Remedial Law Jurisprudence 2011 (for UE)

UE COLLEGE OF LAWREMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

UPDATES ON REMEDIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

Prof. Manuel R. Riguera 18 September 2011

CIVIL PROCEDUREJurisdiction

SC Circular No. 09-94: The exclusion of “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under B.P. Blg. 129 “applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.” Otherwise put, in cases where the cause of action principally involves a claim for damages (as in a torts case), the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Iniego v. Purganan, 24 March 2006). In Iniego the moral and exemplary damages where taken into account in computing the jurisdictional amount while the attorney’s fees were not. Compare with Sante.

In civil action for damages arising from malicious prosecution, the SC held that the other forms of damages being prayed for by the plaintiff, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for by the complaint. (Sante v. Claravall, 22 February 2010).

The wordings of PD 1344 reveal that it has jurisdiction over cases filed by the subdivision or condominium unit buyer or owner against the subdivision or condominium owner or developer but not the other way around. The only instance when the HLURB would have jurisdiction over a case filed by the subdivision or condominium unit owner or developer is if such case is filed as a compulsory counterclaim to an existing suit filed by the subdivision or condominium unit buyer against the developer as in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. 154684, 8 September 2005. (Delos Santos v. Spouses Sarmiento, G.R. No. 154877, 27 March 2007).

The PAL female flight attendants filed an action for declaratory relief with the RTC challenging the Constitutionality and the legality of the CBA provision which sets the compulsory retirement age at 55 for females and 60 for males. The Supreme Court held that the RTC has jurisdiction as the action is one for declaratory relief. The labor arbiter does not have jurisdiction as the issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All

Selected cases up to May 2011Updates on Remedial Law Jurisprudence

Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. (Halagueña v. PAL, 2 October 2009).

Docket fees

The trial court should have dismissed the petition pursuant to the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562, which had been rendered as far back as 1987 and which states that the amount of damages claimed should be specified in the body and in the prayer. It is unfortunate that up to this date, this ruling has been ignored. The trial court had no power to admit the amended petition since it had no jurisdiction over the original petition. Evidently there was an intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees. The amended petition should be expunged and the civil case dismissed. (Siapno v. Manalo, G.R. 132260, 30 August 2005).

The docket fees on the supplemental complaint should be paid at the time of the filing thereof and should not be treated as a first lien on the judgment award. Hence the supplemental complaint should be expunged if the docket fees thereon were not paid. The trial court nonetheless does not lose the jurisdiction it had acquired over the case with the filing of the original complaint. (Do-All Metal Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corp., 10 January 2011, Abad., J.)

Rule 2. Cause of action

The Supreme Court held that the second petition for declaration of nullity while invoking a different ground (absence of a license) involves the same cause of action which is the declaration of nullity of marriage and that the absence of a marriage license which is the ground for the second petition could have been presented and raised in the earlier case filed by the petitioner. Hence the second petition should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. [Mallion v. Alcantara G.R. No. 141528; October 31, 2006].

Rule 3. Parties to Civil Actions

Adjoining land owners are not the real parties in interest to file a reversion suit over land alleged to be foreshore. In all actions for the reversion to the State of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, it is the Republic which is the real party in interest. The action must be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead in behalf of the Republic. The action for the annulment of the homestead patent was thus dismissed. (Manese v. Sps. Velasco, 29 Jan 09).

A judge has no duty to implead indispensable parties. (Tanjuatco v. Judge Gako, 23 Mar 09).

Updates on Remedial Law Jurisprudence

A class suit is not proper where there is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. (Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, 20 April 2010).

P filed an action for reconveyance of land against D, E, F, and G. Seven months later H filed an answer with counterclaims. H alleged that F and G had executed a deed of renunciation over their interests in the land in his favor. P filed a motion to expunge H’s answer but the trial court ruled for its admission. Later however upon P’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court set aside its order admitting H’s answer with counterclaims and ordering H to file a pleading-in-intervention. H did not comply with the order. Eventually the trial court rendered judgment in favor of P. The SC said that the trial court’s judgment may be set aside since H’s right to due process was violated. The SC said that S19 R3 is applicable as H was a transferee pendente lite. While H did not file a motion for substitution or joinder under S19 R3 this technical flaw may be disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already admitted H’s answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. Because H’s answer had already been admitted, the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. P’s insistence that H could not have participated in the case because he did not file a motion to intervene under R19 is misplaced. The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate in the case and he will not be bound by the judgment. In this case, H is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente lite. As mentioned, a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected. His participation in the case should have been allowed by due process considerations. (Heirs of Medrano v. De Vera, 9 August 2010). Rule 4. Venue

Under the “complementary-contracts-construed-together” doctrine, the Suretyship Agreement can only be enforced in conjunction with the Promissory Note. The venue stipulation in the PN thus also applies to the Suretyship Agreement as an ancillary contract of the PN. The venue should be laid in Makati. (Phil. Bank of Communications v. Lim, G.R. 158138, 12 April 05)

Rule on Summary Procedure

The motion for reconsideration of a judgment prohibited under Sec. 19(c) of the RSP is that which seeks reconsideration of a judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits. The dismissal order for plaintiff’s failure to appear in the preliminary conference is not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. (Lucas v. Fabros, 324 SCRA 1).

The third paragraph of Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, provides that: “If a sole defendant shall fail to appear [at the preliminary conference], the


plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.” The second sentence does not apply to a situation which does not involve co-defendants but separate cases which were consolidated. In such a case if a defendant does not appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint as provided for in Section 6 of the RSP. (Soriente v. Estate of Concepcion, 25 November 2009).

Rule 6. Kinds of pleadings

S7(a) R141 as amended on 16 Aug 04 now imposes docket fees even on compulsory counterclaims filed before the RTC. Payment however of docket fees on compulsory counterclaims was suspended by SC Reso dated 21 Sep 04. However a cross-claim filed before the RTC is subject to the payment of docket fee since it was not included in the suspension under the Reso. In the MTC, counterclaims and cross-claims are not subject to a docket fee per S8 R141.

Rule 7. Parts of a Pleading Q: Korean Airlines (KAL), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines filed a collection case against ETI. The verification & certification was signed by its counsel and resident agent A. To the motion to dismiss filed by ETI, KAL countered that A was authorized by KAL in a teleconference by the Board of Directors. No record of such authorization was attached to the complaint. Can the resident agent sign the V&C in behalf of a foreign corporation?A: No. A was not specifically authorized to execute the certification in behalf of KAL. Being a resident agent does not mean that he is authorized to execute the requisite CNFS because while he may be aware of actions filed against his principal, he may not be aware of actions initiated by his principal whether in the Philippines or in the country where such foreign corp. is organized. (Expertravel and Tours Inc. vs. CA, 26 May 05)

A violation of the rule against forum-shopping other than a willful and deliberate forum shopping did not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without motion and hearing. Specifically, the submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping did not automatically warrant the dismissal of the proceeding, even if it might have constituted contempt of court, for Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear on the matter. (In re: Reconstitution of TCTs 3031684 & 303169, G.R. 156797, 6 July 2010).

A certification against forum-shopping is not applicable to a petition for certification election. There is no such requirement under the Labor Code and under the rules governing the form of a petition for certification election. (Samahan ng mga Manggaggawa sa Samma-Lakas v. Samma Corp., 13 Mar 09).

Corporate officers who can sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping without need of an authorizing board resolution: (1) Chairperson of the


board of directors, (2) President, (3) General Manager or acting general manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) Employment Specialists in a labor case. (Mid-Pasig Land Dev’t Corp. v. Tablante, 4 February 2010).

Substantial compliance rule not applicable where a party committed an act of dishonesty in filing the certificate against forum-shopping, as by making it appear that a person had signed the CFS when he was already dead. (Heirs of Retuya v. CA, 6 April 2011).

Rule 8

Implied admission rule under Section 8 of Rule 8 does not apply to a plaintiff who files a reply not under oath if the verified complaint already traverses the actionable document attached to the answer. (Titan Construction Corp. v. David, 15 March 2010).

Rule 13. Filing & service of pleadings, judgments & other papers

Q In the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Alice, a contingent money claim for commission in the event of the sale of properties of the estate was filed by Alan with the probate court at Iligan City. Allan’s counsel, who filed the money claim, holds office in Makati City. The counsel for the executrix who holds office in Iligan City moved for the dismissal of the claim on the ground that there was no written explanation why the money claim was not personally filed and served . The RTC dismissed the money claim. Was the dismissal proper ?A No. S11 R13 provides that the violation thereof ‘’may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.’’ The court therefore has the discretion on whether to consider the paper as filed or not. But the exercise of discretion must necessarily consider the practicability of personal service. Where it is clear that personal service is not practicable, as in this case, a written explanation ‘’might even be superfluous.’’ The rigid application of S11 R13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Sheker v. Estate of Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, 13 December 2007).

Rule 14. Service of summons

Service of summons upon the defendants while they were in the courtroom is valid. There is no requirement that personal service under S6 R14 should be in the defendant’s residence. (Sansio v. Sps Mogul, 14 July 2009).

The Supreme Court has held that an overly strict application of S7 R14 may be dispensed with if the sheriff was prevented from effecting substituted service by the defendant himself. Here the Defendant herself gave strict instructions to the security guards not to allow anyone to proceed to her house if she was not around. In his return the sheriff declared that he was refused entry by the security guard. She should bear the consequences of such strict instructions. It can be considered that summons was properly served upon the Defendant. (Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, 12 December 2006).


Proper substituted service of summons where service made upon defendant’s brother at the defendant’s last known address. Strict compliance not required where it is clear that the defendant is evading service of summons. Here the defendant claimed to have moved out of his last known address yet refused to reveal his whereabouts. The defendant’s brother claimed that the defendant no longer resided at the last known address yet failing to disclose defendant’s whereabouts. (Sagana v. Francisco, 2 October 2009).

Under S7 R14, it is not necessary that the person in charge of defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge. A secretary would be properly considered as a person in charge. (Gentle Supreme Phils. Inc. v. Consulta, 1 September 2010).

The service of summons on BPI’s branch manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration in the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual. Nonetheless, a case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive that when a defendant personally appears before a court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case against him should be dismissed. An alias or new summons can be actually served on said defendant. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. 169116, 26 March 2007).

There was non-compliance with the rule on substituted service under Section 7(b) of Rule 14. The phrase therein, “at the defendant’s office or regular place of business” does not include a corporation where the defendant is a chairman of the board of directors as he does not regularly hold office or conduct business therein. (UCPB v. Ongpin, G.R. 146593, 26 Oct 01).

Rule 16. Motion to dismiss

An unlicensed foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines can sue before Philippine courts. The transactions between Zuiden and GTVL cannot be considered as “doing business” in the Philippines. An essential condition to be considered as doing business in the Philippines is the actual performance of specific commercial acts within the territory of the Philippines for the plain reason that the Philippines has no jurisdiction over commercial acts performed in foreign territories. Here the perfection and the consummation of these transactions were done outside the Philippines. Moreover the transactions are simply export transactions. An exporter is not deemed to be doing business in a foreign country by the simple fact of exporting products to such foreign country. (B. Van Zuiden Bros., Ltd., v. GTVL Mfg. Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 147905, 28 May 2007).

Q P filed an action against D for recovery of ownership of land. The RTC decided in favor of D but on appeal the CA reversed and held that P is entitled to the ownership of the land. The judgment became final and executory. Later D filed an action against P for recovery of the value of the improvements it had introduced on the land. P filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.


This was denied categorically by the trial court. Subsequently P filed an answer in which he raised the affirmative defense of res judicata?

a) May P still raise the defense of res judicata in his answer?P moved for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata. The trial court granted the motion and conducted a preliminary hearing. It then dismissed D’s complaint on the ground of res judicata.

b) May the trial court conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata?

A a) Yes, after all the order of denial of the motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot amount to res judicata. (Spouses Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, 13 December 2005). Rasdas lays to rest the obiter dictum in Clavano v. Genato, G.R. No. L-45837, 28 October 1977, which states that if a ground is raised in a motion to dismiss and categorically denied, such ground can no longer be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer.

b) The general rule is that the trial court cannot conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense if such was raised as a ground for a motion to dismiss and categorically denied by the trial court. An affirmative hearing may only be conducted if no motion to dismiss was filed. Here a motion to dismiss was filed and categorically denied by the trial court. Hence the issue of res judicata should have been litigated during the trial proper. There is an exceptional circumstance in this case, however, which justifies a deviation from the general rule: It is evidently clear that the second action is barred by res judicata. D built the improvements at the time he already knew that he did not own the land. Hence the Supreme Court overlooked the procedural error of the trial court and upheld its dismissal of the second action on a preliminary hearing. Rasdas v. Estenor, supra.

Respondents filed an action for reconveyance of land against Aqualab. Aqualab moved for the dismissal of respondents’ complaint on the grounds that the action had prescribed, that it is an innocent purchaser for value, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the CA reversed the dismissal and decided the case on the merits holding that Aqualab was not an innocent purchaser for value and that the conveyances in its favor were fraudulent and illegal. The SC held that the CA acted correctly in reversing the order of dismissal since Aqualab in filing the motion to dismiss had hypothetically admitted the allegations in the complaint that the conveyances were fraudulent and illegal and that it was not an innocent purchaser for value. It was however error for the CA to decide the case on the merits since the admissions are not judicial but merely hypothetical ones. The CA should have simply remanded the case to the lower court for trial on the merits. (Aqualab Phils. Inc. v. Heirs of Pagobo, G.R. 182673, 5 October 2009).

Rule 18

If the Plaintiff fails to file the motion to set case for pre-trial, the trial court should not dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Under the SC Guidelines on Pre-trial and Discovery effective 16 August 2004, the branch clerk of court shall, in such a case, issue the notice of pre-trial. (Polanco v. Cruz, 13 February 2009). However


if the failure to file the motion to set the case for pretrial happened before 16 August 2004, the complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Espiritu v. Lazaro, 25 November 2009).

If the plaintiff fails to appear at the pre-trial, the court may upon motion dismiss the complaint and allow the defendant to present evidence on his counterclaim. The provision of S3 R17 may be applied by analogy to supplement S5 R18. (Perkin Elmer Singapore v. Dakila Trading, 14 August 2007).

Discovery

The BID certification that Corral had departed for abroad on a plane is adequate proof that Corral was out of the country. Had the deponent returned to the Philippines, the onus was on Petitioner to show that such was the case. Hence the deposition may be used in evidence under Section 4(c) of Rule 23 (Sales v. Sabino, 9 Dec 05).

A motion for production or inspection of documents or things under Rule 27 is subject to the requirement that the documents or things should not be privileged. Here what are sought to be produced is a detailed list of an industrial product’s ingredients and chemical components which are trade secrets and thus privileged. Hence BTC’s motion should be dismissed. (Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. 172835, 13 December 2007).

Rule 35. Summary Judgment

A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable separately from the judgment in the entire case, unless allowed by the court under S1(g) R41. Hence the failure to appeal separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory. (Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, 15 November 2010).

Rule 39

It is clear from the caption of S2 R39 (Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal) that discretionary execution is allowed only when the period to appeal has commenced but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration prevents the running of the period to appeal. Hence when there is a pending motion for reconsideration an order granting execution pending appeal is improper and premature. (JP Latex v. Ballons Granger Balloons Inc., 16 Mar 09).

An alleged admission by the defendant of its liability is not a good reason for allowing discretionary appeal. The admission is more apparent than real for the issue of liability was one of the grounds raised by defendant in the appeal. Even assuming that the fact of liability was admitted, the defendant still contests the amount of liability. Also the fact that defendant filed a counterbond to discharge the attachment would militate against the Plaintiff’s claim that the judgment in its favor would become illusory. (Geologistics v. Gateway Electronics, 25 Mar 09).


The Supreme Court has held that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not apply in land registration proceedings. S6 R39 refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must promptly enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, a right or a particular fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, 14 March 2007).

Under S6 R39, a final judgment may be enforced by motion within 5 years from the date of its entry, but not thereafter. The rule however is not absolute and admits of exceptions, one of which is when the delay in enforcing the judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion. Here Petitioner triggered the series of delays in the execution of the RTC’s final decision by filing numerous motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing the CA’s issuance of the TRO enjoining the enforcement of the decision. (Central Surety & Insurance Co. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. 149053, 7 March 2007).

Husband can file a third-party claim or separate action if conjugal property is being levied upon to answer for the separate obligation of the wife. (Spouses Buado v. Court of Appeals, 24 April 2009).

Appeal

Under S3 R41 P had 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order to appeal the RTC decision. The order denying P’s motion for reconsideration was a final order since it finally disposed of the issues in the case. Hence P had 15 days from 22 July 2004 (date of receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration) or up to 6 August 2004 (22 + 15 – 31 [days in July] = 6). The “fresh” 15-day period applies also to Rule 40 (appeal from MTC to RTC), Rule 42 (petition for review from RTC to CA, Rule 43 (appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the CA), and Rule 45. (Neypes v. CA, G.R. 141524, 14 Sep 05, en banc).

The Neypes rule does not apply to judgments which have already become final and executory. (National Power Corp. v. Spoues Laohoo, 23 July 2009).

The Neypes rule does not apply to a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the COMELEC and the COA which is governed by S3 R64. (Pates v. COMELEC, 30 June 2009).

The fresh 15-day period provided for in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases, notwithstanding the wordings of S6 R122. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. 170979, 9 February 2011).

The order of the RTC dismissing the appeal is a final order. Since it was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy for the


Appellant was to file a petition for review under Rule 42. The petition for review should have been filed by the Appellant within 15 days from 7 February 2003 or up to 24 February 2003 (22 February being a Saturday) pursuant to S1 R42. It is axiomatic that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should not be a substitute for a lost appeal. (Ang v. Grageda, G.R. 166239, 8 June 2006).

When a judgment is amended, the date of the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in the computation of the period for perfecting the appeal. For all intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned. However, this rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and proportion that would, in effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment. But when the amendment merely consists of the correction of a clerical error, no new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the appeal should still be counted from the receipt of the original judgment. (De Grano v. Lacaba, 16 June 2009).

Plaintiffs filed an action for the annulment of the mortgage against Defendant. The trial court rendered a decision dated 14 September 2000 ordering the release of the mortgage and the payment by Defendant to Plaintiffs of P24,000 representing excess payments. Upon a partial motion for reconsideration by Plaintiffs, the court issued an amended 7 February 2001 Decision increasing the amount to be paid representing excess payments to P843,000. The Defendant appealed from the 7 February 2001 Decision. The Plaintiffs moved for execution of the portion of the decision ordering the release of the mortgage which the trial court granted. The SC said that the trial court erred since the appeal from the 7 February 2001 Decision should be considered an appeal from both the original and amended decision. The Supreme Court said that the judgment is not divisible since the issue of the release of the mortgage is inextricably intertwined with the issue of the excess payments. (Associated Ango-American Tobacco Corp. v. CA, 23 April 2010).

An appeal from the decision of the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, is made by way of Rule 42 and not Rule 41, pursuant to Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 or the CARL. (Landbank v. CA, 11 April 2011).

P filed cases against A, B, C, and D. D filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no proper service of summons upon her. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The SC held that the availment of the special civil action for certiorari was proper since the dismissal order is in the nature of a several judgment under S1(g) R41 which may not be the subject of appeal. (Palma v. Galvez, 10 March 2010).

Rule 43. Appeals from quasi-judicial agencies

An arbitral award of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) is appealable not to the RTC, but to the CA under R43. The PCHC rules cannot confer jurisdiction upon the RTC over arbitral awards. (Metro Bank v. CA, 18 Feb 09).


Rule 47. Annulment of judgments

Under B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of judgments of the RTC. Here the action at bottom seeks to nullify the judgment of the CFI, acting as a land registration court, on the ground that a land registration court cannot issue a title over property of the public domain. Hence it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129 and R47 of the Rules of Court. (Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168861, 26 October 2007).

The RTC has no jurisdiction to issue an order for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate title if the owner’s duplicate title was not actually lost but was in the possession of a person who had bought the property. The order of the RTC may be set aside under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and cannot become final and executory as the order is void for lack of jurisdiction. (Villanueva v. Viloria, G.R. No. 155804, 14 March 2008).

Rule 58. Preliminary Injunction.

While PD 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions or restraining orders in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions in administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The issues of whether there is a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to health under Section 15, Article II and whether NAPOCOR had violated Section 27 of the Local Government Code are questions of law which divest the case from the protective mantle of PD 1818. (Hernandez v. National Power Corp., G.R. 145328, 23 Mar 06).

The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes applies only to national internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes. (Angeles City v. Angeles City Electric Corp., 29 June 2010).

Rule 64. Review of Decisions of the COMELEC and COA

Q Esteves filed an election protest with the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Bitong moved to dismiss the election protest because it did not specify the precincts were fraud and irregularities were allegedly committed. The motion to dismiss was denied by the RTC. Bitong assailed the denial in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the COMELEC. The COMELEC (2nd Division) eventually nullified the RTC’s denial order and dismissed Esteves’ election protest. Esteves then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 with the SC assailing the 2nd Division’s dismissal order. May the petition of Esteves be dismissed?A Yes. Under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of a Division to the COMELEC en banc. This requirement of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the High Court. Failure to abide by this requirement constitutes a good ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Esteves v. Sarmiento, G.R. 182374, 11 November 2008).


Rule 65. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus

Q What is the remedy if a motion for execution is denied?A The remedy is mandamus. The issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty of the court under S1 R39, compellable by a writ of mandamus. (Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee v. Jancom Environmental Corporation, G.R. No. 163663, 30 June 2006, citing cases). Jancom and other cases cited therein may be deemed to have superseded Soccoro v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-23608, 24 December 1964, wherein it was stated that the proper remedy is appeal.

Rule 67 Expropriation

In an action to recover property or for payment of just compensation over property taken by the government without instituting expropriation proceedings, the trial court cannot award just compensation without following the procedure laid down by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 67 regarding the appointment of not more than 3 commissioners. (Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. 162474, 13 October 2009). Compare with the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 147245, 31 March 2005, where the SC held that the RTC may in an action for recovery of possession of property taken by the government without the benefit of expropriation proceedings award just compensation since the government waived the procedure in R67 when it violated the procedural requirements. It is submitted that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals is the ruling case law, since a decision of a division can be modified or reversed only by the SC en banc pursuant to Section 4(3) of Article VIII of the Constitution.

A record on appeal is required in multiple and separate appeals. Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in expropriation proceedings because there are two stages in every action for expropriation. The reason for multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case, a record on appeal is indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial court. In this case since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the complaint for expropriation, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court. (Marinduque Mining and Ind. Corp. v. NAPOCOR, G.R. 161219, 6 October 2008).

While under the 1964 Rules the defendant in an expropriation case may file a motion to dismiss, under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the defendant may no longer file a motion to dismiss. Any objections or defenses the defendant may have to the taking of his property must be set forth in an answer. (S3 R67; Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006).

Rule 70. Ejectment


The motion for reconsideration of a judgment prohibited under the RSP and R70 is that filed before the MTC. Where the MTC’s judgment is appealed to the RTC, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s judgment is not prohibited. (Estate of Macadangdang v. Gaviola, 4 March 09).

Petitioner, even though a non-party in the ejectment case, is bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative or privy to the Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she was placed in the property by the Spouses Fernandez after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in order to frustrate the judgment. (Salandanan v. Spouses Mendez, 13 Mar 09).

In an unlawful detainer suit, such as the instant case where the defendant was occupying the land through the plaintiff’s tolerance, an allegation of how and when the defendant entered the property is not a jurisdictional requirement. This is because the one-year period to institute the ejectment suit is counted not from the unlawful entry but from the time the possession became unlawful, i.e., from the time the demand to vacate was made. (Delos Reyes v. Sps. Odones, 23 March 2011).

Even public lands may be the subject of ejectment suits. (Lee v. Dela Paz, 27 October 2009).

Rule 71. Contempt

Under S4 R71, indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated motu proprio by the court by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Disobedience to the MTC’s order for the return of the vehicle qualifies as indirect contempt for which the MTC properly issued a show-cause order to Union Bank. The show-cause order was a legitimate exercise of the MTC’s judicial discretion to determine whether Union Bank should be sanctioned for disregarding its order. Thus independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No verified petition is required if the contempt proceedings are initiated in this manner. (Leonidas v. Judge Supnet, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1433, 21 February 2003).

Under S4 R71, if the contempt proceedings are not initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed, the charge for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. Here it was Go who brought to the attention of the CA the alleged misbehaviour of Atty. Regalado through the filing of the manifestation with omnibus motion. Without such positive act on the part of Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all. Hence the filing of a verified petition was mandatory and the absence of such meant that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the special civil action for contempt against Atty. Regalado. The Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from Leonidas v. Judge Supnet, supra, where there was an utter violation of the court’s order requiring Union Bank to return the seized chattel and where independently of the motions filed by the Tamondongs, it was the Pasay MTC


which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. (Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6 February 2007).

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Mandamus is not available for a son to compel his mother to produce his father’s will. This is because there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, that is, the filing of a petition for probate under S1 R76 and then moving for the production of the will under S2-5 R75. (Uy v. Lee, 15 January 2010).

Lawyer may file a direct claim against the estate for payment of legal fees where the executor refuses to pay the legal fees. (Salonga Hernandez & Allado v. Pascual, G.R. No. 127165, 2 May 2006).

Non-payment of docket fees not jurisdictional in the case of a money claim. Certification against forum shopping not required. (Sheker v. Estate of Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, 13 December 2007).

Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. The status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of property. (Gabatan v. CA, 13 Mar 09). Escheat and Reversion

A private individual has no personality to question the title of a transferee of land on the ground that the transferee is an alien. It is only the Republic, through the OSG, which can do so by filing the appropriate action for escheat or reversion. (Balais-Mabanag v. RD of Quezon City, 29 March 2010).

Adoption

The petition could also incorporate a petition to change the name of the child. (S10 ROA). The better view is that the change of name may also cover the change of the first name since adoption ipso facto changes the surname of the adopted to that of the adopter. The ruling in Republic v. Hernandez, 9 February 1996, which stated that a prayer for change of first name cannot be decreed in an adoption case and that instead a petition for change of name should be filed in a separate proceeding under R103, must be deemed superseded by S10 ROA.

Habeas Corpus

The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. If the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict. A similar petition may be filed either in the CA or in the SC, or with any member of


said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue appropriate orders. (S10 Rule on DNA Evidence).

Where both parents had joint custody of a child, the writ may be availed of if a father is deprived of his right to see his child. (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. 162734, 29 August 2006).

A petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine the rightful custody of a child is not mooted by the production of the child and her delivery to the petitioner. The court should still proceed to determine who should have the rightful custody of the child. (Bagtas v. Santos, 27 November 2009).

Writ of Amparo

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final and executory judgment is not included among the enumeration of rights in S1 RWA. (Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, 5 June 2008, en banc).

Rule 103 (Change of Name) and Rule 108 (Correction of Entries)

In June 2005 Merlyn L. Mercadera sought before the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City the correction of her name as it appeared in the birth certificate from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera. The LCR of Dipolog City however refused to act on the correction unless a court order was obtained since he was not yet equipped with a permanent appointment. Merlyn L. Mercadera thus filed a petition under Rule 108 with the RTC of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in the birth certificate as Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera, the name she has been using since childhood and in her official and school records. The RTC granted the petition. On appeal, the OSG asked that the RTC’s decision be set aside as the proper remedy that should have been availed of is Rule 103 for change of name and not Rule 108 for correction of entries. Is the OSG correct? No. If what a petitioner seeks to do is simply to correct a typographical or clerical error in the entry of her name, then the procedure to be followed is Rule 108 and not Rule 103. On the other hand, Rule 103 is based on change of name which is not simply a correction of a typographical or clerical error, as where the name is dishonorable or is indicative of former alienage. Here the correction of a patently misspelled name (Marilyn for Merlyn) is proper under Rule 108. The RTC did not allow Mercadera to change her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she has been using ever since she could remember. (Republic v. Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, 8 December 2010).

Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name not enough to justify a child born of Singaporean father and Filipino mother, but whose birth was registered in the Philippines, to change his name by dropping the middle name (surname of the mother). (In Re Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, 30 Mar 05)


Sex reassignment surgery not a valid ground for change of entry regarding first name (Rommel Jacinto to Mely) and sex (male to female) in birth certificate. In change of first name, LCR has primary jurisdiction. RTC would have jurisdiction upon denial of administrative petition for change of first name. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007).

Respondent was born in 1981 and registered a female. While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both female and male characteristics. At 13 tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing, and she has no breast or menstrual development. She prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. SC affirmed trial court’s grant of petition. Failure to implead the LCR who is an indispensable party deemed substantially cured when Respondent furnished copy of petition to LCR. (Republic v. Cagandahan, 12 September 2008).

A petition which seeks to change the petitioner’s name as well as his status (from illegitimate to legitimate) involves a substantial change and thus should be done through adversarial proceedings in which the local civil registrar and all persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby should be impleaded. Here although copies of the petition were served upon the LCR, he was not impleaded as a party. Nor were Petitioner’s father and mother made parties thereto. Hence the judgment of the RTC allowing the change of name should be set aside. (Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 2 February 2011).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Jurisdiction

2 informations for unfair competition filed against the Petitioner before RTC. Motion to quash was filed by accused saying that since the penalty was not over 6 years, the jurisdiction is with the MTC. SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over cases for infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and false description/representation regardless of the imposable penalty citing, Sec. 27 of the Trademark Law which provides that jurisdiction over such cases is with the Court of First Instance. (Samson v. Daway, GR 160054-55, 21 Jul 04).

Rule 110

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the “offended party” but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio. (Francisco v. People, 18 February 2009).


Filing of the complaint with the Prosecutor’s office already tolls the running of the prescriptive period even if the offense is for the violation of a special law (in this case, B.P. 22). The phrase “proceedings” in Section 2 of Act. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be deemed to refer to proceedings judicial or executive in character. (Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. 167571, 25 November 2008). Zaldivia v. Reyes, 3 July 1992, overturned.

Under Sec. 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with it. If the SEC finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. A criminal charge for the violation of the SRC is a specialized dispute. Hence it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, court will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007).

Under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure effective on 1 December 2000, a generic aggravating circumstance which is not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated against the accused even if the same was proved during trial. Section 8 of Rule 110 being a procedural law, the same can be applied to pending cases. (People v. Roxas, G.R. 140762,10 Sep 03; Sombilon v People, 30 September 2009).

The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines is confined only to the proceedings before the trial court based on S5 R110 of the Rules of Court. In appeals and special civil actions before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, it is the Office of the Solicitor General which represents the People pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence the Petition for certiorari filed by accused with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the RTC judge’s order refusing to lift the warrant of arrest was fatally defective since a copy thereof was served not upon the OSG but upon the Provincial Prosecutor. (Salazar v. Romaquin, G.R. No. 151068, 21 May 2004).

The petition for review of the RTC’s judgment of conviction filed with the CA must be served upon the OSG not the provincial prosecutor. This is because it is the OSG which represents the People in appeals and special civil actions before the CA and the SC. The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Its decision acquitting the accused is null and void where the OSG was not given notice of the proceedings and given a chance to comment on the petition. (People v. Duca, 30 October 2009).

Q May the complaint-affidavits and the supporting affidavits filed with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation be subscribed before a notary public?A Only if there is a showing that a prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath was unavailable as required by Sec. 3(a) R112. If


there is no such showing the investigating prosecutor should not accept such affidavits. (Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 1 June 2007).

The CA may not take into account the records of the preliminary investigation as basis for finding the prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion. (S8(b) R112; Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga v. CA, G.R. 125796, 27 Dec 00). Take note however of the SC Guidelines on Pretrial and Discovery effective 16 August 2004 which mandates that the judge shall order the prosecution to attach the records of the preliminary investigation to the case record.

Venue in libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the defamatory article was printed and first published. In criminal prosecution for libel where defamatory article was posted on a website, an allegation that the defamatory article was first published and accessed in Makati is not sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Makati RTC. There is no way of determining the situs of the article’s first printing and publication. The place where the article was first accessed cannot be equated to the first publication. (Bonifacio v RTC of Makati, 5 May 2010).

Rule 111. Prosecution of Civil Action

In a prosecution for B.P. Blg. 22 against the signatory of a corporate check, the offended party cannot move that the corporation be impleaded in the B.P. 22 case since a corporation cannot be held criminally liable under B.P. Blg. 22. (Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. 173807, 16 April 2009).

Rule 112. Preliminary Investigation

PCGG has no authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to file informations for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. Hence the informations that it filed are null and void. (Pp v. Romualdez, G.R. 166510, 29 April 2009).

A Regional State Prosecutor has no authority to approve the filing of an information as he is not among the officers mentioned in S4 R112. (Tolentino v. Paqueo, 7 June 2007).

The judge misapplied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause under S6 R112. The equipoise rule may be applied only after the parties have presented their evidence. Notwithstanding the misapplication of the equipoise rule, the judge properly exercised his power to dismiss the case for lack of probable cause under S6 R112. (Pp v Gabo, 3 August 2010).

Rule 113. Arrest

Reliable information or tip by itself not sufficient basis for a warrantless arrest under S5 R113. (Pp v. Racho, 3 August 2010).

Rule 114. Bail


Upon conviction of the accused by the RTC imposing a penalty greater than 6 years but which is not death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary if none of the circumstances mentioned in Section 5 (flight risk, crime risk, recidivist, habitual delinquency, previous escape, etc.) are present. Admission to bail is not a matter of right as argued by Petitioner. The court may deny bail on considerations other than the absence of the circumstances under S5 R114. On the other hand, if any of the circumstances are present, the court has no option but to deny or revoke bail. (Leviste v. CA, 17 March 2010).

Rule 115. Rights of the Accused

Judge cannot archive case if accused had been arraigned. Trial in absentia should be conducted. (Visbal v. Judge Vanilla, 7 April 2009)

Rule 117. Motion to Quash

Q Respondent was charged in the SB with the violation of Sec. 3(g) of the Anti-Graft Law for entering into contracts manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Respondent pleaded not guilty. The prosecution and the respondents entered into stipulations during the pre-trial. Based on these stipulations, the respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground that “the facts charged do not constitute an offense.” The thrust of the motion is that the respondent as a director of the GSIS did not sign the minutes wherein the board resolution approving the contract was passed. The SB granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case. The People appealed to the SC under R45. Will the appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?A No. While the ground of the motion to quash is ostensibly that “the facts charged do not constitute an offense,” an analysis thereof reveals that it is really grounded on insufficiency of evidence. Insufficiency of evidence is not a ground of a motion to quash but of a demurrer to evidence filed after the prosecution has rested its case. In dismissing the case based on insufficiency of evidence before the Prosecution has presented its evidence and rested its case, the SB deprived the prosecution of due process. There was a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction. The dismissal was void for the SB acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence the dismissal order was void and cannot be the basis of double jeopardy. (People v. Dumlao, 2 March 09).

Order granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not governed by Section 8 of Rule 117. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which S8 R117 applies. Hence the time-bar rule does not apply to the dismissal of the information and the case may be re-opened if the trial court finds that the quashal was improper. (Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. 173588, 22 April 2009).

Following a collision Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Crim. Case No. 82367)


for injuries suffered by Evangeline Ponce, and Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for the death of Nestor Ponce (Crim. Case No. 82366). Petitioner pleaded guilty to Crim. Case No. 82367 and was meted the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Petitioner moved to quash Criminal Case No. 82366. The SC held that Criminal Case 82366 should be quashed since it relates to the same offense. The SC held that Reckless Imprudence is a single crime and that its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 17 November 2010).

Rule 119. Trial

The prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits. On the same day, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the violation of his right to a speedy trial and on the ground that the trial court has no evidence to consider, that the charge had no leg to stand on, and that the prosecution witnesses had no knowledge of the accused’s participation or connection in the crime. The trial court treated the motion to dismiss as a demurrer, denied the same, and deemed the accused to have waived the right to present evidence since he filed the motion without leave of court. The Supreme Court held that the motion to dismiss cannot be treated as a demurrer since a demurrer can only be filed after the prosecution has rested its case pursuant to S23 R119. The motion is actually a motion to dismiss based on the violation of the right to a speedy trial. (Cabador v. People, G.R. 186001, 2 October 2009).

Appeal

In criminal cases, decisions of the RTC should be appealed to the CA even if the appeal involves only pure questions of law. The rule allowing a direct appeal to the SC from an RTC judgment where the appeal only involves a question of law/s applies only to appeal in civil cases. (Tan v. People, 381 SCRA 75 [2002]).

A RTC decision convicting a public officer (<SG27) of malversation of public funds is appealable to the SB (not to the CA) pursuant to P.D. 1606. (Quilesete v. People, 18 Feb 09). Since the accused availed of the wrong mode, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.

The fresh 15-day period provided for in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases, notwithstanding the wordings of S6 R122. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. 170979, 9 February 2011).

Rule 126. Search & seizure

A search warrant proceeding is in no sense a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It however has no relation to a civil process. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. (United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 28 June 2005). However a private individual or


a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of a search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. (Id.)

EVIDENCE

Best Evidence Rule

Production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial court’s discretion whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the documents and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. Here there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence the RTC correctly admitted the photocopies in evidence. Concepcion Chua admitted signing the deed of partition and in effect admitted the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale when she failed to specifically deny it under oath pursuant to S8 R8. The Spouses Gaw did not contest the contents of the deeds but simply alleged that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary. (Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, 16 April 2008).

When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified true copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (S7 R130). The public officer must have the legal custody of the record. (S24 R132). A certification by an officer of the local assessor’s office that a copy of the deed of sale is a certified true copy is not an acceptable secondary evidence. First the local assessor’s office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in S24 R132. Second the certification did not state that it is a certified true copy of the original as required under S25 R132. (Gabatan v. CA, 13 March 2009).

Presentation of check in evidence not a condition sine qua non for conviction under B.P. Blg. 22. The best evidence rule applies only where the contents of the document is the subject of inquiry. It does not apply where what is to be proved is the execution or the existence of a document. (Arceo v People, G.R. 142641, 17 July 2006).

Presentation of photocopy of Gulf Air finance manual permissible in labor proceedings which are non-litigious. (Gulf Air v. NLRC, 24 April 2009).

Best evidence rule does not apply where the contents of a document are not the subject of inquiry, as in the case where neither party disputed the contents of a service contract. (Nissan North EDSA v. United Phil. Scout Agency, 20 April 2010).


Q Is the Best Evidence Rule under the Rules on Electronic Evidence applicable to non-electronic documents?A No. (MCC Industrial Corporation v. Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007). Hence non-electronic documents (paper-based documents) are covered by the best evidence rule under S3 R130.

Photocopies of fax transmissions are not admissible unless the non-production of the original fax transmission is accounted for. Fax transmissions are not electronic documents or electronic evidence. (MCC Industrial Corporation v. Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007, Nachura, J.)

If not all the contents of a document are generated or recorded electronically, such as if the document contains a manual signature and handwritten notations, then a photocopy of such document will not be considered as an equivalent of the original. (National Power Corporation v. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491, 3 April 2007, Chico-Nazario, J.).

Text messages are ephemeral electronic communications. Once saved or recorded however they become electronic documents and are subject to the best evidence rule.

Parol evidence rule

A beneficiary under a stipulation pour autrui is considered a party to a written contract and is bound by the parol evidence rule. (Pacres v. Heirs of Ygona, 5 May 2010).

Privileges

Under S7 of the Human Security Act, a police or law enforcement official may apply for a written order from the CA authorizing the surveillance or interception or recording of communications by terrorists or suspected terrorists. Such surveillance etc. shall not be authorized over communications between attorneys and clients, physicians and patients, journalists and their sources, and confidential business correspondence. (PBA J)

Filial Privilege

A stepmother may be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter since the stepdaughter is not her direct descendant. (Lee v. CA, 13 July 2010).

Informant in illegal drugs case


When informant must be presented in an illegal drugs case: (1) Accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, (2) there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the accused, or (3) only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction. (Quinocot v. People, 23 June 2009).

Insurance policies and applications

No privilege in contents of insurance life policies and applications. (Yu v. CA, G.R. 154115, 29 November 2005).

Vicarious admission

Acts and declarations of the developer Ayala Land Inc. would be binding upon the Ayala Alabang Village Association in an action to enforce the deed of restrictions on subdivision lots in Ayala Alabang Village. This is because the deed of restrictions provide that the same may be enforced by ALI and/or AAVA. Hence ALI is a person jointly interested with AAVA within the purview of S29 R130. (The Learning Child Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association, 7 July 2010).

Similar Acts Rule

The 3 contracts to sell were not sufficient enough to prove a habit or custom on the part of XEI to grant the 120-month term to all its lot buyers. (Boston Bank v. Manalo, 9 Feb 06).

Admissions

Accused’s silence when his wife’s nephew asked him why he killed his wife is an admission by silence under S32 R130. In addition, accused’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which can be received as an implied admission of guilt under S27 R130. (Pp v. Español, 13 Feb 09).

Failure to respond to a demand letter is not an implied admission of liability. A person does not make a letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts stated therein. He can no more impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. (Phil. First Ins. Co. v. Wallem Phils., 26 March 09).

Accused’s confession to a radio broadcaster was admissible in evidence. He was not entitled to the Miranda rights as he was not under custodial investigation. (People v. Hipona, 18 February 2010).

Accused’s confession to a Bantay Bayan made without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Inquiry made by a bantay bayan has the color of a state-related function and entitles the suspect to his Miranda rights. (People v. Lauga, 15 March 2010). On the other hand, the accused’s admissions before


barangay tanod and barangay officials made in public with other persons present were held admissible notwithstanding that the accused was not afforded his Miranda rights. (People v. Sace, 5 April 2010).

Hearsay

Declarant’s out-of-court statement admissible to establish the fact of the making of a statement and the tenor thereof. Here the prosecution witness’s testimony that he overheard a conversation between Rolando and accused (wife of the victim) that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. (People v. Malibiran, 24 April 2009).1

Psychologist’s report on the psychological incapacity of the respondent was based solely on her interview of the petitioner. The psychologist did not actually interview the respondent. Consequently the psychologist’s report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. (Paz v. Paz, 18 February 2010). Dying declaration

Bloodied condition of a stab victim indicates that victim must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death. (People v. Serenas, 29 June 2010).

Res Gestae

Statement made as part of the res gestae admissible even if made eleven hours after the incident, provided the declarant was still under the influence of the startling event. (Zarate v. People, 3 July 2009).

Rule 129. Judicial Notice

Court of Appeals erred in taking judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor. Requirement of notoriety not met. (Sps. Latip v. Chua, 16 October 2009).

Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Hence they must be alleged and proved. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 on proof of official record. (ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Echin, 11 October 2010). It is submitted that foreign law may also be proved under Sections 45 and 46 of Rule 130 as well as by an expert witness.

Rule 132. Presentation of Evidence

1 The more appropriate justification for the admission of the statement is that it falls within the state-of-mind exception since it shows the state of mind of Rolando and the accused, specifically their intent, that they would fetch a man who knew how to make bombs. (FRE 803[3]). Take note that the statement is not an admission for the witness merely overheard the statement.


Testimony of witness who died before cross-examination should be expunged if there is no showing of delay by party waiting to cross. (Sps. Dela Cruz v. Papa, 8 December 2010, Abad, J.)

An improperly notarized deed of sale is not a public document which carries the presumption of due execution and authenticity. Hence the evidentiary standard to prove forgery is merely preponderance of evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. The alleged seller’s testimony that his signature was forged taken with the testimony of the buyer that he did not see the seller sign and that he did not acknowledge the document before the notary public was sufficient to prove forgery even without presenting a handwriting expert. (Dela Rama v. Papa, 30 January 2009).

Where the acknowledgment by the notary public does not indicate the person who appeared before him, as where the blank for the name of the person is not filled in, the acknowledgment is defective hence the document is not a public document. (Dycoco v. Grafilo, 30 July 2010).

Offer & Objection

Mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits does not confer any evidentiary weight on the documents unless these are formally offered. (Heirs of Cruz-Zamora v. Multiwood Inter. Inc., 19 Jan 09).

Tender of excluded evidence applies to the situation where evidence was first offered and then refused admission, not to a case where an application for issuance of subpoena was denied. No privilege in contents of insurance life policies and applications. (Yu v. CA, G.R. 154115, 29 Nov 05).

DNA Evidence

While the accused’s DNA profile was not in the vaginal smear, the DNA result was not conclusive since the specimen was contaminated or stained, having undergone a serological analysis. (People v. Pascual, 19 January 2009).

-oOo-

All rights reserved, 2011.

Remedial Law Jurisprudence 2011 (for UE)/MRR USBKINGSTON 4GB/


Remedial Law Jurisprudence 2011 (for UE)

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