Jurisdiction Digest 1

8/18/2019 Jurisdiction Digest 1

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I. Overview

A.Definition and Concepts

1.Judicial Power

a.Meaning of Judicial Power,

justiciable controversy

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 208566, etc.

November 19, 2013

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Doctrine:

Scrutinizing the contours of the system

along constitutional lines is a task that

the political branches of government are

incapable of rendering precisely because itis an exercise of judicial power.

Facts:

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but

similar to the CDF Articles, the

201170 PDAF Article included an express

statement on lump-sum amounts allocated

for individual legislators and the Vice-

President: Representatives were given P70

Million each, broken down into P40

Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million

for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was

given to each Senator as well as the Vice-

President, with a P100 Million allocation

each for "hard" and "soft projects."

Likewise, a provision on realignment of

funds was included, but with the

qualification that it may be allowed only

once.

• Inter alia, eighty-Two (82) NGOsentrusted with implementation of

seven hundred seventy two (772)

projects amount to P6.156 Billion

were either found questionable, or

submitted questionable/spurious

documents, or failed to liquidate in

whole or in part their utilization of

the Funds.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been

typically associated with lump-sum,

discretionary funds of Members of

Congress, the present cases and the recent

controversies on the matter have, however,

shown that the term‘s usage has expanded

to include certain funds of the President

such as the Malampaya Funds and the

Presidential Social Fund.

Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with

implementation of seven hundred seventy

two (772) projects amount to P6.156Billion were either found questionable, or

submitted questionable/spurious

documents, or failed to liquidate in whole

or in part their utilization of the Funds.

Petitioners filed separate Rule 65 petitions

to prohibit spending and nullify

congressional and presidential pork

barrels.

Issue:

Whether or not (b) the issues raised in the

consolidated petitions are matters of policy

not subject to judicial review;

Held:

No. The issues raised before the Court do

not present political but legal questions

which are within its province to resolve.

Ratio:

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question

Doctrine.

The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork

Barrel System" is not an issue dependent

upon the wisdom of the political branches

of government but rather a legal one

which the Constitution itself has

commanded the Court to act upon.Scrutinizing the contours of the system

along constitutional lines is a task that

the political branches of government are

incapable of rendering precisely because it

is an exercise of judicial power. More

importantly, the present Constitution has

not only vested the Judiciary the right to

exercise judicial power but essentially

makes it a duty to proceed therewith.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The

judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts

as may be established by law. It includes

the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which

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are legally demandable and enforceable,

and to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government." InEstrada v. Desierto,

142 the expanded

concept of judicial power under the 1987

Constitution and its effect on the political

question doctrine was explained as

follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987

Constitution has narrowed the

reach of the political question

doctrine when it expanded the

power of judicial review of this

court not only to settle actual

controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and

enforceable but also to determine

whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any

branch or instrumentality of

government. Heretofore, the

judiciary has focused on the "thou

shalt not's" of the Constitution

directed against the exercise of its

jurisdiction. With the new

provision, however, courts are

given a greater prerogative to

determine what it can do to

prevent grave abuse of discretion


jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of

government. Clearly, the new

provision did not just grant the

Court power of doing nothing. x x x

[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not

assert any superiority over the other

departments; does not in reality nullify or

invalidate an act of the legislature or the

executive, but only asserts the solemn and

sacred obligation assigned to it by the

Constitution."144 To a great extent, the

Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms

undertaken by its co-equal branches of

government. But it is by constitutional

force that the Court must faithfully

perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the

Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution

of these cases would not arrest or in any

manner impede the endeavors of the two

other branches but, in fact, help ensurethat the pillars of change are erected on

firm constitutional grounds.

Francisco v. HR

G.R. No. 160261, etc.

November 10, 2003

Carpio-Morales, J.

Doctrine:this moderating power to determine the

proper allocation of powers of the different

branches of government and to direct the

course of government along constitutional

channels is inherent in all courts[25] as a

necessary consequence of the judicial

power itself, which is the power of the

court to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable.

Facts:

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph

E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint)

against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.

and seven Associate Justices[5] of this

Court for culpable violation of the

Constitution, betrayal of the public trust

and other high crimes.[6] The complaint

was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen

Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to

the House Committee on Justice on

August 5, 2003

The House Committee on Justice ruled on

October 13, 2003 that the first

impeachment complaint was sufficient in

form,[9] but voted to dismiss the same on

October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in

substance.

Four months and three weeks since the

filing on June 2, 2003 of the first

complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day

after the House Committee on Justice

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voted to dismiss it, the second

impeachment complaint[11] was filed with

the Secretary General of the House[12] by

Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.

(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William

B. Fuentebella (Third District, CamarinesSur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results

of the legislative inquiry initiated by

above-mentioned House Resolution. This

second impeachment complaint was

accompanied by a Resolution of

Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at

least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of

the House of Representatives.

Respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.:

impeachment is a political action which

cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,

any question, issue or incident arising at

any stage of the impeachment proceeding

is beyond the reach of judicial review.[47]

Senator Pimentel: the Senates sole power

to try impeachment cases[48] (1) entirely

excludes the application of judicial review

over it; and (2) necessarily includes the

Senates power to determine constitutional

questions relative to impeachment

proceedings.

ARTICLE XI

SECTION 3. (1) The House of

Representatives shall have

theexclusive power toinitiate all cases

of impeachment.

(5)No impeachmentproceedingsshallbe initiatedagainst

the same official more than once within a

period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have thesole power

to try and decide all cases of

impeachment. When sitting for that

purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or

affirmation. When the President of the

Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court shall preside, but shallnot vote. No person shall be convicted

without the concurrence of two-thirds of

all the Members of the Senate.

Issue:

(1) the threshold and novel issue of

whether or not the power of judicial review

extends to those arising from

impeachment proceedings;

Held:

Ratio:

This Courts power of judicial review

is conferred on the judicial branch of the

government in Section 1, Article VIII of

our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be

vested in one Supreme Court and in such

lower courts as may be established by law.Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable,

andto determine whether or not there

has been a grave abuse of discretion


jurisdiction on the part of any branch

or instrumentality of the

government.(Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on

exhaustively expounded upon by Justice

Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case

of Angara v. Electoral Commission[23] after

the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution

whose provisions, unlike the present

Constitution, did not contain the present

provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2

on what judicial power includes.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this

moderating power to determine the proper

allocation of powers of the different

branches of government and to direct the

course of government along constitutional

channels is inherent in all courts[25] as a

necessary consequence of the judicial

power itself, which is the power of the

court to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable.

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902,

decades before its express grant in the

1935 Constitution, the power of judicial

review was exercised by our courts to

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invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted political

law professor and former Supreme Court

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[30] the

executive and legislative branches of our

government in fact effectivelyacknowledged this power of judicial review

in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only

by subsequent ones, and

their violation or non-observance

shall not be excused by disuse, or

custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law

to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shallbe void and the latter shall

govern.

Administrative or executive

acts, orders and regulations

shall be valid only when they

are not contrary to the laws or

the Constitution.(Emphasis

supplied)

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of

discretion byany branch or

instrumentalities of government, the

afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution engraves, for the first time

into its history, into block letter law the

so-called expandedcertiorari jurisdiction

of this Court,

• the role of the judiciary during

the deposed regime was

marred considerably by the

circumstance that in a number

of cases against the

government, which then had

no legal defense at all, the

solicitor general set up the

defense of political questions

and got away with it.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936

Laurel, J.

Doctrine:

the judicial department is the only

constitutional organ which can be

called upon to determine the proper

allocation of powers between the

several departments and among the

integral or constituent units thereof.

Facts:

This is an original action instituted in this

court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for

the issuance of a writ of prohibition to

restrain and prohibit the Electoral

Commission, one of the respondents, from

taking further cognizance of the protest

filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,against the election of said petitioner as

member of the National Assembly for the

first assembly district of the Province of

Tayabas.

National Assembly: Confirmed Election of

Angara on December 3, 1935

v.

Electoral Commission: election protests up

to December 9, 1935

Issue:

1. Has the Supreme Court

jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission

and the subject matter of the controversy

upon the foregoing related facts, and in

the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission

acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in assuming to take

cognizance of the protest filed against the

election of the herein petitioner

notwithstanding the previous confirmation

of such election by resolution of the

National Assembly?

Held:

1. Yes.

2. The Electoral Commission shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of themembers of the National Assembly.

Ratio:

x x x In times of social disquietude or

political excitement, the great landmarks

of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten

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or marred, if not entirely obliterated.In

cases of conflict, the judicial

department is the only constitutional

organ which can be called upon

to determine the proper allocation of

powers between the several

departments and among the integral

or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our

Constitution is of course lacking perfection

and perfectibility, but as much as it was

within the power of our people, acting

through their delegates to so provide, that

instrument which is the expression of

their sovereignty however limited, hasestablished a republican government

intended to operate and function as a

harmonious whole, under a system of

checks and balances, and subject to

specific limitations and restrictions

provided in the said instrument.The

Constitution sets forth in no

uncertain language the restrictions

and limitations upon governmental

powers and agencies. If theserestrictions and limitations are

transcended it would be

inconceivable if the Constitution had

not provided for a mechanism by

which to direct the course of

government along constitutional

channels, for then the distribution of

powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of

rights mere expressions of sentiment, and

the principles of good government merepolitical apothegms. Certainly, the

limitations and restrictions embodied in

our Constitution are real as they should be

in any living constitution. In the United

States where no express constitutional

grant is found in their constitution,the

possession of this moderating power

of the courts, not to speak of its

historical origin and development there,

has been set at rest by popularacquiescence for a period of more than one

and a half centuries. In our case, this

moderating poweris granted, if not

expressly, by clear implication from

section 2 of article VIII of our

Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the

powers of government.Who is to

determine the nature, scope and

extent of such powers? The

Constitution itself has provided for

the instrumentality of the judiciary

as the rational way. And when the

judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not

assert any superiority over the other

departments; it does not in reality nullify

or invalidate an act of the legislature,

butonly asserts the solemn and

sacred obligation assigned to it by the

Constitution to determine conflicting

claims of authority under the

Constitution and to establish for the

parties in an actual controversy the

rights which that instrument secures

and guarantees to them. This is in

truth all that is involved in what is

termed "judicial supremacy" which

properly is the power of judicial review

under the Constitution. Even then, this

power of judicial review is limited to actual

cases and controversies to be exercised

after full opportunity of argument by the

parties, and limited further to the

constitutional question raised or the

verylis mota presented. Any attempt at

abstraction could only lead to dialectics

and barren legal questions and to sterile

conclusions unrelated to actualities.

Narrowed as its function is in this manner,

the judiciary does not pass upon questionsof wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation. More than that, courts accord

the presumption of constitutionality to

legislative enactments, not only because

the legislature is presumed to abide by the

Constitution but also because the judiciary

in the determination of actual cases and

controversies must reflect the wisdom and

justice of the people as expressed through

their representatives in the executive and

legislative departments of the

government.[24] (Italics in the original;

emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Tolentino v. COMELEC

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G.R. No. L-34150

October 16, 1971

Barredo, J.

Doctrine:

these postulates (from Angara v. ElectoralCommission) just quoted do not apply only

to conflicts of authority between the three

existing regular departments of the

government but to all such conflicts

between and among these departments, or,

between any of them, on the one hand, and

any other constitutionally created

independent body, like the electoral

tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and

the Constituent assemblies constituted bythe House of Congress, on the other

Facts:

Petition for prohibition principally to

restrain the respondent Commission on

Elections "from undertaking to hold a

plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which

the proposed constitutional amendment

"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of

Article V of the Constitution of the

Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,

submitted" for ratification by the people

pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of

the Constitutional Convention of 1971,

and the subsequent implementing

resolutions, by declaring said resolutions

to be without the force and effect of law in

so far as they direct the holding of such

plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of

the respondent Commission (COMELEC)

performed and to be done by it inobedience to the aforesaid Convention

resolutions to be null and void, for being

violative of the Constitution of the

Philippines.

the main thrust of the petition is that

Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other

implementing resolutions thereof

subsequently approved by the Convention

have no force and effect as laws in so far as

they provide for the holding of a plebiscite

co-incident with the elections of eight

senators and all city, provincial and

municipal officials to be held on November

8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in

obedience thereof and tending to carry out

the holding of the plebiscite directed by

said resolutions are null and void, on the

ground that the calling and holding of

such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a

power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a

legislative body, and may not be exercisedby the Convention, and that, under

Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,

the proposed amendment in question

cannot be presented to the people for

ratification separately from each and all of

the other amendments to be drafted and

proposed by the Convention. On the other

hand, respondents and intervenors posit

that the power to provide for, fix the date

and lay down the details of the plebiscitefor the ratification of any amendment the

Convention may deem proper to propose is

within the authority of the Convention as

a necessary consequence and part of its

power to propose amendments and that

this power includes that of submitting

such amendments either individually or

jointly at such time and manner as the

Convention may direct in discretion.

Issue:

They (intervenors) contend that the issue

before Us is a political question and that

the Convention being legislative body of

the highest order is sovereign, and as

such, its acts impugned by petitioner are

beyond the control of the Congress and the

courts

Held:

Court has jurisdiction to determineconstitutionality of Organic Resolution 1

of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

(declared void)

Ratio:

There should be no more doubt as to the

position of this Court regarding its

jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality

of the acts of the Congress, acting as a

constituent assembly, and, for that matter,

those of a constitutional convention called

for the purpose of proposing amendments

to the Constitution, which concededly is at

par with the former.

In Gonzales v. COMELEC

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• Since, when proposing, as a

constituent assembly, amendments

to the Constitution, the members

of Congress derive their authority

from the Fundamental Law, it

follows, necessarily, that they donot have the final say on whether

or not their acts are within or

beyond constitutional limits.

these postulates (from Angara v. Electoral

Commission) just quoted do not apply only

to conflicts of authority between the three

existing regular departments of the

government but to all such conflicts

between and among these departments, or,between any of them, on the one hand, and

any other constitutionally created

independent body, like the electoral

tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and

the Constituent assemblies constituted by

the House of Congress, on the other. We

see no reason of logic or principle

whatsoever, and none has been

convincingly shown to Us by any of the

respondents and intervenors, why the

same ruling should not apply to the

present Convention, even if it is an

assembly of delegate elected directly by

the people, since at best, as already

demonstrated, it has been convened by

authority of and under the terms of the

present Constitution.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. L-36142, etc.March 31, 1973

Concepcion,C.J.

Doctrine:

When the grant of power is qualified,

conditional or subject to limitations, the

issue on whether or not the prescribed

qualifications or conditions have been met,

or the limitations respected, is justiciable

or non-political, the crux of the problem

being one of

legality or validity of the

contested act,not its wisdom.

Facts:

While the Convention was in session on

September 21, 1972, the President issued

Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire

Philippines under Martial Law. On

November 29, 1972, the Convention

approved its Proposed Constitution of theRepublic of the Philippines. The next day,

November 30, 1972, the President of the

Philippines issued Presidential Decree No.

73, "submitting to the Filipino people for

ratification or rejection the Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines proposed

by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,

and appropriating funds therefor," as well

as setting the plebiscite for said

ratification or rejection of the ProposedConstitution on January 15, 1973.

Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case

G.R. No. L-35925, against the Commission

on Elections, the Treasurer of the

Philippines and the Auditor General, to

enjoin said "respondents or their agents

from implementing Presidential Decree

No. 73, in any manner, until further orders

of the Court," upon the grounds,inter alia,

that said Presidential Decree "has no force

and effect as law because the calling ... of

such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines

for the conduct of the same, the

prescription of the ballots to be used and

the question to be answered by the voters,

and the appropriation of public funds for

the purpose, are, by the Constitution,

lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and

"there is no proper submission to the

people of said Proposed Constitution setfor January 15, 1973, there being no

freedom of speech, press and assembly,

and there being no sufficient time to

inform the people of the contents thereof."

In view of these events relative to the

postponement of the aforementioned

plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to

refrain, for the time being, from deciding

the aforementioned cases, for neither the

date nor the conditions under which said

plebiscite would be held were known or

announced officially.

"In the afternoon of January 12,

1973, the petitioners in Case G.R.

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No.

L-35948 filed an "urgent motion,"

praying that said case be decided

"as soon as possible, preferably not

later than January 15, 1973." It

was alleged in said motion,interalia:

"6. That the President

subsequently announced the

issuance of Presidential Decree

No. 86 organizing the so-called

Citizens Assemblies, to be

consulted on certain public

questions [Bulletin Today, January

1, 1973];

15. That petitioners have reason tofear, and therefore state, that the

question added in the last list of

questions to be asked to the

Citizens Assemblies, namely: —

Do you approve of

the New Constitution? —

in relation to the question

following it: —

Do you still want a

plebiscite to be

called to ratify the

new Constitution?"

—

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION

BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE

CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE

1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

xxx

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers in me vested by the

Constitution, do hereby certify and

proclaim that the Constitution proposed

by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one

(1971) Constitutional Convention has been

ratified by an overwhelming majority of all

of the votes cast by the members of all the

Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)

throughout the Philippines, and has

thereby come into effect.

The Present Cases

Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142

against the Executive Secretary and the

Secretaries of National Defense, Justice

and Finance, to restrain said respondents

"and their subordinates or agents from

implementing any of the provisions of the

propose Constitution not found in the

present Constitution" — referring to that

of 1935. The petition therein, filed byJosue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and

a qualified and registered voter" and as "a

class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all

citizens and voters similarly situated," was

amended on or about January 24, 1973.

After reciting in substance the facts set

forth in the decision in the plebiscite

cases, Javellana alleged that the President

had announced "the immediate

implementation of the New Constitution,thru his Cabinet, respondents including,"

and that the latter "are acting without, or

in excess of jurisdiction in implementing

the said proposed Constitution" upon the

ground: "that the President, as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, is without authority to

create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the

same "are without power to approve the

proposed Constitution ..."; "that the

President is without power to proclaim the

ratification by the Filipino people of the

proposed Constitution"; and "that the

election held to ratify the proposed

Constitution was not a free election, hence

null and void."

Issue:

WON the Court can decide on the

constitutionality of PD 73 and PP 1102

Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the

nature of a political, and, hence, non-

justiciable question?

Held:

1. There is unanimity on the justiciable

nature of the issue on the legality of

Presidential Decree No. 73.

2. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and

myself are of the opinion that the question

of validity of said Proclamation has not

been properly raised before the Court,

which, accordingly, should not pass upon

such question

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Ratio:

The five questions thus agreed upon as

reflecting the basic issues herein involved

are the following:

1. Is the issue of the validity of

Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, orpolitical and therefore non-justiciable,

question?

Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six

(6) members of the Court, hold that the

issue of the validity of Proclamation No.

1102 presents a justiciable and non-

political question. Justices Makalintal and

Castro did not vote squarely on thisquestion, but, only inferentially, in their

discussion of the second question. Justice

Barredo qualified his vote, stating that

"inasmuch as it is claimed there has been

approval by the people, the Court may

inquire into the question of whether or not

there has actually been such an approval,

and, in the affirmative, the Court should

keep hands-off out of respect to the

people's will, but, in negative, the Court

may determine from both factual and legal

angles whether or not Article XV of the

1935 Constitution been complied with."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or

three (3) members of the Court hold that

the issue is political and "beyond the

ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the

1971 Constitutional Convention been

ratified validly (with substantial, if notstrict, compliance) conformably to the

applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions?

Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six

(6) members of the Court, hold that the

issue of the validity of Proclamation No.

1102 presents a justiciable and non-

political question. Justices Makalintal and

Castro did not vote squarely on this

question, but, only inferentially, in their

discussion of the second question. Justice

Barredo qualified his vote, stating that

"inasmuch as it is claimed there has been

approval by the people, the Court may

inquire into the question of whether or not

there has actually been such an approval,

and, in the affirmative, the Court should

keep hands-off out of respect to the

people's will, but, in negative, the Court

may determine from both factual and legalangles whether or not Article XV of the

1935 Constitution been complied with."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or

three (3) members of the Court hold that

the issue is political and "beyond the

ambit of judicial inquiry."

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating

that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973

Constitution has been validly ratifiedpursuant to Article XV, I still maintain

that in the light of traditional concepts

regarding the meaning and intent of said

Article, the referendum in the Citizens'

Assemblies, specially in the manner the

votes therein were cast, reported and

canvassed, falls short of the requirements

thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I

have no means of refusing to recognize as

a judge that factually there was voting and

that the majority of the votes were for

considering as approved the 1973

Constitution without the necessity of the

usual form of plebiscite followed in past

ratifications, I am constrained to hold

that, in the political sense, if not in the

orthodox legal sense, the people may be

deemed to have cast their favorable votes

in the belief that in doing so they did the

part required of them by Article XV,

hence, it may be said that in its politicalaspect, which is what counts most, after

all, said Article has been substantially

complied with, and, in effect, the 1973

Constitution has been constitutionally

ratified."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,

or three (3) members of the Court hold

that under their view there has been in

effect substantial compliance with the

constitutional requirements for valid

ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed

Constitution acquiesced in (with or

without valid ratification) by the people?

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Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra

hold that "the people have already

accepted the 1973 Constitution."

Two (2) members of the Court, namely,

Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that

there can be no free expression, and there

has even been no expression, by the people

qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of

their acceptance or repudiation of the

proposed Constitution under Martial Law.

Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is

conceded that the doctrine stated in some

American decisions to the effect thatindependently of the validity of the

ratification, a new Constitution once

accepted acquiesced in by the people must

be accorded recognition by the Court, I am

not at this stage prepared to state that

such doctrine calls for application in view

of the shortness of time that has elapsed

and the difficulty of ascertaining what is

the mind of the people in the absence of

the freedom of debate that is a

concomitant feature of martial law."88

Three (3) members of the Court express

their lack of knowledge and/or competence

to rule on the question. Justices

Makalintal and Castro are joined by

Justice Teehankee in their statement that

"Under a regime of martial law, with the

free expression of opinions through the

usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have

no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have

accepted the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? And

On the fourth question of relief, six (6)

members of the Court, namely, Justices

Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS

the petition. Justice Makalintal and

Castro so voted on the strength of their

view that "(T)he effectivity of the said

Constitution, in the final analysis, is the

basic and ultimate question posed by these

cases to resolve which considerations other

than judicial, an therefore beyond the

competence of this Court,90 are relevant

and unavoidable."

5. Is the aforementioned proposed

Constitution in force?

Four (4) members of the Court, namely,

Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and

Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue

of the people's acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely,

Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and

Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the

premise stated in their votes on the third

question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have

accepted or not accepted the Constitution;

and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely,

Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the

Constitution proposed by the 1971

Constitutional Convention is not in force;

with the result that there are not enough

votes to declare that the new Constitution

is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority

of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,

Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and

Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes

of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,

Fernando and Teehankee, all the

aforementioned cases are hereby

dismissed. This being the vote of themajority, there is no further judicial

obstacle to the new Constitution being

considered in force and effect.

Concepcion,C.J.

Accordingly, when the grant of power is

qualified, conditional or subject to

limitations, the issue on whether or not

the prescribed qualifications or conditions

have been met, or the limitations

respected, is justiciable or non-political,

the crux of the problem being one

of

legality or validity of the contested

act,not its wisdom.

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What is more, the judicial inquiry into

such issue and the settlement thereof are

themain functions of courts of justice

under the Presidential form of government

adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the

system of checks and balances, one of itsbasic predicates. As a consequence, We

have neither the authority nor the

discretion to decline passing upon said

issue, but areunder the ineluctable

obligation — made particularly more

exacting and peremptory by our oath, as

members of the highest Court of the land,

to support and defend the Constitution —

to settle it.

1.What is the procedure prescribed by the

1935 Constitution for its amendment?

Under section 1 of Art. XV of said

Constitution, three (3) steps are essential,

namely:

1. That the amendments to the

Constitution be proposed either by

Congress or by a convention called for that

purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all

the Members of the Senate and the House

of Representatives voting separately," but

"in joint session assembled";

2. That such amendments be "submitted

to the people for their ratification" at an

"election"; and

Const. (1935), Art. V, Sec. 1. Suffrage may

be exercised by male citizens of the

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by

law, who are twenty-one years of age orover and are able to read and write, and

who shall have resided in the Philippines

for one year and in the municipality

wherein they propose to vote for at least

six months preceding the election. The

National Assembly shall extend the right

of suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite

which shall be held for that purpose

within two years after the adoption of this

Constitution, not less than three hundred

thousand women possessing the necessary

qualifications shall vote affirmatively on

the question.

Const. (1935), Art. X Sec. 2. The

Commission on Elections shall

have exclusive charge of the enforcement

and administration ofall laws relative to

theconduct of elections and shall exercise

all other functions which may be conferred

upon it by law. It shall decide, save those

involving the right tovote,alladministrative questions,

affecting elections, including the

determination of the number and location

of polling places, and the appointment of

election inspectors and of other election

officials. All law enforcement agencies and

instrumentalities of the Government, when

so required by the Commission, shall

actas its deputiesfor the purpose

of

insuring fee, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and

rulings of the Commission shall be subject

to review by the Supreme Court.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus clear that the proceedings held

in such Citizens' Assemblies — and We

have more to say on this point in

subsequent pages — were fundamentally

irregular, in that persons lacking the

qualifications prescribed in section 1 of

Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to

vote in said Assemblies. And, since there

is no means by which the invalid votes of

those less than 21 years of age can be

separated or segregated from those of the

qualified voters, the proceedings in the

Citizens' Assemblies must be considered

null and void.

Art. XV envisages — with the term "votes

cast" — choices madeon ballots — not

orally or by raising — by the persons

taking part in plebiscites. This is but

natural and logical, for, since the early

years of the American regime, we had

adopted the Australian Ballot System,

with its major characteristics,

namely,uniform official ballotsprepared

and furnished by the Government and

secrecy in the voting, with the advantage

of keeping records that permit judicial

inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy

of the election returns. And the 1935

Constitution has been consistently

interpreted inallplebiscites for the

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ratification rejection of proposed

amendments thereto, from 1935 to 1967.

Hence, theviva voce voting in the Citizens'

Assemblies was and is null and voidab

initio.

3. That such amendments be "approved by

a majority of the votes cast" in said

election.

b. How should the plebiscite be held?

(COMELEC supervision indispensable;

essential requisites)

The point is that, such of the Barrio

Assemblies as were held took place

without the intervention of the

Commission on Elections, and without

complying with the provisions of the

Election Code of 1971 or even of those of

Presidential Decree No. 73. What is more,

they were held under the supervisionof

the very officers and agencies of the

Executive Department sought to be

excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935

Constitution. Xxx And the procedure

therein mostly followed is such that there

isno reasonable means of checking the

accuracy of the returns files by the officers

who conducted said plebiscites.

Makalintal, J. and Castro, J., concurring:

There can hardly be any doubt that in

everybody's view — from the framers of

the 1935 Constitution through all the

Congresses since then to the 1971

Constitutional Convention — amendmentsto the Constitution should be ratified in

only one way, that is, in an election or

plebiscite held in accordance with law and

participated in only by qualified and duly

registered voters.

The Citizens Assemblies were not limited

to qualified, let alone registered voters, but

included all citizens from the age of

fifteen, and regardless of whether or not

they were illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex

convicts *— these being the classes of

persons expressly disqualified from voting

by Section 102 of the Election Code. In

short, the constitutional and statutory

qualifications were not considered in the

determination of who should participate.

No official ballots were used in the voting;

it was done mostly by acclamation or open

show of hands. Secrecy, which is one of the

essential features of the election process,

was not therefore observed. No set of rulesfor counting the votes or of tabulating

them and reporting the figures was

prescribed or followed. The Commission on

Elections, which is the constitutional body

charged with the enforcement and

administration of all laws relative to the

conduct of elections, took no part at all,

either by way of supervision or in the

assessment of the results.

In the deliberations of this Court one of

the issues formulated for resolution is

whether or not the new Constitution, since

its submission to the Citizens Assemblies,

has found acceptance among the people,

such issue being related to the political

question theory propounded by the

respondents. We have not tarried on the

point at all since we find no reliable basis

on which to form a judgment. Under a

regime of martial law, with the free

expression of opinions through the usual

media vehicles restricted, we have no

means of knowing, to the point of judicial

certainty, whether the people have

accepted the Constitution. In any event,

we do not find the issue decisive insofar as

our vote in these cases is concerned. To

interpret the Constitution — that is

judicial. That the Constitution should be

deemed in effect because of popularacquiescence — that is political, and

therefore beyond the domain of judicial

review.

We therefore vote not to give due course to

the instant petitions.

Barredo, J, concurring:

As far as I am concerned, I regard the

present petitions as no more than mere

reiterations of the Supplemental Petitions

filed by Counsel Lorenzo M. Tañada on

January 15, 1973 in the so called

Plebiscite Cases xxx. I reiterate, therefore,

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the vote I cast when these petitions were

initially considered by the Court; namely,

to dismiss them.

As I shall elucidate anon, paramount

considerations of national import have ledme to the conviction that the best interests

of all concerned would be best served by

the Supreme Court holding that the 1973

Constitution is now in force, not

necessarily as a consequence of the

revolutionary concept previously suggested

by me, but upon the ground that as a

political, more than as a legal, act of the

people, the result of the referendum may

be construed as a compliance with thesubstantiality of Article XV of the 1935

Constitution.

the most important point I took into

account was that in the face of the

Presidential certification through

Proclamation 1102 itself that the New

Constitution has been approved by a

majority of the people and having in mind

facts of general knowledge which I have

judicial notice of, I am in no position to

deny that the result of the referendum was

as the President had stated.

It is my sincere conviction that the

Constitution of 1973 has been accepted or

adopted by the people. And on this

premise, my considered opinion is that the

Court may no longer decide these cases on

the basis of purely legal considerations.

Factors which are non-legal butnevertheless ponderous and compelling

cannot be ignored, for their relevancy is

inherent in the issue itself to be resolved.

it being obvious that of the three great

departments of the government under the

1935 Constitution, two, the Executive and

the Legislative, have already accepted the

New Constitution and recognized its

enforceability and enforcement, I cannot

see how this Supreme Court can by

judicial fiat hold back the political

developments taking place and for the

sake of being the guardian of the

Constitution and the defender of its

integrity and supremacy make its judicial

power prevail against the decision of those

who were duly chosen by the people to be

their authorized spokesmen and

representatives.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Ivote to dismiss these petitions

formandamus and prohibition without

costs.

Makasiar, J., concurring:

Assuming, without conceding, that Article

XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribes a

procedure for the ratification ofconstitutional amendments or of a new

Constitution and that such procedure was

no complied with, the validity of

Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 is a

political, not a justiciable, issue; for it is

inseparably or inextricably link with and

strikes at, because it is decisive of, the

validity of ratification and adoption of, as

well as acquiescence of people in, the 1973

Constitution and the legitimacy of the

government organized and operating

thereunder.

The ruling in the cases of

Gonzales vs.

Comelec, et al. (L-28224, Nov. 29, 1967, 21

SCRA 774) andTolentino vs. Comelec, et

al. (L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702)

on which petitioners place great reliance

— that the courts may review the

propriety of a submission of a proposed

constitutional amendmentbefore theratification or adoption of such proposed

amendment by the sovereign people, hardly

applies to the cases at bar; because the

issue involved in the aforesaid cases refers

to only the propriety of the submission of a

proposed constitutional amendment to the

people for ratification, unlike the present

petitions, which challenge inevitably the

validity of the 1973 Constitution after its

ratification or adoption thru acquiescence

by the sovereign people. As heretofore

stated, it is specious and pure sophistry to

advance the reasoning that the present

petitions pray only for the nullification of

the 1973 Constitution and the government

operating thereunder.

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The inevitable consequence therefore is

that the validity of the ratification or

adoption of or acquiescence by the people

in the 1973 Constitution, remains a

political issue removed from the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

If this Court inquires into the validity of

Proclamation No. 1102 and consequently

of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution it

would be exercising a veto power on the

act of the sovereign people, of whom this

Court is merely an agent, which to say the

least, would be anomalous. This Court

cannot dictate to our principal, thesovereign people, as to how the approval of

the new Constitution should be manifested

or expressed. The sovereign people have

spoken and we must abide by their

decision, regardless of our notion as to

what is the proper method of giving assent

to the new Charter.

Even if conclusiveness is to be denied to

the truth of the declaration by the

President in Proclamation No. 1102 that

the people through their Citizens'

Assemblies had overwhelmingly approved

the new Constitution due regard to a

separate, coordinate and co-equal branch

of the government demands adherence to

the presumption of correctness of the

President's declaration.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, ALL

THE PETITIONS IN THESE FIVECASESSHOULD BE DISMISSED.

Esguerra, J., concurring:

this Court should abstain from assuming

jurisdiction, but, instead, as an act of

judicial statesmanship, should dismiss the

petitions. In resolving whether or not the

question presented is political, joint

discussion of issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 is

necessary so as to arrive at a logical

conclusion. For after the acceptance of a

new Constitution and acquiescence therein

by the people by putting it into practical

operation, any question regarding its

validity should be foreclosed and all

debates on whether it was duly or lawfully

ushered into existence as the organic law

of the state become political and not

judicial in character.

what is sought to be invalidated is the new

Constitution itself — the very framework

of the present Government since January

17, 1973. The reason is obvious. The

Presidential decrees set up the means for

the ratification and acceptance of the new

Constitution and Proclamation No. 1102

simply announced the result of the

referendum or plebiscite by the people

through the Citizens Assemblies.

For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss all

petitions.

ZALDIVAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

One department is just as representative

as the other, and judiciary is the

department which is charged with the

special duty of determining the limitations

which the law places upon all official

actions4. In the case of

Gonzales v.

Commission on Elections5, this Court

ruled that the issue as to whether or not a

resolution of Congress acting as a

constituent assembly violates the

Constitution is not a political question and

is therefore subject to judicial review. In

the case of Avelino v. Cuenco 6, this Court

held that the exception to the rule thatcourts will not interfere with a political

question affecting another department is

when such political question involves an

issue as to the construction and

interpretation of the provision of the

constitution. And so, it has been held that

the question of whether a constitution

shall be amended or not is a political

question which is not in the power of the

court to decide, but whether or not the

constitution has been legally amended is a

justiciable question.

it is in the power of this Court, as the

ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, to

determine the validity of the proposal, the

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submission, and the ratification of any

change in the Constitution. Ratification or

non-ratification of a constitutional

amendment is a vital element in the

procedure to amend the constitution, and I

believe that the Court can inquire into,and decide on, the question of whether or

not an amendment to the constitution, as

in the present cases, has been ratified in

accordance with the requirements

prescribed in the Constitution that was

amended.

FERNANDO, J. ,dissenting:

ince the Constitution pre-eminently

occupies the highest rung in the hierarchy

of legal norms, it is in the judiciary,

ultimately this Tribunal, that such a

responsibility is vested. With the 1935

Constitution containing, as above noted,

an explicit article on the subject of

amendments, it would follow that the

presumption to be indulged in is that the

question of whether there has been

deference to its terms is for this Court to

pass upon. Xxx Nor is it a valid objection

to this conclusion that what was involved

in those cases was the legality of the

submission and not ratification, for from

the very language of the controlling

article, the two vital steps are proposal

and ratification, which as pointed out

in Dillon v. Gloss,11"cannot be treated as

unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in

a single endeavor."12

Once an aspectthereof is viewed as judicial, there would

be no justification for considering the rest

as devoid of that character.

"political questions" should refer to such

as would under the Constitution be

decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity or in regard to full discretionary

authority is vested either in the President

or Congress. It is thus beyond the

competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

Unless clearly falling within the

formulation, the decision reached by the

political branches whether in the form of a

congressional act or an executive order

could be tested in court. Xxx Even when

the Presidency or Congress possesses

plenary powers, its improvident exercise or

the abuse thereof, if shown, may give rise

to a justiciable controversy.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

in the final analysis, what is assailed is

not merely the validity of Proclamation

No. 1102 of the President, which is merely

declaratory of the fact of approval or

ratification, but the legitimacy of thegovernment. It is addressed more to the

framework and political character of this

Government which now functions under

the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a

Constitution that is already effective.

In other words, where a complete change

in the fundamental law has been effected

through political action, the Court whose

existence is affected by such change is, in

the words of Mr. Melville Fuller Weston,

"precluded from passing upon the fact of

change by a logical difficulty which is not

to be surmounted."5 Such change in the

organic law relates to the existence of a

prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to

its authority and "does not relate merely

to a question of the horizontal distribution

of powers."6 It involves in essence a matter

which "the sovereign has entrusted to the

so-called political departments of

government or has reserved to be settled

by its own extra governmental action."

Ocampo v. Cabañgis

G.R. No. L-3893

February 15, 1910

Elliott, J.

Doctrine:In a broader sense, and for the purposes of

construing and testing the validity of the

Acts of the Philippine Legislature, they

are constitutional courts, because they,

like the Legislature, exist by virtue of a

written Organic Law enacted by the

15


16/28

supreme legislative body. The validity of

all legislative Acts must be determined by

their compliance with this Organic Law,

and the determination of the legal

question of compliance or noncompliance

therewith is a judicial question, whichmust in the last analysis be determined by

the judiciary.

Facts:

On the 26th of December, 1908 a judgment

was entered in this case in the following

words:

Without prejudice to the filing of

an extended opinion later, the

judgment appealed from is herebyreversed and the defendant is

absolved from the complaint

without special finding as to costs,

and twenty days hereafter let

judgment be entered in conformity

herewith, and ten days later let

the record be returned to the court

wherein it originated, for

appropriate action. So ordered.

The appellees now seek the cancellation

and annulment of the entry of judgment

and the recall of theremittiturand the

record of the case to this court. The motion

is made upon the theory that no final

judgment has ever been entered, and that

by reason of the changes in the personnel

of the court the more extensive opinion

which was contemplated can not now be

filed.

Issue:

WON the decision violates Act No. 136,

Sec. 15 and thus invalid.

Are Philippine courts constitutional

courts?

Held:

No. Motion denied.

In a broad sense, yes.

Ratio:

Section 15 of Act No. 136 provides that "in

the determination of causes all decisions

of the Supreme Court shall be given in

writing, signed by the judges concurring in

the decision, and the grounds of the

decision shall be stated as briefly as may

be consistent with clearness."

Section 15 of Act No. 136 expresses a

proper rule which should be observed by

the court unless there is some substantialreason for departing therefrom, but if such

reason exists, the judicial action can not be

controlled by legislative directions. In

holding that this statute is directory, we

assume of the court against its judicial

judgment.

The doctrine is well established in the

various States of the Union that the

legislatures have no power to establishrules which operates to deprive the courts

of their constitutional authority to exercise

the judicial functions. A constitutional

court when exercising its proper judicial

functions can no more be unreasonably

controlled by the legislature than can the

legislature when properly exercising

legislative power be subjected to the

control of the courts. Each acts

independently within its exclusive field.

But counsel asserts that the courts of the

Philippine Islands are not constitutional

courts, and "that Act No. 136, the Acts of

Congress and the Commission are the

Constitution as far as this Supreme Court

is concerned." We are unable to accept this

as a correct statement of the law. In a

certain sense these courts are not

constitutional courts. In a broader sense,

and for the purposes of construing andtesting the validity of the Acts of the

Philippine Legislature, they are

constitutional courts, because they, like

the Legislature, exist by virtue of a

written Organic Law enacted by the

supreme legislative body. The validity of

all legislative Acts must be determined by

their compliance with this Organic Law,

and the determination of the legal

question of compliance or noncompliance

therewith is a judicial question, which

must in the last analysis be determined by

the judiciary. Xxx The motion is therefore

denied.

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b.Political question

Lansang v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-33964, etc.

December 11, 1971

Concepcion,C.J.

Doctrine:

the Executive is supreme, as regards the

suspension of the privilege, but

onlyif

andwhen he actswithin the sphere

allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the

authority to determine whether or not he

has so acted is vested in the Judicial

Department, which, in this respect, is, in

turn, constitutionally supreme.

Facts:

Proclamation No. 889

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.

MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by

Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of

the Constitution, do hereby suspend the

privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus, for

the persons presently detained, as well as

others who may be hereafter similarly

detained for the crimes of insurrection or

rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses

committed by them in furtherance or on

the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or

in connection therewith.

Due to emergence of rebels with precepts

based on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

teachings

Respondents: the "President of the

Philippines acted on relevant facts

gathered thru the coordinated efforts of

the various intelligence agents of our

government but (of) which the Chief

Executive could not at the moment give a

full account and disclosure without risking

revelation of highly classified state secrets

vital to its safely and security"; that the

determination thus made by the President

is "final and conclusive upon the court and

upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of

the nature of political question(s) which

cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry,"

Issue:

WON "the authority to decide whether the

exigency has arisen requiring suspension

(of the privilege of the writ of

habeas

corpus) belongs to the President and his

'decision is final and conclusive' upon thecourts and upon all other persons."

Held:

No, the Court had authority to and should

inquire into the existence of the factual

bases required by the Constitution for the

suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Ratio:

Upon further deliberation, the members ofthe Court are nowunanimous in the

conviction that it has the authority to

inquire into the existence of said factual

bases in order to determine the

constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the

privilege is neither absolute nor

unqualified. The authority conferred by

the Constitution, both under the Bill of

Rights and under the Executive

Department, is limited and conditional.

The precept in the Bill of Rights

establishes a general rule, as well as an

exception thereto. What is more, it

postulates the former in thenegative,

evidently to stress its importance, by

providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ

of

habeas corpusshallnot be

suspended ...." It is only by way

of

exception that it permits the suspensionof the privilege "in cases of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art

VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger

thereof" — "when the public safety

requires it, in any of which events the

same may be suspended wherever during

such period the necessity for such

suspension shall exist."13 For from being

full and plenary, the authority to suspend

the privilege of the writ is thus

circumscribed, confined and restricted, not

only by the prescribed setting or the

conditions essential to its existence, but,

also, as regards the time when and the

place where it may be exercised.

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the separation of powers, under the

Constitution, is not absolute. What is

more, it goes hand in hand with the

system of checks and balances, under

which the Executive is supreme, as

regards the suspension of the privilege,but onlyif

andwhen he actswithin the

sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,

and the authority to determine whether or

not he has so acted is vested in the

Judicial Department, which, in this

respect, is, in turn, constitutionally

supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the

function of the Court is merely tocheck —not to supplant

22 — the Executive,or to

ascertain merely whether he had gone

beyond the constitutional limits of his

jurisdiction,not to exercise the power

vested in him or to determine the wisdom

of his act. To be sure, the power of the

Court to determine the validity of the

contested proclamation is far from being

identical to, or even comparable with, its

power over ordinary civil or criminal cases

elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from

inferior courts, in which cases the

appellate court hasall of the powers of the

court of origin.

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the

Solicitor General —

... that judicial inquiry into the

basis of the questioned

proclamation can go no

further than to satisfy theCourtnot that the President's

decision iscorrectand that public

safety was endanger by the

rebellion and justified the

suspension of the writ, but that in

suspending the writ, the President

did not actarbitrarily.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid

suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a)

there must be "invasion, insurrection or

rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2),

section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution

— "imminent danger thereof";

two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all

Communists, whether they belong

to the traditional group or to the

Maoist faction, believe that force

and violence are indispensable to

the attainment of their main andultimate objective, and act in

accordance with such belief,

although they may disagree on the

means to be used at a given time

and in a particular place; and (b)

there is a New People's

Army,other, of course, that the

arm forces of the Republic and

antagonistic thereto. Such New

People's Army is per seproof ofthe existence of a rebellion,

especially considering that its

establishment wasannounced

publiclyby the reorganized CPP.

Such announcement is in the

nature of a public challenge to the

duly constituted authorities and

may be likened to a declaration of

war, sufficient to establish a war

status or a condition of

belligerency, even before the actual

commencement of hostilities.

and (b) public safety must require the

aforementioned suspension. The President

declared in Proclamation No. 889, as

amended, that both conditions are present.

The fact, however, is that the

violence used is some

demonstrations held in Manila in1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize

the bulk of its inhabitants. It

would have been highly

imprudent, therefore, for the

Executive to discard the possibility

of a resort to terrorism, on a much

bigger scale, under the July-

August Plan.

Considering that the President

was in possession of the above

data — except those related to

events that happened after August

21, 1971 — when the Plaza

Miranda bombing took place, the

Court is not prepared to hold that

the Executive had acted arbitrarily

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or gravely abused his discretion

when he then concluded that

public safety and national security

required the suspension of the

privilege of the writ, particularly if

the NPA were to strikesimultaneously with violent

demonstrations staged by the two

hundred forty-five (245) KM

chapters, all over the Philippines,

with the assistance and

cooperation of the dozens of CPP

front organizations, and the

bombing or water mains and

conduits, as well as electric power

plants and installations — apossibility which, no matter how

remote, he was bound to forestall,

and a danger he was under

obligation to anticipate and arrest.

paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of

our Constitution, reading:

The privilege of the writ

of

habeas corpus shall not

be suspended except in

cases of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion,

when the public safety

requires it, in any way of

which events the same

may be suspended

wherever during such

period the necessity for

such suspension shall

exist.

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII

of the same instrument, which provides

that:

The President shall be

commander-in-chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines, and

whenever it becomes necessary, he

may call out such armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless

violence, invasion, insurrection, or

rebellion. In case of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion, or

imminent danger thereof when the

public safety requires it, he may

suspend the privileges of the writ

of

habeas corpus, or place the

Philippines or any part thereof

under martial law.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 162230

April 28, 2010

Del Castillo, J.

Doctrine:

"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution

to the executive and legislative--'the political'--

departments of the government, and the

propriety of what may be done in the exercise

of this political power is not subject to judicialinquiry or decision."

Facts:

Original Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court with an application for

the issuance of a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction

The comfort women have approached the

Executive Department through the DOJ,

DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing

a claim against the Japanese officials and

military officers who ordered the

establishment of the comfort women stations

in the Philippines. However, officials of the

Executive Department declined to assist the

petitioners, and took the position that the

individual claims of the comfort women for

compensation had already been fully satisfied

by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty

between the Philippines and Japan.

Issue:

Can the Supreme Court issue a WPMI to

compel the Executive Department to

espouse the comfort women’s claim

against the Japanese Government?

Held:

No. Political question. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the

Executive Department has the exclusive

prerogative to determine whether to espouse

petitioners claims against Japan.

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political questions refer "to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to

be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to

the legislative or executive branch of thegovernment. It is concerned with issues

dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a

particular measure."

It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the

foreign relations of our government is

committed by the Constitution to the executive

and legislative--'the political'--departments of

the government, and the propriety of what

may be done in the exercise of this politicalpower is not subject to judicial inquiry or

decision."

the Executive Department has already

decided that it is to the best interest of the

country to waive all claims of its nationals for

reparations against Japan in the Treaty of

Peace of 1951.

[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation

in its external relations, and its sole

representative with foreign relations.

The Executive Department has determined

that taking up petitioners cause would be

inimical to our countrys foreign policy

interests, and could disrupt our relations

with Japan, thereby creating serious

implications for stability in this region. For us

to overturn the Executive Departments

determination would mean an assessment ofthe foreign policy judgments by a coordinate

political branch to which authority to make

that judgment has been constitutionally

committed.

Mamba v. Lara

G.R. No. 165109

December 14, 2009

Del Castillo, J.

Doctrine:

even if the issues were political in nature, it

would still come within our powers of review

under the expanded jurisdiction conferred

upon us by Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution, which includes the authority to

determine whether grave abuse of discretion

amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has

been committed by any branch or

instrumentality of the government

Facts:

Petition for Review onCertiorari with prayer

for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of

Preliminary Injunction, under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the April 27,

2004 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing

the Petition for Annulment of Contracts and

Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a

Temporary Restraining Order/Writ ofPreliminary Injunction

theSangguniang Panlalawiganof Cagayan

passed Resolution No. 2001-272[4] authorizing

Governor Edgar R. Lara (Gov. Lara) to engage

the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures

Corporation as financial advisor or consultant

for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund

the priority projects of the governor without

cost and commitment.

theSangguniang Panlalawigan, through

Resolution No. 290-2001,[5] ratified the

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[6] entered

into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures

Corporation.

majority of the members of theSangguniang

Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved

Ordinance No. 19-2002,[8] authorizing the

bond flotation of the provincial government inan amount not to exceed P500 million to fund

the construction and development of the new

Cagayan Town Center.

RTC: the instant case is a political question, a

question which the court cannot, in any

manner, take judicial cognizance.

Issue:

WON decision as to flotation of bonds and

funding of construction and development

of a town center are justiciable issues.

Held:

Yes.

20

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/165109.htm#_ftn11


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Ratio:

A political question is a question of policy,

which is to be decided by the people in their

sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the

executive branch of the government to which

full discretionary authority has beendelegated.

Petitioners put in issue the overpriced

construction of the town center; the grossly

disadvantageous bond flotation; the

irrevocable assignment of the provincial

governments annual regular income,

including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to

cover and secure the payment of the bonds

floated; and the lack of consultation anddiscussion with the community regarding the

proposed project, as well as a proper and

legitimate bidding for the construction of the

town center.

the issues raised in the petition do not refer to

the wisdom but to the legality of the acts

complained of. Thus, we find the instant

controversy within the ambit of judicial

review. Besides, even if the issues were

political in nature, it would still come within

our powers of review under the expanded

jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution, which

includes the authority to determine whether

grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess

or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by

any branch or instrumentality of the

government

Fortun v. Arroyo

G.R. No. 190293, etc.

March 20, 2012

Abad, J.

Doctrine:

although the Constitution reserves to the

Supreme Court the power to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the

proclamation or suspension in a proper

suit, it is implicit that the Court must

allow Congress to exercise its own review

powers, which is automatic rather than

initiated. Only when Congress defaults in

its express duty to defend the Constitution

through such review should the Supreme

Court step in as its final rampart.

Facts:

heavily armed men, believed led by the

ruling Ampatuan family, gunned downand buried under shoveled dirt 57

innocent civilians on a highway in

Maguindanao. Xxx President Arroyo

issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,

declaring a state of emergency in

Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,

and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress

similar lawless violence in Central

Mindanao.

Then President Arroyo issued Presidential

Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law

and suspending the privilege of the writ

ofhabeas corpus in that province except

for identified areas of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front.

Two days later or on December 6, 2009

President Arroyo submitted her report to

Congress in accordance with Section 18,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which

required her, within 48 hours from the

proclamation of martial law or the

suspension of the privilege of the writ

ofhabeas corpus, to submit to that body a

report in person or in writing of her

action.

Congress, in joint session,

Jurisdiction Digest 1

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