JP 3-01.1 Aerospace Defense of North America

4 November 1996

Aerospace Defense ofNorth America

Joint Pub 3-01.1

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides the guidancenecessary to plan, coordinate, and executejoint aerospace defense of North America. Itprovides the doctrinal basis for how jointforces approach the air defense, ballisticmissile defense, and space defense operationsthat support aerospace defense of NorthAmerica.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine for jointoperations and training. It provides militaryguidance for use by the Armed Forces inpreparing their appropriate plans. It is not theintent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, US ElementNORAD, subunified commands, joint taskforces, and subordinate components of thesecommands. These principles and guidancealso may apply when significant forces of oneService are attached to forces of anotherService or when significant forces of oneService support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IJOINT DOCTRINE FOR AEROSPACE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Aerospace Defense Operations.................................................................................. I-1• Aerospace Defense Missions..................................................................................... I-1• Defense Measures..................................................................................................... I-2

CHAPTER IICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, ANDINTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• Command Relationships.......................................................................................... II-1• C4I Requirements and Resources............................................................................. II-3• Intelligence Support and Requirements.................................................................... II-5

CHAPTER IIIAEROSPACE DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Passive Aerospace Defense.................................................................................... III-2• Active Air Defense Operations............................................................................... III-5• Active Ballistic Missile Defense Operations........................................................... III-7• Active Space Defense Operations.......................................................................... III-7• Execution and Integration of Aerospace Defense Operations................................. III-9• Contribution of Other Forces and Support Operations.......................................... III-11

APPENDIX

A References......................................................................................................... A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................. B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-2

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FIGURE

I-1 Aerospace Defense Mission Areas.................................................................. I-2II-1 Principal Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

and Intelligence Assets for Aerospace Defense Operations........................ II-4III-1 Passive Aerospace Versus Active Air Defense............................................ III-3III-2 Contributions of Other Forces and Support Operations............................... III-12

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Describes Joint Doctrine for Aerospace Defense of NorthAmerica

Explains Command, Control, Communications, Computers,and Intelligence Requirements

Outlines Aerospace Defense Operations

The proliferation ofadvanced weapons andtechnology may bringNorth America within thelethal reach of emergingregional military powers.

Overview

The survival and security of North America may depend onthe effective execution of aerospace defense against weaponsof mass destruction and an assortment of conventionalweapons. The principal objective of aerospace defense isthe protection of North America, its people, and othervaluable assets. If deterrence fails, aerospace defense isdesigned to destroy attacking enemy aircraft, missiles, andspace vehicles after they leave the earth’s surface or to nullifyor reduce the effectiveness of such attacks. Aerospace defenseconsists of three mission areas that must operate in union formaximum effectiveness: air defense, which is designed todestroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of attacking enemyaircraft or missiles; ballistic missile defense, which defeatslong-range ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles; andspace defense, which consists of all defensive measuresdesigned to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness ofattacking enemy vehicles while in space. No single missionarea is capable of providing complete protection froma determined aerospace attack against North America and acombination of active and passive defense measures fromall mission areas is required. The basic defense criteria —to detect, classify, track, intercept, and destroy — remain thesame for all three mission areas. Active aerospace defensemeasures consist of direct defensive actions to destroy, nullify,or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air, ballistic missile, andspace systems. Passive aerospace defense measures includenonlethal measures of deception, mobility and dispersion, theuse of systems hardening and protective construction, andinclude integrated tactical warning and attack assessmentfunctions.

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Effective command, control, communications, computers,and intelligence (C4I) systems are required to direct allaerospace defense efforts toward the principal objectiveof defending North America. These systems enablecentralized planning to provide the direction for coordinatedand mutually supporting employment of forces and assets aswell as decentralized execution of the rapidly changingoperations. C4I gives commanders the resources necessary tocontrol forces, plan missions, and coordinate operations. TheNorth American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)is responsible for the aerospace defense (which currentlyincludes air sovereignty, integrated tactical warning and attackassessment, and air defense) of North America and is abinational command composed of Canadian and United Statesforces.

Effective C4I systems for aerospace defense operations,including surface-, air-, and space-based assets, should becapable of rapidly exchanging information as well asdisplaying information of common concern. Theinformation exchange between all levels of command shouldbe redundant and flexible, even when an intermediate levelhas been disabled. These systems include command centers,operations centers, processing centers and systems, datasources, and communications systems. The principal assetsthat exist for aerospace defense operations include CheyenneMountain Operations Center, regional air operations centers,and sector air operations centers. Intelligence is critical tothe planning and execution of aerospace defense and is acontinuous process that provides vital information on enemyactions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Acomplete integration of intelligence throughout the NORADcommand structure ensures responsiveness to operationalneeds.

Aerospace defense will be a top priority mission as long asan enemy has the ability to threaten North America withair, missile, or space systems. Offensive operations will beconducted with aerospace defense operations to terminate anyconflict as early as possible on terms favorable to NorthAmerica.

Command, control,communications,computers, andintelligence (C4I) systemsare integral parts of allthree aerospace defensemission areas.

C4I systems should beflexible enough to allowredirection of certainforces, even whenairborne.

Aerospace defenseoperations should becontinuous and should notbe conducted in isolation.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, andIntelligence Systems

Aerospace Defense Operations

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Executive Summary

Passive aerospace defense enhances the survivability ofpeople and assets by reducing the potential effects of enemyattacks. Some of the primary passive measures include:mobility, maneuvering, and dispersal; system hardening andprotective construction; reconstitution; nuclear, biological, andchemical defense equipment and facilities; redundancy;connectivity of timely alert, warning, and all-clear systems;camouflage, concealment, and deception; and securitymeasures.

Active air defense operations are primarily conductedusing an assortment of weapon systems supported bysecure and highly responsive C4I systems. The activedefense operations (interception, area defense, point defense,combat air patrol, and air escort) of active defense resources(aircraft; surface-to-air weapons; and surface, air, and spaceC4I systems) must be integrated and coordinated in order todefend North America.

Active ballistic missile defense will provide defense ofNorth America and Hawaii against limited ballistic missileattacks by destroying ballistic missiles during flight. Ideally,the preferred method of countering such a threat is to detect,identify, attack, and destroy it prior to launch and, if need be,intercept and destroy missiles once they are launched.

Active space defense represents those actions taken to negateenemy space systems in order to nullify or reduce theeffectiveness of an attack against North America. Spacedefense should focus on detecting, classifying, tracking,intercepting, and destroying enemy space forces andsystems.

The successful execution of aerospace defense of NorthAmerica requires an integrated structure of global warningand surveillance systems, engagement systems, and C4Isystems. All elements are highly interdependent and lossof any element may seriously degrade the overall aerospacedefense capability. The optimum employment of weaponsystems requires early separation of friend and foe to maximizethe engagement as far from North America as possible whileavoiding fratricide.

Aerospace defense requires the use of surface, air, and spaceassets. The successful conduct of these operations requiresthe exploitation and integration of many support systems fromdifferent components. To ensure success, aerospace defenseshould be supported with supplementary systems,

Passive aerospace defense.

Active air defense.

Active ballistic missiledefense.

Active space defense.

Integration of active andpassive defense.

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measures, and operations including air-to-air refueling,surveillance and reconnaissance, and logistics and supportagencies.

This publication provides the guidance necessary to plan,coordinate, and execute joint aerospace defense of NorthAmerica. It provides the doctrinal basis for how joint forcesapproach the air defense, ballistic missile defense, and spacedefense operations that support the Commander in Chief, NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command’s aerospace defenseplan for North America.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IJOINT DOCTRINE FOR AEROSPACE DEFENSE

OF NORTH AMERICA

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1. General

An enduring national security objective isthe survival of the United States as a free andindependent nation with its fundamentalvalues intact and its institutions and peoplesecure. Geographically, North America liesbeyond the military reach of most regionalpowers. However, the proliferation ofadvanced weapons and technology maybring the continent within the lethal reachof emerging regional military powers.These regional powers may be capable ofconducting attacks against North America,which could include the use of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD). The survival andsecurity of North America may depend onthe effective execution of aerospace defenseagainst WMD and an assortment ofconventional weapons.

2. Aerospace DefenseOperations

Deterrence remains one of the fundamentalobjectives of the United States. If deterrencefails, aerospace defense is designed todestroy or nullify attacking enemy aircraftand missiles, and also negate hostile spacesystems. The principal objective of aerospacedefense is the protection of North America,its people, and other valuable assets.

3. Aerospace Defense Missions

As shown in Figure I-1, aerospace defenseconsists of three mission areas that mustoperate in unison for maximum effectiveness:air defense, ballistic missile defense, and spacedefense.

a. Air Defense. Air defense consists ofall defensive measures designed to destroy,nullify or reduce the effectiveness ofattacking enemy aircraft or missiles.Missiles may include ground-, air-, or sea-launched cruise missiles; and ballisticmissiles with range capability less than 3500kilometers. These operations may alsoinclude destruction of airborne missile launchplatforms. Air defense includes both activeand passive measures.

b. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).BMD exists to defeat long-range ground-and sea-launched intercontinental ballisticmissiles attacking North America. Thesemissiles are those with a range capabilitygreater than 3500 kilometers. BMDoperations include all active and passivemeasures designed to detect, classify, track,intercept, and destroy attacking ballisticmissiles, or nullify or reduce the effectivenessof such attacks.

“For it is not profusion of riches or excess of luxury that can influence ourenemies to court or respect us. This can only be effected by fear of ourarms.”

VegetiusDe Re Militari, circa 4th century

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c. Space Defense. Space defenseoperations consist of all defensive measuresdesigned to negate enemy space systems.Space defense operations include both activeand passive measures. Within the contentsof this publication, space defense relates tospace attacks directed against North America.

4. Defense Measures

No single mission area is capable ofproviding complete protection from adetermined aerospace attack against NorthAmerica. A combination of active andpassive defense measures from all mission

areas, integrated and coordinated by arobust and efficient command, control,communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I) system, is required tomeet the stringent performancerequirements demanded for aerospacedefense of North America. The basicdefense criteria — to detect, classify, track,intercept, and destroy — remain the same forall three mission areas. Requirements tomaintain continuous intelligence, globalsurveillance and reconnaissance capabilities,air sovereignty, and readiness trainingoperations ensure control of North America’sborders. Aerospace defense implies a reactive

Figure I-1. Aerospace Defense Mission Areas

AEROSPACE DEFENSE MISSION AREAS

AIR DEFENSE

DESTROYS ATTACKING ENEMYAIRCRAFT OR MISSILES

NULLIFIES OR REDUCES THEEFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ATTACK

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

DEFEATS GROUND- AND SEA-LAUNCHEDINTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILESATTACKING NORTH AMERICA

SPACE DEFENSE

NEGATES ENEMY SPACE SYSTEMS

NULLIFIES OR REDUCES THEEFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ATTACK

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Joint Doctrine for Aerospace Defense of North America

posture that allows the enemy to choose thetime and place of attack. However, aerospacedefense operations should be conducted asfar from North America as possible. Thesituation determines when, where, how, andwhich aerospace defense missions areexecuted.

a. Active Aerospace Defense Measures.Active aerospace defense measures are directdefensive actions taken to destroy, nullify,or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air,ballistic missile, and space systems. Theyinclude integrated tactical warning and attackassessment (ITW/AA) warning reports, andalso such measures as the use of air, surface,and space-based systems to counter theseattacking threats.

b. Passive Aerospace Defense Measures.Passive aerospace defense measures includeall measures other than active aerospacedefense taken to minimize the effectivenessof hostile air, ballistic missile, and spacesystems. These include but are not limitedto such nonlethal measures as deception,mobility and dispersion, ITW/AA functions,and the use of systems hardening andprotective construction.

THE FIRST AIR DEFENSE OPERATION

The history of air defense begins with the use of manned flight for militarypurposes. On June 5, 1783, the Montgolfier brothers, Jacques Etienne andJoseph-Michel, demonstrated the first public ascension of the hot-air balloon"L’Entreprenant." In April 1794 the French Army formed a balloon company.The next month it began reconnaissance operations over Austrian lines.General Jean Baptiste Jourdan, who had approved the formation of the ballooncompany, was impressed with information he received concerning enemymovements. Austrians, confused by this new element in warfare, tookdefensive action on June 13, 1794. They used two seventeen-pound howitzersto fire at the balloons. Although their shooting was ineffective, the Austrianopened the first chapter in the history of air defense.

SOURCE: Schaffel, Kenneth, The Emerging Shield, Office of Air Force History, 1991

Active aerospace defense measures includethe use of air systems to counter attackingthreats.

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CHAPTER IICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS,

AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

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America (currently includes the monitoringof manmade objects in space and thedetection, validation, and warning of attackagainst North America, whether by aircraft,missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutualsupport arrangements with other commands)and aerospace control for North America(currently includes day-to-day surveillanceand control of the aerial approaches to NorthAmerica in order to safeguard the sovereignairspace of both countries and, in times ofcrisis or war, air defense against manned orunmanned air-breathing vehiclesapproaching North America). NORAD is abinational command composed of Canadianand US forces. The Commander in Chief,North American Aerospace DefenseCommand (CINCNORAD), and staff falloutside the authority of unilateral Departmentof Defense action. Matters dealing withNORAD are binationally approved byeither the Canada-US Permanent JointBoard on Defense or the Canada-USMilitary Cooperation Committee. USElement NORAD provides the mechanismthrough which US forces are allocated toNORAD. The Commander, US ElementNORAD (CDRUSELEMNORAD), i sauthorized combatant command (commandauthority) by the President through theUnified Command Plan. Detaileddiscussions on command relationships arefound in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF),” the NORADAgreement, and NORAD Terms of Reference.The following commands, responsibilities,and authorities of various commanders existfor the conduct of binational aerospacedefense operations.

“A failure of C4I in combat may result in overall mission failure; missionfailure is totally unacceptable!”

MAJ GEN Albert J. Edmonds, USAF

1. General

Effective C4I systems are required to directall aerospace defense efforts toward theprincipal objective of defending NorthAmerica. C4I systems are integral parts ofall three aerospace defense mission areas.These systems enable centralized planningand decentralized execution of operations.With centralized planning, the supportedcommander for aerospace defense of NorthAmerica provides the direction forcoordinated and mutually supportingemployment of forces and assets. Supportingand subordinate commanders, withdecentralized execution, provide direction thatis responsive to a rapidly changing threatenv i ronment . C4I systems shouldcontinuously store, process, exchange,display, and forward aerospace defensesituation data to regional ground, naval, andairborne command and control centers as wellas to appropriate weapon systems. Aerospacedefense C4I should be robust and complywith Global Command and Control Systemstandards to ensure interoperability with andamong component forces and also with UScombatant commands. They givecommanders the resources necessary tocontrol forces, plan missions, and coordinateoperations.

2. Command Relationships

The North American Aerospace DefenseCommand (NORAD) is responsible foraerospace defense of North America. TheNORAD Agreement assigns NORADthe missions of aerospace warning for North

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a. Combatant Command (CommandAuthority) (COCOM). COCOM is thenontransferable command authorityestablished by title 10, United States Code,section 164, exercised only by commandersof unified or specified combatant commandsunless otherwise directed by the President orthe Secretary of Defense. Normally,CINCNORAD exercises operationalcontrol over Canadian and US forcesassigned, attached, and made available toNORAD.

b. Operational Control (OPCON).OPCON for the binational employment ofCanadian and US forces is defined as theauthority to direct, coordinate, and controlthe operational activities of assigned andattached forces, and over those forces thatare made available. No permanent changesof station will be made without approval ofthe higher national authority concerned.Temporary reinforcement from one area toanother (including the crossing of theinternational boundary) to meet operationalrequirements will be made within theauthority of commanders having operationalcontrol. OPCON may be delegated to andexercised by commanders at any level whenappropriate. CINCNORAD may directrapid changes in the OPCON of aerospacedefense forces to meet new threats shouldthe situation dictate.

c. Tactical Control (TACON). Rapidchanges of TACON may also be requiredto meet evolving threats and situations.Subordinate commanders must be preparedto transfer TACON between regions evenduring the terminal phases of engagement.Unit commanders should assume TACON andoperate autonomously, consistent withapproved rules of engagement (ROE), ifcommand and control (C2) elements andsystems are destroyed or rendered inoperable.

d. CINCNORAD. The Canadian and USGovernments approve the appointment of

CINCNORAD. CINCNORAD is responsibleto the Canadian government and theNational Command Authorities (NCA) of theUnited States. CINCNORAD and DeputyCINCNORAD will not be from the samecountry. CINCNORAD is normally a UScommander who is also Commander in Chief,US Space Command (USCINCSPACE) andCDRUSELEMNORAD. If CINCNORAD isa Canadian, USCINCSPACE remainsCDRUSELEMNORAD and is a lsodesignated Deputy CINCNORAD.CINCNORAD assigns tasks, designatesobjectives, and issues directives concerningNORAD operational matters to regional andsubordinate NORAD commanders.CINCNORAD also develops and submits plansfor approval to the Chief of the Defense Staff ofCanada and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff of the United States for the deploymentand operational use of all forces, weapons, andequipment assigned, attached, and madeavailable, including augmentation forces.

e. Commander, US Element, NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command.CDRUSELEMNORAD, the senior USofficer assigned to NORAD, exercisesCOCOM over the forces assigned by theSecretary of Defense. If directed b yt h e S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e ,CDRUSELEMNORAD may employ orreallocate US NORAD forces to anothercombatant commander for unilateral USaction.

f. Commander in Chief, US SpaceCommand. USCINCSPACE responsibilitiesinclude:

• Supporting NORAD by providing themissile warning and space surveillancenecessary to fulfill the US commitmentto the NORAD agreement.

• Exercising COCOM over those assignedUS forces that provide warning ofmissile attack on the continental United

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Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems

States (CONUS) and Alaska andwarning and assessment of space attack.

• Conducting space operations byexercising COCOM over assigned spacedefense, space support, and forceenhancement forces, as well as forces thatprovide strategic ballistic missile defensefor the United States.

• Providing integrated tactical warning andattack assessment of space, missile, andair attacks on CONUS and Alaska shouldNORAD be unable to accomplish theassessment mission.

g. US Combatant Commanders. Supportrelationships between CINCNORAD and UScombatant commanders are in accordancewith Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).” Combatant commandersmay be tasked by higher authority toconduct offensive operations in theirrespective areas of responsibility to supportthe aerospace defense of North America.

h. NORAD Regional Commanders.Three NORAD regional commanders areresponsible to CINCNORAD: Commander,Continental NORAD Region; Commander,Canadian NORAD Region; and Commander,Alaskan NORAD Region. They areresponsible to CINCNORAD for all airdefense activities in their respective regions.These regional commanders are the principaladvisors to CINCNORAD. They coordinateon matters of mutual interest and refer mattersof disagreement to CINCNORAD forresolution. Each region’s organization isbased on specific geographic responsibilities.

i. NORAD Sector Commanders. NORADsector commanders, where established, areresponsible to regional commanders for assignedmissions. They provide atmospheric warningto the regional commanders and toCINCNORAD, as well as respond to air attacksin accordance with CINCNORAD tasking.

3. C4I Requirements andResources

Effective C4I systems for aerospacedefense operations — including surface-,air-, and space-based assets — should becapable of rapidly exchanging informationas well as displaying information ofcommon concern. The information flow anddirection should follow the NORAD chain ofcommand and be as robust, survivable,interoperable, secure, and near-real-time aspossible. C4I systems should be flexibleenough to allow redirection of certainforces, even when airborne. The informationexchange between all levels of commandshould be redundant and flexible, even whenan intermediate level has been disabled. Thesesystems include command centers, operationscenters, processing centers and systems, datasources, and communications systems. Thefollowing resources, also shown in FigureII-1, are the principal assets that exist foraerospace defense operations.

a. Cheyenne Mountain OperationsCenter (CMOC). CMOC is the primaryfixed ITW/AA system correlation node. Itallows ITW/AA information to be forwardedto the Canadian National Defense OperationsCenter (NDOC), the US National MilitaryCommand Center (NMCC), NORAD,appropriate commands, and other users.When necessary, the NDOC and NMCC willpass this information to their respectivegovernments.

b. NORAD/USSPACECOM CommandCenter. The NORAD/USSPACECOMCommand Center, located in CMOC, providesCINCNORAD with a consolidated commandand control location to evaluate data fromall sources and make an assessment of thesituation to determine whether or notNorth America is under attack. TheNORAD/USSPACECOM Command Centerdirects all NORAD systems and forces in theconduct of real-time operations for

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CINCNORAD. The NORAD/USSPACECOMCommand Center monitors all sources ofspace surveillance, missile warning, andatmospheric defense activities.

c. Missile Warning Center. Also locatedin CMOC, the Missile Warning Centermanages all ballistic missile tacticalwarning and attack assessment, detection,and reporting systems. Through the use ofdata derived from component commands, theMissile Warning Center ensures that timely,accurate, and unambiguous warning of amissile attack against North America isrelayed to the NORAD/USSPACECOMCommand Center.

d. Air Defense Operations Center. TheAir Defense Operations Center, located inCMOC, collects threat and fightergeneration status information from theregional operations control centers andprovides that information to the NORAD/USSPACECOM Command Center forthreat evaluation and assessment byCINCNORAD. The threat assessment is

PRINCIPAL COMMAND, CONTROL,COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND

INTELLIGENCE ASSETS FOR AEROSPACEDEFENSE OPERATIONS

CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS CENTER

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER

REGIONAL AIR OPERATIONS CENTERS

SECTOR AIR OPERATIONS CENTERS

passed to the Canadian government and theNCA of the United States.

e. Regional Air Operations Centers(RAOCs). NORAD has three RAOCs:CONUS, Canadian, and Alaskan. RAOCs arethe primary command, control,communications, and computers (C4)facilities used by regional commanders toexercise OPCON over assigned forces.RAOCs allow surveillance, identification, andcontrol of aircraft within or near their regions.

f. Sector Air Operations Centers(SAOCs). SAOCs are responsible to theirrespective RAOCs and are the C4 facilitiesused by sector commanders to exerciseOPCON over assigned forces. SAOCs havethe capability to receive, process, anddisplay radar inputs that provide aircraftlocation information. The SAOCs permitthe surveillance and identification of air-breathing threats and control of aircraft.

g. Combined Intelligence Center (CIC).The CIC plays vital roles in the following:

Figure II-1. Principal Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and IntelligenceAssets for Aerospace Defense Operations

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• The missions of CINCNORAD andUSCINCSPACE, including warning, airdefense, ballistic missile defense, ballisticmissile analysis, support to the SingleIntegrated Operation Plan, and treatymonitoring and space operations and

• The missions of the IntelligenceCommunity and other DOD agencies.The CIC is also the primary center withinthe Department of Defense for analysisof foreign space operations.

4. Intelligence Support andRequirements

Intelligence is critical to the planning andexecution of aerospace defense. Effectiveintelligence support begins duringpeacetime. It is a continuous process thatprovides vital information on enemy actions,capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.The survivability of North America and theeffective conduct of aerospace defense

operations require timely collection, analysis,production, and dissemination of reliable andaccurate intelligence information.Continuous information from sensors andsources is needed to provide timely detectionand warning, to reliably identify and assessenemy capabilities and intentions, and to

allow a layered defense to nullify hostileactions. Near-real-time intelligence dataenhances the accurate employment ofaerospace defense forces. The NORAD/USSPACECOM CMOC is the centralizedreceiver of intelligence information and thesingle disseminator of all-source air andspace intelligence for NORAD and itssubordinate commands as required by the USDOD Intelligence Production Program. Thedissemination of relevant intelligence amongUS and Canadian forces, in accordance withestablished policies and procedures, is crucialto effective aerospace defense missions. Thisintegration of intelligence throughout theNORAD command structure ensuresresponsiveness to operational needs.

Current and accurate intelligence is needed in order to provide effectiveresponsiveness.

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THE EMERGING SHIELD - GROWING PAINS IN THE 1950s

In 1954 the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported thedevelopment of a large and sophisticated continental air defense buildup. Airdefense would undergo a technological transformation to match in importancethe development of radar in the late 1930s. However, the automated systemsthat would eventually revolutionize air defense operations were still beingperfected in research laboratories in the early 1950s. For the forces on alert inthe field, computerized systems remained years away. Field forces had tomake the best use of equipment at hand, regardless how inadequate, and hopeto meet the threat if called upon. An incident during the spring of 1952highlighted the problems of the defenses.

On April 16, 1952, Col. Woodbury M. Burgess, General Chidlaw’s intelligencechief at Air Defense Command, received a “troublesome" piece of informationfrom Headquarters USAF. The information, categorized as an “indication,”implied that it came from a clandestine source and concerned Soviet militarymovements. Burgess and his intelligence staff remained in the ADC CombatOperations Center, but by late in the evening they had received no furtherinformation to confirm the warning, so Burgess decided they could go home.Meanwhile, he informed Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, ADC operationsdeputy, of the special intelligence, and the two decided there was no reasonat that time to inform either General Frederic H. Smith, ADC Vice Commander,or General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, ADC Commander, of the incident.

Shortly after midnight, the Western Air Defense Force operations center onHamilton Air Force Base, California, notified Colorado Springs of four vaportrails sighted an hour and twenty-seven minutes earlier over Nunivak Island inthe Bering Sea, heading east by southeast. The information originated at theElmendorf, Alaska, center and was transmitted through McChord Air ForceBase, Washington, which provided the only communications links betweenthe two systems. A captain on duty in the intelligence section on Ent AirForce Base, Colorado received the news and promptly phoned ColonelBurgess, who hurriedly returned to the Combat Operations Center. Once there,he directed that the Royal Canadian Air Force be informed of the sighting; healso notified General Bergquist, who rushed back to the center. Bergquistalso attempted to confirm the sighting with the Alaskan center, but before thecall could be completed, the line between McChord and Elmendorf went dead,leaving all involved “simply exasperated.” Bergquist now phoned GeneralSmith, saying “We have something hot—I think you better come over.”

Smith arrived in the Operations Center and had no sooner begun consideringthe various options when the decision was, in effect, made for him. At 0310the intelligence duty officer came running to Smith with word that “Eastern[Air Defense Force] has just called in and reported five ‘unknowns’ comingin over Presque Island [Maine].” One minute later Smith ordered ADC on fullAir Defense Readiness alert. At the same time, notification went out to theair defense region commanders, to the Strategic Air Command, and to theUSAF Command Post in the Pentagon over hot lines specially installed forsuch emergency situations. Meanwhile, commanders of TAC, Air Researchand Development Command, Air Proving Ground, and Air Training Command,all pledged to commit radar and fighter units in an emergency, were contacted

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by commercial toll calls. Also within fifteen minutes, telephone and teletypelines throughout the aircraft control and warning network were operating, anaccomplishment described as “A miracle of dead-of-night efficiency.” Onfighter bases, the number of aircraft in immediate readiness increased from88 to 240 within the first hour.

. . . General Chidlaw canceled the operation at 0550. Communications had notbeen reestablished with Elmendorf, nor had the mysterious contrails overNunivak been identified. In the east, sightings were narrowed to three“unknowns,” which interceptors identified as friendly. These were French,British, and Pan American airliners that had drifted from their scheduledcourses on flight plans other than those reported to the Presque Isle site. Noone blamed the pilots; they had reported their changes in-flight to Canadianflight-monitor stations. Communications between the stations and ADC’sPresque Isle radar site had failed, and the course changes were not identifiedin the Eastern Air Defense Force’s identification logs.

Later, when the incident could be seen in greater perspective, General Chidlawconcluded that the alert had made “more of our top Air Force people . . .aware of the very thin margin of evidence on which we too frequently mustbase our decisions.” If that thin margin was to be overcome, the nation wouldhave to make a substantial investment in sophisticated technology applicableto air defense systems. Meanwhile, the debate over how much to invest inair defense went on during the Korean War period, not only in Air Forcecouncils but also in specially formed, civilian-led committees and amonginfluential scientists and journalists. Their assessments would be crucial indeciding the future of continental air defense.

SOURCE: Schaffel, Kenneth, The Emerging Shield,Office of Air Force History, 1991

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CHAPTER IIIAEROSPACE DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA

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1. General

Aerospace defense will be a top prioritymission as long as a potential enemy hasthe ability to threaten North America withair, missile, or space weapons. Aerospacedefense operations should be continuous andshould not be conducted in isolation. If thesurvival of North America is threatened, allinstruments of national power will be used tocounter the threat. Offensive operations willbe conducted concurrently with aerospacedefense operations to terminate any conflictas early as possible on terms favorable toNorth America. Appropriate UScommanders of combatant commands(CINCs) conduct these offensive operationsas directed by the NCA.

a. Offensive Operations. Strategic andtheater forces normally conduct offensiveoperations under the command ofappropriate CINCs. They should beconducted at the time and place of ourchoosing to destroy hostile targets as close totheir source as possible. These operationsare directed against enemy weapon systems,weapon launchers, and any supportinfrastructure that may contribute to theenemy’s air, missile, and space capability toattack North America. Offensive operationsdestroy, disrupt or limit enemy air, missile,and space power prior to launch orintercept them while transiting theCINC’s area of responsibility. Attemptsare made to destroy the enemy’s ability tolaunch initial strikes or to re-arm andreconstitute forces for follow-on attacks. Themain goal is to prevent the launch andemployment of enemy air, missile, and space

“We can sleep tonight. The Guards are in front of us.”

Gerald KershThey Die with their Boots Clean, 1941

threats. Otherwise, these threats will besought and attacked wherever found.Destruction of these threats prevents theiremployment against critical assets in NorthAmerica.

b. USCINCSPACE. USCINCSPACEsupports offensive operations by providingsurveillance and warning to the appropriateCINCs. This tactical warning allowsoffensive forces the time for posturing andexecution options. All-source, fusedintelligence provides vital information on theorder of battle, capabilities, intentions, andactions of the enemy. An intelligenceassessment of enemy threats, locations, andcapabilities helps determine offensive targetselection, target priority, and the order inwhich targets are attacked. The vulnerabilityof each target is determined by evaluating itsactive and passive defenses. Targets may beplanned prior to hostilities and kept currentbased on the latest intelligence.

c. Airspace Control. Airspace controlof North America may become verycomplex and saturated during wartime.The timely exchange of information overreliable, interoperable means ofcommunication is needed to effectivelycoordinate, integrate, and deconflict theairspace used for military and civilian airoperations. CINCNORAD will coordinatewith the Canadian government and USnational authorities in the preparation ofplans for airspace surveillance and controlto ensure the development of complementarynational systems capable of being operatedas integral parts of the NORAD structure.CINCNORAD also coordinates with

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appropriate Canadian and US nationalauthorities in the development of policy andbroad plans for the security control of airtraffic, the control of electromagneticradiations, and the control of illumination and,where appropriate, initiation of implementingactions. These plans are also closely tied toplans for the security of friendly civilian airtraffic. These plans provide specific airspacecontrol procedures applicable for definedlocations and periods of time. CINCNORADestablishes the geographic regionalboundaries in which airspace control is to beexercised, and provides priorities andrestrictions regarding the use of the airspace.The main goals are standardizedprocedures, close coordination to deconflictall airspace users, enhancement ofaerospace defense operations, andprotection from enemy attacks. The C4Istructure should be designed to integrate withnational and binational components in orderto be responsive and timely.

d. Friendly or Enemy Identification.Airspace control is a combination of positiveand procedural control intended to effectivelyprovide safe and flexible use of airspace.Accurate and timely identification isneeded to ensure engagement of enemythreats, conservation of resources, andreduction in risk to friendly forces. Positivecontrol relies on positive identification,tracking, and directing of aircraft conductedwith electronic means by an authorizedRAOC or SAOC. Procedural control relieson a combination of airspace controlmeasures which have been previously agreedon and promulgated. Necessary exchangeof information between the air traffic controlfacilities and the airspace users requiresreliable voice and data nets, radar, and activeand passive identification means. Normally,electronic methods provide the most rapid andreliable means of identification and should beused when available.

e. Coordination and Integration ofAirspace Control and Aerospace Defense.Unity of command is imperative toeffectively employ all aerospace defenseforces. CINCNORAD coordinates andintegrates airspace control and aerospacedefense operations, enhances the effort tocontrol the airspace over North America, andprotects people and other valuable assets. Theforces committed to aerospace defense arecomposed of assigned and attached forces andresources under the command and control ofCanada and the United States. Aerospacedefense, air traffic control, and intelligenceoperations should be integrated andmanaged by agencies of Canadian and USGovernments. Accordingly, each elementof the aerospace defense system should beorganized in a manner that enhances closecoordination with the operational activities ofthose agencies. Such planning is especiallycritical when autonomous operations arerequired. Airspace surveillance and controlare expected to continue as functionsimportant to the sovereign control of nationalairspace. Each government should maintaina system to carry out these activities inconjunction with the air defense and aerospacesurveillance and warning operations ofNORAD. Airspace surveillance and controlsystems should be integrated, compatible, andcapable of a high degree of coordination.

2. Passive Aerospace Defense

Passive aerospace defense measures applyto each aerospace defense mission area: airdefense, ballistic missile defense, and spacedefense. As shown in Figure III-1, theyinclude all measures (other than activeaerospace defense measures) taken tominimize the effectiveness of hostile air,missile, or space systems. Passive measuresdo not involve the employment of any lethalweapons, but they enhance survivability ofpeople and assets by reducing the potential

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Aerospace Defense Operations for North America

effects of enemy attacks. They are a defenseagainst those threats that escape active defensemeasures. The effectiveness of passivemeasures may be increased through peacetimeplanning, exercising, training, reliablecommunications, and operations securitypractices. All levels of government, military,and civilian authorities should coordinate andbe responsible for the execution of passivemeasures. CINCNORAD, in coordinationwith appropriate commanders, will developand implement plans and establish proceduresfor early warning of aerospace attack. Withthe approval of the Canadian Governmentand the US NCA, CINCNORAD determines

and announces defense readinessconditions (DEFCONs). CINCNORAD alsoestablishes procedures for advising the US andCanadian Governments, military commands,and the appropriate Canadian and US civildefense authorities regarding DEFCONs.Strategic warning will trigger some passivedefense measures. Warnings are both general(attacks are imminent or underway) and specific(certain units or areas of North America appearto be targeted). Depending on the situation andtime available, a variety of measures can be takento improve the passive defense posture of NorthAmerica. Some of the primary passivemeasures are discussed below.

Figure III-1. Passive Aerospace Versus Active Air Defense

PASSIVE AEROSPACE VERSUS ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

PASSIVE AEROSPACEDEFENSE

MOBILITY, MANEUVERING,AND DISPERSAL

SYSTEM HARDENING ANDPROTECTIVECONSTRUCTION

RECONSTITUTION

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,CHEMICAL DEFENSIVEEQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

REDUNDANCY

CONNECTIVITY OF TIMELYALERT, WARNING, AND ALL -CLEAR SYSTEMS

CAMOUFLAGE,CONCEALMENT, ANDDECEPTION

SECURITY MEASURES

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

AIRCRAFT

SURFACE - TO - AIRWEAPONS

SURFACE, AIR, AND SPACECOMMAND, CONTROL,COMMUNICATIONS,COMPUTERS, ANDINTELLIGENCE

INTERCEPT

AREA DEFENSE

POINT DEFENSE

COMBAT AIR PATROL

AIR ESCORT

TARGETS AND RESOURCES

MISSIONS AND TASKS

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a. Mobility, Maneuvering, and Dispersal.Mobility, maneuvering, and dispersalcomplicate the enemy’s ability to locate andtarget friendly assets. These measures areaccomplished by moving assets out of atarget area before an attack occurs,spreading them out, and then bringingthem together at the time and place of ourchoosing. This makes certain targets lesslucrative and requires the enemy to expendmore resources and time locating validtargets. Initiation of these measures mayrequire strategic and tactical warning.

b. System Hardening and ProtectiveConstruction. Valuable assets and their

shelters are hardened to protect againsthostile attacks and also provide protectionagainst the effects of electromagnetic pulseand transient radiation on electronics.Accordingly, hardening requirements shouldbe considered when developing designspecifications for critical system upgrades orfor new systems. These measures should beaccomplished or begun in peacetime.

c. Reconstitution. This capability providesfor the rapid repair of damages resulting fromenemy attacks and returning damaged units

to a desired level of readiness. Reconstitutionconsists of the reorganization or regenerationof people and equipment to restore combatcapability. This includes the ability to repairvaluable assets such as airfields,communications and warning and surveillancesystems, as well as to restore essential servicessuch as power, water, and fuel supplies.

d. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical(NBC) Defensive Equipment andFacilities. NBC defensive equipment andfacilities provide detection, identification,protection, and decontamination fromweapons of mass destruction. Use ofindividual protective equipment (including

full body ensembles for friendly forces)permits continuation of vital functions andmissions in an NBC environment.

e. Redundancy. This concept allows vitalsystems and capabilities to continueoperations even when certain nodes aredestroyed or damaged. Redundancyincludes dual, contingency, or backupcapabilities that can assume primary missionfunctions, in whole or in part, upon thefailure, degradation, or destruction of theprimary system.

Mobility, maneuvering and dispersal are passive measures of defense.

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f. Connectivity of Timely Alert, Warning,and All-Clear Systems. Connectivity ofavailable communications and sensor systemsis required for transmitting accurate, real-timedata to friendly forces. These systems providemaximum reaction time for friendly forces toseek shelter or take appropriate action againstenemy attacks.

g. Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception(CCD). CCD denies accurate location andtargeting of friendly assets by misleadingand feeding false information to the enemy.It reduces vulnerability of friendly assets bylimiting their exposure to targeting. CCD isconducted over the long term or in responseto warning. CCD operations, routinelyconducted, may deny an enemy vital dataabout friendly forces.

h. Security Measures. Security measuresinclude programs designed to protectinformation from corruption, destruction,or exploitation. Operations security(OPSEC) and information security make upthe two basic elements of security measures.OPSEC is the process of identifying criticalinformation and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions to preclude observation byadversary intelligence systems. This includesdetermining indicators that may provide vitalinformation to an enemy. Effective OPSECdepends on executing measures that eliminateor reduce to an acceptable level thevulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversaryexploitation. Alerting of forces to periods ofadversarial intelligence collection, to includesatellite reconnaissance advanced notice, isone key aspect of successful OPSEC activities.Information security relates to the technicalprotection of information by communicationsand computer security programs.

3. Active Air DefenseOperations

Few nations are capable of threateningNorth America through sustained air and

missile attacks. However, past wars, conflicts,and other military operations havedemonstrated that some regional militarypowers may be willing to threaten and attackthe United States, even though military victorymay seem impossible. In such cases, enemyobjectives may be more political andeconomic than military. Air defense forcesshould counter these attacks and deny theenemy the ability to attain their objectives.Active air defense is direct defensive actiontaken to nullify or reduce the effectivenessof hostile air action against North America.These operations are primarily conductedusing an assortment of weapon systemssupported by secure and highly responsiveC4I systems. Integrated employment of thesesystems, through coordinated detection,identification, tracking, warning, assessment,and engagement of enemy forces, is essentialto blunt enemy attacks and protect friendlyforces and other vital assets. Implementationof positive control or procedural measuresshould ensure that friendly aircraft cansafely transit friendly airspace withoutinhibiting air defense or other friendly airoperations. Electronic, visual, or proceduralmeasures are used by air defense forces toreadily identify air threats in the airspace.Rapid, reliable, and secure means ofidentification are critical to the survival offriendly aircraft and to the effectiveness of airdefense.

a. Active Air Defense Targets andResources. Active air defense is verydynamic and reactive to enemy actions.Specific targets are not easily identified priorto hostilities. When conducting active airdefense missions, the primary enemytargets include aircraft and missiles (sea,land, and air launched). Normally, aircraftand surface-to-air missiles provide thepreponderance of force used to counterenemy targets. Integration of these systemsallows efficient control and exchange ofessential real-time information. All Servicesand binational forces should work in unison

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and provide a mix of dedicated air defenseweapon systems to maximize effectiveness.A multi-layered defense may balance thelimitations of some assets with the advantagesof others. C4I systems and capabilities areneeded for forces planning, situationassessment, posturing, and executingaerospace defense operations. These includeearly warning and surveillance, command andcontrol, sensors and satellites, radars,identification, and dissemination systems.Refer to Joint Pub 3-01.5, “Doctrine for JointTheater Missile Defense,” for detailedinformation on the unique characteristics ofcruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles,and other theater missiles, as well as defensivemeasures used to counter them.

b. Active Air Defense Missions andTasks. Depending on the type of enemysystem attacking North America, active airdefense missions will be executed to achievespecific aerospace defense objectives.Tasked units should have decentralizedexecution authority and be given latitude inthe detailed planning and coordination ofassigned missions. The right to self-defenseis inherent in all mission areas and is normallygoverned by common sense and publishedROE. It allows friendly units to defendthemselves against direct attack or threat ofattack through the use of organic weaponsand electronic warfare. The followingmissions are directly connected to active airdefense operations:

• Intercept. Intercept missions mayinvolve the use of aircraft from groundalert status, combat air patrols, orredirection from other missions.Ground- or air-controlled interceptswill be conducted under close control,broadcast control, or current tacticalcontrol procedures. In the event thatno form of control is available, aircrewsshould be prepared to operateautonomously.

• Area Defense. Area defense missionsare conducted for the defense of abroad area of North America.Specialized applications of area defensemay be used when friendly assets arespread over a large geographic area.

• Point Defense. Point defense missionsare conducted for the protection of alimited area. Normally, they involvedefense of the critical elements of a forceor vital installation such as a commandand control facility, port, or air base.

• Combat Air Patrol. Combat air patrolmissions enable rapid reaction to enemyintrusion and may be positioned wellforward of areas to be defended. Patrolsmay also be conducted over a specific

Because aircraft serve as one of the maindefense forces against attack, they are oftena primary enemy target.

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area, over critical areas of NorthAmerica, or over land, air, and seacorridors. These flights contributedirectly to active air defense operationswhen they intercept and destroy attackingenemy aircraft and missiles before theythreaten North America.

• Air Escort. Air escort missions may beflown to support and to protect suchhigh-value assets as air-to-air refueling,C2, and electronic warfare aircraft fromenemy air and missile threats.

4. Active Ballistic MissileDefense Operations

Long-range ballistic missiles constitutethe principal aerospace threat to NorthAmerica. Active BMD may only provide alimited defense of North America againstballistic missile attacks by destroying ornullifying ballistic missiles during flight.Ideally, the preferred method of counteringsuch a threat is to detect, identify, attack,and destroy it prior to launch. However,BMD forces are reactive in nature. CINCs,if tasked by the NCA, execute appropriateoffensive operations to destroy long-rangeballistic missiles, missile launch platforms,and supporting infrastructure prior to missilelaunch. Active BMD forces should be ableto detect, classify, track, intercept, anddestroy attacking ballistic missiles. ActiveBMD should also have the means for near-real-time kill assessment and rapid damageassessment to determine the need forsubsequent engagements.

a. Active BMD Targets. Active BMDtargets may include long-range ballisticmissiles possessing nuclear, biological, orchemical capabilities. These missiles poseseveral unique problems to BMD forces:extremely high velocities; short time of flight(30-40 minutes); and missile masking bydebris, multiple warheads, atmosphericeffects, and penetration aids. These factors,

coupled with compressed reaction time forattack assessment and for selecting theappropriate response, require highlyautomated systems to support decisionmakers. Accordingly, computers should beused to generate display options to maketargeting decisions more manageable.Additionally, automated battle managementshould be used to assist in characterizing theattack. This should provide launch location,predicted impact point and time, proposeddefensive responses, and feedback onnegating attack forces to adjust responses. Thehuman-in-the-loop is required to commandand control the automated battle manager.The CINC decides when to activate BMDforces and how to respond with theappropriate force.

b. Active BMD Resources. Planning foractive BMD begins during peacetime andfocuses primarily on those nations or rogueelements possessing ballistic missile capabilitiesor actively seeking to develop or purchase suchcapabilities. Under the 1972 Anti-BallisticMissile (ABM) Treaty, the United States islimited to a single, ground-based, antiballisticmissile site. In such a case, fixed-based ABMswould primarily be used to destroy incomingballistic missiles during their late midcourse orterminal phase of trajectory. Midcourse andterminal phase intercepts may reduce warheadeffects and collateral damage; however, damagemay still occur from debris falling on thedefended area. No operational capabilityexists to conduct active BMD and defendNorth America from long-range ballisticmissile attacks.

5. Active Space DefenseOperations

Active space defense represents thoseactions taken to negate enemy space systemsto nullify or reduce the effectiveness of anattack against North America. Spacedefense should focus on detecting,identifying, tracking, and negating enemy

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space systems supporting attacks on thecontinent of North America. No operationalcapability exists to conduct active spacedefense operations; the ability to destroypossible threats from space is limited toattacks against ground-based support andlaunch infrastructures. Other CINCs willconduct these coordinated offensive missionsin support of aerospace defense.

a. Active Space Defense Targets andResources. No known operational space-based weapon systems exist that can attackNorth America. The principal threat fromspace comes from systems such as C4I,navigation, weather, surveillance, andreconnaissance satellites. These systems areused mostly to enhance enemy operations byproviding effective support throughout the

THE U-2 “MILK RUN”

Events in the Caribbean took a dramatic turn on 14 October 1962, whenAmerican aircraft resumed flights over Cuba rather than around the island’speriphery. For the first time, US Air Force U-2s were involved. Major RichardS. Heyser, one of the only two Air Force pilots checked out on the CIA-modified U-2, took off from Edwards Air Force Base, California, flew overwestern Cuba, and landed at McCoy Air Force Base, Florida. Havingencountered no MIGs or SAM activity over the communist island, when themajor landed he described the mission as “a milk run.”

Ground crews removed the film from his aerial camera and put it on a planebound for Washington. Navy specialists processed the film and the followingday took it to the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) foranalysis.

In the afternoon, following many hours of close scrutiny, members of the joint-Service and CIA team made a discovery that immediately turned the routine“milk run” mission into an intelligence coup. The photo interpreters discovereda new missile site meant for Soviet SS-4 MRBMs — offensive weapons capableof incinerating American cities and the people in them. Art Lundahl, NPICsdirector, passed the information to his superiors at CIA headquarters, who inturn alerted National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. He immediatelyarranged a meeting with the President at the White House for the next morning,16 October 1962.

Beginning just before noon, Lundahl briefed the President and his chief nationalsecurity advisors. He used the photos to identify and describe the MRBM sitelocated two days before. Based on additional analysis completed by the photointerpreters the night before, Lundahl also pointed out another MRBM siteand another installation whose weapons could not yet be determined.President Kennedy listened to the presentation calmly. But according to ArmyGeneral Maxwell D. Taylor, only recently appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the President displayed a “rather deep but controlled anger at theduplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to deceive him.” The CubanMissile Crisis had begun in earnest.

SOURCE: Utz, Curtis A., Cordon of Steel: The USN and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Naval Historical Center, 1993

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range of military operations. They also givethe enemy increased responsiveness tooperational requirements.

b. Active Space Defense Missions andTasks. To the extent an ABM system is usedto destroy space-based weapons, there couldbe ABM Treaty compliance issues. However,there are currently no specific treatyprohibitions against anti-satellite weapons.Possible mission areas for active space defensecould include area and point defense. Thesemission areas could be conducted usingsurface-, air-, or space-based weapon systems.

6. Execution and Integration ofAerospace DefenseOperations

The successful execution of aerospacedefense of North America requires anintegrated structure of global warning andsurveillance systems, engagement systems(e.g., missiles, aircraft), and C4I systems.All elements are highly interdependent andloss of any element may seriously degradethe overall aerospace defense capability. Allunits should be prepared to defend againstenemy attack using organic weapons andpassive measures. Joint and binational forcesshould integrate all aerospace defense efforts.CINCNORAD assigns tasks, designatesobjectives, and issues directives concerningNORAD operational matters. Execution ofaerospace defense operations requires astrategic surveillance and tactical warningsystem capable of near-real-time productionand dissemination of tracking data necessaryfor the effective engagement of targets. Trackproduction is a sequential process that beginswith the surveillance function. As a track isdetected, friendly forces should identify andlabel it and distribute the information asrapidly as possible. The track data should besufficiently detailed and timely to permit theappropriate commanders to evaluate the track,determine the significance of the threat, andeither designate forces for engagement, advise

units of the passage of friendly aircraft, oradvise units of incoming threats. Once anintercept has occurred, a damage assessmentshould be made to determine if the threat wasdestroyed or if further engagements areneeded. The timely engagement of anythreat requires the establishment andunderstanding of published ROE. Unlessalready established by US and CanadianGovernments or an existing plan,CINCNORAD is responsible for establishingand implementing these rules. Regionalcommanders, sector commanders, and otherNORAD supporting commanders ensurecompliance with the established ROE. Theoptimum employment of weapon systemsrequires early separation of friend and foe tomaximize the engagement as far from NorthAmerica as possible while avoiding fratricide.

a. Aerospace Defense Weapons Control.Weapon systems should be capable ofautonomous operations if positive controlfails or is not available. In the absence ofpositive control, procedural means are usedto permit the safe passage of friendly aircraftand the effective use of aerospace defenseweapons. Integration, coordination, andairspace defense procedures are needed toenhance the synergistic capabilities of thevarious defense weapon systems. Weaponcontrol zones include fighter engagementzones and missile engagement zones. Thesezones are defined as dimensions of airspacein which the responsibility for engagementrests with a particular weapon system. Theideal aim of weapon control zones, basedon target signature technology, is to havea joint engagement zone where all surface,air, and space defense systems can beemployed and operated simultaneously inthe same airspace. The target signaturetechnologies should allow for theidentification of all airborne targets: friendly,neutral, and hostile. Targets positivelyidentified as hostile will be engaged. Thisshould reduce fratricide and relax stringentairspace control procedures. ROE should also

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be simplified, giving air defense systems theflexibility to operate beyond the currentconstraints of procedural control measures.

b. Aerospace Defense Weapons Employment.Aerospace defense weapon systems andforces are composed of many diverseelements. They perform a variety of tasks toaccomplish a common mission through asingle, integrated system. Each weaponsystem should be controlled and employed ina manner that makes best use of its inherentcapabilities. The engagement process shouldbe continuous. Aerospace defense shouldprovide a multi-layered defense to interceptintruding enemy threats as early aspossible, as far forward as feasible, and asmany times as needed to ensure attritionof the threats. The lethality of some weapons(NBC and high-yield conventional weapons)dictates the need to prevent these deadlyweapons from detonating on or over NorthAmerica. Early warning of enemy attack isvital to obtaining a layered defense.Appropriate weapon systems will be deployedto the periphery of the continent to deter, toprovide ITW/AA, and to form a layereddefense against air-breathing threats to NorthAmerica. Effective defense depends onenhanced surveillance and detectioncapabilities. Providing timely informationon threat parameters and target data tosystems capable of attacking and destroyinghostile threats will also enhance aerospacedefense. This layered defense should becapable of passing threats from oneengagement system, region, or sector toanother while preventing fratricide and lossof the detected threat from the trackingsystem. Available weapons should beassigned to inbound threats before anyassignment to outbound threats. Weaponsystems should be employed as follows:

• Aircraft. Missions may be assigned orcommitted in response to the detectionand assessment of a hostile, potentiallyhostile, or unknown target. When

possible, aircraft will remain under thecontrol of the initiating control agency,although this control may be transferredto adjacent regions or sectors if required.

• Surface-to-Air Weapons. Theeffectiveness of surface-to-air weaponsdepends on a highly reliable, automatedballistic missile C4I and an adequateidentification process to precludeengagement of friendly aircraft andunnecessary expenditure of aerospacedefense resources. Weapons controlstatus (weapons free, weapons tight, andweapons hold), weapon engagementzones, and ROE are used to controlsurface-to-air engagements. Availablesurface-to-air defense assets areincorporated in the overall defenseplan and subjected to the integratedprocedures and weapons controlmeasures of CINCNORAD. It isnormally difficult to centrally control allshort-range air defense units; somecontrol should be available through ROEand procedures established byCINCNORAD. However, no ROE orprocedure should deny the right of self-defense to any defensive force or system.Surface-to-air weapons are employedeither in area or point defenseoperations. These weapons potentiallyoffer large amounts of firepower andinstant responsiveness. Throughintegration, the surface-to-air systemsachieve mutual support and provide themost effective coverage. Coordinationshould ensure the minimum risk tofriendly aircraft and the means todeconflict surface-to-air weapons andother defense weapons.

• Space-based Weapons. There are nooperational space-based weapons.Space-based weapons capable ofcountering long-range ballistic missilesare banned by the ABM Treaty. USability to effectively employ defensive

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weapons against possible space threatsis limited. Space-based systems continueto function primarily to enhance all otheraerospace defense operations.

• Surface, Air, and Space C4I Systems.C4I systems should integrate andcoordinate all aerospace defense missionareas and link their active and passiveoperations. Commanders apply C4Isystems to plan, coordinate, anddeconflict integrated aerospacedefense operations, to detect andassess threats, and to employ theappropriate forces to defeat thethreats. C4I allows implementation anddirection of these forces to execute activeair, ballistic missile, and space defense.These systems also permit effectivepassive defense by assessing the attacksdirecting suitable defensive measuresand disseminate timely warning andattack operations targeting informationto affected CINCs and joint forcecommanders. They allow the timelytransmission of guidance, direction, andapplication of weapon systems in acritical, time-sensitive environment. C4Isystems should provide characterizationof an attack to include launch location,predicted impact point and time, andproposed response based on the attackcharacterization. They should alsoprovide near-real-time feedback on thenegation of attacking forces toappropriately adjust responses.

7. Contribution of Other Forcesand Support Operations

Aerospace defense requires the use ofsurface, air, and space assets. The capabilitiesand limitations of different systems aregoverned by such factors as range, payload,weapons carriage, night, all-weathercapability, self-defense capability, and crewqualification. However, planning foraerospace defense operations should not be

limited to those primary systems used tointercept and destroy hostile weapons. Thesuccessful conduct of these operationsrequires the exploitation and integrationof many support systems from differentcomponents. Operational procedures,equipment compatibility, and C2 architectureshould be exercised and standardized amongthe binational forces and Services. As shownin Figure III-2, to ensure success, aerospacedefense should be supported withsupplementary systems, measures, andoperations.

a. Air-to-Air Refueling. Air-to-airrefueling enables aircraft to extend theirrange and endurance. This allows aircraftto intercept enemy threats at greater rangesfrom North America, in greater numbers, withhigher weapons loads, and for extendedperiods of time.

b. Surveillance and Reconnaissance.Surveillance and reconnaissance capabilitiesplay a critical role in the planning andexecution of aerospace defense operations.Collected information, when analyzed,provides overall situational awareness, helpscommanders identify and assess enemyattacks, helps formulate objectives, andsupports friendly forces. Surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities collectinformation that feeds and sustains theexecution of aerospace defense byproviding timely surface-, air-, and space-focused information and weather data tocombat planners and combat operations.Air- and space-based surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities are required foraccurate, real-time, and tailored intelligencenecessary to apply aerospace defense assetseffectively.

c. Logistics and Support Agencies.Military power achieves its full potential whenoperations and logistics harmonize tomaximize mission effectiveness. Logisticsand support are vital to maintain and

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CONTRIBUTIONS OFOTHER FORCES AND

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

KEY AREAS INCLUDE:

Air-to-Air Refueling

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Logistics and Support Agencies

sustain any successful aerospace defenseoperation and should be integral to theplanning process at all levels. Commandersshould consider all aspects of requiredsupport, including such elements asmaintenance planning; manpower andpersonnel; supply support; supportequipment; technical data; security; training;computer resources; facilities; packaging,handling, storage, and transportation; anddesign interface.

Figure III-2. Contributions of Other Forcesand Support Operations

APPENDIX AREFERENCES

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The development of Joint Pub 3-01.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

2. Joint Pub 1-01, Change 1, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”

3. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

4. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

5. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.” (In Development)

6. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

7. Joint Pub 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats." (InDevelopment)

8. Joint Pub 3-01.2, “Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.”

10. Joint Pub 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for SpaceOperations.” (In Development)

11. Joint Pub 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations.”

12. Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

13. Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

14. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers(C4) Systems to Joint Operations.”

15. AFM 1-1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.”

16. ATP-42, “Counter Air Operations.”

17. ACCR 2-1, “Air Operations.”

18. Air Force Theater Missile Defense Concept of Operations, revision, January 1993.

19. Air Force Concept for Theater C4I.

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20. JFACC Primer.

21. National Security Strategy.

22. 1991 NORAD Agreement and NORAD Terms of Reference.

23. 1993 NORAD C4 Systems Master Plan. (SECRET)

24. NORAD Strategy Review Final Report, July 1992. (SECRET)

25. NORAD/USSPACECOM Ballistic Missile Defense Concept of Operations, Vol. II, 20December 1993. (SECRET)

26. NORAD/USSPACECOM Ballistic Missile Defense Concept of Operations, Vol. III,20 December 1993. (SECRET)

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrinesponsor for this publication is the Director, J-7, Joint Staff.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXD//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-01.1

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ABM antiballistic missile

BMD ballistic missile defense

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCCD camouflage, concealment, and deceptionCDRUSELEMNORAD Commander, United States Element, North American

Aerospace Defense CommandCIC Combined Intelligence CenterCINC commander of a combatant commandCINCNORAD Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense

CommandCMOC Cheyenne Mountain Operations CenterCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONUS continental United States

DEFCON defense readiness condition

ITW/AA integrated tactical warning/attack assessment

JFC joint force commanderJTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNDOC National Defense Operations CenterNMCC National Military Command CenterNORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OPCON operational controlOPSEC operations security

RAOC regional air operations centerROE rules of engagement

SAOC sector air operations center

TACON tactical control

USCINCSPACE Commander in Chief, United States Space Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

active air defense. Direct defensive actiontaken to destroy, nullify, or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air action. Itincludes the use of aircraft, air defenseweapons, electronic warfare, and otheravailable weapons not primarily used inan air defense role. See also air defense.(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02 by Joint Pub 3-01.)

active defense. The employment of limitedoffensive action and counterattacks to denya contested area or position to the enemy.See also passive defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)

aerospace. Of, or pertaining to, Earth’senvelope of atmosphere and the spaceabove it; two separate entities consideredas a single realm for activity in launching,guidance, and control of vehicles that willtravel in both entities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

aerospace control operations. Theemployment of air forces, supported byground and naval forces, as appropriate, toachieve military objectives in vitalaerospace areas. Such operations includedestruction of enemy aerospace andsurface-to-air forces, interdiction of enemyaerospace operations, protection of vital airlines of communication, and theestablishment of local military superiorityin areas of air operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

aerospace defense. 1. All defensivemeasures designed to destroy or nullifyattacking enemy aircraft and missiles andalso negate hostile space systems. 2. Aninclusive term encompassing air defense,ballistic missile defense, and space defense.(This term and its definition modifies theexisting term and its definition and isapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

air defense. All defensive measures designedto destroy, nullify, or reduce theeffectiveness of attacking enemy aircraftor missiles. See also active air defense;aerospace defense; passive air defense.(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02 by Joint Pub 3-01.)

air defense action area. An area and theairspace above it within which friendlyaircraft or surface-to-air weapons arenormally given precedence in operationsexcept under specified conditions. Also seeair defense operations area. (Joint Pub1-02)

air defense area. 1. overseas — Aspecifically defined airspace for which airdefense must be planned and provided. 2.United States — Airspace of defineddimensions designated by the appropriateagency within which the ready control ofairborne vehicles is required in the interestof national security during an air defenseemergency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense artillery. Weapons andequipment for actively combating air targetsfrom the ground. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense battle zone. A volume of airspacesurrounding an air defense fire unit ordefended area, extending to a specifiedaltitude and range, in which the fire unitcommander will engage and destroy targetsnot identified as friendly under criteriaestablished by higher headquarters. (JointPub 1-02)

air defense control center. The principalinformation, communications, andoperations center from which all aircraft,antiaircraft operations, air defense artillery,guided missiles, and air warning functions

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-2 Joint Pub 3-01.1

of a specific area of air defenseresponsibility are supervised andcoordinated. Also called air defenseoperations center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense division. A geographicsubdivision of an air defense region. Alsosee air defense sector. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense emergency. An emergencycondition, declared by the Commander inChief, North American Aerospace DefenseCommand, that exists when attack upon thecontinental United States, Alaska, Canada,or United States installations; in Greenlandby hostile aircraft or missiles is consideredprobable, is imminent, or is taking place.(Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense identification zone. Airspace ofdefined dimensions within which the readyidentification, location, and control ofairborne vehicles are required. Also calledADIZ. Also see air defense operations area.(Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense operations area. An area andthe airspace above it within whichprocedures are established to minimizemutual interference between air defense andother operations; it may include designationof one or more of the following: air defenseaction area, air defense area; air defenseidentification zone, and/or firepowerumbrella. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense region. A geographicalsubdivision of an air defense area. (JointPub 1-02)

air defense sector. A geographicalsubdivision of an air defense region. Alsosee air defense division. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air sovereignty. A nation’s inherent right toexercise absolute control and authority overthe airspace above its territory. Also see airsovereignty mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air sovereignty mission. The integratedtasks of surveillance and control, theexecution of which enforces a nation’sauthority over its territorial airspace. Alsosee air sovereignty. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airspace control in the combat zone. Aprocess used to increase combateffectiveness by promoting the safe,efficient, and flexible use of airspace.Airspace control is provided in order toprevent fratricide, enhance air defenseoperations, and permit greater flexibility ofoperations. Airspace control does notinfringe on the authority vested incommanders to approve, disapprove, ordeny combat operations. Also calledcombat airspace control; airspace control.(Joint Pub 1-02)

airspace control sector. A subelement of theairspace control area, established tofacilitate the control of the overall area.Airspace control sector boundariesnormally coincide with air defenseorganization subdivision boundaries.Airspace control sectors are designated inaccordance with procedures and guidancecontained in the airspace control plan inconsideration of Service component, hostnation, and allied airspace controlcapabilities and requirements. (Joint Pub1-02)

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, andcommunications capability to plan andexecute integrated air defense operations.Representation from the other componentsinvolved will be provided, as appropriate,to the area air defense commander’s

GL-3

Glossary

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-01.1

headquarters. Also called AADC. (JointPub 1-02)

autonomous operation. In air defense, themode of operation assumed by a unit afterit has lost all communications with higherechelons. The unit commander assumes fullresponsibility for control of weapons andengagement of hostile targets. (Joint Pub1-02)

boost phase. That portion of the flight of aballistic missile or space vehicle duringwhich the booster and sustainer enginesoperate. Also see midcourse phase; reentryphase; terminal phase. (Joint Pub 1-02)

broadcast-controlled air interception. Aninterception in which the interceptor isgiven a continuous broadcast of informationconcerning an enemy raid and effectsinterception without further control. (JointPub 1-02)

centralized control. In air defense, the controlmode whereby a higher echelon makes directtarget assignments to fire units. See alsodecentralized control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

close-controlled air interception. Aninterception in which the interceptor iscontinuously controlled to a position fromwhich the target is within visual range orradar contact. (Joint Pub 1-02)

decentralized control. In air defense, thenormal mode whereby a higher echelonmonitors unit actions, making direct targetassignments to units only when necessary toensure proper fire distribution or to preventengagement of friendly aircraft. See alsocentralized control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

midcourse phase. That portion of thetrajectory of a ballistic missile between theboost phase and the reentry phase. Alsosee boost phase; reentry phase; terminalphase. (Joint Pub 1-02)

passive air defense. All measures, other thanactive air defense, taken to minimize theeffectiveness of hostile air action. Thesemeasures include camouflage, deception,dispersion, and the use of protectiveconstruction. See also aerospace defense.(Joint Pub 1-02)

passive defense. Measures taken to reducethe probability of and to minimize theeffects of damage caused by hostile actionwithout the intention of taking theinitiative. See also active defense. (JointPub 1-02)

point defense. The defense or protection ofspecial vital elements and installations; e.g.,command and control facilities, air bases.(Joint Pub 1-02)

positive control. A method of airspacecontrol which relies on positiveidentification, tracking, and direction ofaircraft within an airspace, conducted withelectronic means by an agency having theauthority and responsibility therein. (JointPub 1-02)

reentry phase. That portion of the trajectoryof a ballistic missile or space vehicle wherethere is a significant interaction of thevehicle and the Earth’s atmosphere. Alsosee boost phase; midcourse phase; terminalphase. (Joint Pub 1-02)

space defense. All defensive measuresdesigned to destroy attacking enemyvehicles (including missiles) while in space,or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness ofsuch attack. See also aerospace defense.(Joint Pub 1-02)

terminal phase. That portion of the trajectoryof a ballistic missile between reentry into theatmosphere or the end of the mid-course phaseand impact or arrival in the vicinity of thetarget. Also see boost phase; midcourse phase;reentry phase. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

weapon engagement zone. In air defense,airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement ofair threats normally rests with a particularweapon system. Also called WEZ. a.fighter engagement zone. In air defense,that airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement ofair threats normally rests with fighteraircraft. Also called FEZ. b. high-altitudemissile engagement zone. In air defense,that airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement ofair threats normally rests with high-altitudesurface-to-air missiles. Also calledHIMEZ. c. low-altitude missileengagement zone. In air defense, thatairspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagement ofair threats normally rests with low- tomedium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.Also called LOMEZ. d. short-range airdefense engagement zone. In air defense,that airspace of defined dimensions withinwhich the responsibility for engagementof air threats normally rests with short-range air defense weapons. It may beestablished within a low- or high-altitudemissile engagement zone. Also calledSHORADEZ. e. joint engagement zone.In air defense, that airspace of defineddimensions within which multiple air

defense systems (surface-to-air missiles andaircraft) are simultaneously employed toengage air threats. Also called JEZ. (JointPub 1-02)

weapons assignment. In air defense, theprocess by which weapons are assigned toindividual air weapons controllers for usein accomplishing an assigned mission.(Joint Pub 1-02)

weapons free. In air defense, a weaponcontrol order imposing a status wherebyweapons systems may be fired at any targetnot positively recognized as friendly. Seealso weapons hold; weapons tight. (JointPub 1-02)

weapons hold. In air defense, a weaponcontrol order imposing a status wherebyweapons systems may only be fired in self-defense or in response to a formal order.See also weapons free; weapons tight.(Joint Pub 1-02)

weapons tight. In air defense, a weaponcontrol order imposing a status wherebyweapons systems may be fired only attargets recognized as hostile. See alsoweapons free; weapons hold. (JointPub 1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-01.1

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Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-01.1 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

JP 3-01.1 Aerospace Defense of North America

Documents

Transcript of JP 3-01.1 Aerospace Defense of North America