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against

persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, orshall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted

pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt.

The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been

committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed

therefore.

The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions

regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:

1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that theformer Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did

not comprehend contempt committed against administrative orquasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly

considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done

in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative

Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where

a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, givetestimony or produce documents when required to do so by the

official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, saidperson shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of

court, upon application of the official or body with the Regional

Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for

indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so byinitiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their

jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. Thesematters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the

present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional

Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.Lorayes with indirect contempt.

Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion

for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the

following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a

verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with

in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motuproprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the

PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed

by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the

power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings

that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt," specifically the

Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the

arrest of Lorayes, are null and void.

ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC vs. NLRC[G.R. Nos. 116476-84. May 21, 1998]

FACTS

A a complaint for illegal dismissal; underpayment of wages; and fo

nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holidayand rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and

damages was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/oSergio Jamila IV. Thereafter, petitioner was impleaded as a third-party

respondent by the security agency. In due course, Labor Arbiter rendered a

consolidated Decision ordering Veterans Philippine Scout Security AgencySergio Jamila IV, and third-party respondent Rosewood Processing, Inc. to

pay the complainants jointly and severally.

The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by the National Labor Relation

Commission in its Resolution promulgated April 28, 1994, for failure of the

petitioner to file the required appeal bond within the reglementary period.

As earlier stated, Respondent Commission dismissed petitioners appeal

because it was allegedly not perfected within the reglementary ten-dayperiod. Petitioner received a copy of the labor arbiters Decision on April 2

1993, and it filed its Memorandum of Appeal on April 12, 1993. However, itsubmitted the appeal bond on April 26, 1993, or twelve days after the

expiration of the period for appeal per Rule VI, Sections 1, 3 and 6 of the

1990 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. Thusit ruled that the labor arbiters Decision became final and executory on Apri

13, 1993.

In the assailed Order, Respondent Commission denied reconsiderationbecause petitioner allegedly failed to raise any palpable or patent error

committed by said commission.

ISSUE

WON the appeal from the labor arbiter to the NLRC was perfected on time.

HELD

YES. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the

manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such

legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and

executory. The Labor Code provides:

ART. 223.Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are

final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both

parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awardsor orders. xxx

x x x x x x x x x

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by theemployer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond

issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission

in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed

from.

x x x x x x x x x.

Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving amonetary award in labor cases may be perfected only upon the posting of a

cash or surety bond.[10]

The lawmakers intended the posting of the bond to

be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employers appeal.[11]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn10

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However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in

order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of

controversies on the merits.[12]

Some of these cases include: (a) counsels

reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that

the aggrieved party may appeal xxx within ten (10) working days; (b)

fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of

miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is

from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an

earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combinedwith its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.

[13]

In Quiambao vs. National Labor Relations Commission,

[14]

this Court ruled thata relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by substantialcompliance with the rule.

In Globe General Services and Security Agency vs. National Labor Relations

Commission,[15]

the Court observed that the NLRC, in actual practice, allows

the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant and on

meritorious grounds; hence, petitioners in that case should have filed a

motion to reduce the bond within the reglementary period for appeal.

That is the exact situation in the case at bar. Here, petitioner claims to havereceived the labor arbiters Decision on April 6, 1993.

[16]On April 16, 1993, it

filed, together with its memorandum on appeal[17]

and notice of appeal, a

motion to reduce the appeal bond[18]

accompanied by a surety bond for fiftythousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance,

Inc.[19]

Ignoring petitioners motion (to reduce bond), Respondent

Commission rendered its assailed Resolution dismissing the appeal due tothe late filing of the appeal bond.

The solicitor general argues for the affirmation of the assailed Resolution for

the solereason that the appeal bond, even if it was filed on time, was

defective, as it was not in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in

the judgment appealed from. The Court disagrees.

We hold that petitioners motion to reduce the bond is a substantialcompliance with the Labor Code. This holding is consistent with the norm

that letter-perfect rules must yield to the broader interest of substantialjustice.

[20]

Where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than

rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight

because labor determinations should not only be secundum rationem butalso secundum caritatem.[21]A judicious reading of the memorandum of

appeal would have made it evident to Respondent Commission that the

recourse was meritorious. Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse

of discretion in peremptorily dismissing the appeal without passing upon --

in fact, ignoring -- the motion to reduce the appeal bond.

We repeat: Considering the clear merits which appear, res ipsa loquitur, in

the appeal from the labor arbiters Decision, and the petitioners substantial

compliance with rules governing appeals, we hold that the NLRC gravelyabused its discretion in dismissing said appeal and in failing to pass upon the

grounds alleged in the Motion for Reconsideration.

GENUINO vs.NRC

G.R. Nos. 142732-33, December 4, 2007

FACTSGenuino was employed by Citibank, an American banking corporation duly

licensed to do business in the Philippines, sometime in January 1992 as

Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President.Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious

misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank, and(3) commission of a crime against the bank.

On October 15, 1993, Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a

Complaint against Citibank for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with

damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering her

reinstatement immediately to her former position, with backwages, moral

and exemplary damages plus 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's

fees.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's

decision, declaring the dismissal of the complainant valid and legal on the

ground of serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence and

consequently dismissing the complaint a quo; but (3) ORDERING the

respondent bank to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it

reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, a

found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision.

The parties' motions for reconsideration were denied by the NLRC in a

resolution dated October 28, 1994.18

Genuino prayed for the reversal of the NLRC's decision insofar as it declared

her dismissal valid and legal. Meanwhile, Citibank questioned the NLRC'sorder to pay Genuino's salaries from the date of reinstatement until the date

of the NLRC's decision. The Court found that the dismissal of Genuino is for

a legal and valid ground.

ISSUE:WON Citibank needs to "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the

date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a

month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of thisdecision,"

HELD

Anent the directive of the NLRC in its September 3, 1994 Decision ordering

Citibank "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date itreinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, a

found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision," theCourt hereby cancels said award in view of its finding that the dismissal o

Genuino is for a legal and valid ground.Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during thependency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code

which states:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a

dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement

aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, evenpending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to

work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his

dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely

reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employe

shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the

finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the righ

to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the

salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be

deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee wasentitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective

bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices.42

However, if theemployee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then

the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services

rendered without need of refund.

Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payrol

reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is notentitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the falloof the

September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.

ANDO vs. CAMPOG.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011

FACTS

Paquito V. Ando was the president of Premier Allied and ContractingServices, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents They

filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the Nationa

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter ruled inrespondents favor. PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay respondents

separation pay and the award of attorneys fees.

Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its

execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff issued a

Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property in the

name of Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando., promptingpetitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_142732_2007.html#fnt18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/116476_84.htm#_edn12

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issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) befiore the RTC Branch 50,

Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to him and his

wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the

execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor,

execution should be made on the latters properties.

The RTC denied the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court

had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The RTC ruled that, pursuant

to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, petitioners remedy wasto file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff.

Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC

Order. Instead, he filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA.

He contended that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

issuing the Order. Petitioner argued that the writ of execution was issuedimprovidently or without authority since the property to be levied belonged

to him in his personal capacity and his wife. The RTC, respondent

contended, could stay the execution of a judgment if the same wasunjust. He also contended that, pursuant to a ruling of this Court, a third

party who is not a judgment creditor may choose between filing a third-party claim with the NLRC sheriff or filing a separate action with the courts.

ISSUEWON the Petitioner can choose between filing a third-party claim with the

sheriff of the NLRC or filing a separate action.

HELDNO, but his petition in meritorious and, justice demands that this Court lookbeyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.

The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to

hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the

enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases byappropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and

Employment.

Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRCManual on the Execution

of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of

that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court

apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character.

NLRCManual on the Execution of Judgmentdeals specificallywith third-

party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claimas one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the

possession of the property levied upon.[24]

It also sets out the procedure forthe filing of a third-party claim, to

wit:

SECTION 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be

claimed by any person other than the losing party or

his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of histitle thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating

the grounds of such right or title and shall file thesame with the sheriff and copies thereof served upon

the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and

upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the thirdparty claim, all proceedings with respect to the

execution of the property subject of the third party

claim shall automatically be suspended and the LaborArbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct

a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned andresolve the validity of the claim within ten (10) working

days from receipt thereof and his decision is

appealable to the Commission within ten (10) workingdays from notice, and the Commission shall resolve

the appeal within same period.

There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third-

party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be

considered a third partyin relation to the propertysubject of the execution

vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the propertybelongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said

that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitione

alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjuga

partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is

a third party within contemplation of the law.

The Courts pronouncements inDeltaventures Resources, Inc. v

Hon. Cabato[25]

are instructive: Whatever irregularities attended the

issuance an execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the

same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is becauseany court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the

advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and tocontrol its own processes.

There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the

complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioners complaintis the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the

proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues

until the case is finally terminated,[27]

and there can be no end to thecontroversy without the full and proper implementation of the commission

directives.

Further underscoring the RTCs lack of jurisdiction ove

petitioners complaint is Article 254 of the Labor Code, to wit:

ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. Notemporary or permanent injunction or restraining

order in any case involving or growing out of labordisputes shall be issued by any court or other entity,except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264

of this Code.

That said, however, we resolve to put an end to the controversy rightnow, considering the length of time that has passed since the levy on the

property was made.

Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does not

belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was

sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the

property could not be made to answer for the judgment obligation of the

corporation.

The TCT[28]of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs topetitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent o

the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that theprovision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was

registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stand

to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the

case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due

process.

Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute itsjudgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the

judgment debtor al one.[29]

A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach

the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.[30]

Likewisethere is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties o

the corporation.

In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to

vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court lookbeyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.

1. PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYOPHILS., INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE

REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and

JANDELEON JUEZAN(6 March 2012)

FACTS:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/184007.htm#_ftn24

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- Private respondent Juezan filed a complaint with the

DOLE Regional Office, Cebu City against petitioner for

illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave,

13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and

illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages

and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth.

- DOLE Regional Director found that Juezan was indeed an

employee of petitioner and was entitled to money claims.

- On appeal, DOLE Secretary denied petitioner on theground that he submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank

Deposit instead of posting a cash bond.- On appeal with the CA, petitioner was again denied on the

ground that he was accorded due process and that the

DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction.- The SC reversed the CA decision because there was no EE

relationship between the two, and that the NLRC is theprimary agency that determines whether an EE relationship

exists or not, not the DOLE.

- It was held that while the DOLE may make adetermination of the existence of an EE

relationship, this function could not be co-extensivewith the visitorial and enforcement power provided

in Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.

Thus, an EE relationship must already exist beforethe DOLE can exercise its v isitorial and enforcement powers

(Art. 128 (b)).- Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the

DOLE and its duly authorized hearing officers to hear anddecide any matter involving the recovery of wages andother monetary claims was qualified by the proviso that

the complaint not include a claim for reinstatement, or that

the aggregate money claims not exceed PhP5,000. RA

7730, or anAct Further Strengthening the Visitorial and

Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor, did awaywith the PhP5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary

to exercise its visitorial and enforcement power for

claims beyond PhP5,000. The only qualification to

this expanded power of the DOLE was only that there

still be an existing employer-employee

relationship.

ISSUE: WoN the DOLE Secretary may make a

determination of whether or not an EE relationship exists.

WoN the DOLE has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD:

- No procedure was laid down where the DOLE wouldonly make a preliminary finding, that the power was

primarily held by the NLRC.

- Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended byRA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make adetermination as to the existence of an employer-

employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorialand enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not

review by the NLRC.

- IN A NUTSHELL:1. If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to

the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or otherlabor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that

there is an existing EE relationship, the DOLE exercisesjurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC.

2. If the DOLE finds that there is no EE relationship, thejurisdiction is properly with the NLRC.

3. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompaniedby a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly withthe Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217 (3) of the Labor Code,

which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original andexclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages,

rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions

of employment, if accompanied by a claim fo

reinstatement.

4. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an EErelationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The

findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned

through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules o

Court.

- In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Directothat there was an EE relationship has been subjected to review by

this Court, with the finding being that there was no EE

relationship between petitioner and private respondent, based onthe evidence presented. Private respondent presented self

serving allegations as well as self-defeating evidence. The

findings of the Regional Director were not based on substantia

evidence, and private respondent failed to prove the existence oan EE relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as

there was no EE. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against

petitioner is proper.

2. PAUL SANTIAGO vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. (10July 2007)

FACTS:

- Petitioner: seafarer for Sm