Koha Digest 98 (1996)

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The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org. - 1 - KOHA SUMMARY # 98 FRONT PAGE: Adem Demaçi: "ALBANIANS ARE SUSTAINING TWO STATES: KOSOVA AND SERBIA"! Date: 3 April 1996 EDITORIAL THE TRAIN DEPARTURE TIME-TABLE by VETON SURROI "We are aware that it will take time, but the step by step approach will be the best for the solution of the Kosova question". Any Kosovan activist has had the opportunity to hear these words from foreigners and last time I heard them was from a Western diplomat in Paris last week, during an international conference. The problem, of course, is not that things have to be solved step by step, there is not a sword that could cut Kosova's knot and disentangle once and forever the disarray created in Albanian and Serb relations, that can be the commotion to regional security in the Balkans, too. The problem is in the steps, their dimension, will the left foot follow the right one, or will it all look as a stumbling of drunkards. Experience so far has not shown any important engagement (or any engagement at all) of the West in the question of Kosova, and we can justifiably complain about the lack of attention. Apart from the letter by president Bush, repeated by president Clinton, the Serbian administration has, so far, not had any serious feeling that it should deal with the matter of Kosova. None could have seriously taken the CSCE mission and it's human rights violations record-keeping mandate. And, in the meantime, Milosevic managed and knew how to use the lack of unity of the West on many foreign policy issues. Now the West, among other preoccupations on approaching Belgrade, faces the problem of how to formulate a unified policy regarding Kosova. Although there are almost priestly repetitions of the need of an autonomy for Kosova, some new elements come into the surface. For example, the idea drifting in some European circles and which will be confirmed also by the American Administration in a few days, about a form of autonomy which "because of lack of democratic tradition in Serbia" should be under international supervision or guarantees. In fact, if it might be assessed so, a process of more frequent reflection and originating ideas about Kosova has begun. And, the first outcome, no matter how modest, appeared. The exit visas for Albania, for example, were abolished thanks to the American pressure exerted few months ago. Next, diplomatic sources say, could be other concessions like "measures to promote reciprocal confidence". Is it too late for such approaches? In fact, good connoisseurs of the question of Kosova would say yes. Even the ordinary reader of geo-political movements in the Former Yugoslavia will see that stability in the region is being created with new ethnic states, at the expense of, e.g., Bosnia & Herzegovina, whose chances to survive are diminishing on daily basis. In this context, the solution of Kosova's question, which would bring stability to region, should only be independence, but for this too, they said, a process is needed, hoping in Albanian non-violent

description

"We are aware that it will take time, but the step by step approach will be the best for the solution of the Kosova question". Any Kosovan activist has had the opportunity to hear these words from foreigners and last time I heard them was from a Western diplomat in Paris last week, during an international conference. The problem, of course, is not that things have to be solved step by step, there is not a sword that could cut Kosova's knot and disentangle once and forever the disarray created in Albanian and Serb relations, that can be the commotion to regional security in the Balkans, too. The problem is in the steps, their dimension, will the left foot follow the right one, or will it all look as a stumbling of drunkards. Experience so far has not shown any important engagement (or any engagement at all) of the West in the question of Kosova, and we can justifiably complain about the lack of attention

Transcript of Koha Digest 98 (1996)

Page 1: Koha Digest 98 (1996)

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton

Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha

soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the

name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on

http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

- 1 -

KOHA SUMMARY # 98FRONT PAGE: Adem Demaçi: "ALBANIANS ARE SUSTAINING TWO STATES: KOSOVA ANDSERBIA"!Date: 3 April 1996

EDITORIAL

THE TRAIN DEPARTURE TIME-TABLE

by VETON SURROI

"We are aware that it will take time, but the step by step approach will be the best for thesolution of the Kosova question". Any Kosovan activist has had the opportunity to hear thesewords from foreigners and last time I heard them was from a Western diplomat in Paris lastweek, during an international conference. The problem, of course, is not that things have to besolved step by step, there is not a sword that could cut Kosova's knot and disentangle onceand forever the disarray created in Albanian and Serb relations, that can be the commotion toregional security in the Balkans, too. The problem is in the steps, their dimension, will the leftfoot follow the right one, or will it all look as a stumbling of drunkards. Experience so far hasnot shown any important engagement (or any engagement at all) of the West in the questionof Kosova, and we can justifiably complain about the lack of attention. Apart from the letterby president Bush, repeated by president Clinton, the Serbian administration has, so far, nothad any serious feeling that it should deal with the matter of Kosova. None could haveseriously taken the CSCE mission and it's human rights violations record-keeping mandate.And, in the meantime, Milosevic managed and knew how to use the lack of unity of the Weston many foreign policy issues. Now the West, among other preoccupations on approachingBelgrade, faces the problem of how to formulate a unified policy regarding Kosova. Althoughthere are almost priestly repetitions of the need of an autonomy for Kosova, some newelements come into the surface. For example, the idea drifting in some European circles andwhich will be confirmed also by the American Administration in a few days, about a form ofautonomy which "because of lack of democratic tradition in Serbia" should be underinternational supervision or guarantees. In fact, if it might be assessed so, a process of morefrequent reflection and originating ideas about Kosova has begun. And, the first outcome, nomatter how modest, appeared. The exit visas for Albania, for example, were abolished thanksto the American pressure exerted few months ago. Next, diplomatic sources say, could beother concessions like "measures to promote reciprocal confidence". Is it too late for suchapproaches? In fact, good connoisseurs of the question of Kosova would say yes. Even theordinary reader of geo-political movements in the Former Yugoslavia will see that stability inthe region is being created with new ethnic states, at the expense of, e.g., Bosnia &Herzegovina, whose chances to survive are diminishing on daily basis. In this context, thesolution of Kosova's question, which would bring stability to region, should only beindependence, but for this too, they said, a process is needed, hoping in Albanian non-violent

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response to Serbian violence. And, hoping that the model of integration rather than ofdivision is applied in Macedonia. The politics regarding Kosova has been developing inseveral railways. One of them is dissolution of former Yugoslavia with all consequences ithas brought, up to the foundation of new ethnic states. The other one carries the Western trainwhich is collecting ideas on how to solve other crises in different regions, learning in themeantime how to settle the relations among themselves, either between countries of EuropeanUnion or between EU and the USA. Kosova stands on the third railway, looking at the traindeparture time-table.

SURVEY

DEMANDS FOR FREE ELECTIONS

by KOHA SURVEY TEAM / Prishtina

Our institutions and political subjects, among others, often face critiques addressed towardsthe non-engagement or non-involvement of all intellectual and political potential availableamong Kosova Albanians in our political movement. According to many assumptions, thereare people who should be included but are left out of the movement because of the"monopolisation of political functions" within active parties. In order to obtain data on whatthe public thinks about this issue, the first question was related to the inclusion of all ourpotentials in the political movement. The results showed that only 9.89 per cent of peopleinterviewed thought and were firm in their statements that all political and intellectualpotentials were engaged. Those thinking the contrary accounted for by 37.81 per cent. Andthe largest number of the people interviewed thought that our political and intellectualpotential was engaged only partially - 44.17 per cent.

Naturally, since the largest number of people interviewed thinks that our intellectual andpolitical potentials were partially engaged or were not engaged at all, then we asked theinterviewed to mention names, enabling them to mention four personalities that they wouldengage in our political movement. Out of 283 interviewed, 148 or 52.29 per cent did notanswer the question. 135 or 47.91 per cent of them gave answers of persons they thoughtshould be included in political institutions in Kosova. Mahmut Bakalli, Rexhep Qosja andAdem Demaçi were the ones most commonly suggested for engagement in our politicalsystem. 88 or 31.09 people interviewed think that Bakalli should to be engaged. Qosja wasreferred to by 76 or 26.85 per cent of the interviewed and Demaçi was referred to by 71 or25.08 per cent. Veton Surroi with 33 or 11.66 per cent holds the fourth place. All of themfollowed by Azem Vllasi with 22 or 7.77 per cent and Iliaz Kurteshi, who was mentioned by18, or 6,39 per cent. Following were Ukshin Hoti with 3.88 (or 11 or the interviewed) andShkëlzen Maliqi with 2,82 per cent or 8 of the interviewed. As for the others, the interviewedthink similarly, since out of 270 cases there are names mentioned that did not account even by1 per cent. There are some names that would be worth while mentioning such as KurteshSalihu, Luljeta Pula, Rexhep Ismajli, Ejup Statovci etc. We should take into considerationthat the interviewed were asked to refer only to personalities which are not directly involvedin our political institutions and instances.

Another interesting aspect in our political life is the functioning of the government in exile.There has been no serious assessment of the government by our public, so far. Our pretention

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is not to come to a definite reply, but just incite opinions which may give indications for amore serious survey in the future. Those who thought that the work of the government ofKosova was partially efficient accounted for by 57.60 per cent. Only 22.26 per cent thoughtthat the government of Kosova in exile had no effects at all, and 5,65 per cent gave otheropinions on the work of the government of Kosova in exile. Although we received answersreferring to the government in exile such as "criminal" and similar, they are only fewunimportant cases. The general results brought us to the conclusion that the work andactivities of the government in exile are considered as rather positive, because as we saw, 14per cent, thought that its activity was fully efficient and 57 per cent thought that it waspartially efficient. Only 22 per cent of the interviewed gave a negative opinion on this issue.

The Parliament of Kosova, free elections and its non-constitution may be among the mostinteresting problems in our political scene. All swords are crossed in this problem, in thequestion of legitimacy of the presentation of Albanians and further functioning of institutionsand the political system in Kosova. There are actual problems in our political scene escalatingin regard with the constitution or non-constitution of the parliament. The last case of disputeof Demaçi's attempt to enter the parliamentary representation in our parliament rose polemicsand discussions in the media in Kosova.

In our survey, we first asked what would be the reason for the non-constitution of theParliament of Kosova. From the answers we got, we could not draw a general conclusion.Those who thought that this was banned by the Serbian police accounted for by 29.68 percent. On the other hand, we had almost the equal number of those that thought that theParliament of Kosova was not constituted due to the fact that our political subjects were notfirm to implement it - 28.98 per cent. 18.02 percent referred to involvement of internationalfactor or eventual non-recognition by them as a possibility of the non-constitutional of theparliament. Of course, there are individuals who thought that the Parliament of Kosova wasnot constituted because this would not suit some political circles or because our politicalcircles caused the non-constitution, and they accounted for by 8.83 per cent of peopleinterviewed. Those who had no specific opinion on why the Parliament was not constitutedaccounted for by 14.13 per cent.

On the other hand, the expiry of all deadlines for its constitution and the expiry of mandatesof all those elected for the parliament led to an unclear juridical situation in the wholepolitical system of Albanians and its institutionalisation. Therefore, what should follow dueto the non-constitution of the Parliament of Kosova is very important. Those who thought thatsince the parliament was not constituted yet and that it should be constituted now accountedfor by 35.34 per cent. Whereas 10.95 per cent had no specific posture on this question, andmajority of people interviewed or 53.36 percent thought that new elections should beorganised in Kosova.

In terms of the constitution of the Parliament of Kosova, there are also different postures.43.11 per cent of people interviewed thought that such a step would be important forinstitutionalisation of the political life in Kosova. Those who did not see any advancement ofthe question of Kosova by the constitution of the parliament accounted for by 12.72 per cent,whereas only 8.83 per cent of people interviewed saw the risk of the aggravation of thesituation in the constitution of the Parliament of Kosova. People interviewed who thoughtthat the constitution of parliament could not be a step in direction to institutionalisation ofpolitical life, because it was hindered by the disability for the installation of other levels of the

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government such as the army, the police and courts accounted for by 24.03 per cent. 10.95 percent had no specific opinion on the issue of the constitution of the Parliament of Kosova.

The outcome of the survey showed that most of the people interviewed gave high estimationof the work and activities carried by the LDK and by the government of Kosova. On the otherhand, there were more of those who wanted Kosova as an independent and sovereign statethan those who were in favor of the unification. All statements differed in nuances, were theyare not fully positive, but rather contain doses of reserve which showed that the public stillhad reserves when talking of institutions and political subjects. It should also be noted thatthe largest reserve was expressed in regard with the question of the constitution of theparliament which is losing its legitimacy among the public opinion, since 53 per cent of thepeople interviewed saw it reasonable to have new elections and not to constitute the oldparliament. And this showed the demand of the public opinion to restate the verification ofthe mandate of the parliament elected in 1992.

INTERVIEW

ADEM DEMAÇI, Chairman of the CDHRF

ALBANIANS SUSTAIN TWO STATES - SERBIA AND KOSOVA

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI \ London

KOHA: What is the reason of your visit to London?

DEMAÇI: I had an invitation from Brussels. I went to the Parliament, I went to the Senate,where I said that if Europe continues to push Albanians of Kosova to accept any kind ofautonomy under Serbia, then it will not solve a thing, and it will become a co-inciter of a newfire that would burst in the south of former Yugoslavia. Of course, I asked for help andunderstanding, asking them to act in a preventive way, by restoring some of the liftedsanctions against Serbia, and to ask Europe and USA to eliminate the police control ofKosova, to restore the violated rights... And to have free elections in Kosova in presence ofrepresentatives of international institutions where people would elect their legitimaterepresentatives - so they can first discuss among themselves and later think of the modus howto solve their problem and of the form of coexistence. And finally, to go together to Belgradeand negotiate the issue of Kosova...

KOHA: ... what option did you offer?

DEMAÇI: ... I do not want to prejudge anything in finding a solution, but one thing is known:Albanians of Kosova should be provided conditions to express their political will and to havethe problem of Kosova solved in conformity with their political will. Of course, in the interestof both sides, the Serbian and Albanian. I went to Belgium to present this idea, and travelledto London with similar intention. Regretfully, I was not supported in any of the mentionedpostures. I came to London invited by the Albanian Community in Britain, formed some timeago. They proposed me to come here since they could arrange meetings with officials in theForeign Office. This was done and I met a high official in foreign affairs, Derrock, wholistened to all I said and repeated that the posture of British government is that: it should be

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discussed with Serbs and that problem of Kosova should be solved within Serbia. He told methat they are not in position to be involved in the possible content of such autonomy. Shortly,he advised me to find a solution as we know and can.

KOHA: Your decision to become engaged in our political scene had a great echo amongAlbanians in Britain as well. The Albanian Community strongly supported your candidacyfor MP in the parliament of Kosova and proposed you for its chairman...

DEMAÇI: This was only a continuation of the proposal that came from some politicalmechanisms within the existing political parties that work in Prishtina: to be candidate forMP in the election unit of late Anton Çetta. I liked the idea and accepted it, although withreserves. And, I told those who proposed me that their idea would not pass as easily as theythought. But, frankly I did not believe that the resistance that followed my candidation wouldbe so strong. Today it is qualified as omission in "procedure", which in reality is ridiculous,since, if procedure is to be observed, the whole parliament should be extinguished. TheAssembly of Kosova did not hold its constitutional meeting. Thus, according to Constitutionof Republic of Kosova, the Assembly comes to be illegitimate.

KOHA: Where did all that resistance come from?

DEMAÇI: From the top of the LDK! Of course, such a task is given to those who are"competent" for these procedures, but I do not have illusions that even if the top were notagainst, the whole thing would be completed in 24 hours. This proves that the delay of theconstitution of the parliament and its organisation was done deliberately. And those whodeliberately insisted on the non-functioning of the parliament, found it more convenient tomanipulate with the power they have, to keep improvising and not to let the rule be where itactually should be: in the parliament where rules are formulated, where decisions, decrees andlaws are approved and where responsibilities are claimed. But, it seems that some in the topof LDK did not like this, since there are many others who are inside this party but keepinsisting on candidation of Adem Demaçi as MP, through the media. Of course, none, noteven me, ever mentioned that I would be chairman of the parliament! It is true that I have saidthat I would make efforts to animate the parliament, to seek ways so that it functioned. Evenunder conditions existing now. Recently, the media in Kosova published statements of MPsof the Parliament of the Republic that the parliament should be activated. They criticisedthemselves for not being more energetic. In the end, it is all too far away. And the wholething is hampered. I thought of my candidation as a proper way to activate many individualswho know how to think politically, who have knowledge in politics, who have authority andare a considerable political force.

KOHA: If Assembly of Kosova had its headquarters, then it would mean that it's "doors areclosed" for you...

DEMAÇI; Yes. The imagined doors of the imagined parliament are realistically closed! But,it is too late now. Here we are, in April, and there are less than two months before May 24when assembly of Kosova is to be abolished and when all those who helped its nonimplementation and hampered its work will start their speeches on preparation for new multi-party elections. I do not know how do they dare talk of new elections, after all this farce.

KOHA: Then how do you see your political engagement? Will it be by forming a newpolitical party?

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DEMAÇI. By no means! There are enough parties. It would be foolish to found the sixteenthparty. But, something must be done. I will try to make efforts with Rugova and others to finda way to avoid misunderstandings and divisions, and to prevent efforts be wasted in uselessthings. Especially when it is known that Serbia is looking forwards to this.

KOHA: Taking into consideration the resistance so far, chances seem to be small...

DEMAÇI: Well, if they continue to insist refusing, we will find a solution to it. I do notbelieve that there are problems that can not be solved. Don't ask me about the formula,because I do not have it yet. But, I think that I will find it during the talks that I will have. Myintention is not to oppose the LDK or someone else, but it is to find a formula for theunification and creation of a political force to oppose our enemy whom we almost forgot,Serbia and the police rule soaring above our heads. Also this "other side" is well aware thatwe will not enter divisions because Serbia would like this very much and this is why theycontinue with their policy of unscrupulousness, delays and irresponsibility. In the consultationscheduled for January 15, we tried to convene a meeting of all parties, and President Rugovadid not see it reasonable to attend: "The president does not need to be present in theconsultation"' was the reply that we got from the LDK. By this, he devaluated us. And wewere thinking to approve some conclusions which would crystallise our common posturesregarding challenges that we have been facing, and also whether we should accept anautonomy or undertake other activities: whether we should animate parliament, or leave it asit was... We did not want to revert to "reassessments" of the work so far etc, etc, but to takepositions towards the future, but the president did not find it reasonable to be present.

It seems that this side sees our efforts for organisation as direct threat against it and the"authority" it holds.

Regretfully, this appears to be the truth. But, if it continues like this, then we will undertakesomething by all means. There must be a dis-entanglement, absolutely. We cannot continuelike this. All healthy forces that should be engaged in politics today are out of game. Why?Because three or four people want to hold all the cards and do not give way. And they do nowork! They have frozen in one place looking towards the world, as if the world will come andsolve their problems. In the meantime, Serbia does not cease to draw projets and plans toprove to the world that Belgrade has practical solutions for Kosova. When this happens, itwill be foolish to oppose the world and declare that "we do not accept..."!

KOHA: Do you think that conversation with Belgrade are inevitable and that solution forKosova should be found there?

DEMAÇI: I wish it were not so. But, this is what the world is saying. What we call"international community" has decided long time ago that the question of Kosova is to besolved in Belgrade. And I think that if Albanians were organised, they would be able toimpose themselves to Belgrade as a party with critical influence. Thus, the world wouldchange its opinion. Getting convinced that Albanians are decisive to fight up to the end fortheir freedom and equality, that community would change its convictions. But until then, theywill place Kosova where they think it belongs. Shortly, you get proportional to your efforts!Croatia was not allowed to fight in the beginning, but later it was recognised as a state.

KOHA: But Dayton proved that the world might change its opinion but not the borders...

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DEMAÇI: I think that borders have changed. What is said of borders now is absurd sinceYugoslavia does not exist any more. Its borders have been destroyed and there cannot bedifferent criteria about their alteration: somewhere they can and somewhere they can't change.Behind the commotion on the non-alteration of the borders hides the protection of Serbinterests! I do not believe that it has to do with non-alteration of the borders but rather withthe relations of forces: whether the world were interested to support Albanians and theirinterests, or to ignore their problem leaving us under mercy of regime in Serbia.

KOHA: Let us come back to Kosova scene. Do you think that the existing Albanian politicalstructure in Kosova can generate such an imposing force?

DEMAÇI: Who has founded LDK? Those who used to be members of Communist League ofYugoslavia until yesterday! Textually, all of them, the twelve of them, who founded this partywere members of Communist League of Yugoslavia. It was not by chance that there was noneout of Communist League to be among them. Simply, then there was a conviction thatthrough democratic "procedural" forms, freedom would be served in a plate for this people.Thus, the formation of LDK was not hindered by anyone, least by Belgrade. Since those whofounded LDK were implied to be "reasonable" and not extremists, they were a guarantee thatno threat against Yugoslavia and Serbia would follow. But, after burst of war in Croatia,Serbia noticed that things could take similar direction in Kosova, i.e., get out of control, eventhe reasonable LDK could be transformed into a radical force. The rest are known. Allattempts to move forwards, since that day are hindered by LDK. It is a fact that the wholepolicy led by LDK so far has convened Serbia on the whole. For example: for the first time inhistory of Serbia and Yugoslavia, Kosova is rentable for Serbia! Never before in the newhistory happened that Kosova gave more and received nothing. Today, Kosova is the one thatgives but gets nothing: neither for education, nor for health, economy... Nothing. Thus, for thefirst time, Kosova is a rentable territory for Serbia. This is why our "parallel" system does nothamper them, the system which is actually exhausting Albanians who simply have to sustaintwo states! Serbia and Kosova...

KOSOVA

THE ANSCHLUSS AND THE BOOMERANG

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

It has been seven years since the "Anschluss" of Kosova. 28 March 1989 was not a simpledate of voting in the Parliament of Kosova, and this was best explained by one of maincharacters of Serbian policy in Kosova (now Minister of Interior of "FRY"), Jokanovic. In aninterview to a Belgrade magazine he stated that the "attachment" of Kosova to Serbia simplymeant a vote to war or peace!

The "Tolstoyan" dilemma worded by present chief policeman of the "rearranged" Yugoslavfederation, was the most sincere judgement that one could make regarding the events relatedto the decisions about the Parliament of Kosova. This was noticed this year, in the lack ofusual euphoria which used to accompany this "state holiday". Except for flags (only Serbianstate flags) and the ban to use official premises and school buildings, there were no noisycelebrations like in previous years. However, Albanians in Kosova will never forget the

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moment of the celebration of this day in Belgrade's "Sava Centar" when champaign waspoured, while the blood of about 30 Albanians who had gone onto the streets to protestagainst what was happening those days in Kosova, was shed.

28 March 1996 was different not only because no champagne was poured and no blood wasshed, but also it left war in the former Yugoslavia behind. Then, in 1989, war was expected tostart here. Perceived thus, events that happened in relation with the violently suspendedparliament and autonomy of Kosova, can today be observed from the aspect of the "logistic"preparation for a war that would happen further up north in the former federal state... Thesincerity in Jokanovic's words should be understood thus. Hence, Kosova was "pacified"before a mission which was meant to be carried out somewhere north, and there was a need toclear grounds down south, so they would not be hindered for some time!

Looked upon from this aspect, Kosova's "Anschluss" 7 years ago was a tactical move in theframework of a wider strategic activity...

It seems that both parties, each in its way, were aware of this activity which definitely dividedpaths between Serbs and Albanians in Kosova (by eliminating all institutional and democraticforms to solve of problems). And while Albanians saw what times had come and made itclear to themselves and to the others what they aimed with their re-organisation, Serbs did thesame, even by allowing theoretically the possibility of the existence of the "autonomy" ofKosova in their constitution and laws! But, this was done counting on the big Albanian "NO",which was worded as an option when Panic appeared in the Parliament of Kosova in 1992and said: "you will be here together (with Albanians)" to the Serb MPs in Kosova!

The second time when Serbs got frightened (especially the ones from Serbia) of thetheoretical possibility of the participation of Albanians in a parliament of Kosova was lastyear, when one of the juridical architects of the abolition of the autonomy of Kosova, RatkoMarkovic, elaborated the possibility of the right to veto, as a "defending mechanism" from theso called "Albanian majorisation" (which has been continuously worrying Serbs in Kosova).

But Albanians have offered the veto in their way, and they have also offered the "positivediscrimination" to favor Kosova Serbs in the Parliament of the Republic of Kosova (after theelections in 1992) and have left 13 seats for their representatives... (On the other hand,"deputy nacelnik", Nesovic had told European Parliament rapporteur, Cucho, that ifAlbanians decide to participate in the Parliament of Kosova, they would take 86% of seats!).

Seven years after, Albanians and Serbs know that the move that is now celebrated as a Serbstate holiday, was a tactical rather than a strategic solution. Whatever the solution or status ofKosova were, both sides know that it will not be a long term solution. This does not meanthat there will not be efforts (again by some old-new constitutional-juridical Serb architects)to make other solutions which can re-functionalise (regionalise?) the Parliament of Kosova,in a variant of regions centralised in Belgrade... and this idea has already started to beobserved...

In any case, the idea of suspension of Parliament of Kosova, despite all unknowns in the pastseven years, has counted on one thing at least. On the elimination of Albanians from legalrepresentation and institutional regulation of legislation (even if it had limited possibilities)!

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Therefore, apart from celebrating, Serb leaders have to discover now a more efficient form toeliminate the regulation of legislature grounded on the representation by majority of votes. Inany case, the game about the Parliament of Kosova will continue and it will depend much onsituation that will follow... For example, that elimination of Parliament of Kosova took placebefore the beginning of the war in the north of former Yugoslavia. If IFOR leaves Bosnia(which is mentioned as a possibility) parallels will be created to focus Serb attention in thenorth, and the Parliament of Kosova will be actual again. This also referrs to the Parliamentof the Republic of Kosova which has not managed to become functional.

Can the Parliament of Kosova come-back as a boomerang?!

1981

The 15th anniversary of events in 1981 has risen interest for analysis and different opinions.Some of participants in events in 1981, from different points of view, talk of the time which isconsidered as the "turning point" for Kosova and the Albanian people. These are the opinionof Azem Vllasi and the diary of Merxhan Avdyli (published in "Zëri i Kosovës" /Voice ofKosova/ ) about 1981...

VIEWPOINTS

THE CHRONICLE OF THE EVENTS OF 1981

by MERXHAN AVDYLI

Wednesday, March 11, 1981.

Usual pre-spring day, in Prishtina and in all Kosova, at first sight not warning of anythingextraordinary. But the extraordinary is expected to happen. People get ready to do their dailywork. Everyone minds his own business. Evening falls and things change. Youth is the onlyone that can change everything, because youth is ready and make everything move.

In students dormitory no. 3, in the room where Gani Koci, Kadri Kryeziu, Januz Januzaj andsome other students reside, it is decided to start the protest. Someone should start to changethe flow. In the student restaurant, around 7 pm, an unusual movement of students takesplace... They whisper, talk, react in their youth eagerness. They unify. They are not satisfiedwith their general living conditions. Students gather in the student restaurant. Their numberincreases. After a short time, they go out. Their number still increases. Other students join.They gather in front of the dormitories. Ali Lajçi and his friends are the promoters ofdemonstrations. They give instructions. Around 8 pm, students go out in the streets ofPrishtina. They have their word, their cheers, their first demands of economic character,which step by step, start becoming political. Two main streets of Prishtina are crowded withstudents. No written slogans. No placards. Sometime after 9 pm students are back in theirdormitories. They continue their protest there until late hours. They sing different patrioticsongs dedicated to Mic Sokoli, Bajram Curri etc. Police intervenes with tear gas and dispersesthe students.

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March 11 was the beginning of what was to happen later. Reactions were different. Widemasses have strongly supported the events, and the vasals in power in Kosova qualifiedevents as counter-revolutionary.

Wednesday, March 25, 1981

A small group of students headed by Ali Lajçi and Bajram Kosumi gathered in a room inDormitory # 3, and decided that next morning, on March 26, they would demonstrate. Themade plans for the demonstrations, set the time, appointed the ones to carry placards,elaborated the list of demands to be presented...

Thursday, March 26, 1981

Things happened as they were planed: demonstrations started. In the early hours of morning,dignifyingly, the students got out of their rooms, others joined them from private apartmentsand gathered in the Students Centre. Speeches begun. The most distinguished was Ali Lajçi.Some university professors were there. Some Serb vasals, headed by Azem Vllasi, were alsothere. Around noon, students took out their pancarts written in white cloths. Now, the wholething had an emphasised political and national character. Political demands were in theparole: "Republic - either peacefully or by war". The parole that indicated the demand forfinal separation from the Yugoslav statehood was: "We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs(southern Slavs)". Unification of Albanian lands was presented in the slogan: "Pollog andKorab, they are all Kosova". The slogan expressing economic exploitation of Kosova was:"Trepça works - Belgrade grows".

Around noon, students went downtown to demonstrate. Police had set high barricades inmany parts of the city. On the very first effort of students, the police reacted with force andviolence. But, the major part of students had decided to demonstrate in streets of Prishtinaand they did so.

Demonstrations of 26 March continued in different ways until late hours in the evening. Thatday many students were wounded, and many were imprisoned.

March 26 was the day of warning for even more demonstrations which took place throughoutKosova and which, with their demands and bravery, attracted wide masses on April 1 and 2.It's principal slogan: "Kosova Republic".

VIEWPOINTS

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 1981

by AZEM VLLASI

Anniversaries and jubilees of different events are not best opportunities for their enlightenedand assessed in all aspects thoroughly and objectively. In such occasions, there is usually adoses of euphoria, manipulations and partial treatments needed for political conjectures, forpersonal promotion or promotion of political groups. History and historians need facts and

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original material, they need the wholeness of the reality and the time when an event tookplace, they need freedom from pragmatic political pressures to do a creative multi-dimensional work and to come to objective assessments.

Of course, regardless of facts and the objective truth, everyone has the right to have hispersonal opinion, interpretation and point of view about different events that have happenedthroughout history, but it should remain only for personal use. Dominating collective opinion- national or of different social categories - for an important event, is usually formed ongrounds of short or long term reflections on the event. The opinion is formed on basis ofresults or consequences which are the direct outcome or are connected to the event. All theseare present today in individual or collective opinions regarding events in 1981. Despitepropagating noise in the style of socialist "agit-prop" (agitation and propaganda) to imposeone and only one opinion, uncontestable and undisputable, opinions are still divided, but thisis normal in our circumstances.

Those who declare events in 1981 to be epochal, as most important event in our history ofthis century, as the beginning of democratic spring in the darkness of the communist world,not only overdo it, but are aggressive and intolerant towards any other assessment or opinion.These are mainly those who were more or less involved in the events, but not exclusively forpatriotic reasons, and even less for democratic ones. Their motives can be understood, evenjustified to an extent, because they were victimised.

On the other hand, there is a considerable category of people who deem that those events didnot happen in an appropriate time, nor under circumstances favourable for us, nor that theybrought us any epochal achievements. Because, to say that we did something good forourselves by saying that we started the destruction of former Yugoslavia where, despite allproblems, we had created something and used to have a respectable autonomy, and today arein the prison of Serb regime, is not convincing nor attractive. It is also too early.

People of the political establishment of that time, mainly remain quiet regarding those eventsand other things as well. They say that they do so in order not induce divisions, quarrelsamong ourselves, since we have our common problem, we need to maintain unity towards acommon goal - independence of Kosova from Serbian rule. This is how many people thinkand this is right judgement, because it is true that this is our common goal and task.

None of us who was in the political scene those years should be spared from judgement ofdemocratic opinion or amnestied from mistakes, failures, ignorance, wrong steps, becausethere were such ones. But "black and white" assessments, assessments that all participants inthe demonstrations were patriots, brave men, Mic Sokoli (Albanian National Hero),visionaries and those who did not support demonstrations were traitors, anti-Albanians - arenot only untrue but they belong to the manner of times past. In this style, writers of somearticles used the anniversary of demonstrations in 1981 to spread out lies, offence and it isthis and not opposite opinions that are unacceptable for a civilised democratic and publiccommunication.

Which are the dimensions and reflections of events in 1981 or events related to them, forwhich there are no diametrally opposed opinions?

Firstly, regardless of damages caused at the moment or long term benefits, those events, takenas a whole, belong to the continuity of our national movement for independence, since the

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time of League of Prizren. Regardless of challenges and difficulties, this movement continuesto move towards full independence.

Secondly, as regarding the desire and aim for full independence of Kosova from Serbia andthe Serbian rule, it was also a task of Albanians in official government before 1981, since1941, from Fadil Hoxha to Ibrahim Rugova (with a few exceptions), and of those who wereout of the system then and used to act illegally or were forced to flee the country.Divergencies, disagreements and, sometimes, confrontations among us had to do with theassessment of ways to follow, circumstances, "moves" or concrete actions.

Concretely, regarding demonstrations in 1981, the political leadership of Kosova (Albanians)and the whole official policy was sharing the opinion that they were not appropriate neither asform of activity nor according to political circumstances of the time when they happened.Kosova, although it had not small achievements in its development, was burdened by internalproblems of development, by internal political relations which were not fully conditioned bylack of formal name of "Republic". After all, Republic was not soaring in the streets ofPrishtina to be grabbed through demonstrations. Why then, when the system used to be morerigorous, should they have been an appropriate form of activity, and today when we havemuch more reasons for dissatisfaction, and when such activities are not formally banned bylaw, they are not considered such? The answer remains in the assessment of politicalopportunity.

All serious political assessments then hinted that after Tito's death, nothing would be like inhis time. Chances were that Serbs and Serbia would start shifting constitutional relations inYugoslavia, because they used to be the ones most dissatisfied with the Constitution of 1974.For later developments, we in Kosova needed a stable political situation in the position thatwe had in constitution, although we did not consider it as a static position for all times.

Different hints announced that something would happen in Kosova. But, they were hints fromsources under obvious influence by propaganda led by the Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha,and not by an authentic movement for the Republic of Kosova, within the political andconstitutional system (socialist self-managing), that used to exist in Yugoslavia then. EnverHoxha's regime was very much interested in destabilisating Yugoslavia, and especially the situation in Kosova, but it was so because of its internal needs and not for the benefit ofAlbanians here. Closed Albania used to receive information that life in Kosova was better andmore free in every aspect. Enver Hoxha used to offer his totalitarian regime and hisideological dogma as salvation and paradise for all Albanians, wherever they were. The restof the world for him was "dirty and decadent imperialism or revisionism".

The difference between the official policy in Kosova and other political currents in its essencewas not in favor or against the Republic. The difference had to do with the estimation ofcircumstances, of ways and political technology towards this task in a long term process.Although official policy was not noisy, independence from Serbia, but not from formerYugoslavia, was a grounded aim. The official policy was concentrated and counted in aprocess and gradual movement, without high profile moves. It was counted in differentreforms and constitutional modifications which took place relatively often. General relationsin Yugoslavia were gradually leading towards a democratisation obviously grater that the onein other socialist countries.

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The official policy was aware of the will of the Albanian people, but it was also aware of thereality in relation with political forces. Therefore, it kept its the direction of activities.

Different formations out of official policy, and especially political currents consisting of fansof Enver Hoxha's regime and policy, were in favour of drastic moves, of large scale breaks, ina work for a "shock therapy" and of Republic of Kosova with political and constitutionalsystem existing in Albania then. In regard to the latter, our disagreement with them lied in thefield of political principle and ideology. Verbal statements that they were in favour of aRepublic inside Yugoslavia were transparent because "authentic marxist-leninist" socialismand "the revisionist" one would not fit inside one country.

The situation begun to complicate due to the very fact that Enverists insisted thatdemonstrations should be held and that troubles should be created on 26 March, on the datewhen youth estaffete, a symbol connected to Tito's name was scheduled to be in Prishtina. ForSerbs, who anyways would accuse Tito as the first "guilty" for large prereogatives thatKosova had in Constitution of 1974, this was a favourable moment to start an offensiveagainst us under pretext that Albanians were seeing to separating from Yugoslavia and thatthey put all the power they had in service of this goal. Others in Yugoslavia, like majority ofAlbanian population, were revolted why that event should be connected to Tito's name. Tenmonths after Titos' death, there was eagerness to dissolve his political heritage. On thecontrary, the majority feared from

shakes with negative consequences... Thus, demonstrations on 26 March initially weakenedthe political position of the leadership of Kosova. Dissatisfaction and revolt of the Albanianpeople was caused by brutal intervention of federal police units in Students Centre which wascompletely unnecessary to that extent and I think that it was deliberately done in order toaggravate the situation.

Until today, it still remains unclear why one day earlier (on 25 March), as Mustafa Sefedini,former secretary of Internal Affairs of Kosova (in his interview to KOHA) tells now, hiscolleague would insist that police units of Serbia should be sent as eventual assistance on 26March? Why was it exactly that day that demonstrations should be held and the leadership ofKosova had no knowledge that something of the kind would happen?

In the following days (31 March, 1 and 2 April) a big number of people went to streets, notonly with motives of the ones of 26 March, but because of anger against police brutality, toexpress their dissatisfaction with the leadership in Prishtina and in Belgrade. This was anappropriate and understandable response of the people, spontaneous rather than organised.

After demonstrations, political and state head of the Federation hastened before leadership inKosova to make severe and rushing assessments. The assessment "counter-revolutionaryattempts" was mentioned and this became part of all following documents and politicaldictionary. The Kosova leadership lost its initiative and took the course of easing thesituation, to amortise pressures coming from Serbian and Yugoslav public opinion andleadership, and to maintain the constitutional position of Kosova. This political war lasted foreight years.

The situation regarding demonstrations in 1981 and later was not, as some tend to present ittoday, headed by - patriots, democrats, visionaries and brave men, having on the other side,"Titoists", traitors, cowards (in power)... Except for pressures from Belgrade, we had internal

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divisions of the political and ideological nature and concepts. As is it known, neither inhinting the coming events, nor during demonstrations and after, the influence and ideologicalcolour of Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha remained unrevealed. Political groupings wereunder such influence and they had a very active role in these events and later. In thedemonstrations on 26 March, where I attended with late Gazmend Zajmi (then rector of theUniversity), Pajazit Nushi, Ymer Jaka and some others, to talk to the group of studentsgathered there, after three hours of discussions, when we were about to leave to downtown,one of front placards, previously prepared, stated: "Glory to Marxism and Leninism". Therewere two others: "We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs" and "Trepça works - Belgrade grows"which were not disputable, but why demonstrations? Ali Lajçi was there too. In theatmosphere of noise, when we left, since they did not listen to us not to demonstrate that day,the noisiest of all was a group shouting "Party, Enver, we are ready whenever"! Slogans likethis and similar ones were heard in the following days in demonstrations, but it is sure thatthey were not coming from people who had come there to express their revolt against policebrutality, and not to cheer to Enver Hoxha.

Later, this ideological platform started to be presented as a concept targeting to be functional.Letters, pamphlets, programs, different statutes of different political formations startedarriving in many addresses ("Communist-Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia","Peoples' Red Front", "Marxist-Leninist Group of Kosova" etc). It was only the "NationalMovement for Republic of Kosova" who bore no red connotations... In essence, this was aconcept taken from ideological practice and dogma of Stalinist regime in Albania of the timeand of "military communism" of Pol Pot in Cambodia.

In Gjilan, a group that possessed two plastic cans full of propaganda material of the abovementioned character and pictures of Enver Hoxha and Stalin was discovered. They wereplaning to distribute them in an "appropriate" day and "fascinate" people.

They also had some small weapons.

Enver Hoxha's works, and especially his book "Titoists", which was published later, weremain literature for ideological, political and patriotic "enhancement" and inspiration of peopleof this provenance. Before and after events in 1981, "SIGURIMI" was active in inducingactivities from the position of Enverist regime, and for this purpose they had connections witha rather large number of people from Kosova who were involved in these events. TheAlbanian Embassy in Vienna had been transformed into a headquarters of "SIGURIMI" foractivities towards our citizens in Western Europe. Some of them were participants and theystill glorify those events only to the extent of acceptability, hiding other dimensions. I knowthem but I do not want to mention their names, although I wish they were released fromdeceits and dogmas of E. Hoxha's paradise in Albania.

When I speak of this dimension of events, of course, I am referring to some groups andindividuals. All the respect to those whose heart was centered in the national cause, in theidea of national liberation (post war emigration in America and Western Europe) and wereequally against communism - whether it was "Titoist" or "Enverist". Or, for example, UkshinHoti, Ekrem Kryeziu, Tahir Geci whom I know and had nothing to do with Enverist"kitchen". Or Adem Demaçi who, regardless of ideology or regimes, in continuity wasengaged for the idea of national unification.

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Our official policy was aware of the bitter reality in Albania and it opposed influences andactivities from such positions. Now some say that they had not known how was it there?! Butthey did not even want to know it then. To say something bad (or tell the truth) about E.Hoxha and his regime, one would be considered as traitor by people under influence fromthere. I know that some who belonged to that current, even today, have animosity towards mebecause I used to oppose such propaganda openly. I was imputed some things which werebeyond my power then because during events in 1981 I had no power at all (I was official ofthe Socialist league from 1979 until 1982, an organisation without any power, and from '82until '86 I used to be one of 15 members of Presidency of Provincial Committee of League ofCommunists and in the meantime two years chairman of Municipal Committee of Prishtina,'83-'85).

Although at that time court verdicts were based on the Federal Penal Law, as it is happeningtoday, I have never considered them appropriate and productive means, nor even acceptablein the fight against someone's political convictions. I am not preoccupied to justify myself orofficial policy then. Everyone and every political option should undergo critical assessment ofthe democratic opinion. But, keeping silent on a dimension of events that we evoked thesedays, statements made by some that history begun with them, and emphasising failures andmistakes of official policy of that time in over exaggerated dimensions with untruth, is incontradiction with an objective approach.

Whether it was good or bad, with all injustices and mistakes and illusions we used to have,life here, especially after 1966 was better and more free than life in Enver Hoxha's Albania.Whether good or bad, former the leadership of Kosova had some merits in this direction.Even in conditions of limited power, it supported people and we created something(education, science, culture, living conditions). Good or bad, Fadil Hoxha with gis restrictedpower, not only that he did not harm his people like Enver Hoxha did with his unrestrictedpower, but he supported them as much as he could. The leadership after 1981, as it was, foreight years, resisted the brutal pressure of the Serbian hegemony. Even if they were the lastbranches of the policy and leadership which in 1989 was broken by violence and imprisoned,the MPs of the Parliament of that period proclaimed the Constitutional Declaration andConstitution of Kaçanik and promoted Kosova to Republic.

Today we still are where we are. A number of those who exaggerate and present events in1981 in one dimension are still living under Serbian occupying rule. Only freed from thisoccupation we can assess whether we were right to start what we started in 1981. Only whenwe built true democratic relations, we will assess self-deceits of ideological dogma. Those wehad in self-management socialism, but even more those served by uncle Enver.

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INTERVIEW

NERITAN CEKA, Chairman of the Democratic Alliance

KOSOVANS SHOULD INTERPRET BERISHA'S DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

Interviewed by AGIM ISAKU / Tirana

Neritan Ceka, professor of archaeology and chairman of the Democratic Alliance is one ofthe most controversial personalities in Albania. As an intellectual, he was among the first(together with Berisha) to found the Democratic Party and among the principal authors ofthe platform of DP. It is said that he never belonged to the political structures in Albania andthat he differs from the rest with his intellectualism and deep approach towards the Albanianproblem. Later he founded the Democratic Alliance due to his political confrontations withpresident Berisha. Albanians from Kosova remember him for his statement that "the problemof Kosova should be solved within the present borders of the Yugoslav state". He was one ofthe first who defended Qosja and his political approaches, and he never attacked norsupported the Socialist Party.

KOHA: The Party of Democratic Alliance is the most attacked party by the opposition and byBerisha, going as far as accusing you for cooperation with the Socialist Party. Do you havecomments to this?

CEKA: The reason why PDA is severely attacked by the state, has first of all to do with thepolitical culture which characterises this government. Based in a party mentality, this culturecaused a wide gap between parties in power and parties in opposition, that are treated asenemies. Parties in opposition are not attacked equally, because there is a difference betweenthose that aim to be represented by less MPs in the parliament and the opposition parties thataim to get to power. The PDA belongs to the latter group and has priority compared to theSocialist and the Social Democratic parties, because it has no communist past and is notstained by state corruption. To say it in a popular way, the tree carrying fruits is shaken down.

As regarding the cooperation with the Socialist Party, it was done within the framework ofparliamentary struggle against anti-constitutional violations exercised by the DemocraticParty. This cooperation includes other opposition forces such as SDP, Right WingDemocratic Party, Republican Party, etc. and it will continue thus because the opposition sitsin the parliament to present alternatives and not to applaud.

KOHA: You have been accused by the media of the Democratic Party, to be a denouncerduring communism. Your victim, according to the same press, was called Astrit Qorri. Beinga leader of party that has pretensions, readers might be interested to hear your explanations?

CEKA: Absurd accusations against me are a part of a campaign of fabrications against leadersof the opposition and I have called this "a dirty war". This is a kind of war brought toAlbanian political culture by communist-democrats. Its target is to question the morality ofthe opponent, not being able to face the political alternative. As regarding Qorri who wasimprisoned by the dictatorship, I have never had the opportunity to meet and talk to him, andeven less witness against him. In 1993, when this fabrication appeared, I placed charges, butthe case was not put in trial yet because courts of justice in Albania are not independent fromthe political power. A few weeks ago, "Rilindja Demokratike" (Democratic Party's

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newspaper) published another fabrication, accusing me for denounciating another person,Tanush Frashëri. He wrote a letter from Austria, where he is been living since 1990, andrevealed the fabrication. The letter was published in "Aleanca" because Rilindja Demokratikedid not publish it.

Only a state based on hatred can manage such monstrous deeds.

KOHA: After the proclamation of the Electoral Law, do you see the Party of DemocraticAlliance inside the next Albanian parliament, grounded on the law that you have criticised?

CEKA: The Electoral Law was changed not to allow pre-election alliances, because theDemocratic Party wants to remain the only one in power. Luckily or unluckily, this law alsothreatens the Democratic Party which may lose many seats, thus reaching only 20 MPs. Theintention of this law was to exclude small parties, absurdly denying the possibility for pre-election alliances.

This law does not threat to leave the Democratic Alliance outside the parliament because it isprepared to take its share of deputies on basis of majority (out of 115 deputies directly electedin two rounds), since it consists of famous political figures. We are not in politics to collectleftovers. We are there to implement our ideas, and to be able to do this, we will need at least15 per cent or 20 MPs.

KOHA: As one of the main leaders of the December Movement, do you consideraccomplished the tasks of the movement regarding Kosova and would you comment PresidentBerisha's thesis "Kosova will have an autonomy in the framework of so called Yugoslavia"?

CEKA: I wonder why does the media in Kosova consider Berisha's thesis as something new.Since 1992, when he became president and has been directing the foreign policy of Albania,he has two theses in respect to this question: the non-alteration of the borders by force andrenouncing to maximal options. Whoever understood these and translated them in thelanguage of diplomacy they mean: autonomy.

The ideal of the Movement of December was the option of unification with Kosova and theunification of Albania with Europe. I think that these are realistic options and are compatiblewith the perspective of industrial development. Regretfully, the Albanian policy has donelittle to keep the pace with time and has entered a vicious circle, coming back to where weused to be three years ago. Thus, it organised a dirty campaign against Rexhep Qosja, buttoday we have to admit that he was right when he asked an active policy regarding Kosova. Icannot go deep into details within one interview, and elaborate what would be the mostadequate political solution in Kosova, but I can say that the situation as it is now should bechanged in all aspects. In what way, this cannot be determined by one factor only.

KOHA: Regarding the blast of the car-bomb. Competent organs firmly excluded thepossibility of any foreign involvement in the crime. The crime is Albanian, it was said, andelements of former secrete police were implicated. It seemed as if the criminal was in ourhands, still there are no news...

CEKA: International practice shows that car bombs are placed in three cases: in cases ofsevere ethnic conflicts, in cases of dictatorship and pressure on minorities and thirdly: incases of mafia. I would exclude the first two cases and give priority to the third case here. The

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fact that authorities excluded this in an absurd way, strengthened my conviction about theimplication of the mafia, especially when I think of how the power and the mafia in Albaniaare implicated in fuel and weapons smuggling as well as in breach of embargo.

KOHA: Foreign sources claim the existence of a large Serbian fund meant to destabiliseAlbania, Albanian sources address them to the Socialist Party and "Koha Jonë". What do youthink?

CEKA: Since 1991 we have been feeling impacts of a destructive policy organised by secretservices in Albania and we should believe that the Serbian ones have found grounds here, too.To speak about this now, after four years, when Albanian counter-intelligence has beendeveloped and has received US$ 20 million per year from the state budget, means that themoney was used for other reasons instead of being used to protect national interests. Thenews that Serbia is financing the Socialist Party and "Koha Jonë" has been spread by ajournalist after a telephone call from Albania and he was quoted by the ones who have givenhim the news. Only those who do not wish us good have the right to laugh about this.

KOHA: A series of ambassadors have left Tirana in a short time. A politician would not seethese as something happening by chance?

CEKA: It is important that US and Europe are staying closer and closer to Albania. Thedeparture of the American ambassador Lake, the man who strengthened the American imagein our country, went alongside the report made by the State Department criticising theAlbanian government for the disrespect of the independence of courts of justice, of the freepress and the opposition. This was a message for democracy in Albania and bells toll forthose that know how to listen to them.

MACEDONIA

THE BOTHERING UNIVERSITY

by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Shkup

It was relatively calm in front of the District Court of Shkup last Tuesday. No policemen orpeople. The appeal of the rector of the University of Tetova is to be heard. In the smallcourtroom, many journalists and lawyers: some students from Tetova and Sulejmani's wifewho was allowed to cross the border only after representatives of OSCE and UNPREDEPmediated...

The judge repeated the verdict: two and a half years imprisonment for Dr. Sulejmani,"...because he has called people to resist and deny positions of the government regardingUniversity of Tetova" and six months in prison for Milaim Fejziu "...because he obstructed anofficial to carry his duty". Lawyers more or less repeated their defense presented one year agowhen the verdict was made public: the accusation was drawn on the basis of police evidenceand articles published in Macedonian pro governmental media. "Today's hearing on theappeals filed by the Rector of the University of Tetova and the president of the UT Senateproved that people were sentenced in lack of evidence, especially in the penal and juridicalsense. We have to deal with "proofs" that cannot be taken as evidence for penal proceedings"

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said defending attorney Gjuran Dema, whereas the prosecution, represented by deputyprosecutor Blagoja Aleksov repeated the contrary: "it is sure that we will push for theaccusation, and it is up to the court to decide about the matter. We still consider that thisUniversity was formed in a illegal way. The posture of the Government is clear: thegovernment has passed its decision and supports it now. I think that efforts to create auniversity in Albanian, alongside two existing universities in Macedonia is out of all norms. Ipersonally would be happy to have a university in English or another language of the world,but experts in Albanian alone aren't needed neither by Albanians in Macedonia norMacedonia itself. This is a ghettosation of its kind. It is a continuation of what used to bebefore the war, it is a parallel system".

Milaim Fejziu said that he has participated in the event regarding University of Tetova in thecapacities of the president of Forum for Protection of Human Rights and Freedom, of alecturer in this university and of a parent. As per the court proceedings he said that it was afabricated political an police trial. "Because all the accusations came from police. The policewas the witness and the accuser". The same opinion was of the rector of the University ofTetova, Dr. Fadil Sulejmani: "This is a trial against Albanian intellectuals, against initiatorsof the University of Tetova, which is not only in the interest of Albanians but of otherMacedonian citizens as well. What is happening now is ridiculous, tragic for a country whereintellectuals are prosecuted, where culture and education of a people are hindered. This doesnot serve interests of a country that pretends to be democratic and wishes to be engaged ineconomic and political institutions of Europe. I am facing trial for founding the University".Anyhow, the second instance court will pass its verdict on the appeal through municipal courtof Tetova (and Albanian political parties' leaders asked president Gligorov to free theUniversity activists). The verdict will be a challenge for both parties, Albanian andMacedonian, especially taking into consideration that in the last extended meeting of Senateof the University of Tetova, Albanians were asked to condition their participation in theinstitutions of the system in Macedonia with the "institutionalisation of the university". Thisseemed to be the main issue of talks between the OSCE commissioner for minorities, MaxVan der Stoel, with the highest Macedonian and Albanian authorities.

Based on the statements issued by the parties, it seems that the OSCE official has gone furtherin explaining why the university cannot be animated: last year he said that Macedonia couldnot afford financially one more university, and now he has told Albanians that theirengagements and threats would lead towards the "formation of a parallel system which wouldbe harmful and risk the peace and security in Macedonia and in the region".

Regardless of this, in regard to the university it seems that the Albanian side is moreconsolidated than the Macedonian one: "we have told the Macedonian authorities andmissionaries from Europe and USA that any delay in the solution of our demands will pushMacedonia to an abyss: we Albanians are not asking for charity or "gifts". We are firm onwhat belongs to us. I seriously warn that there is no time to lose" - said president of PPDAbdurrahman Aliti. In a meeting with the OSCE commissioner, "...the representatives ofPPDSH re-actualised the inalienable right for self-determination, focusing especially on thecategory of internal self-determination", stated the information centre of this Party.

In all these frictions, the president of Macedonia managed to impose his idea on acomparative study about the position of the minorities in the Balkans. In a meeting with thechief of the Macedonian diplomacy, Ljubormir Frckovski, Stoel suggested to have a round

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table under the auspices of OSCE, on national minorities, where all Balkan Foreign Ministerswould participate.

MACEDONIA

THE OPPOSITION LEADING 1 : 0

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

The extra-parliamentary opposition, and first of all VMRO-DPMNE and the DemocraticParty, have notified that they will start collecting signatures in order to push the parliament toproclaim a referendum on anticiapted elections. During this time, the Ministry of Justice wasasked to specify how are the signatures to be collected. Since, as things were then, Art. 73 ofthe Constitution of Macedonia foresaw the possibility according to which, the parliament wasobliged to procalim the referendum when such a proposal came from at least 150,000 voters.Unofficial interpretations in circles close to position hint that each signature is to be certifiedin the competent state organ, e.g. in court, where a tax should be paid.

According to a calculation, if signatures were to be collected that way, the state would collect3 million DM! Firstly, the Ministry of Justice declared itself as the competent organ to beassigned by the Government and draw the draft-act specifying the way to collect thesignatures in three cases of citizens' initiatives (for a proposal of a law, for the modification ofthe Constitution and for a referendum about anticipated elections). The initiators of thecampaign for collecting signatures for the referendum on early elections understood what wasthe government's intention and started to collect signatures.

In the press conference organised to promote the government's proposal to approve the Lawon the Collection of Signatures, minister of justice, Vlado Popovski, was decisive. Accordingto him, the campaign for the collection of signatures for a referendum on early parliamentaryelections was a political activity, whereas the right for the verification of the status of voterswas a constitutional right of the state. Therefore, the minister considered that the legitimacyto carry the campaign of collecting signatures by the opposition was a matter to be decided bycompetent state organs. The minister and premier Cervenkovski revealed their postures in aTV interview: the government didn't want to interfere in the campaign that had already begun,quite the contrary, this was only a wish to adopt the law which was announced before officialnotification on the beginning of the campaign for collection of 150,000 signatures.

Reactions of the initiator were expected. The leader of VMRO-DPMNE, Georigievski,considers that the government showed fear and this meant a victory for the opposition. This,however, also showed before domestic and foreign public the true picture of the actualsituation in the state where "a clearly defined totalitarian regime" is in power. The leader ofthe Democratic Party, Gosev, called the government's proposal "a delayed suspension of theconstitution". "Divisions on political and non-political activities sound grotesque. Everycitizen has the right to initiate activities in the Republic of Macedonia. Why does thegovernment attempt to defend citizens from politics, instead of defending them from bribe,corruption, robbery, social poverty and low living conditions?" Of course, the initiators of thecampaign understood the government's proposal very well. It was an attempt to devaluate acampaign that was going on.

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The ruling Social-Democratic League raised its voice with a rather naive statement that afterVMRO-DPMNE and DP started the campaign for the collection of signatures, many citizensin the republic came to their party offices complaining about the incorrect behaviour of themajority of people who were collecting signatures. This party confirmed that citizensmentioned cases of threats and blackmail, break-ins into apartments, that they spread falsenews that law on signatures will require buying forms, that citizens were deceived by beingtold that signatures were collected to form new municipalities or for the solution of somecommunal problems, that the campaign was supported by president Gligorov etc.

In this whole rashomoniade, only few took into considerationthe opinion expressed byprofessor Svetomir Skaric, expert on constitutional law. He stated that a citizens' initiative forthe collection of 150,000 signatures can be implemented in practice on the basis of thealready existing effective regulations! The matter of this referendum is regulated with theLaw on Republican Referendum adopted in 1973, and amended in 1991, as well as withArticle 73 of the Constitution. According to Skaric, these regulations, which are in force, arefully applicable for the realisation of the initiative started by citizens. This was the legal basisfor the implementation of the referendum on the independence of Macedonia!

"The Parliament, Government and Ministry of Justice should ground themselves on theexisting regulations and enable the initiative to be carried out, instead of hindering it byadopting their small and immature dispositions", says professor Skaric. This law was opposedby the new oppositionists - the Liberals who failed to pass the amendment which claimed thatthe law had nothing to do with the initiative and by the PPDSH-PDP block. Thus, the lawcame into force after eight days. According to the law, 100 citizens, or a registered party orassociation of citizens can present their initiative for the referendum to the speaker of theparliament, who is entitled to decide if the initiator has legitimacy. He is also obliged toevaluate within three days whether the Constitution allows the observation of the proposedmatter. If he considers that there are no hindrances, again within three days, he informs thepremier, and the latter informs the minister of justice who initiates the whole system ofcollecting signatures. The ministry is obliged, in the shortest possible term, to activate 400registration points (34 according to present territorial division of the state, 246 in registraroffices and 120 in electoral units). Registration points will be working every day, includingSaturday, from 7 am to 5 pm, under the condition that one day they work in the afternoon.The deadline for the collection of 150,000 signatures (modification of Constitution,referendum on elections) is 6 months and for 10,000 signatures (draft) is 3 months.

The question that rises regards the fate of 162,000 signatures already collected and submittedto the parliament only few hours before the Law (on the collection of signatures) wasadopted. The old juridical regulation says that laws cannot have retroactive action but in caseswhen the status of citizens is advanced by them. The notification of the Minister of Justicethat the fate of the initiative depends on the postures of the competent organs, gives thegovernment the right to declare the signatures illegal. It is not too much to mention thebehaviour of media controlled by state in all this confusion. It is clear that the campaign ofcollection of signatures was deliberately left "aside" and minimised. The task is clear. On theother hand, the acceptance of signatures and the proclamation of the referendum on earlyelections do not solve much of the problem - because the referendum should be attended bymore than 50 per cent of voters (in the last elections, the percentage of those who went topolls for some seats in the parliament was below this figure), and 51 per cent of them have todeclare themselves in favor of the elections. Having in mind the "skills" of the actual

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government in the games with electoral lists, etc., there will hardly be any space left foroptimism of the opposition.

But, if the position starts to deny and minimise the importance of the collected signatures, andinsists on new collection of signatures for early elections, it will enter insecure waters. It is anundisputable fact that the opposition collected 162,000 signatures very easily and quickly thistime. This is a good warning for the coalition in power to give up on their arrogance theyhave been practising since their electoral victory. Of course, if they wish to remain on thepolitical scene.