Art 838

Roberts vs Leonidas

129 SCRA 33

FACTS:

Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was survived by his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children from a 1st marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his 2nd wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two wills and a codicil for probate in April 1978, and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the lawyers for Maxine and Ethel.

In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement provided that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm’s Philippine estate and that Maxine’s ½ conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her which would not be less than $1.5 million plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa.

Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record. The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside, and that Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of the Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so the partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for lack of merit

ISSUE:

WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss

HELD:

No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

Nepomuceno vs CA

139 SCRA 206

FACTS:

In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the Will, but the legal wife and children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with Nepomuceno. The will’s admission to probate was deemed an idle exercise since based on the face of the will, the invalidity of the intrinsic provisions is evident. The appellate court, however, declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last will and testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?

HELD:

As to the first issue, the court acted within its jurisdiction. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of

the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

On the second issue, as to validity of the disposition to the petitioner:

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith on the part of Nepomuceno:

a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits it’s indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee

b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the testator at the start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived with as a husband, was already married was important. When the court ruled that Jugo and the petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it was a finding that the petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.

The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot

given even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

Cañiza vs CA

268 SCRA 640

Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".

Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza but it was reversed on appeal by the Quezon City RTC. Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that attempt.

It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of

the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Cañiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and

2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).

An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".

By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

On the second issue, as already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Sanchez vs CA

279 SCRA 647

Facts:

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez, Marilyn

Sanchez, Lilian Sanchez, Nenita Sanchez, Susana Sanchez and Felipe Sanchez. Thereafter, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC. MeTC decided in favor of Teria. RTC decision affirmed the RTC. CA dismissed the case and held the proceedings closed and terminated.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred when it deemed the special proceedings closed and terminated?

Held:

No. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the “debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,” had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate’s residue must contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial court’s conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates have already been paid. Thus, the court has essentially finished said proceedings which should be closed and terminated.

Art 839

Coso vs Deza

42 Phil 585

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testator’s will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator’s free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.

Pascual vs Dela Cruz

28 SCRA 421

FACTS:

On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.

Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

ISSUE:

WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.

HELD:

No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.

The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally

seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.

Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la cruzfell short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.

The probate of the will was allowed.

Art 842

De Aparicio vs Paraguya

150 SCRA 279

Facts:

Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost 4 months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized the marriage on March 4, 1942 but Trinidad and Anastacio never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion. As shown by her birth certificate, her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. Soon after reaching the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action for the recovery of certain parcels of land, which she claims to have inherited from Fr. Lumain.

Issue:

Whether or no Consolacion should be considered as Fr. Lumain’s illegitimate child

Ruling:

The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion.

Hipolito contended that the declarations against the legitimacy of Consolacion cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 256 of the Civil Code. However, since Fr. Lumain not only acknowledged Consolacion as his natural daughter but also designated her as his only heir, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion.

Since Fr. Lumain died without any intestate heirs, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

Art 850

Austria vs Reyes

31 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will and testament which was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. However, such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently, upon Basilia’s death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the former’s will. Ruben and the other petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin and that the five private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in fact been adopted by the testator in accordance with law, hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as heirs. The court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court delimited to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the matter of the genuineness of adoption. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower court’s orders restricting their intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

RULING:

Article 850 provides:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will of the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur:

1. The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;2. The cause must be shown to be false; and3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such

institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her will to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

Art 854

Reyes vs Barreto-Datu

19 SCRA 85

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.

When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two will. In the first will, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the second will, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favour of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, husband of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children, it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not a child of Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the Distributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps. The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 which provided that :

“A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been been included, shall be null and void.”

The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the project

of partition.

ISSUE:

WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and that Salud did not acquire title thereto

HELD:

NO. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstance would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of the forced heir.

Where a partition was made between two persons instituted as heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later not to be the testator’s daughter, while the other was really

his daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was a void compromise on the civil status of the person who was not the testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil status of that person was not being questioned. There can be no compromise on a matter that was not an issue. While the law outlaws a compromise over civil status, it does not forbid a settlement by the parties regarding the share that should correspond to the claimant to the hereditary estate.

A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate, which the court may accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree of distribution that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by an opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to his will should be respected. The fact that one of the distributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court issued the decree of distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. The proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It is binding on the distributee who was represented by her mother as guardian.

Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of them did not know that she was not really the child of the testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other heir who was the testator’s daughter. At any rate, relief on the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years from its discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, when the fraud was allegedly perpetrated and she became of age in 1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her action in 1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.

Aznar vs Duncan

17 SCRA 590

Facts:

Edward Christensen’s (citizen of the State of California) will was executed in Manila where it provides that Helen Christensen Garcia receive a payment of P3,600 and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia opposed the project of partition of Edward’s estate claiming that she was deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law.

Issue:

Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law should apply in the case at bar.

Held:

Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of Edward’s will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law.

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides