KEY IDEA How to Work on Floods? · 2011-04-06 · How to Work on Floods? L ooking at the history of...

Special Issue, September 20072 southasiadisasters.net

In this issue

1. How to Work on Floods? 2

2. 2007 Flood Recovery Agenda forInternational Agencies: Lessonsfrom the Tsunami EvaluationCoalition (TEC) 3

3. Urban Risk and Flooding: TheInternational Agenda in SouthAsia 5

4. Floods and Cities 9

5. Floods and Communities 15

6. Bihar Flood Damage and NeedsAssessment 16

KEY IDEA

Top front page picture:

Sharv Sime slum in Madhubani district, Bihar

state. This village was heavily affected during

the flood in the last week of July 2007; water

logging continued for a week. Many people

lost their livelihood and house. AIDMI is

currently supporting relief activities in the

form of food relief. Later, the Livelihood Relief

Fund, insurance and advocacy will start. So

far, the 140 families that live here received

25 kg of rice and Rs. 250 from the local

government.

Bottom front page picture:

Dabbavas Thakorvas slum in Nadiad. A truck

is used to pump water out of the slum during

the monsoon. See also the article Floods and

communities, page 9.

How to Work on Floods?

Looking at the history of floods in Southasia, 2004 and2007 rate as two of the worst flood years of the past two centuries.

This time Bihar had to bear the major brunt of the disaster, with 21million population affected. The increasing trend over the pastdecades regarding frequency and scale of floods is alarming. Expertsalready pointed out that floods are not caused by nature's fury alonebut also by other factors. With some degree of precision one couldobserve that with the rising number of embankments, which weremeant to regulate the water flow, the areas that are being floodedhave increased in a parallel manner. It is therefore not far off themark to conclude that the prevailing flood management strategy hasdone more harm than good. Moreover, other factors like populationincrease, changing settlement patterns and climatic change exacerbatethe situation as well.

Humanitarian actors - involved with a certain regularity in floodrelief operations in Bihar, Assam or other areas of Southasia - mayincreasingly feel desperate and hopeless, as there does not seem tobe a way out of the catastrophic conditions prevailing in the worstaffected areas. Flood disasters do not come alone; hunger,malnutrition, diseases, debt crisis and migration follow in their wake.How to address all these issues? And how to work on moresustainable solutions instead of just repeating the same reliefoperations, although they may address the need of the day, over andover again?

Only time will tell whether the flood control-establishment willchange. But how could it change for the better? It seems that forenhancing more relevance in disaster management solutionsparticipation of local communities with their vast experience in livingand coping with floods has to be ensured. This is valid particularlyfor marginalised groups which normally get most affected bydisasters. Therefore, the Government and relevant relief agenciesfrom outside should involve networks representing the interests oflocal communities and NGOs already working in the affected areasas major stakeholders in disaster management. Well concerted andcoordinated efforts of all important stakeholders may lead to a moreholistic approach in disaster management, thereby taking intoaccount local needs and expertise to an optimum.

Peter Eppler,

Programme Coordinator, Swiss Red Cross

Editorial Advisors:

Dr. Ian DavisCranfield University, UK

Kala Peiris De CostaSiyath Foundation, Sri Lanka

Khurshid AlamIndependent Researcher and Consultant,Dhaka, Bangladesh

Madhavi Malalgoda AriyabanduInternational Strategy for RiskReduction (ISDR) – South Asia,Sri Lanka

Mihir R. BhattAll India Disaster Mitigation Institute,India

Dr. Rita Schneider – SliwaBasel University, Switzerland

Dr. Satchit Balsari, MD, MPHThe University Hospital of Columbiaand Cornell, New York, USA

This special issue of southasiadisasters.net is the second of a series of three on

flooding in South Asia. In this issue international policies on flood preventation

and mitigation in South Asia, lessons from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition will

be discussed. Based on interviews with local governments in Surat, Vadodara,

Nadiad and Kheda the way municipalities deal with floods will be explain. Final

and article on floods and communities will give more inside in the way vulnerable

communities live.

Special Issue, September 2007 3southasiadisasters.net

2007 Flood Recovery Agenda for International

Agencies: Lessons from the Tsunami

Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

Again, heavy monsoon rainscaused many rivers to overflow

and flooded several South Asiancountries. Thousands of people losttheir lives, hundreds of thousandshave become homeless and jobless,and many more have been affectedin one way or another in Nepal,Pakistan, India, Bangladesh,Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Again,agencies will come to affected areaswith relief and rehabilitationpackages. Relief materials will bedistributed, partially damagedshelters will be repaired, andtemporary and permanent shelterswill be constructed. Some initiativessuch as cash for work (e.g. for cleaningup debris dumped across by floods)and cash for shelter will be taken upto temporarily restore livelihoods ofthose affected. The agencies will thenmove out and the same story willrepeat with another flooding...ifhistory is to repeat itself.

Disasters undoubtedly bring graveconsequences for many. Still, theyprovide an opportunity forsustainable and hazard-resistantdevelopment and socialtransformation towards disasterresilient communities. The lessonsand recommendations offered by theTsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)reviews are highly useful for currentflood recovery efforts. The TEC wasa coalition of 45 local andinternational agencies that dedicatedthemselves to learn, from thetsunami, how to "do" humanitarianwork better. The TEC primarilyadvocates for a fundamentalreorientation of the international

include local communities inplanning and decision-makingthrough participation andconsultation, and commitment todevolve decision-making as faras possible.

• Capacity should be defined inrelation to not only skills andtraining, but also the empower-ment of poorer and marginalisedgroups. The capacity of acommunity to resist disaster isparticularly sensitive to this. Itincludes not simply identificationof such groups but ensuring that

humanitarian community fromsupplying aid to supporting andfacilitating communities' own reliefand recovery priorities. The bulletsbelow discuss the lessons from theTEC reports that are especiallyrelevant to 2007 flood recovery in theSouth Asia region.

Support local communities andinstitutions in managing their ownrecovery• Intervening agencies need an

ability to recognise and identifylocal capacities and the need to

The Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 had devastating effects in many

countries on the Indian Ocean. In February 2005, after immediate response to the

disaster was over, several humanitarian agencies came together forming the TEC

to promote learning from the tsunami response. The coalition aims to improve the

quality of humanitarian action by studying the international response to the

tsunami, and to provide accountability to donors and affected people.

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particularly their voices areheard in decision-making.

• Marginalised groups shouldimprove their position inrelation to communities, andcommunities in relation todistrict and national authorities.The basis for this process isempowerment through thestrategic management ofinformation, and strengtheningdownward accountability.Advocacy is also an importantelement but should be based onenhanced local capacities ratherthan external interventions1.

Develop a system to rapidly assessdisaster damage and needs of theaffected• The international community,

and in particular the UN and theRed Cross movement, shouldeither significantly investpolitically and financially in apermanent rapid assessmentcapacity, or abandon the pretencethat initial cross-sectoral assess-ments by external teams guidethe immediate internationalresponse of governments, thepublic or humanitarianorganisations.

• Donors and agencies shouldfocus their investment on higherquality needs assessment forrecovery and rehabilitation.

• In the first few days after adisaster, needs assessment shouldfocus on validating themagnitude and severity of thedisaster. For this purpose, donorsshould assist national authoritiesin capitalising on remote sensingand other modern techniques.

• Empower the affectedindividuals or families to assessand prioritise their own welfareneeds by using cash subsidieswhenever possible.

• Initial assessment teams shouldroutinely include selected massmedia representatives2.

Collaborate with affectedcommunities, government agencies,and civil society organisations• The international community

should ensure that sufficientpriority is given to enhancing thecoordination capacities of localas well as national governmentbodies. This would include, forinstance, deploying senior staffbeyond capitals and helping tobuild the capacity of localauthorities to utilise informationsystems such as HumanitarianInformation Centre. Where largenumbers of INGOs areanticipated, the deployment of asenior NGO liaison officershould be considered.

• Effective, consistent andcoordinated communicationwith recipient populations at allstages of the response—and witha concerted effort to includewomen in the dialogue—shouldbe prioritised. This should entaildedicated staff resources andtools, with efforts made towardreaching a communicationsprotocol with the hostgovernment. A common strategyshould be developed, includingthe use of public meetings,broadcast media, newslettersand posters.

• The creation and use of a

1 Scheper, B., Parakrama, A., S Patel, S., 2006. Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities. TsunamiEvaluation Coalition, London.

2 de Ville de Goyet, C., Morinière, L., 2006. The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response. Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, London.

3 Bennett, J., Bertrand, W., Harkin, C., Samarasinghe, S., Wickramatillake, H., 2006. Coordination of International HumanitarianAssistance in Tsunami-affected Countries. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.

4 Flint, M., Goyder, H., 2006. Funding the Tsunami Response. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London

5 Christoplos, C., 2006. Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response. Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, London.

common beneficiary database,provided and endorsed by acentral government body, shouldbe an early priority in theemergency phase3.

Pay special attention to financialtransparency and optimumutilisation of local resources• Accountability and transparency

of intervening agencies shouldbe improved, particularly withrespect to financial tracking andreporting.

• Local resources and capitalshould be valued4.

Focus on integrating disasterrecovery efforts with sustainabledevelopment• Links between Relief,

Rehabilitation, andDevelopment (LRRD) must bemore firmly rooted in nationaland local contexts and processes.

• Once links between relief andrehabilitation have beenachieved, greater attention needsto be paid to the implications ofprogramming for longer-termdevelopment.

• For poverty alleviation,interventions need to be betterrelated to ongoing trajectories.

• More consideration needs to begiven to reducing risks of naturaldisasters, and anchoring suchstrategies within nationalstructures for social protection.

• Links between policies andprogramming should be madeby sector and through support tonational and household efforts tobring together relief, reha-bilitation and development5.


In order to investigate theinternational agenda on urban risk

and flooding, a selection oforganisations that are activelyengaged in this field is made. Thisselection is not meant to show the"best" practices or organisations butto give an overview of severalinternational organisations related todisaster risk reduction in South Asia.The policies and activities of thefollowing organisations will bediscussed: the UN InternationalStrategy for Risk Reduction, UnitedNations Development Plan, AsianFlood Network, AssociatedProgramme on Flood Management,World Bank, Oxfam, AsianDevelopment Bank, Christian Aidand Action Aid.

The UN International Strategy for

Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

As the successorto the 1990-1999InternationalDecade for Natural DisasterReduction (IDNDR), the InternationalStrategy for Disaster Reduction wasadopted by the United NationsGeneral Assembly to provide aglobal framework for action to reducehuman, social, economic andenvironmental losses from naturalhazards and related technological andenvironmental disasters6. On the UNWorld Conference on DisasterReduction (WCDR) in 2005, theHyogo Declaration and the HygoFramework for Action (HFA) wereadopted. This framework is alsohighlighted in earlier issues ofsouthasiadisasters.net. Among otherthings, the HFA outlines key elementsof disaster risk reduction. The firstkey element is the involvement of allstakeholders in disaster managementduring, before and after a disaster.

Secondly, the HFA pleas forintegration of disaster risk reducionin development plans. The HFA is ageneral framework for disaster riskreduction, it is not specified for typesof disaster or geogaphical location.Additionally, the ISDR developedguidelines for reducing flood lossesin 2001. These guidelines focus onsocio-economic aspects of waterrelated disaster response, keyelements of flood management, floodforecasting, warning and responsesystems including: conducting avulnerability assessment, use ofGeographic Information Systems,risk mapping, structural measures asdams, diversions and channels,establishment of insurance measures,anticipation of climate change effects,international and inter-agencycollaboration and training.

United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP engages indisaster managementthrough the DisasterReduction Unit (DRU) ofthe Bureau for Crisis andPrevention. DisasterMitigation andVulnerability Reduction has beenincluded as one of the five thematicareas of the 2003–2007 CountryProgramme. The main objectivesunder this theme are to mainstreamthe community-based approach forachieving the integration of disastermanagement in the national and statedevelopment agenda and to enhancecapacities at various levels7. Thisreminds us of the goals of the HyogoFramework for Action. In India, theDRU established a national Disaster

Urban Risk and Flooding: The International

Agenda in South Asia

6 www.unisdr.org/eng/risk-reduction/sustainable-development/cca-undaf/Integrating-DRR-into-CCA-UNDAF.doc.

7 http://www.undp.org/bcpr/disred/english/regions/asia/india.htm

President Arryo of the Philippines (left) and Haruhiko Kuroda, president of the

Asian Development Bank, during the hand over of a grant to the Philippines to

assist the country in the aftermath of landslides in 2006.

Source: www.op.gov.ph/photogallery_191206_pc5.asp


Risk Management Programme inwhich the Ministry of Home Affairsand other key stakeholders areinvolved. In this programmecommunities are helped in disasterpreparedness, drills are facilitated aspart of preparedness, a national planfor Disaster Management Training isestablished and technology transfersin various sectors are done. Inaddition, a Gujarat DisasterManagement Programme was startedthough activities are mainly relatedto earthquake preparedness anddrought prevention. The DRU starteda programme on urban risk in Africancountries as well; however, no specialfocus for urban risk and/or urbanflooding in the Asian—except forIndia—context was found.

United Nations Centre for Human

Settlements-Habitat (UNCHS or UN-

HABITAT)

The mission ofUNCHS is to improvethe sustainability ofhuman settlements andprepare communities to prevent risksand threats. This is done through theDisaster Management Programme(DMP) by developing techniques fordisaster management, initiatingtraining programmes, promotingcooperation and strengtheningcoordination8. Since understandingvulnerability is key in understandingdisasters, vulnerability assessmentsare priority for the DMP9. UNCHS isengaged in a partnership with theISDR. Current programmes in Asiaare the Water for Asian CitiesProgram (WACP) and the Safer CitiesProgram, which concerns crime andviolence in Asian cities. In India, theWACP focuses on the state of MadhyaPradesh. No further specific

programmes related to urban risk anddisasters are found to be undertakenby UN-HABITAT.

The World Bank

The World Bank isactive in the field ofurban risk through itsDisaster ManagementFacility, which is nowcalled the Hazard Risk Managementunit (HRM). This facility was createdin 1998 to establish a mechanism forintegrating disaster prevention intodevelopment planning and toimprove emergency responselending. For the HRM, urban areasform a centre of wealth and humanresources; urban areas are identifiedas areas for investment. The WorldBank engages in two types or urbanlending in relation to disasters. Thefirst type is lending for reconstructionfollowing a disaster. The second typeis proactive lending for mitigation toreduce disaster vulnerability. Projectsconcentrate on repairinginfrastructure and management ofthe local economy. Mitigationfunding is more limited and lesswidespread than reconstructionfunding. Brazil, China, Bangladeshand India account for 40 percent ofthe mitigation budget, with 93percent addressing floods, forest firesor droughts. However, the WorldBank is striving to give more focusmore on the prevention andmitigation of disasters10. By makingdisaster prevention and mitigationactivities central components offuture project loans, the World Bankis able to put pressure on nationalplanners to integrate disasterplanning with developmentplanning11. In 1999, the World Banklaunched its new urban strategy: The

Urban and Local GovernmentStrategy. The goal of this strategy isto (a) improve living standards, (b)provide a competitive environmentfor the private sector, (c) supporteffective management and goodgovernance of urban areas based onpartnerships, and (d) supportconsistent and sound financialpolicy12. In March 2007, the WorldBank initiated a new policy thatestablishes a new mechanism that willprovide initial funding for criticalstart-up activities within a few weeksof a disaster. The time taken todisburse funds for longer-termreconstruction will be cut from ninemonths to a targeted 12 weeks bysimplifying administrative andprocessing procedures in the criticalearly stages of recovery. Currentprojects in India include the GujaratEmergency Reconstruction Project,Mumbai Urban Transport Project,Karnataka Urban Water SectorImprovement and the Third TamilNadu Urban Development Project.Around 7–12 percent of lendingamounts goes to urban lending.

Though the World Bank is active inurban management anddevelopment, the World Bank isheavily criticised for its lendingpolicy, which tends to support large-scale resource exploitation andtechnical environmental projects.This is also true for its urbandevelopment policy where the WorldBank has supported large-scaletechnocratic approaches toenvironmental risk with investmentin physical rather than socialinfrastructure. The root causes ofenvironmental problems is seen asfinancial scarcity with targeted andconditional loans as the solution. This

8 http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=286&cid=2039 http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/866_14075_Vulnerability.pdf1 0 http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/1010/11 Gilbert and Kreimer, 1999. Gilbert, R and Kreimer, A (1999) Learning from the World Bank's Experience of Natural Disaster Related

Assistence, Urban Development Division working paper series #2, World Bank, Washington DC in: Pelling, M. 2003.12 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/

0,,contentMDK:20158153~menuPK:337186~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:337178,00.html


mode of working stimulatesineffective projects since it overlookslocal participation and handling oflarge investments throughgovernment institutions that oftenlack transparency and accountability13.

Oxfam International

The activities of Oxfamtarget poverty reductionthrough: food andincome security, labourand trade advocacy, healthcare,education, emergency response,conflict prevention, promotingpolitical and societal participationand identity promotion. OxfamInternational does not have a specificpolicy on urban risk. Floods are dealtwith as part of emergency responses.Examples include the Oxfamresponse in Peru in 2000, Haiti in2005, Gujarat, India in 2006 andJakarta, Indonesia in 200714.

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The ADB recognises thehigh rate of urbanisationin Asia in the last 50 years.It expects that over 50% ofthe Asian population will live inurban areas by 2020. Therefore, theABD marks urban areas as importantpoints of the economy. In order to bemore active in urban areas, the ABDdeveloped the Urban Sector Strategy.The strategy focuses mainly oneconomic development in Asia. Thestrategy entails the followingobjectives,(a) maximising the economic

efficiency of urban areas,(b) reducing urban poverty,(c) improving quality of life, and(d) achieving more sustainable

forms of urban development.These objectives are to be achievedthrough urban sector policies for,

(a) encouraging good governance,(b) improving urban management,(c) mobilising financial resources,(d) reducing urban poverty, and(e) addressing urban development

sectors as water supply,sanitation, solid wastemanagement, landmanagement, transport andhousing.

Though these policies can contributeto disaster risk reduction, and in thiscontext flood prevention andmitigation, there is limited focus ondisaster management. Urban risk anddisaster management are mentionedas a sub section in the policy onimproving urban management. Thepolicy on urban management entails,(a) institutional strengthening and

capacity building,(b) Urban Land management,(c) urban environmental

management.The mentioned part on disastermitigation is highlighted in part c:urban environmental management.The following aspects of disastermitigation are mentioned: an activerole for the government, localcommunity and the private sector andpreparedness programmes should bein place in order to reduce loss todisasters. Disaster management andrisk reduction measures are notincluded in the policies of UrbanSector Strategy15. In the last 10 years,the ADB has engaged in over 200projects (loans, technical assistanceand grants) which were directed aturban development, mainlydevelopment of infrastructure,housing and transport. Recentexamples of projects in India are theRajasthan Urban Development andInfrastructure project, Urban WaterSupply and EnvironmentalImprovement in Madhya Pradesh

and the establishment of the Urbanand Environmental InfrastructureFund. ADB has also recentlyundergone a review of how itengages community basedorganisations in disaster riskmanagement.

Christian Aid (CA)

From the point ofview of CA,emergency responseis one of the compounding elementsof addressing poverty in Asia. CAworks alongside local partnerorganisations and builds upon theirlocal knowledge. It providesresources for the local partnersengaged in emergency relief. CAprovides their partners with technicalsupport and resources to runemergency response programmesand to include risk reduction into thelong-term work of the partnerorganisations16,17. Furthermore, CAengages in advocacy in lobbyingnational governments andinternational organisations to workon vulnerable conditions of the poor.CA sees community action as the keyto emergency response but states thatfor community based action, earlywarning systems need to be in place.Christian Aid took action in India in2006 in the flood-affected states ofOrissa and Gujarat18.

Action Aid (AA)

AA sees disastersas unpredictableevents that willhave the greatest impact on thepoorest in society. Apart from theoften-dangerous locations that poorpeople live in, the lack of awarenessand poor access to information andeducation are marked ascompounding elements of

13 Pelling, M. 200314 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/index.htm15 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Urban_Sector/urban0202.asp?p=policies16 http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/world/emerresp/emerresp.htm17 http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/world/emerresp/response.htm18 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/OCHA-64D4JX?OpenDocument


vulnerability. Practical efforts of AAinclude training local communities infirst aid and rescue techniques,equipping community volunteerswith radios for more effectivecommunication, disaster education inschools, village plans and makingrisk maps. AA states that manycountries do not acknowledge theimportance disaster preparedness.Furthermore, AA has accepted theHyogo Framework for Action as aguiding thread and is lobbying withcountries to comply with thisframework. AA focuses on schools asmain centres for disaster preventionand mitigation19. AA is active in 14 ofIndia's 32 states: main activitiesinclude poverty reduction strategies,promoting effective governance,supporting woman's rights,supporting the poor in vulnerablesituations, and helping the poor inexploring financial possibilities.These activities are taking place inpoor villages and slums in urbanareas. Emergency response to naturaldisasters entails the provision of food,shelter and medicines20. During the2006 floods in Gujarat, AA's partnerstook action in evacuating people fromaffected areas, providing meals,working with local authorities toensure proper sanitation facilities andsafe drinking water, and advocatingproper government response21.

Asian Disaster Preparedness Center

(ADPC)

The ADPC wants toincrease the safety ofcommunities by implementingprogrammes and projects that reducethe impact of disasters in Asia. ADPCactivities include the strengtheningof institutional arrangements,spreading and exchangingknowledge on disaster riskmanagement and raising awareness.

1 9 http://www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=1882 0 http://www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=232 1 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/HMYT-6TVLJF?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=FL-2006-000070-IND22 http://www.apfm.info/ifm.htm (accessed on 4-6-2007)23 http://www.weather.gov/iao/BLT_AFN.php (acessed on 2-6-2007)

Currently, several programmes arerunning mainly concerning capacitybuilding and urban governance. Nofurther specific programmesconcerning urban risk of flooding inthe Indian context are currentlyundertaken by ADPC.

Asia Flood Network (AFN)

The AFN is a flood mitigationinitiative in Asia and is jointlyimplemented by USAID/OFDA, theNational Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA), and the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS), incooperation with regional partners inAsia. AFN is expected to continuethrough August 2008. Since 2001,USAID/OFDA has supported AFN tostrengthen the capacity of regionaland national institutions in climate,weather, and hydrological forecasting.Through AFN, USAID/OFDA andregional partners directly focus onreducing the vulnerability of high-risk communities to hydro-meteorological hazards by promotinginformation sharing of hydro-meteorological data and informationon trans-boundary river basins22. TheAFN is not active in relief operations;it assists in obtaining accurate dataon meteorological events in Asia and

thereby can contribute topreparedness to disasters.

Associated Programme on Flood

Management (APFM)

The APFM is a joint initiativeof the World MeteorologicalOrganisation and the GlobalWater Partnership. It promotes theconcept of Integrated FloodManagement as a new approach toflood management. The programmeis financially supported by thegovernments of Japan and theNetherlands. The APFM is supportingcountries in the integratedmanagement of floods within theoverall framework of integratedwater resources management. APFMis doing this through the concepts ofIntegrated Flood Management. Thisconcept entails managing waterresources in such a way that benefitfrom floodplains is maximised andlosses of lives and assets due toflooding are minimised. First, itstimulates a participatory approachinvolving users, planners andpolicymakers, gender and culturalaspects. Second, it promotesintegrated land and watermanagement by making analyses onthe way land and watercharacteristics influence each other.Third, it also seeks the positiveelements of small-scale flooding suchas the availability of fresh water.Finally, integrated hazardmanagement approaches should beadopted by integrating riskmanagement into wider riskmanagement. Additionally, earlywarning and forecast methods shouldbe refined and strengthened23.Activities in Asia so far are three pilotprojects in Bangladesh, India andNepal. These pilot projects focussedon community approaches to floodmanagement.

From international perspective to local

tradition.


In the months of June and July,AIDMI teams visited the local

governments of Kheda, Nadiad,Vadodara and Surat. The goal of theseinterviews was to get more insightin the manner that local governmentsview and act upon floods. It can beconcluded that AIDMI learned a lotfrom these interviews since manylocal governments worked-and stillwork-very hard to deal with therecurring problem of flooding.

Location Population Area in km2

Kheda 24,000 1

Nadiad 192,000 13

Vadodara(Baroda) 1,600 000 96

Surat 4,500 000 155

Kheda

The city of Kheda is surrounded bythe Shedhi and Vatrak rivers on thewest, south and east side. During themonsoon season, many smallerrivers downstream also feed waterinto Shedhi and Vatrak rivers, causingthe water level downstream to rise.The water that is flowing upstreamof these little rivers is thus blocked.Therefore, Kheda City can becomeflooded when not even a drop ofrainwater falls onto it. Especially low-lying areas on the riverbank areprone to flooding. In addition, onesmall low-lying area in the west ofKheda is vulnerable to flooding. Thechief officer in this city emphasisedthat floods are very different fromeach other. In 2005, there was onlyone flood but its' magnitude was veryhigh. In 2006, there were six muchsmaller floods; however, these floodscaused more havoc and damage thanthe flood of 2005. Hence, here we havetwo very important characteristics offloods: intensity and frequency.

Floods and Cities

Indiranagar slum in the West of Kheda. The thick line above the arrow indicates

the flood level. In this slum, AIDMI provided support for livelihood, shelter, road,

workshed and drainage building. Affected people were covered under a disaster

micro-insurance scheme.

During floods, accessibility becomesproblematic since roads are floodedor destroyed. The floodwaterstransport enormous amounts ofrubble and especially mud into thecity. Layers of mud as thick as 2–3feet were found in many places afterthe floods of 2005 and 2006. Anotherpoint of concern is water falling fromterraces of houses. This water fallssome 3-5m and can severely damagecement fillings between road tiles. Onseveral places, roads are damaged andclay and sand under the road becomeshumid. This further damages roadsin the city. During a situation offlooding, the drainage system in thecity is not capable of transporting thesurplus of water. Further, drainagesystems can also be damaged whenthe floodwaters reach a level ofseveral meters, causing considerablepressure on the soil and presentunderground infrastructure. Evenwhen a higher capacity drainagesystem is available, it would not beable to function properly when the

floodwater level is several meters.Due to a lack of funds, Kheda doesnot have a fire brigade or boats thatcan be used for rescue operationsduring floods. When a flood occurs,help from other cities is needed and,fortunately, given. In this case, accessi-bility of the area is of course essential.

However, damage in the city is notonly material. Especially during therepeated floods of 2006, peoplesuffered psycho-social effects whenthey had to flee their houses six timesin one monsoon season.

In what way does the localgovernment deal with floods?1. A number of vehicles are

specially maintained. In thisway, vehicles are ready toevacuate people in case offlooding. In addition, spare partsare kept in stock to keep thevehicles operational.

2. Leaflets are spread to inform peopleabout the dangers of flooding.


3. People who can swim are askedto be ready in case of emergency.

4. A list of phone numbers ofgovernment officials is spread toimprove communication duringan emergency.

5. The government placesemergency lights on houses andother buildings that providelight during the night.

6. During city planning, the dangerof flooding is taken into account,for example in building roads.

7. People can come—and sometimesthey do—to the municipal officein Kheda with ideas how to dealwith floods.

In the beginning of the monsoonseason, contacts are established withcontrol rooms in Kheda district. Incase of danger, representatives of thelocal government will go to flood-prone areas in Kheda and inform thepeople about the situation. In case ofimmediate danger people are asked—and sometimes forced when peoplewant to stay—to leave their houses.

What possibilities did and do exist fordisaster prevention and mitigation?The chief officer explained that itmight be possible to divert water

from the source. This means that riverarms further upstream have to bediverted into other directions orplains where the water will not affectpopulated areas. Protection measurescan be built on the riverbanks in thewest of the city to prevent the waterfrom coming into the city. Further,roads can be built of better materialso that they can survive floodingstress. From the interview, it becameclear that for people living in low-lying areas it is not possible to movesomewhere else since safer areas arealready occupied or are too far awayfrom Kheda City itself.

In Kheda, no concrete disastermanagement plans are in place. Plansare made by the Gujarat StateDisaster Management Authority andthen passed on to the cities. All contactwith this government goes throughthe district collector. Further, thetraining of people—e.g. to learn toswim—is not possible due to a lackof facilities and funds.

We can conclude that despite the fewresources that are available to dealwith floods, the local government ofKheda is doing its utmost to handlethe flood and to prevent disasters

from happening. Hence, we see thatresources are simply needed; disasterprevention is not cheap and will notbe sufficient through quick fixes.Through the experiences in Kheda,we can see that besides the socialaspects, technical aspects of disasterrisk reduction are very important.Further, hydrological aspects asinflow of other rivers and theblocking of water by other rivers haveto be taken into account, since thiscan cause flooding without raincoming to Kheda City directly.

Nadiad: Venice in Gujarat

Nadiad City is located about 60kilometres southeast of Ahmedabad.It did not experience many floods inthe past, though the city was almostcompletely flooded in 2006. Whatwere the causes of this flood?

Nadiad is shaped like a saucer; highlying areas on the edges of the city,low lying areas at the centre. Thenearest river is the Shedhi Riverwhich flows into the Sabarmati River.During the monsoon however, thehigh water level in Sabarmati Riverprevents the water from the ShedhiRiver to flow into it. This causes thewater level in Shedhi River to riseand threaten Nadiad. Additionally,the geography of Kheda district is animportant aspect flooding in thesouthwest of the district. Largeamounts of water reach KhedaDistrict from other districts and evenfrom other states. Due to a decreasingslope gradient from the northeast tothe southwest of the district, waterwill slow down as it flows to thesouthwest. Also, many riversintersect in the southwest of KhedaDistrict. All these factors combinedwith heavy rainfall during themonsoon can cause flooding. Thesegeographical and topographicalinsights help us to understand theflooding situation in a better way.

During the flood of 2006, many peopleobstructed their neighbourhood or

Hanumannagar slum in the North of Kheda. AIDMI provided livelihood relief, shelter

material, communal toilets separately for men and women, a washing and bathing

place, a community water tank, road, trees and established a community resource

centre as well as an insurance scheme.


society thereby forcing the waterlevel to rise slightly and to flow toother areas in the city. Oncefloodwater enters Nadiad it is verydifficult to get it out and in 2006 waterlogging continued for 1.5 monthsafter about 400 mm of water fell ontoKheda in less than 72 hours.Infrastructure was especiallydamaged with many roads destroyed.The representative of the localgovernment in Nadiad said thatduring the flood Nadiad "looked likeVenice". Though this is a nicecomparison, Nadiad is of coursebetter off when it just looks likeNadiad.

In what way does Nadiad deal withfloods? Disaster management plansare in place; however, the official ofthe local government said that onecan never plan for a disaster. Nadiadrelies on its previous experiencesthough it has protocols on what to doin case of flooding. Besides plans thatNadiad has in place, the Gujarat StateDisaster Management Authority(GSDMA) can always intervene inthese plans and make adjustment. Inthe end, the GSDMA has to approvethe disaster management plan in anycity.

Medicines are stocked anddisinfection powders are ordered.Pumps are ordered and old onesrepaired. After the flood of 2006, theconstruction of a storm drain inNadiad began and is now almostfinished. In this way, it will bepossible to drain floodwater out ofthe "saucer" of Nadiad. At thebeginning of the monsoon season, acontrol room in the city itself isestablished. Information aboutrainfall, water level at dams andweather forecasts are updated hereevery 2 hours. In case of emergency,the local government has twosatellite telephones; through this,communication is possible when landand mobile connections cannot beused. Further, a fire brigade is

standing by. This fire brigade did alot of good work during the floods of2006. Finally, people or families whoown tractors are asked to help in casea flood occurs. After the floods of2006, the local government providedcash and shelter relief to thoseaffected. Further, the official said thatthere was really a joint effort of thegovernment and local people. Peoplein the city immediately started to actupon the situation.

From this interview, we can concludethat besides the social aspects,challenges posed by topography andgeography are also significant. Theflood situation in Nadiad cannot befully understood without taking intoaccount these characteristics. A secondimportant finding is that peopleimmediately acted upon the situationand cooperated with the localgovernment.

Vadodara (Baroda)

This city is located around 80kilometres southeast of Ahmedabad.The River Vishwamitri flowsthrough the city. The river is verynarrow in the city; this causes thewater level to rise quickly during

times of heavy rain. Further, theVishwamitri River intersects with abigger river around three kilometressouth of the city. Since the other riveris much bigger in size and the angleat which the two rivers intersect isalmost 90 degrees, water from theVishwamitri River has problems inflowing into the other river. Whenthe flow is faster and the water levelis higher, the water from theVishwamitri River is blocked.Consequently, the water level of theriver in Vadodara will rise even more.This problem will be even worsewhen this situation coincides withhigh tide in the Arabian Sea, since thebigger river flows into it. During themonsoon season, minor floods occurevery year. Once every 100 years aflood will occur as significant as thatof 2005. In that year the water levelrose up to 35 ft (10.7m) and 80% of thecity was flooded. Large quantities ofmud and clay were deposited by thewater flow into the city. The zoo wasalso heavily affected, some animalsdied. Pipes for transporting sewageand water were broken and the watertransported a lot of trash throughoutthe city. This choked drainage linesand exacerbated the situation.

Dabbavas Thakorvas slum in Nadiad. Here, AIDMI established community resource

center and provided livelihood support and insurance scheme.


In what way did—and does—Vadodara deal with the problem offlooding? As a precaution, emptydrums are provided to people livingin poor areas. In this way, the peoplewill be able to build some rafts andsave themselves. Information isspread through radio, television andleaflets. Also, a fire brigade withsufficient capacity is standing by inVadodara and enough boats areavailable. The local government alsoplaced emergency sirens on strategicplaces in the city to warn thepopulation in case of emergency.Also, the local government is able tosend mass-SMS messages to areas inthe city to inform and/or warn peoplefor possible danger. In city planning,special building codes are in place forflood prone areas and residential orcommercial zoning in the city isrestricted in those areas. The localgovernment is planning to deepenand widen the Vishwamitri River inorder to prevent the water fromrising to quickly during rain and tocreate a faster and bigger flow in sucha way that it can flow into the biggerriver south of Vadodara.

Vadodara is able to design its owndisaster management plans, thoughagain the Gujarat State DisasterManagement Authority has toapprove the plan and is alwaysauthorised to make changes to theplans. The officials present at theinterview said that there is onlycontact with senior citizens sinceinhabitants of slum areas do not cometo the municipal office.

We can conclude that againgeographical characteristics areimportant. The geomorphologicaspects of Vishwamitri River causethe water level to rise, and a part ofthe solution to prevent Vadodarafrom flooding is to deepen and widenthe Vishwamitri River. Also, trashforms one of the biggest problemsduring floods since it will blockdrainage lines as it is transported by

the floodwaters. Further, we can seethat Vadodara has a sufficientlyequipped fire brigade and boats forsearch and rescue and transportduring a flood.

Surat

Since 1968, Surat did not experienceheavy flooding, until the 2006. Everythree years, minor floods occur butno serious damage is caused. Every5-6 years, Surat experiences a mediumflood, examples are the floods of 1994,1998, 2004. This pattern is quiteregular over the years.

The flood of 2006 was unpredicted;Surat was not prepared. The TapiRiver flows through the city to theArabian Sea. In 2006, heavy rainsoccurred upstream of the Ukai Dam.The in–and outflow of water throughthe dam was not correctly regulated,it was a human error. In total, 20 lakhcusec (cu feet /sec) were releasedfrom the dam. A dam is one part of ariver delta system and size, in–andoutflow of the dam depend on thedimension of the catchment area,changes in water level due to rain(location and intensity) and the debitof the river. Based on these variables,

water has to be released beforehand.The extra water can then be stored bythe catchment area and riverupstream of the dam. Further, duringthe time the water entered the citycoincided with the ebb in the ArabianSea; this caused a flow to the seawhich was not smooth and regular.Though there are artificialembankments in the North of the city,the water overtopped these measuresand entered the city. As in most incities, slums were the most affectedareas. Located in low-lying areas ornear or on riverbanks, these areas areprone to flooding. An importantfactor in Surat is the high price ofland. People in "legal" houses live inrisky areas to be able to sell it laterfor a higher price. The governmentofficial stated that, "we can advise thepeople, but we cannot commandthem."

Most damage was done to the textileindustry, then houses and slums. Thehighest measured level of floodwaterwas 24 ft (7.3 m). Also livestock andcattle died du to floodwaters. Afterthe flood, a massive chlorination andinsecticides/disinfection programmewas started directly after the flood.

Aarab no Takiyo slum in Vadodara. The slum is located near two large ponds that

often overflow after heavy rainfall.


The supplies were brought in fromall over Gujarat. Corporates andpharmaceutical companies evenprovided free medicines.

In what way did Surat deal with thefloods? Because the flood in 2006 wasso unexpected, the city was notprepared. Though some protectionwalls were built in the north of thecity, these were insufficient to stopthe flood water. During the flood, alot of silt and clay was transportedinto the city. On many roads, the layerof mud was between one and threefeet (~ 1m) high. It was not possibleto use vehicles, there was no waterand electricity and all other civicservices were not available. Propercommunication was not possible, socoordination and informationtransfer was difficult.

The government took the initiativein acting upon the disaster. A centralcontrol room was started whichcoordinated the activities. From allover Gujarat Sate, vehicles wereprovided to help the city clean. Twothousand vehicles were provided andused for the cleaning operation. Four

lakh (4,00,000) metric tons of mudwere been removed in 30 daysthrough an enormous operation.During the cleaning operation,insecticides and sprays were broughtin to prevent diseases. From cities insurrounding areas, many hurried toSurat to help and to serve. The peoplein Gujarat showed unity. Very soon,there was an enormous shortage ofwater and milk. Apart from the factthat water is a basic need, in Gujaratmaking cha (tea) is a part of life.Without cha people do not have agood beginning of the day. Further,facilities for food distribution werenot sufficient. During the flood, theIndian Army assisted on manyoccasions. As much as 25 helicopterswere deployed and saved manypeople.

After 2006

Before the flood of 2006, no properdisaster management plans were inplace, now there are. A central controlroom as well as control rooms inevery city zone have been established.The central control room is inoperation 24 hours a day, the wholeyear through. There is also intensive

contact with weather forecastingservices now. In the last five years,disaster management plans have beendeveloped. Each zone in the citymakes its own disaster managementplan. In making the plans the zonesalso communicate. The official of thelocal government further explainedthat local people do not come to theoffice with ideas. However, NGOsand experts on flooding were invitedfor meetings about disasterreduction. Further, risk maps aremade for the whole city includingelevation, dangerous zones andindustrial hazardous locations. As inthe other three cities, the localgovernment makes use ofnewspapers, leaflets and radio toinform and warn people of flood-related dangers.

Protection walls have been repairedand heightened and stone pitchinghas been done at the Ukai Dam. Thisentails the placement of stones onsloped riverbanks to prevent erosionand damaging of protectionmeasures. As in the other cities, theGSDMA gives instructions and checksdisaster management plans of cities.GSDMA is always able to makechanges in the plan according to theirknowledge and experience. Trainingsare conducted by the GSDMA, but nofurther training programmes areavailable.

Conclusion

Cities are very different; hence,problems of flooding in each city arealso very different. The mostimportant causes of flooding are:• Heavy rain• Geography and topography: the

"saucer" of Nadiad, the shape ofthe riverbed in Nadiad, the slopegradient of Kheda District.

• Hydrological aspects: smallerrivers are blocked by biggerrivers; when small rivers feedinto a river, cities can becomeflooded without a drop of rainfalling onto them. Also heavy

New Ranchhodnagar slum in Surat. This slum was affected by 2005 and 2006

floods. AIDMI provided livelihood support, insurance and established a community

resource centre.


rainfall combined with high tidein the Arabian Sea can result inflooding

• Uncollected trash in city streetsblocks drainage lines, resultingin conditions for flooding. Thisis also a social problem; trash isthrown on streets and often notcollected and processed in aproper way.

• Technical aspects: absence ofprotection measures, waterfalling from terraces causingconsiderable damage,insufficient quality of roads,absence of pumps andequipment.

• Mismanagement ofinfrastructure, e.g. of the UkaiDam causing the flood of Surat,2006. Very old structures areeasily damaged or destroyed byfloodwaters, e.g. a bridge inKheda City, killing two women.

Similar Characteristics:• When the need is very high, the

army was brought in and helpedthe affected city in every district.

• Control rooms startedfunctioning in the beginning ofthe monsoon season.

• In every city, enormous amountsof mud were transported into thecity.

• In all cities, the population itselfwas very active during and afterthe flood.

• In all cities, the poorest were hitthe hardest.

• The most important resources—especially in small cities—are thepeople themselves. As in Khedaand Nadiad, people started to actupon the situation immediately.

Cities cope with floods in thefollowing ways:• Maintaining a special number of

vehicles in case of emergency(Kheda).

• People who can swim are askedto assist the local government incase of flooding.

• Families who owntractors are asked to stand-by in case of emergency.

• A list with phone numbersof key officials of the localgovernment is made andspread.

• Leaflets are spread toinform the populationabout flood dangers.

• Emergency lights areplaced during the night.

• Control rooms areestablished to keep anoverview of the situation.

• Making disastermanagement plans (inbigger cities).

• Keeping medicines instock.

• Keeping the fire brigadeready (Kheda does nothave fire brigade).

• Cash and shelter reliefafter flooding.

• Using disinfectionpowders to prevent diseases.

What are the possibilities for floodprevention and mitigation?• Diverting water from the sources

into unpopulated areas (is veryexpensive).

• Providing funds for equipment(fire brigade, boats, rescuematerials).

• Providing funds for training ofpeople in vulnerable locationsand facilities (e.g. teachingpeople how to swim, make rafts,etc.).

• Improving existing protectionmeasures.

• Improving dam management.• Designing proper disaster

management plans, tailor-madein each city itself. Of course, theseplans can be discussed with theGSDMA. However, the city itselfis the most knowledgeable.

• More involvement of the poorin making plans. Involvementand intensive communication isthe only way to come to durable

solution for people living invulnerable areas.

No outbreaks of diseases are reportedin any of the four cities due tomassive provision and use ofdisinfection sprays and powders.Further, in every city the GSDMA hasa decisive role. Each plan has to bechecked and approved by the GSDMAand can be adapted. This mightinfluence the context specificcharacter of the problems in each city.As we can learn from this article, thesmaller cities have to endure the mosthardships since they are lacking fundsto effectively work on disaster riskreduction for the poor.

Special thanks to:1. Mr. M. L. Doshi, Chief Officer, Kheda2. Mr. H. Yadav, Mamlatdar, Nadiad3. Mr. V. N. Tailor, City Engineer,

Mahanagar Seva Sadan, Vadodara4. Mr. H. J. Taparia, Chief Fire Officer,

Vadodara Fire and EmergencyServices, Vadodara

5. Mr. R. P. Patel, Deputy Town Planer,and Liasoning Officer, Surat

AIDMI discussing the flood situation in Surat

during an interview with Mr. R. P. Patel of Surat

Municipal Corporation.


This article is based on surveys inKheda, Vadodara and Nadiad,

conducted by AIDMI. Surat was notincluded in this survey. This shortarticle gives an overview of thesituation of people living in urbanareas affected by floods and pleas fora context specific understanding of aflood situation.

In all three cities, people in the slumsmainly work as small vendors orlabourers. Many people lost theirhouses, worth between Rs. 20,000-50,000/-, although the slum in Barodawas hit the hardest. In addition, manyassets of families, such as furniture,utensils and electrical equipment,were damaged. Relief was providedin the cities. Relief was given afterapproximately three weeks in Kheda,six weeks in Vadodara, and up toeight weeks in Nadiad. Despite thelong waiting time, only peopleNadiad reported that relief was noton timely and insufficient to meettheir basic needs.

Considering the long delay in thearrival of relief, this isunderstandable. Further, in all cities,all interviewed people carried onwith the same livelihood activitiesafter the flood though in many casesincome dropped by about 30%. Thishad a large impact since incomesbefore the floods were just enough tomeet basic needs. Also, allinterviewed people continued to liveon the same location after the floods.In Kheda, about half of the peoplehave outstanding loans of betweenRs. 4000–50,000/-. In Vadodara andNadiad, very few people in the slumshad outstanding loans. After thefloods, most people invested in theirhouses and needed equipment fortheir livelihoods.

Floods and Communities

In Kheda, about half of the people inthe slums have opted formicroinsurance to protect againstfuture disasters. In Vadodara, mostpeople have insurance, however notfor medical issues. In Nadiad, manypeople do not have insurance. InKheda, many families declared theywould be in great trouble if the man,in most cases the breadwinner, wouldfall ill or die. In this case, the wife ofthe man is not earning enough toprovide for the family. Whenchildren are old enough though, theycan assist in making a livelihood. InVadodara, about half of the familiesdeclared to be in serious problemswhen the income-generating personwould fall ill. In Nadiad, mostfamilies declared that they couldmanage when the breadwinnerwould not be available. In Kheda,

The community resource centre (CRC) in Aarab no Takiyo slum, Vadodara. Here,

the community can discuss problems and have meetings with AIDMI teams. Also,

the CRC is used as a small school to educate children who cannot attend primary

school. However, this is not a substitution of primary education.

Vadodara and Nadiad communitiesexpressed that raw material (such asgrain or inputs for livelihood: woodfor making bats or bamboo toconstruct new houses; and money inthe form of loans) were the mostpressing needs. In being asked whatpeople would do in case of a newflood, most people answered theywould go to a safer place faster, keephousehold kits in a safer place, takeimportant documents with them, savemoney in preparation and if possibleget insurance.

Again, we can see that slums indifferent cities face a variety ofdifferent problems. As mentionedearlier in this edition, every floodsituation is different. Every slumneeds to be examined in its owncontext.

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Bihar Flood Damage and Needs Assessment

Community discussionHasmukh Sadhu facilitating a meeting with a localorganisation and the community to discuss about immediateand transitional needs in "Navghachia Village".

Discussing with affected people BiharChundari Devi, living in an urban slum in Patna, informedAIDMI about water logging and floods in their slum areasand loss of livelihood opportunities

Discussing with local governmentMr. Chandrabhushan, from a local organization, explainingAIDMI about the loss of livelihoods and constraints toresponding.

Temporary shelterHeavy rains and floods destroyed the house of Kosi Devi andleft her in this temporary situation with three children. As theirland is also washed away, they are not able to harvest this year.

Severe floods hit the Northern state of Bihar, at the end of July, affecting over 10 million people leaving over 100 people dead.Immediately AIDMI responded and carried out a damage and needs assessment in Madhubani district, one of the poorest andhardest hit districts in the state. In the next issue of southasiadisasters.net, titled: 2007 Floods in South Asia: From Impact toKnowledge, more information about the Bihar floods and activities of AIDMI will be presented.

KEY IDEA How to Work on Floods? · 2011-04-06 · How to Work on Floods? L ooking at the history of...

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