May 3rd, 2005 1 of 21

Central European UniversityMay 3rd, 2005

The Representational Base of Consciousness

Andrew Brook

Paul Raymont

Department of Philosophy &

Institute of Cognitive Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, ON, Canada

May 3rd, 2005 2 of 21

Kinds of consciousness

We can be conscious of:

• The world around us and, via proprioception, states of our own bodies

• Our own representational states (‘conscious of being conscious’)

• Ourselves as subject of these states

Our objective is to develop a theory of consciousness that unites the three kinds one with another and all of them with cognition.

Alternatives to our approach:

• Different theories for each kind of consciousness: e.g., creature vs state consciousness, access vs. phenomenal consciousness

• Consciousness separated from cognition: zombies and inverted spectrum thought-experiments

May 3rd, 2005 3 of 21

Representational base

Whether you hold that consciousness simply is something representational or cognitive or you hold that it is something different from representation or cognition, you will agree that it has a representational base.

Not all representations are conscious, not by anybody’s concept of consciousness. But consciousness has a representational base.

The two best worked-out views of the representational base:

• HOT model

• Transparency model

Big problems await both views.

Alternative? Self-presenting representations (SPR), aka a same- or single-order model. Our SPRs are of a rather special kind.

May 3rd, 2005 4 of 21

HOT and transparency

Thought (unconscious)

Perception Anything (or nothing)

Conscious state!!!!Conscious state!!!!

Transparency Model:

Conscious of world Anything (or nothing)Via (but not of) a

Representation

Consciousness of representation? (And of self?)

An inference from consciousness of

HOT model:

May 3rd, 2005 5 of 21

Principle of representation

Both HOT and transparency accept a certain Principle of Representation:

RP: Representations represent something other than themselves and only something other than themselves.

Not only do they accept PR. If RP were right, some form of the HOT model or transparency model would be the only options available.

May 3rd, 2005 6 of 21

HOT model: problems

However, the HOT model faces problems. Recall the model:

Thought (unconscious)

Perception Anything (or nothing)

Conscious state!!!!Conscious state!!!!

Thought: imagining oneself perceiving (Nothing)(Nothing) (Nothing)

Conscious state!!!!Conscious state!!!!

But what if the thought is about nothing real?

May 3rd, 2005 7 of 21

Transparency model: problems

The transparency model also faces problems. Again, recall how it goes:

Conscious of world Anything (or nothing)Via (but not of) a

representation

Consciousness of representations is by an inference from consciousness of

Problems:1. The step from consciousness of how something is represented to

consciousness of the representation is tiny. 2. Pains, itches, and other bodily sensations are not known via an

inference. (Dretske on pain)

3. No account of one content, two or more modes of representing: difference between seeing a corner and feeling a corner

May 3rd, 2005 8 of 21

RP vs. self-presenting representations

So let us take a look at RP. It is not obviously true: again, pains, itches, etc., and also mood states such as aimless depression

Is there an alternative to RP? Yes. Representings, at least some representings, may be self-presenting.

Consider 1.

1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me.

It is plausible to suggest that the representation expressed by 1. can make me conscious of three things:

the words on the screen in front of meam reading1. I

May 3rd, 2005 9 of 21

Representational base

This three-part structure is our candidate for the representational base of consciousness:

Representational baseus – an act of representing that is all the representation needed to be conscious not only of its object, if any, but also of the representing itself and of oneself as its subject.

Note the emphasis: other things may be needed, too.

The bar code as an analogy. • A bar code contains information about what it is ‘about’ (item and

price), about itself – a few of the bars are an integrity check on the bar code itself, and about the thing that has it.

• Or a gauge (Dretske favours this example but it does not in fact favour him).

May 3rd, 2005 10 of 21

Results so far

Even the results so far have a significant yield. They show that:

1. RP is far from obviously true

2. The idea behind transparency, that we are not directly aware of our representations, is false

3. HOTs are at best unnecessary

4. (And as a bonus) No Ich-Vorstellung is needed

Our notion of the representational base also gives us a unified account of the base of all three kinds of consciousness: of the world, of one’s own representational states, and of oneself as their subject.

So far, so good.

May 3rd, 2005 11 of 21

Global representationHowever, the base of consciousness is usually far ‘bigger’ than an individual representation, traditionally understood. It is usually a,

Global representation – representing many objects as a single complex object and/or taking up many representations as

traditionally conceived in a single representation.

Suppose that one has representings that could be expressed by: 1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me,2. I am puzzled by your comments3. I am enjoying the music I hear outside4. I believe our agreement was to meet at 6:005. I thought I understood Kant's notion of the object6. I wish the world were a fairer place

March 12th, 2004 12 of 22

Elements united in a global representation

• Here there are three different elements that could be united in a single global representation:

1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me

2. I am puzzled by your comments

3. I am enjoying the music I hear outside

4. I believe our agreement was to meet at 6:00

5. I thought I understood Kant's notion of the object

6. I wish the world were a fairer place

May 3rd, 2005 13 of 21

Joint consciousness

Central to the idea of a global representation of objects is what we will call joint consciousness:

Joint consciousness – to be conscious of an act of representing by having it, a feeling by feeling it, an action by doing it, and/or the

objects of these states, is to be conscious of other representings and/or objects in the same way, and of the group of them as a single group.

That is, the base of joint consciousness is representational acts of which one is aware simply by having, feeling, or doing them, and not (merely) as the object of some other representing.

May 3rd, 2005 14 of 21

Structure of a global representation

Representing is the representational base not only for consciousness of its object (if any), itself, and oneself. It is also the representational base for consciousness of all representings.

Three options for the structure of a global representation:

1. Component representings are the object of a H-O global representation.

2. Component representings combine in some single-order way.3. Component contents are taken up and integrated in a global representation but component representings are replaced by a single global representation.

James and arguably Kant believed 3. It is plausible and ontologically simpler than the alternatives. However, there are some prima facie serious objections to it.

May 3rd, 2005 15 of 21

Objections to single representation idea

Obj. 1 – Representation is polymodal: we see one thing, hear another, taste a third. Are not these each separate representations?

Response: Accounted for by the notion of objects in a single representation coming to us formatted or marked – some form of modality indicator.

Obj. 2 – Incompatible representations: binocular conflict, Necker cube.

Response: To be a problem for our view, incompatible representations would have to be,

X

simultaneous all in one subject

all simultaneously conscious for that subject

None of the cases just mentioned meets the third condition.

May 3rd, 2005 16 of 21

Objections to single representation idea 2.

Obj. 3 – Pictures within pictures

Response: Each blade of grass is a distinct picture? If not, i.e., if we have to stop somewhere, why not at the first step?

So where are we at?

Well, even after responding to these objections, we do not view the support that we have offered for 3., the idea that a global representation is not made up of component representations, as decisive.

However, it is fairly strong, certainly strong enough to justify us in accepting the view.

May 3rd, 2005 17 of 21

The challenge of externalism

Externalism, the general idea: (For all x) (if x represents, then something external to x is at work)

Externalism, the general problem:The content of conscious states seems to be entirely internal to them.Examples:

1. When I move to Timbuktu, the content of most of my conscious states continues unchanged.2. “When I close my eyes, I cease to see [the world around me]. The world does not vanish but something ceases to exist when I close my eyes. And this something has to be in me.” (Dretske 1995, p. 36)

The general conclusion:Conscious content is different from representational content.

May 3rd, 2005 18 of 21

Is externalism a problem for us?

Step 1. Grant at least most forms of externalism. Reason? “What [a brain state] represents . . . are not facts one can discover by looking in the cortex, at the representation. One could as well hope to figure out what, if anything, a voltage difference between two electrical contacts in a computer means (represents, signifies) by taking ever more exact measurements of the voltage.” (Dretske1995, p. 37)

Step 2. Distinguish:1. Something being external to a representation, traditionally conceived (to a mode of representing in our jargon), and,2. Something being external to a person, or at least not knowable by a person.

May 3rd, 2005 19 of 21

Is externalism a problem for us? 2.

Also distinguish, 3. An element external to a representation being known, and,4. not being known by the person who has the representation (hereafter, ‘us’).

Step 3. Distinguish four possibilities with respect to the external element.

The element external to a representation could be: • internal to us (e.g., function), or, • also external to us (e.g., causal or nomological link), and,• known by us (possible with most), or, • not know by us (Twin Earth)

May 3rd, 2005 20 of 21

Is externalism a problem for us? 3.

Step 4. Separate out the cases.

If the element external to a representation is either internal to us (e.g., function) or known by us (e.g., causal link or whatever), then it is available to be part of conscious content and there is no problem.

If the element external to a representation is both external to us and not known by us (e.g., twin earth), then it is not available to us cognitively at all.

If not, then it would not be part of conscious content. However, it would not be part of the representational content available to the organism either. So again , there would be no misalignment between conscious and representational content, none that mattered anyway.

(Shades of Fodor’s methodological individualism.)

Step 5. The conclusion. No form of externalism poses a threat to our picture of the representational base of consciousness.

May 3rd, 2005 21 of 21

Final remarks

A theory that the global representation is the representational base of three kinds of consciousness has some real strengths.

As we said, it opens the way to a unified account of the three kinds of consciousness, namely, consciousness of: the world; one’s own representations; and oneself as subject.

It also opens the way to an account of consciousness that unifies consciousness with the rest of representation and cognition.

And it opens the way to nice accounts of: •the unity of consciousness•consciousness of self and its special features, •the subject of consciousness.

Guess what the rest of our book is about?

May 3rd, 2005 22 of 21

Thank you

… and soon it will time for,

May 3rd, 2005 23 of 21

Acknowledgements

Paul Raymont, former SSHRC Post-doctoral Fellow and my

co-author, who contributed some of the key ideas in this paper.

Heidi Maibom, who helped us to think about externalism

more clearly.