Koha Digest 99 (1996)

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    The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by VetonSurroi, a young Kosovar jou rnalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Ko hasoon becam e a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be pub lished daily under thename of Ko ha Ditor. With the kind perm ission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted onhttp://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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    KOHA SUMMARY # 99FRONT PAGE: THE BALKANS SAILING TOWARDS THE WESTDate: 10 April 1996

    EDITORIAL

    INSTRUCTIONS FOR UNIFICATION OF SEAS

    by VETON SURROI

    The Atlantic Ocean has good chances to continue its way through the Mediterranean,including the South Adriatic. It seems so after the conference of Ministers of Defence ofSouthern Balkans, held in Tirana last week. The whole horizontal Balkans corridor that

    unifies Durrs and Istanbul was present, except Greece, and by this act USA, as main thesponsor of the meeting whose host was Albanian Minister of Defence, made it known that anew zone of security in the Balkans is being created. That there is even an American interestin this.

    In fact, the meeting sent multiple messages. Firstly, that the Balkans is being divided in thepart captivated by war and now is in the process of recomposition, and in the part that is notin war. The part in war, former Western Yugoslavia, in different ways, has still to find itself.Slovenia getting closer to EU, but also with special relations with Italy. Croatia with relationswith EU depending on developments in Bosnia. Bosnia, depending on the question of

    whether it will exist or not and Serbia depending on the question of how will it define itself,before itself and the others. The part of the Balkans not captured by these temptations,without territorial pretensions and animosity against each other and with eyes turned towards

    NATO, which begins in Durrs and ends in Istanbul, could create a new form of organisationof collective security and political and economic cooperation.

    It was not by accident that American Secretary of Defence, Perry, mentioned "Marshall'sEurope", that Western Europe that in the last fifty years, under a defence umbrella holding the

    NATO sticker, managed to develop a unique market and forms of close economiccooperation. The parallel in this occasion could be this part of the Balkans, the SouthernBalkans, which can very soon be engaged in the concept of the unique defence bearing the

    NATO tag (or without any big Russian difficulties), and assure a closer political andeconomical cooperation.

    In fact, last week we witnessed the beginning of a new process. It will aim an acceleratedinclusion of Albania into the West (hence, the military aid amounting US$ 100 million), theinclusion of Bulgaria towards this Western security railway and attracting Turkey towards itsEuropean obligations. Of course, maintaining and strengthening the stability of Macedonia inthis regional security sandwich. And, as one of capital duties, this process should involveGreece and Turkey as partners in implementing their mission of regional security, as it

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    belongs to members of NATO, by resolving their antagonisms within the process. What'smore, two more elements have entered this game: Italy, who as member of NATO becomesthe warrant of the NATO triangle to establish the Southern umbrella (together with Greeceand Italy) and OSCE which will gain importance as a key European organisation.

    There will be challenges. Greece, for example, wants to play the leading role in Balkanintegrations and does not see a reason why Italy, for example, as a non-Balkan state should beincluded in this direction. Even more, it does not want its dispute with Turkey in the Aegeanto be inside the integrating processes. Turkey, from its side, is in a constant friction betweenits military power in service of NATO and its political problems (Kurds, Islamistradicalisation) leading it towards the East. It seems that the American pressure will be muchstronger in the Aegean towards Turkey and Greece, than in Adriatic.

    And Kosova? Kosova is the part of the Balkans yet to be defined. However, it takes place inthis process in a way. Albania's strengthening in all aspects, makes the Kosovan argument

    stronger, and isolates more and more the position of Serbia.

    THE BALKANS

    GENERALS OF THE BALKANS "CONQUER" TIRANA

    by AGIM ISAKU \ Tirana

    Although two ministers of defence, of Greece and of what is left of former Yugoslavia wereabsent, the gathering announced as the Meeting of Ministers of Defence of Southern Balkans,passed in almost full harmony and friendship, as if it had not to deal with army, armament,prevention of conflicts and as it were not taking place in the stormy Balkans, but was rather aparty in Hawaii.

    The joy of "small ministers" of the Balkans increased with the participation of the mostimportant "strategian" of the time, the American State Secretary of Defence, William Perry.The high level disarmament and peaceful role of armies were discussed in the meeting. Therewere two sessions without the presence of the press. According to the official statement, themeeting was closed by the Minister of Defence of Albania, who stated: "The Balkans has

    been historically known as a barrel of powder". Finally: peace, friendship and the desire toexpel out of the borders of Southern Balkans what is horrifying the peoples: the war. TheDayton Peace Agreement and its implementation in this part of the Balkans seems to have

    been the principal issue of the meeting. However, during the joint press conference of theAlbanian Minister Zhulali and American Minister Perry, answering to a question put by AFP

    journalist, "Rumours go about an assistance 2 - 3 million dollars for the Albanian army, canyou confirm this?", the latter nervously answered that: America will support Albania withmore than 100 million dollars. This support will mainly consist of military equipment ofsecond level, supporting armament, trucks, clothes and equipment for the rear. This aid willsoon be despatched from Pentagon reserves to Albania. Press sources qualify this as most

    dimensional American support to a country in the Balkans in the last years. If between 1991 -1995, American aid amounted to US$ 160 million, only 10 million have reached the pocketsof the Albanian army. Motivation of aid is explained by Perry as follows: "...As a country

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    with a very new democracy, and taking into consideration the Albanian contribution for peacein the region".

    In any case, the American support to at least two peace-loving countries was felt: Albania and

    Macedonia. Almost all of them pretended that they had not noticed absence of two otherministers mentioned at the beginning of this article. How is this explained? Simply not toharass the atmosphere of peace and friendship?

    Different analysts, without exception, assessed this meeting as another step towards peace.And everyone greeted it. The magic formula of peace and stability, after six years of war andtensions, is wanted by all. But, there were also those who saw the whole thing as a show, ashow targeting wider spectre than only the Balkans, the American spectre, which is in directrelation with the pre-electoral campaign for the White House. "Bill will show the Americansand the world that he will manage what his republican rivals could not. Thus he will try to

    postpone the possibility of a war at least until the elections are over", said a foreign analyst

    who was in Albania for this occasion.

    But regarding our national problems, what news did this meeting bring? It is said that duringhis meeting with Perry, president Berisha opened the problems of Kosova and violation ofhuman rights in the region. Then, the nationalist wing of the Albanian politics hurried to putthe question: Well, peace, but what kind of peace? Peace in the same situation we have beenso far? What did we gain after such long waiting and the real contribution we have given to

    peace in Balkans?

    And the challenging reception by the Minister of Defence of Greece, Arensis, of secretary

    general of the Socialist Party of Albania and former Minister of Interior, Gramoz Rui, passedalmost in silence, almost in a fear that it would break the atmosphere of feast during the daysthe meeting in Tirana. This is even more sensitive, if taken into consideration that Albaniahas entered election campaign and that Rui himself is one of the most slandered figures byBerisha's authorities.

    WHY DID NOT GREECE PARTICIPATE?

    KOHA \ Paris

    Small Tirana cannot have the big role that America is giving to it. This was how the Greecepress summarised, partially, the feeling of the Greek administration towards Albanian-American initiative for the military Summit in Tirana. This was, approximately, how thefeeling of Greek Minister of Defence, Arensis, was expressed who, very often in the past,wanted to play a diplomatic role as well. But leaving aside the personal pride of the minister,Greek circles had two interpretations of foreign policy regarding initiatives similar to one inTirana. On one hand, it is explained, Greece has tried for many years to play an important roletowards future integrations in the Balkans and in this framework are the ideas of the GreekForeign Minister Pangalos about the Balkans Council, a kind of a clone of the Scandinavian

    Council which is a political backbone of integrations in Northern Europe. Taken from thisaspect, Greece wants to play the role of a leader and not of a mere participant in westerninitiatives, coming either from NATO or EU.

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    The second reason is simple and bigger: Turkey. According to Greek sources, Greece doesnot want to attend similar Balkan meetings until the disputes on the islands in the Aegean, orthe dispute on Greek territorial waters which meet Turkish aspirations in the Aegean Sea issolved.

    THE BALKANS

    FOR A MORE DYNAMIC COOPERATION

    by S. XHEZAIRI \ Shkup

    Macedonian authorities paid a first hand importance to their participation in the summit ofMinisters of Defence of Countries of Southern Balkans in Tirana: "The sincere will for

    cooperation, both in mutual plan also in the framework of program of "Partnership forPeace", but also to future membership in NATO were the main expressions of this meeting" -stated Minister of Defence, Blagoj Handzinski. Lupce Popovski, member of the Macedoniandelegation, declared to KOHA that this was an excellent and rare possibility to gather sixministers of defence and representatives of parliaments of countries of Southern Balkans inone place. "Important subjects were evaluated in the function of confidence building betweenstates in the region, in the framework of `Partnership for Peace'. At the same time, it is pitythat Greece did not attend the meeting, although it was invited, because the importance ofimpressions and effects would be more powerful. But, regardless of this, I think that the veryfact that defence ministers of the Balkans were gathered, shows that a new climate for

    establishment of cooperation, communication and information regarding problems, mainly infield of defence is created. All this was in the function of preserving peace and stability of thecountries in this region against unnecessary conflicts" - stated Popovski.

    In Tirana, the Macedonian delegation met Minister of Defence Zhulali, President Berisha andPremier Meksi. In this regard, Popovski said: "The determination of the two countries for adynamic cooperation was reiterated. The development of Macedonian-Albanian relations is inthe interest of both countries and peoples. Macedonia and Albania are states that couldcontribute to the stability and peace in the region. The agreement was reached that soon,during premier Meksi's visit to Shkup, concrete agreements and protocols will be signed toregulate reciprocal cooperation, in the sphere of defence and other spheres. We hope that in

    the meantime the issue of formulation of the name for our country will be solved by theAlbanian side" - ended Lupce Popovski.

    KOSOVA

    DAYTON: AN EMPTY CASE TO BE FILLED UP

    by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

    Recently we heard from an American expert on the Balkans that the "American engagementin Bosnia and the Balkans includes a new geo-political and long-term strategy, not aiming at

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    fully controlling the Balkans, but to ultimately detach the conflictive and problematic Balkansfrom the Orient, pacify it and turn it towards the West".

    What is these days being discussed in the media about the post-Dayton period is whether the

    main goal of the Dayton Agreement was the stability in the region or the introduction ofdemocratic processes in it. Americans, in most of the cases, tend to believe that stability inthe region is much more important than democracy. There are many of those who say that, forexample, they are willing to support Milosevic for pragmatic reasons, because, as they say,there is no other alternative to the stability in Serbia and the region. However, it is obviousthat stability built upon a totalitarian and non-democratic concept can't live long. Thesethoughts were evaluated by the Croatian Social-Democratic leader, Zdravko Tomac as,"ficus-stability", something that doesn't represent the political reality nor does it guaranteelong-term stability in the region. Kosovan political expert,Behlul Beqaj considers that afterall what has happened in Bosnia after Dayton, is only a premeditated failure, which shan't betreated as such until the US elections are over. The first man of the CDHRF,Adem Demai,

    has the courage to evaluate the Dayton Agreement as a "disagreement", however, he says, theGreat Powers stand behind this document.

    The problem that is burdening our region is the post-Dayton Kosova. Where are we in thenew political model? According to many analysts who have dealt with the issue so far, it issaid that the problem of territories of the rump Yugoslavia is undefined, besides the fact thatthe new arrangement must be done inside the existing borders. Therefore, this territory,figuratively it could be said, resembles an empty case which should be packed up carefully.There is still space for political manipulations, especially having in mind the constitutionaland juridical problems that could be placed inside the case.

    If the American strategy in the Balkans includes indisputably the principle of the non-alteration of the existing borders, then it comes out that the majority of the persons who gavestatements to KOHA insist on the recognition the right to self-determination for half of theAlbanian people in the former Yugoslavia, in the respect of the declaration of the people inthe independent Republic of Kosova.

    PresidentRugova says that "After Dayton, the priority was to stop the conflict in Bosnia andthe region, which in a way, has also prevented the conflict in Kosova".

    The main problem of the Dayton Agreement for the Kosova Albanians is how much will

    Kosova be involved in the transformation process of the present Yugoslav Federation. WillAlbanians be happy with these steps or have they expected something more from Dayton?LDK's vice-chairman,Hydajet Hyseni, says: "Even though the problem of Kosova was notdiscussed directly in Dayton, Albanians have expected and invested a lot, almost everything,in the peaceful course. This is why they expected that the peace process would bring them a

    just solution for their cause, especially difficult and especially just".

    Hyseni admits the fact that the "peaceful policy of Kosova was relying on America, and thatall the hopes of Albanians are relying on this promoter". But was it necessary to rely onAmerica for everything ? Hyseni says that "looking at it realistically, Albanians have

    expected much more from Dayton, and it is also true that their unresolved national question isa matter of survival, and it deserved a bigger international attention and support. TheAlbanian issue is a knot of the Balkans, and without its solution, there will be no peace ofstability in the Balkans. He warns that "Albanians have been faithful to the peaceful policy

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    and given it advantage over the policy of war. The eventual failure of this politic would be afailure of the peaceful policy in general".

    The other vice-chairman of the LDK,Fehmi Agani, thinks that "the issue of Kosova was not

    present in Dayton directly, although Dayton's decisions have some implications and influencein the present situation and the future solution of Kosova's problem. Right now, it is hard todefine the situation after Dayton, says Agani.

    The President of the Republic sees the importance of the Dayton document in the fact that:"Kosova is linked to the so called "outside wall-sanctions", which is respected and harsheningon daily basis".

    Referring to this issue, Demai says that he doesn't think that Kosova's situation has improvedafter Dayton. He is clear in his statement: "From Dayton and on, the USA and the EU havestressed in a much more clearer way that they are in favor of the solution of Kosova's problem

    within the framework of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Which is in fullcontradiction with what the Albanians leadership and the people have declared themselves infavor of. In other words, this is a very difficult situation for the Kosovan leadership and theobligations it has taken from the people after the referendum".

    The non-presence of Kosova in Dayton is also to be blamed on the Albanian factor, saysMahmut Bakalli. He thinks that the Albanians were not engaged on time to have Kosovadiscussed there, however he still believes that "within the frames of the Dayton Agreement,and with a well elaborated and inventive political engagement an acceptable solution forKosova's position is possible. It would vitalize the people's declaration for the independent

    Republic of Kosova, it would recognize it's right to self-determination by creating newentities and unions of independent republics, which would also involve the independentRepublic of Kosova, without changing the borders, without creating new international

    borders in the Balkans, but by rather vitalizing and liberalizing the existing borders in theBalkans".

    All future options should be discussed and agreed upon within this reality. However, "no onehas the right to force us to give up on our declaration for independence. The right to self-determination can't be denied to us, but modalities within the new reality - Dayton, should befound", concludes Bakalli.

    Will Kosova's position clarify and will it remain inside the future arrangements or therearrangement of Kosova's positions, Rugova declares: "Our posture after Dayton is to havetalks with Serbia with the mediation of a third party, and a concrete step will be the openingof the American Office in Prishtina and the announcement of some countries and theEuropean Parliament that they will undertake the same step".Azem Vllasi shares Rugova'sopinion saying that "Kosova remains in the international arrangements linked to the "outer-wall sanctions", which means that the international community seems to be willing to forceSerbia into a favorable solution within the new reality". If new modalities are discussed, saysVllasi, I personally think that the solution should be sought in a radical rearrangement ofrelations within Yugoslavia, i.e., with Kosova as a state with the sovereignty similar to Serbia

    and Montenegro, as well as Vojvodina. But, with the right to leave the federation if the agreedrights of any of the units are violated unilaterally".

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    In terms of mediation of a third party, Demai expresses its scepticism by saying that"Kosova's leadership is seeking for a mediator, and it wishes for America, and it was

    precisely USA that stated clearly that it sees the solution of Kosova's issue within the framesof Serbia. Therefore, the one that will mediate has beforehand set a solution which is against

    the will of the people". Hyseni shares his opinion by saying that "all our experience so farproves that the Serbian leadership accepts the dialogue as a bluff or manoeuvre, or assomething imposed. This is proven by its posture towards Albanians. Serbia will be in favorof peace and a peaceful solution only if it can be imposed, and can be imposed by theAlbanian resistance, the democratic forces in Serbia and what we call, internationalcommunity. The best would be if the three would act jointly. Anyhow, we must turn towardsourselves and see how will we achieve our part of the task". Both Demai and Hyseni see the

    possibility that there could be political forces that will not attain to the will of the people,however, Agani doesn't think so, and says: "Seemingly, official Serbia is incapable of solvingKosova's problem. It wishes to separate and modify the solutions according to the status it hasimposed in Kosova and at the same time, keep the situation of annexation which it has

    imposed on Kosova. In regard to Albanians, there are no changes of posture. Theinternational institutions have given some initiatives, as is the attempt of the European Union,for the regulation of Kosova's position according to its viewpoints, but these are more or lessfailures. However, a clear difference was marked by Christopher's visit to Belgrade and hisclear statement that Serbia must find a solution to Kosova's problem, which would beacceptable by both sides, and which is a condition for it's return to international institutions,and to normalize it's international position. Therefore, Christopher didn't prejudge the statusof Kosova in Belgrade".

    Is there any hope for a new Dayton on Kosova and whether we can exert any pressure in this

    sense, Hyseni states that: " Our recent experience proves that historical chances can becreated, but the chances are only for those who take them. If not, then a chance can become athreat. We can't expect recognition of the Republic of Kosova from the world, if we giveinsufficient signs that we ourselves recognize it".

    Mahmut Bakalli doesn't hope for a new Dayton on Kosova because "it is an idea hardlyacceptable by the Great Powers. But, if Kosova's situation is not solved justly, it is possiblethat the Albanian politics will ask for the discussion on the Albanian issue in the Balkans as awhole, in the international fora, and thus also the discussion on the realization of nationalunification, based on the self-determination of the people in the interest of long-term peace inthe Balkans. International consensus and understanding is needed for this". We also heard a

    totally opposite opinion, coming from Behlul Beqaj, who thinks that "Kosova's chances togain the status of the republic are much bigger than its chances to become independent,

    because after the bitter experience the international decision-making centers have had (insteadof solving one create three new problems), if they wish not to further discredit themselves,then they shouldn't repeat Bosnia's mistake. And, a paradoxical conclusion would be thatKosova could gain more thus, than if it would have been present in Dayton".

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    ECONOMY

    KOSOVA FAR AWAY FROM PARIS

    by IBRAHIM REXHEPI \ Prishtina

    It is true that no one from Kosova received an invitation to participate in the conversations inParis regarding foreign debts of the former Yugoslavia, i.e., debts towards IMF. Incited by thewish to have the discussions running as soon as possible in this important financial institutionin the world, a ten member delegation headed by Dragoslav Avramovic, Governor of

    National Bank of Yugoslavia, left Belgrade. It would be absurd to say why no Albanian fromKosova was included in the delegation, but it is not understandable that no one from Kosovaremembered to address a letter to Paris, reminding that Kosova has declared its independence,and that it is aware of the obligations it has towards the foreign creditors and that it has theavailable potential to repay debts, since the largest part of means was invested in enterprises

    that can have a high level of profitability and rentability.

    If an agreement is reached about the division of debts in Paris, it will also mean that amodality will be created for proportions of other balances and share of joint property ofrepublics of the former Yugoslav federation. According to the Constitution of 1974, Kosovaand Vojvodina should participate in the share, as units of the federation. But in all discussionsso far, they were not even mentioned. They were put in the package holding the names ofSerbia and Montenegro.

    Just before its dissolution, the former Yugoslavia used to have a foreign debt amounting US$

    15 billion. This was only the principal amount without interests. According to this, Sloveniawas indebted by US$ 1,7 billion, Bosnia and Herzegovina by US$ 1,5 billion; Croatia by US$2,7 billion; Serbia by US$ 4,8 billion; the federation by US$ 3,1 billion; Montenegro by US$600 million and Macedonia by US$ 700 million. But they also had obligations towards otherfinancial institutions such as commercial banks known as the London Club and the ParisClub, which gather the developed countries of the west. During talks in Paris, the wholedossier will not open, except for the part dealing with debts towards IMF. They have evencreated modality, or have found the formula how to distribute these obligations. The largest

    part, or 36,5 of obligations are to be taken over by the so called Yugoslavia (Serbia andMontenegro) whereas Croatia will take over 28,5 per cent, Slovenia - 16,4 per cent; Bosniaand Herzegovina 13,2 per cent and Macedonia 5,4 per cent. Experts say that this division was

    not quite just, since it is based on the economic power of the new states, the former Yugoslavrepublics, and not in the transfer of means done through budget or other mechanisms ofmonetary or crediting policy, which used to be in the function of their economic development.But this is a matter of later debates, since IMF today is interested to know where are meansused to credit former Yugoslavia located, while new states want to have the problemovercome as soon as possible and create preconditions for membership in internationalfinancial institutions. Their only hope for further development remains in their membership inthese institutions and the use of their means for economic development.

    But, asHajrullah Gorani says, talks in Paris had a political rather than an economic

    connotation. Kosova's absence, should not be taken as something tragic, since "another Pariscan be organised". It is important that there is accurate data on debts that Kosova has towardsthe world and what is the possibility for repayment. Perhaps this situation was "aided" by theimplementation of coercive measures and the opening of the bakruptcy procedure of the Bank

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    of Kosova. Due to the situation created in 1990, banking experts from Kosova made lists,analyses, wrote 140 letters to all international financial institutions and commercial banks inthe world informing them of the destruction of all institutions of government and economy inKosova, therefore, "in this situation we cannot repay debts, according to terms defined

    earlier."

    According to such analyses, Kosova has a debt of US$ 633,6 million, out of which US$ 133,8to the World Bank and US$ 499,8 million to other financial institutions. This amount might

    be increased by 10 per cent, since this was the amount of means handled through "Jugobanka"and used by the economy of Kosova. This means, that if an approximative calculation would

    be done, every citizen of Kosova should pay US$ 300 in the name of foreign debt.

    Without any doubt, the institutions of power in Kosova, and in first place the Government, orMinistry of Economy and Finance respectively, have the obligation to address foreigncreditors and inform them that they are ready to recognise all debts and to define the way of

    their repayment, or find the respective way of reprogramming. In this case, it should be keptin mind that the largest amount of loans was allocated to 14 economic subjects, which in thefuture or under normal circumstances have the possibility to handle these obligations. To sayit in bankers' words, debts are not contaminated. It should not be forgotten that the maindebtors in the future will be from Kosova, since a number of enterprises will be property ofthe state or the state will hold the largest amounts of shares. Let us mention that three subjectswithin the Economy of Electric Power of Kosova ("KOSOVA B" and coal mines ofBellaqevc and Dobrosell) are indebted by US$ 321 million; "TREPA" (Zinc Electrolysis,Battery Plant, Battery Plant Gjilan and Metaliku Gjakov) by US$ 81,3 million;"FERRONIKL" (Gllogovc) by US$ 96,3 million; "BALLKANI" (Suhareka) by US$ 21,3

    million; "PROGRES" (Prizren) by US$ 20,7 million; "PRINTEX" (Prizren) by US$ 7,8million; Steel Tube Manufacturing Plant by US$ 8,2 million; "JUGOTERM" (Gjilan) by US$3,9 million and Railways by US$ 2,2 million.

    Although all these enterprises still had not entered the phase of full utilisation of capacities,they had not faced any remarkable difficulties. Their problems used to be of organisationalnature. Still, apart from few exceptions, almost all enterprises had attractive and marketable

    products. Let us only mention that for the electric energy generated in Kosova there wasinterest not only in the republics of former Yugoslavia, but also in several Europeancountries; "FERONIKL" used to earn US$ 100 million per year from export which wasmore than the debts it used to have towards foreign creditors, "TREPA" after small

    investments, especially in mining, would round up its technology and would reach asatisfactory harmonisation of capacities. Maybe "METALIKU" from Gjakova and the twoenterprises from Prizren, "PROGRES" and "PRINTEX", would face difficulties because ofthe structure of their products.

    According to existing plans, if occupation of Kosova had not happened, we would haveentered this year with debts amounting to about US$ 400 million, since the other part wassupposed to be repaid during past years. But, everyone knows what happened, and opening of

    bankruptcy procedure for Bank of Kosova created a completely unclear situation. It may besaid that in the situation as it is today, it is not known who will repay loans used by Kosova.

    Avramovic, accepting the Paris formula, undertook these obligations as well, but the mattershould not be considered as closed, since the issue of Kosova has not been settled yet.

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    The case of the Bank of Kosova proves that the debts remain pending and that no one wantsto accept them as their own. The bankruptcy procedure was started for political reasons, inorder to destroy the banking system in Kosova. Serbia counted that all obligations of this

    bank would be forwarded to the federation, or that they would be repaid together with other

    republics of the former federation. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, this became a tooheavy burden for Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, there is no solution for this problemnow. This is also proven by the fact that the process of bankruptcy was stopped and in themeantime they are looking for a bank which would undertake these obligations. Rumours saythat "RAS-Banka", one of banks of "Braca Karic" company will undertake them.

    We should not forget that there are not only debts, but there are also demands from differentsubjects. Banks from the so called Yugoslavia are indebted to the Bank of Kosova to theamount of US$ 3,4 million; foreign banks by US$ 2.1; the National Bank of Yugoslaviashould pay the citizens their hard currency savings, accounting US$ 130 million, whereasthere are about US$ 54,9 thousand deposited in different banks and financial institutions. In

    brief, its demands amount to US$ 136 million. When this amount is decreased from thegeneral debt it results that the minus is even smaller, or US$ 497,6 million respectively.Being aware of economic potential of Kosova and possibilities to penetrate the market, thisamount does not represent a heavy burden, or as it is said in the language of economists, thelevel of indebtedness is rather low.

    But it should be admitted that the matter of debts and other economic positions of Kosova israther a political than economical one. Kosovan officials can easily discuss withrepresentatives of IMF or other financial institutions in the world, they could even seek asolution for reprogramming or use of new loans, but this will not be done as long as Kosova

    is treated as part of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, or as long as Dragoslav Avramovicspeaks on their behalf. But there is another problem which is forgotten by the officials inSerbia and Montenegro. While there is "neither war nor peace" in Kosova, it cannot easily becounted on use of any loan, since there is still a high scale of risk here. There is a rule in theworld of capital: "money brings money", while in this Yugoslavia it may easily happen thatany money engaged by a foreign subject could be transformed into a lost capital.

    INTERVIEW

    MUHAMET BICAJ, MINISTER OF EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA

    "SERBIA WILL HAVE TO TALK ABOUT EDUCATION"

    Interviewed by AUGUSTIN PALOKAJ / Zagreb

    KOHA: How do you assess the present situation regarding education in Albanian in Kosova?

    BICAJ: It is quite natural that the situation in education in Kosova is a reflection of thegeneral situation in Kosova. It is extremely hard - repression and different provocations of

    occupying Serb authorities are constantly present. But, teachers, pupils, parents, students andall others who support the Albanian schools are very determined to continue providing anecessary quality, to the possible extent.

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    KOHA: For four years now, education in Albanian is taking place in private houses. How

    long can this school last in the existing circumstances and what are its effects?

    BICAJ: This is true, but we are determined to continue education in Albanian. Of course, we

    have never withdrawn nor given up our school premises and we are still engaged makingpreparations for beginning of the new school year. I do hope that we will have the educationgoing on in our school premises.

    KOHA: There is often information on the mistreatment that pupils and teachers in Kosova

    are subjected to by teh Serbian police, because of school documents, certificates and

    diplomas they receive. These diplomas are not even recognised by Serb government in

    Kosova.

    BICAJ: Of course, Serbian policy aims to force Kosova Albanians recognise Serbia as theirstate. But, as it is seen, Serbs have not managed to do this and I may say that education on the

    whole functions on the basis of laws of Republic of Kosova, ie. it is fully independent anddocuments and curricula are in the same spirit. This is another reason why the Serb occupyingorgans persecute our students and teachers. We are putting efforts in direction of a fullyindependent national school.

    KOHA: Talking of curricula in Kosova, we have to note that lately there have been

    disagreements among Albanian officials engaged in education regarding them. How do you

    judge these discussions?

    BICAJ: Of course there are objections and we cannot say that a curiculum drawn last year

    will be perfect for this and next school years. Most of the objections are not reasonablebecause, as it is known, we are cooperating aiming at the creation of a national school, i.e., aschool with joint curricula, with professional groups and textbooks. And eventually, an expertnot included in the projects now has turned into a free hunter and seeing only darkness.However, my opinion is that this logic will be overcome soon.

    KOHA: Four years ago, the last discussions with the Serbian side regarding education in

    Kosova had failed. The situation in education in Albanian requires a rather urgent solution

    now. Do you think that discussions to find a solution for the problem of education in

    Albanian before starting negotiations on political status of Kosova are possible?

    BICAJ: Of course, we have always been open regarding solution of the question of educationin Kosova and for the general solution of issue of Kosova, because problems of education area part of the general situation. We have also been aware that the Serbian regime is notinterested in its solution because the solution of the problem of education in Kosova is a

    parameter for the general solution of the problem of Kosova. Despite this we are ready tothink that Serbs will be obliged to sit and discuss these problems.

    KOHA: An unavoidable question is, of course, the matter of financing education in Albanian

    in Kosova. Do you think the assistance or Kosova government's funds meant for this activity

    are enough?

    BICAJ: The aid is extremely welcome but not sufficient. It is not sufficient because needs aremuch bigger in all aspects, and first of all for the compensation of the work achieved undervery difficult circumstances by teachers and professors in all levels of education in Albanian.

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    KOHA: You have been out of the country for a long time. Albanian youth are trying more and

    more to find ways to study abroad. As you saw, there is a large number of Albanian students

    in Zagreb. Do you consider this as positive or negative?

    BICAJ: First of all, education is a national priority. It is a valuable treasure for those whohave the possibility to fill in the vacuum created by the Serbian regime in Kosova and byreceiving professional training in world universities which are much more advanced. I can saythat such experts are very much needed for the future of Kosova.

    KOHA: Do you have information whether documents issued by schools or the university in

    Kosova are recognised?

    BICAJ: Depending on the profession and faculties, most of our documents are recognised.Exceptions are some faculties and some professions with big differences in curicula. They arenot fully recognised but based on the very fact that they are not refused, it may be said that

    they are partially recognised.

    KOHA: How do you comment opening of first school in Albanian in the Republic of Croatia,

    on which occasion you were present, too?

    BICAJ: I think that the Albanian school in Croatia, first of all, differs from other Albanianschools in the diaspora, because this is a school which must work in accordance with the Lawon National Minorities of Croatia. The opening of this school will mark a historical day forthe Albanians in Croatia and Albanian education in general. This is also an affirmation of theRepublic of Croatia in this aspect. I usually say that we shouldn't take this as a final

    achievement, but think how to advance it.

    KOSOVA

    RADICALS WENT TO SEEK ASYLUM

    by ASTRIT SALIHU \ Prishtina

    On 21 March 1996, weekly "Zri i Kosoves" (Voice of Kosova), organ of the National

    Movement, published data collected in two surveys among our fellow countrymen in WesternEurope. The first noticeable thing after reading this data, was a thoroughly different approachfrom the ones we are used to reading in Kosovan magazines. The results obtained by "Zri iKosovs" were completely different from those obtained after a similar survey in Kosova andthis would mean that the posture or opinion of our citizens out of Kosova is different fromthose who remain in Kosova. Firstly, there is a rather suggestive title: "People asks for bravemen to lead them".

    The question asked to the people and elaborated in the magazine read: "should peoplepractice a form of active people's resistance, demonstrations and other forms of resistance for

    liberation". Data from this question show that out of 426 people interviewed, 352 or 82,26 percent answered positively. If this were only a mere data from a survey or a monitoringindicator which would hardly be taken as a criteria, there would be no reason at all to mentionall these. But, we found a rather indicative comment in this magazine. The text continues: "...

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    consequently there is no reason to follow the way paved by the leaders in Kosova who decideto extinguish any public protests". This seems to be done to show lack of bravery of ourleaders. If it were to touch the leaders alone, it would be nothing more than a political note,not to say an opposition one. But a more careful reading shows another aspect of it. The

    whole text is accompanied by a doses of radicalisation, insisting on bravery, a kind ofpolitical activisation. But if these postures, as the commentator says, "of people", werecompared to the surveys' data published in magazines in Kosova, the outcome is that there aretwo "people". If we do not want to be misunderstood, and accused of dividing the people, wehave to say that this division is imposed by the commentator of the survey run by "Zri iKosovs" because he calls the posture of a small group "the posture of the people". If this isnot an ideological posture, then let us call it non professional.

    But, let us go back to the subject. Why does it seem that the postures of Kosovans outsideKosova are contrary to those in Kosova? Because all surveys so far show that the highest

    percentage of Kosovans (in Kosova, let's not forget) are not in favor of any "other form of

    liberation resistance", which would imply the non-political means of violence, terrorism or letus say war. Data from the last survey run by "KOHA's" Survey Team, therefore data thatcannot represent "the people" in the sense mentioned by the author of "Zri i Kosovs",showed something quite different. For example, people interviewed that were partially infavour of the work of the LDK accounted for by 55.82 per cent, and those who were in fullfavour of work of LDK accounted for by 18.02%. Therefor, to say that the political leaders ofKosova, although this sounds as an apology or their political excuse (there is no other

    possibility in this case), are people of "politically non-reasonable" paths, is a very serious andincorrect judgment. The same posture was of the people interviewed on the possible form ofsolution of issue of Kosova. Those who thought that it could be solved by non-political

    means, by violence and terrorism accounted for by 6,01 per cent. If data are added to eachother, although there are evident differences in approaching terrorism and war, andconditionally declare them as a common category, it will result that they make up a relativelysmall minority (a total of 23.68 per cent).

    So, the comparison of data shows that Kosovans outside Kosova are much more radical. Mostprobably the majority of them are asylum seekers, and those who have this as an inevitablefate are a minority. So their radicalism sounds rather queer. This is so because they are,nevertheless, radicals because they went to seek asylum. While Kosovarn in Kosova have notdone this yet. The "asylum seeking people" and the "people" that remained in Kosova are twocategories which should be surveyed more deeply and not only on basis of a small non-

    professional survey.

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    INTERVIEW

    SONJA BISERKO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE SERBIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE

    KOSOVA IS THE KEY PROBLEM OF THE BALKANS

    Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Belgrade

    KOHA: The American Congress just recently debated about situation in Serbia and on this

    occasion, it was emphasised that the complete lifting of sanctions against Serbia and its full

    inclusion in international community depends "on internal democratisation" of Serbia. Do

    you think that there is a trend of internal democratisation of Serbia after Dayton?

    BISERKO: The Dayton Agreement prevented the total defeat of Serbia and opened thepossibilities for its return to the international community under certain conditions: full

    cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, the return of refugees and solution of the issue ofKosova, internal democratisation and respect of human rights. Serbia, five months after theDayton Agreement, did not manage to fulfil the undertaken obligations. The refusal tocooperate with The Hague Tribunal is especially dangerous because it opens the possibility ofrestoring sanctions. The fulfilment of these obligations is also a great threat for the regimeitself. Of course, it should be mentioned that the total political scheme after the DaytonAgreement has made a specific move. But, it is obvious that the political scene did not proveto have understood the historical moment and is not ready to face responsibility for the warand to create conditions for a future, and lead to the democratisation of Serbia.Rationalisation of defeat and reduction of the issue and responsibility to "equal responsibility

    of all parties" brought a new consensus, this time on the truth about this war. Taking intoconsideration the situation with the opposition, the economic situation, the total disintegrationof the society and institutions, the criminalisation of the state, I do not see real chances for a

    prompt democratisation in Serbia.

    KOHA: There is an opinion that, in a way, Milosevic was given "free hands" after Dayton

    and that the international community could close one eye when it regards the respect of

    human rights in Serbia and freedom of the media. Actually, how strong is the pressure from

    abroad on the Serbian leader to really initiate a democratisation?

    BISERKO: I think that this was a simplified conclusion. President Milosevic was not given

    "free hands" after Dayton. He is simply our reality because there was no serious candidate forthat job in the opposition scene. Visit byKornblum (Holbrooke's successor) in Belgrade twoweeks ago, by Graham Blewitand later byElizabeth Rehn, then convocations of meetings inGeneva and Moscow, mark a new phase in the implementation of Dayton Agreement. Thefirst military phase was implemented successfully. The second civil phase is much moredifficult and it requires a positive approach by all involved in the Dayton Agreement. In otherwords, the Dayton Agreement without positive approach can lead towards the division ofBosnia. The Dayton Agreement, according to its spirit and intentions, in essence leads to anundivided Bosnia. Regretfully, the negative approach is still here, especially of those whocaused the split. Things are even more difficult because they are also signatories of the

    agreement. A great effort is necessary to have the trend take the right direction. Recentdynamics of the Tribunal is encouraging. The circle is closing step by step and I amoptimistic. I consider that it is an important process happening in the political scene in Serbia,

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    a new differentiation through the Dayton Agreement. Regretfully, forces against Dayton aremore powerful.

    KOHA: The matter of amnesty of draft-evaders who abandoned the country is one of the

    problems in this context. Is this respected?

    BISERKO: Amnesty is a necessary precondition for the return of refugees, but for all sides.As far as I know, law on amnesty is being prepared by all newly created states. Among others,this is an obligation arising from the Dayton Agreement. Regretfully all parties have beendelaying the adoption of this law and thus spending the valuable time to open the process ofreturn. However, this is only a matter of time.

    KOHA: On the other hand, there is a great number of Albanians among the young refugees.

    The matter of reaching an agreement about the return of refugees, asylum seekers in western

    countries, has been postponed several times... There were different interpretations that

    Serbian side could not allow the return of refugees, and the experience of those who tried tocome back was negative. And if the new Citizenship Law is added to this, then the whole

    thing is surely complicated. Is there a hope that these people will return safely to their

    homes?

    BISERKO: As it was known in the last years, there was a policy of silent ethnic cleansing inSerbia. All non-Serbs, and especially Albanians were the target. This is how theunwillingness of this country to allow return of the so called Albanian asylants is explained.There are different written and verbal instructions used to implement such a policy. TheDraft-law on Citizenship is also discriminatory in this respect. The pressure of the

    international community, of the EU first of all, on Serbia is great in this sense. A few weeksago, some young Albanians were deported to Germany from the Prishtina airport. They werenot allowed to leave the plane. They were immediately returned to Belgrade, from where theywere deported one day later. Such practice is to be condemned, regardless of officialexplanations. I think that this matter will soon be on the agenda in the context of a broaderdiscussion of issue of Kosova.

    KOHA: Your "Committee..." is known for its activities regarding refugees from different

    regions. You were the initiators for their return back home. Is there a hope for such a

    process, how much is this process supported by the authorities (Serb and Croat) and other

    foreign governments? Is lobbying for the return of refugees a possible option in the future or

    is it also a "fait accompli" of the crisis of former Yugoslavia?

    BISERKO: Our activities regarding the return of refugees has been initiated spontaneously. Infact, refugees would approach us complaining about their problems. Soon after their exodusfrom Krajina they started to be taken care of. We were only their transmission, their voice.Taking into consideration the large number of refugees who approached us, about 30.000, it

    became a relevant and unavoidable activity in helping them. As you know, our office used tobe blocked up even by 500 refugees per day. This is a serious figure. We have used this andput it in all our reports and managed to impose the subject of the return. We prepared adocument for the meeting in Dayton on this, which was included in the Dayton Agreement

    (Annex 7). Our activities did not enjoy the support of the regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb.Both regimes denied and underestimated our activities. Refugees are their hostages and onlyrefugees justify their war-inciting policy and creation of ethnically clean states. Serbianregime does not have the general policy on refugees, but judging from the way they have

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    treated them, it may be concluded that the intention was to consolidate ethnically cleanterritories in Eastern Bosnia, Posavina, Eastern Slavonia and also in Vojvodina. The attemptto direct them towards Kosova failed, except for a smaller number. Judging from statements

    by international officials, first of all the American, it seems that this will be difficult to be

    achieved in Eastern Slavonia. Now it is difficult to assess how will the process regardingrefugees be developed. For the time being, there are serious hindrances by all parties for theirreturn. The existing regime is even trying to manipulate the registration of refugees in Serbiawhich is to be done together with UNHCR. The purpose of the registration is to determineexact number of refugees and on basis of those data to organise their return. And it is this thatis tried to be prevented.

    KOHA: There are about 16,000 Serb refugees from Krajina accommodated in Kosova. It was

    stressed several times that they have been accommodated there against their will. On the

    other hand, the Serbian government was accused (also by Albanians) that it wants to misuse

    refugees for the colonisation of Kosova with Serbian element (reference is made to Draft-

    Law on Colonisation of Kosova with 100,000 Serbs, adopted by the Federal Parliament).

    What is your experience and your opinion on this matter?

    BISERKO: As I said, there was an intention of this regime to colonise Kosova with refugees,but it was not successful and chances to implement such a project are small. 16,000 refugeessent by force to Kosova cannot change the ethnic structure of population in Kosova. But,having in mind the situation in Kosova, this is a provocation and rises tensions in the region.It is known that many refugees have abandoned Kosova and do not want to settle there. Thereare many reasons for this. Firstly, is the awareness that this is a new instrumentalisation. They

    try to avoid this. Secondly, because that region is alien to them and it is difficult for them toadapt there for many reasons (climatic, cultural etc).

    KOHA: In conflicts between the Serbian position and opposition there were no much

    differences regarding Kosova. Is this relation changing? In fact, is there an advancement in

    the thought among political and intellectual Serbian circles of how should the issue of

    Kosova be solved?

    BISERKO: The Serbian populist movement started in Kosova and it had full support inSerbia. There was a national concesus on it. It is difficult to imagine any party initiateseriously the resolution of Kosova's issue without entering a risk of its kind. For the moment

    they leave it aside, although such position is not expressed because of the constant pressure.Taking into consideration the barricaded positions of both sides, I do not see that there is a

    possible beginning of the solution of this issue without international mediation. The overtureof the American Information Centre will by all means be a kind of a start. However, beforeany start, repression should be stopped. Positions should be equalised. There are also someefforts by nationalists to avoid giving autonomy to Kosova through the regionalisation ofSerbia. In this way this problem would be minimised. At the same time, through efforts tohave an ethnic consolidation of Republika Srpska, there are speculations that physicalamputation of a part of Kosova would be acceptable. Such combinations prove that the

    projects of ethnically clean Serbia have not been given up. But this is unacceptable, having in

    mind that it would ruin the already fragile relation of forces in the region. Here, I primarilythink of Macedonia, and neighbouring countries. Therefore, the issue of Kosova is the keyproblem in the Balkans. I consider that it should be solved as a whole, through international

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    mediation, by fully respecting interests of all peoples in Balkans. A initial basis fordiscussions should be the autonomy that Kosova used to enjoy until 1990.

    ALBANIA

    MILLIONS OF DOLLARS DIE OUT WAITING

    by ANDREA STEFANI / Tirana

    The Albanian economy continues not to use a good part of finances allocated by internationalorganisms. We're referring to more than 100 million dollars which die out waiting, instead ofentering the still fainted arteries of business and economy. Out of US$ 209,152,000 of foreignfinance promised to Albania, US$ 102,932,000 have not been disbursed as foreign aid or

    loanss under very favourable conditions. And again, like in previous years, the blame is puton the lack of experience of the new administration in Albanian departments, however, thislack of experience has been costing Albania millions.

    The situation in this field is on the edge of a paradox. The Albanian economy, still thirsty foraid, loans and investments, results in a financial deficit of more than $ 100 million - the latter

    being caused mainly by the difference between the income and the level of their absorption.There are some statistical data processed by Department of Economic Development andCoordination of Aid from Abroad that reveal this weird situation for 1995 and the outcome isthat out of US$ 101,3 million promised to be given to Albania for this year, only $51,5

    million have been distributed and $ 58,99 million were not collected. This is a structure of aidto cover several fields, from balance of state payments up to food and material relief.

    From the tables made by the same Department of Ministry of Finance, it is seen that from aloans of US$ 107 million only US$ 64 million have been collected and about US$ 44 millionare still not disbursed. Totally, there were more that US$ 102 million waiting during 1995 forAlbanian economy to collect and put them into operation. They are aids of different naturesand loans for developments of different sectors of economy financed among others by

    prestigious organisations such as world Bank or EC PHARE program.

    But which are reasons of "indifference" of the poorest country in Europe for this aid?

    Specialists in the above mentioned department explain this with the lack of experience of theteams working in the Albanian department.

    There have been cases when a loan has not been drawn due to failure to prepare or submitprojects planed to be financed on due time.

    Of course, details of this anomaly are not known yet. They have shown reserves in theheadquarters of the World Bank to speak of reasons for this anomaly which has beencontinuing for several years now. Thus we have found out that for the period 1992-1994 fromthe loans of the World Bank, US$ 20 million were spent instead of the foreseen US$ 40

    million. The justification: bureaucratic delays.

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    In the meantime it is found out that Albania has been promised a total exceeding US$ 364million as aid and loans for 1996. Below is a simplified table for better understanding ofstructure of aid.

    The table includes aid alone:

    AID 1995 1996

    PROMISED PROMISED COLLECTED

    BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 21.8 18.7 25

    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 51.5 25.1 81.1

    HUMANITARIAN AID 0 0 3.7

    RELIEF IN FOOD 0.4 0 0

    MATERIAL RELIEF 2.3 1 11.7

    INVESTMENT 25.1 6.4 41.8

    TOTAL 101.35 51.49 163.5

    INTERVIEW

    PASKAL MILO, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OFALBANIA

    IF THERE IS FREEDOM, OPOSITION WILL WIN

    Interviewed by RIFAT BUZUKU / Vienna

    KOHA: Since we are meeting in Vienna, let us start with the purpose of your visit to Austria.

    MILO: The purpose of my visit was, first of all, to contact the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria, whom we have close relations with. I met the Chief of ForeignAffairs Cabinet - covering Central and South-Eastern European countries, Susane Gaugel. Ialso met with the president of the Socialist parliamentary group in the European Parliament,Peter Schieder. We expressed our concerns about the electoral campaign in Albania; first ofall the creation of a tense atmosphere and psychological pressure by the ruling party, i.e., theDemocratic Party.

    We asked the Social-Democratic Party of Austria and, through it, all other socialist andsocial-democratic parties of Europe to support us during election campaign. We have

    particularly asked these parties and the Socialist Internationale to send observers duringelections.

    Social-Democrats of Austria have promised to give us support, and direct forms of supportwill be discussed in the meeting of the Council of Socialist Internationale at the beginning ofMay in Bratislava, Slovakia.

    KOHA: President Berisha has been repeating that the Albanian Left is isolated. According toyou, is it so?

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    MILO: President Berisha is making efforts and wants to have the Albanian Left isolated, theway he has been making efforts to use any kind of possible manipulation to remain in power.European left forces are concerned with Berisha's authoritarian rule and are interested tofollow up developments in Albania more closely. This is because European left forces know

    that we want the processes in Albania to develop naturally, as really democratic and notpseudodemocratic.

    KOHA: Does this mean that you are worried about the direction that next elections could

    take, or about eventual manipulations by the ruling party?

    MILO: Our concern is grounded, regardless of Berisha's dazzling statements. Our concern isbased in the whole arsenal of means and methods that the ruling party has been using, startingfrom the application of the code of war against the opposition, including Law on Genocide,the Law on the Verification of the Chastity of Political Figures and the Electoral Law with aseries of restrictive measures for smaller parties. Especially with articles such as the one

    foreseeing the shift from the proportional to the majority system; the article providing thePresident the right to determine electoral zones, the article banning MPs or politicians underthe so called Law on Genocide to the right of free movement and run propaganda; the articlewhich restricts propaganda of opposition parties on TV, or the article which gives priority anddomination to the ruling party in the electoral commissions. All these articles related to nextelections make us think that they will not be democratic. If all political trials run by Berisha,followed by a hectic but not convincing propaganda against the alleged Red Front, are addedto this, then it will come out that the electoral campaign will be a harsh one. Political forceswill be under a wild pressure from the political rule which wants to remain in power in anunjust way, not respecting the will of the people; it wants to remain in power to cover abuse

    and political crime in the last four years; wants to remain in power to be saved from people'spunishment for its politics, which in its general lines, has been against basic interests of theAlbanian people, both in the economic and political fields.

    KOHA: What does your Party aim at in the next elections?

    MILO: Our aims are modest. We are not aiming at gaining the power. Our aim is to play adetermining role in the next government.

    KOHA: Do you think that your party will have the power to play such a role?

    MILO: Starting from difficulties and hindrances that Democratic Party has set up, we haveadopted our pre-election tactics. We have paid attention to the creation of the political centre.We have made efforts to form what is known to be the "pole of the centre", to group all

    political forces that feel belong to the centre, starting from the left to the right. By creatingthis pole, we aim to hamper Berisha's efforts to bipolarise the Albanian political life, to createa balancing force between the two strongest political forces and guarantee a balanced politicalgame in Albania.

    At the same time, we support cooperation with all political forces, without any exclusion,when it is in the interest to protect democracy and basic human rights and freedoms. So, we

    are putting efforts to organise an election campaign in cooperation with other political forces,targeting to oppose the threat and risk from instalment of a neo-dictatorship in Albania. Thisis our basic aim. In the name of this aim, we do not see any changes in the program, becauseAlbania needs to be saved from the threat. This threat was observed by great left personalities

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    in Europe, Jean Franois Valen, Etienne Godin and Achile Ochetto when they said thatAlbania is threatened to be isolated from Europe and the world again, if the neo dictatorialcurrent represented by Berisha is to win.

    KOHA: Which parties do you see as parties of the centre?

    MILO: The parties which have more or less already given consent to become part of the poleare the Democratic Alliance and Party of Human Rights. We hoped that our call would beacacepted by the Christian-Democratic Party, but regretfully this Party showed to be rathersuffering from complexes than to led by political realism.

    KOHA: Do you think that there is a party in Albania that could threaten the development of

    democratic processes?

    MILO: Based on programs of our legitimate parties, I think that none of them is a threat for

    Albania. Albania and pluralism need the whole political spectre - from the right to the left. Asparties approved on the basis of a certain political program, none of them represents a threatto democracy. The threat to democracy is an individual who breaks principles of democracyor a clan abusing the confidence of people and manipulating certain political parties focusingto certain narrow targets in contradiction with interests of the majority and the party theyrepresent. Actually this phenomenon is present in the Democratic Party. The power is in tehhands of a clan led by the chairman of the party, who only thinks of his future and not of thefate of the party or the people he represents.

    KOHA: Your party used to be in coalition with the Democratic Party. For some time, you

    used to be in the centre and now, as it was seen in the first phase of the Second Congress ofthe Socialist Party, it has become obvious that you are close to them. Leaders of Socialist

    Party have spoken of a possible coalition with your party after the elections. What could you

    say about this?

    MILO: I previously spoke of the flexibility of political parties in general, for a creative anddeveloping but not dogmatic posture. When we decided to join the Democratic Party fouryears ago, we did it in the name of the purpose of all Albanians, to destroy a regime whichwas overcome and whose failure was proved. On the run, we found out many failures,weakness, and above all, an arrogance and prepotency exercised by the Democratic Party, andespecially by Berisha. After we discussed many times and warned and criticised their

    behaviour in the Parliament and in the media, we came to the position when we were forcedto choose between sacrifice of the Party or abandon the the coalition. We could not sacrificeour party, interests of the class of people we represent, for the sake of interests of a clan orBerisha. We were the ones who voted against the government program. Being in coalitionand at the same time voting against the program of that government, meant the breach of thecoalition. But we continued in coalition until the time of the Draft Constitution when we hadthe final dissolution. We did this because if we had given in, the Constitution would have

    been approved in the Parliament and this would open doors to a new dictatorship. Therefore,we opposed Berisha and his dictatorial aims, opposed Democratic Party and, together withother forces, managed to convince people to take the decision to save Albania and the process

    of democratic development.

    In the meantime, Berisha started his unacceptable diversion against the Social-DemocraticParty.

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    So, shifting from coalition to opposition was a natural change, a change that is normal for apolitical party. I can state that the authority and prestige of Social-Democratic Party hasnoticeably increased after the dissolution of this false coalition. Opposing Berisha's aims andthose of the clan that he represents, opposing his efforts to place an absolute personal rule in

    the Parliament, in the government and out of it, we faced the natural alternative to cooperatewith other parties that also opposed his aims. In this aspect, during four years ofparliamentary life, when we were in the government, we were together, in a same front withother opposition parties, in the aspect of privatisation, protection of human rights, defence ofindependence of courts, different matters of foreign policy and above all, the problem of theConstitution - we were in a front not only with Socialist Party but with other parties too: theDemocratic Alliance, parties of the right, many times with Republican Party, several timeswith the party of Kalakula and the Party of Human Rights. This cooperation between partieswas inspired by common interests to defend democracy. This cooperation cannot be lookedupon as a quarrel between us and the Democratic Party. This cooperation was especiallyemphasised during discussions of the Electoral Draft-Law, when thirteen political parties had

    several joint meetings trying to stop Berisha from approving his non democratic law.

    As it is known, we did not manage in this, but our union was a proof of political cooperationfor the benefit and future of democracy in Albania. This cooperation was a proof thatregardless of program differences, we have many things in common. We are Albanian

    political parties whose aim is to help the process of political and economical development inAlbania in the direction of the Europeisation of the country.

    Regretfully, I have to say that this is not the aim of the Democratic Party, who has done itsutmost to take us centuries back. But this is an effort doomed to fail!

    KOHA: Can you anticipate how will the political mosaic in Albania look like after new

    elections?

    MILO: I can make a forecast, like every other man, but this will not mean that it will be as Isay. All right? First of all, it is known that there are many factors that influence the outcomeof elections. However, in my opinion, based on what we have assessed among people, thevictory of opposition parties is sure and undisputable. But, I will emphasise, under thecondition that elections are really free. I said this because we doubt that Berisha will have freedemocratic elections. I want to say that Berisha is on the top of everything that is cooked inthe Democratic Party for the electoral campaign yet to come. No matter that he has been

    giving promises all over, always stressing "I assure you", and which implies that Albania ishis property, we do not believe that the same are thinking people behind the scene of the

    presidency and the Democratic Party.

    KOHA: Are you referring to president Berisha's repeated statements on his certain victory?

    MILO: I am convinced that not even Berisha believes in his statement because he hassufficient information to know what people really think. But he needs this megalomaniacstatement for his propaganda, to encourage people around him to vote. I say so because I amconvinced that he is aware that he will lose, and all measures that he is taking are focused to

    make his loss as small as possible.