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June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis
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Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management
J. W. Kamphuis
Queen’s University
Kingston, ON, Canada
K7L 3N6
2009 CSCE-ASCE-ICE Triennial Conference, St John’s
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International scientific consensus agrees thatincreasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases
are leading to global climate change. Possibleconsequences of climate change include rising
temperatures, changing sea levels, and impactson global weather. These changes could have
serious impacts on the world’s organisms and onthe lives of millions of people, especially thoseliving in areas vulnerable to extreme natural
conditions such as flooding and drought.Royal Society, London, UK
Conference Statement
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Some Compelling Evidence
Thank you Susan Torrence, Quilter
☺
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We'll rant and we'll roar like true Newfoundlanders
We'll rant and we'll roar on deck and below
Until we strikes bottom inside the two sunkers
When straight through the channel to Toslow we'll go
Courtesy Great Big Sea
Communicative Intermission☺
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1. Very Large changes in design conditions (sea levels, global weather patterns, higher population concentrations)
2. Very Large changes in design concepts (failure, living with failure, resilience)
3. Very large changes in social context (decision making – participatory democracy)
We Face☺
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1. With some careful thought
2. Discarding some “Accepted” Values
3. With some innovation
But…
We can move forward
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Moving forward with (Coastal) Practice and Education
J. W. Kamphuis
Queen’s University
Kingston, ON, Canada
K7L 3N6
CSCE Meeting St John’s, May 2009
Companion Paper
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1. The System
2. Contemporary Decision Making
3. Failure
4. Resilience
5. Introducing Resilience
6. Moving Forward7. Addenda are not presented; the complete
presentation will be on www.civil.queensu.ca
Outline of this Presentation
NEW ! ?
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1. The System
(Details in Addendum 1)
(As we should design it)
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Hi-Ya !
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Loading - Water Levels, Waves
Resistance - Structures + Environment (PES)
Base of Support - Governments, Economy, Stakeholders (SES)
The System
PES – Physico-Environmental SubsystemSES – Socio-Economic Subsystem
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The system = PES + SESNot just any combination of PES and
SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES
The System
SES
PES+
SES
PES
PES – Physico-Environmental SubsystemSES – Socio-Economic Subsystem
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2. ContemporaryDecision Making
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Contemporary Decision Making
• Contemporary: Based on Democratic Principles; relevant to countries with democratic governance, e.g. Canada, US, EU. There are still many jurisdictions with different (often simpler) rules and processes, based on their particular cultures.
•Decision Making: Can refer to projects that are basically non-engineering (e.g. studies, policy formulation, ICM strategies) or to engineering projects, involving design of works. Emphasis in this presentation will be on the more difficult and controversial engineering design projects.
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Early Decision Making
Project Formulation
Coastal Engineers
Decision Makers
Project Design
Coastal Issue
Coastal Scientists
Implementation
(Used Ad hoc)
All early projects were essentially design projects
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Contemporary Decision Making
Coastal Issue
Judgment
Modelling (uncertainties)
Alternatives
Theoretical and Empirical
Relationships
Solution
ProblemFormulation
Physics
Chemistry
Biology
Geology
Coastal Scientists
OthersApprovals
Socio-EconomicInput from
Stakeholders
Coastal Project Management
Decision Makers Coastal Engineers
Implementation
Monitoring
Interest Groups
Governments
Law
Government
Non-Gov’t Orgs
Citizens
Regulation
Public Input
Knowledge
?????
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Resilience
DefinitionsRequirementsOpportunities
SystemDesign
PES Design
Resilient System
Concepts
Decision Makers (often Government)
Resilient System
Knowledge
-Pre-Design
SES
Public Government Stakeholders
Communication
Design
Contemporary Decision Making
Decision
Engineering Projects
Difficult
Timeline
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ProjectCompletion
Resilient System
Decision Makers (often Government)
Resilient System
-
SES
Public Government Stakeholders
Communication
Contemporary Decision Making
Still Difficult
ProjectDevelopment
ProjectInitiation
Decision
Timeline
Policy Formulation, ICM, etc.
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1. Coastal Project Management is central to success of a project
2. Communication skills are vital.3. Coastal Engineers are not well trained in
communication and usually not very much involved in social issues; therefore they are not properly prepared to take on the whole CPM portfolio.
4. Coastal Managers also are not trained to manage the whole CPM portfolio, particularly technical aspects.
5. So ??? Let’s get this right !
Notes on Coastal Project Management (CPM)
Contemporary Decision Making
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3. Failure
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Here is What Happen
Failure
???
Failure
can,does,may be predicted to
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What to Do ?
Increase the Strength of the PES (Structures)
(Mitigation)
Typical Engineering
Solution
Loading
Resistance (PES)
Base of Support (SES)
Failure
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What Else ?
Rethink “Failure”Live with Failure. This means building
Resilience into the System (PES + SES) (Adaptation)
Loading
Resistance (PES)
Base of Support (SES)
Failure
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We have traditionally defined failure in a narrow probabilistic sense by the limit state equation (as for the structures). When the loading exceeds the structural
resistance (strength) we have Failure Design Criterion: Probability of Failure
(PF) as low as possible
Rethinking FailureFailure
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Rethinking Failure
New Definitions:
•R≤S is not Failure
•Call R≤S “PES Failure”
•(Real) Failure is when SES cannot bear the consequences (damage, $, deaths, etc)
Designing for real failure involves the concept of “Living with (PES) Failure”
Failure
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Involves ResilienceSimple definition: What is the potential of the
system (PES + SES) for recovery from damage after PES Failure?
In practical context resilience is difficult to define. It is regularly defined incorrectly
More in Section 4 “Resilience”
Living with PES FailureFailure
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Along with probability of failure PF , we must now consider the consequence of PES failure
This has introduced a new design criterion: Minimum Risk.
Definition: R = ∑ PF * C
• R = Risk, • C= Consequence of PES Failure
Failure
Risk
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The methodology of designing for minimum risk for a system (consisting of PES + SES), was simply and without much thought transferred from structural design.
It is useful for design of structures where PF and C refer to the same (limited scope) structures.
Risk
Caveats on Risk
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But there are Problems using Risk as a design criterion for a complete system (PES+SES) ; for example:
1. How do you combine $ damage with lives lost?
2. PF is by design; C is mostly by historical evolution e.g. development and population growth in urban areas, often in flood prone areas.
Risk Caveats
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3. PF concerns individuals for whom the consequence of a PES failure is fairly fixed - they want lowest PF; C (and R) concerns the collective (governments, communities). They want the minimum total cost. These are opposing expectations
Risk Caveats
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Caveats on PF
1. PF is a statistical quantity that must be based on an appropriate data base.
2. There is no data base for direct hits by large cyclones and tsunamis at a location.
3. Basing PF for major disasters (but also for
regular designable projects) on 100 years of (quiet) records is wrong – the wrong data base
Resilience
We assume we know all about PF, but do we?
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More caveats on PF
4. Basing PF for major disasters on a synthesized
data base can be dangerous with inappropriate and largely unverified data.
5. Using an inappropriate PF makes any design or
risk analysis meaningless.
6. What is PF for “non-standard” design projects, such as nature reserves, designs involving impact of projects on fauna, etc?
Resilience
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Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its
TOTAL COST = (PES + R)The following points stand out.
Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are
found in Addendum 2)
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When risk (consequence of PES failure) is high (e.g. urban areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a low value of PF.
When risk is small (e.g. rural areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a higher value of PF
For mixed urban/rural areas, minizing the cost of PES failure unfortunately implies lower design values of PF for urban areas and higher values of PF for rural areas.
This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions about resilience, compensation, etc. – why should one group suffer more ?
Minimum Total Cost
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4. Resilience
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Resilience
Hot Topic Indian Ocean Tsunami, New Orleans,
Bangladesh and Burma Cyclones
Simple Definition*: Potential (of the system) to recover from damage
Opposite of fragility: little or no recovery
* Diamond (2005)
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Why Sudden Interest?
Traditionally components of coastal systems have been designed for “suitably low PF”
But PF is often based on dubious or inappropriate statistics
Low PF may not be affordableThus, as recent disasters show, failure, even
for low design PF, does happen.
Resilience
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There are other major concerns: “Secondary” Processes (“negligible”
processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge)
Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development More detail in Addendum 3
Resilience
Other Concerns re Resilience
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5. Introducing Resilience
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There are Three Stages of resilience design Stage 1: Design of a resilient PES Stage 2: Design of resilient government
interface (explained below) Stage 3: Design of a resilient Base of
Support (SES)
Introducing Resilience
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Difficulty
Stage 1 << Stage 2 << Stage 3Usually the only stage considered
Usually not considered – thought to be too difficult
Introducing Resilience
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Stage 1: Resilient PES
Loading
Resistance (PES)
Base of Support (SES)
Resilience, like Rubber
Introducing Resilience
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Translation
Structure does not collapse and can be repairedEcosystem recovers from impacts
Usually the discussion on resilience stops here; resilience is mostly thought of as a technical problem !
Introducing Resilience
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Stage 1: Design of Resilient PES
Traditionally in design of structures the Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) was maximized
This criterion is no longer valid, since environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized
Instead of designing structures we must now design PES (structures + impacts)
Stage 1
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In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client Unfavorable EI is rejected by the
regulators, the public and stakeholders.
Design of PESStage 1
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Designing a PES instead of just structures is a paradigm shift in design philosophy.
Incorporating Resilience in the PES is: A second, necessary shift in design
philosophy Results in more costly structures Carries large additional socio-economic
costs
Design of PESStage 1
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Example:
Resilient PES for New Orleans(Presented in Addendum 4)
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But We Can Do (Much) Better
Introduce resilience throughout the complete system (PES + SES)
Within the SES, we must consider Governments - their powers and provisions – separately from the individuals and the public: Governments are collective; the public
consists of individuals Governments have a different focus from
the rest of BOS (e.g. minimum total cost vs low PF).
Introducing Resilience
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We will think of Government and its services as an interface between the PES and the (rest of) the SES
Introducing Resilience
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Stage 2: Resilient Government Interface
Government Provisions
Introducing Resilience
Loading
Resistance (PES)
Base of Support (SES)
Resilience, e.g. Rubber
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Translation
Resilient Government Provisions (they keep going or recover quickly) Research and Development Advance Warning Systems Laws, Regulations, Zoning and Permitting Communication, Transportation Networks Utilities (electricity, water, sewage, garbage
collection) Rescue, Evacuation and Emergency Provisions
Introducing Resilience
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Stage 3: Resilient BOS
Loading
Resistance (Structure)
Resilient BOS, e.g. Rubber
Introducing Resilience
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Translation
All Stakeholders Have been consulted and involved from the
beginning of the project Understand the project, benefits and impacts Are comfortable with designs and decisions Are aware of risks involved (before design is
completed) All stakeholders are in agreement
Introducing Resilience
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Well… (Perhaps more likely)
Introducing Resilience
We have done our best to inform and discuss with all stakeholders and have been partially successful to obtain agreement. But we can justify our positions in any meetings of stakeholders, regulating bodies and the courts.
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Note on Innate Resilience of the BOS
No-one wants to die or loose everything in a disaster
Most people will attempt anything to improve their dire situation (and hopefully to help others)
Afterward, people want get on with life ASAPIn resilience design, we must fully
incorporate any innate resilience
Introducing Resilience
(Very important but hardly considered)
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Two Examples of the Innate Resilience of the BOS
Red River flood of 1997 (Manitoba) Gov’t officials + farmers + volunteers + army +
contractors, were all resilient
Hurricane Charley, 2004 Peace River Quilters’ Guild of Punta Gorda, FL
Introducing Resilience
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100
km
1997
Red River
Typical Rural/Urban mix
Minimum total Cost means:
Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF
Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF
Tiresome in 2009 !!
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Red River
Thanks to J. Doering
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Reflecting on THE flood
Emerson
Rosenort
Grande Pointe
Ste. Agathe
Thanks to J. Doering
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Z dyke
34 km extension of west dyke
Roughed out in 3 days
Completed in 6 days
Cost: ~7M$
Excavated: 825,000 m3.
381 pieces of equipment
Red River
Thanks to J. Doering
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“Tropical Beauty”
Peace River Quilters Guild’s Response to Hurricane Charley
Shown with thanks to the Peace River Quilters Guild
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6. Moving Forward
With coastal design and management
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1. Learn to make decisions within a cumbersome, complex contemporary decision-making process
Work the process. Improve Coastal Project Management
train coastal engineers to be able to communicate and facilitate discussions; and get them involved in political and social issues
train coastal managers to be able to manage and co-ordinate the whole CM portfolio (including technical aspects)
Moving Forward
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2. Learn to think in terms of (and design) complete coastal systems, consisting of a PES supported by SES.
3. Learn to define and use PF properly
4. If the system can be designed with a “suitably low PF”, agreement and approvals will be easier since all parties are satisfied with this solution. Learn to design and examine this alternative carefully (mitigation).
Moving Forward
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5. PES Failure (exceedence of the design conditions) happens, because often we cannot build to a “suitably low PF” or we do not have a data base to define PF properly; Learn to incorporate PES Failure in design (adaptation)
6. Adaptation means learning to design Resilience into the System.
Moving Forward
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7. Resilience design involves conflicting expectations, for example:
Individuals want low PF while the Collective wants minimum total cost.
Minimum cost involves higher PF in rural areasLearn how to deal with the implications
8. Resilience Design also involves fully incorporating SES and its innate resilience.
9. Learn to incorporate and evaluate consequences of PES failure and re-examine the concepts of Risk and Minimum Cost.
Moving Forward
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Design resilient Physico-Environmental Subsystems (PES)
Facilitate the matching of the resilient PES with the Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES) within the complete system
10. Resilience design is like a coin made up of two (very different) sides. Learn how to:
Moving Forward
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Thank You
This Presentation is posted on:
www.civil.queensu.ca
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Addendum 1
The System
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The SystemEvery design involves a systemEven a small coastal protection project
involves a physical construction that impacts physical processes such as erosion/accretion; biological processes such as fish migration; environmental issues such as water quality socio-economic considerations such as local development (parks, houses, hotels)
Addendum 1 - The System
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Traditionally we designed structures Maximum Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) This paradigm is no longer valid, since
environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized
Instead of designing structures we must now design Physico-Environmental Systems (PES)
Structures + impacts
Addendum 1 - The System
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In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client Unfavorable EI is rejected by the
regulators and the public.Designing a PES instead of just structures is
a paradigm shift in design philosophy.
Addendum 1 - The System
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The system we must design = PES + SESNot just any combination of PES and
SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES
SES
PES
SES
PES
PES – Physico-Environmental SubsystemSES – Socio-Economic Subsystem
Addendum 1 - The System
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Loading - Water Levels, Waves
Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment
Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders)
Addendum 1 - The System
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In modern design, it is not possible to consider design of structures, etc. without including the environmental impacts in the design. This combination of structures and their environment, which essentially go hand-in-hand we will call the Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES).
Addendum 1 - The System
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System = Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES) + Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES)
PES = Structures + Environment (Impact)SES = Public + Government + Economy
SES (mainly permitting)
PES
Small system
SES
PES
Large system
SES (government provisions - transportation, health care, research, permitting, etc. - plus stakeholders and the economy)
Addendum 1 - The System
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System Representation
Addendum 1 - The System
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The system is not just any combination of PES and SES, but SES must form the Base of Support for the PES
SES
PES
SES
PES
Addendum 1 - The System
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Loading - Water Levels, Waves
Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment
Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders)
Addendum 1 - The System
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Addendum 2
Calculation of Minimum Total Cost
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Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its
TOTAL COST = (PES + R)
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are
found in Addendum 2)
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Minimum Total Cost
PF
$, €
PES
Risk
Minimum
TotalCost
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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Minimum Total Cost (Exponential)
Log PF
Log $, €
Risk ~ 1011 ∙ PF
Minimum
PF=2x10-3
TotalCost
10-5 100
1010
10-110-3
107
10-4
106
10-2
108
109
1011
PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0.8
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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This solution results in PF ≈ 2x10-3 at minimum total cost
This PF may be higher than individuals are prepared to accept and will lead to difficult stakeholder negotiations in the decision making process
If the cost of Consequences (or Risk) is very high, it is possible that the marginal cost of providing greater protection is small (relative to Risk)
Minimum Total Cost
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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Minimum Total Cost (Exponential)
Log PF
Log $, €
Minimum
PF=4x10-5
TotalCost
10-5 100
1010
10-110-3
107
10-4
106
10-2
108
109
1011
Risk ~ PF 5
PES ~ 106 ∙ PF -0.8
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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Minimum Total Cost (Exponential)
Log PF
Log $, €
Minimum
PF=4x10-5
TotalCost
10-5 100
1010
10-110-3
107
10-4
106
10-2
108
109
1011
PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0.8
Risk ~ 1000 (1011 ∙ PF
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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These figures point to the easy route through the contemporary decision making process for high risk areas.
Minimum cost results in a low PF ≈ 4x10-5.
This is the traditional engineering solution - “failure” must be prevented at all cost !
This solution satisfies everyone Individuals like the high PF The collective likes the low cost
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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We actually discussed two typical regions The solution with the relatively low cost
consequences is representative of rural areas; the resulting PF is higher
The solution with the relatively high cost consequences is representative of urban areas; the resulting PF is lower.
Consider one (the commonest type of PES failure – Flooding. For minimum total flood management cost, the cost for all elements in the flood plain must be summed.
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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To minimize total Flood Management cost of a mixed area, PF has to vary from high in rural areas to low in urban areas, i.e, flood agricultural land to increase the safety of urban areas.
This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions of resilience, compensation, etc.
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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Note with respect to flood management: High PF in rural areas decreases the urban
PF even more if the rural areas are upstream of the urban areas in a drainage basin!
Politically Correct Decision - Everyone same PF - results in: Raising urban PF, which makes both the urban
individuals and the collective unhappy. Lowering rural PF, which makes the collective
unhappy. Bad decision!
Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost
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Addendum 3
Other Concerns about Resilience
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There are other major concerns: “Secondary Processes” Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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There are other major concerns: “Secondary” Processes (“negligible”
processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge)
Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development More detail in Addendum 3
Resilience
Other Concerns re Resilience
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“Secondary” Processes
They cause p(f) ↑ with time, e.g. p(f)=10-4→10-2
To return to e.g p(f)=10-4 is very costlySince upgrading and maintenance have been
delayed, many systems are now vulnerable
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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Infrastructure Concerns
Much coastal infrastructure has been designed and built over the last 50 years and approaches the end of its useful life.
Much infrastructure was poorly designed and built.
Much infrastructure was built to nebulous and often unrelated standards.
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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Rampant and Unsafe Development
In “developing” countries: Overcrowding pushes the people toward relatively
empty shores (often emptied by recent disasters and therefore vulnerable by definition).
Economic migration from the countryside to overcrowded cities, often located along rivers and estuaries and expanding into flood prone areas.
There is an economic push to develop tourism facilities close to the shores.
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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Rampant and Unsafe DevelopmentIn “developed” countries:
Push by developers - the more area they develop, the more money they earn.
Much of this real estate expansion has taken place in “empty”, but flood-prone areas (e.g. filled-in wetlands), often in cooperation with government agencies who need the money from• Cost sharing to build flood protection works, • Increased income from property taxes.
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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Rampant and Unsafe Development
In “developed” countries (2): Much of this real estate development has
taken place in the attractive and often overcrowded shore zone, leaving many expensive properties exposed to destruction by high water levels and wave action.
Addendum 3 – Other Concerns
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Addendum 4
Design Example:Resilient PES for
New Orleans
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From IPET (2006)
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Den Haag
Arnhem
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
From IPET (2006)
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From IPET (2006)
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Problem 1: The design of a resilient PBS for New Orleans can not be done in some theoretical vacuum.
New Orleans is a living city. The world did not stop moving for its citizens.
Citizens are understandably impatient with the progress made since the disaster. They need shelter, housing, clean water
immediately. They want to move back in quickly. They need aid and relief ASAP and government
agencies are perceived to be too slow. They want all government agencies to cooperate
and provide for them.
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Problem 2: “Hope springs eternal” – San Francisco, Vancouver, Bangladesh, New Orleans, Netherlands
Property owners want to renovate, rebuild immediately in the same vulnerable location
As a result, many building permits have been issued quickly, which leaves little opportunity for proper planning, new layouts, new zoning, etc.
Many (often stop-gap) measures were initiated soon after the disaster to rebuild existing protection leaving little opportunity for new design.
Planning and design after such a disaster aims at a moving target.
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Option 1: Reconstruct PES properlyMake all the necessary corrections and
improvements in design and construction with benefit of hindsight
This would be a gigantic projectIt would be very costlyIt would still result in a brittle or rigid (non-
resilient) system
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Option 2: Resilient New Orleans PES would require all of the above, plus the following: Large mass earthen dikes instead of the vertical
walls Secondary dikes to subdivide flood-prone areas
into smaller sub-basins Networks of interconnected drainage channels
with sufficient pumping capacity to evacuate hurricane rainfall. Pumps should continue to function under all hurricane conditions.
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Direct cost of such a resilient system would be much greater than simple reconstruction.
But, there is also a large socio-economic cost to provision of this resilience, for example: Design and construction will take much longer Large footprints of the larger and more
numerous structures will seriously reduce available real estate area.
Systems of dikes and channels will severely impact the city’s communication/transportation systems
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Yet, all this only refers to the costs of Stage 1 - constructing a resilient PBS.
Appropriate Stage 1 design of PES will take a long time to plan, design and carry out
The citizens don’t have that time.Yet Stage 1 is the only sensible alternative to
haphazard reconstruction of ineffective protection in this vulnerable location.
Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans
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Option 3: Much additional resilience can be gained through contributions from the Socio-Economic System (SES), e.g: Resilient government provisions such as
research, zoning laws, emergency evacuation, health care, social assistance (Stage 2)
Citizens’ awareness and involvement (Stage 3) Agreements on Flood Management Practice on
the lower Mississippi River. (Stage 3)These Stages 2 and 3 will take even much
longer
SES DesignStages 2 and 3
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Addendum 5
Design Example:Red River Flood 1997
Material from Prof J. Doering, U. Manitoba ☺!
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100
km
1997
Red River
Typical Rural/Urban mix
Minimum total Cost means:
Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF
Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF
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Red River Floods
1852 – 165,000 cfs 1826 – 225,000 cfs = 6400 m3 /s
1997 – 162,500 cfs = 4600 m3 /s 1861 – 125,000 cfs
1979 – 106,000 cfs
1950 – 104,000 cfs = 3000 m3
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Flow
(cfs
)
Source: Manitoba Water Resources Branch
1826
19501861
1852 1997
1979
2x Rhine
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1826 – Flooded the Red River Settlement 1950 - Winnipeg flooded 1966, 1979, 1997 – Winnipeg in danger 1950 Flood:
Q= 3000 m3/s 100,000 evacuate, Hospitals evacuate 10,000 homes flooded City Centre submerged 700M$ damage (p.v.)
Red River
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Winnipeg, 1950
Red River
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Winnipeg, 1950
Red River
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Winnipeg, 1950
Red River
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Primary Dykes
Response: Strengthen the structures Primary diking system was constructed
in 1950 by Greater Winnipeg Diking Board
Built to: 15 m width raise to 1950 level + 0.6 m two traffic lanes on dry side
Capacity: ~ 2300 m3/s (= ½ of 1997 flood discharge)
Length: ~ 111 km 31 pumping stations built Cost: 4.6M$
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Subsequent Investigations
Two Investigations Red River Basin Investigation
• 1952 to 1956 Royal Commission on Floods
• 1956 to 1958
• recommendations:– Winnipeg Floodway
– Portage Diversion
– Shellmouth Reservoir
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WinnipegBrandon
PortageDiversion Winnipeg
Floodway
Assiniboine R.
Red
R.
ShellmouthReservoir
The Infrastructure
Recommendations
Winnipeg FloodwayPortage DiversionShellmouth Res.
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Floodway: Cost: 63.2 M$ (1960’s) • 9 m deep • 200 – 300 m wide • 47 km long • Started: Oct ‘62 / Completed: March ‘68 • Excavation: 100,000,000 m3
- 40% of Panama Canal excavation - more than Suez Canal - required most of Manitoba’s equipment
Red River
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Floodway: 2400 m3/s is practical capacity of floodway 1997 Flood (1900 m3/s in floodway) 2300?
Red River
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1997
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6,608,000 sandbags 24/7 cartage of clay for secondary dykes
(360,000 m3) 8,500 armed forces personnel Built 34 km west dyke extension (72 hrs) “countless” volunteers Resilient Population: people + equipment
The 1997 FloodRed River
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Red River
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Red River
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Z dyke
34 km extension of west dyke
Roughed out in 3 days
Completed in 6 days
Cost: ~7M$
Excavated: 825,000 m3.
381 pieces of equipment
Red River
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Ring Dykes
Post 1966 Flood
Ring Dykes: Cost: 2.7M$ Completed: 1972
EmersonLetellierSt. JeanMorris
Brunkild
Dominion City
Rosenort
Ste. Adolphe
Post 1997 Flood
Ring Dykes: Lowe Farm (☻) Rosenfeld (☻) Gretna (☻) Riverside (☻) Ste Agathe (i.p.) Grande Pte (i.p.) Niverville (x) Aubigny (x)
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The area experienced a flood of 7.5 m in 1997; 28,000 people were evacuated and there was $500 Million in damage to property and infrastructure, even with the flood protection measures
Environmental implications were: Water Quality of the Red Sea and Lake Winnipeg Chemicals were released in the floodplain Wells and groundwater were contaminated
The 1997 FloodRed River
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Reflecting on THE flood
Emerson
Rosenort
Grande Pointe
Ste. Agathe
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Winnipeg, 1950
Red River
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The Options after 1997
Source: KGS Group, Nov. 2001
1. Expand the Floodway
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The Options
Source: KGS Group, Nov. 2001
Open except when flow exceeds floodway capacity
Otherwise it is passive (no influence on water levels)
2. Ste. Agathe
Detention Structure
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The Options (Summary)
OptionsLimit to Level of
Protection
P.V. of Cost
[M$]
No. 1 expand floodway raise west dyke raise primary dykesupgrade city flood protection infrastructure
1 in 250 yrs.
(natural)
1 in 700 yrs.
(emergency)
658
No. 2 Ste. Agathe detention structure upgrade city flood protection infrastructure
1 in 1,000 yrs.
543
Source: KGS Group, Nov. 2001
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The best choice is clearly the second option - the Ste Agathe structure because:
Most economical Safest Provides most resilience Minimises Risk (not flooding Winnipeg).
Ideally, parts of both schemes should be implemented for maximum resilience (through (redundance) and least impact upstream.
The economics for this look very good: the total cost of $ 1.2 B for the combination vs the social and economic disruption of flooding Winnipeg (provincial capital – 700,000)
The ChoiceRed River
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The Choice
Yet, Floodway Expansion was Preferred
No legal agreements required (no delays!) No Environmental assessments required Incremental benefits for incremental work Visibility (used 2 out of 3 years vs. 1 in 90 yrs) Could be expanded in the future No upstream flooding This choice obviously made to circumvent a
lengthy decision making/approvals process
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After the 1997 Flood, there was time to do proper pre-engineering and engineering design.
With early involvement of all (particularly rural) stakeholders, starting immediately after the flood, with excellent communication, the combination solution (Ste Agathe dam + Floodway could have been achieved.
Missed OpportunityRed River