Jurisprudence on Remedial Laws

8/12/2019 Jurisprudence on Remedial Laws

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JURISPRUDENCE ON REMEDIAL LAWS

Courts andtheirJurisdiction:

JURISDICTION; Supreme Court; Exclusive jurisdictionover appeals in criminal cases where the penalty imposedby the lower court is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonmentor death, even if the same decision further imposes alesser penalty or penalties for crimes arising out of the

same occurrence.

Limpangog v.C, !"#$%&&', (ov.&), #'''.

Same; Court of Appeals; *t has jurisdiction over allappeals from decisions of the +mbudsman inadministrative disciplinary cases.

irol v. -on.andiganbayan Justices,!" #$/'#$,(ov. %, #'''.

Same; Sandiganbayan; he andiganbayan had nojurisdiction where the original information did not mentionthat the offense committed is 0office1related.2 -owever,estoppel applies when jurisdiction was not raised.

ntiporda v.-on.!architorena,!" #$$&3',

4ec. &$,#'''.

Same; Same; 5nder " 3&%', the andiganbayan hasjurisdiction over the accused public officials +(L6 whenthey occupy positions corresponding to alary !rade &7 orhigher. " 7838 w9 respect to plunder cases to fall w9inthe andiganbayans jurisdiction is impliedly repealed.

+rgano v.andiganbayan, !"#$)'#), 4ec.#%, #'''.

Same; Same; 5t !lass muni!ipality mayors fall underte original and e"!lusi#e $urisdi!tion of teSandiganbayan; lthough municipal mayors are not

included in the enumeration under ection %.a. of "epublicct (o. 7'7/, Congress, nevertheless, provided a catchallproviso in paragraph ;/< thereof: 0ll other national andlocal officials classified as !rade &7 and higher under theCompensation and =osition Classification ct of #'3'.=ursuant thereto, ".. (o. )7/3 laid down the criteria andthen authori>ed the 4epartment of ?udget and@anagement ;4?@< to prepare the *ndex of +ccupationalervices, =osition itles and alary !rades. @unicipalmayors are assigned ! &7 in its two editions of #'3' and#''7. he fact that L65 is getting an amount less thanthat prescribed for ! &7 is entirely irrelevant for purposes

of determining the jurisdiction of the andiganbayanA hatL65 is receiving a rate within ! &/ should not,however, be construed to mean that she falls within theclassification of ! &/.

Layus v.andiganbayan, !"

#$%&7&, 4ec.3, #'''.

Same; Regional Trial Courts; *t has jurisdiction over anaction to rescind a sale made upon prior authority of aprobate court.his does not constitute an interference orreview of a co1eBual court since the probate court has no

jurisdiction over the Buestion of title to subject properties.

@odina v. C,!" #8'$//,+ct. &', #'''.

Same; Same; he amended complaint sought to enjoin

petitioners from rescinding the contract and taing over theproperty. Dhile possession was a necessary conseBuenceof the suit, it was merely incidental. he main issue is therescission of the agreement, a dispute incapable ofpecuniary estimationA hence, w9in the jurisdiction of the"C.

?@ v.

5niversal *ntl.!roup ofaiwan, !"#$#)38, ept.#%, &888.

Same; Same; he original complaint ;for specificperformance and damages< of against F was w9in the

jurisdiction of the trial court. he amended complaints w9

Fue v. C,!" #$/%%&,

ug. $#,


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regard to F alleged substantially the same causes ofaction against F and new causes of action against ! ;thecondominium project developer< and its officers. *nsofar asthe causes of action directed against F, they were still w9inthe jurisdiction of the trial court. 6et, w9 regard to thecauses of action against ! and its officers, the -L5"?had jurisdiction over them pursuant to ec. #, =4 #$%%.

nyway, the filing of the first amended complaint did notresult in ousting the trial court of its jurisdiction over theentire case because it retained jurisdiction over the causeof action filed against F.

&888.

Same; Same; %O&D'D()ARTUR( ORD(RS; CCircular $'1'7 dated #', #''7 limits the authority to the"C in criminal cases w9in its exclusive jurisdiction.

4eparture+rder *ssued?y Judge

balos, @''1'1#%#1@CC, (ov.&/, #'''.

Same; O#er te Sub$e!t *atter; it is determined by theallegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or notthe plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of theclaims asserted therein. uch jurisdiction cannot be madeto depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or themotion to dismiss, for otherwise, the Buestion of

jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon thedefendant.

ps. "omanCru> v. ps.orres, !"#'$', +ct.%, #'''.

Same; Same; he issue is whether jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the complaint is vested w9 the regular

courts or the E"?. he complaint does not charge anyviolation of either currency exchange rate adjustment;CE"< or power cost adjustment ;=C


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the FC court acBuired jurisdiction over the case, itexcluded all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction fromacBuiring jurisdiction over the same. he @anila court is,therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the complaint filedresulting in the herein assailed decision w9c must perforcebe declared null and void.

(ationalCereals +ilandGoodstuffs*mport andExport Corp.,!" #$#/8&,June 3, &888.

Forum Non Conveniens; =hilippine court or agencymay assume jurisdiction over the case if it C-++E todo so provided : HiI he =hil. Court is one to w9c the partiesmay conveniently resort toA HiiI he =hil. Court is in aposition to mae an intelligent decision as to the law andthe factsA and HiiiI he =hil. Court has or is liely to havepower to enforce its decision. *n this case, all the incidentsoccurred outside the =hilippines. ll acts complained oftoo place in China. nd the decision of the (L"C wouldhave no binding effect on the employer, w9c wasincorporated under the laws of China and was not evenserved w9 summons. -owever, if private respondent were0overseas contract worer2, a =hilippine forum, specificallythe =+E, not the (L"C, would protect him.

he @anila-otel Corp. v.(L"C, !"#&8877, +ct.#$, &888.

C**L="+CE145"E:

+rdinaryCivil ction

+(N(RA& )RINCI)&(S; &iberal Interpretation of)ro!edural Rules; he general aim of procedural law isto facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims ofcontending parties, bearing always in mind that proceduralrules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate andpromote the administration of justice. Courts in theexercise of their functions, and in rendering decisions,must not be too dogmatic as to restrict itself to literalinterpretations of words, phrases and sentencesA acomplete and holistic view must be taen in order torender a just and eBuitable judgment. *t is far better todispose of the case on the merits which is a primordial endrather than on a technicality, if it be the case, that mayresult in injustice. Considering that the instant caseinvolves a si>able sum of money, the overridingconsideration of a judgment based on the merits shouldprevail over the primordial interests of strict enforcementon matters of technicalities.

@aunladavings andLoan ssn v.C, !"##%'%&, (ov.&%, &888.

Same; Same; *n the interest of substantial justice,procedural rules of the most mandatory character in termsof compliance may be relaxed. *n other words, if strictadherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdityand manifest injustice or where the merit of a partyKscause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non1compliance with certain formal reBuirements, proceduralrules should definitely be liberally construed. party1litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish themerits of his complaint or defense rather than for him tolose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.

6ao v. C,!" #$&%&3,+ct. &%, &888.

CAUS( O, ACTION; Definition and (lements- causeof action is an act or omission of one party the defendantin violation of the legal right of the other. he elements of acause of action are:;#< a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever meansand under whatever law it arises or is createdA;&< an obligation on the part of the named defendant to

"elucio v.Lope>, !"#$3%'7, Jan.#), &88&.


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respect or not to violate such rightA and;$< an act or omission on the part of such defendant inviolation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breachof the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for whichthe latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may berendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted orapproved.

Same; *otion to Dismiss; *n order to sustain a motion todismiss for lac of cause of action, the complaint mustshow that the claim for relief does not exist, rather thanthat a claim has been merely defectively stated or isambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.

4ulay v. C,&%$ C"&&8 H#''/I.

Same; RU&( ON S)&ITTIN+ A SIN+&( CAUS( O,ACTION; he landmar case of ?achrach @otor Co. v.*carangal, )3 =hil &37 is still good law and has not beenoverruled that a party cannot, by varying the form of

action or adopting a different method of presenting hiscase, escape the operation of the principle that one andthe same cause of action shall not be twice litigatedbetween the same parties or their privies. Dhile alternativeremedies are available under the rule, a party may opt toexercise only one of them so as not to violate the rule.

?an ofmerica v.merican"ealty Corp.,

!" #$$37),4ec. &',#'''.

Same; *otion to Dismiss; he trial court and the Cshould not have been too rigid in applying the rule that inresolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure tostate a cause of action, only the averments of thecomplaint and no other are to be considered. he rule

admits of e"!eptions: ;#< all documents attached to thecomplaint, the due execution and genuineness of w9c arenot denied under oath by the defendant, must beconsidered as part of the complaint, w9o need ofintroducing evidence thereonA and ;&< other pleadingssubmitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, maybe considered in deciding whether the complaint should bedismissed for lac of cause of action.

lberto v. C,!" ##'833,June $8,&888.

Same; .ased on Do!ument;ec. 7, "ule 3 of the #''7"ules of Civil =rocedure should be read in conjunction w9ec. ' of "ule #$8 of the "evised "ules of Evidence.

Dhile the specific denial in the original answer was notunder oath and thus gave rise to the implied admission ofthe genuineness and due execution of the contents of thepromissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony,was able to put in issue and present parol evidence tocontrovert the terms of the promissory note, which areessentially the bedroc of his defense. he presentation ofthe contrariant evidence for and against imputations ofgenuineness and due execution undoubtedly cured,clarified or expanded, as the case may be, whateverdefects in the pleadings or vagueness in the issues theremight have been as presented in the original answer.

@aunladavings andLoan ssn v.

Ca, &888.

JOIND(R O, CAUS(S O, ACTION; he joinder of twocauses of action is mandated by the need to avoidmultiplicity of suits and to promote the efficientadministration of justice. Dhile the rule allows a plaintiff to

join as many separate claims as he may have, thereshould be some unity in the problem presented and acommon Buestion of law and the fact involved M subjectalways to the restrictions regarding jurisdiction, venue and

joinder of parties.

?ernardo v.C, !"###7#/, June3, &888.


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)arties; R(A& )ART/ IN INT(R(ST; real party ininterest is one who stands Nto be benefited or injured bythe judgment of the suit.

"ule $, ec.&, "evised"ules ofCourt.alonga v.Darner?arnes O Co.,Ltd., 33 =hil.#&/ H#'/#IA"epublic v.andiganbayan, &8$ C"$#8 H#''#I.

Same; Same; *t is the partnership, not its officers oragents, w9c should be impleaded in any litigation involvingproperty registered in its name.

guila v. C,!" #&7$%7,(ov. &/,#'''.

Same; Same;s Creditor, he does not have any materialinterest to sue for rescission of the contract entered into byhis debtor. -is right against the debtor is only personalright to receive payment for the loanA it is not a real rightover the lot subject of the deed of sale.

dorable v.C, !"##'%)), (ov.&/, #'''.

Same; Same; he widow of the assured of mortgageredemption insurance may file the suit for insurance claimagainst the insurer.

!"E=L*GEv. C, !"##$3'', +ct.#$, #'''.

Same; Same; deceased person or his estate cannot besued as defendant in an action for a sum of moneyA w9cdoes not survive the deceased.

entura v.-on. @ilitante,!" )$#%/,+ct. /, #'''.

Same; Same; if petitioner is not a real party in interest,she cannot be an indispensable party. =etitionerKsparticipation is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial courtcan issue a judgment ordering lberto J. Lope> to maean accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent,and give support to respondent and their children, anddissolve lberto J. Lope>K conjugal partnership with

respondent, and forfeit lberto J. Lope>K share in propertyco1owned by him and petitioner. uch judgment would beperfectly valid and enforceable against lberto J. Lope>.

"elucio v.Lope>, !"#$3%'7, Jan.#), &88&.

Same; INDIS)(NSA.&( )ART/;n indispensable partyis one without whom there can be no final determination ofan action.

"ule $, ec.7, "evised"ules ofCourt.

Same; Same; in an action for Buieting of title, recovery ofpossession and ownership of a parcel of land, anddamages, the mortgagee of the eBuipment and other

improvements on the land is not an indispensable part, ifthe said mortgage does not claim any right to ownership orpossession of such real estate.

"epublic v.-eirs of@agdato, !"

#$73/7, ept.##, &888.

Same; Transfer of Interest 0Se!1 23 Rule 43 ROC; transferee pendenet lite is a proper party M not anindispensable party. uch transferee does not have to beimpleaded in order to be bound by the judgment becausethe action may be continued for or against the originalparty or the transferor and still be binding on the

?an ofmerica v.merican"ealty Corp.,!" #$$37),4ec. &',


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dismissal of the complaint motu proprio, as the same maybe waived, unlie absence in jurisdiction.

-oldings v."egister of4eeds, !"#$$&%8, (ov.#/, &888.

)&(ADIN+S;he allegations in the pleadings determine

the nature of the action and the court shall grant reliefwarranted by the allegations and the proof even if no suchrelief is prayed for. hus, even if the complaint sees thedeclaration of nullity of the contract, the C correctly ruledthat the factual allegations contained therein ultimatelysee the return of the excess interest paid.

?anco Gilipino

avings and@ortgage?an v. C,!" #&'&&7,@ay $8, &888.

Same; 6(RI,ICATION; he reBuirement regardingverification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. uchreBuirement is simply a condition affecting the form ofpleading, the non1compliance of which does notnecessarily render the pleading fatally defective.

erification is simply intended to secure an assurance thatthe allegations in the pleading are true and correct and notthe product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,and that the pleading is filed in good faith. he court mayorder the correction of the pleading if verification is lacingor act on the pleading although it is not verified, if theattending circumstances are such that strict compliancewith the rules may be dispensed with in order that theends of justice may thereby be served. he court mayorder the correction of the pleading if verification is lacingor act on the pleading although it is not verified.

5y v. L?=,!" #$)#88,July &%, &888.

Same; C(RTI,ICAT( O, NON',ORU* S%O))IN+; hereBmt to file such certificate ;dmin Circular (o. 8'1'%,now ec /, "ule 7, "+C< is @(4+"6. hereBuirement applies to any complaint, petition, application,or any initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the partyfiling has actually committed forum shopping. his reBmt isseparate from, and independent of, the avoidance offorum1shopping itself. (on1compliance w9 this reBmtcannot be excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty offorum shopping. ubseBuent compliance therewith doesnot excuse a partys failure to comply in the first place. sto the imposable sanction, failure to comply w9 thecertification reBmt is merely a cause for dismissal w9oprejudice of the complaint or initiatory pleadingA on theother hand, forum shopping is a ground for summarydismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt.

@elo v. C,!" #&$)3),(ov. #),#'''.

Same; Same; he provisions of dmin Circular (o. 8%1'%reBuiring the inclusion of a certification of non1forumshopping do not apply to compulsory counterclaims.

ps.=onciano v.-on.=arentela, !"#$$&3%, @ay', &888.

Same; Same; he lac of certification against forumshopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable bythe submission thereof after the filing of the petition. ec./, "ule %/ of the "ules of Court provides that the failure ofpetitioner to submit the reBuired documents that shouldaccompany the petition, including the certification againstforum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissalthereof. *n some cases though, the Court deemed thebelated filing of the certification as 5?(*LC+@=L*(CE. H#I filing of the certification, a day after the

5y v. L?=,!" #$)#88,July &%, &888.


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filing of an election protest and while within thereglementary period QLoyola vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA477 (15!RA H&Ithe submission of the certification after thefiling of the petition since dministrative Circular 8%1'%was then in effect for only a little over a month when thecomplaint was filed Q"avinta vs. Castillo, #r., 24 SCRA $%4(15!R. he admission of the petition after the belatedfiling of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. *nthose cases where the Court excused non1compliancewith the reBuirements, there were special circumstancesor compelling reasons maing the strict application of therule clearly unjustified.

Same; Same; Certification executed by lawyers of thepetitioners is not correct and could have warranted theoutright dismissal of their actions. ?ut the Court relaxedthe rule in order to resolve the petitions on their merits asa matter of social justice involving labor and capital.

4amasco v.(L"C, !"##/7//, 4ec.%, &888A@actan1Cebu*ntl. irport

uthority v.C, !"#$''%/, (ov.&7, &888.

Same; COUNT(RC&AI*; counterclaim is any claimwhich a defending party may have against an opposingparty. ;ection ), "ule ), #''7 "evised "ules on Civil=rocedure


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/3''7, @ay &3, #'33man, .@.(o. @J1881#&'), +ct. /,&888.

Same; SU**ONS; Ser#i!e of; )ersonal andSubstituted ser#i!e;ection ), "ule #% of the "ules ofCourt, reBuires that summons must be served personallyon the defendant. -owever, should personal service be

unattainable, substituted service may be availed of underection 7, "ule #%, which provides that *f, for justifiablecauses, the defendant cannot be served personally withina reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,service may be effected ;a< by leaving copies of thesummons at the defendantKs residence with some personof suitable age and discretion residing therein, or ;b< byleaving the copies at defendantKs office or regular place ofbusiness with some competent person in charge thereof.N*n a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibilityof personal service justifying availment of substitutedservice should be explained in the proof of serviceA why

efforts exerted towards personal service failed. hepertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the serviceof summons must be stated in the proof of service or+fficerKs "eturnA otherwise, the substituted service cannotbe upheld. *t bears stressing that since service ofsummons, especially for actions in personam, is essentialfor the acBuisition of jurisdiction over the person of thedefendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly

justified. Gailure to do so would invalidate all subseBuentproceedings on jurisdictional grounds. dministrativeCircular (o. /' was precisely issued by this Court tostress the importance of strict compliance with thereBuisites for a valid substituted service.

@adrigal v.C, !"#&''//, (ov.&), #'''.

Same; Same; (9TRA'T(RRITORIA& S(R6IC( O,SU**ONS; Dhen the defendant is an non1resident and isnot found in the country, summons may be served on himextra1territorially in accordance w9 ec. #7, "ule #% of the"ules of the Court. here are only four instances whenextra1territorial service of summons is proper: ;#< when theaction affects the personal status of the plaintiffA ;&< whenthe action relates to, or the subject of which is, propertyw9in the =hils., in w9c the defendant claims a lien orinterest, actual or contingentA ;$< when the reliefdemanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, inexcluding the defendant from any interest in propertylocated in the =hils.A and ;%< when the defendant non1residents property has been attached w9in the =hils. inthese instances, service of summons may be effected by;a< personal service out of the country, w9 leave of courtA;b< publication, also w9 leave of courtA or ;c< any othermanner the court may deem sufficient.

?anco de?ra>il v. C,!" #/7)8173, June #),&888.

Same; Same; Same; here can be no dispute that service 5mandap v.


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of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order thata court may acBuire jurisdiction over his person. ny

judgment without such service in the absence of a validwaiver is null and void. =ursuant to ect. ), "ule #% of the"evised "ules of Court, the general rule in this jurisdictionis that summons must be served personally on thedefendant. -owever, when the defendant cannot beserved personally within a reasonable time after efforts tolocate him have failed, substituted service may be madeunder ect. 7, "ule #% of the "evised "ules of Court. hetwo modes for effecting substituted service of summonsare: ;a< by leaving copies of the summons at thedefendantKs residence with some person of suitable ageand discretionA and ;b< by leaving copies at defendantKsoffice or regular place of business with some competentperson in charge thereof. mong these two modes ofsubstituted service, the sheriff or the process server maychoose that which will more liely insure the effectivenessof the service.

abio, !"#%8&%%, ug.&', &888.

Same; S(R6IC( O, )&(ADIN+S AND OT%(R)A)(RS; Ser#i!e of Noti!e; Dhen a party is representedby counsel, service of notice should be made uponcounsel and not upon the party.

@ancenido v.C, !"##3)8/, pril#&, &888.

Same; Same; Dhere it is reBuired by the rules to befurnished to the parties must be made at their last nownaddress on record. *f they are represented by counsel,such notice shall be sent instead to the counsels lastgiven address on record in absence of a proper andadeBuate notice to the court of a change of address,unless service upon the party himself is ordered by thecourt.

hermochemv. (aval, !"#$#/%#, +ct.&8, &888.

Same; Same; Ser#i!e by Registered *ail; it is completeupon actual receipt by the addressee. he best evidenceto prove this mode of service is a CE"*G*C*+( G"+@-E =+@E" not only that the notice was issued orsent but also as to -+D, D-E(, and + D-+@ thedelivery was made.

brajano v.C, !"#&7873, +ct.#$, &888.

Same; Same; Re8uirement of (9)&ANATION O,S(R6IC(; ervice by registered mail 0due to limitations in

time and distance2 is sufficient.

ecurity ?anv. Cuenca,

!" #$3/%%,+ct. $, &888.

Same; NOTIC(3 S(R6IC( AND R(TURN O, *OTIONS; "5LE, motions must comply w9 ecs. %, / and ) of"ule #/ of the "ules of Court, reBuiring notice to be sentat least $ days before the hearing ;$ days1notice rule


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opportunity to defend himself and pursue his appeal.

Same; NOTIC( O, LIS PENDENS; 5nder "ule #$, ec.#% of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. nd ec. 7) of =4#/&', it is clear that such notice is proper only in actions:H#I to recover possession of real estateA H&I to Buite titleA H$Ito remove clouds of doubt thereonA H%I for partitionA and H/I

any other proceedings in court directly affecting the title toland or the use or occupation thereof or the buildingthereon. (otice of Lis &endensmay be cancelled onlyon two grounds: HaI if the annotation was for the purposeof molesting the title of the adverse partyA or HbI when theannotation is not necessary to protect the title of the partywho caused it to be recorded.

6ared v.*larde, !"##%7$&, ug.#, &888.

Same; ANS:(R; he period to file an answer is notinterrupted by a petition for certiorari, unless a "+ or writof prelim. *njunction is issued against further proceedingsin the case. n application for certiorari is an independent

action w9c is not part or continuation of the trial thatresulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.

ps. 4ia> v.4ia>, !"#$/33/, pril&3, &888.

Same; *OTION ,OR (9T(NSION O, TI*( TO ,I&(*OTION ,OR N(: TRIA& OR R(CONSID(RATION; (osuch motion may be filed w9 the @etropolitan or @unicipalrial Court, "C or C. aid motion may be filed only incases pending before the C. ;(ote: 4octrine ofprohibition to file extension of time to file @" or (ew rial.il v. C,!" #/7)8173, June #),

&888.

DIS*ISSA& O, ACTION; &a! of Cause of A!tion;s aground, it must appear on the face of the complaint itself,meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of

ergara v.C, !"##7'&', (ov.


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the complaint and from none other. &), #'''.

Same; Same; *na motion to dismiss based on failure tostate a cause of action, there cannot be any Buestion offact or doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood ofacts, simply because there no findings of fact in the firstplace. Dhat the trial court merely does is to apply the law

to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming suchallegations to be true. herefore, a decision dismissing acomplaint based on failure to state a cause of actionnecessarily precludes a review of the same decision onBuestion of fact.

China "oadand ?ridgeCorp. v. C,!" #$73'3,4ec. #/,

&888.

Same; )res!ription of A!tion ; dministrative and civilactions for failure to remit contributions prescribed in&8 years from the time the delinBuency is nown or theassessment is made by the , or from the benefitaccrues, as the case may be. Criminal actions for violationof the law prescribe in % years.

Lo v. C, !"#&3))7, 4ec.#7, #'''.

Same; Same; :arsa7 Con#ention; he DarsawConvention does not regulate or exclude liability for otherbreaches of contract by the carrier for the misconduct of itsofficers and employees, or for some particular orexceptional type of damages. *t does not preclude theoperation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. Gormisconduct of carriers officers and EEs, complaint maybe filed w9in & years. Dith respect to breaches under theCivil Code, under rt ##%) on orts prescribes in % years.

nd for loss or damage, the & year limitation is countedfrom the date of arrival at the place of destination.

EPCE=*+( to & year limitation is that where the carrieremployed delaying tactics.

5nitedirlines v. 5y,!" #&77)3,(ov. #',#'''.

Same; Same; An A!tion for Re!on#eyan!e basedupon an Implied Trust prescribes in #8 years from theregistration of the deed or from the issuance of the title.

-eirs ofJoaBuineves v. C,!" #8'')$,+ct. #$, #'''.

Same; Same; he issue of prescription and laches cannotbe resolved on the basis solely of the complaint. 5nderec $, "ule $ of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., deferment

of the resolution is no longer permitted. he court mayeither grant the motion to dismiss, deny it, or order for theamendment of the pleading.

(* v. C,!" #&'#)',(ov. #7,

#'''.

Same; ,orum Sopping; =etition for the ex1parteissuance of a writ of possession involves a different causeof action from the complaint of *njunction. Dhile therespondent sought to enjoin the consolidation of title.=etitioners action is founded on C $#$/ w9c gives thepurchaser at public auction the right to have possession ofthe property sold to him during the redemption period evenif eventually they do not succeed in consolidating their title

to it. +n the other hand, private respondents action isbased on " $$7 w9c gives a mortgagor the right toredeem the property sold at foreclosure sale w9in # yearthereof.

@elo v. C,supra.

Same; Same; Dhere a motion is filed in the trial court andthen a petition to the C, a clear case of forum shopping.he motion and the petition pertain to the same subject.Gorum shopping occurs not only when a final judgment inone case will amount to res udicata in another, but also

Fuinsay v.C, !"#&78/3, ug.$#, &888.


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when the elements of litis pendencia are present. hefiling of multiple suits involving the same parties for thesame cause of action, either simultaneously orsuccessively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable

judgment amounts to forum shopping.

Same; Same; here is forum shopping whenever, as a

result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party sees afavorable opinion ;other than by appeal or certiorari< inanother.

=ET v.

ian>on, !"#$#8&8, July&8, &888.

Same; Same; party is not permitted to pursuesimultaneous remedies in two different fora. his practiceridicules the judicial process. =lays havoc w9 the rules oforderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the otherparties to the case.

-eirs of=enaverde v.-eirs of=enaverde,!" #$##%#,+ct. &8, &888

Same; Same; Gorum shopping is extant when a partyrepetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in

different venues, simultaneously or successively, allsubstantially founded on the same transactions, essentialfacts and circumstances, all raising substantially the sameissues and involving exactly the same parties. *n the caseat bar, he proper remedy of the respondents of thedecision of the @C is to appeal to the "C under "ule%8, ec. # of the "ules of Court. -owever, assailing the@Cs order of execution may be too slow and inadeBuateto prevent the injurious effect of respondents imminentdispossession of the property. hus, filing of a petition forcertiorari on the execution order of the lower court isproper. ?ut such petition of the respondents was notlimited for said purpose as they liewise assailed the maindecision of the @C. his is improper as appeal is stilltheir appropriate remedy under the rules. Dhatcompounded the mateer is that the respondents hadalready a pending notice of appeal w9 the @C. Clearly, byappealing the decision of the @C and the subseBuentpetition for certiorari, respondents are guilty of forumshopping w9c carries the sanction of dismissal of both thepetition and the appeal.

Candido v.Camacho, !"

#$)7/#, Jan.#/, &88&.

Same; &a!es; s to the defenses of laches andprescription, they are evidentiary in nature which could notbe established by mere allegations in the pleadings andmust not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. hose issuesmust be resolved at the trial of the case on the meritswherein both parties will be given ample opportunity toprove their respective claims and defenses. 5nder the rulethe deferment of the resolution of the said issues was,thus, in order. n allegation of prescription can effectivelybe used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint onits face shows that indeed the action has alreadyprescribed. *n the instant case, the issue of prescriptionand laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of thecomplaint. *t must, however, be pointed that under the newrules, deferment of the resolution is no longer permitted.he court may either grant the motion to dismiss, deny it,or order the amendment of the pleading.

(* v. C,supraA -eirsof JoaBuineves v. C,supra.

Same; Same; (stoppel; Laches is the failure or neglect,for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to dothat w9c, by exercising due diligence, could or should havebeen done earlier, warranting the presumption that theright holder has abandoned that right or declined to assertit. his inaction or neglect to assert a right converts a validclaim into a stale demand. Laches prevents a litigant from

tilianopulosv. City ofLegaspi, !"#$$'#$, +ct.#&, #'''.


15/83

raising the issue of lac of jurisdiction.

Same; Litis Pendencia; "eBuisites: ;#< identity of partiesor at least such as to represent the same interest in bothactionsA ;&< identity of rights asserted and relief prayed forfounded on the same actsA and ;$< the identity of the twocases where judgment rendered in one amounts to res

udicatain the other. third1party claim against a draweeban and the ancillary claim against the drawee ban inanother case constitute litis pendencia.

Cebu *ntlGinance Corp.v. C, !"#&$8$#, +ct.#&, #'''.

Same; Res Judi!ata; "eBuisites: ;#< a judgment hasbecome finalA ;&< such judgment was rendered on themeritsA ;$< the court that rendered it has jurisdiction overthe subject matter and the partiesA and ;%< there is identityof parties, subject matter and causes of action betweenthe previous and subseBuent actions. here is identity of!ause of a!tion between a case for nnulment of itleand one for nnulment of Judgment.Causes of action are

identical when there is an identity in the facts essential tothe maintenance of the two actions. *f the same facts orevidence can sustain either, the two actions areconsidered the same, so that the judgment in one is a barto the other.


Same; Same; "es judicata is a ground for dismissal of anaction when as between the action sought to be dismissedand the other action these elements are presentA ;# v. C,!" #$/#8#,@ay $#, &888.

Same; No res $udi!ata 7en te pre#ious order in8uestion is interlo!utory because it reBuired the partiesto perform certain acts for final determination.

=ere> v. C,!" #877$7,+ct. #, #'''.

Same; Con!lusi#eness of Judgment; he ruleprecludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue inanother action between the same parties based on adifferent claim or cause of action. he previous judgmentis conclusive in the second case, only as to those mattersactually and directly controverted and determined and notas to matters merely involved therein.

"i>al urety O*nsurance v.C, !"##&$)8, July#3, &888.

Same; Same; he doctrine of res udicata has twoaspects, to wit: ;#< the effect of a judgment as bar to theprosecution of a second action upon the same claim,

demand or cause of actionA and ;&< preclude re1litigation ofa particular fact or issue in another action between thesame parties on a different claim or cause of action.

errano v.C, !"#&&'$8, Geb.

), &88&.

Res Judicata


16/83

only as a rule of policy and not as one of law. he rulingcovered by the doctrine on the law of the case is adheredto in the single case where it arises, but is not carried intoother cases as a precedent. +n the other hand, under thedoctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law has beenestablished by the court, that point of law will, generally,be followed by the same court and by all courts of lowerran in subseBuent cases where the same legal issue israised.

Same; *otion to Dismiss and CompulsoryCounter!laim; In!ompatible Remedies1*n the event thata defending party has a ground for dismissal and acompulsory counterclaim at the same time, he mustchoose only one remediy. *f he decides to file a motion todismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. ?ut if heopts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may stillplead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense inhis answer. he latter option is obviously more favorableto defendant.

Ginancial?uilding Corpv. Gorbes=ar ssn.,!" #$$##',

ug. #7,&888.

Same; Same; %earing; preliminary hearing onaffirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motionto dismiss has been filed ;ec. ) of "ule #) of the #''7"ules of Civil =roc.


17/83

impleaded, ergo, they could not intervene. *t is now a mustprinciple of justice that a right cannot arise from a wrong.

Same; motion for intervention must be filed beforerendition of judgment. party cannot be allowed tointervene as his interest was already represented by hispredecessor in interest.

eveses v.C, !"#8&)7/, +ct.#$, #'''.

Same; t the execution stage of the decision, *t is notappropriate for petitioner to intervene.

?oncodin v.C, !"#$87/7, Jan.#3, &88&.

SU**AR/ JUD+*(NT; !enuine *ssue has beendefined as an issue in fact w9c9 calls for the presentation ofevidence, as distinguished from an issue w9c is sham,fictitious, contrived or patently unsubstantiated as not toconstitute a genuine issue for trial. *n proceedings forsummary judgment, the court is merely expected to act

chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the case.he hearing contemplated in the rules is not de ri)uerasits purpose is merely to determine whether the issues aregenuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issuesset up in the pleadings. he reBmt. *n "ule $/, ec. $ thatthe opposing party be furnished a copy of the motion #8days before the time specified for the hearing applies tothe motion for summary judgment itself and not to themotion to resolve such motion.

LeyConstructionand4evelopmentCorp. v. 5nion?an of the

=hils., !"#$$38#, June&7, &888.

Same; ,un!tion of te Court; 5pon a motion forsummary judgment, the sole function of the court is to

determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to betried, and nay doubt as to the existence of an issue of factmust be resolved against the movant.

!arcia v. C,!" ##78$&,

July &7, &888.

JUD+*(NT ON T%( )&(ADIN+S distinguised fromSU**AR/ JUD+*(NT; he existence or appearance ofostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, andtheir sham or fictitious character, on the other, are whatdistinguish a proper case for summary judgment from onefor a judgment on the pleadings . *n a proper case for

judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue atall because of the failure of the defending partyKs answer

to raise an issue. +n the other hand, in the case of asummary judgment, issues apparently exist U i.e. factsare asserted in the complaint regarding which there is asyet no admission, disavowal or BualificationA or specificdenials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in theanswer U but the issues thus arising from the pleadingsare sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits,depositions, or admissions. *n other words, a judgment onthe pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, whilea summary judgment is a judgment on the facts assummarily proven by affidavits, depositions, oradmissions. s such, even if the answer does tender

issues U and therefore a judgment on the pleadings is notproper U a summary judgment may still be rendered onthe plaintiffs motion if he can show that the issues thustendered are not genuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, setup in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial. ## he trial courtcan determine whether there is a genuine issue on thebasis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavitsand9or counter1affidavits submitted by the parties to thecourt.

(arra*ntergratedCorp. v. C,!" #$7'#/,(ov. #/,&888.


18/83

Same; trial court may render a judgment on thepleadings or summary judgment even if there is pendingbefore the same court, a third1party complaint.

id.

Admission by Ad#erse )arty; :ritten Re8uest forAdmission 0Se!tion =3 Rule >? of te Rules of Court;here is no reason to strictly construe the phrase Nthe

party to whom the reBuest is directedN to refer solely orpersonally to the petitioners themselves. he writtenreBuest addressed to a partys counsel may be answeredby said counsel in behalf of his client. he application ofthe rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sounddiscretion of the court. *n the same vein, the determinationof the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails tocomply with the modes of discovery rests on the samesound judicial discretion. *t is the duty of the courts toexamine thoroughly the circumstances of each case andto determine the applicability of the modes of discovery,bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditiousadministration of justice. *t need not be emphasi>ed thatupon the courtKs shoulders liewise rests the burden ofdetermining whether the response of the reBuested partyis a specific denial of the matters reBuested for admission.

LaVada, .Ca, !"#8&$'8, Geb.

#, &88&.

)R('TRIA&; is indispensable in any civil or criminal actionas clearly laid out in "ule #3 and "ule ##3 of the "+C. *tis a procedural device to limit the issues to be tacled andproved at the trial, in eeping w9 the mandate of theConstitution to accord every person the right to a speedydisposition of their cases.

bubaar v.bubaar, !"#$%)&&, +ct.&&, #'''.

Same; Stipulations of ,a!t; party may be allowed toshow that an admission made in a stipulation of facts isthe result of a 0palpable mistae2 that can easily beverified from the stipulated facts themselves and fromother incontrovertible pieces of evidence admitted by theother party.

tlasConsolidated@ining v. C*",!" #$%%)7,(ov. #7,#'''.

D(*URR(R TO (6ID(NC(; Dhen a demurrer toevidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, thereviewing court cannot remand the case for furtherproceedings. "ather, it should render judgment on thebasis of the evidence proferred by the plaintiff.

"adiowealthGinance Co.v. ps.icente, !"#&37$', July

), &888.

JUD+*(NTS3 ,INA& ORD(RS;s a rule, the portion ofa decision that becomes the subject of execution is thatordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof.Exception to the rule.

Espina v. C,!" ##)38/,June &&,&888.

Same; ,INA&IT/ O, JUD+*(NT; Immutability)rin!iple; Dhen a judgment becomes final and executory,it becomes immutable and unalterable and anyamendment or alteration ;including the entire proceedingsheld for that purposeardo v.@ontano, !"#$333&, @ay#&, &888.


19/83

Same; Same; judgment becomes final upon the lapseof the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal isperfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.he trial court need not pronounce the finality of the orderas the same becomes final by operation of law. he trialcourt cannot even validly entertain a motion forreconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taingan appeal. hus, it does not matter that the opposing partyfailed to object to the timeliness of the motion forreconsideration or that the court denied the same ongrounds other than timeliness, considering that at the timethe motion was filed, the order had become final andexecutory.

estateEstate of?iascan v.?iascan, !"#$37$#, 4ec.##, &888.

Same; Same; Rationale and )rin!iple; HiI =ublic policydictates that when a judgment becomes final andexecutory, the prevailing party should not be denied thefruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by thelosing party (*uerta Al+a Resort v. Ca, R 12-5$7, Sept. 1,2%%%!A HiiI Courts are duty1bound to put an end tocontroversies. ny attempt to prolonged, resurrect or

juggle them should be firmly struc down. he system ofjudicial review should not be misused and abused toevade the operation of final and executory judgments(uaya v. Stron)/old 0nsurance, R 1%2%, ct. 11, 2%%%!A HiiiI

decision that has attained finality becomes the law of thecase, regardless of any claim that is erroneous ;id.


20/83

shall be adjudged on unliBuidated claims or damagesexcept when or until the demand can be established w9reasonable certainty. Dhen such certainty cannot be soreasonably established at the time the demand is made,the interest shall begin to run only from the date the

judgment of the court is made ;at w9c time theBuantification of damages may be deemed to havereasonably ascertained


21/83

that affidavits of recantation made by a witness after theconviction of the accused deserve only scantconsideration. @oreover, there is nothing in said affidavit,which would support a different conclusion.

Same; Same; ll three ;$< reBuisites must characteri>ethe evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. he

second reBuisite reBuires reasonable diligence in obtainingsuch evidence during the trial but could not. *n this case,the reBuirement of reasonable diligence has not been metby the petitioners.*t has been held that a lac of diligenceis exhibited where the newly discovered evidence wasnecessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existencemust have occurred to the party in the course of thepreparation of the case, but no effort was made to secureitA there is a failure to mae inBuiry of persons who wereliely to now the facts in Buestion, especially whereinformation was not sought from co1partiesA there is afailure to see evidence available through public recordsAthere is a failure to discover evidence that is within thecontrol of the complaining partyA there is a failure to followleads contained in other evidenceA and, there is a failure toutili>e available discovery procedures. hus the testimonyof Judge 4urias cannot be considered as newlydiscovered evidence to warrant a new trial.s early as thepre1trial of the case, the name of Judge 4urias has alreadycropped up as a possible witness for herein respondents.hat the respondents chose not to present him is not anindicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party ina civil case is free to choose who to present as hiswitness. (either can Judge 4uriasK testimony in anothercase be considered as newly discovered evidence sincethe facts to be testified to by Judge 4urias w9c wereexisting before and during the trial, could have beenpresented by the petitioners at the trial. he testimony ofJudge 4urias has been in existence waiting only to beelicited from him by Buestioning.

@ende>ona v.+>ami>, !"

#%$$78, Geb.), &88&.

Same; Same; he basic ground for the grant of a new trialis that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that thenew trial will be in the interest of justice. Dhere aninjustice has been done, and a further trial is necessary tosecure justice, courts have not only the fright and inherentpower, in its discretion, but also the duty, to grant a newtrial.

errano v.C, !"#&&'$8, Geb.), &88&.

R(&I(, ,RO* JUD+*(NT3 Orders or Oter)ro!eeding; Stri!tly Construed; Gor a petition for reliefto be entertained by the court, the petitioner mustsatisfactorily show that he has strictly complied w9 theprovisions of "ule $3, that the said petitioner learns of the

judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside,and not more than ) months after the judgment of finalorder was entered, or such proceeding was taen. hereglementary period is reconed from the time the partyscounsel receives notice of the decisionA for notice tocounsel is notice to the party for purposes of ec. $, "ule$3.

@ercury 4rugCorp v. C,!" #$3/7#,July #$, &888.

Same; &iberal Approa! in te interest of Justi!e;=etitioners should not suffer the conseBuences of theircounsels negligence. *t necessarily follows then thatpetitioners period to file the petition for relief should becounted from their C5L (+*CE of the order, w9c wassometime in pril #'''. he petition for relief filed on @ay

ala>ar v. C,!" #%&'&8,Geb. ), &88&A!* v.?engsonComm.


22/83

&7, #''' was well w9in the )81day period prescribed in"ule $3, ect. $ of the a''7 "ule sof Civil =roc. heinstant case ivolves the possible loss of property w9o dueprocess of law. @ore particularly, petitioners stand to losetheir land w9o being allowed to defend their title from theadverse claims of private respondents. -ence, in theinterest of substantial justice, the reopening of the case isordered to allow defendants, petitioners herein, anopportunity to present evidence in their behalf.

?uildings, !"#$7%%3, Jan.$#, &88&.

Annulment of $udgment; *t is in effect a second cycle ofreview regarding a subject matter w9c has already beenfinally decided. second cycle of review is prohibited.Dhat has been once irrevocably established as thecontrolling legal principle in an earlier final judgmentcontinues to be the law of the case between the sameparties in another suit, as long as the facts predicated onsuch decision continues to be the facts of the other case.


Same; 5nder "ule $3 of "ules of Court, a final andexecutory judgment may set aside through a petition forrelief from judgment w9in the period prescribed therefore.-owever, even beyond such period, a party aggrieved bya judgment may petition for its annulment on two ;& v.?aVe>, !"#$$)&3, Jan.&$, &88&.

Same; Same; *t may be allowed subject to the ff.conditions: H#I there must be a judgment or final orderA H&Ithe trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the caseA H$Ithere must be Xgood reasons to allow executionA and H%Isuch good reasons must be stated in a special order afterdue hearing.

*ntramurosennis Club v.=a, supraACoraona *ntlv. C, supra.

Same; Same;s provided on ec. & ;&


26/83


27/83

debtor9mortgagor. s such, a third person in possession ofan extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who claims a rightsuperior to that of the original mortgagor, may not bedispossessed on the strength of a mere e3partepossessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to hissummary ejectment in violation of the basic tenets of dueprocess. *n the same vein, respondents are not obliged toprove their ownership of the foreclosed lot in the ex1parteproceedings. he trial court has no jurisdiction todetermine who between the parties is entitled to ownershipand possession of the foreclosed lot. Liewise, registrationof the lot in petitioners name does not automatically entitlethe latter to possession thereof. =etitioner must resort tothe appropriate judicial process for recovery of theproperty and cannot simply invoe its title in an e3parteproceeding to justify the ouster of respondents.

)ro!eedings 7en )roperty Claimed by Tird )erson; third party whose property has been levied upon by asheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor isafforded w9 several alternative remedies to protect itsinterests: H#I Gile a -*"4 ="6 CL*@ w9 the sheriffand H&I *f the third party claim is denied, the third partymay ==EL the denial. uch alternative remedies maybe availed of cumulatively and the third party is notprecluded from availing himself of the other alternativeremedies in the event he fails in the remedy first availedof. Even if a third party claim is denied, athird party maystill file the ="+=E" C*+( w9 a competent court +"EC+E" +D(E"-*= of the property illegally sei>edby the sheriff.

6upangcoCotton @ills v.C, !"#&)$&&, Jan.#), &88&.

Same; @T(RC(RIA *n ec. #), "ule $' of the "ules ofCourt, a third party claimant may also avail of the remedynown as 0terceria2 by serving on the officer maing thelevy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the

judgment creditor. he officer shall not be bound to eepthe property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent,on demand of the officer, indemnifies the officer againstsuch claim by a ?+(4 in a sum not greater thatn thevalue of the property levied on. n C*+( G+"4@!E may be brought against the sheriff w9in #&8days from the filing of the bond. he aforesaid remediesare neverthe less w9o prejudice to any 0proper action2 thata third party claimant may deem suitable to vindicate hisclaim to the property. uch 0proper action2 is, obviously,entirely distinct fromt hat explicitly prescribed in ec. #7,"ule $' and would have for its object the recovery ofownership or possession of the property sei>ed by thesheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedlywrongfull sei>ure and detention thereof despite the thirdparty claimA and it may be brought against the sheriff andsuch other parties as may be alleged to have colluded w9him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings,such as the judgment creditor himself.

6upangcoCotton @ills v.C, !"#&)$&&, Jan.#), &88&.

+arnisment; ,or!ed Inter#enor; !arnishment consistsin the citation of some stranger to the ltitigation, who is adebtor to one of the parties to the action. ?y this meansmsuch debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenorA andthe court, having acBuired jurisdiction over his person bymeans of citation, reBuires him to pay his debt, not to hisformer creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor inthe main litigation. *t is merely a case of involuntarynovation by the substitution of one creditor for another.

=(? @adecorv. "O" @etalCasting andGabricating,*nc., !"#$&&%/, Jan.&, &88&.


28/83

here is no need for the institution of a separate actionunder "ule $', ec. %$, w9c contemplates a situationwhere the person allegedly holding property of ;orindebted to< the judgment debtor claims an adverseinterest in the property ;or denies the debt v.=eople, !"#$&3/&, @ay$#, &888.

Do!et ,ees; =ayment of docet fees and other legal feesw9in the prescribed period is both mandatory and

jurisdictional. Gailure to do so is a ground for the dismissal

of an appeal. he bare invocation of 0the interest ofsubstantial justice2 is not a magic wand that willautomatically compel the court to suspend proceduralrules.

La>aro v. C,!" #$77)#,

pril ), &888.

Same; D9 the exception of ec. # ;b< w9c refers to thefailure to file notice of appeal or the record of appeal w9inthe reglementary period, the grounds enumerated in "ule/8, ec. #, are merely directory and not mandatory.4espite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment ofdocet fee, the appellate court still has the discretion torelax the rule in meritorious cases, as in this case, where

the appellant was, from the start, ready and willing to paythe correct docet fee, but was unable to do so due toerror of an officer of the court in computing the correctamount.

yala Land,*nc. v. pa.Carpo, !"#%8#)&, (ov.&&, &888.

Same; he failure to pay the appellate docet fee does notautomatically result in the dismissal of the appeal or affectthe courts jurisdiction, the dismissal being discretionary onthe part of the appellate court. Gurthermore, under ec. /of "ule #%# of the "ules of Court, the appellate court mayextend the time for the payment of the docet fees ifappellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason

for his failure to pay the correct amount of docet fees w9inthe prescribed period.

6ambao v.C, !"#%83'%, (ov.&7, &888.

Same; he power of discretionary dismissal of appealshould be used in accordance w9 the tenets of justice andfair play and w9 a great deal of circumspection, taing intoconsideration all attendant circumstances.

edora v. Ca,!" #%&8,(ov. &',&888.

)eriod of Appeal; he #/1day period for filing an appealis (+(1EPE(4*?LE. Giling of a motion for extension of

rgel v. C,!" #&338/,


29/83

time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration isprohibited in all courts, except the C. here is noexception to this rule.

+ct. #&, #'''.

&ate Appeal; motion contesting a late appeal may befiled before the appellate court even after the transmittal ofthe records therein. he legality of the appeal may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellatecourt, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing thepetition on the ground of its being out of time. recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarilycarry w9 it any assumption or conclusion that it has beentimely filed.

@anila@emorialCenter v. C,

!" #$7#&&,(ov. #/,&888.

Noti!e of Appeal; he #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., w9c tooeffect on July #, #''7, provide that a notice of appeal mustbe filed #9in #/1day reglementary period from receipt of thedecision or order appealed from and the docet and otherlawful fees must also be paid w9in the same period.

Chan v. C,!" #$37/3,July ), &888A?gry. &% ofLegaspi City

v. *mperial,!" #%8$,ug. &%,&888.

Noti!e to file AppellantBs .rief must be given to the partyappellant and not his9her counsel.

guam v. C,!" #$7)7&,@ay $#, &888.

(le#ation of Re!ords of Case; (o error was committedby the C when it ordered the trial court to elevate theorig. record of the case and to desist from proceeding any

further in said case. +nce a written notice of appeal isfiled, appeal is perfected and the trial court losesjurisdiction over the case, both over the record and subjectof the case.

@ancenido v.C, !"##3)8/, pril

#&, &888.

Certifi!ation of Non',orum Sopping; Certification in apetition for review signed by only one of the spouses washeld sufficient as the decision assailed by them relates toa case filed against petitioner1spouses over property in w9cthey had a common interest.

ps. 4ar v.lon>o, !"#%$8#), ug.$8, &888.

AppellantBs .rief; he C may dismiss an appeal for

failure to file appellants brief on time. -owever, thedismissal is directory, not mandatory. his discretion mustbe exercised w9in the tenets of justice and fair play, havingin mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

guam v. C,

supra.

:rong *ode of Appeal; -aving availed the wrong modeof appeal and had not instituted the correct one before thelapse of the period prescribed by law, his right to appeal isnow lost.

6ao v. C,!" #$&%&3,+ct. &%, &888.

Same; petition filed under rule %/ alleging that theappellate court and the "C 0acted w9 grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lac of jurisdiction,2 should bedismissed outright, for being a wrong remedy.(evertheless, in the interest of justice, the Courtconsidered the petition and the issues therein as if theywere properly brought by way of a special civil action forcertiorari under "ule )/.

ps. !erardov. Ca, !"

##8%, (ov.&7, &888.

)etition for Re#ie7 from te RTC to te CA; Copies ofAssailed De!ision; petition for review filed before theC must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original

Lee v. C,!" #$)%,(ov. &$,


30/83

copy of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. &888.

Same; Same; -owever, the other supporting papersattached to the petition are not reBd. to be certified truecopies as well. *n this case, the Contract to ell, w9c9 is thecenter of the controversy, was reproduced verbatim in the@C 4ecision, a duplicate original of w9c was attached to

the petition. @oreover, a certified true copy of the Contractwas attached to the motion for reconsideration. -ence, theappellate court erred in denying due course to the petition.

Cusi1-ernande> v.ps. 4ia>, !"#%8%$), July#3, &888.

Same; Same; he petition should be denied for failure toattach an authentic copy of the decision of the C4ecision.

?uaya v.tronghold*nsurance,!" #$'8&8,+ct. ##, &888

Same; Same; Substantial Complian!e 7< tere8uirement;he submission of a document together with

the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantialcompliance with ection $, "ule %) of the "ules of Court.nd also when it involves an alleged violation of aconstitutionally guaranteed right. he rules of procedureare not to be applied in a very rigid, technical senseA rulesof procedure are used only to help secure substantial

justice. *f a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules ismade, their aim could be defeated.

5y v. ?*", !"#&')/#, +ct.

&8, &888.

Same; Same; Same; 5nder the circumstances,respondent appellate court should have tempered its strictapplication of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous

event considering that litigation is not a game oftechnicalities.

-agonoy@aretendors

ssn. v.-agonoy, !"#$7), Geb.), &88&.

Appeals from uasi'Judi!ial Agen!ies to te CA; tthe time petitioners brought their case to the C, theprocedure governing appeals to said court from Buasi1

judicial agencies was embodied in the "eviseddministrative Circular (o. #1'/, w9c relevantly providesthat the petition for review need not implead the court oragency either as petitioner or respondent. he +ffice of

the =resident is included w9in the scope of said circular.he +ffice of the =resident in this case ;involving the issueof whether a private land should be exempted from thecoverage of =4 &7< is not an indispensable party butmerely a pro forma party.

amaniego v.guila, !"#&//)7, June&7, &888.

Issues Raised in te *R )roper on Appeal; *t is notproforma just because it reiterated the arguments earlierpassed and rejected by the appellate court. he Court hasexplained that a movant may raise the same arguments,precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous.

ecurity ?anv. Cuenca,!" #$3/%%,+ct. $, &888.

)etition for Re#ie7 on Certiorari 0Rule 5; he properremedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the C is apetition for "eview under "ule %/ w9c is not similar to apetition for Certiorari under "ule )/ of the "ules of Court.

s provided in "ule %/ of the "ules of Court, decisions,final orders or resolutions of the C in any case, i.e.,regardless of the nature of the action or proceedingsinvolved, amy be appealed to the C by filing a petition forreview, w9c would be a continuation of the appellateprocess over the original case. +n the other hand, a

Gortune!uaranteeand *nsuranceCorp. v. C,!" ##878#,@arch #&,&88&.


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special civil action under "ule )/ is an independent actionbased on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a!E(E"L "5LE, cannot be availed of as a substitute forthe lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under"ule %/. ccordingly, when a party adopts an improperremedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.

Same; proper issues to be raised are Buestions of law andnot Buestions of fact. Crucillo v.*C, !")/%#), +ct.&), #'''.

Same; Gactual Buestions may not be raised in a petitionfor review on certiorari.

merican=residentLines v. Ca,!" ##83/$,July $#, &888Aelefunenemiconducto

rs EEs 5nion1GGD v. C,!" #%$8#$1#%, 4ec. #3,&888.

Same; Only errors !laimed and assigned by a party7ill be !onsidered by te !ourt3 EPCE= affecting its

jurisdiction over the subject matter or errors affecting thevalidity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedingstherein.

bubaar v.bubaar,supra.

Same; ,a!tual Issues; Te SC is not a trier of fa!tsdo!trine; he Buestion presented is factual and is notreviewable by the C in an appeal via certiorari under"ule %/ of the "ules of Court.

Calusin v. C,!" #&3%8/,June ,&888..

Same; Same; Same; ("!eptions to te Rule; reviewof factual findings of the lower court is not a function that isnormally undertaen in petitions for review on certiorariunder "ule %/. Gactual findings of the C are conclusiveon the parties and carry even more weight when said courtaffirms the factual findings of the trial court. hus, the

Courts jurisdiction in petitions fro review on certiorari islimited only to reviewing errors of law. re1evaluation ofthe factual issues by the court is justified only when thefindings complained of are totally devoid of support in therecords or are so glaringly erroneous as to constituteserious abuse of discretion.

@arBue> v.C, !"##))3',

pril$, &888.

Same; Same; Same; Same; H#IDhen the factual findingscomplained of are devoid of support of evidence onrecordA or H&I the assailed judgment is based on amisappreciation of factsA or H$I when the findings of the"C and the C are opposite.

@etroban v.onda, !"#$%%$), ug,#), &888ACordial v.

@iranda, !"#$/%'/, 4ec.#%, &888.

+riginalCasesbefore theC

,iling of a Comment; 5nder "ule %), ec. 7 of the #''7"ules of Civil =roc., when the respondent in an originalaction filed w9 the court fails to file its comment, the casemay be decided on the basis of the evidence on recordw9o prejudice to disciplinary action against the disobedientparty. Concomitant thereto is the rule that pursuant o "ule

hermochemv. (aval, !"#$#/%#, +ct.&8, &888.


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/#, ec. # ;b


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involving title to the subject property should be determinedin the trial. hey are not allowed, to invoe the title to thesubject property, as these Buestions reBuire adetermination of facts and a presentation of evidence,both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari inthe C under "ule )/ or in a petition for review in thisCourt under "ule %/.

Same; :rit of Reple#in; writ of replevin issued by the@etropolitan rial Court may be served and enforcedanywhere in the =hils.

Gernande> v.*ntl. Corp.?an, supra.

)R(&I*INAR/ INJUNCTION; Dhen a =* is issued in anaction to enforce a contract that prohibits an employeefrom woring in a competing enterprise w9in two yearsfrom resignation M has the same lifetime as the prohibition

M two years also. 5pon the expiration of the said period, asuit Buestioning the validity of the issuance of the writbecomes functus oficio.

icc>on v.ideo =ostmanila, !"#$)$%&, June#/, &888.

Same; Re8uisites; wo reBuisites are necessary if apreliminary injunction is to issue, namely: ;#< the existenceof "*!- to be protected and ;&< the GC againstwhich the injunction is to be directed are *+L*E +G*4 "*!-.

=ublic Estateuthority;=E< v. C,!" ##&,(ov. &8,&888.

Same; =ursuant to ec. #, "ule /3 of the "evised "ulesof Civil =rocedure, one of the grounds for the issuance ofa writ of preliminary injunction is a ="++G that theapplicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole

or part of such relief consists in restraining the commissionor continuance of the act or acts complained of, either fora limited period or perpetually. hus, a preliminaryinjunction order may be granted only when the applicationfor the issuance of the same shows facts entitling theapplicant to the relief demanded. his is the reason whywe have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion ofthe right sought to be protected is material and substantial,that the right of complainant is clear and unmistaable,and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity forthe writ to prevent serious damage.*n the case at bar, thepetitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary

injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to theuse of the trademar on Chin Chun u and its containerbased on her copyright and patent over the same. hename and container of a beauty cream product are propersubjects of a trademar inasmuch as the same fallssBuarely within its definition. *n order to be entitled toexclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty creamproduct, the user must sufficiently prove that sheregistered or used it before anybody else did. hepetitionerKs copyright and patent registration of the nameand container would not guarantee her the right to theexclusive use of the same for the reason that they are notappropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights.ConseBuently, a preliminary injunction order cannot beissued for the reason that the petitioner has not proventhat she has a clear right over the said name andcontainer to the exclusion of others, not having proven thatshe has registered a trademar thereto or used the samebefore anyone did.

ho v. C,!" ##/7/3,@arch #',&88&.

Same; he "ules do not reBuire that issues be joinedbefore a =* may issue. *t may be granted at any stage of

=C*?an v.C, !"


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an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or finalorder.

#8$#%', (ov.#/, &888.

Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of prelim.*njunction w9c would in effect dispose of the main case w9otrial.

@i>ona v. Ca,!" #&8'3/,4ec. %, &888.

T(*)ORAR/ R(STRAININ+ ORD(R 0TRO; upremeCourt dministrative Circular (o. &81'/ which states:#. Dhere an application for temporary restrainingorder ;"+< or writ of preliminary injunction is included ina complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trialcourt, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffledonly after notice to the adverse party and in the presenceof such party or counsel.&. he application for a "+ shall be acted upon onlyafter all parties are heard in a summary hearing conductedwithin twenty1four ;&%< hours after the records aretransmitted to the branch selected by raffle. he records

shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.$. *f the matter is of extreme urgency, such thatunless a "+ is issued, grave injustice and irreparableinjury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the "+effective only for seventy1two ;7&< hours from issuance butshall immediately summon the parties for conference andimmediately raffle the case in their presence. hereafter,before the expiry of the seventy1two hours, the =residingJudge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct asummary hearing to determine whether the "+ can beextended for another period until a hearing in the pendingapplication for preliminary injunction can be conducted. *nno case shall the total period of the "+ exceed twenty;&8< days, including the original seventy1two ;7&< hours, forthe "+ issued by the Executive Judge.%. Dith the exception of the provisions whichnecessarily involve multiple1sala stations, these rules shallapply to single1sala stations especially with regard toimmediate notice to all parties of all applications for "+.

@arcos v.Judgegcaoili, .@.(o. "J1'31#%8/, pril#&, &888.

Same; here is a difference with respect to the reBuisitesfor -E *5(CE +G E@=+""6 "E"*(*(!+"4E" (4 -E L*GE +G -E "+ when it is issued byan Executive Judge or by a =residing Judge of a court. *fthe temporary restraining order was issued by respondentin his capacity as Executive Judge, the "+ was good for7& hours only. Dithin that period he was reBuired tosummon the parties to a conference before issuing the"+ and then assign the case by raffle ;par. $ of

dministrative Circular (o. &81'/o, @(o. "J ''1#%'), +ct. #$,#'''.

Same; Regularity of issuan!e by te CA; TROintended as a Collegiate A!t3 Not te Order of a SingleJusti!e1 here is no Buestion regarding the authority ofthe Court of ppeals to issue a preliminary writ ofinjunction or temporary restraining order pending theresolution of petitions and appeals within its jurisdiction,

especially in meritorious cases.Dhile under the rules, a

-eirs of theLate JusticeJ?L v. Justice4emetria,

.@. (o. C18#1$&, Jan.&$, &88&.


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member of the Court of ppeals may issue a temporaryrestraining order. -owever, he shall advisedly use suchpower sparingly, in case of extreme necessity where thereare compelling reasons to abate or avoid a grave injury toa party. nd, such issuance must be submitted to theCourt for ratification at the very next session of the Court.*n this case, only two members of the Court of ppeals,respondents Justices 4emetria, ponente, and ?arcelona,member, concurring, signed the resolution. Justice +mar5. min, member, did not sign. -ence, the resolution maynot be received for filing, much less served on the parties.he clear intent of the division members was for the threemembers to act on the resolution. Dhen the lawtransgressed is elementary, the failure to now or observeit constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

pecialCivil

ctions

C(RTIORARI; )etition for Certiorari under Rule ?5; *norder to be granted, it must be shown that the respondentcourt committed grave abuse of discretion eBuivalent tolac or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of

judgment. @ere abuse of discretion is not enough M it mustbe grave. Certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgmentw9c are correctible by appeal.

omasClaudio@emorialCollege v. C,!" #&%&)&,+ct #&, #'''.

Same; Same; he essential reBuisites for a petition forcertiorari under "ule )/ are: ;#< the writ is directed againsta tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial orBuasi1judicial functionsA ;&< such tribunal, board, or officerhas acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lac or excess of

jurisdictionA and ;$< there is no appeal or any plain,speedy, and adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw.

"ivera v.Espiritu, !"#$//%7, Jan.&$, &88&.

Same; Certiorari cannot be a substitute for lost appeal.5nder the #''7 Civil "ules of =roc., a petition for certiorarimust be filed w9in )8 days from receipt of the assaileddecision, order or resolution.

@overs1?aseco v. C,supra.

Same; *f a party invoes the jurisdiction of a court, hecannot thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction in thesame case.

omasClaudio@emorialCollege v. C,

!" #&%&)&,+ct #&, #'''.

Same; =rivate respondent has the personality to bring aspecial civil action before the C in regard to the civilaspect of a criminal case. *t is not true that it is only thetate or the =eople that can prosecute the special civilaction.

antos v. C,!" #&73'',4ec. &, #'''.

Same; *t is an original action, independent from theprincipal action, not part nor continuation of the trial w9cresulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. *t

does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor therunning of the reglementary periods involved in theproceedings, unless an application for a restraining orderor writ of prelim injunction to the appellate court is granted.*t is not a mode of appeal where the appellate courtreviews errors of fact or of law committed by the lowercourt. he issue in a special civil action for certiorari iswhether the lower court acted w9o jurisdiction or in excessof jurisdiction or w9 grave abuse of discretion. *n an appealby certiorari under "ule %/, the petitioner and respondent

6asuda v. C,!" ##&/)',

pril #&,

&888.


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are also the original parties to the action in the lower court.?ut in certiorari as an original action, the parties are theaggrieved party versus the lower court or Buasi1judicialagency and the prevailing party, who thereby respectivelybecome the petitioner and respondents.

Same;s long as the court acts w9in its jurisdiction, any

alleged errors in the exercise thereof will amount tonothing more than errors of judgment w9c are reviewableby timely appeal and not the special civil action ofcertiorari. he granting of leave to file amended pleading isa matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only tothe limitations that the amendments should notsubstantially change the cause of action or alters thetheory of the case or that it was made to delay the action.

s to the wisdom or soundness of the trial courts orderdismissing petitioners affirmative defense of prescription,this involves a matter of judgment w9c is not properlyreviewable by a petition for certiorari, w9c is intended tocorrect defects of jurisdiction solely and not errors ofprocedure or matters in the trial courts findings orconclusions.

ps. "efugia

v. -on. lejo,!" #$3)7%,June &&,&888.

Same; *nstead of appealing the decision, @@4 resortedto the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, as a mode ofobtaining reversal of the judgment. his cannot be done.he judgment was not in any sense null and void a+ initio,incapable of producing any legal effects whatever, whichcould be resisted at any time and in any court it wasattempted. *t was a judgment which could or may havesuffered from some substantial error in procedure or infindings of fact or of law, and on that account, it could havebeen reversed or modified on appeal. ?ut since it was notappealed, it became final and has thus gone beyond thereach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect.he remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the

judgment on the merits is appeal. his is true even if theerror, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court renderingthe judgment is its lac of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, orgrave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of lawset out in the decision. he existence and availability ofthe right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari,because one of the reBuirements for availment of the latterremedy is precisely that Nthere should be no appeal. s ageneral rule, special civil action for certiorari is availableonly when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy andadeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of law ;ec. #,rule )/


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Same; *n the interest of justice, the C has often treated apetition for review on certiorari under "ule %/ as a specialcivil action for certiorari. Certiorari cannot be resorted to asa shield from the adverse conseBuence of petitioners ownomission to file the reBuired motion for reconsideration.

eagullhipmanagement andransport v.(L"C, !"#&$)#', June3, &888.

Same; he mere fact that decision of the @C wasappealed to the "C does not preclude the filing of aspecial civil action of certiorari w9 the "C concerning anentirely different incident. he availability of an appealdoes not foreclose resort to extraordinary remedies, suchas certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adeBuateor eBually beneficial, speedy and sufficient.

ensorex*ndustrialCorp. v. C,#'''.

Same; )eriod of ,iling; he prevailing rule now under.@. (o. 881&18$ C gives a party a G"E- )81day

period from receipt of the resolution denying his motion forreconsideration w9in w9c to file a petition for certiorari. hislatest amendment too effect on ept. #, &888. ?efore thesaid amendment, ec. %, "ule )/, as amended by Circular(o. $'1'3, provided that the )81day period for filing apetition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of amotion for reconsideration or new trial. *n the event of thedenial of the motion, the petitioner only has the remainingperiod w9in w9c to file the petition.

(ar>oles v.(L"C, !"

#%#'/', ept.&', &888 AystemGactors Corp.v. (L"C, !"#%$73', (ov.&7, &888.

Same; Same; Retroa!ti#e Appli!ation; he new ruleunder .@. (o. 881&18$1C should be deemed applicable

to this case. tatutes regulating procedure of the courtswill be construed as applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time of their passage.

ystemGactors Corp.

v. (L"C,supra.

Same; Nature; ction challenging the "C w9 )ravea+use of discretionmay be instituted either in the C orthe C. ?oth have original concurrent jurisdiction.Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only /ent/ere is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or ade'uateremedy in t/e ordinary course of la.

Chua v. Ca,!" #%$3,+ct. &$, &888.

Same; +rdinarily, Certiorari is 5(*L*(! where the

appeal period has lapsed. ?ut there are EPCE=*+(: H#Iwhen public welfare and the advancement of public policydictatesA H&I when the broader interest of justice soreBuiresA H$I when the writs issued are null and voidA or H%Iwhen the Buestioned order amounts to an oppressiveexercise of judicial authority. he Buestioned orders of theprobate court nullifying the sale to after it approved thesale and after its order of approval had become final andexecutory amount to oppressive exercise of judicialauthority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac of

jurisdiction.

id.

Same; he writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct alower tribunals evaluation of the evidence and factualfindings.

oriano v.ngeles, !"#8''&8, ug.$#, &888.

Certiorari as an Original Spe!ial Ci#il A!tiondistinguised from Certiorari as a *ode of Appeal0Rule ?5 #s1 Rule 5; ;#< *n appeal by certiorari, theappellate court acts in the exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction and power of reviewA while in certiorari as an

ensorex*ndustrialCorp. v. C,#'''.


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original action, the higher court exercises originaljurisdiction under its power of control and supervision overthe orders of the lower courtA ;&< he period for filingappeal is shorter than for an original action for certiorari.ConseBuently, where the appealed judgment was renderdby the "C in the exercise of its orig. jurisdiction, theappeal to the C may be taen by writ of error or ordinaryappeal.

*ANDA*US; *t lies to compel the performance of a clearlegal duty or ministerial function imposed by law upon thedefendant or respondent resulting from office, trust orstation. *t cannot be used to compel the ugar "egulatory

dministration to issue rules and regulations governing theimportation of sugar in the absence of 0a standard for thecontrol and regulation of sugar importation2 vested on itunder the law.

=acheco v.C, !"#&%3)$, June#', &888.

Same; *t is not a proper remedy to Buestion the legality of

the exercise of the right to top by private respondent. *tdoes not lie to compel the award of a contract subject ofbidding to an unsuccessful bidder. *t may not be availed todirect the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particularway or retract or reverse an action already taen in theexercise of either.

J! ummit

-oldings v.Ca, !"#&%&'$, (ov.&8, &888.

Same; he issuance of the writ of execution pendingappeal being a clear duty of respondent judge in this case,may be the subject of mandamus.

5y v.antiago, !"#$#&$7, July$#, &888.

)RO%I.ITION; *t does not lie to enjoin the implementationof a writ of possession. ps. +ng v.C, !"#%'%, June3, &888.

Same; Gor writs of prohibition, the reBuisites are: ;#< theimpugned act must be that of a Ntribunal, corporation,board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial,Buasi1judicial or ministerial functionsAN and ;&< there is noplain, speedy, and adeBuate remedy in the ordinarycourse of lawN.

"ivera v.Espiritu, !"#$//%7, Jan.&$, &88&.

Same; *t is not an appropriate remedy since the bodysought to be enjoined no longer exists. *t is wellestablished that prohibition is a preventive remedy anddoes not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.

!on>ales v.(arvasa, !"#%83$/, ug.#%, &888.

INJUNCTIONS; Re8uisites; *njunction is a judicial writ,process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do orrefrain from doing a particular act. n applicant forpreliminary injunction must file a verified complaintshowing facts entitling him to the relief demandedaccompanied with a bond which shall answer for all thedamages which the party sought to be enjoined may

sustain by reason of the injunction. *t may be issued whenthe following reBuisites are established:#. he invasion of the right is material andsubstantialA&. he right of complainant is clear and unmistaableA$. here is an urgent and permanent necessity for thewrit to prevent serious damage.

=ET v.ian>on, !"#$#8&8, July&8, &888.

Same; Status uo Order; he Nstatus BuoN is the lastactual peaceable uncontested situation, which precedes

id.


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controversy. tatus Buo should be that existing at the timeof the filing of the case. *n this instance, at the time of thefiling of the case, * was still in actual physicalpossession of the property in Buestion as the lesseethereof. lthough the =ET sent * a letter purportedlycanceling the lease agreement and demanding the * tovacate the premises, said demand was never effectivelyimplemented due to the filing of the present action forinjunction.

Same; ("e!ution )ending Appeal; Judgments in actionsfor injunction are (+ 6E4 by the pendency of anappeal taen therefrom. his rule has been held toEPE(4 to judgments decreeing the dissolution of the writof prelim. *njunction, w9c is immediately executory.

*ntramurosennis Club v.=, !"#$/)$8, ept.&), &888.

Same; he remedy of injunction can no longer be availedof where the act to be prevented had long beenconsummated.

Tabat v. C,!" #&&83',

ug. &$,

&888.

+o#ernment Infrastru!ture )ro$e!ts; ec. # of =4 #3#3prohibits the courts from issuing injunctive writs againstthe implementation or execution of governmentinfrastructure projects, lie housing and resettlementprojects.

(- v. -on.llarde, !"#8)/'$, (ov.#), #'''.

Same; =4 #3#3 and C Circulars (os. #$1'$ and )31'%prohibit the issuance by any court of any injunction thatwould delay the process of a government infrastructureproject.

Caguioa v.Judge LaviVa,

.@. (o. "J1881#//$, (ov.

&8, &888.

UO :ARRANTO; *t may be brought +(L6 by the+L!E(, or a public prosecutor, or a person claiming tobe entitled to the public office or position usurped orunlawfully held or exercised by another.

ergs=roducts v.=C* Leasingand Ginance,supra.

Same; he person suing must show that he has a CLE""*!- to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another.

ec. ofJustice v.?acal, !"#$'$3&, 4ec.

), &888.

(9)RO)RIATION; Expropriation suit is incapable ofpecuniary estimation and falls w9in the jurisdiction of the"C, regardless of the value of the subject property.

?arangay an"oBue v.-eirs of=astor, !"#$33'), June&8, &888.

(J(CT*(NT;

Jurisprudence on Remedial Laws

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