Kant - A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness

8/15/2019 Kant - A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness

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1Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness

Andrew Brook, Carleton University

Kant had the makings of an extremely rich and interesting version of the idea that self-presenting

representations are the representational base of consciosness! "tripped down to its bare

minimm, he held the view that common or garden representations present not #st what they are

abot, not #st their ob#ect! $hey also present themselves and they present oneself, their sb#ect,

that is to say, the thing that has them!

$he sitation with respect to the evidence that he held this view is complicated, however,

more complicated than is sally the case even with Kant! Becase of the way the mind fit, or

did not fit, into his overall pro#ects, everything he had to say abot the mind is sketchy and

incomplete! Also, Kant%s rote into his point of view is very different from any of the rotes that

researchers follow now! As a reslt of the latter, he does not consider many of the isses that are

at the centre of discssion now! "o let s start with the overall pro#ect and how the mind in

general and consciosness in particlar fit into it!

1. Kant’s Overall Project

Kant%s most famos work is the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) of 1&'1(& )two editions*! +or

prposes of nderstanding his views on the mind and consciosness, this work and a small book


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worked p from lectre notes late in life, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View )1&'*

are the two most important works !1 "ince the Anthropology was based on poplar lectres, it is

often sperficial compared to CPR, which therefore is the main work for or prposes! Until

middle age, Kant was a conventional rationalist! $hen memories of reading .avid /me

0interrpted my dogmatic slmbers, as he pt it )1&'2, Ak 34567*! /e called the new approach

that ensed Critical Philosophy!

Two ain Projects

3n the part of the critical philosophy of interest to s, two of Kant%s main pro#ects were to5

● 8stify or conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and niversal

trth )1&'1('&, B1-12*!

● 3nslate religion and morality, inclding the possibility of immortality and of free will,

from the corrosive effects of this very same science )Bxxx*!

Kant accepted withot reservation that 9:od, freedom and immortality% )Bxxx* exist bt feared

that, if science, or any evidence or argment, were relevant to demonstrating or refting their

existence, it wold provide reason to dobt their existence! "o Kant wanted to inslate sch

matters from all evidence and argment! +ortnately, as he saw it, neither scientific evidence nor

philosophical argment can toch these ;estions! 3f so, :od, freedom and immortality cold be

accepted on the basis of faith )and Kant did so accept them* withot being at risk from science!

03 have fond it necessary to deny knowledge, !!! in order to make room for faith. )Bxxx, his

italics*!


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$he first aim occpies mch of the first big part of CPR, which Kant called the Analytic!

$he work of inslation comes in the second big part of CPR, which Kant called the .ialectic and

which consists of a series of attacks on, as he saw them, n#stifiably grand aspirations of the

metaphysics of rationalism! 9.ialectic% was Kant%s name for a certain kind of falty reasoning in

which one%s conclsions rn ot far beyond what one%s premises can spport! $he specific falty

argments that concern s here are abot the natre of the mind or sol and its possible

immortality!

3n the corse of prsing the first aim, ptting knowledge in general and physics in

particlar on a secre fondation, Kant asked the following ;estion5 ore specifically, what mst the mind be like for or knowledge to be

as it is )A6-&*= ?t simply, he held that for or experience, and therefore or minds, to be as

they are, or experience mst be tied together in the way that physics says it is! "o the stats of

physics is secred! Bt this also tells s ;ite a lot abot what or minds mst be like! 3n

particlar, it tells s abot how the mind mst be able to fnction!

@otice how the mind enters Kant%s pro#ect here! 3t enters not as an ob#ect of interest in its

own right bt as a means to an end, the end being to #stify or conviction that physics is a

science! As a reslt, his explorations of the mind are sketchy and incomplete, carried as far as he

needed to carry them for the prposes of his pro#ect bt no frther! As he pt it, 0$his en;iry !!!

into the pre nderstanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faclties pon which it

rests !!! is of great importance for my chief prpose, !!! bt does not form an essential part of

it )Axvii*! 3t is also, he tells s, 0somewhat hypothetical in character )Axvii*! )Kant did not

retain this passage in the second edition of CPR bt the sentiments it expresses contined!* $here


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is no sstained, focssed discssion of the mind anywhere in Kant%s work except the

Anthropology, which, as we said, is ;ite sperficial!

3n addition, the two chapters of CPR in which most of Kant%s remarks on the mind occr,

the chapter on the $ranscendental .edction )$.* and the chapter on what he called ?aralogisms

of ?re eason )falty argments abot the mind monted by his rationalist predecessors*, were

the two chapters that gave him the greatest difficlty! 3ndeed, they contain some of the most

impenetrable prose ever written! Kant completely rewrote the main body of both chapters for the

second edition )thogh not the introdctions, interestingly*!

$. is where Kant attempts to realiDe the first and most important part of the first pro#ect,

the ?aralogisms chapter is devoted to the part of the second pro#ect concerned with the mind! 3n

the first edition, he seems to have achieved a stable position on self-consciosness only as late as

this chapter, which comes well into the second half of CPR. Even his famos term for

consciosness of self, 93 think%, occrs for the first time in the first edition only in the

introdction to the chapter on the ?aralogisms!

odel of t!e ind Arisin" Out of t!e #irst Project

Kant%s exploration of the necessary conditions of experience in the first pro#ect led him to

a nmber of sbstantive claims abot the mind! $he most famos is his claim that representation

re;ires concepts as well as percepts F rle-gided acts of cognition as well as deliverances of

the senses! As he pt it in one of his most famos sayings, 0Concepts withot intitions are

empty, intitions withot concepts are blind )AG1HB&G*! 3n more contemporary terms, the


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fnctions crcial for knowledge-generating activity are processing of sensory inpts and

application of concepts to sensory inpts! Cognition re;ires concepts and percepts! As we might

say now, to discriminate, we need informationI bt for information to be of any se to s, we

mst organiDe the information!

/e also rged that the fnctions that organiDe sensory and conceptal raw materials into

experiences are different abilities to synthesiDe! Kant postlated that there are three kinds of

synthesis )A'-117I the three have a more diffse presence in the second edition than in the first,

thogh all of them are still there*! "ynthesis of Apprehension in 3ntition locates the raw

materials of experience temporally )and presmably also spatially, thogh Kant does not say so*!

"ynthesis of eprodction in the 3magination associates spatio-temporally strctred items with

other spatio-temporally strctred items! And "ynthesis of ecognition in a Concept recogniDes

items sing concepts, the Categories in particlar! $his threefold doctrine of synthesis is one of

the cornerstones of Kant%s model of the mind!

3n fact, Kant held that to organiDe information as we do, we re;ire two kinds of

"ynthesis of ecognition in Concepts! $he first ties the raw material of sensible experience

together into ob#ects )A17G*! $his is now called binding! ?t in contemporary terms, initially

colors, lines, shapes, textres, etc!, are represented separately! +or an ob#ect to be represented,

the contents of these representations have to be integrated!

$he second kind of synthesis ties the contents of these individal representations and the

representations themselves together so as to prodce what might be called a glo!al

representation, a notion that will prove to be central to his story abot self-presenting

representations! A global representation connects individal representations and their contents to


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one another in sch a way that to be conscios of anything ths tied together is to be conscios

of other things ths tied, too, and of the grop of them as a single grop! Kant thoght that the

capacity to form global representations is essential to both the kind of cognition that we have and

the kind of consciosness that we have!

Kant%s model of the mind is a model of cognitive fnction, not nderlying mechanisms!

$his is an effective way to approach the mind, as cognitive science has shown, bt Kant had a

special reason for adopting it! Jne of his most deeply held general convictions was that we know

nothing of anything as it is!


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at all, it wold provide reason to dobt their existence! 3mmortality is the topic of interest to s

here! /is rationalist predecessors, .escartes and LeibniD for example, thoght that they cold

prove that the mind is sbstantial, is simple )withot parts*, and persists in a special way! $hese

conclsions wold at minimm leave immortality an open possibility! )$homas eid took this

approach, too, even thogh he wasn%t in other respects a rationalist!G* "ince the conclsions

wold appear to many people to follow from things Kant himself had said abot the nity of

consciosness in the first part of CPR )specifically in $.*, if his strategy for inslating the

possibility of immortality was to work, he also had to show that his earlier claims contain no

sch implications!

Kant%s official topic in the chapter is falty rationalist argments and conclsions

claiming to yield knowledge of the natre of the mind or sol as it is in itself! /owever, as he

saw it, introspection provides strong prima facie spport for the rationalist conclsions abot

what we can know abot the mind! 3n introspection, we appear to orselves to be sbstantial,

simple and persisting, #st as rational psychology held )9rational psychology% was Kant%s name

for these views*! 3f so, he had to show that introspection reveals nothing of the sort! 3t was in the

corse of his deflationary attack on introspection that Kant made many of his most acte

observations abot consciosness of self!

Kant held srprisingly strong and not entirely consistent views on introspection and

empirical methods generally as a basis for knowledge abot the mind! "ometimes, he maintained

that any empirical stdy of the mind is hopeless! Jf corse, he is notorios for harboring a

similar scepticism abot chemistry )in his defence, it shold be said that there was nothing

resembling a single nified theory of chemical reactions in his time*! $he empirical method most


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directly in his gn-sights here was introspection! $he key text is in "he #etaphysical

$oundations of %atural &cience )1&'6*! After stating his view of chemistry, he went on, 0the

empirical doctrine of the sol !!! mst remain even frther removed than chemistry from the rank

of what may be called a natral science proper )Ak! 345&1*! $he contents of introspection, in

his terms inner sense, cannot be stdied scientifically for at least five reasons!

+irst, having only one niversal dimension and one that they are only represented to have

at that, namely, distribtion in time, the contents of inner sense cannot be ;antifiedI ths no

mathematical model of them is possible! "econd, 0the manifold of internal observation is

separated only by mere thoght! $hat is to say, only the introspective observer distingishes the

items one from anotherI there are no real distinctions among the items themselves! $hird, these

items 0cannot be kept separate in a way that wold allow s to connect them again 0at will, by

which Kant presmably means, according to the dictates of or developing theory! +orth,

0another thinking sb#ect does not sbmit to or investigations in sch a way as to be

conformable to or prposes F the only thinking sb#ect whose inner sense one can investigate

is oneself! +inally and most damningly, 0even the observation itself alters and distorts the state of

the ob#ect observed )1&'6, Ak! 345&1*! 3ndeed, introspection can be bad for the health5 it is a

road to 0mental illness )93llminism and $errorism%, 1&', Ak! 4335122I see 161*!

At other times, Kant links Mself-observationM to observation of others and calls them both

sorces of anthropology )Ak! 43351-2*! 3t is not clear why he didnMt respect what he called

anthropology more highly as an empirical stdy of the mind in his critical moments, given that

he himself did it!6


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inner sense !!! represents to consciosness even or own selves only as we appear to

orselves, not as we are in orselves! +or we intit orselves only as we are inwardly

affected by orselves! B1G2

And he nderpinned all these views with an interesting view of the representational base of

consciosness, which he bilt ot of an e;ally interesting notion of self-presenting

representations! @otice that, as with the first pro#ect, here too the mind enters Kant%s analysis

only indirectly, in the service of other ends! /ere too the reslt is a sketchy, incomplete treatment

of the aspects of mind ths drawn in!

'. Representational Base of Consciousness

By 9the representational base of consciosness%, 3 mean whatever it is abot

representation and representing that sbserves consciosness!


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Kant%s thoght seems to have been that my representation of the page, the sentences, and so on,

is all the representation that 3 need to be conscios not #st of the page, the sentences, etc!, bt

also of the act of seeing them, and of who is seeing them, namely, me! A single representation

can do all three #obs! Kant once pt it this way5 consciosness of representation and self is given

0not indeed in, bt with !!! intitions )B161*! Let s call an act of representing that can make

one conscios of its ob#ect, itself, and oneself as its sb#ect the representational !ase of

consciosness of these three items! /ere is how Kant%s story goes!

Two Kinds of Consciousness of &elf

$he first thing we need to see is that Kant sharply distingished consciosness of one%s

own psychological states from consciosness of oneself as sb#ect of those states! Kant%s term

for the former was 9empirical self-consciosness%! /is leading term for the latter was

9transcendental apperception% )$A*! )Kant sed the term 9$A% in two very different ways, as the

name for a faclty of synthesis and as the name for what he also referred to as the 93 think%,

namely, one%s consciosness of oneself as sb#ect! 3t is the latter sage that is in play here!* 3n a

passage from the Anthropology, Kant distingishes the two kinds of consciosness of self very

clearly5

the ' of reflection contains no manifold and is always the same in every #dgment !!!

nner eperience, on the other hand, contains the matter of consciosness and a manifold

of empirical inner intition!!!! 1&', Ak! 433511-, emphases in the original

/ere is another passage from the Anthropology*


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N! 3nner sense is not pre apperception, consciosness of what we are doingI for this

belongs to the power of thinking! 3t is, rather, consciosness of what we ndergo as we

are affected by the play of or own thoghts! $his consciosness rests on inner intition,

and so on the relation of ideas )as they are either simltaneos or sccessive*! 1&', Ak!

4335161

Kant makes the same distinction in CPR*

the 3 that 3 think is distinct from the 3 that it, itself, intits !!!I 3 am given to myself beyond

that which is given in intition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as 3

appear to myself, not as 3 am !!!! B1GG

$his distinction is reflected in his doctrine of the representational base in the following way! $he

9consciosness of what we ndergo as we are affected by the play of or own thoghts% )and,

presmably, perceptions, emotions, memories, and so on* is the consciosness of representations

that having the representations gives s! $he content of this kind of consciosness varies from

representation to representation! $he consciosness of oneself as the sb#ect of those thoghts

)and !!! and !!!* is also given to s by having those representations bt this consciosness

9contains no manifold and is always the same in every #dgment%!

Representational Base of Consciousness of One’s Ps(c!olo"ical &tates and of Oneself.

$he two kinds of consciosness of self may appear to have very different sorces! $he

sorce of empirical self-consciosness )particlar representations* is said to be what Kant called

inner sense! /e did not work ot his notion of inner sense at all well bt seems to have had


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something like perception of one%s own psychological states in mind! /ere are #st a few of the

problems! Kant insists that all representational states 9belong to% )presmably he means, 9are

presented by%* inner sense, inclding those representing the ob#ects of oter sense )i!e!, spatially

located ob#ects*5


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he said it a nmber of times! @otice the phrase in the passage ;oted in the previos section from

N of the Anthropology5 0consciosness of what we are doing F doing )1&', Ak! 4335161*.

$he way in which one becomes conscios of an act of representing is not by receiving what he

called intitions, i!e!, sensible contents, bt by doing it5 0synthesis !!!, as an act, !!! is conscios to

itself, even withot sensibility )B1G2*I 0this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it

cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility )B12*! 9"ensibility% and 9intition% are closely

related terms referring to the ob#ects or contents of representations of the world, what can be

sensed!* $hs Kant is saying that we do not become conscios of or own representational acts

in the way in which we become conscios of the ob#ects of those acts, by receiving a raw

manifold of inpts and then working them p in acts of synthesis!


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common sb#ect of a certain grop of experiences by being conscios of 0the identity of the

consciosness in !!! con#oined !!! representations )B122*! >oreover, we can be conscios of

orselves as sb#ect merely by performing acts of representing! @o frther representation of the

act or of oneself is needed!

$hat the mind is active and knows itself as active was of fndamental importance to

Kant!


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representation itself and of myself as the common sb#ect of all the constitent representations!

$o reintrodce a relevant passage #st ;oted,

the mind cold never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations!!! if it did

not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it sbordinates all the

manifold !!! to a transcendental nity!!!! A17'

3 am conscios of myself as the single common sb#ect of a certain grop of experiences by

being conscios of 0the identity of the consciosness in !!! con#oined !!! representations )B122*!

Alas, it has to be admitted that none of this is nearly as clear in the original texts as my

reconstrction wold sggest!

Unit( of Consciousness

At heart of the notion of a global representation is the nity of consciosness! $hogh by

no means everything in a global representation need be consciosly accessible to s )Kant is

widely misnderstood on this point*, Kant thoght that we have nified consciosness of a good

deal of what or crrent global representation represents and that having the representation is the

base for being or becoming conscios of the representation itself as a single, nified

representation and of oneself as its sb#ect! 3ndeed, two kinds of nity are re;ired5

1! $he consciosness that this sb#ect has of represented ob#ects and(or representations

mst be nified!

! $he global representation mst have a single common sb#ect )A2G7*!


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Kant said little abot what a 9single common sb#ect% is like, so we won%t say anything more

abot it! /e never said what he meant by 9nified consciosness%, either, bt he did se the

notion often enogh for s to be able to see what he had in mind!

Kant refers to the nity of consciosness both as the nity of consciosness )A172* and

as the nity of apperception )A17G, A17'*! $he notion plays a central role in both pro#ects! 3n the

first pro#ect, Kant arges that we cold not have nified consciosness of a range of items nless

we cold tie the items themselves together casally! )$his argment is not very sccessfl,

thogh it is better than some neo-Kantian moves that have spn off from it Brook 77!*

Unity of consciosness is also a central topic of the second pro#ect! $he first edition

attack on the second paralogism )A2G* focses on the nity of consciosness at a given time

among other things* and what can )or rather, cannot* be inferred from it abot the natre of the

mind, the first part of it anyway )how the self appears to itself also makes an appearance* $he

attack on the third paralogism focses on what can)not* be inferred from nified consciosness

over time! $hese are all from the first edition of CPR! 3n the second edition, Kant makes frther

remarks abot it, ;ite nlike anything in the first edition, for example, 0this nity !!! is not the

category of nity )B121*!

By 9nity of consciosness%, Kant seems to have had something like the following in

mind5 3 am conscios not only of single experiences of single ob#ects bt also of experiences that

have many normal ob#ects as their single, integrated ob#ect! $he same is tre of actionsI 3 can do

and be conscios of doing a nmber of actions at the same time! 3n addition to sch synchronic

nity or nit at a time, many global representations, as we called them, display diachronic nity

or nity across time5 crrent representation is combined with retained earlier representation! 3n


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fact, any representation that we ac;ire in a series of temporal steps, sch as hearing a sentence,

will have diachronic nity )A17I A2G*! $hs, diachronic nity is often part of synthesis of

recognition!

Kant himself did not explicate his notion of nified consciosness bt here is one

plasible articlation of the notion that we find at work in his writings!

$he nity of consciosness Hdf. consciosness of a nmber of representations and(or

ob#ects of representation in sch a way that to be conscios of any of them is also to be

conscios of others of them and of at least some of them as a grop!

As this definition makes clear, consciosness being nified is more than #st being one act of

consciosness! $he act of consciosness in ;estion is not #st singlar, it is nified!

3n Kant%s view, moreover, to have nified global representations, we mst nify them!


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it provides consciosness of the world, bt Kant did not investigate the matter, part of his general

neglect of action and the body! Consciosness of the representation itself= Again, Kant said little

that bites directly on the ;estion! /owever, he did have something to say abot the third isse,

consciosness of oneself as sb#ect!


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only of appearances, highly doctored representations of oneself F that even when one is

conscios of oneself as the sb#ect of one%s experience, agent of one%s acts, by having these

experiences and doing those acts, one has no consciosness of one%s actal self! 3n the second

edition, he reflects this sensitivity as early as B6'I at B1G2, he goes so far as to say that an

apparent contradiction is involved!

Kant%s doctrine of global representations as the representational base of consciosness of

self contains the basis for everything he had to say on both isses, thogh it takes some

reconstrctive srgery on or part to see the connections!

/o anifold in Consciousness of &elf

+irst, Kant held that when one is conscios of oneself as sb#ect, one is not, or need not be,

conscios of any properties of oneself, certainly not any properties that are contingent or

changing! Jne has the same consciosness of self no matter what else one is conscios of F

thinking, perceiving, laghing, being miserable or whatever! Kant expressed the thoght this

way,

throgh the 93%, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given! B12G

And this,

the 3 that 3 think is distinct from the 3 that it !!! intits !!!I 3 am given to myself beyond that

which is given in intition! B1GG


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$his idea is similar to "hoemaker%s notion of 9self-reference withot identification%, the notion

that reference to self as sb#ect involves or need involve not identification of oneself as anything

)Brook 771*! "ince, on Kant%s view, it is not #st identifying properties bt any properties of

oneself whatsoever that one does not need to know in order to refer to oneself as oneself, 9non-

ascriptive reference to self% might captre what is special abot this form of consciosness of self

better than "hoemaker%s term!

Consciousness of &elf is not Knowled"e of &elf

$he notion that in consciosness of self as sb#ect, no manifold is given, is or can be interpreted

as the idea that in it, no properties of the self are represented! )oreover, while neither

CastaQeda nor "hoemaker had an explanation for them, they flow directly ot of Kant%s idea of


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the representational base of consciosness of self! $he ideas first, then their explanation by

reference to the representational base!

Referential ac!iner( of Consciousness of &elf

/ere are some of the things that Kant said abot reference to self as sb#ect!


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y se of the word 93% as the sb#ect of statements sch as 93 feel pain% or 93 see a

canary% is not de to my having identified as myself something otherwise recogniDed

of which 3 know, or believe, or wish to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to

it! "hoemaker 16', pp! GG'

A standard argment for )*, that certain indexicals are essential, goes as follows! $o

know that wrote a certain book a few years ago, it is not enogh to know that someone over six

feet tall wrote that book, or that someone who teaches philosophy at a particlar niversity wrote

that book, or !!! or !!! or !!! , for 3 cold know all these things withot knowing that it was me who

has these properties )and 3 cold know that it was me who wrote that book and not know that any

of these things are properties of me*! As "hoemaker pts it,

no matter how detailed a token-reflexive-free description of a person is, !!! it cannot

possibly entail that 3 am that person! 16', pp! G67

Kant n;estionably articlated the argment for )1*5

3n attaching 93% to or thoghts, we designate the sb#ect only transcendentally !!! withot

noting in it any ;ality whatsoever F in fact, withot knowing anything of it either

directly or by inference! A2GG

$his transcendental designation, i!e!, referring to oneself sing 93% withot 9noting any ;ality% in

oneself, has some nsal featres! Jne can refer to oneself in a variety of ways, of corse5 as

the person in the mirror, as the person born on sch and sch a date in sch and sch a place, as


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the first person to do R, and so on, bt one way of referring to oneself is special5 it does not

re;ire identifying or indeed any ascription to oneself! "o Kant tells s!

$he ;estion is more complicated with respect to )*!


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$he last clase is the key one5 0any #dgment pon it has always already made se of its

representation! Kant seems to be saying that to know that anything is tre of me, 3 mst first

know that it is me of whom it is tre! $his is something very like the essential indexical claim!

@ow we make the connection to the consciosness withot knowledge isse! 3f reference

to self takes place withot 9noting any properties% of oneself, the consciosness of self that

reslts will not provide any knowledge of self! Bt what right does Kant have to help himself to

his notion of transcendental designation=

Transcendental 0esi"nation and t!e Representational Base of Consciousness

$he answer is5 Every right! Even thogh he did not explicitly make the connection

himself, that reference to self as sb#ect is 9transcendental%, i!e!, non-ascriptive, flows directly

from the idea that the representational base of sch reference is having global representations! A

global representation will have no neighbor, to se a phrase of


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3 am looking at the words on the screen in front of me,

the verb expression or the ob#ect expression may divide experience bt the sb#ect expression

will not! 3f so, awareness of self as sb#ect can proceed and, to the extent that ascription re;ires

dividing experience, mst proceed withot any ascription to self! +rom this it follows that

consciosness of self as sb#ect will have all the special featres delineated earlier5 reference that

does not ascribe, manifoldlessness, and a consciosness of self that yields no knowledge of self!

3n this accont, Kant goes frther than any theorist past or present !17

Kant’s /otions and Current )ssues

Can Kant%s notion of the representational base or the rich notion of a self-presenting

global representation that nderlies it help s with any contemporary isses= ?erhaps! "tart with

the ;estion, in virte of what are certain states conscios states= Kant did not address this

;estion bt he seems to have assmed that when having a global representation is not #st the

base of being conscios of it bt is actally providing sch consciosness, then the global

representation will simply !e a conscios state F nothing else needed! )$hs, Kant wold

probably have been very dbios abot the idea that qualia, felt ;alities, are somehow different

from and otstrip the representational properties of representations!*


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representation needed, that nothing representational cold be missing! Bt he cold happily have

allowed, indeed the claim abot 93 think% sggests that he wold have allowed, that something

else needed for consciosness cold still be missing!

Certainly Kant%s view has implications for some contemporary doctrines abot

consciosness! 3n common with most views anchored in self-representing representations, his

view entails that nothing higher-order is needed for consciosness! Pace osenthal )11*, each

representation can present itselfI no higher-order state taking the first representation as its ob#ect

is needed!

E;ally, Kant%s approach pts real pressre on the so-called transparency thesis! $he

transparency thesis is the thesis that we are not directly, noninferentially aware of or own

representations! Being aware of representing redness is no more than being aware of the redness

represented )/arman 17, .retske 1G*!


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References

orks !y -ant Cited

Kant, 3! 1&'1(1&'&! Critique of Pure Reason )trans! ?! :yer and A!


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Bennett, 8! 1&! -ant0s 1ialectic Cambridge5 Cambridge University ?ress!

Brook, A! 12! Kant%s A Priori >ethods for ecogniDing @ecessary $rths! 3n ?! /anson and

B! /nter, eds! Return of the A Priori, Canadian 2ournal of Philosophy &upplementary

Volume 1', pp! 1G-G !

Brook, A! 1! -ant and the #ind. Cambridge and @ew Oork5 Cambridge University ?ress!

Brook, A! 771! Kant on self-reference and self-awareness! 3n A! Brook and ! .e4idi, eds! &elf3

Reference and &elf3Awareness. Amsterdam5 8ohn Ben#amins!

Brook! A! and ?! aymont! +orthcoming! A 4nified "heory of Consciousness. Cambridge, >A5

>3$ ?ress!

Brook, A! and ?! aymont! $he nity of consciosness! "he &tanford 5lectronic 5ncyclopaedia

of Philosophy. UL5 plato!stanford!ed!

CastaQeda, /!-@! 166! 9/e%5 A "tdy in the Logic of "elf-Consciosness! Ratio ', pp! 127-G&!

.retske, +! 1G! %aturali6ing the #ind. Cambridge, >A5 >3$ ?ress!

/arman, :! 17! $he intrinsic ;ality of experience! 3n 8! E! $omberlin, ed! Philosophical

Perspecti+es 7* Action "heory and the Philosophy of #ind. Atascadero, CA5 idgeview

?ress!

>eerbote, ! 1'! Kant%s fnctionalism! 3n 8! C! "mith, ed! 8istorical $oundations of Cogniti+e

&cience! .ordrecht, /olland5 eidel!

?erry, 8! 1&! $he essential indexical! %ous 12, pp! 2-1!


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?ippin, ! 1'&! Kant on the spontaneity of mind! Canadian 2ournal of Philosophy 1&, pp!

-&6!

osenthal, .! 11! $he independence of consciosness and sensory ;ality! Philosophical

ssues 1, pp! 1G-26!

"hoemaker, "! 16'! "elf-reference and self-awareness! 2ournal of Philosophy 6G )7*, pp!

GGG-G6&!

"hoemaker, "! 1&7! ?ersons and their pasts! American Philosophical 9uarterly &, pp! 6-'G!

"ellars,

Philosophical Association , pp! G-21!


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1! /e was already G& when he wrote the first edition of the first Critique, yet he went on to write two

frther Critiques, the Critique of Practical Reason )1&''* on moral reasoning and the Critique of

2udgment )1&7*, a work devoted to a nmber of topics inclding reasoning abot ends, the natre of

#dgment, and aesthetics, and books on natral science, cosmology, history, geography, logic,

anthropology F the list is long!

! $o over-simplify and sticking to the official line on the topic, rationalists hold that we can discover

trths #st by thinking abot things, withot need of observation or experience!

2! All frther references to Kant will be to this work nless otherwise noted! 9A% refers to passages in

the first edition, 9B% to passages in the second! 9H% means that the passage occrs in both editions!

! As >eerbote )1'* and many others have observed, Kant held a fnctionalist view of the mind

almost 77 years before fnctionalism was officially articlated in the 167s by /ilary ?tnam and

others! Kant even shared fnctionalists% lack of enthsiasm for introspection, as we will see, and their

belief that we can model cognitive fnction withot knowing anything very mch abot nderlying

strctre! :iven his personal hostility to materialism abot the mind )1&'2, Ak! 34, end of N6*, he

wold have fond the natraliDing tendencies of mch contemporary fnctionalism repgnant!

/owever, becase the nknowability of things as they are in themselves, one of his most deeply-held

views, entails that one mst be tterly netral abot what the nderlying composition of the mind might

be like, he wold have had to allow that mltiple realiDability and even natralism are open intellectual

possibilities, however repgnant they might have been to him or dangeros to things of the deepest

importance to him, namely, that we have free will and that personal immortality is possible )for a fine

discssion of these isses, see Ameriks 777, postscript*!


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G! $he relationship of Kant to eid is interesting! Among other things, they were near-contemporaries

and some of the phrasing of views that Kant attacks is very similar to phrasing that eid sed! 3 explore

the matter briefly in 1, pp! 11-!

6! 3ndeed, what Kant called anthropology is very like what we wold now call behavioral psychology!

/e lectred on the sb#ect every year for decades and finally plled his lectres together into the little

Anthropology )1&'*! Oet not only does he not exempt what he called anthropology from his strictres

on the empirical doctrine of the sol, he does not even mention it when he is attacking empirical

methodsP

&! $he core of a transcendental argment is what we now call inference to the best explanation5

postlate nobservable mental mechanisms to explain observed behavior! $o be sre, Kant thoght

that he cold get more ot of his argments than #st 9best explanations%! /e had a tripartite doctrine of

the a priori. /e held that some featres of the mind and its knowledge had a priori origins, i!e!, mst be

in the mind prior to experience )becase sing them is necessary to have experience*! $hat mind and

knowledge has these featres are a priori trths, i!e!, 9necessary% and 9niversal% )B2(*! And we can

come to know these trths, or that they are a priori at any rate, only by sing a priori methods, i!e!, we

cannot learn these things from experience )B2*! Kant thoght that transcendental argments were a

priori or yielded the a priori in all three ways )Brook 12*! @onetheless, at the heart of this method is

inference to the best explanation! $he latter was #st the approach taken p by researchers when

introspection fell ot of favor abot 177 years ago! 3ts nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, is

now the ma#or method sed by experimental cognitive scientists!

'! )* is often taken to be closely related to another ptative pecliarity of consciosness of self, what

"hoemaker calls immnity to error throgh misidentification with respect to the first person


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)"hoemaker 1&7, who claims to have fond the core of the idea in

Kant - A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness

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