Key Concepts Revision Session
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Transcript of Key Concepts Revision Session
Founda'ons, Weds 11th Mar 2015
Key Concepts Revision Session
U;lity, Rights, Jus;ce
U;litarianism
U;litarianism: the basic idea
• The principle of u;lity is that which
‘approves or disapproves of every ac;on whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish [happiness]’
• An ac;on conformable to the PU ought to be done, or is right
• When this concerns the community, the interest it is concerned with is the sum of the interests of its members
• It applies not only to ‘every ac;on of a private individual, but of every measure of government’
The argument
• Can’t be proven directly
• People actually do live and argue on its basis
• What’s the alterna;ve? • Misery is good? • Morality could be founded on principles which do not regard
the consequences. But such principles are mere caprice and despo;cal
Advantages
• Person neutral (cf. Wedderburn’s £15,000)
• Mo;va;onal – people desire happiness
• End neutral – doesn’t maWer what makes people happy
• Clear applica;on
Two variants
There are ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ forms of u;litarianism. The most common are:
(Direct) • Act-‐u;litarianism: apply the Principle of U;lity to ac'ons
(Indirect) • Rule-‐u;litarianism: apply the Principle of U;lity to rules
Commitment 1
• Bentham is very clear about what counts as u;lity: pleasurable states of mind (hedonism)
• Is this right?
Some good things in life are not clearly pleasure preference sa'sfac'on My preferences can develop, and for the beWer welfare
(Note that this is s;ll within the broad framework)
Commitment 2
• A cardinal measure needed, for interpersonal comparison
• Can you even make INTRApersonal cardinal measures of u;lity? Objec;on: Some goods are incommensurable, so the u;litarian calculus is inapplicable. Hypothe;cal compensa;on test
• Move to ordinal rankings? Market mechanisms provide maximum interpersonal desire-‐sa;sfac;on? Goodin: principle of charity, in assuming that others are much like ourselves
Commitment 3
• A func;on for u;lity: maximising the (expected) sum
Two tax policies
• Fairness seems to drop out of picture. Vicarious and exemplary punishment permiWed
Jill Jack Jane
Policy A 5 5 5
Policy B 9 5 2
Commitment 3
• Alterna;ve func;ons readily available Maximise average u;lity Maximin (maximise the minimum payoff) Maximax (maximise the greatest possible payoff) …
• How to decide between these? The moment we’re arguing about alterna;ve func;ons, we are using moral concepts and reasons other than pleasurable/valued mental states
Fairness is the most obvious moral ‘baggage’ leh behind
Rights
Why Rights?
• A rival radical vision
• Addresses the (puta;ve) shortcomings of u;litarian-‐style moral theories
• Dominant language of contemporary moral discourse?
The func;on of rights
• Stringent demands
‘Rights are best understood as trumps over some background jus;fica;on for poli;cal decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole’
Ronald Dworkin
• Create ‘exclusionary reasons’, in protec;on of individuals. ‘Rights talk’ reflects this
The concept of a right 1
Dis;nguish ins'tu'onal from non-‐ins'tu'onal rights
• Ins;tu;onal (or ‘posi;ve’) rights: law, employment
• Non-‐ins;tu;onal Societal conven;ons Moral or natural rights. Could be specific, or belong to everyone as a result of their being a human
The concept of a right 2
Dis;nguish nega've from posi've rights
• Nega;ve rights require people not to do things against you e.g. security of person, property; liberty
• Posi;ve rights require people to do things for you e.g. rescue, welfare, healthcare
Rights in conflict
• External conflict, between rights and (e.g.) consequences
• Internal conflict, between different kinds of rights At most one right could be absolute But worse, only one right holder could enjoy that absolute right
• Some;mes it’s obvious which right takes priority. Some;mes not
• Perhaps the jus;fica;on of a right/rights will tell us how to deal with conflict?
Jus;fica;on and schedule
• Two ques;ons SCHEDULE: What human rights are there?
JUSTIFICATION: In virtue of what (if anything) do human rights exist?
• Answers interrelate. Could take SCHEDULE as primary, and argue ‘boWom up’. Or take JUSTIFICATION, and argue ‘top down’
Jus;fica;on: Status concep;ons
• Any capacity or property which has value in itself may provide this grounding
• Humans as ra;onal, as autonomous, as made in the image of God, as having a life plan, as…
Jus;fica;on: Status concep;ons
• Some face the task of bridging from human need to interpersonal claim (e.g. non-‐metaphysical versions, such as Griffin)
• It may uncomfortably rule some people out: babies, mentally incapacitated. It may also rules others in: sophis;cated animals, supernatural agents
• Of limited use poli;cally. Not everyone agrees
Jus;fica;on: Poli;cal concep;ons
• Don’t worry about the (deep) Founda;ons. We can all agree that there are some ways that people should not be treated
• Start from the schedule, and work up
Jus;fica;on: Poli;cal concep;ons
• Significant impact on the Schedule: considerably fewer rights Liberal democra;c rights especially
• What if people actually don’t agree? The equal applica;on of the Schedule to all people has not been obvious historically
• A restricted Schedule may have influenced the func;on: a litmus test for legi;macy of interven;on
Universality?
• Are rights universal? Well, what kind of rights are we talking about? And with what jus'fica'on?
Jus;ce & Equality
Jus;ce & Equality
• Jus;ce: ‘giving people their due’, the ius suum
• But this is merely formal, and specifies no content ‘The Roman legal code conceptualised with firm and unwavering clarity the almost universally shared “intui;on” that to treat a slave as if he or she had any en;tlements would be a gross viola;on of the basic principles of jus;ce.’ Raymond Guess, Philosophy and Real Poli'cs, p. 74
What are people due? And due in what capacity? Some considera;ons are morally irrelevant, some relevant. Relevance may change according to situa;on
• Dis;nguish primary jus;ce from rec'fying jus;ce; former concerns distribu;on. What posi;ve claims do people have?
Do inequali;es maWer?
• Should we be concerned if the overall level of inequality in a society (e.g. in income or wealth) increases?
• Should we be pleased if the overall level of inequality across the world decreases?
• Should we be concerned about inequali;es between
par;cular groups (e.g. men v women, ethnic Chinese in UK v ethnic Bangladeshis in UK)?
Distribu;ve Principles
1) Sufficiency – people have enough 2) Equality – gaps maWer Equality of outcome Equality of opportunity
3) Priority to the least advantaged – absolute posi;on of worst off
Jus;ce as Fairness
Principles derived from thought experiment of original posi;on and veil of ignorance U;litarianism rejected: allows the welfare of some people to be sacrificed for the greater good of the many
Rejects happiness as the metric because that denies personal responsibility for preferences
Instead, primary goods: rights and liber;es, opportuni;es and powers, income and wealth
Rawls’ Two Principles of Jus;ce
1. “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liber/es, which scheme is compa;ble with the same scheme of liber;es for all”
2. “Social and economic inequali;es are to sa;sfy two condi;ons:
– First they are to be aWached to offices and posi;ons open to all under condi;ons of fair equality of opportunity; and
– Second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-‐advantaged members of society (the difference principle)”
Equality of opportunity
Formal equality of opportunity (careers open to talents): jobs and offices
should be offered on a compe;;ve basis and awarded to those who are best
qualified to hold them.
Fair equality of opportunity: ‘….those who are at the same level of talent and
ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same
prospects of success regardless of their ini;al place in the social system, that
is, irrespec;ve of the income class into which they are born. In all sectors of
society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement
for everyone similarly mo;vated and endowed’.
Rawls’ difference principle
Social and economic inequali;es are just when (and only when) they work to the (greatest?) benefit of the worst –off group in society, e.g. by ac;ng as economic incen;ves for the more talented
Is this too stringent? Why should we set this condi;on on inequali;es so long as everybody is lihed out of poverty (the sufficiency view)?
Is this too lax? Might large inequali;es be bad even if they help to improve the posi;on of the worst-‐off group in absolute terms?
Reasons for opposing inequality
Instrumental reasons: inequality is bad for people Cf. Wilkinson/PickeW, The Spirit Level: see TED talk at hWp://www.ted.com/talks/richard_wilkinson.html
Intrinsic reasons: a) some inequali;es are unjust/undeserved/unfair; b) some inequali;es produce social rela;onships that are incompa;ble with equal respect
Conclusion: how are jus;ce and equality related?
Jus;ce requires equality of some things (equal basic rights, equal opportuni;es) but not of all things
Inequali;es of outcome can be just when they are deserved and/or there are equal opportuni;es to achieve them
Some think that inequali;es of outcome are just when they serve as incen;ves, again provided there are equal opportuni;es to achieve them
But we may s;ll be concerned about inequality for other reasons: because of its effects, or because we think it is intrinsically bad